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JANUARY, 1850.

ARTICLE I.

THE SPIRIT OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

By TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., Prof of the Greek Language and Literature, Union College,
Schenectady.

It is commonly maintained that the Old Testament, in comparison with the New, and even when regarded in respect to its own intrinsic merits, is deficient in tenderness, in inward as distinguished from outward moral power, and, in a word, in what is commonly denoted by the term *spirituality*. Such an idea is not exclusively peculiar to the rationalizing, or the neological, interpreter. It may be often traced in the sermons of preachers who are styled evangelical, and in the writings of commentators who are supposed to hold the plenary inspiration of all parts of the acknowledged Word of God. Even by divines reputed orthodox, is it sometimes held, that in this Older Scripture there are actually wanting some of the fundamental truths of salvation. It is maintained that that there is to be found therein no trace, or but the faintest trace, of views, without which the lowest form of any thing like spiritual religion would seem to be an impossibility,—without which the devotions and devotional writings of God's chosen people must be regarded as falling, in this respect, below the known standard of heathen and classical pietism.

Many, too, within the reputed pale of evangelical Christendom, appear to be taking a step even in advance of these opinions so perilous to all solid and healthy faith in Scriptural inspiration. The sentiment is growing more and more in our churches, (and it would seem to be one of the most noticeable signs of the times,) that the Old Testament is rapidly becoming, if it has not already become, obsolete in respect to us and our age,—that for the present Christian church it possesses chiefly an antiquarian value,—that its teachings are, in great measure, if not wholly, super-

seded by the higher and purer instructions of the new dispensation—nay more, that they are actually at war, and, in some very important respects too, with what is called the genius and spirit of the gospel.

How all this is to be reconciled with any consistent belief that the Old Testament writings are verily included in what Paul denominates *γραφὴ θεόπνευστος*—*Scripture given by the inspiration, or inbreathing of God*,—it would indeed be hard to determine. It would be equally, if not more, difficult, to maintain its consistency with the solemn reverence our divine Saviour ever manifested for the books of the Jewish canon,—his constant appeals to the certainty of their predictions,—his implicit faith in *Holy Scripture*, *ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς ταῖς ἀγίαις*, as something “which could not be broken,” and which contained the evidence or credentials of his own divine mission,—his deep sense of the spiritual richness of that ancient law, the least jot or tittle of which was to survive the dissolution of the heavens and the earth,—his apparently sincere and unsuspecting trust in the accuracy of their historical and supernatural narrations, whenever referred to in illustration of his own didactic warnings,—his continual accommodation of their devotional parts to his own spiritual wants, and this too, not merely in public, by way of condescension, as it might be said, to the national prejudices, but in all the honesty and truthfulness of his most private exercises whether of conflict or of triumph,—his liturgical use of the Psalms, even of passages standing, sometimes, in immediate connection with others for which our more rational commentators, in their higher spirituality, would deem it necessary to apologise, on the ground of their belonging to an obsolete and less spiritual worship,—his righteous zeal for the purity of the ancient law, and for the maintenance of its primitive simplicity and integrity in opposition to the perverse traditions of the Jews,—and, to sum up all, the high honor he delighted to confer upon the Old Testament by ever citing it in proof of his own doctrines, as the *lex scripta* that formed the immutable ground of his own instructions, as the firm support of his own faith in the dark hour of conflict and temptation, as the medium of his soul’s utterance in the agonies of the garden and the cross,—to reconcile this, we say, with the anti-evangelical theories of the Old Testament, would require a higher degree of hermeneutical skill than is needed for the solution of the worst difficulties of these strange yet sublime records of God’s earliest revelations;—especially when we bear in mind that these books, which the Saviour so devoutly studied, were substantially the same (as every scholar knows) with the now-acknowledged Jewish canon, and that HE who ever manifested such deep and deferential reverence for the authority of the *lex scripta*, was himself the Supernatural and Infinite Reason,

The Eternal Wisdom, that "True Light that lighteth every man who cometh into the world."

And the opinions to which we have alluded are gaining ground. They are presenting themselves in their most extreme and startling forms. Among many heretofore reputed evangelical, they have had their origin in zeal for a false philosophy of reform, with which the unyielding spirit of the Old Testament would seem to come in direct collision. Their rationalising casuistry, and shallow utilitarianism, and abstract philanthropy, cannot brook its stern method of resolving all morality into a strict observance of the duties arising from the acknowledged relations of human life, and of deducing all its sanctions from the acknowledged sovereignty of God. There seems too little reason, too little regard to the "fitness of things," too little recognition of the universe as something back of Deity, too little of that philosophy of the "greatest happiness of the greatest number of sentient beings," in a law whose only sanction is ever the same solemn *Ani-Jehovah,—I am the Lord*. Hence such opinions are held by very many who are unconscious of the danger attending them, and of the inevitable consequences which must be the result. The signs of the times indicate a still wider diffusion; and unless checked by timely expositions of their fallacy, they must end in a fruitful harvest of skepticism in respect to the inspiration of all Scripture, both new and old.

To return, however, to some of our first points, or to that which is seemingly the least faith-destroying of these neological dogmas—There are many, we may say, who stop short of the view taken by Warburton, Whateley, and the great mass of modern rationalists. They recognise in the Old Testament an *implied* belief, to say the least, in a future life, and would even regard certain passages as express declarations to that effect, or at all events, as admitting no fair interpretation in any other way. Still, even among such is it very generally maintained, as something uncontrovertible, that the hopes and fears of the Jew, even of the pious Jew, were directed mainly to temporal objects, and that outward rites and ceremonies formed a far greater part, and a more acknowledged part of their religion than the cultivation of any spiritual affections having reference to the eternal and the invisible.

The Old Testament, it is often said, looked mainly to the outward, the ceremonial, the formal, the carnal, while it insists but faintly upon the inward, the unseen, and the spiritual. The latter were not wholly lost sight of, but they were almost entirely reserved for the later and higher revelation. The gospel first laid the main stress on *inward* rectitude of motive; it first declared the blessedness of him who had not only "*clean hands*," but "*a pure heart*." There is doubtless some truth in this, but at the same time, more that is fallacious. There is such a thing as destroying the very ground

and sanction of our Saviour's instructions, in the attempt to magnify the New Testament by unduly depreciating the older revelation. There is in the latter more spirituality of view and feeling than meets the eye of the careless reader. It requires, however, the spiritual perception and the spiritual mind. It obtrudes not itself upon the outward Sadducee, whilst in the experience of the true Israelite is it often felt, that there is no part of God's word, the reading of which is more precious, or which has more power over the purest and most inward affections of the soul.

It is indeed true, that ceremonial observances occupy a most prominent, and sometimes an almost exclusive space in the law and national records of the Jews. Hence it is, that we lose sight of those frequent declarations which were intended, on this very account, to guard against the danger of a merely formal, and to urge the necessity of spiritual religion. In the mysterious plan of God's revelation, the outward would seem to come first, and yet the inward ever accompanies it, ever presents itself to one who seeks for it, ever appears expressly or impliedly in the outward language instead of being left merely to the inferences of the natural conscience. To one, therefore, who has hastily adopted the idea of the exclusively formal character of the Old Testament teachings, it is sometimes a matter of astonishment when he finds, on careful examination, how very many passages there are of a directly opposite nature,—passages exhibiting the necessity of the internal and the spiritual with even more of melting and glowing earnestness of language, than is ever found in the more sober and preceptive instructions of the gospel itself.

The Psalms, the Prophets, the Law, and even the historical portions abound in them. "I have cleansed my heart in innocence, therefore will I encompass thine altar, O Lord. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not refuse. Create within me a clean heart and renew a right spirit within me." ¹ Thou desirest truth in the inward parts." Ps.

¹ The writer has often thought that if one needed a brief confession of his faith, one that should be liturgical, (if we may use the expression) rather than dogmatic, one that could be repeated in the hours of private meditation and devotion, one in which every line, and word almost, might be regarded as suggestive, if not openly, declarative of the main doctrines of the gospel in their most direct application to the human soul, it would be Watts' most impressive paraphrase of this 51st Psalm, commencing

"Lord, I am vile, conceived in sin,
And born unholy and unclean."

It is, indeed, a free paraphrase, and yet there is not a thought which is not suggested by the spirit of the original, not a thought which is not legitimately seen in this ancient mirror of the contrite soul, although we are indeed enabled to read it more clearly and distinctly by the reflected light of the New Testament. It is that perfect union of pure, evangelical conception, with the Hebrew spirit and metaphor, which no other paraphraist has ever so successfully

51. In the Hebrew it is בְּחֻמּוֹ in *pracordiis*,—the same as *renes*, the *reins*,—or φρένες—the seat of those deeper thoughts and affections which the Greek terminology would seem to place in the most central regions of vitality. So also in Job 38: 36—“Who hath put wisdom in the *inward parts*,”—where the same Hebrew word is used in parallelism with פְּקָדֵי, the picturing or *conceptive* department of the soul, where the thoughts may be said to receive an objective distinctness,—the source of the most interior emotion, of the most spontaneous intuitions, or as they are elsewhere styled (Gen. 6: 5:) רָצוֹן מִחַשְׁבּוֹת לֵב, *the very imaginations of the thoughts of the heart*,—those first beginnings of emotional mental activity which give moral character to all that subsequently proceeds from them. Again,—“*In the hidden parts* (בְּחֻמּוֹ Ps. 51: 8, in the most secret or interior chamber) *O make me to know wisdom*,”—in that region of the spirit which is *concealed* from direct consciousness, which is below the very thoughts themselves, where the thoughts have their birth, or in other words, spring¹ up from that state of the affections which is most closely allied to the very essence of the soul—“*O there, even there, make me to know wisdom*.”

In accordance with the same idea is that fervent prayer for inward grace that soon follows—*O, take not thy Holy Spirit from me; O give back to me the joy of thy salvation*. And then the light in the intellect which comes from the purification of the conscience—“*Then will I teach transgressors thy ways; then shall sinners be converted unto thee*.”

Beside such express declarations as these, how much do we find of implied meaning that is utterly inconsistent with the idea of a mere formal or outward religion,—how many expressions, for example, containing indeed no explicit mention of a future state, yet full of that emotion which has no meaning except in connection

exhibited as Watts, and which will ever make his version the delight of pious souls, however lightly he may be esteemed by the critic of the frigid Johnsonian school, or of the narrow Oxford sect. A modern critic, of deservedly high standing, is somewhat fastidious, we think, in his censure of the last line of the closing verse—

“And bid my broken bones rejoice.”

This, he thinks, conveys a harsh and disagreeable image. He would, therefore, substitute “*broken heart*,” or some other modern sentimental euphemism. It is left to the reader to decide, which is most in accordance not only with the bold style of the Hebrew metaphor, but with the feeling of the truly contrite or bruised soul.

¹ From some such idea of the soul seems to have come that beautiful Hebrew metaphor, עָלָה עַל לֵב, *ascendere super cor*, representing thoughts as *rising* or *wellng up* in the soul, as from some deep fountain of being far below them, and in which resides the true moral character of the spirit. See Jeremiah 3: 16 7, 31—32, 35, &c.—Compare also the Hebræism in Luke 24: 38, *διὰ τὴν διανοητικὴν ἀναβαίνουσαν εἰς τὰς καρδίας*—“*Why do thoughts arise in your souls*.”

with the idea of a higher life for the human soul, and from which all glow, and warmth, and elevation, and strength, and beauty depart, the moment it is severed, in the mind, from all such connection, and regarded as proceeding from the low level of the materialist, or as having reference to the poor deliverances of an existence so exceedingly brief as this,—an existence deriving all its value from another, but in itself considered, and apart from any idea of any higher state, so worthless, so aimless, so utterly and hopelessly inexplicable.

Let this test be applied to such passages as Ps. 73 : 25 : and the succeeding verses,—“Thou wilt guide me with thy counsel, and afterwards receive me to glory—Whom have I in heaven but THEE, and there is none upon earth that I desire beside thee.” Or, as it might be more literally rendered from the Hebrew—“Whom else have I even in Heaven, and WITH THEE I have no other desire (or delight) upon the earth. For though my flesh and my heart (my body and soul) both fail, yet THOU art the strength (the rock) of my soul, and my everlasting portion.” A mere heroic song of thanksgiving for temporal deliverances, says the unevangelical interpreter; but apply the test to which we have referred. If Asaph and David were indeed materialists. If they looked, in all this, only to temporal prosperity, and to a temporal salvation, why has this language been ever felt to be so appropriate to the devout utterance of the spiritually-minded in all ages? Why is it, that the Christian finds in it such a satisfactory expression of the most evangelical emotions? How has it happened, that away back in the earliest and most barbarous times of Judaism, as some would style them, these old songs of thanksgiving, and prayers for deliverance were framed in such strange yet perfect adaptedness to the wants of periods far remote, and of souls in circumstances so widely different? How came there to be imparted to these and similar psalms, such a warmth and life, such an indescribable elevation and sublimity, such an air of purity, such a “*beauty of holiness*,” as to fit them for the church’s standing liturgy, as well as its anthem, and form of confession, in all ages,—a liturgy which never becomes obsolete, which is never felt to lose its appropriateness, or to need revision in order to adapt it to the most interior wants of the most spiritual and heavenly-minded souls. Strange coincidence this, if not still more wonderful design!

The neologist contends that the Hebrew words which we render, *soul*, and *life*, and *death*, and *redemption*, and *glory*, and *sal-*

¹ The evident contrast here, between נַפְשִׁי and לִבִּי, shows that they are intended to represent the two great departments of humanity, the *material* and the *spiritual*. Both fail. The soul as well as the body, is dependent upon God, for its continued existence. It is not, *per se*, aeonian, or immortal, as some of the Platonists would proudly argue. But God is himself the *strength* (the rock) of the soul, its everlasting support and portion.

vation, may have no other meaning, throughout the Old Testament, than animal life, and breath, and natural death, and temporal salvation, and an earthly redemption; and hence he at once pronounces all interpretation of a more spiritual kind foreign to the *usus loquendi* which has been so unwarrantably assumed. Now admitting that they may and do have this lower sense, what right has the rationalist to the assumption which confines them there? How, in view of the striking fact to which we have alluded, the fact of their strange adaptedness to the expression of the higher emotion, and to which the general voice of the church, in harmony with the private experience of the individual Christian, is ever bearing testimony,—how in view of this fact, we say, dare they deny that these terms have also the higher sense, and that this peculiar fitness is of itself evidence that they were expressly designed, by the Divine Author of the Scriptures, for its most devout utterance.

If it be said that almost any strain of heroic triumph, or of earnest supplication in the hour of danger, might have been accommodated in the same manner, and to a similar purpose; let the experiment be tried with the purest and loftiest selections from classic poetry; it would thus be found that there is indeed an element in the inspiration of David, and Asaph, and Moses, and Isaiah, which is altogether wanting in that of Homer, and Aeschylus, and Pindar. But in what could this marked difference have consisted, if the Jew, as well as the Gentile sung only of “temporal deliverances,” and temporal triumph? Surely it is something more than an artificial impression of sacredness which long devotional usage has attached to the writings in question. We feel that no such usage could ever have imparted, at least for us, a similar character to any productions of the Grecian or Roman lyric Muse. In accounting, therefore, for the difference of effect, we are compelled to admit, that there is in the Hebrew poetry a spirituality of feeling and conception that connects itself with the invisible and the eternal,—and that, too, even where the letter seems to relate mainly, if not wholly, to the earthly and the temporal. In this way do we account for the fact, that although the Jewish writings seem to be far behind the classic in express mention of another existence, its nature and localities, they are nevertheless so much more imbued with the spirit of the unseen world as the everlasting rest of the soul, as the termination of its highest hopes, as that which alone gives significance even to its best earthly aspirations. Here, too, we see the reason of their having become the favorite channels, in all ages, of the most devout and spiritual utterance.

The Grecian poet speaks as familiarly of the Elysian fields, of the Land of the Shades, and the Isles of the Blessed, as of the vale of Tempe, or the hill of Parnassus; and with as little true spirituality of feeling in the one case as in the other. The Hebrew

seldom attempts to lift the veil from Hades, or *the unseen state*, but in what classic hymn, or in what heights of the most transcendental classic philosophy, do we ever meet with such language and conceptions as in the verse we have quoted from the 73d Psalm :—
"Without THEE the Heavens are a blank, and Earth has no delight."

If David was indeed a materialist, or in other words, one who had no belief in the doctrine of the soul's *separate* spiritual essence, and of its future existence, when and where, we ask, has such language ever before been heard from the lips of any one holding a similar animal and earthly creed? Or when have such addresses to the Deity ever been used, except in inseparable connection with the idea of a higher life for the human soul, associated with the kindred idea of the eternity of Him who styles himself, *The Father of our spirits*.¹ We get accustomed to this sacred language; but let our minds dwell upon the depth, and grandeur, and fullness of meaning, contained in that remarkable, yet common expression which declares God to be the "portion of the soul;"—as though the universe contained nothing else in the comparison. "The lines have fallen unto me in pleasant places; "for the Lord is the portion of my inheritance." Ps. 16: 5. "Thou art my portion saith my soul." "The Lord is our dwelling place in all generations. Before the mountains were born, before the earth and the round worlds² were formed, from eternity even unto eternity, (ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ὡς τοῦ αἰῶνος).—"Thou art (our) God," Ps. 90: 2. The apostle does but aim at repeating the same ineffable conception, when he says—"Chosen in Him before the foundation of the world," πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου. When and where, we ask, have any of our commentators, who have such a low opinion of the Old Testament, and are so offended by its outwardness, its grossness, and its carnality, ever risen to higher degrees of spiritual emotion, or felt the want of higher language to express the full conceptions of their adoring spirits.—Who is there in the class represented by De Wette, or Parker, or Spurzheim, who would not be startled at the unwonted fervor and spirituality of his own devotions, should he at some strange period in his soul's experience, find himself in the spontaneous utterance of language, so familiar, yet so dear to God's ancient saints.

"*The Lord is my portion.*"—We get accustomed to this frequently occurring language of the Jewish Scripture; and yet what can it denote, but the highest spirituality of conception, in respect

¹ This connection of ideas remarkably appears in the common Hebrew oath—As the Lord liveth and as thy soul liveth.

² The parallelism shows that the Hebrew תָּרָב here means something more than the earth. It can, therefore, denote nothing else than the whole visible world or universe, in its apparently globular form, as built upon, or over the earth. See Samuel, 2: 8. "For to the Lord belong the ends of the earth, and over them has he placed the Tebel, or round world. Compare also, Ps. 93: 1. Gesenius, in such places, would render it, *universum terrarum orbem*.

to the most intimate relationship and intercommunion of the divine and human spirits? As though, in looking abroad upon the universe, the soul saw God, and the enjoyment of God's presence, as constituting the value and the reality of every other possession. It is only metaphorical language, says the neologist, into which we infuse the life and warmth of later evangelical sentiment. In its older use it comes from those ideas of temporal possession and *allotment* in the land of Canaan, to which they had been so long accustomed. Be it so. But then it certainly shows how strong the spiritualising tendency, and how distinct the spiritual teaching, which led to such an application. It is, too, no weak proof, that such was actually one main design of the author of the Scriptures, in giving to the letter of the sacred books, such a wonderful capability of accommodation. It suggests the same law of hermeneutics which the apostle adopts in his favorite parallel between the literal and the heavenly Canaan, the temporal and the eternal rest; and it warrants us in applying the same mode to other parts of the Old Testament, with the confident belief, that we are using no forced interpretation, but only tracing out the legitimate harmony, which exists between the letter and the spirit.

Again, how can we account for the same earnestness of language, the same strong confidence, the same elevation of assurance, even under circumstances in which all merely temporal hopes, must surely be regarded as vanishing fast away, and the speaker as drawing nigh to that period, which, if the unevangelical theory be true, he must look upon as the final and total cessation of his brief existence. There is, however, no failing of strength, none of assurance, none of triumph even, in the very prospect of the grave. "I will come in the power of the Lord Jehovah, I will make mention of *thy righteousness*, of *thine* only. Oh God! Thou hast taught me from my youth, and even now will I declare thy wonderful deeds. In old age and hoary hairs, O God, thou wilt not forsake me. Thou hast caused me to see many and sore troubles yet wilt thou *quicken* and bring me up again from the depths¹ of

¹ *Thou wilt bring me up again from the depths of the Earth.*—The Hebrew here *תְּחַיֶּה מִיְּדֵי מוֹת* would seem to be only another expression for Sheol, Hades, Orcus, the invisible subterranean world, which was supposed to be the residence of departed spirits, even of the saints, (as in the case of the ghost of Samuel, 1. Sam. 28 : 14) until their deliverance from their *quiet*, (see 1. Sam. 28 : 15.) and blessed, although imperfect and temporary resting place in the *Ge-tzalma-veh*, the "Valley of the shadow of death," the *Terra umbrarum*, or Land of the Shades. The declaration here may have no reference to the resurrection of the body; and yet we see not why one class of commentators may not be as much justified in so regarding it, as another in confining it to the merest temporal deliverance. It might, perhaps, be taken metaphorically for great and overwhelming afflictions, as in Ps 42 : 8, did not the preceding mention of *extreme* old age, such as is generally expressed by the Hebrew *זֶקֶן* force the thoughts to the contemplation of a future and more spiritual deliverance. It

the earth. Wherefore I will praise thy truth (Heb. thy faithfulness) with the psaltery. I will sing unto thee with the harp, thou Holy One of Israel. My lips shall triumph, because I sing of **THEE** and of my **SOUL** which thou hast redeemed."—Ps. 71 : 17.

What means the redemption of the soul, in this passage; or may it have a higher and lower significance? Soul is only a term for *life*, says the neologist; נֶפֶשׁ (*nephesh*) is *animal breath*; its redemption is only a rescue from animal and temporal death; it is simply a prolongation of the present brief existence to a little longer endurance of trial and suffering; the "*depths of the earth*," is only a metaphorical term for overwhelming troubles from which there is obtained a short respite before the sufferer goes hence and is no more forever. This then, is the only redemption sung of, and for this the delivered one tunes his harp in such lofty and triumphant strains; to the Holy One of Israel. Now the unevangelical interpreter may, if he pleases, give it the lower sense. The passage is undoubtedly capable of being so taken. But again, we say apply the test; take into view the whole context; dwell upon the strength and elevation of language, the serious and holy triumph, the serene faith, the *solemn joyfulness*; and what an immense difficulty is there found in supposing these to be the words of an aged materialist rejoicing in a mere momentary deliverance from a death which he knows must soon, in the inevitable course of nature, come upon him, and which, moreover, he regards as the end of his being,—especially when viewed as the close of an existence, which he so feelingly laments as having been only a lengthened scene of "great and sore troubles."

Be it admitted, then, that there are two senses here; or rather *two degrees of sense*, in these and similar passages. Let him who chooses it, take the lower. It may be to him a true, and useful, and instructive sense. The spiritually-minded Christian, however, feels that there is such an adaptedness, such a perfect sympathy with the higher sentiment, and the higher emotion, that he cannot doubt of its having been intended by the author of the Scriptures,

may thus signify some release of the human *spirit* from Sheol or Hades, without supposing any designed allusion to the doctrine of the resurrection of the *body* itself; although the language does indeed look so much like it. The Scotch version, in its beautiful simplicity and faithfulness, seems to present strongly this idea of a bodily resurrection, and yet it would be very difficult to show wherein it departs from the most rigid and truthful rendering of the Hebrew.

Thou Lord who great adversities,
And sore to me didst show,
Shall quicken and bring me again
From depths of earth below.
Thee, with thy truth, I'll therefore praise,
My God with psaltery,
Thou Holy One of Israel,
With harp I'll sing to thee.

and of the evangelical being, not only an allowable, but the more substantial, the more *universal*, and, therefore, in fact, the more real interpretation,—although unobtruded upon the soul that does not love, and, therefore, cannot perceive its higher significance.

At times, however, the language rises to an elevation, at which the spiritual stands out so prominently, and every possibility of any other sense so entirely disappears, that the veriest rationalist is compelled to acknowledge the presence of the higher element. "Thou wilt not leave my soul in Sheol; thou wilt not suffer thy beloved one to see corruption." This, too, if one so chooses, may be taken in the lower sense of a mere prolongation of natural life,¹ and, in this way, of a redemption, or rescue from the grave; although it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile such an interpretation with the common rendering of the Hebrew verb employed in the first member. So also in the last verse of this sixteenth psalm: "Thou wilt make me to know the path of life, the fullness of joys that are in thy presence, the pleasures that are at thy right hand

¹ That this sixteenth psalm refers to a spiritual redemption, and to one that takes place after death, is made probable from the very title, נִקְחָם. Professor Stuart in his commentary, (Biblical Repository No. I.) is very much perplexed in respect to the meaning of this inscription, and, after going to the Arabic and other cognate tongues, comes at last, to no satisfactory conclusion. We think however, that there is no need of resorting to anything else than the Hebrew, and the Biblical usage of the root. A comparison of Jeremiah, 2: 22, with a parallel passage, Jeremiah 17: 1, seems to show that the true meaning of נִקְחָם in the former passage, is not *spotted* or *stained*, as Professor Stuart supposes, and as is favored by our version, but rather *stamped*, *engraved*, or *imprinted*. The other rendering, (*spotted*.) was doubtless suggested by the preceding word בִּירִית (soap). The participle נִקְחָם would mean, according to the exigency of the climax in that passage, more than *stained*. It would denote something which could not be washed out—something *cut in*, or *engraved*. In Jeremiah 17: 1, כְּתוּבָה written and חֲרוּשָׁה *engraven*, are used in the same connection, and in perfect parallelism with נִקְחָם Jeremiah 2: 22. "The sin of Judah is *written* with a pen of iron, and with the point of a diamond; it is graven upon the tablet of their hearts." Hence, very easily and naturally the secondary sense which we find in the noun נִקְחָם, *stamped* or *coined* gold, in distinction from pure gold. So also חֲרוּץ from חָרַץ. Hence also, by a very natural transition, the meaning which the LXX have given to נִקְחָם in the inscription to this psalm, namely, στήλογραφία, *engraving*, *monument*, *epitaph super mortuum*. How admirably, in this sense, is it adapted to the application which the apostle makes. It is "*Michtam to David*," even the spiritual David. It is the michtam of the Holy Sepulchre, the monumental epitaph of Christ, and of Christ not only, but also of every one who dies in the Lord.

Thou wilt not leave my soul in Sheol.
Thou wilt not suffer thy beloved to see corruption.
Thou wilt show them the way to life—
The joys at thy right hand forevermore.

forevermore." All this, if any one will have it so, may mean only temporal prosperity ; all these swelling and glowing expressions of a rapturous faith, "the path of life," the bliss of the Divine presence, the "fullness of joy at God's right hand forevermore," may possibly denote only a worldly happiness, a rejoicing indeed, in the Divine favor and goodness, but only for "the corn, the wine, and the oil." It is true, hardly any one can fail of being struck with the strange incongruity so apparent, in that case, between the soaring fullness of the diction, and the comparative poverty of the thought ; but yet, if the interpreter prefers the unevangelical rendering, there are, doubtless, many good and plausible arguments in favor of such an exercise of hermeneutical skill. He may tell us of the oriental metaphor, the luxuriance of the Jewish figurative language, of the Jewish fondness for hyperbole, in such strange contrast with the meagreness and unspirituality of the Jewish religion ; and thus find only earth and earthliness, where the apostles, and the church, and evangelized souls in all ages, have found Christ, and the higher life, and Christ's redemption. All this is possible, in respect to the passage on which we have been dwelling. But when the strain rises higher and clearer, even to the triumphant finale of the succeeding (or 17th) psalm, there is no longer any denying the presence of the spiritual and the eternal. The temporal utterly vanishes away, besides being absolutely excluded by the strong contrast between the present, and some higher and more enduring life. "Deliver my soul from the wicked, thy sword—from mortal men, who are thy hand, O Lord—from men (of *Heled*,) of the present temporal world, (*rerum terrestrium amantes*. *Ges.*) whose portion is in life, (or among the living,) whose belly (or appetite,) thou dost fill with hid treasures, who are satisfied in their children, and leave their residue to their babes. But as for me, *I shall behold thy face in righteousness, I shall be satisfied when I awake in thine image.*" Even Rosenmüller finds the future and glorified life in this passage. The lower sense is wholly absorbed in the higher. No mere worldly prosperity, it is felt, no deliverance from temporal danger alone, no accession of wealth or power, no triumph over enemies, is at all in harmony with the holy sublimity of this strain of clear and joyful assurance.

The morality of the Old Testament, it is said, was formal and outward ; but where do we find stronger dissuasions from mere ceremonial morality, than in the Hebrew prophets.¹ Where do we find sterner denunciations of the spirit that would look to God for acceptance and justification on the ground of mere ritual observances, without sincerity, truthfulness, repentance, faith and love ? "Bring me no more vain oblations ; incense is an abomina-

¹ The Hebrew may be rendered, "when thine image, or similitude awakes," referring to some transformation of the soul, after its rest in Hades, or when the body awakes, at the resurrection, in the image and glory of Christ.

tion unto me ; the new moons and Sabbaths, the calling of assemblies I cannot away with ; it is iniquity, even the solemn meeting. To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices, saith the Lord. When ye spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes from you. Wash you, make you clean ; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes ; cease to do evil, learn to do well ; relieve the oppressed ; judge the cause of the fatherless ; plead for the widow. Come now and let us reason together, saith the Lord. Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow ; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool. Zion shall be redeemed with judgment, and her converts with righteousness. O house of Jacob, come ye and let us walk *in the light of the Lord.*" And yet shall we dare to maintain that the prophetic declarations were required to counteract the false and carnal spirit of the law ? This would be indeed to set them in opposition, as some have done, and to derive them from altogether different sources. The prophetic messages, moreover, are loud in their assertions of the purity of the law, and in denunciations of the divine vengeance, on those who departed from its spirit.

And what is the law, even the ceremonial law, to one who reads it aright, but a continual enforcement of inward holiness by the most vivid typical representations of outward purity ? For what purpose are those baptisms, and washings, and sprinklings, and ceremonial purifications, and separations, but to serve as a standing presentment of God's love of inward purity of soul, thus ever *pictured* forth to the outward senses. It is hard to suppose that the pious Jew, even of ordinary grace and intelligence, failed to perceive the higher intent of these solemn ceremonial instructions, or was unable to see that the law, even the ritual and ceremonial law, which seemed to "stand (outwardly,) in meats and drinks, and divers baptisms," had regard to a higher end, than mere bodily health and purity. In other words, what was all this minute concern for personal cleanliness, but the most impressive method that could be adopted to represent to those prepared to receive it, the infinitely greater value of holiness, or sanctification of the soul. So the prophets speak of it in their vehement and impassioned exhortations,—so the apostles interpreted, and so may we view it, not in the way of forced accommodation, but in the spirit of a true and rational hermeneutics,—strange indeed in itself, and yet deduced most legitimately from the study of those most strange and peculiar Scriptures.

It was this aspect of the law which led the devout Israelite to those expressions of fond attachment, which are so frequently to be found in the devotional books of the Old Testament, and which, when viewed in reference only to the naked ritual, might seem tumid and extravagant. Compare the great variety of epithets which occur in the passionate ejaculations of the 119th Psalm. The author never seems to become weary, in the reiterations of

his admiring and adoring love for the *statutes*, the *ordinances*, the *testimonies*, the *judgments*, the *precepts*, the *commandments*, the *word*, the *law* of Jehovah. "Thy word is very pure, therefore thy servant loveth it. Thy testimonies are wonderful, therefore doth my soul keep them. The entrance of thy words giveth light. Open thou mine eyes that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law. Thy righteousness is an eternal righteousness; thy law is (eternal) truth. Forever, O Lord, thy word is settled in heaven. I have seen an end of all perfection, but thy commandment is exceeding broad. O how love I thy law; it is my meditation all the day. I understand more than the ancients, because I keep thy precepts. How sweet are thy words unto my taste! O, sweeter are they than honey to my mouth. Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my path. Thy testimonies have I taken as my heritage forever. Great peace have they who love thy law. Exceedingly do I love thy testimonies. I have longed for thy salvation, and thy law is my delight. Mine eyes prevent the night watches, that I might meditate on thy word. Thy word is from the beginning, thy testimonies have I known of old, that thou hast founded them forever."

Again—in the nineteenth psalm, just after that sublime hymn of praise to God for the wondrous display of *natural law*, in the heavens and heavenly bodies, how sudden, yet hearty is the transition to the higher theme of adoration. "The *law of the Lord* is perfect, converting the soul; the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes. The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring forever, the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether. More to be desired are they than gold, yea, than much fine gold; sweeter also are they than honey and the honey-comb."

So, also, in the more didactic portions, as in the first psalm, how vividly does the writer present the comparative blessedness of "the man whose *delight* is in the law of the Lord, and *who meditates therein day and night*." He shall be like a tree planted by the rivers of waters; his leaf shall not wither; his fruit shall never fail; *he shall stand in the judgment*, when the wicked are driven away like chaff before the wind.

It might be said that this was the language of a comparatively advanced period, desirous of making all it could of the old barren ritual, and of spiritualising it to a higher sense; as some of the later schools of philosophy attempted to do with the old Greek mythology. Hence a sort of mystic meditation on the old statutes employed simply as a mirror, presenting in itself only a blank surface, but reflecting, by way of accommodation, the higher thoughts of the devotee's own soul. This would be an extravagant supposition for the age of David, or even of the captivity. The false Philonic spiritualising, arising from the influence of foreign philosophy, was of a much later time. But this language dates back to

a period compared with which that of David might be viewed as modern. The same blessedness, in respect to the same character, and for the same reason, is pronounced away back in the olden time, before the law had acquired to itself an antiquarian veneration that discovered in it more than it really contained. Even in the days of Joshua, the son of Nun, it was the characteristic of the true Israelite to "meditate therein day and night;" that it might not depart out of his mouth; for in so doing was his life, his light, his security for the Divine favor, and the Divine presence. Vide Joshua 1 : 8.

Now it should be ever borne in mind, that this law, and these statutes, and these testimonies that called out such terms of devout and ardent attachment, were the same old Judaical ordinances which our more spiritual rationalist brands as gross, animal, ceremonial, and outward,—as occupied with the external cleansing of lepers, with bloody sacrifices of innocent animals, with frivolous rules about the construction of arks and tabernacles, and candlesticks, with directions respecting meats and drinks, and ceremonial uncleannesses, with sprinklings, and changings of garments, and the regulations of camps, together with barbarous statutes of social life and criminal jurisprudence, which the humanity of more enlightened ages rejects with abhorrence. There were no other Holy Scriptures in those days, in which the pious could "meditate by day and by night." All the light and love, therefore, and holiness, and purity, and *everlasting truth*, which are so frequently spoken of in the devotional psalms we have quoted, must have been found in that stern old law of Moses, with which some are so much offended,—that same stern law which the modern sentimental reformer maintains Christ came to annul, but which Christ himself sums up as essential love and purity,—declaring, moreover, that heaven and earth shall pass away, before one jot or tittle of that ancient law should ever fail.

It was evidently to this higher, or typified, purity that the psalmist had regard, in the expressions of his deep contrition. "*Thou wilt purge me with hyssop.*" The emphatic reference would seem to be to that true washing of regeneration which God only could bestow, and of which the ritual hyssop was but the sign. There was felt the need of something more than the outward purification by the priest. "*Thou wilt purify me with hyssop* (as the Hebrew may best be rendered) or, when *thou shalt purge me with hyssop*, then shall I indeed be clean; "*When thou shalt wash me* (in thy spiritual laver) then shall I indeed be whiter than snow;" "*When Thou shalt cause me to hear joy and gladness*, then indeed shall my very bones rejoice." It will be something far more than any ritual purity. When *Thou* thyself healest the leper, it will be something far more than any priestly annunciation of the completion of the outward ceremonial cleansing.

In the same light, also, may we view the many striking declarations of the Scriptures by which the Divine purity is itself set forth. The neologist stumbles at such precepts as are contained Deut. 23 : 12, or Exod. 20 : 25. It is the grossest anthropomorphism, he exclaims. It ascribes to God not only the passions, but also the lowest senses of men ; as though his eyes were offended at the display of personal nakedness, or his nostrils with the impurities of the camp in which he was said to dwell. And yet may we not well conceive, that when a people have become accustomed to such injunctions of outward purity, they will, on this very account, be the more struck with those declarations of the inward holiness of the Divine character with which the same Scriptures abound. "Thou art of eyes too *pure* to behold iniquity ; upon sin thou canst not look." "How shall man be righteous before God ; how shall he be clean that is born of woman. Behold even the moon ; it shineth not ; (Heb. לֹא־נִרְאָה for לֹא־נִרְאָה it hath no splendor or glory in the comparison.) yea, the stars are not pure¹ in his sight."

From the same idea of transcendent holiness and purity, comes that sublime expression, Ps. 104 : 2, "Who veilest thyself with light as with a garment." Behind even that "bright effluence," in which God has dwelt from all eternity, there is a splendor, a clearness and a purity, in comparison with which light itself becomes an intervening shade, separating the Holy (*or separate*) One, as with a covering, from the universe with which the philosophizing pantheist would confound him.

His robe is the light.

Paul does no more than attempt to copy the Old Testament sublimity and spirituality, when he represents God as "dwelling in light unapproachable"— $\phi\omega\varsigma\ \alpha\iota\kappa\omega\acute{\nu}\ \alpha\pi\rho\acute{o}\sigma\iota\tau\omicron\nu$; as also James, when he styles him "*the Father of lights*." $\delta\ \pi\alpha\tau\eta\rho\ \tau\omega\acute{\nu}\ \phi\omega\tau\omega\acute{\nu}$, intimating by the plural *lights*, that he is the source of all, to which the name is applied, whether literally or metaphorically. He is the Father of *all lights*, of all that reveals or "makes manifest," either in the natural, the moral, the intellectual or the spiritual world—

"Since God is light,
And never but in unapproached light,
Dwelt from eternity—dwelt then in thee
Bright effluence of bright Essence Uncreate.

"The Lord is my light and my salvation." "In thy light shall we see light." The idea on which these sublime expressions are founded, is much older than the Psalms. It dates from this old law, so condemned as gross and outward. It was presented on the high-priest's pectoral, or breastplate, in the remarkable engraving of

¹ The Hebrew לֹא־נִרְאָה here, admirably unites the two ideas of moral and outward purity or cleanliness. It is used alike in reference to both. It denotes—no spot—no shade.

the Urim and Thummim, **אֲבִירִים וְתֻמִּימִים** which has been variously rendered *revelatio et veritas, lux et veritas, φῶς καὶ ἀλήθεια* Exod. 28:30. Lev. 8:8, Deut. 33:8. It might be translated *lights and perfections*, if we keep in view the more usual acceptations of the root and related forms of **אָרַם**. The English word, however, is too vague. The radical idea of the Hebrew is *purity and simplicity of heart*, not so much perfection in regard to outward observances, or external rectitude, as that *clean, clear, sincere, (sincerus, ἀσπίστος integer)* singleness of heart and motive, which may be called the *light of the moral nature*, in distinction from that of the intellect, the *light of the heart*, in distinction from that of the head. It is that of which our Saviour speaks, when he says, "If thine eye be *single*, thy whole body shall be full of light." To this idea Luther's version, *Licht and Recht*, would seem to make the nearest approach.

It is worthy of note, that it is **אֲבִירִים**, in the plural, *lights*, as in the remarkable expression of the apostle James, *The Father of Lights*, indicating the three degrees, the light of the eye, or of sense; the light of the intellect, or truth, and the light of the heart, or that moral clearness or purity, which clarifies the understanding, which imparts to truth all its value,¹ and enables the soul clearly to distinguish what in the intellectual world, or world of truth, is of higher and lower dignity. It is difficult to determine which of these applications of the word should be regarded as metaphorical, or whether they are alike literal. The last, however, is undoubtedly the highest and most important. It is that "Light of the Lord, *through which* we see light," and which will finally bring the soul that possesses it, into the very presence of God. "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God."

Gesenius would intimate that this idea of the *Urim and Thummim*, was stolen by Moses from the Egyptians. This frigid neologist devoted his life to the study of an old book, which he himself regarded in some sort of way, as being the word of God, a book, too, which certainly derives its great interest, from the fact of its being truly such, and yet in the face of its most solemn declarations, he presents a view which has no real evidence in its favor, and which could only have been chosen, because of its taking away all its spirituality from one of the sublimest portions of the Old Testament. "And Aaron shall bear the names of the

¹ Plato might be supposed to be darkly aiming at some such idea in his remarkable definition of the Agathon, or the Good, as being something not only higher than knowledge, or truth, or intellectual light, but as giving to it, its true value and reality—*Καὶ τοῖς γινώσκουσιν τὸν μὴ ὄντα τὸ γινώσκεισθαι ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν ὁβολὴν ἐκ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι.* Plat. Repub. VI. p. 509. "For to things known, it may be said, that not only their being truly known, is derived to them from the Agathon, or the idea of the Good, but that their very being and essence is only truly perceived in connection with the same idea."

children of Israel in the breastplate of judgment upon his heart, when he goeth in unto the Holy place, for a memorial before the Lord continually. And thou shalt put in the breastplate of judgment the *Urim* and the *Thummim*; and they shall be upon Aaron's heart, when he goeth in before the Lord; and Aaron shall bear the judgment of the children of Israel upon his heart continually." "And thou shalt make a plate of pure gold, and grave upon it like the engravings of a signet, HOLINESS TO THE LORD." In all this, the German lexicographer and commentator discovers but a poor imitation of a very doubtful custom, which the Egyptians of a later age seem to have had, of suspending a tablet with the word *truth* from the neck of a judicial officer. *Hebræi autem hoc in more symbolico Ægyptios imitati sedentur, apud quos iudex supremus sapphirinam veritates imaginem e collo suspensam gestabat.* But Aaron did not represent a judicial officer in this. Besides their being no evidence of any such thing in the account itself, we are expressly told, in the introduction of the chapter, that he was to appear in his *priestly office*, as mediator before God, on behalf of those whose names he bore upon his breast. "And take thou unto thee Aaron, thy brother, and his sons with him, from among the children of Israel, that he may minister unto me in the *priest's office*." And he shall bear the names of the children of Israel upon his heart when he goeth in unto the Holy place." Instead, then, of representing any ἀρχιεραστής he typified rather the great ἀρχιερεύς, the High Priest who has entered, once for all, into the Holy of holies, or Heaven of heavens, bearing on his breast the true Israel of God, his redeemed church, pure and spotless in his righteousness, that he might thus present it to God with its *Urim* and *Thummim*, its light and love, μή ἔχουσιν στίλον ἢ ῥυτίδα ἀλλ' ἵνα ᾖ ἁγία καὶ ἀμωμος (Eph. 5 : 27,) having no stain or wrinkle, but holy (that is, separate,) and pure.

Great High Priest we view thee stooping
With our names upon thy breast—

How much more of light for the intellect as well as the heart, is to be found in this simple hymn of the social prayer-meeting, than in all the learning and philosophy of the great lexicographer and critic. It will be found, moreover, that the passage in Diodorus, to which he refers, does not sustain his position, weak and untenable as it is in itself. The historian (Diod. I : 48,) says nothing of any inscription, nor even of any image. His words are—*ἔχοντα τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐξηρητημένην ἐκ τοῦ τραχήλου.* With as much reason might the critic have traced a connection between the priestly *Urim* and *Thummim* of the Mosaic law, and the sword and scales of Themis, or the Grecian mythological jurisprudence.

1 "The Hebrews in this symbolical custom seem to have imitated the Egyptians, among whom the chief justice was accustomed to wear suspended from his neck a sapphire image of Truth."

The Jews, say some, were full of the grossest anthropomorphic notions, derived from the language of their law and sacred books. "The God of the Hebrews," says Spurzheim, "was irritable and revengeful; he delighted in war; he was fond of incense, perfumes, and bloody sacrifices." "He is represented in their Scriptures," say others of this school, "as confined chiefly to the narrow bounds of the Jewish land. He was the God of the hills. He was merely a *θεὸς πατριῶνος*, a patril or Gentile deity, ranking in this respect with the gods of the surrounding nations, only regarded (and that, too, merely in the national pride,) as more renowned than Baal, or Dagon, or Remmon, or even the far-famed Zeus, the chief God of the remote "isles of the sea." But have those who write in this way, ever really studied the Old Testament? When, we may ask, did rationalist or phrenologist, unless they borrowed the language of the Bible, ever rise spontaneously to a height of conception surpassing, in sublimity and spirituality, many declarations of the same Scriptures, cotemporary with parts and passages at which such offence is taken? It is true God is represented (Deut. 23 : 14,) as "*walking about*" in the camp of Israel, and as "*coming down*" (Exod. 3 : 8,) for their deliverance. But then it should be remembered that this is in the same chapter in which he styles himself the, I AM THAT I AM—the *Jehovah*, the sole Eternal, Self-Existent One, who only hath life, and essence, and immortality in himself. It is true he delights in characterising himself by terms expressive of locality, and the most intimate relationship to finite and temporal objects. He is the God of Abraham; of Isaac, and of Jacob. He is his people's "dwelling-place in all generations." "His foundation¹ is in the Holy Mountains; He loveth the gates of Zion, even more than all the habitations of Jacob. He has, indeed, a "peculiar people" in a more distinct sense than was ever predicated of any local divinity. "As the mountains stand alway round about Jerusalem," so the Lord is ever nigh to those who fear and serve him. He comes down to their finite wants, and thoughts, and feelings. He hears their prayers; he delights in their sacrifices; He "smells a sweet smelling savor" in the incense of their confessions and thanksgivings. He is, indeed, their *θεὸς πατριῶνος*, their patrimonial Deity. He is *their* God, and the God of their fathers, and of their children, and of their

¹Heb. יְסֻדוֹ — *His settled abode*. It would seem to convey the idea of a beloved private seat, dwelling-place, or homestead. The word is closely allied to the noun יָסַד from the same root, and with the same radical idea, *consensus*, vel amicorum familiariter colloquentium, vel judicum consultantium. As in Ps. 25 : 14. "The *secret* of the Lord, (סֵתֶר) (his familiarity, his intimate friendship,) is with those who fear him." He is, in this sense, not only a *national*, but also a *household* deity—their *θεὸς οἰκίας*,—the God of the home, with all its hallowed associations, of the hearth, the fireside, the *domestic altar*,—if we may, with all reverence, apply to the God of the Bible, one of the most significant epithets which old tradition has handed down, and given to the Grecian Zeus.

children's children, even unto the third and fourth generations. He is a God "nigh at hand;" and yet it is the same One who saith "Am I not also a God *afar off*? Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord." When we have contemplated this *near*, and intimate, and familiar aspect of the Divine character, we may, with the full sanction of these wonderful writings, turn to meditate on the *far off* view, and endeavor to conceive of Him as occupied with powers, and worlds, and natural laws, at distances so immensely remote that the difference between the astronomical conception of a Herschel, and that of Abraham or Job, shrinks into the veriest infinitesimal, or differential of a differential.

The Bible directs the mind to both. It is the same ancient Scripture, whose anthropomorphism gives such offence, that declares, "The Heaven, and Heaven of Heavens cannot contain Him." It is the same ancient Scripture, or rather still more ancient Scripture, that soars above all philosophy in the transcending inquiry—"Who can by searching find out God? Who can trace the Almighty unto perfection. It is high as the Heavens; what canst thou do,—deeper than Hades; how canst thou know it?" Job 11.

Philosophy claims to have higher thoughts of the Divine nature than are presented in these old records, which, it is asserted, were intended for the infancy of mankind. She assumes to transcend the laws of our own *human* being, and to determine the mode of the *Divine* existence. After more than three thousand years discussion, she has not yet settled the very first problem in anthropology. She is still warmly debating as to what we *are* and *do*, in every momentary exercise of our mental activity. She has not yet clearly decided the famous question which Socrates hunts through every stage of definition in one of the longest of the Platonic dialogues,¹ and is compelled to leave, at last, utterly unsolved, the question,—*What is knowledge?* even human knowledge? What is it to *know*? Is it an *action*, or a *passion*, or both? How much in every thought, and even perception, comes from without, from the world of sense, and how much, if any, is furnished from the soul's innate stores? There are, even yet, two schools, as distinctly divided on these points, as in the days of Heraclitus, and Parmenides.

And yet, this same philosophy modestly assumes to "find out God," and to know something more and higher of him than is presented in his own revelation! She undertakes to decide what he *is*, and what he is not, what he *must be*, and what he *cannot be*, how he *exists*, and how he cannot exist, what is possible and what is impossible, in respect to the unity or distinction of his personality. Yea, she would even determine the very law and mode of his spiritual action. He transcends time and space, it is proudly affirmed. He does not know things as we know them in *time* and *space*. He does not think as we think, by succession of thoughts

¹ The Theætetus.

or ideas; He does not view things by parts, as the anthropomorphic language of the Bible would seem to represent. All things are to Him one *universal presence* in space; all events are to Him one *eternal presence* in time; knowledge is his sense, his intuition; truth is his very essence.

But what does philosophy mean by her "great swelling words of vanity?" What does she gain by all these barren negatives, or disguised nonentities, or concealed truisms? What is all this to the immeasurable sublimity, and yet profound simplicity, of these Old Testament Scriptures, in setting forth the same transcendent aspect of the Divine character at which philosophy so labors,—“His ways are not as our ways—His *thoughts* are not as our *thoughts*. As the heavens are high above the earth, so are his ways above our ways, and his *thoughts* above our *thoughts*.” “For with the Lord one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day.” “They are in his sight as a yesterday when it is past, and like a watch in the night.” Isa. 55: 8; Ps. 90: 4.

Boethius, in imitation of Plato, and some of the schoolmen in imitation of Boethius, define the Divine Existence as being “without pretention or futurity,” as “*tota simul et interminabilis vite possessio*.” We would not quarrel with the language; rather would we admire it for its clear conciseness, and as the best form of words philosophy could invent for the expression of so transcendent a truth. But how is it itself transcended by the Scriptural mode of setting forth the same, or even higher aspect of the same idea. Jehovah, says the prophet, “*inhabiteth Eternity*.” It is his dwelling-place, in which he abideth the same forevermore. It is his boundless bound, his life, which he liveth all in every part and at every moment.

Philosophy would spurn all expressions of nearness, or locality, or special providential care. She would contemplate the infinite aspect of the Divine character. Towards this, in her proud folly, would she strain her vision, until it grew dim, and dark, and finally went utterly out, in the vain attempt to measure the measureless, to grasp the incomprehensible. But this is not the only aspect presented for our contemplation. With all reverence would we say it—God is also finite as well as infinite. Although it may seem a paradox, yet the latter may be said to involve the former. The idea of perfection seems necessarily to embrace both, and each as essential to any right conception of the other. In other words, he would not be perfect and infinite, if he *could not*, in truth and reality, present to us that *other side* of Deity, (to use the strange expression with all reverence) in which he truly and actually, and not merely by way of metaphorical accommodation, “*comes down* to see the children of men,” (Gen. 11: 5,) and meets our finite being, and himself enters into our temporal succession of thoughts and feelings, and thus does truly think and feel in “*time and space*,” even as we think, and as we feel.

Both aspects then, we repeat our belief, are true—the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal. Both are real. The one is no mere metaphorical accommodation any more than the other. Both are essential to the idea of perfection in Him who filleth all things, and yet abideth in himself forevermore,—who concerns himself with the acts and thoughts of beings of a day, and yet “inhabith eternity.” The Scriptures, we think, present them, and, in this way, both are to be received as the complement of each other, and as the true solution of all mysteries and difficulties which seem to occur in the Scriptural representations; so that in thus receiving them, we may have, in the one aspect, an elevation of view to which mere philosophy could never hope to soar, and in the other, a nearness, a clearness, an intimacy, and a trust, such as might characterize our most familiar human conceptions. Both, then, we say, are presented in the Bible. And yet, if we must err on either side, better to go to the very verge of anthropomorphism, if we only preserve the moral attributes, than to run into the other, and far worse extreme of a blinding, chilling, hardening, pantheistic “philosophy of religion.”

“His ways are not as our ways; his *thoughts* are not as our *thoughts*.” He does not think as we think. His spiritual action transcends, undoubtedly, both in mode and essence, all we know of the exercises of the human soul. And yet again, with truth and reverence may it be said, He does think as we think; He does feel as we feel. It is a part of his eternal and infinite power and perfection, that He *can* do this. It is on this side, this finite side of infinite and eternal deity, that he reaches away down to us, and comes even in closest communion with us, so that “He sympathizes with our infirmities,” and knows our finite thoughts, even as they are finite and successive, and enters into our finite hopes and fears, even to know them as we know them, and to think them as we think them, and to feel them as we feel them.

Again—The Scriptures do not only present both these aspects in different parts, and with different applications. They sometimes unite them in one declaration; as in that most wondrous passage, (Isai. 57: 15,) which would seem to present in one view, the height and the depth, the length and the breadth, the far off infinity and the endearing nearness of the Divine character. “Thus saith the High and Lofty One, whose dwelling is eternity,¹ whose name

¹ The interpreter of the Grotian school might lower the force of this most sublime expression, by rendering the Hebrew simply—“who liveth forever”—with the idea of mere *duration* or prolongation of time. But the emphasis is on the word עֹלָם, which ever contains the idea of domain, fixedness, habitation, home—eternity is his home. עַד too, in this place, is a noun, as in the remarkable declaration, Isa. 9: 5, אֲבִיר עַד. The “father of eternity.” The construction of the Hebrew gives the idea of eternity, not simply as being the *duration* of the Divine existence, viewed as immensely prolonged time, but as its *fixed* residence, of which it finds each and every finite part at each and every moment, to the exclusion of every notion of *flowing* or *succession*.

is HOLY—In the high and holy place I dwell ; and with him also who is of a contrite and lowly spirit ; that I may revive the spirit of the lowly, and the heart of the contrite ones.”

It is not, however, to the Psalms and Prophets alone, or to the more expressly devotional and poetical parts of the Old Testament, that such declarations are confined. They make their appearance too, in the law. They not unfrequently occur where we should least expect to meet them. They are to be found, at times, relieving the bare, and as it would seem to some, barren historical narration ; as when the adoring Elijah hears the “*still small voice*” that followed the tempest, the fire, and the earthquake, revealing a power away back of nature, even in her most sweet and irresistible manifestations. They shine out too, in the very midst of ritual and ceremonial precepts. The law of love to God and man, or that teaching which sums up all legal requirements, and all duty in the cultivation of these holy affections, stands out prominently on the roll of the ancient lawgiver. It is no new commandment. Christ gives but the words of Moses, and here too, as in so many other places of his instruction, thinks it no degradation from his own high claims as the most divine of teachers, to cite what was already written *ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς ταῖς ἀγλαῖς*, in the *Holy Scriptures*. “Hear O Israel, the Lord our God is one ; and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength.” Deut. 6 : 5. “*And thou shalt love thy neighbor as thine own self ;* I am the Lord.” Lev. 19 : 18. There is appended the usual sanction—I am the Lord,—presenting the homage and love of the Creator as the original *ground* of all true love or benevolence to man ; and this, too, in perfect consistency with the converse proposition of the beloved apostle, that love to our human brethren “whom we have seen” is the best and most acceptable *evidence* of love to the *invisible* “Father” of all human “spirits.” It is this which is repeatedly set forth as the pervading spirit of the law amid all its minuteness of precept and ritual. If the Jew lost sight of it, it was owing to that same Sadducean hardness of heart, and stupifying carnality that produces similar effects in opposition to all the influences of the gospel. No one who carefully reads and ponders the numerous admonitions of the Old Testament on this point, can charge it to the want of spiritual instruction of the loftiest and purest, and at the same time, simplest kind. “And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, and to love him with a perfect heart, and with all thy soul ?” Deut. 10 : 12.

We need only refer in addition, under this head, to the striking summary, Deut. 30. 19. “I call this day to witness against you heaven and earth. I have set before you life and death, the blessing and the curse ! Then choose thou life that thou mayest live, thou and thy seed after thee ! And this is thy life, that thou

shouldst love the Lord thy God—that thou shouldst listen to his voice,—that thou shouldst cleave unto him. *For He is thy life*, and thy length of days in thy dwelling in the land which the Lord swear to give unto your fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob.”

It may, perhaps, be said that here is a distinct reference to the temporal, in the prolongation of the present life. But let it be remembered, that the life, even this temporal life, in this aspect of it, was to consist in the love and service of God, as though without him earth had no true inheritance for the soul. It had therefore, the essence of spirituality in it, even in reference to our present being. Although commencing in time, it had an element connected with eternity, and deriving its great value, and even its very significance, from such connection. “For he is thy life; and this is thy life, that thou shouldst love the Lord thy God.” How striking the resemblance between this and the language of the beloved apostle—“God is love, and he that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, and God in him.” 1 John 4 : 16. For this is his life, and in this he lives, and “there,” as the Psalmist says, (Ps. 133 : 3,) in reference to the derived and kindred affection of fraternal love for the spiritual Israel, “there hath God commanded the blessing, even *life forevermore*.” And of this nature, too, must be the life and corresponding death so often mentioned, Ezek. 18 and 33. The idea of the latter as a mere temporal penalty inflicted, or to be inflicted, in all the cases there mentioned, and of the former as a deliverance from it, is attended with insuperable difficulties arising from the whole tenor of these remarkable passages. The wicked man, it is over and over again declared, shall *die in his sins*, the righteous shall *live in his righteousness*. To the same effect the solemn closing strain; “For as I live saith the Lord I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, wherefore turn and live,” Ezek. 18 : 32; 33 : 11.

It was in this way the pious Israelite was led, even more effectually, perhaps, than by any formal mention of a future state as merely a revealed *fact* in the history of our existence—to the thought of some higher condition of the soul, coming more fully up to the suggestive significance of this remarkable language, and of which higher life, the love *here learned* would still be the essence, the eternal realization.

This life was not merely the reward, (considered simply as a prolongation of days on earth,) but the very essence of well-doing and *well-being*—the true *σωτηρια*—the *salvation* itself, which constitutes the ultimate and permanent rest of the soul, whether in time or in eternity. It was a return, in truth, to the very life itself

¹ “In his sin that he hath sinned, in that shall he die.” Ezek. 18 : 24. That is, in his sinning he shall die. Compare the language of Christ to the Jews, John 8 : 24. “Therefore I said unto you, ye shall die in your sins.”

that Adam lost by the forbidden fruit, "in the very day he did eat thereof." Thus the Psalmist (Ps. 30: 6.) "In thy favor is life," Ps. 63: 3, "Thy loving kindness is more than life." This very Hebrew phrase, ארך ימים or "length of days," which is so peculiar to the promises of the old law, is also the very one which David employs, (and, as we think, for the soul's ultimate rest,) at the close of the twenty-third Psalm. It must have had reference to something extending beyond this brief existence; for he had just before spoken of passing through the valley of the shadow of death, or *land of shades*, and expressed his perfect confidence, even then, in Him whom he is so fond of styling "*his light*," "*his life*," "*his salvation*," and the "*strength of his life*." In its largest sense, then, or in reference to his whole being, must he be regarded as saying—"Surely goodness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my existence;" and the succeeding clause, therefore, or the one containing the phrase alluded to, is rightly rendered in our version, "I shall dwell in the house of the Lord forever;" or still more literally in the Scottish metrical translation—

And in God's house forevermore
My dwelling-place shall be.

This strongly suggests, Ps. 84: 8. "Blessed are they who dwell in thy house; they will be *still* praising thee," Heb. עוד, *yet* praising thee. It denotes something *still* to come, being from the root עד—*iterare, iterum iterumque iterare*. In this way, and when the context requires it, it becomes one of the Hebrew words to express the boundless, the termless, the perpetually recurring—the eternal. So also Ps. 139: 18, אקיצה ועודי עמי—"I awake and am *still* with thee"—*yet* with thee—*evermore with thee*. To the same effect, Ps. 146: 2, "I will praise the Lord whilst I live," (בחי) or during my natural life, (ἕως χρόνου)—*yea more*, as the rising and amplifying parallelism implies, "I will sing praises unto my God whilst I have my being," (בחי באלוהי מונ). Whilst my *soul liveth* I will be *still* praising Thee.

Similar to this is the expression לעולם ועד, although עד may be from a different root. "I will praise thy name forever and *ever*, forever and *yet*—forever and *more*, or forever *more*—forever and *still* on—still more and more; the same boundless going forth of the thoughts which there is an attempt to express in the Greek, and Latin reduplications—"secula seculorum, and, *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων*."

We might reverently say, that in no other way could the true idea of the eternal rest and blessedness be *experimentally* revealed to the soul, except as the continuation of a present temporal state of being, of which God was the light and life; and thus the ארך ימים, or "length of days" of the old law, so easily passes, in the pious

and spiritual mind, into the עולם עולם, the *dies eternitatis*—the everlasting rest, the eternal kingdom, of which it is the natural type. "They that thus believe," that thus receive the Divine promises "have already entered into rest."

In such a spirit did our Lord, and the apostles, commissioned and inspired by him, interpret the Old Testament. In so doing, they seem to have followed no secret cabala,¹ as some have thought, no hidden law of hermeneutics which is now lost, no vague system of accommodation by which any meaning or any amount of meaning, could be given to any passage. In opposition to all this, we may regard them as giving, with all simplicity and honesty the sanction of their inspiration to the then known and settled mode of interpreting the old Testament which was peculiar to the common pious mind of their age. It was no new and fanciful method of interpretation which led Christ to regard a promise like the one referred to, Deut. 30 : 21—a promise made to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to patriarchs who had long since departed from the present life, as having no meaning, or as deficient in a very important aspect of its meaning, if it does not imply an existence commensurate with its whole duration. It was no absurd doctrine of "correspondences," converting the word of God into a cabalistical cypher, which led the apostle to give that higher significance to the ancient Canaan, to Zion, to "Jerusalem, the mother of us all," to the "promised rest," to the "chosen people." It was no mere fancy which connected his views of the spiritual relations of Christians with those Old Testament ideas of *inheritance*, of *allotment*, of *first fruits*, and of *redeemed possession*, by which he is so fond of characterizing them. As when he speaks of the "spirit of promise which is the earnest of our inheritance, until the redemption of the purchased possession to the praise of his glory." Eph. 1 : 14. It was, in short, no spirit of frigid accommodation which led them to find Christ where the Grotian or Sadducean interpreter never sees him,—as the rock in the wilderness, the emblem of faithfulness and permanence, and yet ever following his people in the flowing waters of a spiritual salvation, 1 Cor. 10 : 4. Even in the ancient law, Christ was present. He was not far, the apostle affirms, from the pious Jew; and there needed not that any one should ascend into heaven to bring Christ down, or descend into the abyss, to bring him up from thence. Rom. 10 : 6, 7. To the one that looked for him, he was very nigh, even in his heart, (Deut. 10 : 11, 14,) even as that very word, which, although afterwards more specifically

¹ This opinion is advanced by Cunaeus in his treatise *De Republica Hebraeorum*. Lib. III. ch. 8. He regards Paul and the other apostles as having a real and secret cabala, although of Divine origin, and taught to Moses in Horeb. This cabala had been perverted by Jewish writers, but still the method itself was sacred and genuine. Paul had learned it in the school of Gamaliel. Hence the writer does not hesitate to style the Pauline interpretations *cabalistica et mystica*, although meaning no irreverence or distrust by the terms.

presented, was still the same unchanged word, the same *righteousness of faith*" by which the "*redeemed*" have been justified in all ages of the world, and which Noah and Abraham preached, as well as Paul.

The Jew, it is often said, was taught by the very spirit of his religion, to confine his benevolent affections within the narrow circle of his own tribes or clans; whereas the gospel expands into a wider field, and lays before the soul the whole world, or brotherhood of humanity. Now there is no doubt that the New Testament dispensation may be said to be for the whole world, in a sense which is not applicable to the apparently local, and temporary, and preparatory Jewish dispensation, even when the latter is regarded in its moral and inward aspect. There is no doubt that in the development of God's mysterious providence to our race, the Jew was led, by the very genius of his religion, to cherish a stronger family and national feeling than was peculiar to Christianity. Any one, however, who attentively considers the spirit of some parts of the more devotional books of the Old Testament, will be astonished to find how much more liberal and expansive in his affections was the Jew of David's time, than his descendants afterwards became in the later periods of their national history. The author of the *Natural History of Fanaticism*,¹ makes a very strong argument, under this head, to show how far the religion of the Old Testament, and the Jew of the Old Testament were from any appearance of fanaticism. For this purpose he introduces some very apposite quotations from those Psalms that seem to have belonged to the Jewish temple worship. "Little as we may have heeded the fact," says this exceedingly valuable author, "yet certain it is, that expressions of the most expansive philanthropy echoed in the anthems of the Jewish temple. The passages challenge attention—"God be merciful unto us, and bless us, and cause his face to shine upon us—That thy way may be known upon the earth, thy saving health among *all nations*. Let the people (the nations) praise thee O God; let all the people praise thee. *O let the nations be glad and sing for joy; for thou shalt judge the people righteously, and govern the nations upon earth. Let the people praise thee O God; let all the people praise thee.* Then God shall bless us and all the ends of the *earth* shall fear him." Again, proceeds this au-

¹The two concluding chapters of this noble work have the common title—"The religion of the Bible not fanatical." The first is devoted to the Old Testament, the second to the New. The two chapters constitute an argument for the Divine origin of the Scriptures, constructed on a very new and peculiar line. Taken and published together, they would make a manual of great value on the Evidence of Inspiration.

²It might be contended by some, that the word here rendered earth, should be translated *land*—meaning the land of Judea. But such a view of the term here, (although it often has that meaning,) is opposed to the whole spirit of the context. A prayer of more expansiveness and philanthropy was never uttered at one of our monthly concerts.

thor, "Certainly it is not fanaticism that says—'All nations whom thou has made shall come and worship before thee, O Lord, and shall glorify thy name.' Ps. 86: 9. It is not fanaticism that in a moment of national exultation challenges all men to partake with itself its choicest honors. Yet, such was the style of the songs that resounded, Sabbath after Sabbath, from the consecrated places of Zion. 'O sing unto the Lord a new song; sing unto the Lord, all the earth. Declare his glory among the heathen, his wonders among all people. Give unto the Lord, all ye kindred of the people, give unto the Lord glory and strength. Give unto the Lord the glory due unto his name. Bring an offering and come into his courts. O worship the Lord in the beauty of holiness; fear before him all the earth.' Ps. 96. 'O praise the Lord all ye nations, praise him all ye people.'—*Natural History of Fanaticism*, ch. IX, p. 302.

We may make an appeal, under this head, not merely to the warm and glowing spirit of devotion as exhibited in the Psalms and the Prophets. There is a feeling there, it might be said, which often overleaps the ritual and ceremonial bonds that would contract the affections and confine them within the narrow circle of clanship. Our appeal, then, is not to the warmer and more expansive parts of the Hebrew writings, but to the very Pentateuch itself. What more effectual method could have been taken to repress and break down every fanatical feeling of national pride, than the humbling declaration the Jew was required to make in one of the most solemn acts of his religious worship? "And thou shalt go unto the priest that shall be in those days, and thou shalt say unto him; I declare this day, before the Lord thy God, that I have come unto the land which the Lord swear to give unto our fathers. And the priest shall take the basket from thy hand, and he shall present it before the altar of the Lord thy God. Then shalt thou answer and say before the Lord—A poor perishing Syrian was my father, when he went down into Egypt; and he sojourned there with a few, and became there a nation great, strong, and numerous. And then the Egyptians, too, oppressed him, and afflicted him, and put upon him a cruel service. And he cried unto the Lord God of our fathers, and he heard our voice, and he beheld our trouble, and our hard labor, and our oppression. And the Lord brought us out from Egypt, with a strong hand, and with a stretched out arm, and with great terror, and with signs and wonders." Deut. 26: 4—10.

It was in view of this humbling origin, and this sore oppression, of his fathers in a foreign land, that the Jew was commanded to "love, and pity," and relieve the stranger. The very facts in his history which might have been turned to the cherishing of rancor and malevolence, or to a misanthropic feeling of revenge, such as in later periods brought upon them the stigma of being *hostes hu-*

mani generis, enemies of the human race—these facts, we say, were made the very ground on which the Mosaic law enjoined the warmest and purest benevolence towards the wretched and defenceless of every nation. “Before the hoary head shalt thou rise up; thou shalt honor the face of the aged man; and thou shalt fear thy God—I am the Lord. And should there be the stranger sojourning with you in thy land, thou shalt not oppress him. But the stranger that dwelleth with thee shall be unto thee even as one born among you, *and thou shalt love him as thine own self*. For ye yourselves were strangers in the land of Egypt.—*I am the Lord.*” Levit. 19 : 33.

So also, Deut. 10 : 17, “For the Lord your God is the God of gods and the Lord of lords. He is the great, and strong, and fearful God who wilt not regard persons, nor receive bribes.” That is, He is no mere local or national divinity; or Ζεὺς πατριώτης; and although for special purposes connected with the best interests, ultimately of the human race, he exercises a special care over the nation of Israel, yet in the great matters of eternal justice, he regardeth not persons; he knoweth no national differences,—he is turned aside from his immutable equity by no offerings or ritual, even of his own most cherished appointment. He it is, proceeds the solemn declaration of the law—“He it is that executeth the judgment of the fatherless and the widow, and who loveth the stranger, to give unto him food and raiment. Wherefore thou also must love the stranger; *for ye yourselves were strangers in the land of Egypt.*”

Two motives are here appealed to as the *ground* and *sanction* of the law,—motives as far as possible removed from the outward, the formal, and the carnal,—one coming up from the deepest fountain of tenderness, from the most inward emotions of the human spirit,—the other coming down from the higher and most spiritual conceptions of the Divine character. “For ye also were strangers”—as though it had been one of the Divine designs, that, in this school of experience, they should learn to cherish a spirit of sympathizing tenderness for all the oppressed. Again, “For the Lord your God, He executeth the judgment of the fatherless and the widow—*He loveth the stranger;*” as though the mere fact of defencelessness gave some kind of claim upon his protection, and upon his righteous intervention in case of any wrong arising out of their helpless state.

It was but the echo of this ancient voice; as it came down the long valley of tradition, which so impressed upon the primitive Greek theology those similar doctrines that stand out in such bright relief amid the darkness of the Homeric and Hesiodean polytheism. These striking Old Testament attributes of the Deity (if we may so style them in consequence of their being almost entirely peculiar to the olden scripture) appear in the strong no-

tions so early and universally entertained of the *sacred* duty of hospitality, and especially of kindness to suppliants, however guilty in some respects they might be who had fled to us for protection. Hence, the farther we go back among all nations, the more distinct and emphatic do we find the moral injunctions under this head, and the ascriptions of corresponding qualities to their chief deity or deities. Hence, too, the duty of hospitality or of kindness to strangers, as strangers, came to be ranked, not merely among civil and social, but rather among *religious* obligations. It was classed among the duties styled *δσια*, or *τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, in distinction from the merely *δικαία*, or *τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους*. The discharge of it was regarded as an act of *piety* rather than of *justice*; the violation was looked upon as an *impiety* peculiarly calculated to call down the vengeance of Heaven. Hence, the epithet *Ζεὺς ἑξάνιος*, so strikingly suggestive of this same spiritual appellation, "*The stranger's God*." Hence the touching lines of Homer, so much in the spirit, and almost in the language, of the Mosaic precept—

Ἀλλ' ὅδε τις δόστηνος ἀλώμενος ἐνθάδ' ἱκάνει
Τὸν νῦν χρὴ κομίσαι——

Odyss. vi., 206.

Or the still more tender expressions—Odyss. xiv., 56.

Ἐεῖν' οὐ μοι θεμὺς ἔστ', οὐδ' εἰ κεντὼν σέθεν ἔλθοι
ἔεινον ἀτιμῆσαι——

I must not turn away the stranger, nor inquire
If crime has brought thee here; a worse than thou
Should still receive my aid.

And then follow the lines which are repeated in both these examples, and whose proverbial form and style intimate, that from "the olden time" they had been regarded as containing the religious ground of the duty—

πρὸς γὰρ Διὸς εἰσιν ἅπαντες
ἔειναι τε πτωχοὶ τε——

Jove's special care
Are strangers poor and friendless.

It is the very style and voice of the Scriptures. "Love ye, therefore the stranger; for the Lord loveth the stranger."

There is another illustration of the ancient ideas on this subject, so striking that we cannot omit referring to it. So peculiarly a favorite of Heaven was this virtue of kindness to the stranger supposed to be, that the celestial powers were said to disguise themselves in order to make trial of human hospitality. As in the

Odyssey XVII. 484, where a gross act of violence is thus rebuked—

οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἔβαλες δούστηνον ἀλήτην
 Οὐλομεν'. εἰ δὲ ποῦ τις ἐπουράνιος θεὸς ἔστιν,
 καὶ τε θεοὶ ξείνοισιν εὖισκῶτες ὕλλοδαμοῖσιν
 παντοίοι τελέθοντες, ἐπιστροφῶσι πόληας
 ἀνθρώπων, ἔβρον τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἔφορῶντες.

Not to thine honor, didst thou deal the blow,
 O impious wretch, upon the stranger's head.
 If there's a God in heaven, He saw the wrong,
 Or, as old legends tell, Heavenly Powers
 In stranger's semblance, taking various forms
 Do sometimes visit the abodes of men,
 Disguised spectators of the wrongs they do,
 And all their kindly deeds.¹

Here too the Bible and tradition seem to agree. The argument is Scriptural. The motive presented is strikingly similar to that given in Heb. 13 : 2; "Forget not to entertain the *stranger*; for in so doing some have entertained angels unawares."

In enumeration of great crimes and impieties, as they are often presented by the Greek poets, the three on the list of highest enormity are generally, the violation of the oath, the violation of the filial duty, and, thirdly, the denial of hospitality and refuge to the stranger and the suppliant. It was as though their crimes, more than all others, called aloud upon the Universal Parent and Guardian,—more strongly than all others touched the vibrating chord that connects our social human relations with the invisible Justice in the heavens. Hence those against whom they were committed were called *μνηστήματα*, *causes of the Divine displeasure*; appellants against their wrong doers to the ever wakeful Divine Vengeance.

The parable of the man who fell among thieves, or of the Good Samaritan, is supposed by many to have been intended as a rebuke to the narrow, clannish, spirit of the Jews, and to teach a cosmopolition or universal philanthropy. It is, therefore, a favorite passage with a certain class of reformers, who are generally distinguished for their dislike to the Old Testament and the Mosaic law. The mention, too, of the priest and levite gratifies another

¹ In our somewhat loose version of the passage, we have rendered the Greek word, *εὖισκῶτες*, rather freely: and yet, we think, so as to present the intended significance. It literally means "*reverence for law*," or "a law revering conduct." The *good law*, however, thus referred to is this law of hospitable deeds—this universal custom, or sentiment, which it was deemed an *impiety* to violate. It became in this way, a part of the ancient "*law of nations*," as though it had been designed, in the moral providence of God, as some compensation for many of the opposite evils which prevailed in those rude and warlike, yet sincere and religious ages.

feeling, by giving them an occasion of railing against the present church and ministry. The Jewish legislation, among its other faults, was deficient, they say, in not defining the word *neighbor* or in giving it too narrow and local an acceptation. Christ they affirm, meant to take it from this clannish meaning, and to give it a significance coextensive with humanity. Such a view, however, is itself definite, and would seem to have come from allowing their own one-sidedness to blind them to some of the most important inferences from this striking parable. The clannish spirit *may* be rebuked in it. This, doubtless, was one object, although it is fairly to be inferred that the man who fell among thieves was himself a Jew as well as the priest and levite who passed by. But may it not have been designed also as a rebuke to that spirit of abstract and ideal benevolence which would equally destroy the true meaning of the word *neighbor* by expanding it to an inflated bubble, to a heartless and vague conception of "humanity," or "being in general." The one perversion is as bad as the other, and, therefore, the spirit of the parable seems to be in like opposition to both. Our true *neighbor* is not merely the man allied to us by blood, or by family neighborhood, or national ties, although these have also their own appropriate sacredness; neither is he, on the other hand, merely one who possesses that thing so ill defined, and so little capable of possessing any warm and kindly feeling—our *common nature*, or a share in our *common being*. This, even if it had the requisite power to move, would still be liable to the same objection as the first. It would still be clannish, although on a larger, and therefore weaker scale. It would still be allied to selfishness. It would still present, if not a false, at least a motive lower than the true. The strong claim upon us is not that the man possesses our *common being*, or our *common nature*, or our *common humanity*, any more than that he possesses our *common kindred blood*. It is no one of these so much as the simple yet touching fact, that he is a being capable of being distressed, and actually in distress, and that it is in our power to help him. The motive presented in God's Word is of no generic, or abstract, any more than it is of any clannish kind. It is no more grounded on the idea of race, in the widest sense of the term, or of nature, or of humanity, than on that of family. It is simply a recognition of the authority, and loving-kindness, and tender mercy of the Lord our God, who commands us to relieve the miserable and the needy, because we ourselves are needy, very needy and we must, therefore, be kind to our neighbor, and love our neighbor, as we would expect our common God to love and pity us. This is the simple morality of the Old Testament, which the transcendental philanthropist would affect to hold so lightly in his search for some more abstract and philosophical motive. "What ye would that men should do to you, that do ye to them; *for this is the law and the prophets.*"

'Love ye, therefore, the stranger, for ye were strangers once, and the Lord your God loveth the stranger.'

The question then still recurs—Who is our true neighbor? He is just the one, we answer, whom the word in its most literal etymological acceptation would denote. He is the *one nearest to us*—our *vicinus*—ὁ πλησιέστερος ἑμῶν—the most contiguous object in distress, whoever he may be,—of whatever kindred, country, world,—of whatever character, class, or order of being. He is our *neighbor*. With him should we immediately begin the work of an ever-widening benevolence; not starting with abstractions and universalities, and ever abiding there, but in the order which God and nature both seem to point out, with the immediate circle around us, with the men who have fallen among thieves in our own immediate neighborhood, and so from thence, expanding until the concentric circles of our practical philanthropy embrace the world.

If, however, we had actually to decide between them, we should not hesitate to say, that the clannish, the family, or the national feeling, or *instinct* (as some might choose to stigmatize it) is really higher in the scale of virtue than this abstract philanthropy which so affects to despise it as low and narrow. The first has certainly something higher than selfishness, though doubtless borrowing from this source much of its strength. It may be said to be narrow, and yet it brings out a power of rich and intense emotion which compensates in one direction, for its limited extent in the other. A man is all the better man for having a home, and for loving strongly his home, his children, his neighbors, his immediate friends and acquaintances. The other feeling, in proportion to its false expansion, is dry, flatulent, "puffing up," and, in this way, heart-hardening. It cheats the soul with the gaseous luxury of sentiment, and by thus satisfying it, keeps it away from all warm, and practical, and self-denying benevolence. Its love is a gnostic theory—its philanthropy is an eristic philosophy, a war of casuistry, a strife of logomachris. (See 1 Tim. 6: 4, 5.) Its ambitious passion for doing something afar off, or on a large scale, blinds it to the more obvious duties of a less self-inflating and self-exalting nature; and hence is solved the apparent mystery of the strange affinity between this boasting love on the one hand, and censoriousness, uncharitableness, strife,—in short, some of the very worst aspects of our depraved humanity, on the other.

It might perhaps be said, that the family, or kindred, or merely social feeling, as a moral motive, is condemned—Math. 5: 46—"If ye love those who love you, what reward have ye &c." Some have even gone so far as to say that the gospel denies to *friendship* any place among the virtues. To all this, however, it may be replied, in the first place, that in that passage there is nothing condemned at all, but only an exhortation to a higher prin-

ciple; and secondly, that if condemned, it is neither the same feeling nor the same relation. Allusion is there made to the lower affection of loving others simply for something they have personally done to us. This is lower than the love of children, friends, and neighbors, from the pure social affection irrespective of any personal advantage to be derived from them. It is, in other words, simply *gratitude*—a feeling growing out of selfishness, yet rising above it. It is the youngest of the virtues,—the first outgrowth of the heavenly Eros from the dark womb of the earthly parent. Christ does not condemn it. He only directs the mind to a higher principle,—the doing good to those who, instead of doing good to us, are hostile and seek our hurt.

But even when we are commanded to love our enemies, it must mean those with whom we are in immediate conflict, and in this way have reference to immediate practical duty. The command too, is predicated on no abstract philanthropy, but seems to keep in view our more immediate relations to each other and to God. We are, in fact, addressed as those who have no right to have enemies, because we are all sharers of the common depravity. We are all, by nature, *enemies* to God, and are, therefore, called upon to love and become reconciled to our human foes if we would become reconciled to the common ruler and judge of all;—"That we may thus become the children of our Father in heaven, who causeth his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust."

There is in the Old Testament a spiritual sense. We mean by this nothing cabalistical or fanciful, or mystical, but that deep and holy wisdom, which, although not obtruded upon by the profane, or superficial reader, is yet presented without any forced interpretation to the spiritually-minded Christian, whether learned or unlearned. The Sadducee may have read it with all honesty; and yet he found no proof of a soul, or of a separate spiritual state. Christ, however, discovered it at once, in one of the most common and oft repeated texts, which, doubtless, the blind Sadducee had read hundreds of times without seeing anything remarkable in the language or the thought. The Savior, perhaps, merely gave the interpretation that prevailed among all the pious Israelites of his day, and which was well known to Simeon, to Anna, to Eleazar, and to many others who were looking for the kingdom of heaven. To such a spiritually-minded one, the declaration, "I am the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob," ever presented that blessed state, or place, into which "the fathers" had entered as into their resting place in the Divine pavilion, "the secret place" "beneath the shadow of his wings," in which they abode in peace, when he was yet "*their* God"—"the God, not of the dead but of the living," and where they, although long since dead to earth and earthly things, did yet most truly and personally *live unto HIM.*" The

Sadducee saw in this familiar, yet, in itself, strange language of the promise, only a "form of words," a mere *usus loquendi*, to use the favorite hermeneutical phrase with which critics of the Whately school explain all difficulties. It was an ancient form of words, a mere metaphor, with little or no meaning. Their striking peculiarity long familiar usage had served to veil from his earthly mind. So also, the solemn declaration—"Lord, Thou art our dwelling-place in all generations,"—to the Sadducee, as to the modern rationalist, sounded only of temporal deliverance, and temporal salvation. To one who was "a Jew inwardly," it was the clear revelation of the far higher truth—that the belief in the eternity of a spiritual God is inseparably connected with the thought of the eternal safety and blessedness of all those whose God he styles himself, and respecting whom he repeats the declaration ages after they had departed from the earth. Thus each derived his own meaning from the passage, and each may be said to have derived a true meaning perhaps, in some sense of the term; for the Scriptures may be regarded as containing a higher and a lower significance, or a greater or less amount of significance, according to the capacities of each soul for its reception. But the satisfied Sadducee felt perfectly content with earth. He confessed not "that he was a pilgrim and sojourner" upon it. He was not "seeking a better country, a city which had foundations;" and, therefore, to him the door of the inner sanctuary of the word was never opened. He read the ancient book of his fathers, and found therein neither angel nor spirit, nor spiritual life, nor world to come, nor, in short, anything to explain the mysterious care and providence exercised towards beings of so little value when regarded as having no connection with the invisible and eternal state.

A peculiar feature of the Old Testament is the prominence it everywhere gives to the doctrine of a particular providence. It maintains upon the mind a continual sense of the Divine presence. God is everywhere, and in every event; and although we must suppose him also concerned in overruling the affairs of every other nation, yet in respect to Israel the curtain seems to have been raised. In one narrow direction the supernatural machinery is disclosed; and God is presented as taking part in all the events of this remarkable history. It is this which gives to the pages of the Old Testament, even in the simplest narrative parts, a holy and supernatural aspect. It is this which impresses on the mind, even of the spiritual reader, an awe which is not so strikingly felt in the reading of the New Testament; and which renders this old book so intolerable to the mere naturalist, or the trifling wit, or the profane worldling. God is somehow felt to be very near in these Scriptures; and it is this which makes them so very proper in the earliest instructions of children, if we would wish to form in them

a truly religious character, grounded not on a childish rationalising, but on that "*fear of the Lord* which is the only true beginning of all wisdom." Along with this, too, there is a simplicity, an indiscribable truthfulness, which *commands* assent, even in its most marvellous narrations. It never seems to manifest any distrust of its own claims upon our belief;—it dreads no objection;—avoids no statement out of deference to any system of philosophy. The *extreme personality* of its representations of the Deity seems to have been intended to meet, face to face, that other extreme of a pantheistic or naturalistic, and sometimes mystic *impersonality*, to which the depraved human soul is ever inclined, and the more so, because it assumes so philosophical an aspect. The very boldness of its style therefore, allows no part of the charge of inconsistency in portraying every part of the Divine character. It shrinks not from the most terrific imagery in setting forth the sterner attributes of the Deity, whilst it employs (and sometimes almost in immediate connection) the most melting figures in the description of "His loving-kindness and tender mercy."

No mistake can be greater, than to suppose that the Old Testament indulges in harsher views of the character of God than the New. In truth, the latter being mainly didactic or preceptive, falls even behind it in the melting language of mercy; and if the penitent wishes for the most moving terms to soothe his fears, and inspire his hopes, he must resort to the pages of David and the Prophets. To refer to all the passages we have in view, would be to quote whole chapters. "The Lord knoweth our frame; he remembereth that we are but dust." "As a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth those that fear him." "For a very little while have I forsaken—thee, but with great compassions will I gather thee. In a mere *moment* of wrath hid I my face from thee, but with the loving kindness of an *eternity* will I have mercy on thee, saith the Lord thy Redeemer." Isaiah 54 : 7, 8. Gesenius here would render עָנַן *inundatio*, as though allied to עָנָן. The translation, however, which we have given is that of the Jewish traditional lexicography, and is clearly demanded by the designed antithesis which appears from a comparison of the two verses, and which the conjectural rendering of Gesenius utterly destroys. The Hebrew word occurs but once, and yet the sense seems clear. The contrast is between the comparative momentariness of the wrath,¹ and the eternity of God's loving-kindness towards his chosen. We are aware how much, and how plausibly, some may object to the full rendering, "*eternity*," which we have given to the Hebrew עָנָן, and the corresponding Greek words; but it makes but little difference, in passages of this kind, even if we concede all the limitations they would put upon the language. It

¹ The traditional rendering of the Jewish lexicographers is also favored by the Septuagint version—ἐν θυμῷ μικρῷ.

is the swelling, the hyperbole, the impassible mounting up of the thought which manifests itself under any version. Be it rendered "ages," or "ages of ages," if any will have it so—the *moment of wrath, the loving-kindness of the ages*,—still is the soul, in these and similar expressions, carried away out of and beyond, and above the present world, to those conceptions of the boundless, æonian state, which all language must fail to represent. Again—How do these old Scriptures abound in the most moving declarations, not only of the permanence, but also of the intensity of the Divine love—'Can a mother forget her sucking child? Yea, she *may* forget; yet will not I forget thee saith the Lord.' "I have graven thee on the palms of my hands. Thy name is in continual remembrance before me." "Fear not thou worm Jacob, I will help thee, saith the Lord. Thy Maker is thy husband, (thy covenant God), the Holy One of Israel,—thy Redeemer."

Sometimes, too, we find the awful equilibrium of the Divine character maintained, and apparently opposing attributes boldly set forth in the same passage. As in Nahum 1: 1, &c. "The Lord is jealous and taketh vengeance. The Lord is slow to anger yet will he not acquit the wicked. The Lord hath his way in the whirlwind and the storm; the clouds are the dust of his feet. The mountains tremble; the hills melt; the earth is burned at his presence. Who can stand before his indignation? And who can abide in the fierceness of his anger? His fury is poured forth like fire, and the rocks are thrown down by it.' How sudden, and yet how consistent with the never-to-be-imitated style of inspiration is the transition. "*The Lord is good—He is a strong hold in the day of trouble,—He knoweth those that put their trust in Him.*"

ARTICLE II.

EXTREMES IN THEOLOGY.

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It is important, now as ever, that against every form of false theology, the church of Christ should be faithfully warned and wisely guarded. Yet the danger most imminent at the present day, is not we apprehend, that of gross heresy. Nay, it may be doubted if at any period in the history of the church that has been the chief danger. It is not to be expected, that men professedly orthodox should deny outright any leading article of the faith, or set forth as such any dogma wholly false. Nor is it thus commonly, in point of fact, that corruptness takes its rise in evangelical

communities. It is in the re-fashioning of old elements, rather than the foisting in of new ones. It is in forcing some acknowledged truth out of place or out of shape. It is, especially, in straining points—in pressing things beyond their just limits—in passing from the safe middle path of a well balanced and symmetrical theology into various extremes.

Ultraism, indeed, is not peculiar to matters of religion. In relation to all subjects the human mind has ever been falling into it, and ever oscillating between opposites. But nowhere, perhaps, have tendencies of this sort been more apparent than within the pale of the church. How prone have been the leading polemics especially, to one-sided views. And what a swinging of the common mind has there often been from pole to pole—in what cycles has it run. Some are of the opinion, that as with the mechanism of a clock, so in the world's history, it is only by means of a pendulous movement progress is achieved. We rather think, however, this perpetual vibration a hindrance to true progress; that it comes of the jarring and friction of disordered machinery, rather than of a harmony like that of the spheres. It is no part of heaven; and it can scarce be known on earth, when "the watchmen see eye to eye." Duly to expose it, and to suggest the proper preventive and remedial treatment, can be no unworthy aim—especially at the present day, when if Christianity suffers at all, it is not so much at the hand of open enemies as of its professed friends.

It may be well, at the outset, to explain still more fully what we mean by the phrase, *EXTREMES IN THEOLOGY*. Nor can this be better done, than by entering to some extent into particulars. A delicate task this, yet not difficult for lack of materials. There is scarcely a department or a topic in divinity but affords something in point. In selecting here and there, we shall avail ourselves of certain just and convenient generalizations.

First, then, we may consider theology as consisting mainly of two great elements, the *Divine* and the *human*. The sum of it is, *God* dealing with *man*; what God is and what God does, what man is and what man does. In a perfect system, these two departments are presented not only in their proper distinctness, but in due correlation. They are made to harmonize—neither being allowed to trench upon the other, but each assuming its due importance. Yet no error is more common than the overlooking or disparaging the one or the other—the undue exaltation of the human, or the pressing out of its proper place or proportions some aspect of the Divine.

On the one hand, for example, in the effort to divest the character of God of all imperfection, he is diligently set forth as "without passions." And this is very well, if nothing more is meant than to exclude the grossness of human passion, and to include

only such affections as are proper to an infinite spirit. But the matter is overdone. It is forgotten that man was made in God's image—that the anthropopathy of the Bible has a meaning—and that we must retain our hold upon it, if we would keep the Divine character within the sphere of human apprehension and sympathy. On the other hand, the Divine is sometimes so humanized as to lose its peculiar glory. Its unchangeableness is compromised; its justice is in peril; its impassibility comes to be questioned—yea, even by ancient or modern Patripassians to be stoutly denied.—By one class, the agency of God in nature and providence is so magnified, as almost to exclude all other agency. There are scarce left you what are commonly called nature's laws. You are brought back to the old Cartesian theory of occasional causes. The whole creation is but a vast system of opportunities for the direct putting forth of God's power—an immense transparency which serves only to show God working. Nor is this view confined to unintelligent being. The Divine efficiency is so set forth as to make God's will, virtually, the only will in the universe. In a moral sense, he not only creates good, but he also creates evil. From a distinguished American pulpit such language as the following has been uttered:—"When Moses called upon Pharaoh to let the people go, God stood by him and moved him to refuse. When Moses interceded for him, and procured him respite, God stood by him and moved him to exult in his obstinacy. When the people departed from his kingdom, God stood by him and moved him to pursue after them with increased malice and revenge. And what God did on such particular occasions, he did at all times. He continually hardened his heart, and governed all his actions, from the day of his birth to the day of his death." By a different class of reasoners, everything is resolved into natural law, the connection of which with God's power is scarcely recognised. He is well nigh shut out of his own creation. A self-determination is ascribed to the human will scarcely compatible either with Divine government or with human dependence. Instead of looking for God in providence, they look for man there. They discourse of human progress, as if its causes were in man rather than in God,—in our inherent goodness and energy, rather than in the Divine beneficence, wisdom and power;—as if nature, fallen and corrupt, had not a constant downward tendency—as if its only hope were not in supervening grace.

The doctrine of election is pressed by some into the highest supralapsarian form—taking men, as Dr. Gill expresses it, "in the pure mass of creatureship," and that not actual, but possible and predetermined. By others, it is not merely reduced to the sublapsarian level, but virtually denied, being made a mere general purpose to save those who repent and believe.—In one quarter,

² Rev. Dr. Emmons: Sermon on Reprobation.

the atonement is, for the supposed honoring of Divine justice, distorted into the commerical form—the endurance by the Redeemer of just the amount of suffering to which the redeemed were liable. It is no boon to the whole of our race, but a special favor to the elect portion. In another quarter, not only does it embrace the whole world, but an over-sensitiveness is felt as to any application to it of the term penalty. Nay, we have heard of late, that so far from having any penal character, or being designed to meet objective or governmental difficulties, it is mainly of subjective value. It is for man's convenience, so to speak, rather than God's. It is but an "altar form," an "æsthetic" arrangement, suited to dispel all fear of penalty, and to inspire confidence in God as a loving father.—The doctrine of justification, while some so shape it, for the magnifying of Divine grace, as to involve more or less antinomian error, is so held by others, as to make those works of man which are but the superstructure, a component part of the foundation.

In the matter of the sinners turning to God, the Holy Spirit is by some made to do all. Means are nothing—human effort is nothing. The unrenewed are represented, indeed, as under an entire and unqualified inability. To such lengths is this view pressed, that room is scarce left for self-condemnation. By others, the sinner is made to do all, or that so nearly, that he is in no little danger of taking the glory to himself. No distinction is made between regeneration and conversion. Motives are presented by man, and urged by the Spirit. The sinner looks at them as at any other motives, wills as on any other subject, and the work is done. Thus, from the doctrine of purely physical efficiency on the one hand, you pass to the baldest moral suasion on the other. And, like opposites are met with, in relation to the whole subject of Christian progress. In regard to its certainty, as embraced in the doctrine of the saint's perseverance, while in one quarter, the Divine power only being taken into view, a fatal lapse is judged impossible; in another, not only is it deemed as it should be—having regard only to man's strength—quite possible, but it is believed to be often matter of fact.

There are like diversities as to the elements of Christian character. Faith is held by some to be mainly a persuasion on the part of an individual that God's love has embraced him—a sort of intuition of the Divine decrees. By others, the element of affiance is scarcely recognised, and a moral likeness, a oneness of feeling chiefly insisted on. By some, a sort of benevolence is required more disinterested than that inculcated by either Moses or Christ—a transcendental annihilation of self—a willingness to be damned as an indispensable preliminary to being saved. By others it is affirmed, that "of all specific voluntary action, happiness is the end;" advantage is made the foundation of virtue—"gain," on a

large scale, "godliness"—and countenance given to that love for Christ on the sinner's part which is awakened solely by the notion that Christ loves him.

So much concerning theology, as resolvable into the Divine and the human. It may be taken in another view, as embracing the *spiritual* and the *formal*—piety in the heart, and the manifestations and helps of piety. To each of these elements—both important in their place and proportion—undue prominence has often been given. By one man, creeds and constitutions are deemed the chief fastenings of orthodoxy. Let these, be diligently used, and the faith will be in little danger. By another, they are pronounced mere ropes of sand—like "the spider's most attenuated thread;" and our chief reliance is alleged to be on certain spiritual instincts—on a certain quietistic brooding over nothing—a staring into intellectual vacancy, with a pleasing expectation, that out of the "vast deep," shapes of truth will at length appear. In one direction, you find the Church exalted above even God's Word. It becomes a sort of many-headed Pope. It is infallible. Nothing is done rightly, that is not done church-wise, or as the church would have it. Any species of voluntary association for religious purposes, is little short of impiety. In another direction, we have nothing but voluntarism. There is nothing much more Divine about the church, and scarcely anything more venerable, than about a temperance society, or the Society for the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor. With one class, ministerial functions are unduly magnified, the functions especially of those, who along the wires of succession—rusty and foul enough in places—through the Cretan labyrinth of the dark ages, have received the genuine apostolic fluid. With another class, a clergyman is only a respectable and pious professional gentleman, having little more a sacred calling than the sexton or the undertaker. External observances, on the one hand, are deemed of unspeakable moment. The baptismal ceremony confers grace—confirmation strengthens it—the eucharist augments it. The various rites are not simply expressions, but potencies. All rites, on the other hand, are lightly esteemed—the inward exercise is deemed everything, the outward sign nothing. So from the utmost extravagance of Puseyitish formalism in one direction, you may pass in the other to the inward light, the formless piety of orthodox Quakerism. Nay, within our own observation—in the most evangelical of our churches—how often do we perceive an undue reliance either on merely outward proprieties and decencies, or in quite another line, on changeful and evanescent frames and feelings.

These few specimens must suffice to identify the sort of error we have in view. It may be instructive to glance next at its *main sources*. These are threefold, the limitation of the human powers—individual peculiarities—and the influence of circumstances.

As to the first of these, there are themes too vast for us in every field of inquiry—themes so vast, that we do but partially grasp them, and so are ever in danger of one-sided theories. God's mind can take in, by a single intuition, the whole universe—all its parts, however minute or multitudinous, with all their mutual relations. But *we* get beyond our depth in a single drop of water; a single blade of grass, as we study it, stretches out beyond our ken. We are much in the predicament of the insect creeping slowly up the lofty column, and attempting to scan the pile of architecture to which it belongs. Especially is it so in relation to Christianity, that most stupendous and glorious fabric of God, magnified by Him above all his name—that mystery of mysteries into which angels desire to look—into which they have been looking since the world began, but which in all its vastness even their mighty intellects are far from having fully explored. With man there is, besides, a peculiar disability. He is, at the best, a depraved being—the blight and the palsy of sin, though chiefly felt in the affections, have yet extended, more or less, to all his powers. And as to no subject, of course, is this influence so manifest as Divine truth. So it comes to pass, that in no one mind, even the purest and most gifted, do we find a perfectly symmetrical theology. Something is always wanting—something a little out of shape. To embrace the whole, just as it should be, we need to have all good theologians, or the good points of all, combined in one. We need, with the eclecticism of inspiration, to cull from all their systems. Just as in the excellence of the one man Jesus, there were commingled and perfected all the various excellencies of all the Scripture worthies. No wonder, then, that extremes of doctrine meet us in every direction. No superfluous work is it, to "exhort one another daily" against all such corruptness.

But *individual peculiarities* are also to be taken into the account; and their name is legion. The author of "Ancient Christianity" has it in view, he has lately told us, to trace the peculiarities of all the prominent religious sects to the minds chiefly concerned in founding them. It is to be hoped he may be spared to accomplish his purpose. Meanwhile it is not difficult for ordinary inquirers to achieve something in the same direction. How manifest is it, that Luther lives yet—in his personal excellence and his personal faults—in the creed to which he has given his name. His generous, magnanimous spirit, and his humble trustfulness in the prominence, he has given to the doctrine of justification by faith; his tenderness of conscience, and his conflict with its terrors, in his high-toned and somewhat distorted theory of imputation; his abhorrence of formalism, misapplied, in his lax views of the Christian Sabbath; and his profound reverence for God's Word, not wholly guided by knowledge, in his too literal interpretation of the passages relating to the eucharist. Who can fail to see, in the peculiar views of Zwingle, traces of that freedom and

independence of thought, so congenial, it would seem, with the mountain scenery amid which he dwelt, and which the storms, both elemental and political, that spent their fury there, served but to promote? It is remarkable what a coincidence there is, in important points, between his mode of theologizing and that which obtained, as the result of somewhat similar circumstances and training, in our own New England. Calvinism, in its sharp, rigid features—its intellectuality—its stern inflexibility—its majestic calmness—its trustful, upward look, how does it remind you of its author—so far as earthly author it had—dying amid the Syndics of Geneva?—Who that has studied the character of Wesley, but perceives that the whole doctrine, and polity, and genius of Methodism, is but that character re-embodied?—After following the elder Edwards through his college studies and his ministerial life, from his table to his study, from his study to his closet, from his closet to his pulpit—after noting his power of analysis, his self-renunciation, his chastened austerity, the dignity and absoluteness of his family rule, his coolness of temperament, and his devotion to principle—who could look for a scheme of divinity much unlike that he has given us? It has been thought by some, that the religious opinions of men are apt to express themselves in the very countenance; so that in a circle of portraits, it would not be hard to distinguish the Methodist, for example, from the Presbyterian, and both from the Prelatist. But it may be questioned whether the peculiarities of character expressed be not to some extent a cause, rather than simply a result. The creed may have been fashioned by them, rather than they by the creed. Some men seem born to entertain a particular set of opinions—originally predisposed to be Baptists or Pseudo-baptists, Arminians or Calvinists, Independents or “Churchmen.”

Space would fail us to notice all those traits or habits of mind which may lead to the misshaping of particular doctrines. Sometimes it results from a low state of piety—sometimes from an excessive fondness for theorizing—often from a desire of originality. Many of the strange and pernicious fancies promulgated in Germany, so numerous and so very fanciful, that to the theologues of that land has been pleasantly assigned “the empire of the air,” have had their origin, doubtless, in an effort, by a show of novelty, for the sake either of fame or of bread, to draw around the professor’s chair a large class of students. Nor is a morbid and perilous craving for the pleasure or the reputation of originality confined to Germany. Some there are even among us, who seem to prefer new and dazzling errors to plain old truths. A like result may come of undue self-confidence, forbidding a resort to the best means of correcting error. So from the habit of excessive concentrativeness, or a too exclusive dwelling on some particular topic. There are hobbies, if we may be allowed the term,

in the theological, as well as the literary and political world. Prophecy, for example, or some particular point of prophecy, as the restoration of the Jews, the destruction of mystical Babylon, or the battle with Gog and Magog. Some ingenious theory of regeneration, some peculiar view of the atonement, or some unique representation of the Trinity. Extreme views sometimes result from a love of the bold and the startling, or an ambitious desire of rhetorical effect. It is not alone in the splendid productions of Macaulay, or on the historic page, that a fondness for brilliant antithesis has sometimes strained truth out of shape, and error into truth.

The influence of circumstances, it was remarked, is concerned in the formation of extravagant views. They have an indirect bearing, of course, as they have to do with the fashioning of individual character. But they have, also, a direct influence. Controversy often drives men into extremes. Many a man, doubtless, has been made a heretic, or at least more one-sided, by being hard pushed. A particular extreme in which you find either an individual or a community, will often appear, on inquiry, to be simply a *reaction*. The mind, in that pendulous movement to which it is so prone, does more than escape from some other extreme. It is driven past the legitimate point of rest. So was it, as we have already hinted, with the great Reformer. So, to some extent, with Puritan England in Cromwell's time. Probably there is not one of our readers who might not detect in himself some overstrained view, to which he has fled, almost unconsciously, as a refuge from its opposite. Or, it may be apparent, that obliquities of opinion on some subjects, are at present rife in the community, and need to be rebuked; and in the effort to set things right, they may be pushed as much awry in another direction. Certain extravagant teachings on the subject of human ability, for example, uttered abundantly from our pulpits some twenty years ago, were justified, or at least excused, it will be remembered, on the ground that impotence and passivity had been so immoderately taught. Only the opposite view, it was thought, could move the people; and so error was unwisely invoked to cast out error.

From the origin of extremes in religious doctrine, we pass to *the evils which spring from them*. These are numerous and serious. Errors in principle are ever worse than mere errors in act. Far better adopt a wrong measure in religion, than preach a wrong doctrine. The measure may be of evil influence; like the spring torrent it may carry ruin in its course. But, like that, it is in its nature temporary; while error, once received, is like a perennial fountain.

Of the class of errors in hand, it may be observed, first, *they take from our spiritual being its appropriate nutriment*, and substitute

that which is hurtful. As food is essential to the health and growth of the body, so is truth to our spiritual health and growth. And as our physical being requires food of a wholesome sort, fitly prepared, and without any noxious admixture, so with the soul. To its highest good it is essential that it live upon pure truth—clearly presented, fully apprehended, undistorted, uncorrupted. The body, it is true, has great power of accommodation; it may live on, with a degree of strength, in spite of no little unwholesomeness of aliment; in spite even of small quantities of poison mingled with its food. Yet some harm it must suffer; and as surely, yea more surely—in proportion as the spiritual machinery is more delicate than the material—must the soul suffer from any the least corruptness of doctrine. Merely misrepresent a truth—shade it improperly, or give it undue prominence—dwarf it or exaggerate it, take any extravagant view of it—and the wants of the soul are not fully met; something is detracted not only from its intellectual well-being, but from its spiritual vigor, and symmetry and beauty. A little poison is taken; and to use the mildest terms, a little harm is done. Yet that little—when we call to mind the accustomed growth of spiritual evil—how much! It may prove, indeed, the soul's ruin.

These minor errors, moreover, do ever more or less *countenance the grosser departures from truth*. Errorists of all sorts are always watching for such encouragement. Let some one-sided view be taken of the doctrine of future retribution, whether on the lenient or the severe side—as, for example, that of John Foster, that ignorance of the consequences of sin detracts from its ill desert, or that sometimes ascribed falsely to Calvinists, that multitudes of infants are among the lost—and what a joyful clamor is raised among the Universalists. They are helped alike by the concession on the one hand, and the revolting extreme of orthodoxy on the other. Let the incarnation be transformed, under evangelical shows, into a mere manifestation, or the atonement into an “artistic” representation—a scenic display for the simple purpose of moral teaching and moral suasion—and what gladness is diffused through the Socinian ranks. “Art thou become,” they cry, “like unto us?” As orthodoxy sinks, so in their view does heterodoxy rise. One piece of ultraism, advocated in respectable quarters, does more to sustain grossly heretical views, than a multitude of the most plausible direct defences. Especially are the common people in danger, as you narrow the line of demarcation between the true and the false. How shall they distinguish, or believe there can be much difference, when the one is so nearly confounded with the other?

This suggests the further remark, that extreme views not only favor gross error, *but are apt to grow into it*. This was, indeed, hinted in our opening remarks, and was not unapparent in some of the instances given by way of identifying our subject. But it

deserves in this connection to be more fully set forth. We see here the subtlety of Satan. He knows full well that the human mind is so constituted—with such an original aptitude for truth—that it can scarce receive unmingled error. No more in its theology than its morals does it become grossly vicious at once. So, trivial errors are inculcated—slight perversions of truth. And these increase unto more error. Once borne off from its proper orbit, the centripetal attraction lessened, it is easy for the human mind to go farther. Extremes tend naturally to become more extreme. It is even a proverb that extremes meet. The unity of God has been so insisted on, in connection with the incarnation, as to bring us to the very borders of a sort of pantheistic polytheism. The doctrine of depravity has been so represented as to take away all sense of guilt. The office of faith has been so magnified, as to make it the highest kind of working—even a substitute for Christ. The duty of being perfect has been so urged, as to lower the great standard of all perfection. No man can say whither his bark will drift, if he allows it to be drawn, either on the right hand or on the left, into the shifting and deceitful currents of ultraism.

We scarce need to say that the errors we speak of *dishonor God, and injure his cause*. They dishonor Him, as far as they go, in common with all error, by misrepresenting his character. They injure his cause—always by abstracting from the power of the Christian system, and often by bringing upon it needless and undeserved odium. And in this further way do they harm it, they are a fruitful source of dissensions among brethren. That the truly orthodox be kept separate from the radically unsound, is of course desirable. But it is a sad thing for those to be severed, who hold really the same great truths, even though they have fallen into the habit of dwelling somewhat too exclusively on different aspects of them. The great Presbyterian family in these United States, had one portion of it been a little less extravagant in some of its views on the divine side of theology, and the other portion leaned a little less strongly toward the human side, would, to this day, probably, have remained one undivided body. We mourn that it has not been so. For “behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity;” but “a brother offended is harder to be won than a strong city, and their contentions are like the bars of a castle.”

We add only, in this connection, that extremes in doctrine commonly *lead to extremes in practice*. So it is under our first classification. With some, for the honor of God, there is nothing but waiting; with others, in the exalting of human ability, there is nothing but striving. Here, growth is all; there, you hear only of aggression. Here, you have “new measures” in abundance; and there you have no measures. In one quarter, everything must be done in the regular way—God’s ordinances, it is said, must be trusted in; in another, little is expected from the stereotyped me

thods—all power, it would seem, inheres in novelty. Here all excitement is dreaded, as if it must needs give undue prominence to second causes—as if God's agency were only in the gentle rain, or the falling dew. There, nothing is thought to be accomplished but in a tempest of popular agitation. One would have light alone, another lightning; one can abide only the still small voice, another must have seven thunders. One would throw out truth upon the community—God's truth—as bread upon the waters, and leave it to germinate when and where He pleaseth; and is satisfied only with this method. He is afraid lest in any other he should take upon himself God's work. Another, would have the seed borne, after the manner of Harlan Page, to individual hearts; and has little hope from any process short of this. With one, the power of God's Word is everything; with another, the power of "personal effort." In respect to preaching, the reliance of some is chiefly on the skill with which the truth is set home; others would leave it, once clearly enunciated, to work its own way. We have had of late—strange to say—in one of our prominent religious quarterlies, a labored argument against the old Baxterian "application." Those unhappy excesses, which were connected with certain revivals of religion, some twenty years ago, had their origin mainly in exaggerated views of man's agency. Now, it is to be feared, we have fallen into the other extreme, and are even covering our worldliness and sloth with the pleasant names of prudence and moderation, of trust in God and reverence for his ordinances. Like contrasts we see in relation to matters of popular reform. Now you have a wild, self-confident radicalism. It would sweep away at once, with the breath of its own mouth, and the might of its own arm—with little respect either to great social laws, or to the movements of Providence—such evils as intemperance, war, and slavery. Now you have a blind and stupid conservatism, which under pretence of cleaving only to Divinely prescribed methods, is content with letting things alone; except as silence gives consent, and ingenious palliatives, salvos, and excuses serve much the same purpose as positive justification. If we turn to our second classification, the *spiritual* and the *formal*, we shall find a similar connection between doctrine and practice; as manifest, for example, in the treatment of the ministry, in the regard paid to ordinances—to baptism, to the Lord's Supper, to the Sabbath—in the attention given to church architecture and church music, and even in the formation of men's private religious habits. Specifications on these points, it is hardly needful to give, so readily will every one's reflections suggest them.

We pass to speak, in the last place, of *the proper treatment, both remedial and prophylactic*, of the evil under consideration. We might simply refer, here, to what has been said of its causes. When these, as they were set forth, cannot, in the nature of things,

be removed, we should, at least, be on our guard against their influence. But some further suggestions may be offered as to the means of securing a well-proportioned and well-balanced theology.

We mention first, *liberal culture for the ministry*. Ignorance is neither the mother of devotion, nor of any other good thing. It is, in the popular mind, a fruitful source of error, and not less in the mind of the Christian teacher. If through the predominance of grace, it leads not to rank heresy, it must needs give rise to narrow and ill-balanced views. For proof of this, we may confidently appeal to the history of every unlearned ministry the world has yet seen. Not only is divinity itself of vast compass, but it has manifold relations to other subjects. Bound together as the universe is, by ten thousand ties and affinities, all science illustrates all science; especially do all other knowledges illustrate that which is the end, the centre of all. The more ample and various a man's learning, then, the more likely it is, other things being equal, that his theology will be right. There is no department of science which in this regard may not be found profitable. Besides, amplitude of investigation enlarges the mind, and makes it more capable of complete views. Give the candidate for the ministry, then, sufficient time, and all needful facilities for a thorough course of study. No more in the classical than in the theological course, let meagerness of attainment have countenance. Dead languages and living languages, history, economics, physics, and metaphysics,—will all be helpful to safe as well as thorough theologizing. It is from half-made men, a large part of those errors have proceeded which from time to time has vexed the church. Nor should those who have entered the ministry deem the work of self-culture ended. They should take time for study, and be diligent therein, that their theological views may be growing more and more complete. They will feel, after all, at the close of their course, that they have been but "gathering pebbles on the shore of the great ocean of truth."

Another help to soundness in the faith, is *intercourse with men of various persuasions*. It is of no little advantage to be conversant with persons of various secular conditions and pursuits, and of various habits of general thinking. As minute metallic fabrics are sometimes polished by being shaken together, so by the contact of mind with mind, the excrescences and roughnesses of each are worn away. It is a felicity of the present day, that the whole world are being brought into ready intercommunication. Individuals and nations will learn from each other; each will be incited to copy the excellences of all. In our own country, especially, where men of all nations are brought together—to labor, to do business, to vote, to worship in company—an amalgam of character may be looked for, a synthesis of all that is desirable in all the varieties of our race, of all possible excellences of humanity, such

as since the Fall has never been seen. And is not a result somewhat like this to be expected in religious matters? The Christian world are getting acquainted with each other. They are having not only the denominational interchange of delegations, but congresses, and conventions, and alliances, and all on a larger and larger scale. The asperities of sectarian feeling are thus softened. There has been a great advance in this respect, within a century past. Those seem to us strange times, in which a man like Lightfoot could style one of his own controversial works, "A Battle with a Wasp's Nest," or a man like Toplady—author of some of the tenderest and sweetest hymns in our language, could entitle one of his pieces against John Wesley, "An Old Fox tarred and feathered." Now with this increase of kind intercommunication, will not the various sects learn of each other? May not combinations of excellence result, in doctrine and polity, unknown before? Is it not thus, possibly, millennial perfectness in those respects is to be attained? And where is it so likely to be first witnessed as in this free land of ours? Let us maintain, then, fraternal intercourse with our brethren in Christ of every denomination. Let us candidly study their creeds and their forms. Let us not disdain to be profited thereby, and the issue may be a more symmetrical faith both in us and in them. Let us not imagine that the church to which we happen to belong, or any other, is a perfect one. That name would be due, if at all on earth, only to an embodiment of all the excellences of every existing church.

We may be aided to avoid extremes, it may be further observed, by the study of ecclesiastical history. It is of great importance in this view. Not that in remote and shadowy antiquity we are to look for unmingled truth. Not that patristical literature is to be deemed the great thesaurus of divinity. It may be compared rather, like the kingdom of heaven, to "a net which was cast into the sea, and gathered of every kind." Not that the voice of the church is the voice of God;—that is heard only in the utterances of inspiration. The religion of Protestants is to be found wholly in the Bible. We would heartily repudiate, in the study suggested, all Puseyitish views—all resting upon tradition—all undue regard for human authority. It is chiefly useful, not so much, perhaps, in bringing to light old and precious forms of truth—though in this respect it may be of some service—as in exhuming, and for admonitory purposes showing forth old and odious forms of error. The heresies of the present day are far from being, as some fancy, new things under the sun; they are but reproductions. They have all had existence in other ages; and they come up now, much like one of the old books—the same matter in new type and binding, with now and then, under the hand of a genius, rare pictorial illustrations. It is of no little importance that this should be understood, especially by the teachers of Christianity; and that they

should see too in what these errors have ordinarily had a beginning—in what slight departures from truth, what minor obliquities and extravagances of doctrine. The lights to be sought for in ecclesiastical history, are to great extent beacon lights. Let it be resorted to with this view. Let it be well noted with what frequent oscillations of opinion the church has held on her way—like the tempest-beaten ship driven to and fro by varying winds, now nearing rocks on the one hand, and now quicksands on the other. Let the harm which has actually resulted from such alternations be well pondered, and we shall gain for the faith of the gospel an additional safeguard.

But far above all aids of this sort, we remark once more, must be placed *the study of the Scriptures*. It is one of the clearest proofs of the inspiration of the Bible, that though written by so many different men of so many different ages—men so diverse in their circumstances and modes of life, their intellectual and moral peculiarities, it is yet one harmonious whole. The utmost ingenuity of the whole race of skeptics, has failed to discover a single discrepancy. The stones of this wondrous temple, like those of Solomon's, were, as shaped apart, so exactly fitted to each other, that in their coming together there was no need of the stroke of the hammer upon them. There is nothing unduly magnified—nothing improperly belittled—nothing forced awry—nothing out of position, or in any respect out of keeping. Every doctrine, every precept, every argument, every illustration, every appeal, is just as it should be. The more our theology is drawn from the Bible, then, the more perfect will be the adjustment of its several parts, the greater the completeness and symmetry of the whole. It is from deficiency here, giving ampler scope to all other perverting influences, that many a good man has fallen into hurtful extremes. You see, at once, in the writings of some, just why they err. The Scriptures are little referred to; it is reason, evidently, or human authority, that rules, rather than God's Word. A particular doctrine is first adopted, or a system of doctrines, and then, if ever, the Bible is resorted to for proofs. The texts are made to fit the system, not the system the texts. They seem often, indeed, under treatment of this sort, to be of waxen pliability—elastic as the consciences that can thus desecrate them. The minister of the gospel, especially, should, in this regard, be very jealous over himself. For the avoiding of all error—particularly of that species of it now under consideration—he cannot be too solicitous to cast all his teaching in the moulds of inspiration.

As a crowning means to the same end, we notice, finally, the *outpouring of the Holy Spirit*. It was the Holy Spirit who gave the truth. It is He who prepares the heart to receive it. His work there, is the exact counterpart of his work in the Bible. He takes of the things that are Christ's, and shows them to the be-

liever ; and it is by His gracious influence alone, soundness in the faith is maintained. What shall keep dead orthodoxy from palpable putrescence? How naturally, when the love of the truth has declined, do men pass to at least a partial rejection of it. If they dare not cast it out entirely, they at least reshape it, in accordance with their own corrupt inclinations and habits. When the great deep of the human heart becomes "like the troubled sea which cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt," how is it possible the glorious things of the firmament should be reflected from it, save in imperfect and unsightly forms? We cannot insist too earnestly on the indispensableness of deep and habitual spirituality, to the clear apprehension and right unfolding of Divine things.

We had chiefly in mind, however, those special visitations of the Holy Spirit not peculiar to our land, but with which our churches have been so signally favored. It is not alone out of compassion for dying souls around us, we should desire revivals of religion. They are of immense consequence with reference to purity of doctrine. The gracious operations already adverted to, so helpful to correctness of belief, are at such seasons enjoyed in unwonted measure. Those worldly influences, which corrupt at once the practice and the faith of men, are held in check. The whole atmosphere is instinct with truth. God is manifestly present, and in his light we see light. It is noontide with the church, when, as with the ship at sea, those solar observations are taken which show where she is, and how far she has been drawn from her course by head winds and deceitful currents. At no time do men see so clearly just what God's truth is, as when He who revealed it is writing it anew, as it were, upon all hearts, yea, writing it upon all creation. Object not that from revivals of religion extravagances have been known to result. This may have been the case, ever so abundantly, with spurious revivals. Nay, we deny not that it may sometimes have happened in connection with a genuine work of grace. For where the master soweth wheat, the enemy soweth tares. With great good of any sort, in this imperfect world, some evil is apt to be associated. Under the genial and fructifying rains of heaven, worthless and cumbersome weeds spring up ; yet, what are they to the waving harvest? Under bright tropical skies there may be poisonous plants and fruits ; yet how little are they to be accounted of, in comparison with those rich and noble products of the earth which have ripened under the same sunshine? Revivals of religion are never quite perfect, just because imperfect man has ever to do with them. Yet a woful day will have come to our land, when they shall have ceased from among us. Even now, in their partial suspension, in the incipient laxness of doctrine, the world-ward and flesh-ward extremes which seem here and there to be creep-

ing in—we have ample occasion to utter the prayer of the prophet, “Oh Lord, revive thy work!”

ARTICLE III.

FAITH IN THE GOSPEL THE FOUNDATION OF HUMAN GREATNESS.

By Rev. L. CURTIS, Woodbury, Ct.

THERE are two classes in whom the leading sentiment of this article may provoke a smile. Unbelievers, who regard all religious faith as degrading to the human mind, and believers who have thought of faith only as a condition of justification with God, and as a passport to heaven. And few, comparatively, seem to perceive that *faith in the gospel is essential to man as man*; must be the principle of his true greatness on earth. This fact was seen by Paul, and was expressed not obscurely by him in the eleventh chapter of his Epistle to the Hebrews. The illustrious men of the Jewish nation, owed their greatness to *faith*. This inspired their noble aims, and nerved them for heroic deeds. Through this they “subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, waxed valiant in fight, out of weakness were made strong.” Nor must we imagine, as some do, that faith was merely a *condition* on which God wrought success for them by miraculous power. This was sometimes true. To inspire their confidence in Jehovah, it was occasionally necessary to show them that the most formidable array of power could accomplish nothing without him; while, with him, the most incompetent means would insure success. We are not to conclude, therefore, that faith has no more natural connection with great deeds, than the blowing of ram’s horns had with the fall of Jericho. Nor shall we infer that faith is a mere form of obedience consisting in blind credulity, in shutting the eyes to all earthly connection between means and ends, and in folding to sleep every power of personal activity. On the contrary, nothing can so quicken and expand both the mind and heart, and so kindle every natural energy into efficient and permanent action as *faith*; and faith too in that gospel which was but imperfectly apprehended by the ancient Jews. No other principle is so deep and powerful, nor so ennobling to the entire character. The time will come when men will not have two standards of human excellence—popular opinion for the present life, and the gospel for the future. The two will coincide. Those only will be “great” among men, as well as in “the kingdom of God,” who “do the work of

God." And that work will be, to "believe on Him whom he hath sent." Whatever is essentially great in man as a moral being, does not depend upon the caprice of human opinion, or on the relation of time and place. It stands upon relations permanent as truth; and is to be estimated by principles which are as universal in the world of mind, as the laws of light and gravity are in the world of matter. God's standard must be the true one for all latitudes. As a separate principle, indeed, faith is inferior to love; but it implies and involves it. In respect to some of its objects, too, faith will become vision: but it will not cease to be a basis of excellence for all worlds. The highest archangel will never fathom the depths, nor measure the circumference of infinity. There will forever be an ample field lying far out beyond the limits of his vision, which faith alone can traverse. And that is a fallen archangel who will not stretch his confidence beyond his vision.

It is our purpose, however, to consider faith only in its relations to *sinful beings*; and, more particularly, faith in the gospel of Jesus Christ, as the foundation of human greatness.

We do not assert that all who exercise this faith possess greatness. Other conditions must be fulfilled; but where this is done, faith in the gospel not only imparts greatness, but constitutes its chief element. And here we only take for granted the truth of the gospel as a Divine system for human redemption, and use the term greatness in the highest and broadest sense.

But we must examine here, more particularly, the elements of human greatness, and the influence of natural faith. True greatness does not lie in any one element of character. It does not consist in extraordinary natural capacities merely, as great power of intellect, or energy of will, or depth of emotion. With all these, one may be greatly contemptible. Nor does it consist in the right direction of the natural powers; for these may be feeble. It lies in the *union* of capacity and right voluntary direction; that is, in *character*, natural and moral. It pertains to the whole man. A great poet, a great scholar, a great hero, is not, of course, a great man. The latter involves far more than any one excellence, natural or acquired, which protrudes itself in a given direction, and overshadows or absorbs every other human excellence. We must bring ourselves up toward the Divine standard. Otherwise we shall be subject to every caprice of human opinion, and accord greatness now to some Nimrod for his prowess in subduing beasts, and now to some chieftain for equal success in hunting men. Or, in an age of peace and cultivation, when intellect is enthroned, we shall ascribe it to him who overpowers by the majesty of his conceptions, or astonishes by the inventions of his skill, or charms by the creations of his fancy. We want a standard broad and permanent, which will

stand the tests of time and truth ; and judging by such a standard. it will one day be seen, that to possess great strength of muscle, or prowess as a conqueror, or the one-sided elongations of eccentric genius, or to be a storehouse of knowledge, or a magazine of energies, is not to possess greatness *as a man*. We must not be deceived by monstrosities, by power striking out of its orbit, or genius perverted to an evil end. But, together with force and capacity, man's powers must have a central principle to direct and harmonize their action—something, which, as it kindles them all to a deep and fervid glow, shall, amid their intensest workings, hold a firm and steady balance, and move the whole man with steadfast energy right toward the end for which he was made to live. This is true greatness ; and faith alone can produce it. But faith in *what* ?

Mere *natural faith*, or faith in an earthly object of ambition, or in man or nature, or a principle, has great power. The capacity for it proves the superior dignity of man. Unlike the animal, he does not live in mere objects of sense. By acquaintance with a few of these, he learns hidden laws and universal principles, on whose stability he rests with perfect assurance, anticipating the future and grasping the unseen. Not like the bird of passage which journeys to distant climes only by bodily movement, and impelled by the proclivities of instinct, he travels on in the silence of thought. Cautiously, at first, he moves along the steps of a limited experience ; but soon, by conclusions which overstep the limits of personal knowledge, or by intuitions which take no note of space or time, he passes out on the chain of rational principles beyond the sweep of the remotest star, or the slow cycles of the ages. His whole life is a life of faith—faith in some object as meeting his wants—in plans for obtaining it—in principles as the basis of his plans. In fact, his objects of faith determine his character. If he trust in one of earthly ambition, and in his own competence to gain it, he will have the inflexible energy of self-reliance, and become a hero. If he trust in another man, it will inspire loyalty for his chieftain, and an enthusiasm which will render a few thousand invincible as the legions of Cæsar. If he have faith in a principle, he will have the intrepid daring of a Columbus, the prophetic vision of a Le Verrier, the world-wide grasp of a Newton, or the firm assurance of a Galileo, and though proscribed and imprisoned by his generation, he will calmly await the triumph of truth and justice in a wiser age. *Such faith*, modest but unshaken, has something sublime. It is the basis of what men call greatness. Sooner or later the world does homage even to the *intellect*, which sees beyond the horizon of other men, and stretching the gaze beyond the boundary of demonstration, grasps the unseen but certain results of faith in elementary principles and invisible laws. Mere natural faith is

not to be despised. Now, what this is to the highest achievements of an earthly ambition, faith in the gospel is to the true greatness of man. This alone can furnish the three elements, which together are essential to its existence—the broadest views for the intellect, the loftiest aims for the heart, and the strongest motives for the will.

I. First the gospel opens the most comprehensive views for the intellect. True, the mere naturalist has the universe to range in! But he may travel far and see but little. Comprehensiveness of view does not respect the mere surface over which the eye may sweep, but, also, the various kinds and departments of knowledge which one may understand in the moral as well as in the natural world. The mere mathematician may revel in problems which respect number and magnitude, and be dead to the inspirations of poetry, the beauties of art, the enjoyments of social life, and to those profound and solemn problems which address the moral nature of man. The heart has to do with the discernment of the best and greatest truths. The intellect alone cannot know them. They are spiritually discerned.

Nor does largeness of view respect the mere number of facts understood in all departments; but also their dependencies and relations. A mere encyclopedist of facts, a capacious reservoir of items, with no key to their meaning, no central principle by which to link them into the unity of a system, has no comprehension of what he knows. Newton could point the telescope to every star, and map down before him the constellations of the heavens; but while ignorant of the one law which governs and systematizes all material bodies, he knew but little of the heavens. He could not grasp the grand idea of their system, and all else was but a superficial knowledge of unintelligible facts. So when men look, as philosophers merely, on the affairs of this world, its sciences, the history of human society, the nature of man, the course and laws of his destiny, on the general scope and aim of this world's phenomena, a mist seems to cover the scene, and chaos to be its ruling spirit. But when they enter with a heart quickened by faith, into the deep significance of the gospel, a new and governing law flashes on their consciousness; a moral centre appears, around which all the forces of this world gravitate, and all the facts of its history cluster. The ebb and flow of the ocean's currents are not more subordinate to the course of the moon that hangs above them, than the setting tides of this world's affairs are to the course of the Divine plan for human redemption. We may not see the swell and the course of its every wave as it crosses and jostles in the conflict of the elements: but we have the key to their movements and the law of their storms. An intelligent faith in the gospel, and that alone, places one on a position high enough to see that all its separate currents and counter-currents are lost in the general lift-

ing and flowing of its depths toward the light and power of Divine love in the plan of redemption. From that position, we see that the world exists for a *moral end*; that the gospel is the Divine plan for attaining it; and that toward this history and science, civilization and government, the affairs of nations and individuals, are continually shaping themselves, under the hand of Him who setteth up one and pulleth down another, and who, in the blotting out of a continent, or in the fall of a sparrow, has an equal reference to the triumph of a kingdom which is not of this world. The gospel, therefore, is the only clue to this world's history, the only law of man's progress, the only just measure of his immortal interests. And he who will not look through it as a glass, putting to it the eye of *faith*, can have no comprehensive view of past, present, or future; of this world or the next. Every step is into the mazes of conjecture, or a plunge in the dark. The world has no clear, glorious significance. It is without form and void, and darkness covers the face of its depths. But when the eye of faith opens intelligently upon the scheme of redemption, it is like sunrise upon the earth: it is rather a new creation. God has said to the blind, groping spirit, "*Let there be light.*"

But the gospel not only pours light on human society, the nature and destiny of man, crystallizing into order and shape the facts of this world's history; it opens something of the vastness of Divine plans for the moral creation. At least, it unfolds the principles of a universal moral government; it breaks through many a cloud that was round the Almighty's throne, revealing its foundations in justice and judgment, and it throws a thousand-fold radiance around Him who sits thereon, the highest, greatest object of thought for man or angel.

What is the range of natural science, ennobling as it is, when it does not merge itself into the higher science of the spiritual, to which all that is material is but the shell to the kernel, the scaffold to the building, the shadow to the substance? And what is the scope of that mind which is cognizant of only natural objects and laws, with no appreciation of spiritual truths in the vastness of their relations, with no enlarged view of the moral government of the world, and without a glimpse of the chief glories of Him "of whom and for whom and to whom are all things?" Mere systems of natural science cannot open this wider, loftier range in the moral world. The gospel is the only vista through which man can look into it; and there is no summit lofty enough to command the glorious prospect but the summit of gospel faith.

2. Faith in the gospel inspires the *loftiest aims for the heart*. There is great excellence in comprehensive views, in *knowledge*; but it is inferior to another principle, the fruit of faith, which is *love*. "Though I understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and have not charity, I am nothing." Knowledge is valuable as an

instrument of the heart : it is ennobled according to the end to which it is directed. What should we think of a Newton directing all his intellectual resources to the manufacture of a pin ? Or all his intellectual and moral wealth to the ambitious projects of a Napoleon ? In the former, he might have been useful : in the latter, renowned ; but in neither, great. It were no proof of greatness in the Czar of the Russias, should he plant himself on the Bosphorus, and with one hand clutch the dominions of Asia, and with the other the empires of Europe. Mere self-aggrandizement is not an end at which greatness aims. That end must lie in the direction of man's noblest aspirations ; in the spiritual and eternal. Power crumbles. Wealth consumes. Fame is a breath. One and all they have no alliance with anything permanent. They can but feed a passion, or perfume a sense, or adorn a grave : and the meanest can have them all. Every intelligent mind knows the vanity of a mere temporal end for an immortal being. There must be consistency in a great mind ; harmony between its convictions and its aims. The understanding and the heart must not fall out by the way. They were both made for God. They can rest only in Him ; and together, they must move towards Him. The intellect climbs up to Him as the one Eternal Cause, naturally as the wandering child goes up the stair-way to its paternal home. The heart too, wander where it will, finds not its rest till it ascend in the same direction, and repose in the same object. And furthermore, as the mind takes its expansion from what it contemplates, so the heart does its character, from what it loves. And as God is the greatest object for the mind, so is he the best object for the heart : as he therefore who knows him best will have the greatest thoughts, so he that loves him best will have the noblest character : and to such the excellence and the blessedness of that love is the highest aim for the heart.

But "No man cometh to the Father but by me." The union of a guilty soul with God, is only in the way of his appointment ; by faith in his Son. "This is the record that God hath given unto us eternal life, and this life is in his Son." His death is the ground of the sinner's hope ; his character is the model which he is to copy : and as that model is taken up into the life of the soul, the soul is received into union with God. And in that union, where are full confidence and affection, the life of conscious favor and of conscious love, is at once the noblest excellence and the highest blessedness of a rational creature. No aim can be higher. The love of God is the love of all perfection and of all being ; for everything is his. Seen by affection's eye, quickened and illuminated by faith, the universe is ennobled. The heavens shine with a holier lustre ; the sea swells with a grander harmony : the earth wears a more attractive loveliness ; and even *man*, degraded as he

is, becomes the defaced image of God, and the purchase of his son. Every object is transformed and ennobled by faith.

Thus we see faith sustains the same relation to the expansion and elevation of the heart, that it does to the enlargement of the mind. In the one case, it widens the range of vision and shows objects in the harmony of their just relations: in the other it bathes the whole prospect with a warm sunlight, tinging every object with the colors of heaven. What before formed an image in the mind, now kindles a response in the heart, and these two powers, no longer at variance, move on together with the same enlargement; for what the one beholds, the other loves; and no longer chained to the little center of self, they range the universe in freedom, circling in the light, and dwelling in the "fullness of him who filleth all in all."

But there is another aim which faith awakens; it is *to do*, as well as *to be*. The soul that is quickened to the love of God, has begun to breathe the elements of that new life which is by his Son. With wonder it surveys the glory of that scheme, by which itself has been brought into fellowship with God. That same scheme can renovate a fallen, suffering world. If it cannot change its surface, and send running streams through earth's deserts, and smoothen its rough hill-sides to become vocal with flocks, it can lead the waters of a better life through its moral wildernesses, till the wastes of human character shall blossom with all the virtues, and the very air be sweet with their breath, and jubilant with praise: till it can be said, "Behold the tabernacle of God is with men." Nay, till a great multitude which no man can number shall have gained complete redemption, the repose of perfect confidence, and the bliss of perfect love, in heaven.—It is a vast scheme, embracing the world, and reaching its main results into the future. It is deep in wisdom, suited to every want of man. It is accomplished too with the most glorious display of Divine perfections before the universe.

To such a scheme, faith has introduced the believer. He surveys its greatness. He kindles with its excellence, and forgets henceforth the low, self-seeking ends of earth. Now he can embrace other and higher interests; and from his newly quickened heart, warm with its fresh impulses, he breathes out to his Saviour,

"I love thy kingdom, Lord."

He knows no higher end for which to live, no nobler end for which to die. In cheerful consecration, he brings to his Redeemer the thank-offering of his life, and recognizing in his kingdom the choicest purposes of God, and the dearest interests of man, he says:—

"For her my tears shall fall,
For her my prayers ascend,
To her my cares and toils be given,
Till toils and cares shall end."

Henceforth he comprehends the deep significance of that command which embraces the two highest aims of the human soul, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness."

3. But, thirdly, the *motives* which the gospel furnishes, are as essential to human greatness, as the range of view it opens, and the aims it inspires. A man may have the widest range of knowledge and the noblest aims, but without the proper motives to apply the one and carry out the other, he will accomplish nothing. He will lack *efficiency*, success. It must ever be the characteristic of a great mind, that it shall have the practical force to *carry out* the plans of the intellect and the aims of the heart, so that the aim shall become an action, and the idea have an embodiment. The plan of a steam-engine was ingenious while yet it existed only in the brain of the inventor; but it was the projection of that plan into actual form, into the substantial machinery of iron, and the application of a power which turned its ponderous wheels, and shot the rattling train or the flying steamer to its destination, which gave to the theory and the intention their practical worth. Many a feasible scheme, and noble aim, have never seen the light, for want of *motive power*, to bear with strong and systematic pressure on dormant energies. The world has enough of sentimental dreamers. Dreams must become acts. We do not say that a man must lack efficiency of character without faith, nor that he will of course possess it, *with* faith. But we do say that without faith the greatest efficiency will not move in the right *direction*; and with it, a character of inferior strength, feels the spring of new and powerful motives, and begins the only process of growth and development toward true greatness. The energy of a Napoleon, the efficiency of a thousand Robespieres would never reach there. It is not on the road.

Besides, we deceive ourselves by appearances, in our measurement of power. There are outbreaks of lawless energy more imposing than if the same force were expended quietly in systematic modes. Beneath the earth's surface are forces which accumulate, till by a sudden explosion a continent is shaken. But the silent moon as she circles the earth walking in her brightness, calm and serene, every day, lifts toward herself the masses of all the oceans, and with healthful and responsive currents all round the world, like throbs of life, moves the waters of every sea. The torrent that plunges with roar and spray into a chasm, strikes us with awe. But the same current led down to that level through field and grove and meadow by a hundred winding streams that pass gently on, pleases the beholder by the sweetness of its murmur and

the verdure that springs by its sides. The same elements of power are working in new forms, and accomplishing other ends. It is not the boisterous *violence* of energy, which measures the greatness of power. The Almighty wields omnipotent forces, in gentleness, and a universe, in quiet harmony. And men; could they approach to a similitude of the infinite one, must do so by partaking not only of the holiness of his aims but also of the ease and quiet majesty of his action.

Efficient power in man so far as it relates to human greatness, must be directed as we have seen, to great ends. And the *degree* of that power must depend upon the number of the human faculties which can combine for such ends, and upon the energy, the steadfastness, and the harmony with which they move toward them. In a bad cause, the noblest powers of man work against him. Ever and anon they are raising a mutiny, or sounding a retreat, and spreading confusion among his own ranks. It is only in the cause of God that they can move forward unbroken, undismayed and triumphant. Faith combines and harmonizes, and directs *all* the powers of man. What one, does not the Christian consecrate to God? What one, subject to his law, may not promote his glory? Faith links them all to one holy purpose. It weakens none, though it tames and chastises the lawless. It depresses none, though it subdues and softens the wayward. Evidently, it does not diminish or impair the native strength of the mind; while by quickening these higher sensibilities which were before dead, by drawing forth those better affections which fasten upon the unseen and eternal, by kindling holier aspirations, by inspiring purer hopes, by awakening deeper and warmer sympathies, it brings into action nobler elements of power. True, it turns the native energies into other channels, and works them in new forms; but it gives depth, and tone, and earnestness, and elevation, to the entire character.

We might refer here to its influence upon national character. It will be found that the people most distinguished for intelligent, unwavering faith in God, for a faith which embraces the cardinal doctrines of the gospel, are preeminent for those qualities which constitute rational strength. Look at the brave Magyars. But a few millions in number, and occupying a small area, they withstood and often routed the combined forces of Austria and Russia. Their faith gave them the clear consciousness of their rights, and heroic bravery in defending them. It took two of the most formidable nations of Europe to crush them. Look at the Swiss and the Scotch. Look at the whole Puritanic stock wherever you find them. With a character broad and deep in its foundations, compact, massive, towering, they are a mountain of granite. They stand where God placed them, and they are impregnable.—We might speak of individual characters. Cromwell and Washington

were greater men for their faith. Chalmers, as the literary professor, and the moralist, would have been admired ; but it was his faith which made him great. But the example of Paul is a better illustration of our meaning and a more decisive proof of our position ; because Christianity was inwrought more intimately into his character, and we see that its transformation was, under God, the work of faith.

As a bigoted Pharisee, indeed, Paul was not a weak man. He had the mental energy of a son of thunder. He could drive his foes "even unto strange cities," for there was an exceeding madness in his vengeance. But all his capacities could avail him nothing for true greatness, while employed for the narrow ends of sectarian bigotry. It was when the gospel opened its higher field of truth for the expansion of his mind and the elevation of his aims ; it was when love to Christ crucified supplanted the love of sect, and the scheme of the world's redemption bade him embrace in the same affection, both Jew and Gentile, the world over ; it was when he planted himself upon the foundation of eternal things, and anchored his immortal hope sure and steadfast within the vail, that he began his great work. Now, every energy, while it took a different direction, took also new vigor and a deeper tone. Higher elements are working in him. He is another man ; no longer Saul the Pharisee, but Paul *the believer*. He is stronger, firmer, greater than before. He does not lower, indeed, with that fearful vindictive passion which breathed threatnings and slaughter. He has kindled with the theme of a Redeemer's love and a Redeemer's kingdom of righteousness and peace. The smile of his Master's spirit plays over his character, and the light and warmth of love beam out from it. We find him in journeyings, often, in perils and weariness, in stripes and imprisonments. But wherever you follow him, into Arabia or Damascus, into Jerusalem, Athens, or Rome, whether before the haughty Felix, the conceited, jealous synagogue, or the polished Areopagus, you behold him as strong and fearless as he is gentle and courteous ; as manly in his bearing, as he is humble in pretension ; holding equally to his rights as a citizen, and to his spirit as a Christian. With a keen consciousness of injury, yet forgiving in meekness, with broad views of doctrine, and a truly liberal spirit, yet contending earnestly for the faith with unyielding fidelity to the truth ; bearing stripes with fortitude, imprisonment with patience, and insult with magnanimity ; persevering amid reverses ; hopeful in the darkest hour ; ever girding himself with the same divine armor ; holding on his perilous and rugged way with an upward aim, and a serene and hopeful spirit, and a purpose that knows no faltering, a love that had no abatement, and a faith that was unshaken as the hills,—always abounding in the work of the Lord, knowing that his labor was not in vain.

If the world knows true greatness in man, it is here, and faith was its chief element. While it tamed his natural impetuosity, and broke down his arrogance and self-confidence, it gave him the higher, stronger elements of love to the Redeemer, humility at the cross, and faith in God. That very system of doctrines which so many have scouted as narrowing the soul and degrading the believer into a weak, servile thing that cannot stand in the presence of a man, or be efficient for any manly work, or liberal with any broad view, or cheerful with any rational enjoyment,—that very system of doctrines, gave to Paul a sublimity of greatness unparalleled in the world's history. Faith in them, was the telescope of his far-reaching vision; the rock of his adamant firmness; the inspiration of his lofty heroism. It was the fuel of that inward flame, which softened his natural asperities, and blended the most incongruous elements; which adjusted and balanced the widest contrasts, giving to his character the unity and strength of a divine harmony, and throwing over it the charm and sweetness of a heavenly serenity.

He is a short-sided, groveling man, who bows down to a hero renowned for success in destroying men's bodies, and scorns a Paul for the nobler ambition of saving their souls.

It will be seen that faith appropriates all right motives of a temporal nature, while it superadds those of eternal moment. We need not here analyze these motives, whether they bear upon the aims of personal holiness, or on the promotion of the Messiah's kingdom in the world. They are drawn from the majesty of infinite justice and the love of a Divine Redeemer; from the goodness and the severity, the grace and the truth, the forbearance and the threatenings of the Most High; from the dreadful evil of sin as measured by an infinite atonement or by an eternal penalty; from the worth of the soul and the awful contingency which hangs round its prospects; from entire dependance and from conscious guilt; from the freeness and greatness of the salvation provided, and from the immediate danger of losing it forever; from the condition which inspires hope and forbids delay; which appeals alike with incessant and oppressive force to duty and interest, to gratitude and fear. From the very nature of these motives there is an infinity stamped upon them. Nothing can add to their power. And besides it is not merely their power taken separately, which adapts them to human wants, but their wonderful balance and harmony of operation. There cannot be conceived a system of motives equal to these, either for power, elevation, or constancy of purpose. They bear directly upon every spring of character; they thrill the deepest-toned chords of the human soul.

It is often said that great exigencies make great men. The secret is, they inspire high aims, and arouse and direct every natural energy. It was so in our Revolution. It is so in all great crises

in the affairs of men. Even in relation to earthly interests, men need great motives to arouse them. They must be placed in a position where momentous consequences turn on present deliberation or present action. And much more is this true in relation to those higher spiritual interests to which depraved man is dead, and to which he must be quickened by abounding grace, as well as by infinite motives. Faith reveals at once, the depths of man's debasement, the nobleness of his capacities and the greatness of his destiny. It throws around the lowest man an interest almost overwhelming. Though a guilty, lost creature, he is an heir of immortality. Ransomed by an infinite atonement, he *may be* restored to all that constitutes the worth and the blessedness of man: to the love of God, and the consciousness of his favor: but his destiny hangs upon the passing hour.

Leave out of view the religious and immortal interests of man, and those facts of the gospel which put these interests in immediate peril, and yet in a peril from which they may possibly be rescued, and the condition of man is hopeless. The last missionary has left his comfortable home, to meet hardship and death for the sake of the nations that sit in darkness. The only adventurer among them, will be the curious traveler, the scientific inquirer, the importer, or the gold digger. Let religion die, and philanthropy falls the same hour into the same grave. True, there are some who now deny all religion, and yet have a form of philanthropy—perhaps something of its life. But if it be anything more than empty sentimentalism, if there be any vitality in it, that must be fed by inhaling the religious atmosphere around, as men are said to have sustained life for a period, not by taking food themselves, but by inhaling its odor. But the soul of such philanthropy must be as great as the bodies of such men. Take away the facts and motives of religion, and man is but an intelligent, social animal. His dignity and worth are gone. Morality, too, has lost its basis, and benevolence its aim, and life its meaning. What high aspiration remains for man? or what system of education can keep him from sinking down into that debasing animalism which says, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

On such a system greatness is impossible to man. He wants the capacity, the aims, and the motives of greatness. These are all found in the gospel and there alone. For this brings life and immortality to light; it reveals the worth of man, the cause of his present wretchedness, his nobler destiny, and the motives and means for attaining it. The erection of hospitals and asylums, and the prosecution of every work of real reform, it would not leave undone. But it commands every man as an immortal creature, to "seek *first* the kingdom of God and his righteousness." Spiritual and immortal ends must hold the *first* place. Earthly good cannot be gained, sought chiefly, and for its own sake. The

whole course of history is but an echo of this voice of the Most High—"the kingdom of God and his righteousness *first*; and these shall *be added*." In the gospel, then, is solved the deep and solemn problem of human life. There is the clue to this world's history and prospects, the law of its entire changes and progress. There, too, are opened those higher fields of spiritual knowledge, where the mind of man finds its true expansion and its loftiest range. There, too, are furnished the highest aims which can kindle the human heart, and those divine motives which give the utmost efficiency and elevation to the human character. Faith in the gospel, as it is the key of knowledge, the principle of moral excellence, and the foundation of strength, must be the chief element of human greatness. This can remove mountains; and without it no mighty works can be done.

ARTICLE IV.

THE DEATH OF ARIUS.

By Rev. S. M. Hopkins, Prof. in Auburn Theological Seminary, N.Y.

"On the same day which had been fixed for the triumph of Arius, he expired: and the strange and horrid circumstances of his death might excite a suspicion that the orthodox saints had contributed more efficaciously than by their prayers to deliver the church from the most formidable of her enemies. Those who press the literal narrative of the death of Arius must make their option between poison and miracle." Gibbon's *Rome*, chap. XXI.

The historian evidently means to hint the probability of poison. On the other hand various Christian writers have found in the circumstances of the case the special interposition of an avenging Providence. Taking the literal narrative of the death of Arius to be authentic, it may be easily admitted that our only option lies between these alternatives. But we get this narrative from men who regarded Arius with the strongest personal or political animosity. Athanasius had been doing battle against him from the opening of the controversy; and certainly entertained the hate of a true polemic against his shrewd and resolute antagonist. Socrates and Sozomen were credulous and prejudiced writers, devoted to the Nicene party (for there was more of party than of piety in the religious disputes of the period) and prepared to find a judgment of God in every event that could befall an Arian. It is moreover demonstrable that partly through the force of this prejudice, and partly through ignorance of the human physiology,

the writers mentioned have given a false and absurd account of the circumstances attending the death of Arius. We shall show reasons for concluding, that neither of the alternatives suggested by Gibbon is to be adopted. With no favorable opinion of the views of Arius we shall find sufficient ground to believe that his death was not caused by miracle, with no violent prejudice in favor of the orthodox saints of the Nicene period, sufficiently probable evidence can be adduced that it was not caused by poison. The conclusion will be that it was the result of unknown but natural causes.

The history is briefly this: Arius was condemned and excommunicated as a heretic by the Bishops at Nice. Constantine ordered him into banishment. The Emperor's purpose was to enforce with all necessary rigor the decrees of the council; uniformity and peace he would have in the church, if possible; and his first line of policy for effecting it was imposing Nicene Christianity on all the clergy under adequate pains and penalties. Arius and the two non-conforming bishops of the council were kept exiled near six years in Illyricum. By the end of this period Constantine had become satisfied with the experiment of compulsory pacification. It had not worked well. All the authority of the Synod, and all the power of the Empire, had failed to quiet the controversy. So far from it, the Shibboleth of the Nicene creed had only raised fresh disputes. "The term *Homoousios*," says Socrates,¹ "disturbed some men's minds. While they busied themselves about this word, and made too curious inquiries into its meaning, they kept up a continual warfare among themselves, and what was done was not unlike a battle in the night; for neither side seemed to understand why they reviled one another. Those who disliked the term *Homoousios* charged such as used it with Sabellianism. On the other hand the *Homoousians* charged the other party with introducing polytheism. Every bishop felt bound to write volumes of furious controversy; and though each side asserted that the Son of God had a real and true personality, and each maintained that there were three persons in one God, yet (how it came to pass, I know not) they could never agree among themselves, nor cease from disputation."

This unfortunate result, in which other councils have so faithfully imitated it, seems to have cooled the Emperor's zeal for the Nicene conclusion. There is no positive evidence that he adopted Arian views of doctrine, either at this or at any future period of his life; but he resolved to change his policy. He had come under the influence of Eusebius, of Nicomedia, and other leaders of the Arian party. In particular he was wrought upon by a certain Arian presbyter, who had been a favorite of his sister Constantia, and was domesticated, perhaps as chaplain, in the palace. This

¹ B. I., chap. 23.

individual, who figures influentially, though anonymously, upon the scene, embraced opportunities of insinuating that the views of Arius had been misunderstood, and that he would readily subscribe a confession of orthodox doctrine.

Influenced by these considerations, Constantine resolved to try a different method of quieting the church. Proscription of Arianism had failed. He would try what virtue there was in a system of comprehension. The Arians might be restored to the church by subscribing the Nicene creed with explanations, or some similar formula differing from it chiefly by the omission of the Homousion. He began with recalling Arius from banishment. In Constantine's letter written just after the Council of Nice, he had styled the heretic "a most impudent servant of the Devil." He now addressed him as his "beloved brother." Arius promptly availed himself of the permission to return, and appeared at court with a confession of his faith. He professed to agree wholly in sentiment with the Nicene bishops. He did not offer however to subscribe the creed, nor was he required to do so. He was admitted to a personal interview with the Emperor, at which, besides verbal explanations of his views, he handed in a written "Libel" or confession for himself and his friends. It read as follows: "We believe in one God the Father almighty; and in the Lord Jesus Christ his Son; who was begotten by Him before all worlds; God the Word by whom all things were made that are in heaven and that are in earth; who came down from heaven and was incarnate, and suffered and rose again, and ascended into the heavens; who also shall come again to judge the quick and dead. We also believe in the Holy Ghost, in the resurrection of the flesh, in the life of the world to come, in the kingdom of heaven, and in one Catholic Church of God." To this Sozomen (B. II., chap. 27.) adds a solemn form of imprecation, as having belonged to the confession. "If we do not thus believe these things, and if we do not truly admit of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost in such manner as the whole Catholic Church and the Scriptures (which we believe in all things) do teach, God be our Judge both now and in the last day."

The creed was scanty and indefinite; but Constantine declared himself satisfied. It may easily be believed, that he was no great judge of orthodoxy; but he was a sagacious and politic ruler. The great source of trouble and uneasiness in the Empire was found in the violence of religious controversy. Give him a united church and he had nothing to fear from Paganism. By a due mixture of firmness and indulgence he could manage the priests and augurs; but it was a different thing to deal with the bishops. Constantine pleased himself with the hope of quieting the dispute by restoring Arius to the church on a satisfactory profession of faith. A synod happened to be in session at Jerusalem.

Arius was sent there for examination. The bishops either through fear or favor, admitted his soundness in the faith, and relieved him from the excommunication which had rested on him since the council of Nice. He was of course restored to the communion of the church. But Constantine was not satisfied with this alone. Jerusalem was a comparatively obscure and out-of-the-way place. He was determined to exhibit Arius as a restored and orthodox church-member in the most public and formal manner. He would not have his favorite plan of church pacification rest on a thing done in a corner. Arius was accordingly sent to his own church at Alexandria with orders to the bishop to endorse the acts of the synod at Jerusalem, and admit him to church fellowship. Athanasius, whose spirit was as high as Constantine's own, and who never trembled to face power, refused to pay any respect to the mandate. It now came his turn to suffer. He was sent into banishment at Triers in Gaul. Constantine had become weary of this haughty imperious prelate,—the Thomas à Becket of an earlier age, and was glad of a good excuse for getting rid of him.

Arius was now summoned to Constantinople. There at least, under his own eye, the Emperor could see that he was fully and honorably restored to church communion. He made a fresh profession of his adherence to catholic doctrine: and Constantine issued orders to Alexander the bishop of the city to admit him to fellowship on the following Sabbath. Alexander, a fanatical Homoousian went into the church and betook himself to prayer. The greater part of the clergy and people of the city were devoted to their bishop and his party.—The excitement was immense; and it may easily be admitted that among that ferocious populace who afterwards perpetrated so many atrocities in the name of orthodoxy there may have been some who would have felt no scruple in resorting to assassination to rid the church of a heretic. It is not strange that this consideration, coupled with the character of Alexander's prayers (which may be considered as a suggestion of murder) and the extraordinary opportuneness of Arius' death should have sometimes led to the suspicion of poison. The Greeks of that day knew the art of compounding subtle poisons, and were none too good to use them. It is maintained however, that the account we have of the circumstances, together with what we know of the operation of poisons, leaves no room for the suspicion of such an agency in the present instance.

The general indications of the existence of poison are said by Christison, one of the highest living authorities on the subject, to be these: that "the symptoms commence suddenly and prove rapidly fatal; that they increase steadily; that they are uniform in nature throughout their course; that they begin soon after a meal; and that they appear while the body is in a state of perfect health."

Some of these criteria we are unable to apply for want of information. For instance, we do not know what was the previous state of Arius' health; whether he may or may not have been already suffering from a disorder of the bowels; or may have had similar attacks before. Other indications are satisfied in the case; as the "sudden commencement, and sudden fatal termination of the symptoms: others still are negatived, as the "beginning of the disease soon after a meal," of which there is no evidence, but the reverse.

It was on Saturday that the mandate was issued to Alexander for the public restoration to take place next day. Arius quitted the palace after a final interview with the Emperor, a little before sunset; and attended by a number of his friends, all elated at his approaching triumph, passed in a sort of procession through the streets. As they came abreast of a porphyry column standing in a park called Constantine's Forum, Arius suddenly fell deadly sick, and enquired if there was a "house of office" at hand; one was pointed out to him in the rear of the Forum, to which he withdrew. His friends waited long for his return. Becoming anxious at length, they followed him; and opening the door of the privy found Arius lying dead upon the floor. The account of the circumstances given by Socrates is this: "*Mox animo deficere coepit; et una cum excrementis, anus ipsi delabatur: et id quod medici vocant ἀπεφθισμα, protinus per anum decedit; subsequuta est sanguinis copia; ac postremo tenuia intestina simul cum splene ac jecore effusa sunt.*" The account given by Athanasius, in a letter to the African bishops (Sozomen II., 30.) is less particular. He says that directly after quitting the palace, Arius, as if in retribution for his crime, suddenly met his end; and falling headlong, burst asunder in the midst (*pronus jaciens, crepuit medius*). For the sun had not yet set, when impelled by an urgent call of nature he withdrew into a public place, and there died suddenly; bereft at once of church-communion and of life!

The "*crepuit medius*" of the last extract, is plainly an allusion to the case of Judas, and is not to be pressed literally. Socrates does not intimate that the abdomen of Arius burst open, so that *all his bowels gushed out*, but that the discharge of blood and viscera was by the natural passage. *Ac postremo tenuia intestina, simul cum splene ac jecore effusa sunt; i. e. per anum*, as he says just before. But this is demonstrably an exaggerated statement created by rumor and founded on ignorance of the human anatomy. The discharge of the spleen and liver is a natural impossibility. These viscera are situated entirely without the stomach; and can no more be voided than the heart or lungs can. Nothing can be discharged *per anum* that does not make a part of the contents of the stomach, except what is secreted by vessels opening

¹ B. 1. chap. 38. Valesius' parallel version.

into the alimentary canal. Rejecting therefore from the statement what is evidently fabulous, and confining ourselves to facts naturally possible and sufficiently authenticated, the account would read thus: That Arius while walking through the streets with his friends, was suddenly seized with violent pains of the bowels, followed by a copious discharge of blood; from the effects of which he very soon died."

Now although such a death, under just such circumstances of time and manner, was very remarkable, yet there is nothing to connect it probably with poison as a cause. At near the time of sunset, it may be assumed as quite certain that Arius had not partaken of food for several hours. The Greek breakfast or dinner would have taken place as early as ten or eleven o'clock in the morning, and the hour for supper had not yet arrived. No poison that Arius could have taken at a meal would have developed itself in the sudden manner indicated in the story. Supposing him to have imbibed some poisonous draught in the palace, if powerful enough to produce such effects, he would have felt it instantly or in a few moments. If not intensely powerful it would have pervaded the system and affected other organs before the full development of its violent action on the stomach. We reject therefore the supposition of poison as inadmissible, or not sufficiently warranted. No doubt it would be more satisfactory if we had the result of a coroner's inquest like that held over Sir Theodosius Boughton, or Mr. Chapman of Pennsylvania. A post mortem examination, with a chemical analysis of the contents of the stomach (for in spite of Athanasius and Alexander probably *something* was left) might have enabled us to speak more confidently; but we suggest the strong probability that the Christisons and Becks of Constantinople would have detected neither arsenic nor laurel-water; neither poisons from the mineral nor from the vegetable kingdom. Our nearest approach to a coroner's inquest over the body of Arius points in that direction. His friends made no accusation of poison. They alleged sorcery; a crime which had been before charged upon leading antagonists of Arius. Had there been any ground for the suspicion of poisoning, they would no doubt have made the most of it.

Let us inquire then whether there is any room in the case for the interposition of miracle. The supposition implies that the Most High to vindicate the doctrine of the supreme divinity of Christ; to avenge the impiety or hypocrisy of Arius and prevent his restoration to church fellowship, smote him in the same miraculous way that Herod and Ananias were smitten. The immediate power of God without the presence of natural disease, or of any irritating agents in the system, produced the effects under which Arius died. We might inquire here

1. Respecting the real doctrines of Arius; whether they were

so peculiarly blasphemous as to require that among all heretics he should be singled out as the subject of an immediate visitation of God. Any doctrine which degrades to the rank of a creature Him whom *all men should honor as they honor the Father*, is no doubt blasphemous. It must be offensive in a very high degree to a God of truth, jealous of his own glory; but we cannot perceive that there was anything in the peculiar *kind* of subordination view maintained by Arius, peculiarly shocking. It can scarcely be thought worse to ascribe the highest conceivable honors to the Son short of absolute Deity, than to reject His personality altogether; to speak of Him as a mere emanation of the Father; or to reduce him to the level of common peccable humanity. No one surely can imagine that Arianism which struggled to express in suitable terms its conviction of the *all but* infinite glory of Christ and prostrated itself in profound reverence before Him as *God of God* and *Light of Light*, the only *begotten of the Father*, is to be named at the same time with those insolent and disgusting systems of elaborate blasphemy invented by Basilides and Valentine. Arius, in the opinion of Neander, is not by any means to be regarded as the intentional assertor of novel doctrines in regard to the person of Christ. "He was intending simply to defend the old doctrine of the church respecting the Trinity against Sabellian and Gnostic opinions, and to exhibit it in a consistent manner." This indeed is stated by Socrates himself in his account of the origin of the controversy.—Arius imagined that in the conference held between Alexander and his presbyters the former verged towards Sabellian errors. He held that the Son was of the *same substance* with the Father, the Sabellian expression. Recoiling from this statement in the Sabellian sense, Arius maintained that the Son was not *ὁμοῦσις τῷ πατρὶ*, but only of a similar nature or substance. It was not that a portion of the Father's essence went to make up the Son, as all the Patristians taught, but that so far as a begotten (and therefore, reasoned Arius, a derived) being could be divine, the Son was in all respects *like* the Father; a created being, but of a nature similar to that of the self-existent and eternal Father from whom he proceeded. On this account, Arius held him worthy of the highest titles, the most exalted honors. He was his Creator and his Redeemer; his Lord and his God. There was nothing in Trinitarianism, so far as it was expressed in that imperfect symbol, the Nicene creed, to which he would not subscribe, excepting only the *Homoousion*. He could have subscribed the formulæ of the Council of Antioch; a Council avowedly Arian, with a confession by universal consent, orthodox, only omitting the Nicene shibboleth.

It cannot seem likely that the same holy and jealous God who bore with Cerinthus Sabellius and that Father of heresies, Origen,

should have interposed miraculously to express his abhorrence of such sentiments.

2. Was Arius guilty of any such flagrant hypocrisy or perjury as we should expect would be visited with a special judgment? Neander expresses the opinion that Arius erred from honest conviction, and in confirming with an oath his assent to the Nicene view, had sworn to nothing but what he sincerely believed. We are compelled to differ from him, (if the statement of Sozomen can be depended on,) and to hold that Arius *was* guilty both of hypocrisy and of perjury; for while he might honestly perhaps have used the same terms as the orthodox used to express the true divinity of Christ, putting his own construction upon them, he could not honestly have sworn that he held the same opinions on the subject, that the whole church held. This he knew was untrue. But even flagrant hypocrisy and perjury in religious things will not be held in the administration of Divine Providence, sufficient ground for suspecting a direct judgment on the offender. These crimes are ordinarily left to their own natural punishment here, and to just retribution hereafter.

The Father, who is holy, wise, and pure,
Suffers the hypocrite or atheous priest
To tread his sacred courts and minister
About his altar;

Multitudes of men, worse in every respect than Arius, doctrinally and practically, have passed unchallenged by Divine justice through the church. Could we go through the existing religious establishments of Europe, and without pretending to search the heart, examine only the lives and teachings of their members, we should find bishops, priests, and deacons, not a few, compared with whom Arius was an eminent Christian. When God does interpose with a miracle of vengeance, we may be sure the arrow is launched against signal and peculiar wickedness.

3. The immediate occasion of the supposed judgment was not a dignus vindice nodus; and there is sense in the Horatian maxim which forbids us to introduce a Deity without adequate cause, to arbitrate on the scene of human events. The excommunication had been already taken off from Arius by competent authority at Jerusalem. He was already in the enjoyment of church fellowship. The scene at Constantinople was to be only a more public recognition of the fact, to silence the clamors of those who still cried out against Arius as a declared heretic. But even were this to have been his first recognition as sound in the faith, it cannot be admitted as sufficient cause of miraculous interposition. It was only the restoration of an unsound and unworthy member to the church; and it is in the highest degree likely that the church at Constantinople contained hundreds who were equally heretical with Arius,

and far more objectionable on the score of morality. The heresiarch was a man of grave, dignified and religious life.

4. The interposition of a special judgment would have been an encouragement to superstition, and an apparent answer to unauthorized and vindictive prayers. Alexander the bishop unable to resist the mandate of Constantine, betook himself vigorously to imprecation. Entering the church of Irene he prostrated himself before the altar, and prayed that either Arius or himself might be cut off before the time set for the public restoration should arrive. If the opinions of Arius were sound, he prayed that he might not live to witness their triumph in his person. If they were false, he prayed that swift vengeance might overtake the heretic. It will be easily admitted that this was a fanatical and unchristian prayer: one which finds no warrant in the Scriptures, and which God could not answer. It was the curse causeless. In the wise administration of that department of the Divine Providence which assigns to each man the bound he cannot pass, and in accordance with the demand of Arius' physical system, his end synchronized in a very remarkable manner with the prayer of Alexander. No doubt, the bishop thought with Cenci,

'Tis plain I have been favor'd from above,
For when I cursed my enemy he died;

but Arius would equally have died, whether Alexander had cursed or blessed. The catastrophe was post hoc, but not propter hoc. The prayer was but the croak of the raven. The victory was decided by influences of a very different character. It is well for the peace of society, that hands like this fanatical bishop's are not permitted

God's bolts to throw,
And deal damnation round the land
On each they judge his foe.

The only conclusion remaining then is, that the death of Arius, extraordinary as it was in its circumstances, and in its opportuneness for the cause of orthodoxy, was the result of natural causes previously at work in his system. It is well known that there are certain conditions of the viscera in which the vessels of the lower part of the body become gorged with blood; and that the depletion from them is sometimes very great and rapid.¹ It is also a fact,

¹ An accomplished physician, resident at Avon Springs, Dr. Salisbury, mentioned to the writer a case occurring in his own practice, illustrative of this history. An individual liable to a constipated habit of body, was found in precisely the same situation as Arius, having suffered a loss of blood which had produced deliquium; and but for a timely discovery would have terminated in death.

that in this condition of body the hæmorrhage may be immediately produced, and produced in excess, by mental emotions ; by joy or grief ; by elation or despondency, as well as by exposure or fatigue.

We have only to suppose that the previous state of Arius' health, whether connected with the circumstances of his exile or not, had led to this particular congestion. The fatigue and excitement of the day produced a rupture of the congested vessels ; and the hæmorrhage was so sudden and violent, as in the absence of medical aid to terminate in death. The *sanguinis copia* was real. The discharge of the *tenuia intestina simul cum splene ac jecore* was a fable originated by the protrusion of the intestine which is common in similar cases.

ARTICLE V.

THE DEMAND AND DEMONSTRATION OF A FUTURE RETRIBUTION IN NATURAL THEOLOGY.

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It is no improbable conjecture, but a very rational one, among the many that have been raised, respecting the book of Ecclesiastes, that it is simply a survey of some of the lessons in the volume of Natural Theology, and of the apparent inconsistencies and incomprehensibilities in the same, with the demonstration at last deduced from the whole, of a righteous judgment in the future world. That which is crooked cannot be made straight, and that which is wanting cannot, *in this world*, be numbered. But all the incontrovertible crookednesses of present things, and all the permitted injustice and oppression, and all the vanity and vexation of spirit, and all the now insoluble riddles of our being, shall be straightened and accounted for and solved, when, at the last, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked.

There is a vanity which is done upon the earth : that there be just men, unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked : again, there be wicked men unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous : I said that this also is vanity. We seem to see a man walking thoughtful on the shore of a great ocean, far-seeing, anxious, burdened with human guilt, surveying the depravities of man, and the providence of God in the midst of them. His thoughts stir up perplexity upon perplexity, but there are grand bursts of light between. He walks and ponders. I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there,

and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there. Then I said in mine heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked. It must be so. - He will show men as they are, and put the wrong right. And the conclusion from the whole is solemnly summed up at the close, God will bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil.

Now this is a grand demonstration, into which the very perplexities of Natural Theology force the mind. The inconsistencies presented are the very staple of the argument; they are to be employed, and not evaded. But the study of Natural Theology has been pursued too generally as if it were a science merely buffeting with difficulties and struggling for existence. The aspect of the argument has been timid; that of a man seeking not to be borne down, that of a man struggling in the great waters to avoid being drowned. There has almost always been betrayed a consciousness of weakness; the argument has seemed afraid to grapple with the question of evil; it has been seeking to demonstrate supreme goodness, and has set out with the assumption, and most justly, that infinite goodness could originate nothing evil, and that nothing but happiness ought to be found in a creation from the hand of a perfectly benevolent being. Every intervention and occurrence of evil has been a stone of stumbling, to be taken out of the way, or else covered deep in the soil, out of sight, before the reasoning could go forward; or else the reality of death itself, and all the unconcealable miseries of our mortal state, and the sufferings of the brute creation, have been disposed of, or evaded, as if they made no break in the argument. But a Natural Theology must have the digestion of an Anaconda, which can swallow and dispose of suffering in a creation *not regarded as under the curse of sin*. So it has labored on; and we have seen men ingeniously apologizing for pain and suffering in the creation, by showing that in no case can it be found that pain is the direct object of contrivance; as if the circumstance of direct or indirect made the least difference with the actual difficulty under consideration, *unless sin were taken account of*. Then indeed it makes a difference. But the fact is undeniable, that the existence of evil, *in a creation not considered as sinful*, is an insurmountable bar against any conclusion demonstrative of infinite goodness. It cannot be that an infinitely good being would create a suffering nature, or frame a suffering constitution, or take delight in pain. Suffering, therefore, without sin, destroys the argument in Natural Theology for the goodness of the Deity; but the moment you accept the true theory in regard to sin, the suffering which was before such an insurmountable difficulty, becomes now the triumphant sealing of your demonstration. It becomes necessary to the perfect proof of the benevolence of God.

Now then, the consideration of evil, instead of being a thing to

be avoided, becomes a main necessity in the argument. The paths, and essence, working of evil, in all its forms, are as important to be traced, as the evidences of design in the structure of the universe, or the adaptation of the structure of our physical and mental frame to activity and enjoyment. All that observation sees, or experience enforces, and all that history teaches, of sin and evil in our race, all of inward passion and conflict, all of external wrong and cruelty, all of the curses of despotism, poverty and labor, all of unhappiness and unrest, all the chaos of human nature, all the phenomena of the "troubled sea" of wickedness, and all the perpetual consequences of its restless tides, all this is part of our Natural Theology. Find the diary of a wicked man's existence, and *that* is natural theology. The diary of a good man's *conflicts* with evil is natural theology revealed in the evil, revealed theology made manifest in the good. The very fact that the way of holiness is a perpetual conflict, is a powerfully significant feature in our natural theology. Natural theology is a volume of depravity and suffering; depravity on the part of man, and suffering in consequence, under God's righteous arrangement, proving that God is good. If you had the depravity without the suffering, how *could* you prove that the author and governor of this constitution of things hates sin? How prove him to be a righteous God? Or if you had the suffering without the depravity, how *then* could you prove his righteousness? You could not do it. Nay, your Natural Theology, so far as it goes, would prove the direct contrary, or would prove your deity to be at best a divine Gallio, caring for none of these things.

This in fact is the very argument of the infidel and scoffer, disregarding "the operation of God's hands," disregarding the manifestation of God's retributive providence, already intimated, against human guilt, and on the ground of such disregard and rejection, denying also the assurance of a further, future, perfect retribution as revealed in the Scriptures. They say of God, that he will not do evil, neither good. Where is the promise of his coming? How doth God know? What likelihood that he busies himself in the affairs of mortals? A Pagan theology is thus taken up by Christian infidels, and adopted as *their* theology. The stale, moral idiocy, the putrifying light of the sty of Epicurus, is adopted by men under the light of Christianity itself. But admit the premises of these blind fools, or practise their neglect and exclusion of the great facts of Natural Theology, namely, human guilt, and suffering on account of guilt, and the natural theologian himself takes part with the same pagan and infidel theolog. The natural theologian himself, seeking to demonstrate a God of infinite goodness, but denying a present retributive providence, or neglecting the proof, the clear manifestation of it, in all human evil, and the prediction of a full and perfect manifestation and execution

of it in the world to come, demonstrates nothing but the God of infidels and heathens, namely, a God who cares neither for wrong nor right in the world, a God who will not punish sin, a divine omnipotent Gallio, that is, no God at all.

Here then, under such teachings, both Natural Theology and infidelity are at fault together, and strangely united in this one thing, there pulsion from their schemes in Theology of the acknowledgment and right consideration of moral evil and suffering in God's creation. Infidelity *will* not, and men accepting Christianity in the general, but afraid of its strict and exclusive teachings in regard to man's depravity and retribution, *dare* not look at, and acknowledge the plain demonstrations of Natural Theology in regard to this same depravity and suffering. And so here both the infidel and the Christian theologians, who reject God's views of man's depravity as shown in his Word, meet to fill Natural Theology with darkness, to make it contradict Divine, to demonstrate a God *not* hating iniquity, and neither just nor right, a god permitting the prosperity of the wicked, without any signifying of his determination to punish them hereafter; a God and a theology, which the Bible denies as the spawn of men's own corruption, and rather than accept which an intelligent and devout mind would almost take Atheism itself in preference. Indeed, it is hard to say which is the worst, the denial of the being of a God altogether, or the misrepresentation and perversion of his attributes. That the last tend directly to the first is a matter of direct observation and experience.

A correct view, then, both of the character of man, and the attributes of God is necessary in any theology, which would not lead the soul into infidelity or error. A correct view of the character of man is necessary, especially in regard to guilt, because the justice of the dealings of God with his intelligent creatures is to be judged by the character and doings of those creatures. And a correct view of the attributes of God is necessary, in order to judge rightly of the character of man as accountable to God, as a creature owing to him supreme allegiance and love. The holiness of the Creator must be taken as it is, and the sinfulness of the creature must be taken as it is.

Sin must be taken as a voluntary depravity, and depravity as a voluntary sin, in every part, connection, and succession, whether of space, time, or character, in mankind as a race, and in man as a personal being, whose personality and accountability consists in a never-ceasing personal will, co-present and co-active with every emotion and activity of an intelligent nature. Sin must be viewed as coming out of a man, not going into him; as growing out of the voluntary elements of his character, and not set from abroad as a plant among them; thrown up from the depths of his voluntary being, and not introduced by circumstances, although circum-

stances may be laid hold upon by that being, as occasions for its sinful development.

Sin must be viewed as it appears in the light of God's attributes, and not as it appears merely in the darkness of a sinful, and therefore half-atheistic human mind. The evil of sin must be seen and acknowledged, as against God, and in contrast with his holiness. What sin *deserves*, must be judged by what God *is*, and not by what man *wishes*. Except there be a true conception and consciousness of the voluntariness and sinfulness of sin, there cannot be seen in Natural Theology any satisfactory demonstration of a perfect God, a God of infinite goodness. On the contrary, take any lower premises than those of man's entire sinfulness, with the blame of it entirely and solely on himself, by reason of his own voluntary nature in every part of it, and it is difficult to see how the ways of God to man can be justified, even as Natural Theology alone reveals them. And hence, those men who palliate and deny the actual wickedness of the wicked, do at one and the same time charge God (taking them on their own premises, and admitting sin to be the light thing they make of it) with injustice in all that he has already done to a wicked race; and also (taking men in their actual character, such as Natural Theology incontrovertibly teaches them to be, in their wickedness), they charge God, by denying the operation of his attributes for the just retribution of wicked men, with being a God indulgent to evil, indulgent to that which is the essence of suffering, indulgent to iniquity, in not punishing sin as it deserves. On the one side they would demonstrate a God not going far enough, on the other a God going too far: in both cases, they involve the mind in inextricable darkness and confusion. This they do, by their low estimate of man's guilt, and their entire disregard of the nature and inevitable operation of the Divine holiness and justice.

These same men, putting human names as means of odium and prejudice upon Divine truths, have been fond of holding up Calvinism as a source of infidelity, when their own rejection of those Divine truths converts Natural Theology itself into infidelity, the system which they reject being the only safeguard of the human mind against blank contradiction and Atheism. Their own system, neglecting the fact of sin, or denying it, with its consequences, under the pretence of gentleness, liberality, the detestation of pain and suffering, and a delight in universal enjoyment, drives God out of the world, as the God of the Scriptures, and of right reason, and sets up a God of the human fancy no better than the idols of the heathen, building a system that must inevitably drive a reflecting mind, without firm anchorage in the Scriptures, to Skepticism. It is nothing but a refuge in God's Word, and in that very system there, which these men revolt against, and forge a denial of, in their Natural Theology, that can save such a mind from the uttermost desperation in the gloom of unbelief.

For, certainly, if you have the article of suffering, without the article of depravity, you have the absolute demonstration of a malevolent God. Or if you make the depravity something else than voluntary sin, something else than an absolute hostility and declaration of war against God; if you make it a mere pardonable mistake, or an inevitable frailty, consequent on the very nature of a creature made weak and erring, or consequent on the circumstances, by which the creature is surrounded, or consequent on the very relation between the body and the world which the creature is made to inhabit, again the suffering becomes unjust, and inconsistent with the demonstration of a God infinitely good. It is as wrong to inflict injury on an intelligent being for a mistake or an evil, *which could not have been avoided*, which, from the circumstances which that being did not make, was an *absolute necessity*, as it is to inflict suffering where there is no sin. You must, therefore, admit, in regard to sin, its true, positive, attributes, its infinitely detestable character. For if your infidelity or your theology makes sin to be anything *but* sin, it also makes suffering to be anything *but* righteous. If it makes sin a pardonable weakness, and *not* sin, it makes punishment an undue, unjust, inexorable cruelty, and represents the work of keeping up a world of suffering, as the consequence of such weakness, a frightful enormity of malevolence.

But if, again, your infidelity, or your theology, makes sin a necessity, though admitting it to be sin, yet a dire, unescapable necessity of creation and of existence, an attendant, yea, a penalty of existence itself from the hand of the Creator, then again you thrust upon the soul the idea of a malevolent malignant Creator; you demonstrate, so far as you demonstrate anything, no other than a supreme, omnipotent ingenuity of evil; since what could be conceived more diabolical, than to invent a sensitive mechanism, exquisitely susceptible of suffering, inevitably producing sin, and, as inevitably plunging itself into suffering because of sin! Why! the mind of the arch-fiend himself, the murderer and liar from the beginning, the accuser, hater, tempter, destroyer of mankind, the enemy of God and man, could imagine no refinement or hugeness of diabolism equal to this. And if from the monstrous, misshaping womb of your infidelity or theology you thrust this Medusa head, worse than all gorgons and hydras and chimeras dire, into the volume of Natural Theology, into the teachings by nature of the reality of things, no wonder that you scare the soul from the confines of such a system, or paralyse it so with horror as to give it over helpless into the power of the tempter. It seems to have been some such conception of theology inflicted upon him at an early period of life, and ever and anon thrusting out its grim form to glare upon his soul, that almost drove the great mind of John Foster into madness, and indeed did carry him upon the

confines of the madness of rejecting one of the clearest truths of all Revealed Theology, the eternal punishment of sin. And how *could* a man accept, retain, believe both, the absolute, inevitable, unescapable, created necessity of sin, and eternal suffering on account of sin, and still believe in the infinite goodness of the Author of such a system, still remain unagonized by doubt, not driven to utter desperation for want of some anchorage to his soul in the attributes of a God of infinite benevolence. The exclusive voluntariness and unnecessariness of sin is one of the axioms of a benevolent creation ; so is its exceeding and infinite sinfulness and detestableness. Better believe anything, rather than not believe that God is infinitely good. Better believe that by a defect of Omnipotence God could not have avoided sin, rather than believe that the God of the universe is such a person as prefers sin, and makes it necessary, and yet punishes men for being the creatures of his own preference ! O, if there ever was a distortion of Natural and Revealed Theology, coming from the very smoke of the pit, it is this ! And perhaps, incredible as it may seem that such a nightmare of malignant conception should weigh upon the soul under the guise of Christianity, no language can tell the anguish, the struggle, the conflict, the fearfulness and horror of great darkness, into which this reprobate caricature of God's Theology has driven many an inquiring, trembling, penitent mind !

We must believe in the voluntariness and sinfulness of sin ; that it is neither a necessity created in man's nature, nor imposed upon his nature by his circumstances, nor a pardonable imperfection or mistake ; but a wickedness, the choice and persistence of his own free will establishing itself against God ; or else we make Revealed Theology an incredible thing, and Natural Theology the demonstration of a supreme malevolent agency. There must be right views of sin, to make either Revealed Theology credible, or Natural Theology trustworthy or endurable. Mistakes here have been unquestionably the source of greater error and evil, both speculative and practical, than can be described. The only right observation-point, from which to view all theology, natural or revealed, is just where we are, in the abyss of human guilt, and not where we might imagine or wish ourselves to be ; and there, in those depths, a right sense of sin is the quadrant of the soul, without which, indeed, it can take no accurate observation.

For again, as is the case with some, if your system makes sin a thing which suffering exactly pays for in this world, and is just its equivalent all through life, so that suffering is but the wages of sin paid now in full—this again, besides being a papable contradiction of God's Word, introduces a lie into your Natural Theology, and upsets all its conclusions as to the righteousness of God. For it is as clear as day in the reality of things, that some sins receive no wages at all in this world, while, *in the comparison*, other sins

are vastly overpaid. Some great crimes pass' unpunished, undiscovered, even up to death, and the executors of great villanies riot in the enjoyment of the fruits of their wickedness, while truly good men are punished for their very goodness. There is, indeed, under this view, no rule whatever, but a perfect confusion, a chaos, a storm of right and wrong, with all winds blowing athwart each other, and contending for the mastery. There is such a state of things, that great and good minds have been thrown from their balance by it, and have well-nigh relinquished their belief in the goodness and righteousness of God's providence; being saved only by the interposition of the assurance that all things shall be righted at last, and that there is a day of doom, when the wicked shall unfailingly and justly be punished, and the righteous unfailingly and justly be rewarded. But if your scheme of Natural Theology, or rather the prepossessions which you bring to it, make sin a thing which is not an evil nor a wickedness, *deserving* punishment in the future world, than you are compelled to exclude from it all *prediction or promise* of such retribution; for that which it would be unjust for God to inflict, it would be unjust for God to threaten; and so the very intimations in our Natural Theology of a retribution to come, are arguments against God's goodness, since it is under God's constitution of our moral nature that we have these intimations, and they cannot otherwise be considered than as intimations from Him. He has, therefore, according to this scheme of the nature of sin, as undeserving of future punishment, made our constitution to promise what He himself denies; and to predict concerning Him what is absolute injustice.

It is perfectly undeniable that some good men suffer greatly, while some very bad men suffer very little, if at all. There never was a theory broached, more palpably contradicted by fact, every step of the way, than this, in the Natural Theology of some men, that sin receives its retribution as it goes along. If this were true, then is God, even by the showing of His own Word, an unjust, partial God—"a judge of evil thoughts," accepting the persons of men. For His own children, under the guidance of His own inspiration, are represented reasoning with Him on this point. Job, Jeremiah, David, Asaph, reiterate the question: Wherefore do the wicked prosper? Wherefore are all they happy that deal very treacherously? False theologians and forgers of lies, like Job's friends, may undertake to answer that the wicked do *not* prosper; but it is palpable that they do; and sometimes the prediction in their own consciences, that a day of reckoning is coming, is almost the only ingredient of pain or retribution in their cup. And the only possible answer to such false premises and such questions, is that of Job, David, Asaph, and Jeremiah themselves, that the wicked are reserved to the day

of punishment. Mark me, and be astonished. Even when I remember I am afraid, and trembling taketh hold on my flesh. Wherefore do the wicked live, become old, yea, are mighty in power? Have ye not asked them that go by the way? And do ye not know their tokens, that the wicked is reserved to the day of destruction, and shall be brought forth to the day of wrath? The stifling of this truth, the rejection of it from Natural Theology, the not attending to it, or the denial of it by the assertion that the wicked receive their punishment in this life, inevitably makes Natural Theology a falsification of God. It makes it speak wickedly for God.

And therefore, Natural Theology must recognize sin as sin; as something neither pardonable because trifling, nor a mere weakness, nor an unavoidable necessity, but an enmity against God, and a selfishness chosen and persisted in, and a voluntary depravity, not punished here in this world, though causing, even here, all the misery that mankind ever endure, but to be punished hereafter; a state of guilt and consequent ruin in man, deserving all, and doubtless more than all, that men's consciences and fears ever prejudice in regard to it. For the judgment of the criminal against himself, is ever on the side of leniency; and the judgment of men's natural conscience against sin, and their predictions of a future retribution, are to be taken as beneath the truth.

The recognition, therefore, of man as a sinner, deserving of punishment, which he does not receive in this life, but is to receive in another, is the only way to clear up God's character as a governor and judge. If you do not make this recognition, you falsify even the light of nature, and you manufacture a natural theology which must give the lie to revealed theology. You contradict the undeniable clear affirmations of the system of nature, and you prepare nature, so falsified, to appear in opposition to revelation. You make, indeed, a ruin of all Theology, human and Divine.

Now, to complete our argument, we might run through a list of solemn quotations from heathen and pagan writers themselves, declaring the dictates of Natural Theology without the Scriptures. Professor Lewis has arrayed them in a manner, which, so far as we know, has never been accomplished before, in his *Essay on the Divine Attributes*, exhibited in the Grecian poetry and philosophy.

"Punishment," the ancients said, "stalks silently, and with a slow pace; it will, however, at last overtake the wicked." Archbishop Leighton makes a striking application of sentences to this purport from Seneca and Plutarch. "The good man God accustoms to hardships, and prepares him for himself. But the luxurious, whom he seems to indulge and to spare, he reserves for evils to come. For you are mistaken, if you think any one

cepted. The man who has been long spared, will at last have his portion of misery ; and though he seems to have escaped, it is only delayed for a time." Plutarch in this matter comes very near to Peter. "*If he who transgresses in the morning is punished in the evening, you will not say that in this case justice is slow ; but to God a whole age, or even several ages, are but as one day.*" We shall take now but two more of those instances out of many to our purpose.

Thus says Plato in his seventh epistle to Dion, "Thus ought we always to believe those ancient and sacred words, which declare to us that the soul is immortal, that judges are appointed, and that they pass the highest sentences of condemnation, when the spirit is separate from the body." In a still more striking passage from the Republic, Plato gives us the most express declaration of the common belief. "For well know, O Socrates, that when one supposes himself near the point of death, there enter into his soul fears and anxieties respecting things before unheeded. For then the old traditions concerning Hell, how those who in this life have been guilty of wrong must there suffer the penalty of their crimes, torment his soul. He looks back upon his past life, and if he finds in the record many sins, like one starting from a frightful dream, he is terrified and filled with foreboding fears." "Compare also with this," says Professor Lewis, "the terrific account of the world of woe, contained in the tenth book of the Republic, and of the sufferings of that wretched and incurable class, who, in the emphatic language of the writer, *never come out*, but remain to all eternity. From such descriptions as these, as Plutarch tells us, Plato was charged by Chrysippus with adhering too closely to the popular traditions, and attempting to frighten mankind with the fears of Hades." Just in the same way in which the preachers of retribution in the eternal world in our day are disposed of in some quarters, by men who wish in their trembling souls that they could get rid of the truth of retribution, by sneering at fire and brimstone. But the mockery of the fool at sin cannot keep off its punishment, nor the foreboding terror of that punishment.

That God is revealed in nature as a God of retribution, the writings of the heathen abundantly show. The attribute of retributive justice they made a separate deity, whose conclusions and awards would be full and perfect only in the future world. They gathered this, first, from the admonitions of conscience within them ; second, from those judgments of God, from time to time falling upon mortals, so extreme and awful, that even the most darkened minds were compelled to interpret them as God's testimony, both of His wrath against sin, and His determination to punish it. By far the most remarkable of these judgments are related in the Scriptures ; and the sacred writer adds to the enu-

meration of them, that they happened as examples, and are to be regarded as proving this great truth, that God is reserving the unjust to the day of judgment, to be punished. God's judgments awaken men's conscience, and set it powerfully at work. They reveal a God who can and will punish sin. If the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah had been related in profane history *alone*, men could not have avoided connecting it with the enormous wickedness of those cities, and viewing it as an example of overtaking vengeance. But in regard to this and other great judgments, revelation has set the matter at rest, and taught us distinctly what is the lesson God designs to impress, namely, that he is a God who will by no means clear the guilty, but reserves the unjust to the day of their punishment. It is well remarked by Professor Lewis, that the declarations of Plato are the sentiment of the common mind in all ages, exhibiting just the same views of death, and the same apprehensions of future retribution as now prevail, and ever have prevailed among mankind.

There is, indeed, a sense of the future judgment in the heart. Every sinful being is conscious of it. There is no sin ever committed, but it carries with it a monition, a prediction, I shall meet that sin again. The mind travels forward with the speed of thought, to the time when all things shall pass in review. The consideration of that review may not always be distinct in the consciousness; nay, there may be, there almost always is, a shrinking back from the idea of the future judgment, and an attempt to avoid its acknowledgment; but the idea remains, and cannot be struck down or obliterated. It is inwrought and indelible in the Natural as well as Revealed Theology and consciousness of mankind.

There are times when these alarms of retribution sound louder in the soul than at others; times when its deep roar is like the booming thunder of a distant ocean; times when, if you listen at the door of the soul, you may hear it reverberating like the sound of a gong in subterranean caverns. There is within the soul, and ever will be, an instinctive consciousness of future retribution. The power with which this feeling is engraven on the soul, the marked place it occupies in the domain of conscience, the instinctive dread of dying, the shrinking back from the eternal world, the gloom in which that world is shrouded to the wicked soul, are among the undeniable predictions and demonstrations of our Natural Theology. If the world to come were but *one* world, and that world only heaven, whence should ever enter into the soul, and have such universal power and prominence there, the thought and dread of an eternity of woe? Aye! it is the dictate of natural religion, that the future state of the wicked will be a state of misery. It is one of those insignia of man's Divine origin and moral nature, which nothing can obliterate; no power of sin—no

recklessness of debauchery, can ever wear it out; no searedness of conscience is proof against it. All men fear it, and so all men believe it. Guilt is a dread attendant. Guilt is woe. No inscription of natural religion is in broader light than this. Guilt and woe are one. They are sworn friends. One tracks the other. You never see them alone. Either the reality, or the prediction of the reality, justifying God, and condemning the guilty, you always find. Sometimes both the consciousness and the prediction, in gloomy embrace within the soul, produce almost the experience of hell beforehand.

I could not share in childish prayer,
Nor join in evening hymn,
Like devil of the pit I seemed,
'Mid holy cherubim.

And guilt was my dread chamberlain
That lighted me to bed,
And drew my midnight curtains round,
With fingers bloody red!

You may say it is only the guilt of murder that is followed by such experience; but there are hours in your own being which tell you that it does not need to be a murderer, in order to hear within your own soul the roll of the muffled drum summoning you to judgment. Sin of every kind, *your sin*, all sin, unrepented, unannealed, unpurged, is perdition. It is not the Bible alone that tells you of it. God's judgments are like the light that goeth forth in regard to it; it is the very voice of universal, outraged nature; the instinctive shuddering and dread of death is the echo of that voice, rolling from the recesses of eternity. Nature cries out through all her works that sin is woe! Revelation utters a corresponding voice, the wages of sin is death! It is heard through all heaven, sin is woe! It reverberates through hell, sin is woe! It is echoed from that world to this, in thunder that makes every guilty soul tremble, sin unrepented of is death eternal!

We have then the following stream and chain of the demonstration in our Natural Theology. We put it into the shape of its successive conclusions.—1st. The constitution and course or system of nature, including man in his mind, his moral character and entire development, as well as God in *his* development to man, apart from his Word. Out of this springs,

ON THE ONE SIDE,

God as a moral governor, good, wise powerful, righteous, exercising now a providential government, which is to go on for ever.

ON THE OTHER,

Man as a moral agent, with the ideas of God, immortality, accountability, virtue, vice, judgment, retribution, all developed as a manifest possession of his being and operation of his faculties.

God hating sin, proved at present but partially, though clearly.

Man as a sinner against God, proved by his own conscience, by the universal admission of the race, by the undeniable reality of things.

God inflicting evil on account of sin, proved by all the suffering that exists.

Man as a sufferer in consequence of sin, proved again by conscience, and the direct evidence of fact.

But, God partial in such infliction, sometimes sparing the more guilty, and letting the more innocent suffer.

But man again as suffering unequally, and sometimes very little, and therefore partially, neither with relative nor absolute justice in perfection, the innocent sometimes suffering while the guilty escape.

Therefore, God waiting to execute fully all just awards unexecuted in this life, by and by, in due season, in the future world.

But again, man's own conclusion from these facts, and from the predictions of his conscience, that God will hereafter interpose to punish sin.

The Result, more than all others palpable, proved also by the examination of the faculties and the experiences of the human mind, supposed active itself in a future world, which is admitted,

RETRIBUTION.

The question which Natural Theology cannot answer, How to be saved from it? The point where Natural Theology stands gazing into the eternal world, in breathless, solemn fear and expectation.

We have denominated the argument in our Natural Theology a demonstration, for it is clear that whatever demand is clearly made by our Natural Theology is of that nature. If it teaches that man, as a sinner against God, his own nature, and his fellow-man, has not received, and does not receive, the just award for his deeds, then it demands such an award, and in demanding it predicts it, and in predicting it demonstrates it. For, unless it comes, God is not righteous, not infinitely good. It *must* come, *will* come; as certainly as Natural Theology demonstrates the being of a God, so certainly it demonstrates a future retribution. If such retribution were not a reality, considered as present in the reality of things, though future in their development, then the demonstration of a God would fail. Therefore the prediction by our Natural Theology of a future retribution is actual demonstration. We

reason just thus in regard to sequences and relations in this world. If I see a man kindling a flame at the root of a dry tree in the forest, or see him lay down his axe at the root of such a tree, and after girding himself for the work, begin to strike, this with me is demonstration that he is going to fell the tree. If I see a number of workmen under the direction of a man of wealth, building a large and costly house, it is demonstration to my mind that the house is meant to be inhabited. If I see a man plunge a dagger into the heart of his neighbor, it is demonstration to my mind that he intended to kill his neighbor.

Or, to take another line of illustration, if I walk along the streets of some buried but excavated city, and see beside me in one quarter a number of sepulchral monuments with memorial inscriptions upon them, I conclude that these were places for the burial of the dead; and although in entering these monuments I find no vestiges of dead bodies, this does not in the least weaken in my mind the force of the demonstration that the tombs once contained the remains of the dead, or were built for the purpose of containing them. If on entering those monuments I find an urn, with a groove at the top to receive a cover, it is demonstration that the urn originally possessed the cover, and is imperfect without it. This is demonstration towards the past, although the past in those particulars, is as unknown to me as the future. Or, if I find anywhere a gold box with a groove for the cover, and places for the hinges, and a manifest arrangement for the fastening, although the cover cannot be found, it is demonstration to my mind that there was or is a cover somewhere; the cover may be irretrievably lost, but I know as certainly that it belonged to the box, as I know that the box is before me. Or, if I go into a jeweller's shop, and find a curious ring, with a cavity in the center for the stone, I know that a stone is to be placed in that ring, although the master of the shop may say nothing to me of his design in regard to it. Or, if I go into the shop of a bookbinder, and there see the sheets of many copies of the Bible in process of folding and sewing together, it is demonstration to me that those books are to be bound, and that when bound, the sheets which I do not there see will be found bound up in them. This is demonstration in regard to the future.

Now apply the same principles to Natural Theology. I find, as it were, a system without the cover; but there is a place for the cover, and the mind is satisfied with the proof that there must be a cover. I find a system as it were in loose sheets, and those sheets before me tell me of other sheets that are to be added. I know that it is to be bound, and that when it is bound, I shall find the sheets that are missing. I find God's Ring of Providence in the great workshop of the Master; but the stone I do not see; I see the place for it, and I know that when the ring is perfected, it will be there. I find in Natural Theology this requisition and

prediction of a great consummation, a just and final award for characters and deeds, which must have such a retribution. I know that it will come, as certainly as I know that I am in my Master's workshop, in the creation of my Maker. I see many things which I cannot understand, but I know that everything has a righteous design and meaning, and I know that God does not say one thing in his works, and a contradictory thing in his providence, nor one thing in his providence, and a contradictory thing in his Word.

It may perhaps be answered, that all this demonstration of a future retribution in Natural Theology is still but mere probability, because no man has yet gone into the eternal world and returned, under the system of nature. But we affirm it is actual demonstration, and not mere probability, because, without the predicted result, God is not just. Therefore it is not mere probability, but demonstration. If the result predicted were of such a nature as to be immaterial in regard to God's character, then, indeed the proof would be mere probability. It might be so, and it might not. But the attributes of God already known *require* the predicted result, and therefore the prediction is demonstration.

The iron clamp of Natural Theology upon the soul is that of guilt and retribution, and the command of Natural Theology is repentance. But nature has no promise of pardon, does not even say that pardon is possible. Here, on this dreadful darkness, rises the Sun of Righteousness upon the soul. Here comes in the gospel, bringing life and immortality to light through the atonement. I hear many good things from Plato and the heathen moralists, said a holy man and profound writer, but I never hear anything like the sweetness of the sentence, "Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest."

Neither is there any anticipation of that sentence, nor any foreshadowing of it in Natural Theology, but the reverse. There is the flaming sword, turning every way in the gate of Eden, forbidding all access, but no gentle form inviting us within. Our Natural Theology brings us to the threshold of the eternal world, and leaves us there, to gaze at the only reality absolutely demonstrated from nature, as awaiting us in that world, namely, Retribution.

The next question which the soul seems to raise, and about which the universal conscience of mankind is exercised, is not so much how to avoid that retribution; for the sense of it lies upon the soul as an inevitable reality; but, how that retribution is to be exercised? The imagination of mankind under the power of a guilty consciousness, has wrought out a thousand terrible external suppositions, and predictions, and is indeed the mother of almost all the superstitions, as well as truthful guesses in the world; for superstition is simply the work of an angry conscience in nature's sinful-

ness and ignorance, or of a powerful imagination goaded on by conscience, and excited to almost preternatural exercise.

But when reason pauses, as it sometimes does, and turns from outward imaginings to inward realities, it finds already in existence and in partial operation, even in this world, powers and causes enough for a great infliction of punishment, or of justice, if carried only as they are into the eternal world. We find the human constitution itself so fearfully and wonderfully made, that its examination sustains and carries out the conviction and prediction of punishment, by showing us what may be, even in ourselves, the agents of such punishment. We find that even in this world by far the greater portion of the suffering we endure comes from ourselves. We find in mankind, in ourselves, an individual conscience of such power, that beneath its rule it is only necessary to be guilty, in order to be miserable. There are indeed great external evils and sufferings, which are the consequences of sin; pain, sickness, poverty, the loss of friends, the penalties of human law, all are sources of sufferings; but the suffering would be, comparatively, very little, were the mind at peace with God, in the enjoyment of a sense of God's favor. It is the inward guilt, unrest, torment and foreboding of the soul, that make external suffering what it is. So that, allowing the constitution of nature to remain, as to all external suffering, precisely as it now is, if yet the inhabitants of the world were a race of pure, gentle, loving beings, submissive to God, with an innocent and quiet conscience, and seeking and delighting in one another's happiness, external suffering would scarcely be felt, as such, and this world would be very like heaven, even with all its present external sufferings in full existence. And on the other hand, let the sinful passions of men have their full development, let the natural depravity of mankind operate unrestrained, and this world, without any other cause, even in spite of its external enjoyments, would be very like what our most direful imaginings conceive of the misery of hell.

Now then it is manifest that, carried as we are into the eternal world, we must have there the same elements of suffering within us, because the same guilty nature and conscience that we have here. But our reason tells us that our suffering, even of this kind, in this world, is but restrained and partial, and that in the world of perfect development and retribution it must be complete; and we cannot help asking ourselves how it may be accomplished? We cannot help forecasting our situation and experience in the presence of a just and holy God. We cannot help an uneasy consciousness that in such presence, in the eternal world, *simply and only as we are*, all consideration of the infliction of external penalty being left aside, there must be in ourselves the experience of misery. We ask what elements or agents are there in the constitution of the human mind, the discovery and experience of which,

now, prove to us that they are adapted for the perfect experience, *hereafter*, of what we deserve, that they are wondrous instrumentalities of a perfect retribution for all the evil of our characters and doings. What elements are there now, indeed, developed but in part, but which, when developed in their strength and perfection, seem adequate to do even God's own work of judgment and of retribution.

We find them, even in our intellectual nature, considered apart from the awful fact of our guilt, and before the question of desert or conscience in our moral nature, an assurance of the preservation of all the materials of judgment. We find an assurance of the perfect representation of all our character and doings. We find a machinery provided, so to speak, which will bring into view, and into renewed experience, all the developments of our being, on which it is requisite that judgment be passed, and sentence or verdict awarded. We find the fearful and wonderful development of *MEMORY*, by which the next most perfect consciousness and possession of our being, after that of present existence, is that of our past existence; which itself may be, the whole of it, an eternal now, and eternal present consciousness and possession, by the working of this power. Next after what is, is that which has been; and from that which has been and is, comes that which is to be. The foundation of the nature of our future existence is the preservation of our past; and the preservation of the past is a demonstration, not of the Divine omniscience only, but of our own intellectual constitution. The two demonstrations from the Divine omniscience and the human memory, are both referred to in that wonderful passage in the wonderful book of Ecclesiastes, to which we have already alluded as a system of Natural Theology; "That which hath been is now; and that which is to be hath already been; and God requireth that which is past."

There are five great realities that constitute the body of our practical theology, known partly from experience, and partly from God:—Remembrance, Remorse, Repentance, Redemption, Retribution. Three of these belong to our Natural Theology, are either developed or clearly demonstrated there, namely, remembrance, remorse, retribution. But the other two belong to Revealed Theology, namely, repentance and redemption. Considered under another classification of deep interest, remembrance and remorse are of man; retribution is a demand of man from God, and a work both of God and man; repentance is a demand of God from man, and a work of God *in* man; but *REDEMPTION* is the work *ONLY* of God, the infinite benevolence of God, the infinite glory of God.

Now to trace the passage of these from one to the other; remembrance leads inevitably to remorse, and remorse to retribu-

tion. But the passage from remorse to retribution, which is the legitimate chain and passage in Natural Theology, from the first step to the last, may be intercepted by Revealed Theology, by the interposition of repentance, leading to and resting in redemption, this side of retribution. It *may* be; but that passage, though made possible, and offered and urged, by God's mercy in the gospel of his Son, is not inevitable. There is no natural nor inevitable connection between remorse and repentance. Remembrance leads unfailingly to remorse, but remorse does *not* lead unfailingly to repentance, but, for the most part, passing over both repentance and redemption, disbelieving, or neglecting and rejecting both, plunges, as in the case of Judas, into the depths of eternal retribution. And there is nothing behind retribution. Retribution is the last thing. Every other thing stands between it and the soul, to keep the soul away from it. God has put everything before it, every development, every experience, every effort of mercy, every instruction and admonition of nature and of revelation, the interposition of promise, of threatening, of expostulation, of law, of grace, of providence, of truth, of discipline, of partial suffering, all things possible in the constitution and course of nature, God has put before retribution, and in the way of it. The thunderings and lightnings of Sinai, the warning judgments of God's wrath, before the perfect execution of it, the pestilence going before him, and burning coals at his feet, the nations driven asunder, the everlasting mountains scattered, the deep uttering his voice, the deluge and the earthquake, the fiery brimstone-light of burning cities, all these things are intervened of God in the way of retribution to keep men from advancing into it. But above all, the cross uplifted between heaven and earth, the God Incarnate stretched upon it, the sublime mysteries and amazements of God manifest in the flesh, the scheme of salvation, and the agencies of the universe engaged in it, all stand before the last dread reality of retribution; so that the soul has to storm its way, as it were, through the successive barriers of the delay of God's justice, the trial of God's goodness, and the work of redemption itself, before it arrives at this last thing.

But retribution is the last thing. Arrived at that, there is nothing else to experience. The soul has gone, as it were, to the bottom of eternity, and will find no further element or mode of existence. There is no return. The only way into redemption is from this side, through repentance; but from retribution to redemption there is no way back. There is a way from repentance to redemption, and redemption was appointed both to make repentance possible and available, and to render possible an avoidance of retribution. If there could have been redemption by retribution, no other redemption *than* retribution would have been needed. Redemption was not instituted to make retribution *available*, but to *avoid* retribution, because retribution is that ultimate state, from which there

is no return. It is precisely because of this last ingredient in retribution, because of its ultimateness and eternal dreadfulness, that the occasion becomes worthy of the interposition of such an infinite scheme of grace as that of redemption, by which, through repentance, that eternal reality of retribution may be avoided. The eternity and unchangeableness of retribution justify the sacrifice even of the Son of God upon the cross, to render possible the salvation of those who will repent.

In this view, and it is the only possible view in this direction, retribution is the foundation of redemption; that is, it is the necessity and certainty of retribution, which have made redemption necessary and fit. God so loved the world as to give his only Son, that whosoever would believe in him *might not perish*. Here the thing represented as the cause of redemption, the object of it, is, that men might not perish. That is, they would inevitably perish *without* redemption, or in other words would go on to meet the retribution of eternity, from which eternal retribution it is the object of redemption to save them.

The first great development in our *intellectual* nature, looking towards the judgment, is Remembrance. The first great development in our *guilty* nature, is that of Conscience. But we should have known nothing about what we call conscience, had it not been for sin. It is a remarkable testimony of the state of human nature, that the very term conscience is indissolubly associated with, and almost springs out of, the idea of sin. The mere consciousness of innocence could never have made any approximation to our idea of conscience. The consciousness of sin constitutes the *power* of conscience, and we find thus developed a faculty in our nature, which by itself alone works out a kind of retribution, even now. But this is by no means regarded as *the* retribution, which the consciousness of sin compels us to expect. Conscience is the Judge, not the Avenger; it is the declaration of desert, and the promise of retribution, but not the accomplishment. Conscience is not the Executor of God's law, but the accuser of the soul for having violated it. Conscience is the Attorney General, the officer who draws up and brings against the soul the indictment of its guilt. Then there must be the trial, then the execution of the sentence. The consideration of the sentence will come up under the article of retribution; and meanwhile, in our enquiries as to the *power* of retribution with which the operations of conscience are by themselves invested, it is always to be borne in mind, that we are not supposing conscience itself to be the *last* retribution, however great and important may be the part which we may find conscience playing in that retribution. But the more distinct consideration of the nature and power of conscience must come in under the article of Remorse.

We have now, therefore, to consider that part of the constitu-

tion of the human [mind, through which conscience itself works, and on which the reality of the judgment would seem to depend; that part of our constitution which renders certain the supply and presentation of materials for conscience and the judgment to act upon. That part is the Memory. Conscience acts by remembrance, and without it would be divested of all her retrospective power. By remembrance conscience becomes at every step the consciousness of past sin, or the past consciousness of sin, renewed in present consciousness. By remembrance the consciousness of sin is rendered eternal. Without remembrance there could be no consciousness of sin, except at the instant fleeting interval of time, in which sin is actually in commission. The moment the sin is past, there would cease, without remembrance, to be any consciousness of it. Reflection upon it would be impossible, and therefore the sight and sense of its sinfulness would be impossible. For it is only on reflection that the sinner ever sees and feels truly his guilt. The excitement of sinful motive, and the strength and passion of design, intent upon accomplishing an object, very much prevent the sense of sin during its commission, so that it is only *after* the commission that conscience begins her active power. There was a *warning* power beforehand, but the retributive power not till afterwards.

What, then, is the power of the Memory? How does it work? By what circumstances is it affected? What reason have we to suppose that it is eternal? All these become questions, of a deep and solemn interest, when we put them looking at our destiny in the eternal world. Our memory might almost be described as the power of Omniscience, and Omnipresence at every part of the circle of being, in which we have had existence; so rapid is its operation, so minute its action. It is that faculty or operation of the mind, by which we recall our past experience; that mysterious power, by which we may live over again our past life, and do live it over again, in all its vividness. It is that faculty by which we recollect; but what is it to recollect? Separate the word into its elements. *Re*-collect, to collect again what has been scattered, to gather together what has been dispersed. The mind does this, as a master among its treasures; the mind collects again under its own survey, into its own present experience, the materials and steps of its past experience, its past knowledge, no matter how widely they have been strown abroad.

It is that faculty or power, by which we retrace our past life, go over it again, not merely retouch it, as a painter might retrace an old faded painting, but *re-track* it, renew it, reviving its past realities and impressions, and travel again among them. It is that faculty by which we remember. But what is it to *re-member*? It is to unite, in their true relation and place, the misplaced or forgotten facts and experiences of past existence, not merely to recollect

them, but to member them together in their true relative arrangement, to re-member them. It is not merely to remind ourselves of them, to reinstate them in the mind, but to *re-mind them*, to renew them as parts of the mind's present consciousness, and as it were, throw the mind into them. In this sense, remembrance may denote a higher exercise of the memory than mere recollection, which may be a re-gathering without a re-placing.

The Memory is a powerful and capacious faculty. Even in this world, with so many hindrances, in an imperfect development, its manifestation of tenacity and vastness is sometimes prodigious. There have been men, who have seemed to remember everything, and it is in the highest degree probable that the memory can and does retain all past experience. And by this we mean not merely experience of men and things in personal life, with which we become acquainted, but all things that have ever passed through the mind, ever occupied a place in the consciousness. All books, all knowledges gained in any way, all words and movements of the soul, either in receiving or transmitting impressions, all conversations, and all trains of feeling and reflection, and all thoughts transmitted, may be retained in the mind, so retained at least, and linked with its being, as to be under complete command of the memory, capable of being brought up again into notice and existence of the mind, and liable at any time to be reproduced, and not only so, but in such a way as to set the mind back, as it were, living its past life over again. This power may transport the whole being into a past period of existence, with all the associated events and characters darting their influences again upon the soul, and all the associated thoughts and feelings clustering again around it, in all their original freshness and vividness. We see and know this to be done sometimes in this world. The way in which it is accomplished may seem under no law, a matter almost of mere chance, the steps are so hidden and unobserved. The secret links that bind thoughts and things together being unnoticed, the starting of such invisible scenery into existence seems something of a supernatural character, not to be accounted for.

A man shall be walking alone, beneath the stars, by the sea-side, among the trees, on a lonely mountain, anywhere indeed, and ever so far removed from his customary associations; when, from some slight secret connection of thought and feeling, some mysterious invisible suggestion by a circumstance not possible to be traced, there shall suddenly gather around his mind a past world of experience and associations. It shall come upon him, so powerfully and so suddenly, that it shall be as if a circle of forms and intelligences, acting and conversing, had suddenly, at the bidding of Omnipotence, filled the air around him. And yet he cannot trace the incomprehensible power of identity and relation in past and present existence, that brought all this so suddenly into being. But

it reveals to him a power of his nature, a capacity and activity of memory, a law of intelligent existence, which may well lead him to exclaim, I am fearfully and wonderfully made. Sometimes the mind of a sinful man is hurried by this law, which acts with a certainty and power as fixed as the laws that whirl on the swift spheres of God's universe, back into a far distant period of life, into the presence of some distinct but long forgotten act of sin; it may be a word, a fraud, a theft, an injustice, a cruelty, a sin against God or man; and he is made to confront it, and stands, as it were, alone in the universe, with nothing but his sin and himself in company, and gazes at it as if insensible to all things else, and sees it not only as he then saw it, when first he gave it being, but in new lights, in relations before-unnoticed, unimagined. Now let the Deity but commission this power to take the sinner thus in the eternal world over the circle of his past sinful experience, and at every step let merely the judgment of the man against himself be recorded, and then let the law and the condemnation be announced to the universe, and assuredly there would be need of no other exposition to justify the processes of Divine retribution.

Looking at this matter with reference to the eternal world, it is necessary to bear in mind that in *this* world remembrance is in fact the great spontaneous occupation and operation of our intellect. Our processes of induction and of reasoning are carried on from what we remember; from materials, which memory furnishes, all the fabrics of our busy powers are woven. Remembrance constitutes almost the whole body of our literature; the world of thought and feeling, of imagination and of genius, grow out of it. We are ever living in remembrance. The whole history of our race is remembrance. The past is all remembrance. Our projections of ourselves into the future, and our compulsions of the future into the sphere of the present, are all based upon conclusions drawn from the materials, of remembrance. Man may be defined as a remembering being, and a reasoning being only *through* remembrance. Every addition to the stores of memory constitutes, according to the moral character of the remembering agent, an additional source of future happiness or misery, an extension of the circle of experience and of voluntary being, which the soul is still to be occupied in reflecting upon, retracing, and out of it still forecasting and demonstrating the future. Just so must it be in the eternal world. Every added interval of existence then, every age and every cycle of ages will form, according to the character of the soul, as holy in God's image, or sinful, in its unregenerate own, additional material of memory, additional provinces of past existence approximating forever to the reality of a past eternity, over which the mind will be ceaselessly winging its solemn retrospective flight, and from which it will be forecasting, from broader, vaster, mightier con-

clusions of the past, still vaster, more interminable, more demonstrable incursions of expectation into the future. So, from the weight of the experience of thousand, thousand ages past, the holy soul will be able to demonstrate, and will be ever forecasting, the blissful experience, and the sinful soul the gloomy and terrible experience of thousand ages to come. The present thus ties together both the past and the future in our existence, and makes it in some respects an eternal Now.

As to the vividness and minuteness with which men's past lives thus come back to them in this world, much depends upon the weakness or power of the law of association in individual minds; for it is upon the law of association mainly that the phenomena of memory depend; a law which we shall have occasion to trace with reference to the security by which God has provided in ourselves for the appearance of all things at the judgment, in proper order and fulness and unity. What we see and experience in this world shows us with what amazing power and comprehensive extent this law may act in the eternal world, where every hindrance is removed, and the mind shall be at leisure, under guidance of this law, to travel broodingly over its whole past existence. And just so the prodigious capacity of some men's *voluntary* memory, in this world, when they set themselves to the exercise and improvement of this faculty, shows what may be done with it in the eternal world. It *can* retain, we have reason to believe, all past experience. This conclusion is almost demonstrable from the various and interesting phenomena of involuntary memory. As persons in a momentary swoon or trance have sometimes lived what has seemed a lifetime in a moment, so persons in a state of drowning have had the scenes of their whole life developed to their consciences (a phenomenon well known, and quite familiar, though sometimes most extraordinary,) as if the whole transactions of the judgment were passing in an incredibly swift interval. Persons drawing near to death not unfrequently remember the minutest incidents of childhood, or things of later life long utterly forgotten. And solemn and awful it is to see with what tenacity and power the minute recollections of guilt cling to the soul.

I knew a rich old man dying, who suddenly sent to a poor widow the price of an iron crow-bar, of which he had defrauded her many years before. A mountain of iron lays not so heavy on the earth, as the remembrance of one sin on a guilty man's conscience, when nearing the passage into the eternal world. No human being beheld the circumstance of the transfer of that iron-bar from the possession of that poor widow into the possession of that rich man. It might have been at first a simple act of borrowing, with the intention to return still deferred, till the iron-bar became inventoried, as it were, as a fixture of the rich man's

own. But conscience and the memory glide not over life so superficially, as men might wish, in their selfish, careless disregard of what belongs to others. Conscience and the memory came to the dying man's bedside, and asked him what he would now do with the poor widow's iron-bar, and the soul was compelled to its decision. But if there be such minuteness of recollection, and such power of conscience in little things, how much more in greater things, in all schemes of fraud and injustice, planned and executed in whatever apparent security. Security? There is an omnipresent Conscience, and an all-recording Memory, that constitutes not only a security, but a certainty, of retribution for your guilt, an assurance infallible for its knowledge and discovery; but there can be no possibility of security *against* it; there is an assurance infallible for its knowledge and discovery, in your own being; but there is no possibility of *concealment*, there is no such thing as success in guilt, or an escape from its consequences. Even if you could keep it from the knowledge of others, you do not keep the key of your own memory; you are not the master of its possessions, to confine them or bid them forth at your will. You may shut the chest, in which you think to keep buried in the caves of memory your secret sins; you may lock it, and throw away the key; but Conscience will wrench it open, and scatter its letters of shame to the eye of the universe. It may be a Safe against all ordinary fires of human investigation, and even providential discovery; but put it into the fires of conscience, and it shrivels like a scroll. Or if it were even possible that the fires of conscience could not touch it, then there are the fires of the Last Day.

Our subject now becomes intensely interesting and solemn, in the light of the law of association, and we are not willing to dismiss it with a merely general or superficial survey. It is a subject full of points, from which the fires of God's expostulations against sin, shoot off in every direction; lines of warning, in Mr. Foster's striking language, infinitely more formidable than material fire. For, what one portion of his past existence is then, from which the tyrant conscience of the sinner, by her agent, memory, will not evoke the buried forms of guilt, and the materials of condemnation? What one portion is there, from which conscience does not predict, and demonstrate as inevitable, a future complete Retribution? Therefore, the voice from the whole past deep of a man's existence is a perpetual warning to flee from the wrath to come. Sometimes there are great reefs of guilt, where the surges break and roar with incessant thunder; and even if the reefs of a man's sins be so deep buried in the waste of waters, that no human eye ever sees their rugged prominences, still there is a roar of the sea above them. In moments of silence or of unexpected thoughtfulness, a man hears it, and knows its prediction,

its warning, even though, amidst the whirl of business, of care, of gain, of revelry, of pleasure, ordinarily and profoundly insensible. If he would stand still amidst the roar of life, and listen to the voice of conscience and of God, stand still and hear what God says to him, what his own being says to him, he would oftener turn at that voice, and flee where Christ beckons him.

ARTICLE VI.

PAUL BEFORE THE AREOPAGUS.

By ASANIEL ABNOT, New York.

AMONG all the reasons that have been alleged to favor the study of the old heathen authors, the strongest and best is that which the great lights of the church have ever held as a sufficient justification for their practice in the diligent comparison of sacred and profane authors. It is this. *In those authors alone we are able to learn most fully what man will do when left free from the restraints of the Divine Word and its ministry.* In the gospel we have God humanized; while in heathenism we have man deified. Of this point, no man seems ever to have been more fully aware than the great apostle to the Gentiles; and if we are wise we shall imitate his example, and make ourselves masters of heathen learning; that we too may know what man is when left without a special revelation, and what has been the influence of Heathenism upon Christianity itself, from the days of the apostles to the present time.

Natural Theology has been substantially the same in all nations and through every age. Proclus, in commenting upon the *Timæus*, tells us that there has been ever less doubt and controversy concerning the one God than concerning the many gods; and Maximus Tyrius, in oft-quoted words, affirms the sense of the whole pagan world to be, that there is one God, the King and Father of all, and many gods, the sons of God, reigning together with God.

But when we come to what Varro and Scævola name Political and Mythical Theology, the confusion is endless and without remedy; and all the teachings of their natural theology prove but words without life, through the want of that requisite discipline the church alone can furnish, and that influence of his Spirit that God has never vouchsafed to such as, in any age and for any cause, turn from his word and ordinances to the inventions or perversions of men.

Thus heathenism in its politics, mythology, and philosophy, affords a foil to Christianity. Without it we should never have

known out of what depths of darkness and moral debasement the Cross has delivered us; and with it we shall be saved from "wandering after" that most terrible and apostate Power that has clad himself in the "armor of light," only the more to contend against God, and "wear out the saints of the Most High," till the Son shall consume him and his allies "with the brightness of his coming."

It is worthy of notice, that while plain and unlearned men were chosen as apostles to the more remote and rude nations, as well as to the body of the Hebrews in their dispersion, yet for the more polished nations about the Levant one was preferred who knew heathenism, not only as Jews knew it, but as the heathens themselves knew it; thus not only commending to them, on their own principles the gospel of Christ, and clearing it from their objections by means of their own dialectics, while he reproved them for the practice of vices that they knew to be damnable; but leaving us also an example by which we may be taught that we should never despise any proper means of enlightening our fellow-men, and above all that we should not neglect the study of that heathenism which in his time afforded the apostles of our faith no insignificant share of help and hindrance in their work. Paul, by knowing heathenism, through we know not how much study, and the passing of a large part of his life in the heathen city of Tarsus, knew how to approach the mind of the heathen as if he were one of themselves, at the same time he could justify to himself a proper contempt for their metaphysical subtleties as tending to no end but to "darken counsel by words without knowledge."

Thus at the opening of his wonderful argument concerning justification by faith, in his Epistle to the Romans, he brings to the minds of all well-read men all that Homer and the Greeks, and, after them, the Romans, with the priests of Babylon, Tyre, and Egypt, have ever written, when they declare God to be known by means of his works and providence, and the violators of his laws to be justly deserving of eternal death; while he exposes their vices in all their original horror, and accuses them of raising to the dignity of gods such as exceeded other men in the practice of them; by which they deified vice itself. So in his defence against the false reasoners that troubled the church in Corinth with subtle and vain questions, while they ridiculed the plainness and directness of his teaching, as wanting in the art and elegance of the highest rhetoric, he blows upon the whole world of their philosophers, as men of words and nothing more, from which reproach he will except none, not even Socrates and Plato; since even their superior knowledge in divine things never emancipated them from the thrall of error, nor was accompanied with the virtue to put in practice what they knew; after which he affirms that his teaching was according to God's Spirit, and accompanied by a power and influence that helped and enabled the weakest under Christian discipline to

outdo in fact what the highest efforts of Grecian genius had never presented as possible to a human being.

But perhaps nowhere has even Paul shewn himself so great, as when before the court of Areopagus he declares, to that grave and venerable assembly, the supremacy of God to the displacement of all their gods and heroes for the mediatorial rule of one who should raise the dead and judge the world in his own right, as the Son of God, declared with power by His own resurrection from the grave. In this we scarce know which most to admire, the boldness or the address of our apostle.

It was by this same dreadful assemblage, and under the same laws, that Socrates had been doomed to death, on the ground that he had taught the worship of strange gods; when he had given to the gods of his city only strange names, borrowed from the rituals of Egypt and the East. For what the Greeks held to signify by a perversion of his words a dog and a goose (*μὲν τὸν κύνα καὶ τὴν χήνα*) we are told by Porphyry in his book *De Abstinencia*, and Plato in his *Gorgias*, to have been an Egyptian god; that Plutarch in *Isis and Osiris* affirms to be the same with the Grecian *Hermes*; doubtless the same as the *Chinn* or *Remphan* of the Scriptures, who, like the other gods of heathenism, was sometimes male and sometimes female; whence Socrates gave the name in both forms.

But when Paul, after being for some time the butt of ridicule for all the wits of Athens, at length began to attract the notice of the authorities, and the officers of the laws haled him away to that terrible Judgment-seat, where, in the darkness of night, either alone by himself, or by the aid of an advocate not to be procured without a cost beyond the means of an apostle to meet, he must plead for his life; and in so doing avoid all appeal to the passions of his judges, and confine himself solely to the facts of the law,—then was the hour for the greatest reasoner in the world to show himself capable of filling the most trying position possible, and not only, by one of the most ingenious arguments ever constructed, prove his teaching to be in strict conformity with the Athenian laws, but to shew himself superior to the gravest and most learned of their philosophers, in discoursing of the nature and worship of God. His success proved complete. Not only was he himself cleared of all blame by the decision of the court, but, as befits the favorite apostle of Him who “led captivity captive,” he bore away with him one even from among his judges, and the name of “*Dionysius the Areopagite*,” has become as inseparable from that of Paul, as *Damon* from *Pythias*, or *Jonathan* from *David*.

It is not our purpose to show that in Paul's defence before his judges there are to be found all the parts of a regular discourse; though there is nothing more perfect as a model of forensic eloquence than the speeches of Paul always are; but to develop the leading characteristics of his plea and argument, as it must have

affected his hearers; in order that we may be able with more certainty to perceive what helps and what hindrances the gospel met in the heathenism of the apostolic age.

It is saying little, when we affirm that there is nothing extant in the oratory of the Gentile world, that shows such an opening to a discourse as in this of Paul. When Tertullus appeared before Felix as Paul's accuser, it was with consummate art, but with a strain of adulation offensive to a man of just feeling. When Cicero would impeach Verres, he begins by assuring the judges they have now an opportunity of proving how false or how true is the common impression that they were not inaccessible to corruption—a compliment savoring rather of insult than of flattery. But when Paul seeks to propitiate the good-will of his judges, he remembers his own dignity as an apostle, and the gravity of his judges, and says nothing that can, by the most distant implication, be taken to justify the will-worship of the heathen, nor anything to afford the most fastidious a ground of offence. Hence he chooses a form of words that may import a compliment of the highest order, while it may also be understood to convey a delicate reproof of excessive veneration for many gods; but of this no idea can be formed from a translation.

For it is well known that *δεδουδαίμωνια* may be taken no less for the unworthy fear men are prone to entertain of created spirits and the mere phantasms of a disordered imagination, such as is usually understood by superstition, than for that veneration for the supreme Deity, which is becoming in creatures, and is commonly named religion. For though *θεοὶ καὶ δαίμονες* gods and demons, are often taken together to signify the greater and lesser hero and angel-gods of Paganism, yet often has *δαίμων* the sense of *θεός* or God; as in the fragments of Callimachus, "If thou knowest God, this also thou knowest that the divinity (*δαίμων*) is almighty." Vide in Homer Il. 1. 98. In like manner *τὸ δαιμόνιον* is used for the supreme God. Thus it is said in Aristotle, "God (*τὸ δαιμόνιον*) is envious," i. e. allows no man to be prosperous without mixing ills with his condition. And in Epictetus; "Commit all to God (*τὸ δαιμόνιον*) and his providence." Also in Isocrates—"Worship God (*τὸ δαιμόνιον*) at all times, but especially with the city in her public sacrifices.." And in Demosthenes—"The Gods (*οἱ θεοὶ*) and the Deity (*τὸ δαιμόνιον*) will note him that gives not a just sentence." Orat. *περὶ παρρησίας* p. 266, Basil 1532 fol. So as to Socrates in Plato, we find him arguing with Melitus that he was no atheist, though his enemies so held him; and he says that he has been acknowledged to assert the existence of something divine (*δαίμονια*) whence he must also have taught the being of gods (*δαίμονας*.)

According to this view then, we shall make Paul say, "O men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are exceedingly devout "

He then gives a reason for his opinion in these words, "For as I was passing and beheld your devotions, I saw an altar with this inscription, **TO THE UNKNOWN GOD.**" It is asserted that there were many such altars consecrated to unknown deities in and around Athens. For when any public calamity was not removed by the invocation of gods known by name to the laws, it was customary to let go the victims into the fields, or along the public ways, and wherever they stopped there to sacrifice them "to the propitious unknown God." And this, though it might in many cases be only one of the ordinary gods, yet we are too well assured to doubt that it was often no other than the true God. Indeed, had it been aught else than the Supreme Deity to whom the Athenian altar Paul found was erected, he would have met with only contempt for making mention of it; since he directly asserts it and bases upon it his plea of not guilty in the matter of declaring a God and a worship unrecognized by the laws of their city. For it immediately follows, "Whom ye worship as unknown, him I declare unto you."

It is not possible to exceed the heathen writers in the variety and appositeness of names they attribute to God; with whom he is the Maker, the Prince and chief Ruler of the world, the first God, the great God, the greatest God, the Most High, the supreme of gods, the highest God, the chief God, the God of gods, the Principle of Principles, the First Cause, he that generated the whole world, he that rules the universe, the Supreme Governor and Lord of all, the God over all, the ingenerate, self-originated, and self-existent Deity, unity and goodness itself, that which is above essence, or superessential, that which is above mind or understanding, the supreme and eternal, immutable and imperishable, the beginning, and middle and end of all things, and infinite more of the same kind. But one of the famous modes of representing God, is that mentioned by Paul himself, when he describes him as named *The Unknown*. This we find also among our sacred writers, see Prov. 30: 4; Job 11: 7. Among the Egyptians Isis was never unveiled; and the sacred Trinity Damascius affirms (according to Eudemus and Eryubinus) to have been honored among them as a darkness above all knowledge and understanding, or an unknown darkness to be thrice repeated. It is unnecessary here to cite Lactantius, Aulus Gellius, Tertullianus and others, to show that the heathen universally in the deeper emotions of their souls, or in times of great danger, as an earthquake, were used to invoke not the gods, but the Unknown or Invisible God: though after the danger was past they would flock to the temples of their inferior gods and pour out to them their libations.

Thus Paul, by one great master-stroke, showed himself clear of declaring a God not acknowledged by the laws of Athens, or the

empire. "Him that ye worship as the Unknown God declare I unto you."

But his defence is not yet complete. He stands accused of setting up as new gods, Jesus and Anastasis, or the Resurrection; that they deem certain deities of oriental mysticism; and of this he is now called to speak. How shall he dispose of such a charge? He worships Christ as God-man; how shall he escape with his life if he acknowledge this? Surely there is no Athenian or Roman law that decrees worship to Christ. Here then is a dilemma; which horn shall he choose?

He has opened his cause wisely by making the God he declares to be the same with the Athenian's "Unknown God;" and he is thus prepared to vindicate himself, should there be occasion, for honoring Christ as God; because as God he is recognized by the laws of Athens. He is the "Unknown God" now manifested and shining forth to all creatures in a human form. We shall perceive in the sequel that he does not actually do this. It was sufficient for his purpose to speak of Christ as merely a man raised from the dead and appointed to act as judge of the world; though in doing this he comes so near to disclosing the Divinity of Christ that we are astonished to find no suspicion expressed; but some at once begin to rail on the doctrine of a resurrection; while others desire to hear more of the matter at another time. He cannot be censured for preaching Jesus as raised up instead of *Æacus*, *Minos*, *Rhadamanthus*, or *Cato* to be the divine medium of judgment to the whole world; and his *Anastasis* proves no goddess, but a change of human bodies from death to life.

It is an important law of rhetoric, that in a discourse nothing is to be introduced which is not necessary to the case in hand. No advocate should raise a point of law, or use a fact, not called for in making out a just cause. So no minister of the gospel should indulge in a loose and rambling style of argument; it lays him open to criticism, and tends to destroy the force of his discourse. We know of no more perfect examples of strict adherence to this rule than are to be found in the New Testament. Christ, for example, when called upon to defend the doctrine of a resurrection to human bodies before the multitude, attempted not to show that *all* shall rise from the dead; but instead he used merely the language that was then current among the religious teachers of the nation, many of whom affirmed the resurrection of the body (as *Josephus* informs us) to be the privilege of none but *good* men; whence he says, "They that are accounted worthy to obtain that world and the resurrection of the dead are like the angels." So Paul before the Areopagus, had no occasion to declare the supreme Divinity of Jesus Christ, except by assigning him the work of judging the world, not by lot, as the heathen judges are held to have done, though divinely directed, but by divine wisdom; as

his judgment is to be "in righteousness," and not according to any mere arbitrary laws or conventional customs, the only measures usual in the judgments of men, or, so far as we can learn, assigned to the heathen judges of departed souls.

And yet, had there been occasion to speak explicitly upon this head (and we probably have only the substance of his defence) there was no ground for cavil in the heathen mind. All their gods, and all the things of nature, were mere incarnations and embodiments of the supreme Deity; and that some man was expected about this time to be, in a higher sense than any before him, a visible incarnation of the Godhead there is no occasion to prove. So that in all probability the Athenians understood Paul to assert that incarnation as fulfilled in Jesus; though they mostly regarded it as a pretence based upon grounds too little known or too slight to deserve their notice.

But we may notice here that in all the choicest oratory of the heathen world there is nothing to compare with the splendor, the majesty, the dignity, with which that wonderful man entered upon his explanation of Christ and the Resurrection. "God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not confined in temples made with hands; neither is worshipped with the hands of men as though he were in need of anything, since he giveth to all life, and breath, and all things; and hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation; that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him, though he be not far from every one of us; for in him we live and move and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring."

With what emotions of admiration and astonishment must that learned and grave auditory have listened to this discourse from one whom they deemed a barbarian and a fanatic! With what delicacy does he reprove their idolisms, their splendid temple service, and all those things of a religious kind of which they were vain! Those everlasting edifices, dedicated to a hundred gods, with their wonderful statuary—the master works of Phidias, or Praxiteles, and that even in their ruin challenge the admiration of the world—all surround him with their splendor, and the conclave of superior deities look blank upon him from the frieze of the Parthenon, lest from his fluent lips leap forth some word that should change them to dust, and disgrace the deities of Olympus by sending them down together to groan upon burning rocks where the fugitive demons of Empedocles lie chained in eternal torments.

Yet was there not found a single listener who could note a fault in our apostle's doctrine. The Epicurean could not deny God to be "a living one, that hath all happiness with incorruptibility,"

though he might make him material and not a spirit, and hold fast to the dreams of Democritus, Leucippus, and Protagoras, that excluded a God, and substituted mere Chance in the formation of the world; or to that of Strato of Lampsacus who would have the world formed by a living and active but senseless nature, producing all forms and bodies according to some natural necessary order or law. The Stoic, after Heraclitus, would derive all things from God as a spiritual fire, while the admirers of Anaximenes would have God create all things from air; and the disciples of Thales made water, or watery slime, the matter of which all things were formed by that Deity, whom he named the eldest of beings and eternal. The Peripatetic would, indeed, have the world eternal, yet an eternal work of God, whom he made the most self-sufficient and self-happy of beings; while the whole universe, and all the higher gods, were but perpetual and eternal "productions or emanations from God." The followers of Plato could find nothing to censure in the doctrine of a God infinitely transcendent and removed from created things, since their master would have it so, and made the world to be enlivened and ordered by a holy and spiritual nature.

The delicate irony of Socrates would still remain fresh in the minds of all, wherein he ridicules the popular notions concerning the worship of God, as if he needed aught from men. Nor were they ignorant of that remarkable expression in the author of the book *De Coelo*, commonly imputed to Aristotle, wherein the supreme God, and his most exalted ministers, are described as residing in a calm and mild region beyond all vacuum and time, inaccessible to change, or death, or any other accident of this perishable life, not confined to place, or modified by motion, but strong, calm, and passionless, and endued with the highest and most self-sufficient life, to last through all eternity.

For, although they erected statues and sacrificed on altars to the supreme Deity from remote ages, yet was it universally understood that He was not like anything corporeal, and that he needed not any of such things as were offered in sacrifice. For heathenism consisted in the commixture of creature worship with the worship of God; or else in the deification of nature in its parts as manifestations of God in his works, and so parts of Him. For the former view we have the current of heathen, Jewish, and Christian writers; as when we hear Maximus Tyrius, and Plato speak of the gods as co-reigners with God; or as Seneca in Lactantius affirms, that God generated the gods to be ministers of His kingdom, while He himself intended through the whole. Maimonides (in *More Nevochim* 1: 36,) affirms that statues and images were designed to represent creatures who were mediators between men and God. Lactantius urges upon Hierocles the absurdity of assailing Christians for the worship of one God, that

he and all others among the heathen professed to hold as infinitely above all the inferior gods, saying, "You affirm that there be gods, and yet you subject and enslave them to that God whose religion you assay to destroy.

The latter view, that make the parts of the world to be honored as if they were parts of God and manifestations of Him, is contained in an epistle of Maximus Madamensis to St. Austin, wherein he says of God—"His virtues diffused through the whole world (since we know not his proper name) we invoke by many names; whence it comes to pass that while we prosecute as it were with various supplications his divided members, severally, we are seen to worship the whole Deity. The Orphic verses teach the same; as when it is said Jove is the profundity of the earth and the starry heavens, the breath of all things, the force of unquenchable fire, the bottom of the sea, the sun, moon, and stars," &c. Timotheus the chronographer in Cedrenus makes the Orphic theology to teach that by the divinity were all things made, and he is all things. And Plutarch, in his *Defect of Oracles*, blames the fanaticism of the Orphic school for this making all things out of God, according to the well known verse, "Jove is the beginning and middle, and all things grow from God;" at the same time that he reproaches the Naturalists, such as Anaximander and the other Italics between Thales and Anaxagoras, with laying aside the divine agency in their theories of the world; though it is possible he goes too far in relation to the Orphic cosmogony; since in another verse it is said "How can all things be one, and each distinct with a life of its own?" For the Oriental Pantheism that makes the world a body to God, and himself the soul of the world, is of early date and universally received among the most ancient nations; though with most it differed but little from the Scriptural view of all things consisting in God, and quickened by him, and his being all in all; only that the heathen were used to deifying the creatures as manifestations of God's power and wisdom while the Scriptures reprove all this as fond and vain and contrary to all true reason and the divine laws.

Then he reminds his auditory that man is homogenous, and the nations are parted on the earth that each may find out for itself what is God from a diligent study of his works. Too many of us, in the full satiety of our own ignorance concerning things so remote from us, are apt to consider the apostle as uttering through his whole speech new truths before unknown to that polite and learned assembly; whereas this would have proved the certain ruin of his cause. And though it is pretended that the Athenians prided themselves upon springing from their own soil, and claimed as congeners the grasshoppers, still this is but a figurative and hieroglyphic way of denoting that they had resided in the same place through all the most remote ages, while others led a wandering

and unsettled life, or established themselves in cities and commonwealths at periods of time long after Cecrops led their fathers over the sea, and transferred Egyptian arts and sciences to the shores of the Ægean. Were there nothing else to show that in the opinion of the old world all men were of common origin, we shall find it asserted in the fact that the same universal Deity is honored in all nations, though by many names, and in many modes; or, as they sometimes expressed it, "an agreeing discord." Besides, it is well known that among the ancients it was universally held that a deluge had once swept away all mankind, except a single family, from whom, as their common head, all nations have sprung. We say nothing of that Grecian fable which originates all mankind from stones thrown by Deucalion and Pyrrha; since it was of a piece with Cadmus and his sowing of dragon's teeth, and other hieroglyphics of the same sort, introduced from the Egyptians and Orientals, and expressed in words; neither will it, if allowed, in the least degree affect the question; as this, equally with all others, assigns to men a common origin. For though it may seem at first sight that the flood of Deucalion was confined, (and some say the same of the deluge of Ogyges,) to a small portion of the earth's surface, yet all who have looked well into the matter are aware that all nations, in both hemispheres, have ever done the like, and treated the deluge of Noah as if it were partial and confined, each to their own country; only that the Hebrews have preserved its memorial as of universal extent over the earth. The floods of Deucalion and Ogyges are the same; and both are identical with that of our sacred history; and from "such as escaped the deluge," (*τὰ λελυμένα νόττον*) came all the race of mankind, while the family that escaped were the original gods of the early nations, whose number was eight, and of these the eldest were Saturn and Rhea. Thus in the Works and Days of Hesiod we have the gods and men alike generated or made from the same root or stock. And again: "the gods formed a golden age of men." That is, God formed the parents of our race, and these, afterwards raised to godhead, begat sons and daughters.

But the nations were divided (he affirms), that in their dispersion over the earth they might each in its own way search after God, and, though possessed of the sharpest wits and clearest intellects, yet they should never of themselves find him; though so near to us in his works; but he should remain to them through all ages an "Unknown God," because they had no direct revelation of him in words as the Hebrews had, but were left to cherish the truth learned of their fathers from the earliest times, and to find out as they might the Divine attributes and character from the works of nature. This also was no new view of nationality; for it was commonly understood that all tribes of men were separated

by God himself for purposes of his own, that in many ways, though with one spirit, the Deity should be honored in all parts of the earth. And though in after times the Athenians, and several other nations, enacted laws against importing new ceremonies and gods from abroad, yet this was only because of the immense number of gods honored by different nations, that were mere duplicates of each other infinitely repeated, and therefore the greater number would add nothing to such as were honored among any one people; while each must have a separate service, and a separate altar, and so produce endless confusion in any state that should affect to receive them indiscriminately from abroad.

He then reminds them, how favorite a saying it had ever been among them, that men are the offspring of God. In this he is usually supposed to refer them to the "*Phænomena*" of Aratus; though there is no need to enquire into this; since he affirms nothing new or strange when in his introduction to the study of the heavenly bodies he says, "We all share the beneficence of Jove, for we are also his offspring, who kindly shows prosperous signs to men." Theon, the scholiast, says that "by Jove is here meant the Creator of the world," or "the God who made all things." In like manner Moschopolus understands Jove or the supreme God to be meant when in Hesiod (as above cited) it is said that "the Immortals made a golden age of men." The example of Cleanthes will be at once recognized when he names the supreme Deity Jove, and says, "It is becoming in all men to call thee for we are thine offspring, having alone the gift of speech."

The conclusion is irresistible. "Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, it is not becoming to think of the Deity as resembled to images of gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device." In this Paul asserts what is self-evident and universally acknowledged. The Stoic remembers how his favorite Heraclitus replied when Euthycles had accused him of impiety: "Is God shut up within the walls of temples? Is this your piety to place God in the dark or to make him a stony God? O you unlearned! know ye not that God is not made with hands, and hath not from the beginning any basis, nor can be confined by any wall; the whole world variously adorned with plants, animals, and stars being his temple?" And again: "Is there no God without altars? are stones the witnesses of the gods? Let his own works be the witnesses of God, and chiefly the sun; day and night bear him witness; the fruitful earth declares him; the circle of his work, the moon, is a celestial witness of him." The disciples of Plato and the Peripatetics are unable to dissent. For both these gloried in the acknowledgment of a spiritual and self-existent Deity not confined to time nor place; as their masters the Orientals before them had ever held God to be "the cause of generation and the whole course of nature and of all powers in the elements them-

selves, separate, exempt, elevated above, and of himself, expanded over all the powers and elements of the world, since he is transcendent and above the world, immaterial and incorporeal, supernatural, unmade, indivisible, manifested wholly from himself and in himself, ruling over, and in himself containing all things." (Iamblicus de Myster. *Ægypt.* 7, 2.) Among the Ionics, Anaxagoras had said, "God is mingled with nothing but is alone by himself and separate." Diogenes Sinopensis had been recorded in Laertius as publicly reproving one whom he found honoring a statue of some god with an unusual show of devotion, saying, "Beware of behaving unseemly in the sight of that God who stands behind you, for all things are full of him." Nor can it be shown that that Jove to whom were consecrated the most noble statues and the oldest and costliest temples, was ever once held by the learned to be the same with what Pythagoras names "the Tetractys, or Tetrayammaton, that affords to our souls the fountain of Divine nature." Since the Jove thus honored was an inferior and mediatorial Deity, that the Egyptians named Ammon or Cham; the same that rebelled against his father Saturn, and usurped the government of the earth by violence, and when his own viperous and apostate progeny the giants, or Babel-builders, rose under Nimrod to set up the Chaldean Empire adverse to his own, requiting his filial impiety, at the same time that the Titians, or the families of Shem and Japheth resisted his pretences and stood fast by their misused father, he launched against them the thunder of his excommunication, and condemned their whole crew to the torments of hell; as his enmity in impiety toward God, the Pontiff of Rome, still fulminates interminable curses against all that refuse to acknowledge his pretence to sit in the temple of God, and as God upon earth to receive the homage due to God from all creatures, both "in heaven and in the the earth, and the waters under the earth."

For of the supreme God the heathen sages and wise men were accustomed to speak under the name of the "unknown darkness," "the illuminator, animator, and quickener of the universe, and the original of motion," "one single, solitary and most simple being, unmade and indestructible, existing necessarily of himself, incorporeal and without magnitude, immutable, and of a duration not measured by the flow of time, but of a constant and fixed eternity without past or future;" as Parmenides in Simplicius and Aristotle; and more of the same kind. Socrates, in Zenophen, says, "That God who framed and contains the whole world, though he be seen to do the greatest things yet is in himself unseen and invisible:" wherefore men should not despise invisible things but rather honor the Deity, taking notice of his power by his effects." Plato says, "The Supreme Good is not itself essence but above essence, excelling the same at once in dignity and power. Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics*, speaks of God as "an incorporeal substance divided

from sensible things, indivisible and devoid of parts and magnitude. Hence the wisest and gravest among pagans (and of such only were Paul's auditors) could never be made to believe that the supreme Deity ought to be represented under any form whatever ; and if this were ever done at all before the rise (or rather the *fall*) of that apostate power we name Popery, to conceal our ignorance of what is meant by a "mystery of iniquity," it was only then as now reckoned among the public shows and spectacles, and invented solely to divert and amuse the common people.

He then proceeds to set forth the first elements of the gospel as a new development of the most ancient faith known to men, and a full explication of the matter charged upon him as a crime when he had before "preached unto them Jesus and the resurrection." "And now indeed God, having winked at the times when he was held as "the Unknown," commandeth all men everywhere to repent ; because he hath appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained ; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men in that he hath raised him from the dead." In all this there is nothing to shock the prejudices, or contradict the belief of his judges. For though the "Epicureans and Stoics" may unite in ridiculing the one man's universal hope that he shall live beyond the grave, the other the faith of all God's choicest ones from the beginning of the world that the body shall rise again, yet the admirers of Pythagoras and Plato can see nothing harsh in the return of man from the grave, whether after three days or three thousand years. That he who was to be born of a virgin should die and rise again for the good of mankind, had been believed in all ages, and in all nations. Innumerable fables are afloat through all the world of Vishnu, Buddha, Osiris, Adonis, Hercules, Castor and Pollux, Orpheus, Theseus, and others, who have gone among the dead and returned again to life. That souls pass from one body to another, or from the same body to the same in a different state, has been everywhere held in some form from the most remote ages.

Thus as to the first we have Dionysus or Bacchus (the same with Osiris) falling from the throne of Jove, and torn in pieces by the Titans ; but afterwards his members are replaced and he ascends alive into heaven. (Origen contra Cels. b. 4.) So Æsculapius by his medicines is said to have raised the dead to life, and for this to have been smitten with thunder and cast down to hell, by angry Jove ; making thus a striking figure of Him who bore for us "the chastisement of our peace, and suffered, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God." In the *Phædo* we have Plato asserting that men shall revive, and from the state of death become living. Diogenes Laertes makes Theopompus affirm of the Magi, that they held to a resurrection, when men's bodies should no longer need food, nor cast any shadow. Owen (Theol. b. 1. c. 8)

affirms the same thing as known by the American savages, and Hackwell (Anno 1595) with others, tells us that the same doctrine was held by the Indian Brahmins whom they met in Cambaia during their voyage in the Oriental parts. Vossius (*De Idolat.* 1. 10) says, "It was the common consent of nations that the soul survives; yea among many were there reliques of its reconjunction with the body; but this they greatly corrupted with their Metempsychosis." For this was often a change from body to body; or a regeneration, a new birth; of which we can make nothing satisfactory, owing to that want of careful and explicit statement which is ever found in the heathen writers when they treat of religious doctrines, and for which they are censured by all the Fathers of the church. But be this as it may, such as held at all to the Metempsychosis could find no special cause of blame in the great apostle for putting it in the form ever maintained by the church.

And as to a time of judgment to all men, and a change of the world by fire, no Grecian could reproach him who had seen Christ without calling in question the gravest and most venerated among his own doctors. When Plato in the *Timæus* will treat of the story of Phaëthon, the son of Helius, and his burning of the world, he says, "It has the figure of a fable, but the truth is this, there shall be a great change of things in heaven and earth, and in a short time a great dissolution of all things upon the earth by reason of much fire." He also gives this as the explication of an Egyptian priest to Solon, when he inquired concerning Deucalion, Pyrrha, Phaëthon, and others. Seneca follows the Stoics in this, and affirms (*Quæst. Natural.* 3: 13), "The world's period shall be by fire." Minutius Felix says the Epicureans had the same opinion. And Plato especially held some faith in a time of judgment, at the period of the world's conflagration, as he says (*De Repub.* 10), "Seeing the soul is immortal and patient of labor, we must, by a kind of pleasing violence, follow on toward the celestial bliss, that we may be friends to ourselves and the gods, and victors *in that long passage of the thousand years*—that we may live happily here and *in the thousand years when we come to them*."

Neither can we suppose the apostle's doctrine of repentance could strike harshly upon a Grecian ear. For there again he has Plato, Empedocles, Pythagoras, and the whole world of their admirers on his side, when they affirm that the human spirit was at first like a winged chariot, self-controlled, and able to soar at will through heaven and earth; but, having sinned, and lost its wings, it fell down into this miserable and contentious world—into this field of Atë and darkness, where murder and wrath, and a troop of other mischiefs reign, and where it must wander on and be lost, unless by a return to God and holiness, she may recover again the golden wings of virtue and original truth.

But Paul's triumph ends not with thus clearing himself before

the Athenian judges alone. The malice of the Sophists is the cause that has led to his arrest; and they are all put to shame before the very judgment-seat, where they had hoped to prevail against him by the force of criminal law, whom they could not answer with words or deeds. Nothing can exceed the coolness of his contempt for the whole crowd of his accusers, and their clamors against his doctrines, when, from "the market-place," they roll like clouds of smoke up "the Hill of Mars," haling with outcries and insults, as if all Jerusalem were again broke loose, the victim of a hundred persecutions, before a tribunal as stern and as inexorable to favor or pity as that of Minos or Hades, while he well knows that though he must finish his testimony by a violent death, they shall not live to see it; nor shall any Athenian jailor be moved to tears when, like Socrates, he blesses him who brings to his lips the cup of hemlock. But, omitting all they have said or can say, and disdaining to refer to them at all, he calls up the venerated shades of the ancients—blind Thamyras and blind Mæonides,

"And Tiresias and Phineus, prophets old,"

The canonized Thracian, that of his sweet lyre is held to lead the choirs of Elysium, the graven shapes of Pherecydes and Thales, and the countenance of hoary Socrates, with their mighty competitors, Pythagoras, Solon, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Cleanthes, Plato, and Aristotle, the priests of Egypt, Chaldea, Phœnicia, Persia, and India, that in the grandeur and splendor of their multitude, all else may shrink away to nothing, and become too low for censure; as when, at the prayer of Elisha, the hills about Samaria became thick-set with fiery squadrons to defend his fearless and blameless head against "the armies of the aliens."

Then, by thus referring them to the words and thoughts of the illustrious dead, he affords them abundant cause of mutual confusion and dissension, so that they shall find it occupation enough to argue the whole matter out among themselves, and leave him without disturbance to pursue the calm and earnest vocation of his apostleship wherever it may lead him, until the tyranny of Nero shall give him release by an honorable death, and remit his great soul to its place among "the first-born," who see God in His holy hill of Zion.

Thus, strong in his own integrity, in the Divine commission for his work, and for his doctrines the common consent of the wisest and gravest sages of the whole earth, the apostle sums up his great argument with Christ, the Judge and Saviour of mankind, the sum and substance and embodiment of all truth—as a man infringing upon none, and as God honored in every nation over the globe. Not only has he cleared himself of all blame before the Athenian laws, and confounded all the philosophers among themselves, that they could no more combine against him, but even his

judges desire to hear him again concerning the doctrine of Christ ; and he goes forth again unbound, to bear with him the gospel to the utmost corners of the earth, until a blessed martyrdom at last equal him with the holiest seers of old, and finish for him the "dying of our Lord Jesus Christ" in his body, by the life of the same Jesus revealed in his glorified spirit, amid the Paradise of God.

But who, with him, can retire from the presence of that venerable and august assembly, but must be conscious of a feeling of sadness coming over his soul, when he reflects that he shall meet but few of them indeed among the sanctities of a better world ? "Dionysius, the Areopagite, and a woman named Damaris, and certain others with them, gave unto him, and believed ;" but the most refused, and left him to gather up as he might, affectionate and believing auditors among the lowest of the people, while they of the Areopagus ; with the whole crowd of Athenian scholars, counted themselves too wise for instruction, too lofty for reproof, from one whom they esteemed a barbarian. Such, brethren, is the mystery of our calling. The gospel is for the poor and the despised ; while "philosophy and vain deceit" are for the rich, the learned, and the powerful of the earth. From the day-laborers, the slaves, the poor of the world, has God raised up His ministry of most fiery, nimble, and invincible spirits, against whom senates, kings, and hierarchies combine only for their own confusion. Before them fell the persecuting empires of paganism, and behind them lie the bleeding remains of those once terrible nations that "wondered after the Beast." From the valleys of the Caucasus, from the morasses of the Danube or the Rhine, from the glaciers of the Alps, he brings them forth, like Israel from the Red Sea, and founds of them the mightiest nations of the renewed earth ; and the unnamed myriads that rode to heaven in the flaming chariots of their own martyrdom, above them raise the song of Moses and the Lamb, saying, "Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord God Almighty ; just and true are thy ways, thou King of saints."

ARTICLE VII.

THE ATONEMENT AND THE PENALTY OF THE LAW.

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DID CHRIST, in making the Atonement, of which we have both the history and the doctrine in the Bible, suffer the penalty of the law? Was the penalty of the law inflicted upon the Redeemer as the atonement for sin? This is not merely a modern question, having been keenly agitated several centuries ago. In respect to it, theologians generally deemed evangelical, are divided into two classes: one of which, for convenience of designation, we shall call the *Penalists*; the other, the *Substitutionists*. The former hold the affirmative of the above question; the latter, the negative. The doctrine of the former is, that the sins of elect sinners, and these only, were so imputed to Christ, that He was legally bound to suffer, and did suffer the penalty of the law threatened against them; that of the latter is, that what Christ suffered, was not the proper penalty of the law, but an *equivalent*—a full and sufficient *substitute*, answering all the *ends* of the penalty in respect to the character and government of God, and thus opening the way for pardon and eternal life to the penitent believer.

By both classes of theologians it is maintained, that Christ suffered and died as reported in the gospel narrative; that His sufferings and death constitute the *essence* or *matter* of the atonement; that although the suffering and death are predicated of Him as one person, still they were true of Him in respect to His *human* nature only; and that salvation is graciously bestowed upon men through Christ as an atoning Saviour; and in no other way. All this is common ground to both classes. The point of divergence respects the application of the *penal* predicate to that which is held to constitute the matter of the atonement. Did Christ, in making the atonement, which consisted in His sufferings and death—did He, in those sufferings, and in that death, endure the penalty of the Divine law threatened against sinners? This is the question we propose to examine. For this purpose we present three inquiries: First, what are the elementary ideas which the human mind assigns to the term *punishment* or *penalty*? Secondly, what is the penalty of the law? Thirdly, *who* is the *penal sufferer* according to the express provisions of this law?

I. *What is PUNISHMENT or PENALTY?* Webster defines the former term to mean, "Any pain or suffering inflicted on a person for a *crime* or *offense*, by the authority to which the *offender* is subject, either by the constitution of God, or of civil society;" the latter

to mean, "The suffering in person or property which is annexed by law or judicial decision to the commission of a crime, offense, or trespass, as a punishment." This definition not only gives the general, and, therefore, the correct use of the term, but very exactly represents the consciousness of men. Simple suffering is not punishment. A being may suffer, when he is not punished. We naturally and necessarily connect with the term the idea of fault, blameworthiness, moral delinquency, on account of which suffering is inflicted upon an offender, and, as so inflicted, is punishment. This is what men mean by the term. It implies *ill-desert* in the subject.

The Reviewer of Beman on the Atonement, remarks: "It is *ill-desert*, and not the general good, which every man feels in his own case, is the ground of his just liability to punishment."¹ Whose *ill-desert*? His own, not as innocent, but as an offender. And if so in respect to himself, has he not the same intuitive conviction in respect to every other being? The innate sense of justice which affirms this doctrine, does not also affirm that A, being innocent, may be punished for B, being guilty: it affirms punishment only where the *ill-desert* exists. The crime, the *ill-desert*, the penalty, imply the same person—the criminal. So intimate is the connection between these ideas, that men spontaneously reason from the one to the other. Job's three friends were disposed to regard him as a criminal in explanation of his providential sufferings. When the barbarians saw the viper fastened upon the hand of Paul, they at once supposed him to be a murderer. Acts 28: 4. They saw, as they thought, the exhibition of punishment, and instantly inferred its antecedent, crime in the subject punished. The law of this inference was in their own minds.

The learned and technical use of the term by civilians and legal commentators, conforms to the common idea. Blackstone thus defines punishments: "Evils or inconveniences consequent upon crimes and misdemeanors, being devised, denounced, and inflicted by human laws, in consequence of disobedience or misbehaviour in those, to regulate whose conduct such laws were respectively made."² Burlamaqui, formerly professor of natural and civil law at Geneva, thus presents the doctrine of penalty: "Sanction is that part of the law which includes the penalty enacted against those who transgress it. With regard to the penalty, it is an evil with which the sovereign menaces those subjects who should presume to violate his laws."³ Michaelis, the learned commentator upon the laws of Moses, observes: "By the term *punishment*, therefore, all mankind understand something which has for its object, not properly the amendment of the *culprit*

¹ Pres. Board's Edition of Old and New Theology, p. 10.

² Commentaries, vol. iv., p. 6.

³ Natural Law, vol. 1, p. 47.

himself, but the determent of others from the imitation of his example." It is here implied that this "something" applies solely to the culprit himself. Mr. Barnes quotes the language of Lord Coke: "*Nemo punitur pro alieno delicto*," i. e. no one is punished for another's sin; also that of Grotius: "No one is to be punished beyond his ill-desert." If not beyond, then surely not except for his ill-desert. Should he suffer without ill-desert, that suffering would not be punishment in the proper sense of the term. We quote these legal authorities, not to determine a theological question, but to show the correct use of an important term according to the general sense of mankind.

To this we add the usage as found in the writings of professed theologians. The younger Edwards observes: "An innocent person may choose to be made the subject of sufferings, in the stead of a criminal. Therefore, though sufferings which he chooses to endure, be inflicted on him, no injustice is done him; nor will it be pretended that this procedure is according to strict distributive justice, which requires the *criminal* to be *punished*, and not his substitute."¹ In his *Sermons on the Atonement* it is everywhere implied, that punishment applies only to a criminal; and that the atonement of Christ is not punishment, but a substitute "to maintain the authority of the Divine law." Andrew Fuller has expressed the same idea with great clearness: "Real and proper punishment, if I understand the terms, is not only the infliction of natural evil for the commission of moral evil, but the infliction of the one *upon the person who committed the other, and in displeasure against him*. It not only supposes criminality, but that the party punished was literally the criminal. Criminality committed by one party, and imputed to another, is not a ground for real and proper punishment."² Dr. Lightfoot, one of the Westminster divines, held the same doctrine: "Was Christ so much as punished by God? Much less, then, was He overwhelmed by the wrath of God—damned by God. Was a lamb punished that was sacrificed? He was afflicted, but not punished; *for punishment argues a crime or fault preceding*. Were the sad sufferings of Christ laid on him as punishments? Certainly not for His own sins; no, nor for ours neither. He suffered for our sins—bare our sins; but His sufferings were not punishments for our sins."³ President Dwight remarks: "Strict justice demands the punishment of the sinner only, and can in no sense require the punishment of another in his stead." "In refusing to render it (obedience) we are criminal; and for this criminality

¹ Commentaries on the laws of Moses, vol. 4., p. 460.

² Barnes' Defense, p. 229.

³ Works of President Edwards the Younger, vol. 1., p. 74.

⁴ Fuller's Works, vol. 1., p. 653.

Lightfoot's Works, London Edition, vol. 6., pp. 23, 24.

merit punishment. The guilt thus incurred, is inherent in the criminal himself, and cannot in the nature of things be transferred to another.”¹ Mr. Barnes in his response to the seventh charge of Dr. Junkin, quotes several authorities on this subject. Dr. Owen: “There can be no obligation to punishment where there is no *desert* of punishment.” “The guilt of sin is its desert of punishment. And where this is not, there can be no punishment *properly so called*.” Turretin: “The justice of God does not inflict punishment, except on him that deserves it.” Ridgely; “Guilt is an obligation or liableness to suffer punishment for sin committed.” According to these views, if Christ suffered punishment, then in some way the “desert of punishment” must have been conveyed to Him; otherwise His sufferings would be “no punishment properly so called.” Dr. Richards, late Professor of Christian Theology in the Seminary at Auburn, observes: “*Sin, guilt, ill-desert*, are, in the very nature of things, *personal*; and *punishment* pre-supposes guilt, and guilt in the subject: neither the one nor the other is properly transferable.” Dr. Woods of Andover, observes: “So, when Christ has come and suffered that which answers the ends of justice in the Divine government, the necessity of punishment, so far as those ends are concerned, is superseded. And if any of us should say, that *our sin was imputed to Christ*, our meaning must be, that Christ suffered on account of our sin, in some sense, as He would have suffered if our sin had been imputed to Him; though a real imputation of our sin to Christ, in a *literal* sense, would have been a palpable inconsistency in a government founded in *justice* and truth.”² Why an inconsistency? Because justice requires the punishment of the *criminal*, and him only.

In these extracts we cannot fail to observe the ordinary, and we may add, the *necessary* idea of punishment, implying criminality in the subject. The case of the innocent suffering for the guilty, or by virtue of some connection with the guilty, is an entirely different case from that of the guilty suffering for their own sins. The two are essentially unlike in elementary ideas, and can never be described by a common term. The one is punishment; the other is not. To quote the language of Magee: “*Guilt and punishment* cannot be conceived but with reference to *consciousness* which cannot be transferred.” Destroy the consciousness of moral evil, and you destroy man’s capacity to conceive of himself as being punished, though he might have the consciousness of suffering. The idea must exist in his bosom that he is an offender, as the indispensable condition of the other. i. e. that he is capable of being

¹ Dwight’s Theology, 1830, vol. 2., pp. 219, 306.

² Barnes’ Defense, p. 233.

³ Lectures of Dr. Richards, p. 313.

⁴ Woods’s Letters to Unitarians, p. 69.

punished. Dr. De Witt in a discourse on the necessity of the atonement, remarks, "But if it (sin) deserves no punishment, it is no moral evil;" for *desert of punishment* is essential to our notion of moral evil; that is, the two ideas are inseparably connected, imply each other; and for aught we can see, the moral evil must exist where the desert of punishment exists, and the desert also in the same person who is punished for the moral evil.

Those theologians who insist that Christ suffered the penalty of the law, evince the common belief in regard to the nature of punishment. They do not represent Him as suffering this penalty, considered as innocent, but in the eye of the law as guilty, in the sense that he was legally obligated to suffer it. This is accomplished by imputing the sins of the elect to Christ. Mr. William Rushton, in his strictures upon Andrew Fuller, observes: "An innocent person may *suffer*, but an innocent person cannot properly be *punished*: nor can justice admit that an innocent person, *considered as innocent*, should suffer in the room of the guilty." To harmonize Christ's endurance of the penalty with this view, he maintains the positive "transfer of *sin itself*" to Him, as the necessary antecedent of punishment.¹ Dr. Crisp held imputation to be an actual transfer of character, and thus laid the basis for inflicting the penalty on Christ.² The language of Luther, though it appeals us, is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that character and punishment go together. "And this, no doubt, all the prophets did foresee in spirit, that Christ should become the greatest transgressor, murderer, adulterer, thief, rebel, blasphemer, that ever was or could be in this world." "If thou wilt deny him to be a sinner and accursed, deny also that he was crucified and dead." "But if it be not absurd to confess and believe that Christ was crucified between two thieves, then it is not absurd to say, that he was accursed, and of all sinners the greatest."³ Here Luther has the common and correct idea of punishment, and fully expresses it. Dr. Junkin declares that the death of Christ "was one of the strongest manifestations of injustice that ever was made, unless imputation be admitted:"⁴ implying that Christ was *punished*, but that he could not be, considered as innocent.

The imputation of sin to Christ, as contended for in modern times, is not a transfer of character. It is a *legal* imputation, by which Christ, for the purpose of penalty, is taken to be the offender, is deemed guilty without personal ill-desert, in the sense of being justly liable to punishment as truly as if He had committed the sin. Whether such a procedure is admissible in the govern-

¹ Murray Street Lectures, p. 152.

² A Vindication of Particular Redemption, pp. 77, 89.

³ Fuller's Works, vol. i., pp. 565,

⁴ Luther on the Galatians, chap 3; 13.

⁵ Trial of Albert Barnes for Heresy, p. 144.

ment of God, is not now the question. If the law can *assume*, contrary to the fact, that our sins are Christ's, so as to make Him in strict justice penalty liable for them; and if, acting upon this assumption, it punishes Him for those sins; then it does not punish him as an innocent person. In legal vision, at the moment in which He suffers, he appears as an offender, and not "the just for the unjust;" He has so taken our sins that they subject him in strict justice to the penalty. According to this view a legal obligation to punishment without ill-desert, takes the place of ill-desert, and not only justifies but demands the punishment. Hence, even this theory recognizes the doctrine of inflicting punishment where, and *only where*, the crime which is its legal occasion, is deemed to exist, and never upon a person considered as innocent. If there be any flaw in the process, it is in the doctrine of a *putative* offence. For aught we can see, it is as difficult to impute sin as the antecedent and necessary ground of punishment, as it would be to punish without the imputation. But if the law can admit of a *putative* offence, then it inflicts *veritable* punishment according to the true idea of its nature.

Thus we have gained the idea of punishment as it necessarily exists in the human mind. Crime is the antecedent and ground. Our intuitive sense of justice demands that this crime should be that of the person who is punished. Imputation is an effort to satisfy this sense, either by an actual transfer of character, or by *assuming* that the innocent is guilty.

If it be said, that the innocent are sometimes punished *as* the guilty; we answer, that this is either by a *mistake* or by *cruelty*, and that neither is possible in the government of God, though possible in that of man. If it be said that the innocent are sometimes punished *with* the guilty; we reply, that the former may *suffer* by their connection with the latter in a social system, but we deny that this suffering is *punishment* according to the universal idea of the word. The case of a man suffering for his own sins, and that of another suffering with him by virtue of some social connection, are two different cases in point of fact; and though we should apply a common term to both, still the things are essentially unlike, and must so appear the moment they are analyzed.

Hence, we confess our inability to conceive of Christ as *punished*, as in the strict sense the subject of penalty, when making the atonement. In express allusion to this transaction, Peter tells us: "Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the *just* for the *unjust*." Could that which is claimed to have been the penalty of the law, have been justly enforced against him, in opposition to his own will? We suppose all will reply in the *negative*. The *voluntariness* of Christ is plainly indispensable to the atonement. Punishment, however, may be enforced against the guilty, either with or without their consent. He who is the proper subject of

punishment at all, is so whether he consents or not. Here is an essential point of distinction between the atonement and punishment. It is not possible, we think, to identify the two; to make the two sets of ideas one. The moment they are described, their difference appears; and it becomes perfectly obvious that Christ was not and could not be punished in the same sense in which the sinner is and ought to be; that is, the atonement was not punishment, taking the sinner's case as the proper exposition of the latter.

II. *What is THE penalty of THE LAW?*—Whether Christ suffered *this* penalty cannot be settled, until we decide what it is. To say that what He suffered is the penalty, that his sufferings are to be taken as its exponent, would be a *petitio principii*. Neither can we determine the point by a view of the general nature and uses of punishment; for it is a *particular* penalty we are seeking to find.

By *law* we mean the moral law of God, which threatens its penalty against sinners. Orthodox divines agree in holding that this penalty consists in the future and eternal sufferings of sinners, either these *exclusively*, or if not, yet *mainly*. What they believe on this point, fully appears in their arguments against universalism. The penalty they vindicate is "the second death," the damnation and misery of the soul in the life to come. The word *death*, by some theologians, is taken as a comprehensive summary of all the evils of sin, here and hereafter; the whole being regarded as the penalty of the law. Upon this construction the sufferings of the lost soul in the next world, form so large a part of the penalty, that where these are not endured, almost infinitely less than the *whole* is inflicted. We regard them as the penalty of the Divine moral law. Let us briefly examine the argument.

Is *spiritual* death a part of this penalty? What is spiritual death? The *criminal* condition of the sinner, his moral state, a death in trespasses and sins. It is a strong description of total depravity. Detached from its consequences, it is not suffering, but *crime*, the very moral evil for which a penalty is sought—either a single act of sin, or sin in continuance. If the former, then to call it penalty, is to confound cause and effect, and to deny that sin has any penalty by giving two names to the same thing. If the latter, then the punishment affixed to sin is a series of other sins. God leaves the sinner to go on in sin; He punishes him *for* sin *with* sin. Such an idea of penalty, in whole or in part, would be a mockery in moral government, a legal absurdity. It destroys the very nature of punishment. Every time a Christian sins, he would be bearing, though not *suffering*, the penalty of the law from which Paul tells us Christ has redeemed his people. Nothing would be more pleasant or less terrible to sinners.

than this part of God's curse; since the ways of sin are what they supremely prefer. To say that Christ suffered the penalty, taking it in the sense of spiritual death, would be the blasphemy of saying that He sinned. Dr. Janeway remarks, "Christ certainly was not subject to spiritual death;" also that "the law did not require the infliction of *this* part of the penalty upon the surety of sinners. The reparation of its insulted honor demanded only, that he should submit to that humiliation, pain, shame, and anguish, both in body and soul, which constitute the *essence* of its penalty." Spiritual death then, though a "part of the penalty," is not that part which belongs to its "*essence*." Those who maintain that Christ suffered the penalty, and yet exclude spiritual death in His case, virtually concede that such death is neither a part, nor the whole of the penalty. In this we agree with them. Spiritual death is that which incurs the penalty, and is not, and in the nature of things cannot be, the penalty itself. So far as the discussion about the atonement is concerned, it is conceded by the penalists themselves that, in the sense of spiritual death, Christ did not suffer the penalty of the law. If this be a part of the penalty, here is one part he did not suffer.

Does this penalty consist in the *present* afflictions and sufferings of sinners, together with bodily death? We reply, that these are no part of the penalty, or that they are not the *material* and *principal* part. We make this reply to those who admit the Bible doctrine of future and eternal punishment. If they claim that these things form a *portion* of this penalty, still in comparison with the *whole*, this portion is reduced to an inconceivable smallness. Eternal suffering in hell either is or is not included; and if it is, then it is the whole or a part; and if the latter, then so immensely the *greater* part, that not to mean this when speaking of the penalty, is to omit the principal idea, to use the term without its contents. We confess our belief that it is the penalty of the law, and for the following reasons:—

The Bible uniformly represents men in this life, as being in a state of *gracious probation*, and not legal retribution. That they should suffer evils in connection with a fallen state, is not incompatible with such probation. These evils may be corrective—may act as premonitory tokens of God's displeasure against sin. They belong to his present *providential* government of the world. But that they should be the penalty of the law, strictly speaking, cannot easily be reconciled with probation, which supposes retribution applied to individuals, to commence only when probation is ended. We cannot, without a confusion of ideas, conceive of God as inflicting the penalty, and yet using measures of grace to avoid that infliction; or inflicting one part of the penalty to obviate the necessity of inflicting the other part.

¹ Pres. Board of Publication, Tract No. III, p. 11.

Where penalty begins, grace ends ; being so different, that they cannot reign in the same world.

Again : The sufferings of this life are not assigned to men in due proportion to their character. Virtue sometimes lives under a cloud, while vice is in great prosperity. God's truest friends often suffer more than his bitterest enemies. From this fact we infer, that Jehovah is not now inflicting the legal penalty upon sinners. A judicial sentence founded on character, and leading to an execution of strict penal justice, could not include such a state of facts as undeniably exists in this world. If men here endure the penalty in *part*, then so much of it is not meted out with a uniform reference to character. If it be supposed that the present pains of conscience form an item, it will follow in many cases that the penalty decreases with the increase of depravity. Great depravity lessens the power of conscience to afflict its subject.

Again : The language of the Bible leads us to look not to this, but into the future state, for the ministration of punitive justice, according to law. It places the judgment, the sentence, and its execution upon the guilty, in the state after death ; spreading out a *forensic* scene awaiting the sinner in eternity, in which God will deal with him according to character, calling him to an account for the deeds done in the body, and rendering to him according to those deeds. Mat. 25 : 31-46 ; 13 : 37-43 ; Rom. 2 : 6-11 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 10 ; 2 Thess. 1 : 6-10. The natural impression due to these, and parallel passages, is, that the justice of God in its penal display, is reserved for the scenes of another life. The apostles evidently looked *forward* when they thought of the gracious rewards of the gospel, or the terrible penalty threatened against sinners. Heaven and hell were in their vision, and not the good or evil of this transient life.

Again : Christians are expressly declared to be redeemed from the curse of the law, pardoned, and free from condemnation,—Gal. 3 : 13 ; Rom. 8 : 1. They cannot suffer the penalty, from which they are redeemed. They do, however, suffer in this world, bodily and mentally, and at last die like other men. Hence the inference is irresistible, that these sufferings and this death do not form what the apostle means by “ the curse of the law,” either in whole or in part. If they be taken as a part, then the redemption of God's people is *defective* ; they suffer the penalty in part, and are saved from it in part ; pardon does not remit the *whole* penalty—only a part. This idea is not in harmony with the Scripture doctrine of salvation.

Finally : What the Bible teaches us in respect to the doom of apostate angels, furnishes an instructive interpretation of the penalty of the law. 2 Pet. 2 : 4 ; Jude 6 ; Rev. 20 : 10-16. These angels sinned, and were cast down to hell. The Saviour,

in pronouncing the final sentence upon the lost of our race, expressly consigns them to a fate, common to them and the apostate angels: "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." To these angels God never gave a day of grace. He treats them according to the strict rule of law—namely, He inflicts its penalty upon them. The same penalty falls upon the finally impenitent of mankind—a fact which shows what the penalty is, and equally what it is not.

For these reasons we are inclined to the opinion, that the penalty of God's law is inflicted on sinners only in the eternal state. When the apostle says, "For the wages of sin is death," the antithesis shows that he means eternal death; he adds, "the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord." That the word death, is sometimes used in the Scriptures, not in the sense of future and eternal misery, is no proof that the penalty of the law is not this misery, or that the term death, and especially "second death," in other passages is not to be taken in the sense of "everlasting punishment." Life sometimes, but not always, means the rewards of heaven, as death means the pains of hell.

It may be asked, what shall be said of present sufferings and bodily death? We answer, that we are not logically obliged to say anything, our purpose being answered in the proof, that they do not belong to the penalty of the law. As a fact, however, they exist under a mediatorial dispensation of grace, suspending for a season the rigorous action of pure law against the guilty. The curse of the ground, the sentence of bodily mortality, the evils incident to the apostacy ensuing upon Adam and his posterity in this life, we do not regard as the penalty of the law. Its execution upon our first parents would at once have consigned them to hell, as proved by the evidence of subsequent revelations in respect to that penalty: That it was not thus executed, depended on the introduction of a plan of mercy in the promise of a Saviour. The list of *earthly* evils following this promise, follows only because mercy had stayed the arm of strict legal justice, and presented the first intimation of salvation by a Messiah. God spared our first parents in mercy; promised a Saviour; and then, and only then, comes to view the train of earthly ills ending with death, annexed to the gracious probation of a fallen race. Why God should make the probation of a race of *sinners* a scene of suffering, mingled with happiness, we need not pause to inquire; our question being, does this suffering belong to the penalty of the moral law? We think the difficulties are much greater in affirming, than in denying.

We are aware that those who insist that Christ suffered the penalty, generally dissent from the preceding view. They usually represent it as consisting in all forms of evil—present sufferings, spiritual death, temporal death, eternal death. When,

however, the Saviour suffered it, then *spiritual* death was no part of the penalty. So also, in His case *eternal* death is no part of the penalty. What then is left? The sufferings and death of Christ in the flesh, in His human nature, admitted to be the *essence* of the atonement, but not the penalty of the law, if the previous argument be valid. If it be deemed invalid, still, so far as the penalty includes *eternal* sufferings, and the atonement did not, the two are unlike, not at all the same thing. Admit that all forms of evil taken together constitute this penalty, still one, namely eternal death, is infinitely the greater form—so much so, that if this is deducted, the main part is gone. We think, the *whole* is gone.

The *manner* in which the penalists and the substitutionists speak of the penalty of the law, when treating of the atonement, leads to the appearance of a greater difference between them, than exists in fact. We propose to illustrate this remark.

Among the former we have noticed the frequent use of such expressions as the following: The punishment of sin is the loss of God's favor, the experience of His displeasure, the endurance of His wrath, any evil evincive of His opposition to sin. Though these expressions convey a truth, they give no definition of the penalty; they merely describe its general nature. They are ambiguous. There is nothing in them to which a universalist might not easily assent. The Bible when all its testimony is collected, is much more definite, showing in what way, in what world, and for what period, God evinces His displeasure. According to all orthodox divines, He threatens the eternal misery of hell against the ungodly; which is a more *specific* idea, than the loss of His favor or the experience of His displeasure.

Dr. Hodge, in his sermon on the nature of the atonement, thus defines the penalty of the law: "The penalty of the law is not any specific degree or character of pain which the law imposes, but it is any and all pain, which sustains to the law the relation of a sanction." This is manifestly no description of the penalty. An universalist might adopt it without the least difficulty; for it does not appear that future and eternal suffering "sustains to the law the relation of a sanction." It moves in a circle; reveals nothing. What is a sanction? Either the penalty or the reward of law; in this definition it is the penalty. "The penalty of the law is," therefore, "any and all pain which sustains to the law the relation of a" PENALTY; that is, the penalty of the law is the penalty of the law. The Bible speaks more *descriptively*: "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire," &c. "Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction," &c. Here is the future and eternal ruin of the soul, and not the vague idea of "any and all pain which sustains to the law the relation of a sanction."

¹ Spruce-Street Lectures, p. 147.

We presume the Dr. believes this, and in controversy with universalists would assert it; yet when writing to prove that Christ suffered the penalty of the law, the necessities of his argument were best met by an ambiguous, or rather almost meaningless definition of that penalty.

We take another passage from the same sermon: "When it is said, the sufferings of Christ were of the nature of punishment; the word punishment is used in its ordinary acceptation, for suffering judicially inflicted, or sufferings imposed in execution of a legal sentence." What is "a legal sentence," but a judicial decision resulting in the consignment of a criminal to penalty? What is the rule of such sentence? It is not itself the rule. The law is the rule. If then the sufferings of the Redeemer were judicially imposed in the "execution of a *legal* sentence," what we want is the law for such a sentence. If the procedure is not according to law, if it be a departure from the letter of the law, then so far it is not forensic or judicial. Now we presume Dr. Hodge will not say, the language of the law is, that the *sinner* shall die, or a *substitute* shall die; and if not, then his description of punishment refutes his own proposition, namely, that "the sufferings of Christ were of the nature of punishment." He not only fails to give any idea of the penalty of the law, but equally involves the supposition, contrary to his own theory, that the sufferings of Christ were not that penalty.

The reviewer of Beman on the Atonement observes: "By the penalty of the law is meant that suffering, which the law demands as a satisfaction to justice. It is not any specific kind or degree of suffering, for it varies both as to degree and kind, in every supposable case of its infliction." This is merely a *nominal* definition. What is "that suffering which the law demands as a satisfaction to justice?" Plainly, the penalty of the law. What then is this penalty? That suffering which will satisfy justice. Here is no idea of the thing except by what it accomplishes. How much suffering, whether that of an hour, or of eternal ages, will be necessary, does not appear. Such a statement from the lips of a sovereign would hardly amount to a legal threat. The Bible speaks more definitely, giving us not only the fact of God's justice, but also the fact that will constitute its penal display against the transgressor, namely, his eternal punishment in the future life. The reviewer gives not the remotest idea of what the fact is: whether one pain of conscience, the death of the body, or the undying remorse and agony of hell.

We quote the same reviewer again: "We say further, that by punishment we mean sufferings judicially inflicted as a satisfaction to justice." A judicial infliction for the satisfaction of justice, is the infliction the law appoints. What is it? This is

¹ Pres. Board's edition of Old and New Theology, p. 42.

the question, and is entirely untouched in the above definition. Future and eternal misery either is or is not in this infliction, this penalty; and if it is, why not mention it in a professed definition of that penalty? Why so define the penalty of the law as to leave in total uncertainty what it is? With such a definition, it is impossible either to affirm or deny, that Christ suffered this penalty.

The author of "Letters on the Atonement," in the *Christian Advocate*, remarks: "The fact that Christ died a painful and ignominious death, and that he submitted to such a death for the sins of his people, is no subject of dispute. Our brethren admit it as cordially as we. It is admitted in the quotation above. The point of difference is the *character* of his sufferings. We say that they were an infliction of the *curse* or penalty of the law denounced against sin: this they deny. But death, it has been shown in the preceding letter, is the *wages* of sin, the curse or penalty of the law; and consequently, as Christ underwent death for the sins of men, he endured the penalty of the law due to them." The death of Christ, to which the author refers, is "the painful and ignominious death" of the cross. The proof that *this* death is the penalty of the law, consists in the fact that death is "the wages of sin, the *curse* or penalty of the law," as shown in a previous letter. In this letter the author thus defines death: "It comprehends all the pains and sorrows, labors and toils, sufferings and miseries, which wicked men endure, either in this world or in the next; for all these, together with the death of the body, constitute the wages of sin, or the penalty of the divine law, when inflicted on impenitent offenders." This is the penalty, he describes. How much of it does he bring into the article of atonement in the above passage? Not the *whole* of it—only a part, and that part which consists in "the painful and ignominious death" of the cross. The penalty is one thing in the definition, and not the same thing when affirmed of Christ, though the word death, is employed in both instances. The term is used in two senses, the one sense including vastly more than the other. To be consistent with himself, he should have said that Christ suffered a *part* of the penalty, not the whole.

In the same letter the author concedes, "that the Redeemer did not endure *eternal death*; and remarks, that "the *infinite dignity* of his person imparted to his temporary sufferings a value that made them a *fair and full equivalent* for the everlasting sufferings of all who shall be finally saved." This is the very doctrine of those against whom he is earnestly reasoning. He adds, that "the *eternity* of punishment is to be considered rather as a *circumstance* growing out of a case, than as belonging to its *essence*. It depends on the nature of the subject. In a *mere crea-*

Christian Advocate, Sept. 1826, pp. 388, 389.

ture it must be eternal; but not in a *Divine Substitute*." The design is to make the *eternity* of the penalty a mere "circumstance," that may be dispensed with, while the penalty in "its essence" may remain, in order to another "mode of inflicting the penalty," namely by the temporary sufferings of Christ. Such a "mode" is plainly no infliction; it essentially changes the constituent ideas of the thing, though retaining the term. The idea of eternity as much belongs to the "essence," as the idea of suffering. To make it "a circumstance," is merely a logical contrivance to avoid the necessity of admitting, that Christ did not suffer the penalty of the law; as He certainly did not, if His sufferings were temporary.

Dr. Janeway distinguishes "between the punishment inflicted on a sinner and that inflicted on the Redeemer," though in both he insists that it is the penalty of the law. It does not include *spiritual* death in the latter, as it does in the former; neither is the *duration* the same in the two cases. "The punishment of a sinful creature must necessarily be protracted through eternal ages; because he is unable to bear it in a limited period. But the Divine Saviour was able, in consequence of his almighty power, to bear in a given time, any amount of suffering, and could, by the infinite dignity of his person, impart to his suffering an infinite value." What the Dr. says about the value of Christ's sufferings, we cordially adopt. The rest seems to us singular reasoning, in order to make the atonement and the penalty the same thing. The punishment of a sinner must be *eternal*: Why? "Because he is unable to bear it in a limited period." Why unable? Because it is eternal. His inability "to bear it in a limited period," results from the *nature of the punishment*. It is not this inability as true of Christ, as of the sinner? It is not pretended, that the *Divine* nature of Christ suffered. The experience of pain was limited to His *human* nature, according to Fisher's Catechism, p. 131. How, then, could that nature "bear, in a given time, ANY amount of suffering"—bear *eternal* suffering? The same difficulty attends in both cases the infliction of an *eternal* penalty in "a limited period." The penalty must be changed; or the atonement must be changed; or the two are not the same thing.

The Rev. Mr. Wood gives us the following statement: "In a penalty, some things are *essential*—others *incidental*. It was *essential* to the penalty, that Christ should suffer a violent and ignominious death—but whether he should die by decapitation or by crucifixion, was *incidental*. It was *essential* that he should suffer for our sins; but how long his sufferings should *continue*, was *incidental*." This is preceded by the admission, that Christ did not

¹ Pres. Board of Publication, Tract No. III, p. 11.

² Pres. Board's edition of Old and New Theology, p. 95.

suffer the penalty, "either in *kind* or *duration*, which would have been inflicted upon the sinner, if a Saviour had not been provided." Here it appears, that that which constitutes the penalty in *kind* and *duration*, is not essential to a just conception of the same; this is merely "*incidental*." We would like to know how much of a thing is left, after deducting from it what belongs to it in kind, duration and degree. Is it the same thing? He tells us, that "a violent and ignominious death," was essential to the penalty. But, is this the penalty of God's law threatened against sinners, according to the Bible? Does it threaten "a *violent* and *ignominious* death?" Where is the passage proving this? Is such a death *eternal* punishment? Plainly the *contents* of the thing are changed, though the term is retained.

From the above, we think, it must be evident that the penalists are justly chargeable with not a little ambiguity and confusion of ideas, in reference to the penalty of the law. They make it a very *pliable* thing. In the case of the sinner it is *spiritual* death, in part; but not so in that of the Redeemer; in the former it is eternal suffering, but not so in the latter. In the two examples of its infliction it is infinitely unlike itself, and yet the same thing! They give to it an equivocal import. Two things so essentially unlike in themselves, as the sufferings and death of Christ and the damnation of a sinner in hell, cannot well be represented by the same term, without giving to that term a great elasticity and uncertainty of import. Such an ambiguity would be fatal in an argument against universalism; it would leave the proposition to be proved in total uncertainty. We cannot see its propriety, though we see its logical necessity to the cause of the penalists, in respect to the atonement.

How do the Substitutionists speak of the penalty of the law? With much less ambiguity, and more precision: We give a few examples.

Dr. Beman expressly says: "The penalty of the law was something definite." What it is, he thus explains: "The penalty of the moral law which is the *second death* or *eternal death*, was expressive of the divine displeasure against transgression." "Thus in the administration of the divine government, the sufferings of Christ come in the place of the *eternal condemnation* of every ransomed soul." "It is the suffering of Christ in the place of the *endless suffering* of the sinner." Throughout his work he attaches this idea, and no other, to the term. He means penalty in the sense of the threat; as he often remarks, "in the strict and literal sense." He expounds the penalty, not by the atonement, but by the law—assuming it to consist in the future and eternal misery of the wicked, and denying that Christ suffered this penalty.

In the Christian's Instructor by Rev. Josiah Hopkins, of Auburn,

— Beman on Atonement, Troy, 1825, p. 15, 46, 50, 51.

a work agreeing with Dr. Beman in regard to the nature of the atonement, is a formal argument to show, that the penalty of the law is not spiritual death, or bodily death, or present sufferings, but eternal death, the suffering and ruin of the soul in the life to come. Mr. Barnes, though as we think not perfectly consistent with himself, mainly means, by the penalty of the law, "*the pains of hell*." He observes; "*The penalty of the law* is what God will inflict on its unrepewed violators, neither more nor less. The result, therefore, is the best interpretation of what was meant by the threatening. 'Thou shalt die,' Gen. 2: 17; Ezek. 18: 4, 20. The *fact* turns out to be, that in that threatened death were included temporal pains, and dying, remorse of conscience, and direct eternal infliction of suffering in hell. Christ's sufferings were severe—more severe than those of any mortal before or since; but they bore, so far as we can see, only a very distant resemblance to the *pains of hell*—the *proper* penalty of the law. Nor is it possible to conceive that the sufferings of a few hours, however severe, could equal pains, though far less intense, *eternally*, prolonged." In his notes on Galatians, 3: 13, he observes: "The law of God denounced death as the wages of sin. It threatened punishment in the future world forever." "*Eternity of sufferings* is an *ESSENTIAL* part of the penalty of the law—but the Lord Jesus did not suffer forever." In his response to the eighth charge of Dr. Junkin, he shows conclusively that his *main* idea is, that the penalty consists in the future and eternal "*pains of hell*." He did not deny that Christ suffered and died as a sacrifice for sin, and in behalf of sinners, but that he suffered the penalty of the law according to his conception of that penalty.

Professor Stuart, in his "Two Discourses on the Atonement," rejects the doctrine of penalty, and adopts that of *substituted* sufferings, having, in legal effect, an "equivalency" to the penalty; understanding by the penalty, not "any and all pain," &c., (Dr. Hodge,) but "the worm that never dies, the cup of wrath without mixture, which is drunk by sinners in the world of woe." p. 12, 13. Both Jenkyn and the younger Edwards, in claiming that the atonement was a substitute, and not the penalty itself, clearly evince the belief that eternal suffering is an *essential* part of this penalty. Andrew Fuller stands on the same ground; as, indeed, do all divines who maintain that the atonement was not the penalty of the law. In their view this penalty is something definite—is, at least, an *eternal* penalty; and since the atonement was not identical with this, neither the same thing, nor like it, they do not speak of it as the penalty, but as a substitute.

This difference of phraseology in regard to the penalty of God's law, has proved a fruitful source of misunderstanding. The penalists insist on applying the term *penalty* to the atonement, and

¹ Barnes' Defence, p. 20.

have sometimes complained of their brethren for not doing the same thing; yet they exclude from the term the ideas which, in all other connections, they include in it, and on account of which the substitutionists decline to use it. The difference is that between a varying, uncertain, and ambiguous, and a fixed and definite use of a phrase. The former is the practice of the penalists; the latter, of the substitutionists. The former make the atonement to be the penalty of the law, by changing its nature as they hold it in application to sinners; they retain the term, but with a *new* meaning. The latter admit all the *facts* to which the former refer as an execution of the penalty upon Christ; but deny that it is such an execution, adhering to the true sense of the word *penalty*. Dr. Janeway, for example, says that the law demanded only that Christ "should submit to that humiliation, pain, shame, and anguish, both in body and soul, which constitute the *essence* of its penalty." The substitutionists admit these facts in the history of Christ, and that they form the essence of the atonement; but deny that they constitute anything like the essence of the penalty threatened in the law. Dr. Dana is quoted by Dr. Beman, as saying, that Christ's "sufferings were a substantial execution of the law—a real endurance of the penalty, so far as the nature of the case admitted, or required:" and yet as admitting that He did not endure "precisely the same misery in kind and degree to which the sinner was exposed." This is the contradiction of saying, that "a real endurance of the penalty" is supposable without its *kind* or *degree*. To be consistent in respect to correctness of language as well as truth, the penalists, we think, ought to adopt a new phraseology; and say that the *sinner's* penalty was *commuted* in respect to Christ. This is the fact, as they admit it. Christ did not suffer the penalty threatened against the sinner. What, then, did He suffer? Something else—some *other* penalty, if penalty at all.

III. Who is the penal sufferer, according to the express provisions of the law?

This question is to be answered not by the necessities of this or that theological system, but by going directly to the law and testimony. It is a *law* question. It is as much the business of moral government to determine the *person* who shall suffer the penalty, as to determine the penalty itself. The latter idea is not complete without the former. A penalty threatened with no designation of the person who shall suffer it, is a nullity. It can only be visited upon a person, and if that person is not specified, the very nature of law is subverted. The penal sufferer is the one named in the law; he, and he *only*, can suffer its penalty.

We come then to the question: Who is described in the government of God, as the being upon whom that government is

pledged to visit the penalty? Not obedient angels: not the Lord Jesus: but sinners, offenders—these, and these only. We know not where the passage is to be found, in which God threatens the penalty against any other beings. He marks the person with as much definiteness as the punishment. Take the following Scriptures: “In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.” “The soul that sinneth it shall die.” “And the Lord said unto Moses, whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book.” “The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God.” “The wicked is driven away in his wickedness.” “Wo unto the wicked! it shall be ill with him; for the reward of his hands shall be given him.” “Though hand join in hand, the wicked shall not go unpunished.” “Who will render to every man according to his deeds, * * * unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil.” “For whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap. For he that soweth to his flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption.” “In flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction,” &c. “Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them.”

These and a multitude of parallel Scriptures explicitly settle the question, who is legally subject to the penalty. The idea of threatening one person, and then executing the threat upon another, is not in the language of the threat. When God says, “The soul that sinneth it shall die,” He means the death of *that* soul, and not the atonement of Christ. If he shall interpose by an atonement, this will be a very different matter, and not at all the thing contained in the threat. The law as such makes no mention of a substitute for the sinner; promises none; aside from the plan of mercy demands none. Simply as law threatening its penalty, it has to do only with the *guilty*, the ill-deserving, the sinful—without a solitary commination against any other being in the universe. The sinner is the penal sufferer; he only, strictly speaking, can suffer the penalty; since it is limited to him in the very language of the threat. If it were admitted that Christ endured eternal suffering, still *His* endurance of it would not be the penalty of the law; for He is not the being to whom it legally applies.

The Substitutionists hold rigidly to the language of the law on this point. Dr. Beman repeatedly asserts this view. The same is true of Dr. Jenkyn. Mr. Barnes says, “I appeal here to the general aspect and tenor of the Scriptures as sustaining the position, that *punishment* is to be regarded as an evil inflicted by a just moral governor *for a personal offence*.” Professor Stuart observes:

¹ Barnes' Defence, pp, 229, 230.

"The letter of a penal code demands that the offender himself, and no other, should suffer." Andrew Fuller remarks: "Nor was it indifferent to the lawgiver, who should suffer, the sinner or another on his behalf. The language of the law to the transgressor was not, *thou shalt die, or some one on thy behalf*, but simply, *thou shalt die*: and had it literally taken its course, every child of man must have perished. The sufferings of Christ in our stead, therefore, are not a punishment inflicted in the ordinary course of distributive justice, but an extraordinary interposition of infinite wisdom and love; not contrary to, but rather above the law, deviating from the letter, but more than preserving the spirit of it." President Dwight held the same doctrine. "Strict justice demands the punishment of the sinner only, and can in no wise require the punishment of another in his stead." This locates the penalty where God locates it in the express terms of the threat; and decides, that Christ not being the *sinner*, did not, and could not, suffer this penalty.

Is there any answer by which this conclusion is to be obviated, so as to make the penalty apply to the Redeemer?

In respect to the idea that "punishment is natural evil inflicted for *personal* sin," Dr. Janeway remarks: "Admit this definition to be complete, and it will follow that Christ could not endure our punishment. But correct the definition, by adding two or three words, and you deprive the weapon of its edge, and render it harmless. Let punishment be, as it ought to be defined, natural evil inflicted for *personal*, or for *imputed* sin, and it will operate in our favor." Very true: but we ask whether God himself describes and threatens His penalty according to this definition? Does He threaten it against the transgressor; or as the alternative, *promise* to impute sin to Christ, and then visit the penalty upon him for that "imputed sin?" The difficulty with the Dr's. "two or three words" is, that they are not contained in the Divine statement of the matter: they bring to view a penal sufferer, not known in the letter of the law. They contain an idea Jehovah does not present when threatening the penalty.

In Pictet's Theology it is asserted, "that there is a distinction between not punishing *sin*, and not punishing the *sinner*." "A just and holy God must hate sin, and must punish it; it is therefore inconsistent with justice and holiness to allow it to go unpunished; but these perfections are not injured, if, when sin is punished, the sinner is pardoned, because it is by the punishment of sin that the justice of God is satisfied. Now this method of punishing sin and pardoning the sinner is very agreeable to the

¹ Discourses on the Atonement, p. 11.

² Fuller's Works, vol. 1, p. 657.

³ Dwight's Theology, 1830, vol. 2, p. 219.

⁴ Pres. Board of Publication, Tract No. III., pp. 10, 11.

wisdom of God, for thus room is given for mercy, and yet justice is satisfied."¹ The design of this distinction is to prepare the way for the punishment of *sin*, not in the person of the *sinner*, but of some one else. What then is the punishment of sin, according to law? Is it anything but the infliction of the penalty, not upon sin, but upon a conscious agent? Who then is this agent specified in the law, and the only one, in whose person it proposes to punish sin? The *SINNER*. The idea of punishing sin without punishing the sinner, God has not revealed in His law; it overlooks the express language of Jehovah, defining the only person whom the law holds amenable to its penalty. The law can as well forego the penalty as the person; for it is equally pledged to both.

It is often urged by the penalists, that *sin must always be punished: God must punish sin; He cannot let sin go unpunished*. It is not said that the *sinner*, but that *sin* must always be punished. The stereotyped uniformity of these expressions implies, that there authors attach to them an argumentative value. The design is to realize a substantial literality of the penalty in the atonement, in the sense that *sin* is punished, not in the sinner, but in another. Strictly speaking, you might as well punish a vacuum as sin; it is the legal occasion, and not the subject of penalty. Hence we must take the phrase in one or the other of two senses: One is, that the *sinner* must be punished; in which sense it does not prove that Christ suffered the penalty, but that he did not. The other sense is, that God must show His opposition to, and holy abhorrence of, sin. How? Either according to the mode prescribed in the law, which is to punish the *sinner*; or in some other way. If in some other way, then the question is, whether this realizes the literality of the law, either as to the penalty or the sufferer? It is in both respects a departure from the legal denunciation, even though this other way as fully displays God's feelings and character, as the penalty itself. Hence, these expressions upon analysis, fail to furnish a penal sufferer, different from the one named in the law. Christ and the sinner are not the same beings; the latter, and not the former, is the only penal sufferer known in the law. In spite of all the confusion of words and ambiguity of phrase, those who hold to the atonement at all, must hold that it is *extra-legal*—a measure above, and different from, the literal provisions of the law, both as to the sufferings and the sufferer. It is a measure of the sovereign *law-giver*, departing from the letter, but more than preserving the spirit of His law.

The *veracity* of God is also urged as an argument on this subject. It is insisted, that His veracity requires Him to execute the threatened penalty, and that it is forfeited in the case of the re-

¹ Pres. Board's edition, p. 222.

deemed, if Christ did not suffer the penalty.¹ The object of this reasoning is to commit God to a literal and rigorous execution of His law, or involve a breach of His veracity. What does God's veracity require Him to do? Let us assume for an answer, *exactly* what He *said* he would do in case of disobedience. What then did he say? That he would execute the penalty of his law. Upon and against whom? Christ? Not a word to this effect, not the remotest allusion to Christ in the legal threat. God had as solemnly pledged himself to punish the *offender*, and him only, as he had to punish at all. Hence this mode of reasoning from the veracity of God necessarily shuts the atonement out of his government, for it cannot be pretended that Christ is the offender; it binds the hands of sovereign love; either the Divine veracity is in fault, or we have no gospel and no hope of heaven. The solution of this difficulty is found in the plain fact, that a legal threat does not irreversibly pledge the veracity of the sovereign ruler, in all cases, to a literal execution. God himself has illustrated this principle. The threatening against Nineveh was absolute, without one solitary condition in the commission of Jonah, and not "conditional," as Mr. Wood says; and yet it was not executed. Was God's veracity impeached by the failure? While a legal threat does not give a sinner any ground to expect anything but the penalty, it does not foreclose *a priori* the question of mercy, so as to rob the sovereign Jehovah of the pardoning prerogative, by adopting some other measure to meet the ends of justice, besides the one of literal penalty. The proof of this is in the plain record of the Bible, that God did threaten the sinner, and him only, and that he does by the atonement of Christ pardon believing sinners. But, was not the atonement a fulfillment of this threat? We answer—no, it was not; it was not the thing God threatened to do, either as to the suffering or the sufferer. God's veracity, therefore, cannot be appealed to, to show that Christ is the sufferer contemplated in the law. The argument would make the law read, as it certainly does not.

It may be said, and sometimes is, that unless the penalty was realized in, by being inflicted upon, Christ, in some way its *proper* subject; the law, in the case of the redeemed, has never had its *demand*. What is the demand of the law referred to? We suppose, its *penal* demand, as set forth in the mouth of God, and not as fashioned by this or that school of theological philosophy. What then is the demand as Jehovah states it? Solely against the *sinner*. Hence, we grant, that in the strictly retributive and penal sense, the law does not have its demand, in all those cases in which God pardons; that is to say, He does not pardon and punish the sinner at the same time. He remits the penalty in re-

¹ Christian Advocate, Oct. 1826, p. 433, 442; Old and New Theology, p. 107, 108, 109, 124.

spect to the only being against whom it thundered; and that He should do this, is the only supposition compatible with salvation. Did He place this same penalty upon the person of Christ? Where is the proof that the law demanded this, or that the doing of it would fulfill such a demand? It is not to be found in the law itself. But, whether the *ends* of retributive justice are not met by the atonement, though a sinner is pardoned, is a very different question. We hold that they were, but on a principle different from the literal demand of the law. The simple, unmixed enforcement of the legal system, to its *letter*, is not the death of Christ, but the death of the transgressor. The latter, and not the former, is the demand of the law. Dr. DeWitt says: "Strictly speaking, it (the atonement,) was neither contemplated nor demanded by justice. It was an expedient, devised by boundless wisdom, and furnished by boundless love, to supersede the rigorous execution of justice.¹ Symington admits, that, "it, (the atonement,) is an event quite *unique* in the administration of God's moral government. It is strictly and literally an extraordinary proceeding."² If so, then it did not and could not realize the literal demand of the law. Those who insist on the literality of this demand, virtually insist on having no atonement.

We refer to another argument, adopted to bring Christ under the category of a *legal sufferer*, enduring the penalty of the law. "The son of God, the apostle tells us, was made *under the law*, that he might redeem *them that are under the law*." Gal. 4: 4, 5. How was Christ under the law? Just as they whom he came to redeem were under it. Sinners are under the law, both in respect to its preceptive requirements, and its penal demands; they are bound to obey the one, and to satisfy the other; and so was the Redeemer under the law; he voluntarily obligated himself to obey all the precepts of the moral law, and to satisfy all its penal demands by enduring its curse."³ In Gal. 4: 4, 5, the apostle very plainly is speaking of Christ in reference to his *human* nature—of Christ as a man, as the seed of the woman. He affirms two facts namely; He was "born of a woman"—*γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός*; He was "made under the law"—*γενομένον ὑπὸ νόμου*. The purpose of this arrangement was "to redeem them that were under the law." The same thought is given in Hebrews 2: 14, 17. "Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise, took part of the same." "Wherefore in all things it behooved him to be made like unto his brethren." We have an *incarnate* Saviour: the Son of God assumed our nature, by virtue of which he was made, or born under the law, became in that respect subject to the law. This was the Divine plan in making

¹ Murray Street Lectures, p. 125.

² Pres. Tract and Sunday School Society, Tract No: XIII. p. 29

³ Christian Advocate, Aug. 1826, p. 343.

Him the Redeemer of those under the law. This is the amount of the apostle's teaching. The apostle does not say, that He was under the law "*just as*" they whom he came to redeem were under it;" this is added by the author. The holy angels are under the law, but not "*just as*" sinners are under it. The saints in heaven are under the law, but not "*just as*" devils are under it. The passage contains no proof, that by a forensic imputation the law esteemed Christ the proper subject to suffer its penalty; especially since this very law in the express language of its own threat gives a different judgment. It is very easy for a theologian thus inclined, to add the idea; but this does not commit the authority of the apostle to its truth.

Another argument on this point has been drawn from the *suretyship* of Christ. Christ is represented as the *surety* of the elect undertaking to pay their *debt*, and in the capacity of a surety held liable for the debt he had assumed—that is, *legally esteemed to be the debtor*. "A surety is one who engages to pay a debt, or to suffer a penalty incurred by another. Such a surety is our Lord Jesus Christ. He undertook, in the everlasting covenant, to be responsible to the law and justice of God for that boundless debt which his elect were bound to pay."¹ "The Redeemer is expressly called a *surety*; that is, one who stands engaged to become the substitute of another, to fulfil his obligations, and pay his debts."² "Besides, let it be remembered that Christ is expressly denominated a surety; that is one who stipulates to meet the engagements of another, and to pay his debt."³ Accordingly, Christ as surety was "responsible to the law and justice of God for that boundless debt which his elect were bound to pay." This debt, we suppose, means the penalty of the law. Christ as a surety undertakes to pay it; it is transferred from the elect to Him; and being thus transferred, He is legally regarded as the debtor. Upon this view we have several remarks:

First, Christ, as a matter of fact, and equally by the concession of the penalists, did not *literally* pay this debt; that is, He did not suffer the penalty of the law threatened against the elect, in *kind, degree or duration*. His sufferings were a legal equivalent for the penalty, but not the penalty in either of the above respects, and therefore in no respect.

Secondly, it is admitted by the penalists, that the debt of the elect, said to have been paid in their behalf by a surety, or the penalty incurred by them, but endured by Him, still lies against them until they come under the denomination of believers. "It was the pleasure both of the Father who gave them to his Son to be redeemed, and of his Son who bought them with his blood, that

¹ Exposition of the Con. of Faith, p. 122. Pres. Board's edition.

² Christian Advocate, July 1826, p. 296.

³ Pres. Board of Publication Tract No. III, p. 1

they should remain under the curse of the law, until they should believe on the Redeemer. Then, and not till then, are they, or can they be justified." Until the time of faith, the elect are still amenable, still held as debtors, though the debt has been paid by a surety.

Thirdly, it is further admitted that the figure of *paying a debt* is a very inadequate and defective exhibition of the work of Christ. "At the same time, we shall be careful not to push this similitude (of debtor and creditor) to an *unlawful extreme*, nor to represent the satisfaction of Christ as *tallying in all respects* with that which is made in human transactions." "But pecuniary transactions, we not only admit but insist, can furnish no *perfect* parallel to the mysterious transaction of saving sinners."¹ "This does not make redemption a commercial transaction, nor imply that there are not essential points of diversity between acquiring by money, and acquiring by blood. Hence our second remark is, that if Dr. Beman will take up any elementary work on theology, he will find the distinction between pecuniary and penal satisfaction clearly pointed out, and the satisfaction of Christ shown to be of the latter, and not of the former kind."² Thus it appears that the figure of paying a debt by a surety, is defective; and that a "penal satisfaction" only is meant by it. The analogy between *sin* and a *debt* is very remote, and equally so that between a "penal satisfaction" and the payment of a debt. It is by unduly pressing this analogy, that errors have arisen in respect to the atonement. "The supposition of an exact and perfect resemblance between the atonement and the payment of a pecuniary debt, might lead us to deny the full extent of the provision made by the death of Christ for the salvation of mankind; or it might lead us to believe that all men will finally be saved; or what is a still more shocking error, to believe that sinners are under no obligation to obey the divine law, and cannot be justly required to endure its penalty."³ Strictly speaking, the atonement pays no debt; neither is Christ a surety for a *literal* debtor.

Fourthly, the doctrine of penalty inflicted on the person of a surety, is not the doctrine of the law of God. The Scriptures abundantly testify that Christ suffered for sinners, in their behalf and for their sakes, and in order to their pardon. But even this is not contained in the law as such; is no part of the law—much less, that as a surety He did, or could suffer the legal penalty.

Fifthly, the term surety is applied but *once* to the Saviour in the New Testament, and not at all in the Old. "By so much was Jesus made a surety of a better testament," Heb. 9: 22. In this

¹ Christian Advocate, May, 1826, p. 199.

² Ibid June, 1826, pp. 246, 247.

³ Review of Beman on Atonement, Pres. Board's edition of Old and New Theology, p. 64.

⁴ Wood's Works, Vol. I. p. 83.

chapter the apostle shows the superiority of Christ's priesthood over that of the Mosaic system. He refers to the solemnity of His appointment: "Thou art a priest forever, after the order of Melchisedec." He then reasons—"And inasmuch as not without an oath he was made priest, * * * By so much was Jesus made a surety of a better testament." The apostle does not say, surety of the *elect* undertaking to pay their "boundless debt," but "surety of a better *testament*"—meaning the gospel dispensation placed in contrast with the Mosaic, which he speaks of as being disannulled. In precisely what sense Christ is a surety, does not appear, except from the word itself. The term means a *bondsman*, a *security*, one who pledges himself for another. What the apostle says is, that Christ is the *bondsman*, so to speak, of the New Covenant, the "better testament." To continue the figure, (for it is plainly a metaphor.) He signs the covenant and seals it with His own blood—stands pledged for it. The commercial idea of a debtor and a creditor, and of Christ as stipulating to pay to the latter the debt of the former, is almost infinitely removed from what the apostle said. True, "the Redeemer is expressly called a *surety*; but of what? "Of a better *testament*," and not the elect undertaking to pay their "boundless debt."

Sixthly, the *commercial* metaphors of the Bible used to describe the work of Christ, have no analogy to the idea of a *debt* paid by a *surety*. Christians are said to be *bought* with a price—*redeemed* with the precious blood of the Saviour. These are confessedly *metaphorical* expressions, though teaching the delivery of His people from the curse of the law by the death of Christ. In the language of metaphor His blood was the *price* of their redemption; by it they have been released from the curse of a violated law. But these metaphors are not analogous to the proper idea of a *surety*. This is a very different metaphor. A surety does not *redeem him* for whom he is surety; he pays no price for him; he simply pays his *debt*, or stands pledged for it. The metaphor of a *redeemer* respects the *persons* of the redeemed; that of a *surety* respects not the persons, but merely a *pecuniary* liability. Hence when Christ is said to *redeem* us, and His people to be *bought* with a price, the idea of a *surety* is not at all contained in the figure. It is, therefore, illogical, not authorized by the Scriptures, to say that Christ is a surety stipulating to pay the "boundless debt" of the elect, and then refer to the terms, *price*, *bought*, *redeemed*, *ransom*, in confirmation of this proposition. The terms do not imply the idea figuratively—much less, literally.

Finally, the similitude between the payment of a debt by a surety, and the work of Christ as a Saviour, besides being not at all Scriptural, is in almost all respects defective. A debt infers no *fault* or crime; a debtor as such is no violator of law; but Christ's work is in behalf of *sinner*s, and on account of *sin*. A

debt infers no *penal* exposure ; but sinners are in danger of eternal damnation. A *creditor* is not a *public*, but a *private* person : he may remit the debt without satisfaction, and is bound to cancel it when paid by a surety. God is not the sinner's creditor, but his *lawgiver* ; and the work of Christ in his behalf has reference to the government of a sovereign ruler. In it are obstacles to the sinner's pardon, which have not the faintest analogy to the relation of a creditor. A debt is *transferable* ; a surety may assume it and pay it. Sin is not transferable ; it belongs inalienably to the being who committed it. Neither is the *ill-desert* of sin transferable : and if, as the reviewer of Beman on Atonement declares, and as we firmly believe, "ill-desert * * * is the ground of just liability to punishment," then this "liability" is not transferable. Hence, to quote the words of President Dwight, "All that, in this case, can be done by a substitute of whatever character, is to render it not improper for the lawgiver to pardon the transgressor."¹

These points of dissimilitude between the payment of a debt by a surety, and the work of Christ as a Saviour, are so radical that we cannot reason from the one to the other. Let us take the definition given of the term surety. "A surety is one who engages to pay a debt, or to suffer a penalty incurred by another." Are the two definitions, connected by the disjunctive "or," *identical* ? If so, does the first rule the meaning of the second ? If so, then the term surety gives no proper idea of the work of Christ as a Saviour. Does the second rule the meaning of the first ? If so, then the term is not correctly defined. Do the two definitions convey *different* ideas ? If so, then those ideas are so essentially different, that little short of an infinite gulf lies between them. The idea of paying a debt for another, and that of suffering a legal penalty for another, are as wide apart as the poles.

We avow our belief that Christ did *not* suffer the penalty of the law. Let the questions, what is *punishment* ? what is *the* penalty of the law ? *who* is the penal sufferer made known in the law ?—let these be carefully studied and definitely answered ; then let the atonement be presented as consisting in the sufferings and death of the Saviour ; and we think the objects present to the understanding must be viewed as not the same. The doctrine, therefore, of *substituted sufferings* as well as a *substituted sufferer*, neither the one nor the other being according to the *letter* of the law, but both being a departure from that letter, a measure of the lawgiver not known in a purely legal system, is the only doctrine of atonement we are able to verify in the Bible. The effort to *identify* this with the penalty of God's law, so as to use a common term for both, we think, is a failure. It was not the penalty, either as to the *person* or the *suffering*. The penalists when *defining*

¹ Dwight's Theology, 1830, Vol. II. p. 306.

their proposition are careful to assure us, that they do not mean the penalty of the law threatened against sinners, either in *kind*, *degree*, or *duration*. When, however, they *reason* from the Scriptures or otherwise, to prove that Christ suffered the penalty, then they logically forget their own disclaimers, and prove it not *with* those limitations and disclaimers, but *without* them; that is, they do not prove the proposition they define, but *another* one, so far as they prove any. We give an example:

Dr. Alexander remarks: "The sufferings of Christ could no otherwise open a way of pardon but by removing the penalty of the law; but they could have no tendency to remove the penalty, but by his enduring it." Let us fill out this argument. The sufferings of Christ "could have no tendency to remove the *penalty*," that is to say, *the eternal damnation of the sinner*, "but by his enduring it," that is to say, *not the eternal damnation of the sinner in kind, degree or duration*. It is plain that all the argument the passage contains, is founded upon the *exact identity* of the two, namely, the sufferings of Christ and the penalty of the law. Disclaim this identity, and the reason vanishes into air.

Take another example. Dr. Junkin earnestly inquires, "Can any man be at a loss to say what the violated law requires? Do not all men know that it demands the infliction of its penal sanction? Can *justice* be *satisfied*—*fully satisfied*—with anything short of this? Why, by the very terms, to stop short of the full demand of law, is *injustice*; and can justice be fully satisfied with injustice? with a partial meeting of its claims? Clearly, then, the very essential nature of justice demands a *penal* infliction—an infliction of the penalty—the *WHOLE* penalty—and nothing but the penalty of the law; and any and every *diminution* from this, is a sacrifice of justice."

The object of this reasoning is to show that Christ suffered the penalty of the law—in the strong language of the author, "The *WHOLE* penalty, and nothing but the penalty." We submit two questions: First—does the author believe that "the *whole* penalty and nothing but the penalty of the law," when inflicted on *sinners*, involves their future and eternal misery? We suppose he does. This is "what God's law required of his own people who had transgressed it"—the criterion of this penalty as named by the author himself. Secondly—does he believe that this "whole penalty, and nothing but the penalty," as thus ascertained, was inflicted upon Christ? We suppose not. If he does, then he contradicts Dr. Hodge, the reviewer of Beman, Dr. Janeway, the author of *Letters on the Atonement* in the *Christian Advocate*, the Rev. Mr. Wood, Symington—indeed, all the penalists. If it be said, that the demands of justice were satisfied with the

¹ Pres. Tract and S. School Society, Tract No. XII. p. 29.

² *Vindication &c* of Dr. Junkin: pp. 114, 115

temporary sufferings of Christ, then they were satisfied without "the *whole* penalty, and nothing but the penalty of the law"—which is contrary to the Dr.'s statement, though in exact correspondence with the views of the substitutionists. The reasoning, if it proves anything, proves the *literal* infliction of the penalty in the most *literal* sense, upon the Saviour. But this proposition the penalists disclaim, though it is the only one their argument is adapted to prove.

The same remarks apply with equal pertinency to the Scriptural argument of the penalists. They refer to those passages, in which Christ is said to *bear* our sins, to be made *sin* for us, to have the *iniquities* of his people *laid* upon Him, to be made a *curse* for us, &c., in proof that the penalty of the Divine law was inflicted upon Him. We pause not exegetically to canvass the origin and exact meaning of these phrases, as used in the Scriptures. Let us assume, that they prove that Christ did suffer the penalty of the law—the point to establish which they are cited. The question is, do they prove this point, *as explained* by the penalists: namely, that He suffered the penalty, but not in *kind, degree, or duration*? Do they contain this exposition of the thing they prove? Plainly not. If they prove the infliction of the penalty, they prove it, not as the penalists hold it, but as they do not: namely, they prove the infliction of "the *whole* penalty, and nothing but the penalty," in *kind, degree, and duration*, as conclusively as they prove its infliction at all. Hence, they prove *too much*. Where then shall the *limitation* be fixed? The penalists say: They prove the infliction of the penalty, though not in *kind, degree, or duration*. The substitutionists respond, as we think, justly: This is giving up the point while professing to retain it—using the *penal* phraseology without the *penal fact*—continuing the name in the absence of the substance. Hence, the latter decline to use the word *penalty*, because they do not hold to its infliction in the proper and literal sense. The former use the term, and attempt the proof of its infliction in the manner named, and yet do not hold to that infliction in the sense in which their brethren deny it, and in which their argument proves it, if at all. Who uses language most correctly? Who speaks exactly, as he means? Here we think the one class of theologians have greatly the advantage of the other.

The author of Letters on the Atonement, in the Christian Advocate, after a strenuous effort to show that Christ suffered the penalty of the law, when replying to an objection, abandons his own ground, without any apparent perception of the transition. The objection is, that Christ did not endure *eternal suffering*. This the author concedes; and adds, "*the infinite dignity* of his person imparted to his temporary sufferings a value that made them a *FAIR* and *FULL EQUIVALENT* for the sufferings of all who shall be finally

saved."¹ This, however, is the very doctrine of those against whom he is reasoning, and whose falseness he has proved, if he has proved anything. The whole strength of his own argument is expended against himself. The difficulty is easily seen. When *proving*, he has one proposition in view: when replying to objections, he states another, not the one he has proved; that is, the *direct* argument and the *responsive* argument assume different doctrines. In the direct, it is the penalty; in the responsive, it is *not* the penalty, but a substitute, an equivalent for it, of equal value, answering all its *ends*. This inconsistency is to be avoided only by maintaining, contrary to the plain fact, the doctrine of penalty throughout, or denying it throughout. The atonement either is, or is not the penalty of the law. If it is, then no explanation, however necessary to answer an objection, is admissible, if it implies the reverse. A proposition which in one stage we maintain, but in another must abandon, is either defective in its form, or untrue in what it asserts. That of the penalists is beset with both of these difficulties.

There is one point, to which, before dismissing this subject, we ask a moment's attention. The theory of the penalists leads by a strict logical necessity, to the inference of a LIMITED atonement. Let it be granted, that Christ suffered the penalty of the law for the elect, and that in order to this their sins were imputed to Him, and that these two propositions are essential to the nature of the atonement; and we confess a total inability to avoid the conclusion, that it is *limited* in its nature, just adequate to the salvation of the elect, and no more. We must believe this, or adopt the doctrine of universal salvation, by making the elect to include *all* sinners. It is worthy of note, that in their exegesis of the Scriptures, the penalists *limit* to the elect all the passages, which to others seem to convey the doctrine of a general atonement. Where then is the proof, that Christ died for the *non*-elect any more than for devils, when the only passages showing that He died for *any* body, are taken to mean the elect, and these only? All the Scriptural proof that He has made *any* atonement for sinners, is, by this mode of interpretation, monopolized with this class. This is the very course pursued by Symington, in his chapter on the *extent* of the atonement; and it is perfectly consistent with his positions in respect to its nature. An atonement, such as he describes, has no more to do with the *non*-elect than with lost angels. As a basis on which to proceed in the offer of pardon, and in preaching repentance and faith to a lost world, it is of necessity limited to the elect.

But do not the penalists hold to the *infinite* MERIT OR SUFFICIENCY of the atonement, to save all men, yea, even a thousand worlds? They do; but when we take these expressions in con-

¹ *Christian Advocate*, Sept. 1826, p. 149.

nection with their views of its nature, it is not easy to see in what sense it is sufficient to save any but the elect. Surely it is not sufficient to save all *against* its own nature; and to make it so *according* to its nature, the sins of the *non*-elect must be imputed to Christ, and He must suffer the penalty in their behalf; neither of which suppositions, according to these divines, is real; and, therefore, the atonement, *as it is*, by the very necessity of its constituent ideas, is sufficient for the salvation of the elect only. It is all-sufficient for what? To save all men, if the sins of all had been imputed to Christ, if He had suffered the penalty for all; but not otherwise, except at the expense of ideas declared essential to its nature. It is true, the reviewer of Beman assures us, that they "do not hold that there is any limitation in the nature of the atonement. They teach as fully as any men, that an atonement sufficient for one is sufficient for all. It is a simple question relating to the design, and not to the nature of Christ's work." pp. 72, 73. Not so, if we understand this reviewer, in respect to its nature; it is more; for an atonement sufficient for one is *not* sufficient for all, unless the sins of all have been imputed, and Christ has suffered the penalty for all, neither of which is admitted to be a fact.

But, suppose a *non*-elect sinner were to become a *believer*, would he be saved by the atonement? The author of Letters on the Atonement in the *Christian Advocate*, puts this question, and answers it in the affirmative.¹ He must so answer it, or contradict the Bible; yet the answer *ought* not to be true, and *is* not, according to the author's theory. Surely, the sinner's faith does not affect the nature of the atonement by addition, or deduction, or modification. And if it be essential to its nature that Christ should suffer the penalty for the elect, having their sins imputed to Him, and if neither of these is true in respect to the *non*-elect, then clearly the salvation of a *non*-elect sinner, on the supposition of his faith, is a logical impossibility. We should answer the question in the *negative*; or, alarmed at its palpable collision with the plainest principles of the Bible, re-model the theory which necessitates that negative. The theory strictly adhered to, does not admit the affirmative.

The doctrine of the substitutionists, on the other hand, does not place in the atonement any elementary ideas, which of necessity *limit* it to any particular class of sinners belonging to our race; and in this respect harmonizes with the exact teaching of very many passages, and also the general tenor of the Scriptures. In their view the number that will be saved is not determined by the atonement itself. Its *application* in the sense of faith on the part of the sinner, and justification on the part of God, depends on other agencies. God has determined in this

¹ *Christian Advocate*, April, 1826 p. 149.

way actually to save only a portion of our race; and viewed with respect to this *purpose* the atonement is *definite*, its success being "coincident in extent with that of the Divine purpose." Contemplated as an atonement simply, the sufferings and death of Christ have opened the way of salvation to all, and in itself considered *equally* to all, containing in its nature no ideas which restrict it to the elect. This is what we mean by a *general*, in distinction from a *limited*, atonement. God's purpose to make it *effectual* to the salvation of *some*, by calling them to repentance and faith, is another matter. That the atonement is thus *general*, we believe to be a Scriptural doctrine, a plain fact lying upon the face of the inspired record. We can see how it *can* be thus general upon one view of its nature, while we cannot see the same thing upon the other view. The Bible is in harmony with itself. It has not presented to the world an atonement in the sacrifice of Christ, having so many obvious marks of being general, imposing upon all sinners, elect and non-elect, the obligation of acceptance, adding untold intensity both of guilt and doom to its rejecters, when it is absolutely limited to the elect by the constituent ideas which compose its nature. This cannot be. The incongruity is too strange to be true.

ARTICLE VIII.

NATHANAEL'S FIRST INTERVIEW WITH CHRIST; OR THE MEANING OF JOHN 1: 45—51.

By Rev. E. C. Jones, Southington, Ct.

It has commonly been supposed that what our Lord said of Nathanael, (John 1: 45—51.) "Behold an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile!" was intended to be descriptive of his *general character*, and to signify that he was a Jew "inwardly;" a man of sincere and consistent piety, in distinction from one who only bore the name and profession of a Jew. This is the view adopted by most commentators, if not by all.

Dignus hic est nomine veri Israelitae. Non omnes Israelis posterii digni eo nomine, sed qui Jacobi probitatem referunt." *Rosenmüller*.—"A person that indeed deserves the honorable title of one of God's people, and is worthy of his descent from Jacob, his pious ancestor, as being a plain and upright man." *Doddridge*.—"A sincere professor of the faith of Israel; he was true to the religion he professed, and lived up to it." *Henry*.—"A genuine son of Israel, a servant and worshipper of Jehovah, an honest upright

person, a man of faith and prayer, a real Israelite, while most of his neighbors have nothing but the name and outward form of Israelites." *Scott*.—"One who is really an Israelite, and not by birth only, but one worthy of the name. One who possesses the spirit, the piety, and the integrity, which befit a man who is really a Jew, who fears God, and obeys his law."—*Barnes*.

It may be true that Nathanael possessed, in an eminent degree, the virtuous qualities which are thus usually ascribed to him. But it is very questionable, to say the least, whether our Lord's remark was intended, or understood, to have any such general reference to his character, as is here supposed.

1. Such a mode of speaking was *not customary* with our Saviour. He was not given to compliment. There is no other instance on record of his pronouncing such unqualified commendation of a man's character, as this interpretation supposes. When to Simon, the son of Jona, he gave the name of Cephas, "which is by interpretation a stone," he but prophetically hinted at Peter's future standing and usefulness in the church, without intimating that he approved of everything as unexceptionable in his moral and spiritual character. Time and trial showed that there were some very irregular and brittle seams in this stone at which it was liable to split; and our Saviour was never known to express an opinion of men which did not hold sound. He sometimes spoke in high terms of particular instances of faith, as in the case of the centurion, the Syro-Phenician woman, and others; but he uniformly refrained from general eulogy. It was not his manner to indulge in oriental hyperbole and flattery; but he was habitually sparing and guarded in his encomiums upon character. And if the interpretation about to be given be correct, he did not depart from his usual reserve in the case of Nathanael.

2. It was *not necessary to our Lord's purpose*, that he should be understood as speaking of Nathanael's general character. That purpose evidently was to make it apparent that he knew what was in man; that he could read the hidden thoughts and emotions of the soul afar off. He was aiming by this means to produce in the mind of Nathanael the conviction which was wanting, that he was indeed the Messiah, as Philip had just stated. Philip had said to him, "We have found him of whom Moses in the law and the prophets did write, Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph; implying that Jesus was a *native* of Nazareth, as in truth he was not, and as he should not be, according to the Scriptures, if he were indeed the Messiah. For Moses in the law had said, that Christ should come out of Judah, and the prophets had assigned Bethlehem as the place of his nativity. On this point Nathanael's mind labored; for he saw a discrepancy between Philip's statement and what he knew the prophets had written. Hence the objection that he raised, "Can any good thing come out of Naza-

reth?" There is no reason to suppose, according to the common notion, that he intended to speak contemptuously of Nazareth, as being a place of evil notoriety, especially when we consider that he himself was also of Galilee, and would naturally wish to avoid speaking ill of it, if he could. But his meaning doubtless was, "Can it be that any good thing like this, should come out of Nazareth, a place which is never mentioned by the prophets as destined to such a distinction? The Scriptures do not warrant us to expect it." A similar objection was made on the same ground by others. While some said, "Of a truth this is the prophet;" and others, "This is the Christ;" there were yet others who asked, "Shall Christ come out of Galilee? Hath not the Scriptures said that Christ cometh of the seed of David, and out of the town of Bethlehem, where David was?" So there was a division among the people because of him." Nathanael's objection, therefore, did not arise from prejudice against Nazareth, nor from that wayward skepticism in which a man sometimes braces himself when he is not willing to be convinced. But it arose from his correct knowledge of what the Scripture had said on the subject, to which the statement of Philip, he perceived did not correspond. Our Saviour not choosing to explain the facts in his history, by which this discrepancy might have been reconciled, aimed to convince Nathanael on other and more substantial grounds, and in spite of the objection that lay in his mind: To accomplish this, it was not necessary that he should give a general description of his character. Enough, and much better suited to the purpose was it, to fix upon something definite, something of recent occurrence, and fresh in mind, by which to convince him that he discerned his inmost thoughts and feelings, and that, therefore, he was no ordinary man, but was omniscient and Divine. This he did, as we intend to show.

3. If Nathanael was a man of sincere and humble piety, as no doubt he was, *he would naturally have shrunk from receiving such an encomium from Christ*, as is commonly understood. He would have felt and expressed himself to be unworthy of it. Good men are usually most sensible of their deficiencies, and feel that he who searches the heart, and knows the whole life, must see much in them that is sinful and unlovely. If Nathanael had understood our Lord's words as many do, he would have been likely to say within himself, "Surely this can be no prophet sent from God who pronounces upon my character in such terms as these." He would have felt unprepared to accept the commendation, as just and true; and his suspicion that Philip had misjudged would have been increased rather than diminished. But instead of this, he seemed to see at once the pertinency and justness of the remark as applied to himself, and to manifest a consciousness that it was simply according to fact. His modesty was not offended nor em-

barrassed. He expressed no objection or misgiving, as if he felt that this was saying too much of him. His whole manner indicates that he did not understand our Lord's meaning, as it is generally understood.

4. His question of surprise also, "whence knowest thou me?" is *not what we should expect* under such conditions. It is put in the present tense. He does not ask, "whence *hast* thou known me?" or "How didst thou become acquainted with my character and manner of life?" But he speaks as if he felt that Jesus was that moment looking into his inmost soul, and observing its frame and spirit; as if he had just been scrutinizing the private thoughts and emotions, and desires of his heart. "Whence knowest thou me?" But understood as it commonly is, the question gives him somewhat an air of self-complacency, as if he considered himself quite entitled to unqualified praise, while his only wonder is how Jesus should know that he so well deserved it.

5. Christ's *reply* to this question shows that neither he nor Nathanael, had any reference at all to general character in what they said, but only to some particular act or experience just then passed, or passing. "Before that Philip called thee, when thou wast under the fig-tree, I saw thee." This clearly limits the meaning of the conversation on both sides to the act of private devotion in which Nathanael was engaged under the fig-tree when Philip called him. This explains definitely to what our Saviour referred in his first remark. This was a complete and satisfactory answer to Nathanael's question, and defines the purport and the limit of that question.

6. There is a manifest want of fitness and propriety in *the remarks that followed*, on the common interpretation. Nathanael's objection was overcome, though not explained, by this striking proof that Jesus had perfect knowledge of the hidden exercises of the heart, and he immediately exclaimed, "Rabbi, thou art the Son of God; thou art the King of Israel." Our Saviour's answer still points to the scene of private devotion under the fig-tree as the particular subject of discourse. "Because I said unto thee, I saw thee under the fig-tree, believest thou? Thou shalt see greater things than these." He says nothing to make it appear that any reference had been made to general character, or that Nathanael believed because he so understood the matter; but rather that he believed solely because he perceived that our Lord had been an all-discerning witness of his frame of spirit under the fig-tree, and had so perfectly described him as he was there, where he was sure that no eye beheld him, but the eye of Him that seeth in secret. The meaning of our Lord's remark, therefore, must be restricted to that scene of devotion, and interpreted accordingly. His own words, and the whole drift of the conversation, plainly

confine it to that; nor need we look further for a satisfactory solution of it.

7. Once more, as the subject is generally viewed, our Saviour's *concluding assertion in the 51st verse*, has no natural and obvious connection with what precedes. We look in vain to see how it grows out of the attending circumstances and conversation; and we wonder what should have led him, just then, to speak of "the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man." The remark seems unaccountably abrupt and mysterious. And, indeed the whole picture, as usually explained, wears an air of obscurity and unnaturalness. We are not satisfied. We cannot repress the feeling that there must be some more fitting key to it, which we have not yet found. The Evangelist's account of the interview is concise, touching only upon the prominent peculiarities of it; but if we attend carefully to what he says, and to the circumstances and connection in which he says it, at the same time keeping before the mind the leading object in view, to set forth the divinity of Christ, we shall find that the outline of the draft is complete, and all its parts consistent with each other.

Nathanael and his pious friends had come to attend upon the ministry of John, as he was preaching and baptising on the banks of the Jordan. Jesus himself had also come, to honor the mission of his forerunner, to receive baptism at his hands, and public testimony from his lips that he was the Divinely promised Messiah. The great topic of thought, feeling, conversation, reading, and prayer, among these friends on this occasion, doubtless was, the speedy appearing of Christ, and the blessings and glories of his reign. John had announced his coming, as nigh at hand, and every reflecting and pious mind was alert with expectation; every heart was full; the Scriptures were searched and discussed with intense interest, in reference to the subject in question; and godly persons were incited to pray with unusual fervor and faith. The state of feeling that existed among them, we must suppose, was not unlike that which prevails in seasons of great religious awakening in modern times. Two of these friends were present when John pointed out Jesus as "the Lamb of God," and followed him. One of them, Andrew, hastens to find his own brother, Simon, acquaints him with the joyful news, and brings him to Jesus. The next day, Philip becomes acquainted with Jesus; he also is convinced, and follows him. Full of the discovery, he in turn hastens to find Nathanael, to communicate the intelligence to him. But Nathanael was just then absorbed in private devotions under the fig-tree, wrestling with God in prayer, as did Jacob of old; and perhaps having specially in mind, at that very time, the character and example of Jacob. It was not uncommon to choose such a retreat for reading the Scriptures, meditation and prayer. "Passages from the rabbinical books might be multiplied to show

that the Jews were in the habit of studying the law and meditating upon religious subjects under shady trees." Philip, on finding Nathanael in his retirement, says to him, "We have found him of whom Moses in the law, and the prophets did write, Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph." Nathanael raises the objection, that according to Moses and the prophets, Nazareth was not the place from whence so good a thing was to be expected. Philip was not prepared to answer this objection, nor does it appear that he attempted it. Overruled, however, by the inward conviction that Jesus must be the person foretold in the sacred writings, he cuts short the conversation by saying, "Come and see." Feeling confident that on acquaintance his friend would be convinced as well as himself, Nathanael yields to the solicitation, and accompanies him; but at the same time he carries along with him the doubts and misgivings which had arisen in his mind. As he comes within hearing, Jesus, knowing all the circumstances, takes him completely by surprise, saying to those that stood by, "Behold an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile! What did he mean by this remark; and how was he understood? Take for the key that the leading allusion throughout is to the patriarch Jacob, and we may be able to slide the bolt.

1. What is an Israelite indeed—*ἀληθῶς Ἰσραηλῆτης*—an Israelite in the true sense of the word? What is the primitive and genuine signification of the term? The answer is to be found in Gen. 32: 28. "Thy name shall be called no more Jacob, but *Israel*: for as a prince hast thou power with God and with men, and hast prevailed." Here we learn the original use of the word, and the peculiar significance attached to it—a *prince with God*; or, a *successful wrestler with God*. And it was evidently in the genuine original sense of the term that our Saviour intended to apply it; as is indicated by the adjunct *ἀληθῶς*. An "Israelite indeed," then, is one who wrestles with God in prayer, and prevails. This was the very act in which Nathanael had just been engaged under the fig-tree. The circumstances of the times, the announcement of John that the kingdom of Heaven was nigh at hand, and the high-wrought state of feeling that now pervaded every pious heart, naturally lead us to suppose that he had been pleading with God that "the desire of all nations" might come, and that he might be permitted to see him before he died, that so he might have it to say, as did Simeon, "Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes have seen thy salvation." And in that prayer he prevailed; for within the same hour he was indeed permitted to see the Lord's Christ, though at first he knew him not. The exclamation, "Behold an Israelite indeed!" so understood, mirrored back Nathanael to himself in a moment, and flashed conviction upon his mind that Jesus knew him as no other than a Divine and omniscient Being could know him. It was like saying,

"Behold a man who has been wrestling with God in prayer that the Messiah might come, and that it might be his privilege to see him; and he has prevailed. The Messiah has already come, and now stands before him." Well might Philip flatter himself that if Nathanael would "come and see," he would soon be convinced.

2. But what signifies the remainder of the sentence—"in whom is no guile." The allusion is still to Jacob; and perhaps our Lord added these words, partly for the very purpose of making it more apparent to Nathanael that such was the allusion intended. Be that as it may, we very well know that Jacob supplanted his brother by *guile*, and that he discovered a strong propensity to practice it in other instances. And, indeed, the name *Jacob* signifies, *a supplanter, an artful manager*, and was given to be predictive of one leading trait in his character. But when he wrestled with the angel he was sincere, he was in earnest. Hence, the pointed significance of the angel's question, "What is thy name?" He asked, not for information, but that he might take occasion from the answer to change his name, and by the change to signify to him most impressively, that he was no longer to be regarded as having obtained the blessing by *supplanting* his brother, but as *a prince of God*, who had wrestled with him in prayer for it, and prevailed. "Thou shalt no longer be considered as a *supplanter*, a *deceiver*, but as a sincere and successful pleader with God." The Lord thus pardoned his sin and wiped away his reproach. Understanding our Saviour, therefore, as speaking in strict allusion to the significance of names, what he said amounts to this, "Behold a man who may properly be called *Israel*, according to the real import of the name, in distinction from being called *Jacob*, in the descriptive sense of that term."

3. This view of the subject accounts naturally for Nathanael's surprise, and for the question by which he expressed it, "Whence knowest thou me?" He comprehended in a moment the meaning of our Saviour's remark, and saw in it the perfect delineation of his own likeness as he was under the fig-tree; and filled with astonishment, he was already beginning to be convinced.

4. Our Lord's reply finished the driving and clenching of the nail: "Before that Philip called thee, when thou wast under the fig-tree, I saw thee." This, to the consciousness of Nathanael, explained the whole matter. He perceived that the eye of Jesus was one that "seeth in secret;" that he had been a witness of his inmost thoughts and feelings, of the intensity of his desires and petitions; and however his connection with Nazareth might be explained, he was convinced that this same Jesus was no other than the Messiah.

5. Nathanael, in the freshness of his convictions, and from the fulness of his heart, now professes his faith in Christ without

further misgiving or hesitation. "Rabbi, thou art the Son of God; thou art the King of Israel." Perhaps by the last expression, "thou art the King of Israel," he intended to keep up the allusion to Jacob, and to signify that he comprehended it. "If I may properly be called Israel, thou art the King of Israel; thou art my King, and my Lord, and as such I receive thee."

6. The reply of Jesus to this profession harmonizes freely with the train of thought suggested. "Because I said unto thee, I saw thee under the fig-tree, believest thou? Are you convinced by this single proof of my power to discern the hidden things of the heart, that I am the Son of God, and do you therefore receive me in faith as your Lord and King? Thou shalt see greater things than these." Jesus was just now beginning to make himself known to the world as sent of God, and this was one of the first exhibitions of his wondrous power and knowledge. Many other signs were to follow more striking, and more convincing, than this.

7. And, finally, Jesus ended the conference by throwing out a prophetic, and somewhat enigmatic intimation of what they might expect to see further. This he did in that solemn and impressive manner which he often adopted when he wished to fix the attention of his hearers, and put their minds closely on the alert. Addressing himself to the whole company in the plural, he said, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, hereafter (or henceforth) ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man." Nathanael had pronounced him "the Son of God," and this title he did not decline. But now, to bring into conjunction with that, the view of his human nature also, he calls himself "the Son of man." He was both; and the ladder, which Jacob saw set up on the earth, and the top of it reaching to heaven, was strikingly emblematical of both. The allusion to Jacob is still kept up, though the scene changes to another incident in his life. Our Saviour, doubtless, intended to be understood as meaning that he was represented by the ladder that Jacob saw in his dream, the foot of it on earth, the top of it in heaven, and the angels of God ascending and descending on it. Gen. 28: 12. In his human nature, Jesus was on earth like other men; in his Divine nature, He was one with God in heaven. As he said to Nicodemus, "And no man hath ascended up into heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven." Like the ladder, he was on earth and in heaven at the same time. He was "God manifest in the flesh," the only medium of communication between earth and heaven, between man and God, aptly represented by the angels ascending and descending upon the Son of man, and through him as Mediator, acting as ministering spirits to them who shall be heirs of salvation. The enlarged understanding and faith of

Christ's disciples would thereafter comprehend this mediatorial arrangement, as if they saw heaven open, like Jacob in his dream, and witnessed the process of reconciliation and intercommunication between God and man.

Understood in this manner, the purport and design of the whole conversation are clear and consentaneous, the scene morally beautiful and impressive in the highest degree, and the instruction remarkably rich, comprehensive, and suggestive. Nathanael and his friends were furnished, in a few words, with a theme for study and meditation all their days; a theme never yet exhausted by the Christian church, and one into which the angels desire to look.

ARTICLE IX.

THE INCARNATION.

By REV. EDWARD BEECHER, D.D., Boston.

The attention of the Christian community has been of late, specially directed not only to the subject of the Trinity, but also to the great doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God. The relations of this wonderful dispensation of Divine wisdom and love are two-fold, first to the intelligent universe at large, and secondly to men as especially and personally interested in the blessings which it was primarily designed to confer. There is at this time a strong tendency in many minds to overlook the first aspect of this doctrine, and to convert the character, and work of Christ, into a more moral power, designed to effect a renovation of the sinful mind of man. No one familiar with the Word of God, will think of denying that the character of Christ is such a moral power. But he will regard it as an extremely limited and one-sided view to restrict the mind to this aspect of the subject.

We know indeed that of late the doctrine of angelic agency, as held for ages by the church, has been thrown into those heaps of theological rubbish, which the progress of true science is to sweep away, and that a theory has been promulgated of a universal necessity among all orders of beings, of passing through a salutary discipline of sinning in order to obtain a finished spiritual education and to arrive at a state of confirmed and established virtue. The incarnation of Christ, has been wrought into a system founded upon a theory of the universe which has this philosophy for its basis. We are told that the "God of Calvary and of the firmament, the love of one and the grandeur of the other, are gradually

melting into union. We have still immense masses of theologic rubbish on hand, which belong to the Ptolemaic system, huge piles of assumption about angels that have never sinned and angels that have; about other worlds and the reach of Christ's atonement there, which were raised up, evidently, on the world when it was flat, and must ultimately disappear, as we come into a more true sense of the astronomic universe." *God in Christ*: p. 314. When we have come into this true sense of the astronomic universe, we shall find, it would seem, that the events of this world, even although they include the incarnation and atonement of the Son of God, are not the central events of the moral universe, any more than this earth is the center of the solar and starry systems, and that the attractive power of Christ's atonement no more reaches to distant worlds, and to all orders of beings in the intelligent universe, and holds them to the throne of God, than the attraction of this world holds together the solar system, and those innumerable orbs of light which fill on all sides the infinitude of space. We shall on the other hand discover that this vast universe in all its extent, is, and ever must be, a system of educating intelligent minds by the aid of a necessary process of sinning, in order to try out by experience the nature of things, and to gain a true knowledge of good and evil.

Though this system may occasionally coincide in ideas and language with some parts of the Scriptural system of Christianity, it is impossible to overstate the magnitude and importance of the difference between them, both in their essential nature and in their results.

It is not, however, our purpose to undertake a radical investigation of this system, but merely to state as we understand it, its Scriptural antagonist. Neither is it our purpose to go at great length into the proof of the views which we shall advance. Our great end at present is merely a symmetrical statement of our views of the relations and influences of the Incarnation of the Son of God. We shall indeed give to our discussion a Scriptural aspect, and advance, in evidence of the truth of our statements, various Scriptural proofs; but the limits to which we are restricted will forbid an extended and complete investigation of all those portions of the Word of God which throw light upon the subject.

God manifest in the flesh, is doubtless the great mystery of godliness, the most wonderful occurrence which a created mind has ever contemplated, and even if revelation had been silent, and reason had thrown no light on this subject, we might have concluded, a priori, that most important ends were to be accomplished by an occurrence so wonderful in the eyes of an astonished universe—into which angels desire to look.

Many, we are aware, seem to think that little is revealed on this subject, and that salvation by an incarnate Mediator is a dispen-

sation to be submitted to, but not understood—a mystery to be believed but not to be investigated; and some even think the investigation of it a kind of irreverence. Others, as already intimated, take limited views of the subject, and confining their attention to a particular point, attach to it undue importance, and exclude other considerations, of equal or greater consequence. Thus some think of Christ merely as an example, a teacher, or a source of moral power, and neglect all his other important relations and works.

But if we would arrive at safe and infallible results on this subject, we must consult the Word of God alone. What facts he has revealed we may safely collect, compare and classify, neither adding nor omitting. If we proceed thus we shall find that much more is revealed than many imagine. Not only are facts revealed, but also their connections and bearings, and much of what we may call the philosophy of the subject is presented to our view. We do not assert that there are not many things connected with this subject, yet unrevealed, and which in another world may be disclosed, but this should not induce us to overlook what is revealed; for a comparison of various parts of the Bible with each other, will throw floods of light on this subject. We shall therefore proceed to state the reasons which God has assigned for the Incarnation of Christ, and the relations and effects of his incarnation.

1. He became incarnate in order to defeat the designs of evil angels, especially of the Devil, their leader and head. This is directly asserted by John. (1 Jn. 3: 9,) "For this purpose the Son of God was manifested (in the flesh,) (see 4: 2, 3,) that he might destroy the works of the Devil;" and again, Paul expressly asserts that he became incarnate "that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is the devil." (Heb. 2: 14.) Of the evil angels there are many ranks, called in the Bible by different names. Peter and Jude speak merely "of the angels that kept not their first estate," but Paul speaks of them under the name of "principalities and powers, in high places"—and, likewise, speaks of the holy angels under the name of "thrones, dominions, principalities and powers." It is a fundamental doctrine of the Bible, that a conflict exists between these fallen angels and God; not of physical power, for He could with ease annihilate them, but of moral influence. He does not annihilate them, He permits them to live, and they attempt to disorganize and destroy his government, by tempting others to rebel. He by moral power, designs to defeat their plans, to preserve holy, the greater part of the universe, and to redeem from ruin, many whom they have actually induced to revolt, and finally to destroy the influence of the rest, and by their punishment, sustain his kingdom. They manifest a peculiar hatred of man, probably because from the human race a church is to be redeemed who shall be exalted to the place whence they fell.

Hence their aim is to prevent the exaltation of men, by causing them to persist in their revolt, and fall under the eternal penalty of the law. And in view of their sins they are said to accuse them before God, and to lay crimes to their charge, so that men, like fallen angels, may be consigned to everlasting punishment. But we find in Psalms 8, and 1 Cor. 15 : 24—28, and in Heb. 2 : 8, 9, that the human nature, in the person of Christ, is asserted to be exalted above all the universe, especially above all opposing rule and power and authority, that is above all opposing angels. And Christ says in Rev. 3 : 21, "To him that overcometh will I grant to sit with me in my throne, even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in his throne." We read also, that "the saints shall judge angels," and that "they overcome the accuser of the brethren, who accuseth them day and night before God, by the blood of the Lamb."

Of course the moral character and future destiny of man is the present ground of conflict between evil angels and God. Man is a free agent, such God will preserve him ; and now the question is, who shall decide his moral character, God or evil angels ? that is, who has the greatest power over mind, not over matter ? Who can exert the greatest moral influence over the minds of free agents ? Traces of this conflict appear in every part of the Bible. By the wiles of Satan all men were involved in revolt and ruin apparently inevitable. In the earliest ages, a deliverer was promised who should bruise the serpent's head. Types and symbols foretold his advent. When he came in the nature of man the Devil attempted to seduce and ruin him. At the same time evil angels showed peculiar malignity towards men by possessing their bodies, yet they knew Christ, and trembled before him and besought him "not to torment them before the time," nor to "confine them in the abyss." At one time Christ in the midst of his sorrows rejoiced in spirit, and assigned as a reason, that "he saw Satan fall as lightning from heaven"—a figurative mode of indicating that he foresaw his own speedy triumph over the adversary ; and again in an hour of distress he thus breaks forth : "Now is my soul troubled, and what shall I say ? Father save me from this hour, but for this cause came I unto this hour. Father glorify thy name : " and being comforted by a voice from heaven assuring him that thus it should be, he adds in holy exultation : "Now is the judgment of this world, now shall the Prince of this world be cast out." And as the final scene drew near he had a sensation of the presence of the Adversary, for he told his disciples, "Behold the prince of this world cometh," yet he adds with holy assurance, "he hath nothing in me," that is, he shall gain no victory in the conflict ; and when he was forsaken of his disciples and about to be conducted to death, these were his emphatic words to his enemies, "this is your hour, and the power of dark-

ness." The conflict who can describe? He trod the battle-field alone, and of the people none was with him.

Nor were the holy angels unconcerned—though he did not ask and receive as he might "more than twelve legions of angels," yet in his solitary and bloody agony one appeared to give him strength, and on the final joyful day of victory they hailed their ascending Lord, and comforted his mourning disciples. Nor did his disciples escape their malignant power: Peter fell before the Adversary, nor had he forgotten his fall when in his epistle he endeavors as directed to strengthen the brethren, in these emphatic words: "Be sober, be vigilant, for your adversary, the devil, like a roaring lion walketh about seeking whom he may devour." Paul also says: We contend not merely with flesh and blood, but with principalities, and powers, and with spiritual wickedness in high places; and warns us to take the whole armor of God that we may be prepared to stand against the wiles of the devil. Satan is also called "the god of this world;" he is said "to blind and to deceive all of those that believe not." Moreover the special message of the apostles was to turn men from the power of Satan unto God. If this conflict is so extensive and so interesting, we shall see little ground to be surprised at the joy which holy angels feel when one sinner repents, nor that they should rejoice to be sent forth as ministering spirits to minister to those who shall be the heirs of salvation, nor shall we fail to understand the Saviour when he says of the most insignificant of his disciples, that they have guardian angels in heaven who always behold the face of his Father.

Many, we know, treat with contempt, these ideas of a mighty conflict. But could their eyes be opened as the prophet of God of old, opened the eyes of his fearful servant, that he might behold the chariots and horsemen of fire that surrounded them, who can conceive of their amazement? They would perceive that crowns and empires are trifles, in comparison with that moral conflict which is raging in the empire of God. He would perceive the marshalled ranks of opposing minds; and the rolling of a mighty flood of destiny, in the midst of which kings and empires are but as a drop of the ocean. Alas for the dreams of this world, they do not pass the limits of their senses. They hear not the sound of the trumpet, nor the clashing arms of encountering hosts, and fondly imagine that there is no conflict. They have no eye of faith to behold the movements of the eternal Spirit, nor the combination of rebel hosts in his moral empire, nor of angels of light who are ministers to the heirs of salvation, nor the glory of the incarnate Mediator, who came to destroy the works of the Devil, and who moves on from conquering to conquer.

2. Christ became incarnate in order that he might remove the legal obstacle that prevented our pardon. Man by sin was ex-

posed to the penalty of the law : Gal. 3 : 10-13. This penalty was executed upon the fallen angels without mercy, and doubtless they expected that the same would be the fate of man. Hence, the Bible represents our adversary as "accusing the brethren before God day and night," in order to secure their punishment. But in the words of inspiration, "they overcome him by the blood of the Lamb." That is, the atoning death of Christ delivers them from the penalty of the law. Paul, also, in view of the atoning death and intercession of Christ, asks, Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect ? It is God that justifieth ; who is he that condemneth ? Here the ideas and language are legal, and relate to penalty and justification alone.

The object of the penalty is merely to sustain the authority of the law, and to show how much God values it, and how much he hates sin. It does not indicate a love of misery ; he does not wish the penalty for its own sake, but merely because it sustains a law without which he sees that all his creatures must be miserable : of course, when any are punished they become an example of the evil of sin, and deter others from sinning : that is, the penalty exerts a moral influence which sustains the authority of the law of God—See 2 Peter 2 : 4-9. Now as God does not desire the penalty for its own sake, but merely for its effects, he can omit it, if anything can be found to take its place. This the death of Christ is asserted to do. It establishes the law, secures its authority, and thus preserves the interests of the whole intelligent universe, while God pardons the sinner. Thus Christ "redeems his children from the curse of the law, by being made a curse for them ;" and he is said to be "set forth by God as an expiatory sacrifice, so that God can now be just and yet justify him who believeth in Jesus." The operation of the death of Christ in producing this effect is not arbitrary but natural, as might easily be shown, did space permit. In accordance with these views it is often asserted, that Christ became incarnate in order that he might suffer as an atoning sacrifice, and with peculiar energy in the following remarkable passage : "Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he likewise took part of the same ; that *through death* he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the Devil, and deliver them who through fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to bondage. And again it is said, that "in all things it became him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might (be a merciful and faithful high Priest, in things pertaining to God, to) make reconciliation for the sins of the people." Now if we remember that his death makes atonement for sin, destroys the designs of the Devil, and delivers Christians from the fear of death, we shall be able to understand another glowing passage of Paul : "O Death where is thy sting ? O grave where is thy victory ? The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law ; but thanks be to God which

giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ," the victory over sin, and over the foe of God and of man.

Under this head is included all which really belongs to the atonement, as such. It sustains the law of God, and renders pardon consistent with the interests of the universal government of God.

3. The Saviour became incarnate in order to increase the power of motives to reform the human character. To render pardon possible, on condition of repentance, is the proper effect of the atonement—but this is not reforming man. To induce man to repent is still another important end to be gained. Now it is certain, according to the laws of the human mind, that a system of mere law and punishment has no tendency to reform a being who is entirely depraved. In the first place, it makes no provision for pardon, for the condition of law is in the words of God, "He that doeth these things shall live by them, but cursed is every one who continueth not in all things written in the book of the law, to do them;" of course a system of mere law and penalty excludes hope in the case of transgressors, and threatens vengeance. Now this, although it might keep a holy mind from sin, would never bring a sinner to repentance. It would provoke, terrify, irritate, and enrage. A sinner who is entirely selfish, and in despair, will not repent, when he knows that it will be useless; he will rage and curse the law and his God. Accordingly, Paul, in the 7th of Romans, asserts that the effect of the law upon the native heart of man is "to produce sinful emotions, which bring forth fruit unto death," and that it "excites all manner of concupiscence;" that is, of evil emotions; and that although holy, just, and good, its only tendency is to work death in the sinner. He says also that the law being weak through the flesh, could not do what God has done by the gospel, that is, reform the sinner.

Nor has the character of God, as manifested under a system of mere law, any tendency to reform a sinner, for the holiness and justice of God are fearful attributes to a rebel; his power terrifies him, and the divine truth and immutability seal his doom. Mercy is an attribute unknown under a system of law.

But by the incarnation and atoning death of Christ, a new view of the Divine character is presented. God can pardon, and of course the door of hope is opened, and it is not in vain to repent. And then a view of the Divine love and compassion is exhibited, so tender, so moving, that it tends to melt the hardest heart. "God so loved the world that he sent his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life; for God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved. This is love; not that we loved God, but that he loved us. Scarcely for a righteous man would one die, yet peradventure for

a benefactor one would even dare to die; but God commendeth his love towards us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us."

Hardened and sinful as man is, such appeals as these do melt and move his heart. No doctrines reform men like evangelical doctrines, and here is their great power. The law may convince men of sin, and fill them with terror, but it is the love, the unspeakable love of Christ, that dissolves the heart in godly sorrow for sin, and bitter repentance for past ingratitude. Facts in all ages correspond with this view. Among savages, or civilized men, in the cold regions of the north, and in burning deserts, this is the master-key which unlocks the human heart. We know that even this doctrine is in vain without the influences of the Holy Spirit, but he always acts in accordance with the laws of the human mind, and blesses most those means which are best adapted in their own nature to affect the heart of man. Of course since he always blesses this doctrine, it follows that in itself it has an inherent reforming power. And in our daily intercourse with mankind, we all acknowledge the principle of the human mind on which this power depends. We all know that it is easier to reform men by hope, encouragement, and kindness, than by threats or terror; one attracts and soothes, the other arouses all the pride and opposition of the heart. So wisely has God adapted his means to the nature of man. And not without cause did Paul determine to preach nothing but Jesus Christ, and him crucified, and to glory in nothing but in the cross of Christ. And justly does he call this doctrine the power of God, and the wisdom of God unto salvation.

4. The Son of God became incarnate in order that he might be able to sympathize with his people in all their innocent infirmities: so that he might comfort and console them; and in their access to God inspire them with courage and hope. Accordingly, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, we read, that since he hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succour them that are tempted. And we are exhorted "to come boldly to the throne of Grace, because we have not an High Priest who cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but was in all points tempted like as we are yet without sin." What Christian has not felt the sustaining and consoling power of these precious words? He who is at the head of the universe, partakes our nature, sympathizes with us, and is not ashamed to call us brethren. We remember his compassion when on earth, and rejoice that he is still the same. Who in an hour of deep distress, when earthly hopes have been blasted, and the deepest recesses of the heart have been filled with unutterable sorrow, when the ties of love and nature have been rudely broken, would not rejoice to pour out his whole soul before him who can sympathize with the feeling of

our infirmities ; who has borne our griefs and known our sorrows ? None but he can really understand our feelings exactly as they are, and comfort us so kindly and gently as to bind up the broken heart and wipe away tears from every eye. Those who have never entered into scenes like these, may not know how precious are the Divine consolations of our great High Priest : but this world is a vale of tears, and all will know before the close of life their need of such a comforter ; their happiness if he is theirs, and their misery if they exclude him from their breast.

5. The Son of God became incarnate in order that he might affect not only the mind of man, but of the intelligent universe, by example. Of his character, as an example, it is not uncommon to take a superficial view, limiting its sphere of influence chiefly to this world, and to man. But for such a limitation, neither reason nor revelation furnishes a justification. The whole intelligent universe stood in need of such an example as none but Christ could set. There seems to be in created minds a tendency towards elation and pride. From this quarter there are intimations in the Word of God that the ruin of Satan sprang. Exalted as he was, he said I will ascend up, I will be like the Most High. Thus the spirit of self-exaltation was his fall. Throughout his kingdom this is the ruling spirit still. An example was needed, powerful enough to infuse into the universe a conception of the essential humility of temper that exists in God, of God necessarily exalted, though he is, by his own inherent greatness, above all blessing and praise, and that the more any one aspires, like Satan, to ascend on high, the less like God will he become. In the incarnation of Christ, was there for the first time a manifestation to all worlds of the real and inward humility of God. Satan had conceived of him as reigning in pride, when lo ! He who created and upheld all worlds, He whom angels worshipped, made himself of no reputation, assumed the form of a servant, and humbled himself unto the death of the cross. The power of this example and its value to the universe are infinite. All created minds have felt, and will feel it to all ages. It was a blow against pride and its father, such as had never been struck before. All who admire and adore this act of Christ, must abhor Satan and his spirit, evermore. It may well be regarded as the great turning point on this subject, in the universe of God. Hence, Christ as his own extreme point of humiliation, drew near, exulted, because he saw "Satan falling as lightning from heaven." The flame of holy hatred of pride would from this point become more intense, till he should be consumed in it for ever.

An example, too, was needed in this world of men-fearers and time-servers, of one who could live entirely above his age, and out of sympathy with it, and encountering obloquy, sufferings and death, for the sake of those great ends which God and future

generations alone could appreciate. Such was Christ. He stood alone, his point of vision was the throne of God, his area of vision eternal ages. He spoke words to be read in the conflagration of worlds, and to be studied through the boundless tract of eternity. All the revolutions of time were but the filling up of parts of his boundless, all-comprehending plan, the founding of a kingdom that cannot end.

The world, too, needed the conception of a perfect human character. No one can tell how infinite is the value of such a conception, incorporated into the thinking of this world. This priceless boon Christ conferred on our race. But such were the circumstances, that he exhibited in the most striking light, those peculiar trials of character most needed in a world of sorrow and of sin; — entire faith in God, submission, and meekness. Men in a state of probation, exposed to pain, sorrow, and injustice are much more in need of the unostentatious and passive virtues of Christ than of the more splendid qualities which excite the admiration of mankind; and such is the view of the example of Christ insisted on by Peter 2: 20. "Christ suffered for us, leaving us an example that ye should follow his steps. Who, when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered he threatened not: but committed himself to him that judgeth righteously." How wonderful the wisdom and love that carried the power of such an example through the innumerable subjects of oppression and outrage with which in all ages this world has been filled. Yet our Saviour has also left us a practical demonstration that all these milder graces of the Christian spirit are not inconsistent with the utmost energy and decision of character, and with the most entire devotedness to the active duties of the Christian life, see Heb. 12: 1-5. We have in him what we find in no other character, all the kind, gentle, benevolent, and conciliating traits of perfect loveliness and unspotted holiness, united with power of intellect, unyielding strength of purpose, decision of character and constant energy of action.

Of his teaching we need say but little, for we have it in our hands day by day. Suffice it to say that he spake as never man spake, as one who searched the heart, and could not be deceived, and who needed no recommendation of his precepts but the native power and majesty of Divine truth. Yet although the influence of Christ as an example and teacher is great, we must consider it rather as an incidental result than as the main object of the Incarnation. Many, we know, limit their views of the character of Christ entirely to his example and his doctrines. But Christ is not the only inspired teacher whom God has sent into the world, nor is the mere example of Christ an adequate cause for a proceeding so wonderful as the Incarnation; and those systems which attempt to explain the attributes and offices

of Christ merely with reference to his example and instruction, render the language of the Bible in the highest degree frigid and unmeaning. We therefore repeat it, the example and teaching of Christ though of inestimable value, are but incidental results of a proceeding intended to obtain other and more important ends.

6. Christ became incarnate in order to bring down the Divine character to man, in a manner more adapted to our modes of conception, and more calculated to interest and effect the mind. Men are beings of sense, and are more powerfully affected by what is presented to the senses than by abstract conceptions. And even when we attempt to conceive of spirits, we are of necessity obliged to think of some form or shape, more or less definite. We are affected to a certain degree when we hear God described as a pure and invisible Spirit, but how much more are we affected when we conceive of a pure and holy human form, in which we know that God dwells. So that his words are the words of God, his actions the actions of God, and so that he exercises all the attributes of God. This brings the Divine nature as near to us as possible, and yet so softens and tempers his ineffable glories, that we may gaze without terror, and love and adore. This view of the Incarnation is clearly exhibited in the New Testament. "No man hath seen God at any time, the only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father he hath revealed him :—" "the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and we behold his glory." He is called "the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person." He is also called "the image of the invisible God." This language does not, as is sometimes asserted, imply the inferiority of the Son to the Father, but merely implies that Christ by his incarnation conveyed to beings of sense, the most accurate idea possible of the spiritual and invisible God. In all previous ages God, in accomodation to human weakness, always assumed a visible form ; but in the incarnation he did it permanently. Nor have we any evidence that, even in heaven we shall have any sensible perception of any local residence of the Divine being, except in Christ our incarnate Lord. There may indeed be modes of spiritual conception unrevealed and inconceivable in our present state ; and of course we ought not to speak confidently on a point which is yet unrevealed.

7. Christ became incarnate in order to act as Mediator between God and man. The office of a mediator is to interpose and reconcile two parties who are at variance. In order to do this he must be able to understand the views, feelings, and interests of both parties. But who can understand the views, feelings, and interests of God except the Divine Mind? Can any finite being claim this knowledge? Of course the mediator must be one of the Divine persons of the Godhead. But how shall he fully enter

into the views, feelings, and wants of man? He has assumed this nature, so that he is now entirely qualified to act as Mediator between God and man. In accordance with these views, we find him stating that all power is given him in heaven and on earth, which implies that as Mediator he controls the universe. And again it is asserted that "no man can come unto the Father except by him."—See also, Eph. 2 : 18 ; Heb. 10 : 19–22 ; Rom. 8 : 34, &c. God has thus put into his hands all the interests of the Divine government ; and if any one wishes to be pardoned and restored to the privileges of the sons of God, let him approach the Mediator and commit his cause into his hands—He will render the pardon and safety of the sinner consistent with the interests of the empire of God. In all this, there is a peculiar fitness. God cannot, as a lawgiver, treat with a sinner. It is only possible by a mediator, whose death has rendered pardon and the suspension of the regular course of justice, consistent with the interests of the universe. Of course none can be saved who are not saved during the existence of the Mediatorial government ; and when it shall come to a close, the door of hope will be forever shut. This, as we are informed, will be at the close of the present system of things. When the whole human species have lived on the earth, and enjoyed a period of probation, and when all the designs of the foes of God have been defeated, "then cometh the end." Then will the Mediator lay aside that peculiar authority which he assumed for a particular purpose ; and law and justice will follow their regular course. God will be all and in all, and the mandates of authority will proceed directly from his throne. Those who object to the idea of a Divine Mediator, as implying that God mediates between himself and men, would do well to remember that their objection rests on the gratuitous assumption, that there are no persons in the Deity ; for if we admit that there are persons, who can object, if to one of them should be assigned the office of consulting for the honor of the Godhead, in receiving and pardoning rebel men? And to whom could this be more appropriately assigned than to him who took upon him their nature? Nor does such an assignment, or delegation of power imply inferiority on the part of him who receives it. It is an official delegation, and does not interfere with the original qualities of the Mediator. Besides, all power in heaven and on earth cannot be delegated to a finite mind. Can infinite power be delegated to a finite being? We might as well speak of delegating infinite extension to finite space.

Christ became incarnate in order that he might act as judge.

that "the Father judgeth no man but hath committed all unto the Son;" and again it is said that "God hath given authority to execute judgment also, because he is the son that is because he partakes of the human nature. And

again we read, that "We must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ;" and again "that God hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness, by or through that man whom he hath ordained;" that is, the human nature in the person of Christ, will be exalted to the judgment-seat.

In all this, there is a peculiar fitness; for the parties to be judged are men, and fallen angels, for we read of the fallen angels that they "are delivered into chains of darkness and reserved unto the judgment;" and again that they "are reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness unto the judgment of the great day." Then will the long-continued conflict be brought to a close, and the accuser of the brethren be silenced, for he that sitteth upon the throne hath redeemed them by his own most precious blood, he partakes of their nature and is not ashamed to call them brethren. In the presence of an assembled universe he pardons them for his own mercy's sake, declares that they have overcome, and exalts them to his throne, even as he overcame and is exalted to his father's throne. Their adversaries are then condemned by Christ and by his people, humbled and cast down to shame and everlasting contempt, and with them depart those who have refused to return to God, but have leagued themselves with his enemies and their own. They depart to everlasting fire, prepared for the Devil and his angels. At this time will the host of heaven celebrate the victory of the incarnate Messiah. Now is come salvation and strength and the kingdom of our God and the power of his Christ, for the accuser of our brethren is cast down which accused them before our God day and night. And they overcame him by the blood of the Lamb and the ransomed of the Lord will respond, "Unto him that loved us and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God and his Father; to him be glory and dominion forever and ever. Amen. The delegation of the work of judgment to Christ does not imply inferiority, for none but God is qualified to act as judge, but merely as in the preceding cases, that he is peculiarly qualified for the work by reason of his incarnation, and as he from the beginning has been the immediate governor and Saviour of the human race, as he has engaged voluntarily to defeat their malignant foes, it is fit that he should see of the fruit of the travail of his soul, and that he should exhibit before the universe the glorious results of his incarnation, sufferings and death, in that very nature which the enemies of God attempted to destroy.

9. Christ became incarnate in order to exert by the work of redemption, a moral influence which shall promote holiness and establish the law of God throughout the universe. The results of the incarnation of Christ are infinitely important if we regard merely the interests of the human race. But neither reason nor revelation would lead us to conclude that they are limited to them

We have before remarked that the conflict which exists in the universe is not one of physical power, for in this respect God is unlimited: he can instantaneously annihilate all which he has ever created. But when God is engaged in a moral conflict it is not thus. If God has created a universe of free agents, and chooses to keep them in existence, and not to reduce them to mere machines; the nature of the case requires that he govern them as free agents, that is by motives. And in this respect God has limited himself to the use of motives, so that, if he does not present motives strong enough to induce his creatures to love him, and keep his law voluntarily, he of necessity, loses his power to rule them.

It is as absurd to suppose him to keep the moral universe in order by physical force as it would be to suppose him to control the planets in their orbits by motives and persuasion. Here then God is called on to display his manifold wisdom in producing and exhibiting such varied moral developments as shall produce the greatest possible degree of holiness among all the inhabitants of his vast dominions, and this we have no doubt he will do; nor can we doubt that the work of redemption, as connected with the incarnation of Christ, is intended as such a display of the character of God, of the evil of sin, and of the excellence of holiness, as shall forever establish the holy part of the universe, so that God will gain the great battle as it regards moral influence throughout all his vast dominions. Any other victory than this would be comparatively insignificant and unworthy of God. For he who has physical power to create, can easily conquer all physical resistance. But to preserve the laws of mind in free agents and then to make such displays of wisdom and goodness as shall unite their hearts forever to God, is a work worthy of the infinite Jehovah, and which corresponds with the glowing language of the Bible with regard to his government. And this view of the subject does not rest on mere conjecture; we are expressly informed that "God created all things, to the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God." We are also informed that Christians are made "to sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus, that in the ages to come he might show the exceeding riches of his grace in his kindness towards them through Christ Jesus." We are also told that the object of God from all eternity was, "that in the dispensation of the fullness of times, (that is a dispensation to be introduced when the appropriate time had fully arrived) he might gather together in one, all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are in earth;" that is, God intended to unite and establish the holy universe through the incarnate Mediator. And a passage in the first chapter of Colossians is remarkably ample and particular on this point. God, says the inspired apostle,

"hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of his dear Son; in whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins, who is the image of the invisible God and the Lord of all the creation. For by him were all things created, that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or power, all things were created by him, and for him, and he is before all things, and by him all things consist; and he is the head of the body, the church; he is the beginning, the first-born from the dead, that in all things he might have the pre-eminence. For it pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell, and having made peace by the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself: by him I say, whether they be things in earth or things in heaven." In this passage almost every topic of this discussion is presented to our view, especially the sublime truth that God intends not only to reconcile the redeemed from the sinful race of man to the holy universe and to himself, but also to unite them all in one universal kingdom through Christ and to establish them in holiness forever through him.

President Edwards, in his history of the Work of Redemption thus presents his understanding of these passages of the Word of God. "Another great design of God in the work of redemption, was to gather together in one all things in Christ, in heaven and in earth, i. e. all elect creatures; to bring all elect creatures, in heaven and in earth, to an union one to another in one body, under one head, and to unite all together, in one body to God the Father. This was begun soon after the fall, and is carried on through all ages, and shall be finished at the end of the world." He expresses his views of the influence of the humiliation of God in Christ on all orders of beings in these words: "Christ's humiliation in many ways, laid a foundation for the humiliation of all elect creatures. By seeing one infinitely above them descending so low, and abasing himself so much, they are abundantly made sensible that no abasement is too great for them. Lucifer thought what God required of him too great an abasement for so high and worthy a creature as he; but in Christ Jesus they see one infinitely higher than he, descending vastly lower than was required of him. It tends to humble the angels, and to set them forever at an immense distance from any thought that anything that God can require of them can be too great an abasement for them; and then it tended to humble them that this person that appeared in such meanness, and in so despicable a state, is appointed to be their Lord and their God, and that they were required humbly to minister to him in his greatest abasement." Similar illustrations and confirmations of the views advanced by us could be derived in abundance from the writings of our most eminent and spirit-

ual divines. But it is needless. We do not rest on authority, but upon the clear testimony of the Word of God.

In view of this comprehensive outline of the ends, relations, and influences of the Incarnation, one inference is obvious. The great peculiarity of the Scriptural view of this subject is, that the Incarnation was designed to meet a great temporary crisis in the universal kingdom of God, and to put the whole universe of intelligent minds into a different state from what they were in before. It matters not by what name the opposers of this view are pleased to call it, whether "theological rubbish" or any other term of contempt. Still, in our humble judgment, it is the only view presented in the Word of God, and it is the only view that is worthy of him. To suppose that the course of moral development in this world, is an illustration of the natural development, education, and government of minds in all ages and worlds, is as absurd as to suppose that the life of diseased patients in a hospital is a fair illustration of life in all circumstances and all worlds; or that the conflict of a battle-field is a fair illustration of all conditions of the social system in all worlds.

It may seem to some a light matter when a Christian teacher denies that there are angels who never fell—and casts the existing doctrine of fallen angels into the heaps of theological rubbish, and teaches the doctrine that no beings can arrive at stable virtue except through a course of experimental sinning. It is only his theory of the origin of evil, it may be said. Let him enjoy his own philosophy. We are not disposed to deny him this privilege. But we are disposed to say, and we do say, that such a mode of philosophizing is no light matter. It of necessity subverts from its deepest foundations the whole system of the Word of God. There is, according to it, no universal conflict and victory of God in this world, affecting the destiny of all worlds and changing the state of the universe forever. It is merely a course of educational development on principles common to all minds, in all ages, and in all worlds. We do not wonder that one who speculates on such principles should be unable to understand one of the sublimest passages of the Word of God: "Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and authority and power. For he must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all." Who can ever understand this passage who casts into "immense masses of theological rubbish," the current doctrines of the Christian community, "about angels that have never sinned, and angels that have, and about other worlds, and the reach of Christ's atonement there," and in place of the sublime view of the Word of God in-

introduces a theory of the necessity of sinning to a finished education which degrades in its fundamental conception the very idea of free agency itself, and tends to cut up by the roots all deep and genuine abhorrence of sin as utterly needless, and in the highest degree criminal and inexcusable. A similar degradation of our ideas of free agency is effected by the fundamental theory of Swedenborg, that the law of life, development, and death in this world is that of all worlds, and is so far as we know to be eternal. The universe of worlds exists in the form of a grand man, and from all these school-house worlds spirits are entering the interior spiritual world, as they drop the natural bodies in which development began. But according to the Bible, the system of this world is an exception to all that precedes it, and all that follows it. It is the great, singular, anomalous dispensation of the universe. Time was when sin did not exist. Time will be when its power will be subdued. All between is one great moral conflict, and thrice blessed is he who in this conflict shall overcome. The human race is a peculiar race. Of their own kind they had no predecessors, they have no contemporaries in other worlds, they will have no successors, the confident assertions of Swedenborg to the contrary notwithstanding. The whole system implies to the contrary. The great end of God now, is not education and development according to fixed and eternal laws, but war and conquest. The incarnate God is not chiefly an educator but a warrior. There is a God, a king and a kingdom to be destroyed—and he is the great destroyer. For this end he reigns and wields universal power. For this end angels and principalities and powers are subjected unto him. And he will reign till all enemies are put beneath his feet: **THEN COMETH THE END.** Then a new and immutable system of the universe shall take the place of that which now is, and shall endure forevermore.

Nor is there the slightest tendency in the progress of natural science to subvert these views. What though the Ptolemaic system has passed away? What though we know that the earth is not flat but round, and that it is not the centre of the system, and that the system of the universe does not revolve around it? Does it therefore cease to be true that the eternal and infinite Jehovah is the centre of the universe of minds? Does it follow that this world is so small that he cannot make in it a development of himself that shall penetrate throughout the boundless tracts of space and time, and illuminate all ages and worlds with his glory, and bind all orders of holy intelligences, created or to be created, to his throne by indissoluble ties of reverential love? What have intellectual and moral precedents and developments to do with the size of worlds? What though the diameter of our little planet is but seven thousand miles? Is it not large enough,

for all this, to be a theatre of the full revelations of his glory, whom not even the heavens, nor the heaven of heavens can contain?

If, then, amidst the splendid revelations of modern astronomy, it ever seems incredible that a world so small as this should be spoken of as for the time the moral centre of the universe, let it never be forgotten that he who in fact is that moral centre became incarnate there, and that till his final victory it is and will be the centre of that great conflict in which the highest interests of all created minds are involved. Let us cease to confound moral with local greatness, and to suppose that if God desires to display his glory, he must needs seek out the world of the greatest diameter and the most central position, if such there is, in the distant regions of illimitable space.

In conclusion, it is hardly necessary to say that the essence of Christianity lies here, and that those views of the character of Christ are entirely defective and erroneous which deny his divinity, incarnation and atonement, and their attending consequences. Of those who deny these doctrines, few are satisfied what the character and offices of Christ really are. He is to them an inscrutable mystery. To some he is a mere man, to others a super-angelic being, some venerate him as a teacher, others as an example, some assert that he died to sanction his testimony with his blood, others admit that there may be reasons for his death more important than this, but to us unknown. But to all these views there is one important objection; we mean the Bible. The divinity, incarnation and death of Christ, with their consequences, are the very essence of the Bible; and those who deny them are constantly employed in explaining not what the Bible means, but what it does not mean. That these doctrines are essential to the Bible is manifested by one fact—those who deny them are always tempted to become infidels. The solution of the fact is this, their hearts and feelings are entirely opposed to these doctrines; and if the Bible does teach them, who can wonder if they are tempted to deny its inspiration and reject its authority. This has been the fact in Germany, in England.

It was also distinctly foretold that such would be the consequences among us. This prophecy is now history. Even the resurrection of Christ has been denounced as an idle tale, by one who boasts that he is but carrying to their mature results the principles of those who began their career by a denial of the divinity and atoning sacrifice of Christ.

On the other hand, all tendencies to return to the pure faith of the Word of God in Europe, are marked by a renewed interest in the great doctrines of the divinity of Christ, his incarnation, and salvation through his atoning blood. Here is the rock of ages. All else is but shifting sand. Who then is wise? Let him shun the sand, and build on the rock

ARTICLE X.

CHAP. XIX. OF DR. THOLUCK'S "HOURS OF CHRISTIAN DEVOTION.

Translated for the Bib. Repository, by Rev. WM. HALL, New York.

The building vast, sublime, the weak child's eyes
To span it, all majestically defies.
Then let the child's *anticipating faith* embrace,
Till as it is, he *sees* it face to face.

2. Tim. 3: 16. *All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness.*

Ps. 92: 5, 6. *O Lord, how great are thy works! and thy thoughts are very deep; a brutish man knoweth not, neither doth a fool understand this.*

Ps. 25: 14. *The secret of the Lord is with (for them) that fear him.*

1. Cor. 13: 12. *We see now through a glass darkly, (in a dark word. Luther's trans.)*

"I regard it as a sign, that one has already become almost a master in the art of prayer, who has come so far as to prefer the Lord's prayer before all other prayers, and has become inwardly convinced, that scarcely any other prayer can be thought of, wherein a Christian heart, is able to include so perfectly everything which it has to plead before the eternal God. What now holds of this little portion of the Word of God, holds as true, also, of the whole Word of God, viz.: that a Christian man has already become rich in grace, so soon as he has reached the point of being better edified by the books of Holy Scripture than by any other Scripture. How powerfully the Holy Spirit must rule in the Bible, we can recognize in the fact that it seems, humanly speaking, so small by the side of many other books, and has also, as history teaches, been put together in its present form quite incidentally, and yet accomplishes such astonishingly great things in a human heart. Verily, in this book the Lord Jesus, too, is wrapped in poor and insignificant swathing-bands, as in the crib of Bethlehem, but still the wise men of the West, and of the East have been obliged to come and kneel down before this crib, and offer their gifts. When we at first approach the book, how strange all there from the beginning to the end, seems to one, and yet in the end a soul can make itself such a home therein, that it shall feel better off there than in all other books in the world. *It is only the dark places in our hearts that cause us to find so many dark places in the Bible.* But let Christ grow and become greater in the human heart, and he will at the same time become ever greater and more

glorious in His Word. Still you can meet with no experienced Christian, who would not testify, that he has found in the Bible a fountain which no one can exhaust, as Dr. Luther has so pleasantly said: 'I have now for some years read the Bible through twice a year, and were it a great and mighty tree, all its words being twigs and branches, then it were true that I have knocked on all its little twigs and shoots, and longed to know what was on them, and what virtue they had, and still, during the whole time have knocked down only a few little apples or pears.'

Therefore, dear brother, will thou have a blessing from the reading of Holy Scripture, let it not stumble thee, if even by the very side of what is clear, there is always much still which remains hidden to thee; only consider, that though the Heavenly Father certainly thought of thee too when he caused the Bible to be written for all the millions who dwell upon the earth, in order that those therein shouldst find thy light and thy dish, thy little herb and thy little vine, He had in the meantime equally in mind all his other children. From this it must follow then, as thou canst easily conclude, that an incomputable amount which will be clear for *them*, will be dark for *thee*, and that one acre of the Divine Word is designed to bear fruit specially in one, another in a different time. Here e. g. the Word of God has passages, which were written particularly for *learned* men, who are seeking their solution, in others Divine Wisdom has been thoughtful for *Kings*, again there are others in which special care has been taken for *little children*. In some passages seeds have been sown, from which high and deep *thoughts* were designed to grow up to shine as stars before human knowledge, from others *exalted and excellent deeds*, from others again noble *arts* were to spring forth. Some of the beautiful flowers have given a strong fragrance only in the *East*, others in the *West*; with some the *middle ages* were refreshed, others are best suited to *us*. O what a skillful and what a rich Lord must He be, who has been able to cover so beautiful a table for so many, and such very different guests! Be it now, that some dishes don't fit my palate, it certainly were not quite decorous towards the master or respectful towards the various guests by my side, to grumble. Suppose I let what does *not* agree with my palate, pass by—the table is still richly furnished. And who knows—the day has not come to an end yet! Perhaps my Lord has even for me in his rich Word still many an enjoyment in reserve, of which I have as yet no conception, as soon as the Scripture expresses it, "my senses shall be exercised!"

As in a certain place the Saviour says to his disciples: "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit—when the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth," so the Saviour has likewise probably kept back much

¹ Heb. 5: 14.

² John 16: 12, 13.

from me in his holy Word, which I cannot bear now, and which therefore will not suit my taste. Then patience, humility!—And besides, the best seasoning must still be added by *that* cook, who after all, has the most to do with all good relishing—*hunger*. That hunger is a good *cook*, has been set down to his credit for the longest possible time the world over, but what a good *teacher* he is also! He interprets to the poorest peasant the gospel of St. John, upon which many learned masters are still breaking their heads, so intelligibly, and offers such delightful explanations to him, that his heart beats for joy over it. Such is the teacher, whom the Saviour himself so beautifully commended, when he says: “*Blessed are ye who hunger!*”¹ It is not my opinion on this account that we should deprive of their creed and homes those learned gentlemen, who interpret the Scripture form in the church of the Lord. Oh no, I am rather of the opinion, that many pious Christians are not quite sensible enough how much the good God has given to the church in the beautiful expositions of the Bible by learned men, and are not justifiable, in being willing to go down into the shaft of the Divine Word with but just the little miner’s taper which the Holy Spirit has kindled for *them*. That is not right. The Holy Ghost, who has kindled the light for the understanding of the Divine Word, belongs not merely to one *individual member* of the communion of the Lord, not merely to thee or to me, but to the whole body; therefore no one should lightly esteem the gifts, which the Holy Ghost has imparted in all times to learned men and servants of the church, since indeed it stands written, that “the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man *for the common profit*.” so that, therefore, a humble spirit ought rather to praise God, if through the guidance of Divinely-blessed writings of pious Scripture expositors in all ages it is granted to him, to be able to enter upon his journey into the glorious land as it were in the company of so many godly and experienced path-showers, that is to say, the glorious land of holy Scripture. Does not in this way become mine, what of light the Spirit of the Lord has in all ages of his church, sent for the understanding of the Word of God?

From the fact that it is the Holy Ghost alone who can teach us to understand the holy Scripture, I have also deduced another doctrine still for myself, viz., that in reading the Word of God the right interpretation can by no means be reached by *picking at the letter*. In time past I have but too often—and even with a true and earnest conscience—tormented myself to comprehend very literally this and that verbalism, however hard it might sound, and was obliged still to grant that many other passages of holy Scripture and especially its general spirit were against my sense, and that

¹ Luke 6: 21.

² 1 Cor. 12: 7, Luther’s Translation.

made much trouble and anxiety for me. I knew very well for instance, that many laid stress upon the spirit only in order to put their own spirit into God's Word, and where perhaps the doctrines and commands were too strong for them, flew over it with the *spirit* and wished out of it, as much as did not answer their turn. For as Dr. Luther says: "Human reason flits and flutters about the letter of the Divine Word, until it has got it to rights for itself," that is, in other words, until it has regulated the sundial by the clock in its chamber. But is it now *the Spirit of God*, who alone teaches to understand the Word of God, then working on the letter can certainly not open the door of the understanding, on the contrary so far as one would protect himself from the haughty illusions of human reason, nothing will do except to learn rightly to distinguish the human spirit and the Divine spirit. Hence I believe, that, just as what a human author has meant in a single passage of a book, is perceptible only from his meaning in the whole book, and as the importance of a single member can be known by us only so far as we endeavor to understand it correctly from the structure of the whole body, so also, what the Holy Scripture means in any one passage, only then rightly occurs to a pious reader, when he holds up and accomodates the individual part to the whole, as Luther has said of his own translations, that "the good understanding was more in his estimation than the disputatious letter." It is true that timid spirits are often alarmed at such spiritual freedom with the Word of God, as if, when we do not keep rigorously to the letter, God's Word would be *trifled with* and *perverted*; now we must on no account pervert God's Word; as the Emperor Conrad once said of the imperial word: "An Emperor's word will not do to be perverted and trifled with." But on the other hand the chief of apostles has also told us that "the letter killeth and only the spirit maketh alive." Although ye, who squeeze and press the letter, do it with good intention, do but be reminded by history, which may truly be named a genuine mother's breast how often when Scripture has been too much pressed, *blood* instead of milk has flowed forth! Heaven forgive us. What abominable fanaticism, and how much cruel bloodshed have come out not only of that word of the Apostle—when for instance the flesh has interpreted it: "Stand fast therefore in the *liberty* wherewith Christ hath made us free," or from the Lord's own language: "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you *free*!" As to which so many have entirely forgotten, what stands in another place: "Only use not liberty for an occasion to the flesh," and: "As free, and not using your liberty as a cloak of maliciousness, but as the servants of God;" and again: "All things are lawful unto me but all things are not *expedient*," The apostle writes, "Ye children be obedient to parents in *all*

¹ Gal. 5: 1. ² John. 8: 32 ³ Gal. 5: 13. ⁴ 1 Peter 2: 16. ⁵ 1 Cor.: 6, 12.

things" may not then the flesh pervert from the letter, as if children must be obedient to their parents even in everything *base* and ungodly? Has our Lord said: "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, neither thy kinsman, nor thy rich neighbors, but when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind, and thou shalt be blessed,"² may not the flesh which seizes the letter with a rough hand, so press this, as if one should never invite his relations to his table? So the Lord has likewise said: "Sell what ye have and give alms," and here too the flesh may press the Word, as if a Christian ought to have nothing at all of his own—while still so many other passages of Scripture contradict all such childish misconstructions of the flesh! Thus then thou seest, that nothing helps here, except as thou humbly seekest well to understand the spirit of the Lord from the entire holy Scripture, in order that it may become clear to thee, what is meant in this or that place.

To the unenlightened eye, the New Testament may seem, it is true, an unsightly edifice, wherein the architect has committed many an error: as if he might have placed the gable somewhat straiter, added a story or two in grander style, also set here a window, there the door still differently. But in the end it is with this building of the Word of God precisely as with the building of the whole world; we are obliged to give God the honor, and to say: "Thou hast ordered *all* according to measure and number and weight." As the *history of the Lord* is the foundation-stone of our faith, this, therefore, has the first place in the writings of the New Testament, in order that every one may first with it lay the foundation-stone of his faith. Then after the seeking soul has in the four Evangelists become acquainted with the *Head*, it is informed by the history of the apostle, how at first the *body with its members* was added to its head, in the next place learns from the letters of the holy apostles, what the *faith, love and hope* were, by which the body of the first community of believers was supported and whereon it was nourished, and finally with the Revelation of St. John, contemplates the *victory* of the Christian church through all times up to the end of the world. Again, how wise and gracious is this too, that one and the same truth of the gospel has come to us in such a manner, that the one beam of light has been obliged to be broken into different colors, in order that its riches might be rightly manifest and be as it were just so many *doors*, through which a man desirous of salvation can enter the palace of truth.

It is very true, as soon as human reason begins to subtilize, we imagine that we should have been able to impart to our Lord God better advice, in everything. Thus it occurs to one, first of all, whether it might not have been more beneficial and promotive of general good had it pleased God, instead of so repeating the one

¹ Col. 3: 20. ² Luke 14: 12, 13.

great theme in the Scripture, with so many variations as by this too much *contention* has been excited in the Christian church to present to us a single beautifully wrought system of faith, as it were a catechism of Christian doctrine framed by the holy apostles themselves. But how much had still been lost to the Christian church, had she, instead of these histories and epistles, which are, as it were, *portions cut out* from the very life of the first church-community, received a rule of faith and morals in every respect complete! As much power and fulness and variety of life had departed from her, in proportion as the new song had been always sung by one voice only, and in one tone, for the variety of voices, as they are heard in the New Testament, has certainly had its echo in all ages of the church from the beginning.¹

What here in narrow compass we behold :—
 A glorious contest of accordant notes,
 Now sweetly joined, now striving separate
 Which shall the God-man, most exalt and bless,
 Now deep and faint, like smothered thunder heard,
 And now like trumpets of the judgment-day,
 Now quick and cheerful like the festive flutes,
 And now majestic as a choral chaunt :—
 The noble music-tone unfolded here,
Has echoed through the world's wide history.
 The war-cry shouted by the soldier *Paul*,
 Hath not its echo called to thousand strifes ?
 Through thousand hearts, echoes of peaceful love
 Have sounded sweetly from the strings of *John* !
 How many an ardent flame hath sprung to life,
 Reflected from the fire of *Peter's* words,
 And others still—bring silent *offerings*,
 Humble disciples from the school of *James*.
One theme it is which ever soundeth on,
 Now, as at first, with varied harmonies.

It has been declared to us, that the great world-building was built by the heavenly wisdom "according to measure, number, and weight;" when, however, we try our hand at reckoning it over, we are always great bunglers. We make a beginning, and even as soon as we set out, expect high things; but it turns out afterwards with us as Luther says of the jurists: "A new jurist is in his first year a Justinian, and seems to himself above all Doctors; the next year he becomes a Doctor, the third a licentiate, the fourth a baccalaureate, and the fifth a little student again." In like manner it happens to one now, when one would re-calculate the divine wisdom's measure, number, and weight, in the beautiful structure, which has been placed before us in the Holy Scriptures, it always ends with one's saying, as the wise Socrates observed of

¹ The translator is indebted for this very accurate and elegant rendering of some original verses, here introduced, by Tholuck, to the pen of Miss Potts, daughter of Rev. Dr. Potts of this city, who has kindly furnished it for the present article.

the writings of a great philosopher: "*What I do understand of them, is so excellent that from this I also draw a conclusion as to what I do not yet understand.*" But this variety, which prevails in the dear divine garden of the Holy Scripture is still, so far as we have already attained to the comprehension of it, really something quite wonderful and glorious. Perhaps most souls begin with the Gospel of John. True, this is a more difficult lection than the other Gospels, but then, too, it is not exactly the *understanding* of it, that allures and draws souls, but rather it is at first merely as a lovely music, which in a beautiful summer evening sounds over a stream. Then there begins to be a gentle movement and swelling in the heart of the man, so that perhaps he may ask his own heart: Heart, what wilt thou? for he understands it not himself. Thus it may be in our time with most souls who come to the Saviour, that it is with them in this matter, as with the Samaritan woman, who also said to the Saviour: "Sir, give me this water that I thirst not," before she was as yet rightly aware of what the Saviour was speaking.

Light, Love, Life,—these are the tones, which float gently and softly over the stream and wave, and gently breathes around the unquiet heart. There is a breath of another world to be felt in them. So one sets himself down at the feet of Jesus, and comes soon to experience, that those were only sweet allurements, in order that the child might be drawn into the School. But now in the School we go on to *learn*; here the question is no more of *tones* but of *fruit*, and the more one's understanding opens to it, the more too will the first gospels be disclosed to one. Here we perceive, what we must *leave*, if we would *receive*; here we step under the New Testament Sinai, and get sight of the strict domestic discipline in the family of the children of God. This is in the next place also—set forth in body and life—shown to us by the Acts of the Apostles, a very noble and worthy book, which Christians ought to make much more profitable than they do. It is the great visible witness, that the Lord has fulfilled his promise, saying: "I will not leave you comfortless, I will come to you." There we see how the Lord, after he had put off his earthly body, assumed a yet greater body—the *body of the Church*; there we perceive, that although he is now in heaven at the right hand of God, he has nevertheless also remained among his own on earth. When we learn for the first time rightly to understand what that waving and moving in the heart meant in the beginning, under John's alluring love-tones, then are we educated for the preaching of the *righteousness of faith*, which Paul preaches. This, in my opinion, is the uppermost class in the school of Jesus. With Paul one comes next to study James too; for when the view has been given to one of the righteousness which comes from free

¹ John 4: 15.

² John 14: 18.

grace, it is then time also to learn to know the outward form of faith, and to prove in the work of *love* how powerful *faith* is. And with James goes hand in hand Peter, who shows us how "the chosen generation, the royal priesthood, the holy nation, the peculiar people, should show forth the praises of Him who has called them out of darkness into his marvellous light."¹

Then if the gift of *knowledge* has been particularly granted to one, he therefore probably goes on still knocking, and his understanding is opened by Paul to that superscription of the world's history: "From him and through him and to him are all things;"² and by John the mystery of the Godhead is unsealed to him: "In the beginning was the Word." But should we perchance belong to the chosen few whom the Lord holds worthy to have something special spoken in their ear, we may perhaps make trial of ourselves in the Revelation of St. John, whether it may have been given to us to read some lines in the book with seven seals, in the book of the world's history, whose seals he alone was found worthy to open, to whom the new song is sung: "Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof: for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood, out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation; and hast made us unto our God kings and priests: and we shall reign upon earth."³

O Heavenly Wisdom, in deep humility I supplicate thee; open my eyes, that I may recognize the wonders of thy law! So much has thy grace blessingly permitted me already to experience, that I can say with full conviction, "Where else should I go? Thou hast the words of eternal life." But thy Word has for me also many dark places still. I thirst for this, Lord, to see Thee wholly in thy light, my thirst is not the thirst of *doubt*, it is the thirst of *faith*; yea, I am most surely convinced, that thy darknesses are light; therefore wilt Thou also satisfy it. Only help me to read thy holy Word always aright, with an undistracted mind, and with a reverential and humble heart, as one ought to read a king's hand-writing. Make my heart, as often as I step before it, pure from all carnal and idle thoughts, that I may not behold *myself*, while thinking that I perceive *Thee*, and that thy divine thoughts may be truly mirrored therein. And since Thy light, holy God, is a light of life, therefore help me, that all light which beams into me from thy Word, may clarify me also, and make me transparent and may become a power of life for me.

¹ 1 Peter 2: 9.² Rom. 11: 36.³ Rev. 5: 9, 10.

ARTICLE XI.

LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES OF BOOKS.

BY THE EDITOR.

1. *General History of the Christian Religion and Church: from the German of Dr. AUGUSTUS NEANDER. By JOSEPH TORREY. Vol. III: comprising the Third and Fourth Volumes of the original. Third American edition. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. London: John Wiley. 1850.*

WE hail the appearance of another volume of this noble History, with no little pleasure. NEANDER, so far as completed, is incomparably the best ecclesiastical history ever written, and will unquestionably be regarded as the standard work on this subject for ages to come. We need not speak of the peculiar and transcendent merits of this History, as the two volumes before translated by Prof. Torrey, and published, have made it extensively known to English readers, both in this country and in Great Britain. No man can be said to be well read in church history, who has not read and studied this most learned and splendid work of the great German historian. It seems to combine the excellencies of all other histories, and to leave little more to be said or done in this department of sacred literature.

Prof. Torrey has also executed his truly formidable and difficult task in a most scholarly and able manner, quite to the satisfaction of all who are capable of forming an intelligent judgment in the matter.

The present volume comprises the third and fourth periods of the church, according to the plan of division adopted by the author, i. e. from the time of Gregory the Great to the death of Charlemagne; and from the death of Charlemagne to the time of Gregory VII., or from A.D. 590 to A.D. 1073. We hope the learned author will be spared to complete the master work, and that Prof. Torrey will be encouraged to introduce the remainder into the circle of English literature.

We rejoice that this volume, and the scarcely less valuable work of Gieseler, make their appearance in this country at a period so opportune. It is manifest to an observing mind, from various signs in the theological heavens, that the fundamental doctrines of Christianity are to undergo a new and thorough investigation and discussion in the American church. And we do not fear the result. The truth will gain new laurels. All who love it will gain a clearer perception of it, and come to hold it in greater simplicity. But we need, in such a discussion, as a thing indispensable, the light of history. Church history has not been half enough studied in our seminaries, and by our ministry. More attention must and will be given to this branch of learning. And we thank God that such admirable helps and increased facilities are furnished for the needed work.

2. *History of Spanish Literature.* By GEORGE TICKNOR. In three volumes. 8 vo. pp. 568, 542, 549. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

THIS is a truly magnificent work, whether we regard its external appearance, its typographical beauty, or its literary merits. The publishers have excelled even themselves in producing these stately and elegant volumes. We have seen no American book that surpasses them in the mechanical department. And we are not surprised that so much pain and expense had been expended upon the work: it merits its rich and beautiful dress.

We have no hesitation in pronouncing this the greatest literary work that has appeared in this country since the publication of Prescott's *Histories*; indeed, few native productions will compare with it. It confers no little honor on American literature, and is a rare and most valuable contribution to the literary world. It exhibits the fruits of patient toil, immense research, varied and profound erudition, and a literary taste and ability of the highest order. It is written in a style of great beauty, and brings to light a mass of curious and deeply interesting matter, illustrative of Spanish literature and history. The notes and appendices are numerous and learned, containing a vast fund of information and learning upon general subjects, while the references to authorities are full and complete. And not the least interesting part are the specimens of the old Spanish ballads, chronicles, and romances which are freely interspersed throughout the three volumes.

The first volume contains a complete historical and critical exposition of the development of Spanish literature, from "the first appearance of the present written language, to the early part of the reign of Charles the Fifth." The second and third volumes bring it down to the early part of the present century. The leading subjects dwelt upon and illustrated are the ballads, the chronicles, and romances of chivalry, the drama, the provençal literature, the courtly school in Castile, an extended notice of the theatre, historical and narrative poems, lyric poetry, romantic fiction, epistolatory correspondence, historical composition, and various historical sketches of kings and other subjects between the accession of the Bourbon family and the invasion of Bonaparte.

We can do no more at present than to give the closing paragraph of this learned and elegant history, which will serve to show the style and genius of the author. He takes a hopeful view of the future, as it respects Spain and her literature: a movement toward the revival of letters was made even while Ferdinand the Seventh was living, which may press directly onward and complete the canon of literature, whose forms, often only sketched by the great masters of its age of glory, remain yet to be filled out and finished in the grandeur and grace of their proper proportions:

"But, whether a great advancement may be hoped for or not; one thing is certain—The law of progress is on Spain for good or for evil, as it is on the other nations of the earth, and her destiny, like theirs, is in the hand of God,

and will be fulfilled. The material resources of her soil and position, are as great as those of any people that now occupies its meted portion of the globe. The mass of her inhabitants, and especially of her peasantry, has been less changed, and in many respects less corrupted, by the revolutions of the last century, than any of the nations who have pressed her borders, or contended with her power. They are the same race of men, who twice drove back the crescent from the shores of Europe, and twice saved from shipwreck the great cause of Christian civilization. They have shown the same spirit at Saragossa, that they showed two thousand years before at Saguntum. They are not a ruined people. And, while they preserve the sense of honor, the sincerity, and the contempt for what is sordid and base, that have so long distinguished their national character, they cannot be ruined.

"Nor, I trust, will such a people—still proud and faithful in its less-favored masses, if not in those portions whose names dimly shadow forth the glory they have inherited—fail to create a literature appropriate to a character in its nature so poetical. The old ballads will not indeed return; for the feelings that produced them are with bygone things. The old drama will not be revived; society, even in Spain, would not now endure its excesses. The old chroniclers themselves, if they should come back, would find no miracles of valor or superstition to record, and no credulity fond enough to believe them. Their poets will not again be monks and soldiers, as they were in the days when the influence of the old religious wars and hatreds gave both their brightest and darkest color to the elements of social life; for the civilization that struck its roots into that soil, has died out for want of nourishment. But the Spanish people—that old Castilian race, that came from the mountains and filled the whole land with their spirit—have, I trust, a future before them not unworthy of their ancient fortunes and fame; a future full of materials for a generous history, and a poetry still more generous; happy if they have been taught, by the experience of the past, that, while reverence for whatever is noble and worthy, is of the essence of poetical inspiration, and, while religious faith and feeling constitute its true and sure foundations, there is yet a loyalty to mere rank and place, which degrade alike its possessor and him it would honor, and a blind submission to priestly authority, which narrows and debases the noble faculties of the soul more than any other, because it sends its poison deeper. But, if they have failed to learn this solemn lesson, inscribed everywhere, as by the hand of Heaven, on the crumbling walls of their ancient institutions,—then is their honorable history, both in civilization and letters, closed forever."

3. *The War with Mexico.* By R. S. RIPLEY, *Brevet Major in the United States Army, &c.* In two volumes, 8 vo. pp. 524, 660. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

WHATEVER may be thought of the justice or necessity of our recent War with Mexico—and there are not a few true and loyal citizens who can never

be brought to defend the measure as a wise and righteous mode of redressing our grievances—a full, authentic, and standard history of so important a war, we owe to ourselves and to the civilized world to produce. The two beautiful and stately volumes before us, are manifestly a candidate for this honorable and distinguished place in our national literature. And we are free to confess that they possess a fair share of literary and historical merit. Written by one who is master of the science of war, and who took an active part in this memorable conflict, we might suppose him capable of an intelligent judgment, and possessed of the necessary materials for such an accomplishment. The author is evidently not wanting in many of the personal qualities essential to a good historian. The work is written in an admirable historical style—in a calm, bold, and fearless spirit. The author is master of his subject, and strives, evidently, to be rigidly impartial and scientific in his statement of facts, and speculations based upon them. Still it can never take the place to which it aspires—a standard history of the Mexican War: such a history is yet to be written, and the present generation probably will not see it. The present one is decidedly *partisan* in its character. It stands committed to the administration that declared and waged the war; it approves of its policy and all its measures, in a spirit of blind devotion: it speaks in no modest terms, we will say, in a tone and emphasis that deserve the severest rebuke, of the men, in Congress and out, who honestly deprecated and opposed the war; and it criticises the doings of Generals Taylor and Scott with little delicacy, and with extreme severity and presumption. There is a latent, lurking desire and aim throughout these calm and scientific pages, to rob these Generals of their hard-earned laurels, and secure the glory of battle and conquest for the administration of Mr. Polk. It is an *administration* history and not a *national* one, in the true and full sense of the word. As a record of facts, it is in the main reliable and valuable; but we would not give much for its speculations, criticisms, and party ebullitions.

Gen. Taylor, in many of his noted battles, and in the whole line of his operations comes in for no little share of blame. We give a single specimen from many which we had marked. In allusion to an expression in one of the General's letters, he says:

“That he had lost, in a measure, ‘the confidence of his government,’ is more than probable. Let reference be made to the correspondence of General Taylor with the War Department, and it will be seen, that from the very commencement of hostilities, to the time when General Scott was ordered to the field—a period of more than three months—not one plan of operation or suggested course of action, having in direct view the object of the war, had been received from General Taylor, and that all which had been made by the Secretary of War, which were necessarily liable to objections, made, as they were, at more than a thousand miles from the scene of operations, had been met by statements of difficulties and delays, unaccompanied by any suggestions for overcoming them. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising

that he should have lost some portion of the confidence which, after his surprising victories of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, may have reposed in him as a great commander; and that the government, tired of proceeding upon false principles of action, should have done the best it could, by sending General Scott to the field to control the operations, as General-in-Chief of the army." This is sufficiently explicit and sweeping. But the voice of a great nation, speaking in thunder tones, has pronounced a more favorable judgment on the hero of so many battles.

4. *Parental Wisdom; or the Philosophy and Social Bearings of Education, with Historical Illustrations of its Power, its Political Importance, &c.* By the author of "*The Wrongs of Poland.*" Second edition. London: Saunders & Otley. 1849.

WE take great pleasure in introducing this English work to American readers. We know not the author, but he has certainly produced one of the most philosophical and valuable treatises on this all-important subject, that we remember to have seen. The great question of the social and moral training of the human mind, is here placed on the only true foundation—the Christian religion, and is discussed with rare wisdom and ability and impressive earnestness. The writer feels the vastness of his theme; he brings to the work profound and careful observation, and a practical and extended knowledge of human nature; he exhibits enlarged and elevated views of his subject; the principles he maintains are mainly sound and fundamental; his arguments are enforced by many striking historical illustrations; and the whole is written in a most happy spirit, and in an attractive style. It is a book full of deep, philosophical, practical thought, which parents, moralists, and statesmen may study to great advantage. It cannot be read, thoughtfully, without impressing one anew with a sense of the mighty power of education in moulding society, and in shaping men's destinies for this world and the next, nor without fixing in the mind a deeper conviction of the too-often forgotten fact, that the only true foundation of a good education is the religion of the Bible.

The work comprises an introductory chapter and six essays on the following points: Importance of Education; Parental Responsibility; A Philosophical Theory of Education; On the Prevalent Levity of Youth; Testimony Derived from Ancient and Modern History; Practical Hints to Parents.

We hope the work will be speedily republished in this country.

5. *The Little Savage.* By CAPTAIN MARRYATT, R. N. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

WE are not among the admirers of Marryatt's writings; indeed, we are at a loss to account for their popularity even among the lovers of our light and fictitious literature. He has little artistic skill; no power in the delineation of character; a false taste, and is not over nice on the score of truth and morality.

This present volume is comparatively harmless. There is much that is

wholesome and true in it ; but the story is so unnatural and marvelous ; the two leading characters are such savage monsters in conduct ; and the whole work is so darkly shaded by human guilt, that we question its happy tendency on the class of minds for which it is mainly intended.

6. *Windings of the River of the Water of Life in the Development, Discipline, and Fruits of Faith.* By GEORGE B. CHEEVER, D.D., New York and London : John Wiley. 1849.

DR. CHEEVER is too well known to the readers of the Biblical Repository to require any advertisement from us of the style and value of his thoughts. We need only to say of this new work, that it is highly characteristic of its author, and, in our humble judgment, is the ablest and best of all his works. It has evidently cost him no little labor, and is the fruit of a rich and instructive experience. It cannot fail to interest and instruct the Christian reader. It blends the practical with the speculative, on the great subject of Faith ; it advocates no theory, but traces " the stream of Christian experience as it is recorded in the Word of God, and makes its appearance in the hearts of God's people." " Faith is a life, not a speculation ; it is a life, and not a mere emotion in regard to the Author of life. I have endeavored to trace its workings, its forms, its results, its various developments for the ministry of the life of a practical piety, in Christians who, like Paul, count not themselves to have attained, but would be passing forward."

It is divided into four parts : First part—Christ in the Mind ; Second part—Christ in the Affections ; Third part—Christ in the Life ; Fourth part—Christ in the Soul, the hope of glory.

No man, we are persuaded, can peruse it attentively without imbibing a life-giving draught from the pure river of the water of life ; and a second reading, like that of every truly good book on religious experience, will have him more satisfied of its original value, and anxious to turn to it again, and will more thoroughly impregnate his mind with its truth, as being what Milton calls the precious life-blood of a master-spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life. We commend it especially to ministers and students in theology, as an eminently Scriptural, suggestive, and fertilizing work, all the more valuable as being a fresh and original production of the times.

7. *Glimpses of Spain ; or Notes of an Unfinished Tour in 1847.* By S. T. WALLIS. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1849.

THIS is more than a readable book. It contains no little information ; and its sketches of Spanish life, and manners, and society, are lively and graphic. The literary merit of the work is considerable. The author gives a more favorable opinion of life in the Peninsula than travelers in general have expressed. We commend it to all who wish for information in regard to a country so rich with historic interest.

8. *A Wheat Sheaf gathered from our own Fields.* By F. C. WOODWORTH and T. S. ARTHUR. New York : M. W. Dodd. 1849.

THIS is among the most interesting and valuable holiday gift books for the young that we have seen. This we should have guessed from the known character of the joint authors. They have here gathered into a beautiful sheaf, some of their choicest stories for the young, beautifully illustrated, and presented in a style and dress to make it truly attractive to the young. It is not a book to amuse only, but to instruct, teaching and illustrating much valuable truth.

9. *Anecdotes of the Puritans.* New York : M. W. Dodd. 1849.

THESE are short, pithy anecdotes, illustrative of Puritan life and character. They are said to be drawn from authentic sources, though the authorities are not given. Some of them are new ; many of them are worth knowing ; and the book, as a whole, cannot fail to stimulate the young to the study of the history of those remarkable men.

10. *Memoir of Charles Henry Porter, a Student in Theology.* By E. GOODRICH SMITH. American Tract Society.

11. *The Missionary's Daughter : A Memoir of Lucy Goodale Thurston, of the Sandwich Islands.* American Tract Society.

THESE are among the best of the memoirs published by the Tract Society. They are both worthy of general circulation. The memoir of Mr. Porter is an admirable little work to be put into the hands of our pious young men, and of theological students in particular. It can scarcely fail to stimulate to Christian duty, and may lead some to devote themselves to the work of the gospel ministry. "The Missionary's Daughter" is a work that all the daughters and mothers of America ought to read. It has already done much to foster a missionary spirit, and, we doubt not, is destined to prove a rich blessing to thousands more.

12. *Fairy Tales from all Nations.* By ANTHONY R. MONTALBA. *With Twenty-four Illustrations* by RICHARD DOYLE. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1850.

ANOTHER beautiful and entertaining book for the young. It is a collection of tales gathered from the fairy lore of all nations, and for the first time translated into English. In themselves considered, we think them of little worth, and we more than question the tendency of all such reading on the youthful mind. But as specimens and illustrations of the popular literature of the various nations from whom the stories are drawn, the book is not without its literary value. We cannot say that the *illustrations* are to our taste. Such grotesque, outlandish, monstrous caricatures of humanity may find favor with others, but not with us, while we have any reverence left for creatures made "in the image of God."

13. *Apostolic Baptism. Facts and Evidences of the Subjects and Modes of Christian Baptism.* By C. TAYLOR, *Editor of Calmet's Dictionary of the Bible. With Thirteen Engravings.* Stereotype edition. New York : M. W. Dodd. 1850.

We are glad to see a revised and stereotyped edition of this learned and valuable work on the baptismal controversy. It is not necessary, at this late day, to speak of its peculiar merits, as the work has been before the American public for several years. These "Facts and Evidences," drawn from Christian archæology, may not be conclusive, but they certainly go far to show, in the language of Mr. Taylor, "*that Baptism, from the day of Pentecost, was administered by the Apostles and Evangelists, to infants, and not by submersion.*" We are not aware that these "Facts and Evidences" have ever been invalidated, either in this country or in Great Britain, and if not, they are certainly entitled to no little weight in favor of the arguments of Pædobaptists, both as to the subjects of Christian baptism and the apostolic mode.

14. *Institutes of Theology.* By the late THOMAS CHALMERS, D.D., LL.D. *In two volumes. Vol. II.* New York : Harper & Brothers. 1849.

THIS is the last volume of the Institutes, and the eighth in the series of posthumous works. We expressed our mind so freely and fully on the merits of this work, on the appearance of the first volume, that we need now only repeat our commendation and high appreciation of it. The first volume treats of Natural Theology—Evidences of Christianity—Subject-matter of Christianity. Part I. On the disease for which the gospel Remedy is founded. Vol. II. Continues the Subject-matter of Christianity, and gives us Part II. on the nature of the gospel Remedy, with six supplementary lectures on the Trinity; the moral uses of the doctrine that Christ is God; the union of the Divine and human nature in Christ; on the doctrine of the Spirit; on the distinction between the mode in which theology should be learned at the Hall, and the mode in which it should be taught from the Pulpit; on didactic and controversial theology.

The appearance of these Institutes is timely: they bear on every page the impress of Chalmers' massive and comprehensive mind; they discuss the doctrines essential to Christianity, in a very able and lucid, and often original and striking manner; and, we doubt not, that they will take rank among the ablest and best of the Doctor's many excellent works.

We have been impressed with one thought in reading this work; it is this: either theological controversy has not raged on the other side of the water as it has done on this, during Chalmers' lifetime, or else he never turned his mind particularly to some of the most fundamental points involved in the controversy, in the way of investigation and vindication. Take, for example, his supplementary lecture on the *Trinity*; and we are not a little surprised at the meagerness of his argument to sustain the Trinitarian doctrine. He urges one

or two points with great force; but the argument is certainly very imperfect, and will not begin to compare, in regard to fulness, force, and conclusion, with many we have seen from American theologians. Indeed, we are of the opinion, that the doctrine of the Trinity has nowhere been so thoroughly and ably discussed, and so triumphantly vindicated from Arian and Socinian objections, as in our own country.

15. *An Essay on Justification by Faith, with particular reference to the Theory of Forensic Justification.* By JOSEPH MUENSCHER, D.D., Rector of St. Paul's Church, Mt. Vernon, Ohio.

A CLEAR, discriminating, learned, and strong Essay on this fundamental Christian doctrine. It takes substantially the new school Calvinistic view, and reasons the various points involved in a sensible, and, to us, conclusive manner. We are glad to see views so Scriptural so clearly and decidedly expressed in such quarters, at such a time, on a point of faith so essential to Christianity. The author is worthy of the D.D. which has recently been conferred upon him.

16. *An Address by E. D. MACMASTER, D.D., on the occasion of his resigning the Presidency of the Miami University, Ohio.*

WHILE this address is mainly occupied with matters relating to the condition and history of this University, it incidentally discusses several points fundamental to a liberal education, with singular ability, exhibiting views not more sound than elevated and important, of the true and proper object of college training.

17. *History of the National Constituent Assembly of France.* By J. F. CORKRAN, Esq., New York: Harper & Brothers, 1849.

THE author of this work enjoyed peculiar facilities for the service he has performed. An eye-witness of the whole scene, and knowing personally the chief actors in it, he has given a most graphic sketch of the doings of this noted Assembly, and of the thrilling events connected with the origin and infant days of this new republic. His sketches of the chief men who figured in the administration and in public affairs, are life-like, and, we presume, true. His description of the terrible days of June, is by far the most full, connected, and intelligent, that we have anywhere seen. On the whole, it is a very interesting book, and useful in giving a connected and intelligent view of the state of things, past and present, in this misnamed republic, and active ally of crowned despotism, in crushing Italian liberty. The author evidently thinks, and with complacency, that the republic, in form even, will be of short duration,

18. *The Whale and his Captors; or the Whaleman's Adventures, and the Whale's Biography, as gathered on the homeward cruise of the Commodore Preble.* By Rev. HENRY T. CHEEVER. With Engravings. New York. Harper & Brothers, 1850.

THIS is one of the very best books published this season. We hail it, in-

deed, as among the beginnings of a brighter day for seamen, the dawn of the Sabbath's light upon the sea. It will take its place with Dana's "Two Years before the Mast," in every sailor's library, and it will be read by thousands of landsmen with not less interest than by the sailors themselves. It is full of instructive and stirring pictures of the hard and dangerous life of the whaleman, with accurate descriptions of the life and habits of the whale, drawn from actual observation in the whaleship. The scenes and events are recounted in a clear and vivid style, and the influence of the work on the mind and heart of the reader, is all the while elevated and admirable.

While it presents instruction and thought for men, it is also one of the best holiday presents for children, both because of the intrinsic interest of its subject, as a commanding chapter in the Natural History, and the clear and beautiful manner as to printing and engravings in which the Harpers have presented it to the public.

The closing chapters of the work, concerning the Sabbath at sea, and the moral and religious influences that may be brought to bear upon the minds of seamen, address themselves powerfully to thoughtful and religious men. The argument presented in so excellent a spirit to the owners and captains of vessels, cannot fail to produce a happy result. The author clinches his arguments drawn from the Word of God and the nature of the case, as well as his own observation, by the experience of the veteran Captain Scoresby, the hero of twenty-eight perilous whaling voyages, whose admirable Sabbath keeping example, amidst trying circumstances for successive years, is to be commended to the whole world. In the appendix to the volume (and a most valuable addition it is), there are given, among other things, the interesting results of a strict and conscientious observance of the Sabbath at sea, from the memorials of Scoresby the son.

The Christian lessons from the voyage, gathered up by the author, in the eighteenth chapter of this work, are original and beautiful, and some of them truly affecting. The following paragraph, concerning the wrecks met with in the Gulf stream, some of which, it is supposed, go round and round the whole vast course of the current, and after being lost from knowledge a long time, re-appear at intervals just in the same identical Gulf as before, is full of truth, aptitude, and present applicability. "Just so," remarks the author, "in the political, religious, and philosophical world, you will see the wrecks of certain errors and fallacies exploded, dismasted, water-logged, or quite foundered in one age, re-appear in another on the revolving current of opinion. After having floated off into obscurity, and been quite lost sight of for a time, they will come round again, and perhaps be taken up and towed into port by some political novice or demagogue, or transcendental speculator, pretending to great originality of genius, or by some novelty-hunter in religion—by them re-ribbed, caulked, and coppered, perhaps *razed*, and set afloat anew upon the tide of speculation, with a great boast of newness, and a mighty press of canvas." This is admirable.

19. *History of King Alfred of England.* By JACOB ABBOT. *With Engravings.* New York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS volume well sustains the interest of this highly popular and really useful series of popular histories of distinguished persons. It presents a lively sketch of the life and character of the great and good Alfred, as well as a summary of the history of the aboriginal Britons, and of the origin of the British monarchy. We know of no work that combines so much valuable historical information on this subject, in the same space, as this unpretending volume; and then it is presented in such a happy manner, as to secure for it the reading of every person into whose hands it may fall. And this is the chief excellence of these histories. They are short, yet comprehensive; accurate histories, yet invested with the attraction of brilliant romances. If parents wish to cultivate in their children a taste for history, they are almost sure to secure so worthy an end by putting into their hands this elegant little library of Histories.

20. *The Mercy Seat: Thoughts Suggested by the Lord's Prayer.* By GARDINER SPRING, D.D., *Pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church, in the City of New York.* New York: Published by M. W. Dodd, Brick Church Chapel. 1850.

WE always greet a new work from Dr. Spring with a cordial welcome. The elevated character, the sound instruction, and the practical aspect of his religious writings, commend them to all who love the gospel of our common Saviour. There is a clearness in the statement of truth, a depth of piety, a richness of Christian experience, and a degree of spirituality, united to a chaste and beautiful style, and a sweet and chastened spirit, that is truly grateful to the renewed heart. We love to commune with such a mind on the tender and interesting and sublime theme of religion.

The present work is among the author's happiest productions. It is not perhaps, equal to his "Obligations of the World to the Bible," or his "Attractions of the Cross," or "The Power of the Pulpit," in point of literary merit, and intellectual originality and strength; but we think it surpasses them all in richness of instruction, tenderness of spirit, earnestness and fidelity of appeal, and power to awaken and sway the best feelings of the sanctified heart. His general observations on prayer, and his remarks on the matter and manner of prayer, are most excellent, and worthy of careful and thorough study.

The Lord's Prayer, as a mere composition, is the most sublime and comprehensive form of words to be found in any language. For depth of meaning, and reach of thought, and power of suggestion, it is the most remarkable Scripture that we have ever attempted to study and comprehend. There is no subject in the whole range of Christian truth so admirable on which a pastor may prepare a course of sermons unusually interesting and instructive to himself and his people, as this same brief prayer. The Dr., therefore, could not

have chosen a better theme, as the subject of his matured and Christian "Thoughts." He has chosen, also, we think, the best form—not the sermonic but the lecture form—which leaves him more freedom in discussion, and a wider range of application. It is divided into sixteen chapters. We give the subject of each: General Observations on Prayer; The Instructions of the Bible, as to the Matter and Manner of Prayer; God a Father; The Name of God Hallowed; The Kingdom of God on Earth; The Means of Extending God's Kingdom; The Will of God performed on Earth; Dependence for Temporal Blessings; Prayer and Pains; The Doctrine of Forgiveness; Prayer for Forgiveness; A Forgiving Spirit; A Martial Spirit not the Spirit of Christianity; Temptation Deplored; The Dread of Sin; The Argument by which Prayer is Enforced.

We commend it to our readers, not formally, but with true heartiness, and express the earnest hope that its spirit and teachings, so redolent with the spirit and principles of the Divine Prayer which has suggested it, may reach and imbue the hearts of multitudes who are wont—alas! too often as a mere form—to say: "Our Father, Who art in heaven, Hallowed be thy Name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven. Give us this day, our daily bread. And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors. And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil. For thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, forever and ever. Amen."

21. *A System of Ancient and Mediæval Geography, for the use of Schools and Colleges.* By CHARLES ANTHON, LL.D., *Professor of the Greek and Latin Languages in Columbia College, New York.* 8 vo: 769 pp. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

"THE present work," the author says, "is intended as a text-book for the combined study of ancient Geography and History—two branches of education that ought never to be separated, but of which the former is either entirely neglected among us, or else only taught out of superficial and defective compends. Now that classical instruction aspires to be something more than a mere ringing of changes on letters and syllables, and the recitation rooms of our colleges are beginning to have the dull routine of mere verbal translation enlivened by inquiries and investigations calculated at once to interest and improve, a knowledge of ancient sites and localities, that are more or less identified with the stirring events of former days, cannot but prove an important aid in advancing the good work."

It is evidently a work of extensive research, and accurate and authentic in all its vast and varied details. No pains have been spared in collecting the materials, as the list of works from which they have been obtained, abundantly shows. The best sources of information have been consulted, and everything calculated to interest or instruct, from whatever quarter it could be obtained, has been freely used. It professes to be a system, not merely of ancient, but also of mediæval geography, though the latter division of the sub-

ject is not spread out so fully in detail as the former. This learned and exceedingly useful work, to those who are perusing geographical and historical studies, is designed to be used in connection with Findlay's Classical Atlas, which may be procured from the publishers of this volume.

We have often felt the need of just such a work as this, and we doubt not it is destined, like the numerous other works of this eminent author, to a useful and honorable career. It is brought out in a style of great neatness, and is a valuable addition to any man's library.

22. *A Complete Concordance to the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament.* By ALEXANDER CRUDEN, M.A. *From the Tenth London Edition, carefully revised and corrected, to which is added an Original Life of the Author.* New York: M. W. Dodd. 1849.

A FULL concordance to the Scriptures is indispensable in every religious family; it should be preferred even to the best commentary. It not only greatly facilitates the study of God's Word, but helps one to understand it, comparing Scripture with Scripture. The great advantage of the present edition is its accurateness and completeness, and the low price at which it is sold. One who has examined into its merits, says: "I have carefully compared your edition of Cruden's Concordance with a fine English edition, and find it true to the original. Knowing, from many years' use, the value of Cruden, I cannot but be glad that you have thus presented a cheap edition of his invaluable work to the American public. I find in your copy an unimpaired, complete Cruden." The low price of this edition brings it within the reach of almost every family.

23. *The Works of LEONARD WOODS, D.D. In Five Volumes. Vol. I.* New York: Published by M. W. Dodd. 1849.

WE welcome the first volume of these Works, as a most valuable and timely addition to our theological literature. Seldom have we read a book with so much interest—with such entire satisfaction, and for so many reasons—with such a deep and profitable sense of *truth* as its grand material. This volume consists of forty-one theological lectures, being a part of the course delivered by the venerable author, while occupying the Chair of Christian Theology in the Seminary at Andover. Several of the first lectures are designed to act as guides to theological students, in acquiring the science of theology. They are most admirably adapted to this purpose, stimulating the mind strongly to the most thorough and searching inquiry, and, at the same time, in the most wholesome and convincing manner inculcating the lesson of *intellectual humility*, on the ground not only of its piety, but also of its rational dependence on the constituted limitations of the human understanding. Man cannot know everything; neither can he explain everything. It is well to know *where* to stop—what are the limits God has set to our powers of anal-

ysis and investigation. While the views of Dr. Woods are far from implying any servile and stupid credence in the matter of religious belief, they impress us with a sense of our intellectual feebleness, and its resulting obligation, namely, our duty to be *humble* inquirers after the truth. We think this part of the work of great value, in many respects suited to our times.

The tri-personality of the God-head, involving an elaborate examination of the Scriptural testimony in respect to the person of the Messiah, and the doctrine of the Divine purposes, form the two commanding themes of this volume. The Socinian, Arian, and Sabellian heresies, are brought to the test of the Scriptures, and thoroughly exploded. The theory of Dr. Bushnell has a most complete answer in the very able argument of Dr. Woods—the best on the subject we have seen. Dr. Woods has evidently bestowed upon the doctrine of the Trinity a vast amount of thought. The argument both direct from the Scriptures, and responsive in reply to objections, is conducted with the skill of a master; its parts are most admirably arranged. It is pure reasoning of the strongest and highest order. We know not how such an argument can be answered, or its conclusion avoided, without impeaching the credibility of the Scriptures.

The style of Dr. Woods is exceedingly good. It is simple, clear, and free from redundancies. He uses words in their plain and obvious sense. It is not difficult to know what he means. We do not recollect a sentence in reading the whole volume, whose purport was not apparent upon the first reading. We think him a very convincing specimen of the fact, that spiritual ideas may be conveyed in words—that language, as the instrument of religious thought, is *intelligible*. We have strongly the impression that a system of religious doctrines drawn up in his style, would be no very great puzzle to *common* people, whatever might be their fate in the hands of those who theoretically question the *fidelity* of words.

Dr. Woods is a *reasoner*. This volume is a very fine specimen of sound reasoning. He is a *safe* reasoner. One of the marked characteristics of this volume is the fact, that the views therein contained come from the Word of God, are proved by the Word of God. The argument on doctrinal points is eminently a Scriptural argument. The Book of God is honored as the rule of faith. The Dr. has happily avoided the miserable practice of merely *shooting* proof texts without *aiming* them. The passages he quotes are always pertinent. That pertinency is shown by a critical exegesis. We think his reasoning remarkably *candid*; evincing a far greater desire to gain the truth than to conquer an opponent. It has the appearance of proceeding from a heart strongly loving the truth, and exercising the fullest confidence in it.

On the whole, we are prepared to express a very high opinion of this volume, and cordially recommend it to the ministers and theological students of our country. It is the product of a very mature mind, and will well pay for the money expended in buying and the labor of reading it.

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ARTICLE I.

CORRESPONDENCIES OF FAITH.¹

By REV. HENRY T. CHEEVER, New-York.

IN perusing these truly fruitful, suggestive volumes, as well as the *Life of Faith* and *Memoirs of Madame Guyon*, by Professor Upham, and the contemplations and commentaries of heavenly-minded Leighton, we have been arrested by the numerous unmeant correspondencies of thought and expression between experimental writers upon religion. Though widely remote in time, and of different sects and opinions in philosophy and theology, and unacquainted, too, with one another's writings, yet let the Spirit of God breathe upon them, and indite the truths of the Christian life as learned in their experience, (the only way a man learns anything truly in religion,) and while they will each be original and peculiar, there will be certain great features and forms of expression recognizable in them all; and the same holy faces will be looking at you and speaking through their breathing words, and beaming with instruction at every turn.

The meanderings of the river of the water of life through the channels of human experience are many, and every real Christian, especially every truly heaven-inspired religious teacher, is himself an original, a new creation of God, different from every

¹ THE GREAT EFFICACY OF SIMPLE FAITH IN CHRIST, Exemplified in a Memoir of Mr. WILLIAM CARVOSO, 60 years a Class-Leader in the Wesleyan Methodist Connection. Written by himself, and edited by his Son. From the 10th London Edition. *New-York*: LANE & TIPPET.

WINDINGS OF THE RIVER OF THE WATER OF LIFE. In the Development, Discipline, and Fruits of Faith. By GEORGE B. CHEEVER, D.D. *New-York and London*: JOHN WILEY.

other. But in them all it is the same water of life, and in all its turns and sinuosities, it is

The river winding at its own sweet will.

And at whatever cove, or inlet, or eddy, you look down into its depths, you will always see reflected there from its clear molten mirror, God's sun and stars, God's clouds and trees; and if you are God's child, you will see yourself there, for as in water face answereth to face, so doth the heart of regenerated man to man.

These unintended correspondencies of devout minds are especially noticeable on the subject of faith, whatever be their theology; and there is a reason for it in the relation faith holds to the whole body of Divine truth. To every science, and almost every art, there is generally found to be one principle or secret which lays at its foundation; and, that being once thoroughly mastered, further acquisitions in it are comparatively easy and sure. But if complete possession be not gotten at the outset of this bottom principle, there will be no real progress; even apparently good attainments will be found superficial, baseless, insecure; and the student will have to keep hobbling back to the first principle, just as dull cipherers, in our school-days, used to have to be put back from Vulgar Fractions and the Rule of Three, into Simple Multiplication and Division.

The same is true of the arts of Sculpture and Design; but it holds above all in Religion, whose foundation-principle is Faith, without which, no religious fabric it is attempted to build, can be secure or permanent, whether that fabric be rearing in an individual soul, or in a community. It is not religion, nor will it endure, or sustain the pressure of calamity and temptation, any more than an arch will hold without a key-stone. Religious forms, resolutions, penances, morality, and all natural goodness, too, are to the structure of religion in a man's heart, or in the mind of a nation, its mere scaffolding, which, taken away, the arch falls, unless it has been buttressed and key-stoned with faith. Or, to change the figure, we say that the true method of religious discipline, and of the soul's education for eternity, is symbolized in the building of an anthracite fire. Unless you begin right with kindling matter, like articles of faith, and put the hard coal over all, and then apply your fire, you will try in vain to ignite the heap. You may put wood, hay, stubble, in any quantity at the top, and then apply the blower, and there will be noise enough, and a transient heat, but the coal will not kindle until you remove all those black pieces of unpromising mineral, and dispose the combustibles in their right place, and then put in

again the stony material which you wish to inflame. Till you do this, it will not develop for you its latent heat, but the cold, unsightly stones will be naught but cold stones still. Just so in religion : if you will have a character from which shall radiate the heat and emanate the blessed light of holiness ; if you will have those dark materials of your depraved nature converted into the fuel of holy love, the altar-fire in your soul must begin with faith. Faith in the infinite wisdom and goodness of God, faith in the atoning blood and intercession of the Lord Jesus Christ, faith in the blessed Saviour as your soul's only wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption, must begin that funeral pile of your sins, from which in due time your soul shall issue forth, regenerated and disenthralled, to burn and shine like a seraph in the kingdom of God forever.

In the religious life we proceed like infants : it is by faith we first learn to stand, by faith we begin to walk, we go alone, we grow, we endure, we live, we die ; it is by faith we enter into glory ; and without genuine faith, a faith that evinces certain great criteria and correspondencies in all minds, we are not, we cannot be Christians at all. For the sum of religion, certainly the virtue or act of the mind, by which alone the life of God in the soul of man can be maintained, is faith—faith, of course, as defined in Scripture, working by love, the belief of the heart. This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom He hath sent. It is being justified by faith that we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ. The thing a man does practically believe, says Carlyle, concerning his vital relations to this mysterious universe, and his duty and destiny there, that is in all cases the *primary thing for him, and practically determines all the rest*. That, we add, supposing this half-blind giant feeling after truth, to mean by it religious faith—that is the chemical base of the religious character ; without which, there being nothing for the other Christian graces to combine and crystalize with, they can be little else than crude, often caustic acids. All the rest of a man's Christian character and life is raised upon faith, not merely as its underpinning, but as the building-plan spiritually controlling and putting to its place in the wall each lively stone and cornice of principle and sentiment, and fixing beforehand the relative size and positions of king-post and tie-beams in the roof of his morality.

We are led into such a train of remark after reading the Memoirs of that most excellent man in the Methodist connection, William Carvosso. His whole character and life-long were a constant and most wonderful exemplification of the vivifying power of faith, faith working by love, as it

always does when real and genuine. Hence it was that when he told those that came to him, have faith in God :

Believe, and all your sin's forgiven ;
Only believe, and yours is heaven :—

himself seeing Christ, in the strong light of faith, present and willing to save unto the uttermost, it often produced an effect upon the inquirer hardly less than miraculous, like the command of God himself, or the name of Jesus of Nazareth upon the possessed of devils.

Perhaps in no man's lips that ever spake on the subject of faith, was the simple word, "Believe," ever made to appear so full of meaning, and so immediately potent, like a talisman, to produce belief in other minds, as in his. When others said to the penitent "you must believe," the words often seemed without force, yea, meaningless. But no sooner did Carvoso utter them to laboring sinners or sorrowing saints in private, than the wisdom and power of God were manifest with the words ; and Gospel truth spoken by him in simplicity, frequently acted at once upon the unbelieving and hopeless mind, like a powerful alcoholic stimulus upon the body ; and multitudes of captive souls that came to him, found present liberty through that magic SESAME, BELIEVE. His affecting emphasis, his lifted hands, his falling tears, every lineament of his countenance, all declared to whatever sorrowing spirit he addressed, that his words came from a heart which felt the power of the Lord present to heal, and they powerfully enforced his words ; while his own strong faith, no doubt, of itself brought a degree of gracious aid to the helpless soul, and excited to the act of believing, for which God himself gives every man the power.

Faith and its effects were continually his theme, and it was his persistent, strong believing that solaced him under all trials, subdued or transfigured every evil, and made up for every deficiency by making the fullness of Christ all his own, and through the strange contagion there always is in such faith, constituted him the instrumental agent of light, consolation, and liberty to numbers while he lived, and doubtless to many more since his death, by the publication of his Journals ; humble and unlearned a man as he was, who never wrote a sentence, nor knew how to, until after he was sixty-five. He once entered in his diary, what is as correct in its theology, as it was a true transcript from his life : "This morning God filled my soul with peace and joy *in believing*. He that believeth, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water. It is not according to our joy (this is the fruit and

effect of faith), but according to our faith, that God blesses, and saves, and accepts, and loves us."

Faith, in its complex character, as an exercise of the intellect and heart, a joint product of the whole man, intelligential and sentient, is the mainspring and father of all the graces. By rendering the apprehensions of eternal things vivid and tenacious, through them it impresses the affections and sensibilities, determines the will, and governs the conduct and life. In reference to God and Divine things, faith stands for sight, being itself, as it were, the spiritual organ of inward seeing; and what seeing is to those that walk naturally, faith is to those that walk spiritually. Faith is to a man in his navigation for eternity, what sight is in the daily walks of life, a look-out and guide. Faith, indeed, may be called the soul's sense, whereby it perceives and apprehends spiritual realities, just as the eye is the bodily sense by which acquaintance is made with what is visible; the one being to things unseen and eternal what the other is to the seen and temporal. The eye is the inlet of the soul to the natural world; faith is the inlet of the soul to the spiritual world. It transmits, so to speak, to our conscious being the truths of God and eternity, heaven and hell, eternal life and eternal death, just as the eye informs the mind of light and shade, trees, rocks, hills, vales, rills, lakes, and seas, and moving forms, sun, moon, and stars, and human face divine. It is faith that spans the great gulf between the known and the unknown, the visible and the invisible, the present and the future, with a bold bridge over whose springing arches there is a walking to and fro of the faithful soul, like the angels ascending and descending upon Jacob's ladder. Without faith, indeed, as deep a night broods over the soul and its pathway into eternity, as that which hangs like a pall before the eyes of the blind. And all the torches of philosophy and reason will be as vain to enlighten it, as to set a Drummond light before the rayless eyes of a man that has lost the sense of seeing.

Carvosso says in his Journal at one place: "The Lord this morning shined into my heart by his Holy Spirit, and gave me to see what is implied in the believer's being an heir of God, and a joint heir with Jesus Christ. Such was my faith, I could easily claim all that God hath in earth and heaven as my own. *I clearly discover it is by these believing views that the soul is changed from glory into glory.* It is by believing, or by faith, that we are enabled to see the true nature and emptiness of all the things of this world, and that we see they were never intended for our rest or our portion. By faith we see that at last a smiling or a frowning world

amounts to nothing; we see the soul's wants, and miseries, and cure; we see Christ and heaven near; we triumph over all our foes, and lay hold on eternal life, and are made partakers of the Divine nature. This is what man lost when Adam fell. But, glory be to God, what I lost, and more than what I lost in Adam, is purchased for me again by the precious blood of Christ; for where sin abounded grace did much more abound. So that it clearly appears to me, that if we are not wanting to ourselves, we shall in the end, through the superabounding grace of God, be gainers by the fall."

We quote again in order to show by comparison hereafter, the forms of correspondence between uneducated minds, taught by the Spirit, and without any system to defend, and the minds of disciplined thinking men, used to philosophy and the dogmas of the schools. "I see more and more clearly that faith is the root from which all the branches of holiness grow. Christ is the vine, and we are the branches, grafted into Him by faith, before we can bring forth fruit. As a branch cannot bear fruit of itself, so we cannot bear the fruit of love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, &c., till by faith we are united to Christ. We are not to rank faith *among* the other graces, but to account it the *foundation* of them all. Works do not go before faith, but we must believe, in order to work aright. *This is the work of God, that ye believe*; and having given us the power to believe, He justly commands us to use it; and O, what a damnation does not the sinner deserve who refuses to accept pardon, and holiness, and heaven, on terms so easy!" Faith, he might have said without paradox, *is morality, is salvation.*

Talk they of morals, O thou bleeding Lamb!
The sole morality is faith in Thee!—*Crooper.*

At a still later period in his long warfare with sin and course of faith, this good man says: "I never saw so much included in the word believing as I do now. I clearly perceive that were I for a moment to cease believing, I should at once be swallowed up by the enemy of my soul. But, I bless God, whenever the adversary attacks me, I feel a power to look to Jesus; and I find his name a strong tower, and a city of refuge, and a place of triumph." This comprises both the theory and practice of religion, the true Christian philosophy and tactics for a graduate of the School of Christ. There is no way to conduct the campaign of life so as to conquer, but through faith in Him as the soul's wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. Carvosso found for himself, what all other devout minds correspond to him in, that we must cast ourselves upon

Christ from moment to moment, by a self-perpetuating act of faith, in order to make any progress in the Divine life, or to come off victorious in any of our conflicts with the world, the flesh, or the devil. The first great act of faith in a justifying Saviour, may establish, and give us a great lift in religion. But one act of faith will not do; faith in Christ must become our inbreathed life, our voluntary, and yet, by use, our involuntary habit and nature. As we cannot live by one inspiration or breath, but must keep breathing on, and drawing the electric vital fire into our lungs, together with the air, so must we be momentarily believing on, and thereby drawing into our souls the Divine fire of spiritual life, the vitalizing energy of God himself, even the blessed element in which believers live.

After fifty-six years spent in the service of God and steadfast believing, Carvosso said, "I find I have nothing to keep my soul in motion but faith in the blood of Christ." Without this, I should at once be as a ship becalmed. When Jesus is our peace, strength, righteousness, food, salvation, and our all, we are penetrated with the consciousness. Without this we should never rest, nor ever think we have it strong enough. *This it is to keep the faith.*" Most wonderfully did he keep the faith, which he argues for, and urges thus, in a letter, upon others; and himself enjoyed the presence of Christ for sixty-four years, till he was gathered to his grave, at eighty-five, as a shock of corn fully ripe in its season. His whole active life-long was a practical realization of the wondrous efficacy of faith, when, with steadfast tenacity and holy fixedness of purpose to obtain the blessing, it only appropriates personally the Christian promises, which are to such a soul like wings to the albatross, or the great propellers to an Atlantic steamer.

Now to this there is a remarkable correspondence in the experience of the distinguished Lady Maxwell, to whom Carvosso once referred, and who says of herself: "I most sensibly find, it is only by a momentary faith in the blood of Jesus that I am kept from sin; and that my soul is more or less vigorous, as I live by faith. I have never known so much of the nature of simple faith, and of its unspeakable value, as since I have tasted of the *pure love of God*: by it how has my soul been upheld in the midst of temptation! The Lord has taught me it is by faith, and not joy, that I must live. He has often enabled me to act faith on Jesus for sanctification, even in the absence of all comfort. This has diffused a heaven of sweetness through my soul, and brought with it the powerful witness of purity. I would say to every penitent, Believe, and justification is yours; and to every one who is

justified, and sees his want of sanctification, *Believe, and that blessing is yours also.* I find a lively faith in constant exercise to secure what I already possess of grace, and keep adding to my little stock. At times my faith for sanctification is as strong as a cable fixed to an immovable rock, and as clear as the sun shining at noon-day." How correspondent is this to the words of the apostle: Which hope we have as an anchor of the soul, both sure and steadfast, and which entereth into that within the veil, whither Jesus, the forerunner, is for us entered; who of God is made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption.

This is the secret of the believer's walk and work, the well-spring of the victorious Christian's living and acting, namely, self-abjured, and Christ always apprehended by faith, Christ ventured upon in the dark, leaned on in the light, fed upon through time, trusted for eternity. Walking by faith is not, as some have objected, an unreasonable venturing without evidence, nor is it required without evidence, not without the testimony of the immutable God. Instead of being unreasonable, it is the highest exercise of reason itself in reliance upon Him who cannot lie, of whose veracity philosophy, as represented in her noblest son, has declared, There is no demonstration stronger than this, GOD HATH SAID IT. It is to believe evidence for its author's sake, that has no foundation in the senses, or the mere proofs of reason, or the examples of the living. It is to take God *at* his word, barely because it is his word; it is reasonably to yield the reason to that, as its supreme authority, and to wish for no other or stronger argument than this, *God hath said it.* It is to walk and work on in the way of holiness, and obedience, and self-denial, strongly magnetized by things future and unseen, for the reality of which we have no proof but the testimony of God, and for the truth of that testimony, no proof but our own deep and immovable convictions that God is light and love, and truth itself, and therefore can neither himself mistake, nor lead another astray.

God's promise is to the man whose habit it has become to walk by faith, not by sight, as much a fixed and reliable verity, as the absolute truths of geometry and mathematics, or the experience of sense that fire will burn and water drown. God's Word is the rock on which his feet rest securely, not to be washed off even by the great waves of affliction, for by that he is made sure, however appearances may seem now, that all things shall work together for good to them that love God, who are the called according to his purpose.

This testimony of God is the ark-hull of our hopes, often, indeed, almost wrecked above-board, decks swept, shrouds broken, yards snapped, sails blown away, masts gone, but the hull sound, never sinking, still over-riding the waves, though storm-beaten, not foundered in the blasts and vicissitudes of this life. We believe this testimony because we are satisfied a priori that God is good and true, because there is in us an abiding persuasion, which cannot be shaken, that He is at the helm with his everlasting arm and skill, in all our perilous navigation through time, to steer us safely to the promised haven, through storm and calm, in the deep sea, and by the lee-shore, if we do but quietly leave the helm and all its management to Him. We believe all that God has told us in his Word of the character and work of Christ, and that whosoever believeth in him shall not perish, but have everlasting life. We believe it, not mainly from the external evidence of the genuineness and authenticity of the Scriptures, but from our own internal apprehensions of the same, and correspondence thereto. Through grace we have ventured our all on that testimony; and do we not know whom we have trusted, and are persuaded that He is able to keep that which we have committed to him? And can we not, as believers, testify to the gospel of the grace of God? For though none of these assurances are certified to sense, or derived by the natural judgment, taking things as they appear, yet having evidence that God has given certain pledges to faith, we are satisfied, we believe; and there we rest, God's own Word, either expressed or implied, being better than eyes: *Whom, having not seen, ye love; in whom, though now ye see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory.*

It is then faith, not sight, that lays the foundation of *this joy*; and it is a dispensation of faith, not of sight, that all men are under, and must be under, all their life here. For before the open vision of the future state—open in comparison with the circumscribed and dim view of things in this—and preparatory to it, it is but reasonable and fit, that there should be a doubtful and cloudy state of probation, for the trial of virtue, and the exercise and strengthening of faith. As there could have been no Hercules, had there not been monsters to subdue, so it is a saying substantially of Cudworth, were there no such difficulties to encounter with, no puzzles and entanglements of things, no temptations and trials to assault us, virtue would grow languid, and that excellent grace of faith want due occasions and objects to exercise itself upon. Here have we, then, the reason for such a state of things; and this world is as a stage erected for the acting and inuring of virtue, the

Free Academy, as it were, for the rudiments of an education for eternity, where the great lesson all are learning is, how to live by faith, not by sight. The Christian scholar's joy, therefore, in this school of life, is always just in proportion to the degree of perfectness with which he learns and practices this great lesson. It is according to his faith, not to his seeing; and until this lesson be learned by heart, there is no happiness here for any man; since to the natural eye, to the eye of unassisted reason, not borrowing the glass of faith, the horizon of this world, with all its sin and misery, and strange inequalities, and the ill-understood economy of Providence in it, seems gloomily black and lowering.

The solemn drama of human life, from the most commanding point of view we can obtain without faith, is awfully mysterious and inexplicable, full of strange turns and difficulties, of hidden passages, labyrinthine mazes, confused and intricate cross-rows and cross-purposes, puzzling knots, and complicated ravelings, unfinished plots, and unsolved enigmas; which, work at them as we may, we can never find out by sense and unassisted reason merely, because they were never meant by Providence to be so revealed. When, therefore, we attempt to scan minutely the wide panorama of life with the naked eye, we find it hung with dismal drapery of gloom; and we are always disappointed and baffled.

We must occupy a far higher post of observation than is ever gained in our present state, before we can get anything like an all-embracing view of the complicated and changing scene of mortal existence.

When at Molokai, one of the Sandwich Islands, we were very much struck with the analogy derived to us, from observing the coral reef with which that island is widely surrounded far out to sea. When we stood on the shore, on a level with the reef, and looked away off seaward, over the placid water with which it was all covered, like a vast lagoon, we could not tell what were its dimensions or limits, where there was deep water, or where it was shoal. But when we climbed a steep mountain two thousand feet, and looked down from that commanding elevation upon the wide reef, and the still wider boundless ocean all around, it was then that we could see clearly where the reef began and where it ended; where the water upon it was deep, and where it was shallow; where the surf broke, and where the blue sea-line began; and we could distinguish even the different hues of separate fields of coral, and the outlines thereof below the surface, through the different shades of the water in which it was all hid. Just so in a whale ship at sea, the man at the main-topmast head is always

the first to discover when the ship is entering shoal water, from a change in the color or shade of the all-surrounding fluid, only discoverable at first from that great height. And in illustration of the same it may be added that once, on a calm, clear day, when twelve hundred feet above the level of the Mediterranean Sea, on the top of the Rock of Gibraltar, we recollect seeing, at its base, some Genoese fishermen dragging their nets, and exposing their persons in the water, all unaware of the dangerous vicinity of three huge prowling sharks, which could be seen with wonderful clearness through our spy-glass, swimming around the rocks underneath, and seeming to us every moment as if they would dart up and seize the unsuspecting fishermen.

Now, the spiritual lesson we learned from all was this, that in order to have a just view of the trials, and temptations, and perils of probation; of the points of safety and of danger, and the limits of each, and the lines where they meet, and the gracious providences that are ever stepping between us and destruction, we must stand on the eminence of Mount Zion above. From the top of some commanding cliff in eternity, and by Heaven's own light, we must be able to look backward over the troubled sea of this life, and onward upon the calm ocean of eternity into which it has passed, before we can judge justly of its hardships and encounters, and the meaning of them, or perceive the greatness and goodness of our often miraculous deliverances, or estimate aright the skill and wisdom of the Divine providential Pilot that never quits our helm. Must we not, then, quietly leave the management of these precious barks of immortality to infinite Wisdom and Love, navigating by faith alone, and ever singing as we glide or dash along by quicksand and breakers :—

A thousand deaths I daily 'scape,
I pass by many a pit;
I sail by many dreadful rocks
Where others have been split;
My vessel would be lost,
In spite of all my care,
Did not the Holy Ghost
Himself vouchsafe to steer.
Then I, through all my voyage, will
Depend upon my STEERSMAN'S SKILL.

What else can we do, when the unknown future to which we are bound is to all men what the equatorial coast of the Brazils is to the mariner who makes his land-fall just at night, in the rain and howling wind, and sees the dark clouds gathering heavier and blacker, and the lurid lightnings flashing with louder thunder over those vast regions before him, somewhere

in the deep shades of which he is to find a port? We must wait, then, till the morning of the resurrection for the clouds to clear away and the sun to shine; sailing, meanwhile, by faith's chronometer, just as that navigator must lay to and stand off, or go sounding, on his dim and perilous way, by lead and line, till the night and storm are past, and sunlight opens to him such a tract of tropical luxuriance and wealth of nature as there is not in the world another, cursed only by slavery and the Man-of-Sin.

Now, notwithstanding that God maketh thick darkness his pavilion, and clouds are round about his throne, his way in the sea, his path in the great waters, his footsteps not known; still faith believes, by a foregone conclusion, that God is light, and love, and truth itself; and not that only, but faith believes, also,

That every cloud which spreads above
And veileth love, itself is love.

And when faith is vivid and strong in this, the mysteries of the present life; the afflictions of the good, the prosperity of the wicked, the permission of evil, the temptations of Satan, the long reign of sin, the apparent injustice and inequality of many things here, do not distress us nor impair our confidence. But let a film grow across the eye of faith, let there ensue *amaurosis* of the spiritual sight, let *gutta serena* fall upon the organ of inward seeing, that invisible optic nerve, on whose retina are painted in miniature, or clearly foreshadowed, the images and truths of the world to come; let the vision of eternal realities become dim, as it always does when we relax at all in prayer and watchfulness; let us begin to walk by sight, not by faith, then we are troubled, then the inequalities of this life perplex us; then clouds settle upon the world and involving night; then the sun is eclipsed, and the moon and stars withdraw their light; then no glory gilds the sacred page, but the book of nature and the book of grace are alike obscure, and the soul's horizon is skirted with a curtain of gloom; then we cannot justify the ways of God to man; like Asaph, we think to know this, but it is too painful for us, and we almost fall over the precipice of unbelieving doubts and distrust of God's wisdom and goodness. Just then it is in the experience of the believer, through grace, as portrayed in one of the religious sonnets by Professor Upham:

That faith returns and takes me by the hand,
And now the valleys rise, the mountains fall.
Welcome the stormy sea, the dangerous land!
With faith to aid me, I can conquer all.

Faith lays her hand upon the lion's mane ;
Faith fearless walks within the serpent's den ;
Faith smiles amid her children round her slain ;
When worlds are burning, cries, unmoved, Amen.
Yes, I am up, far upward on the wing ;
The withered arm is strong, the broken heart doth sing.

It is no wonder that even so great a mind as John Foster's, with its natural melancholy and thoughtful turn, and his religious faith, not of that child-like and yet energetic, all-conquering character which it ought to have been, and undoubtedly would, had he been a more fervent wrestler in prayer,—it is no wonder that he speaks of the scene of human existence as a most mysteriously awful economy, overspread by a lurid and dreadful shade. It is always so to the eye of sense, but it is not so to the soul, when faith is in vivid exercise. To the great English Baptist, when faith was low, it was cloud pursuing cloud, forest after forest, Alps upon Alps. "It is in vain," he tells his friend, in sadness, "to declaim against scepticism. I feel with an emphasis of conviction, wonder, and regret, that all things are almost enveloped in shade, that the number of things to which certainty belongs is small, that many things are covered with thickest darkness ; I hope to enjoy the sunshine of the other world." Ah ! how much more of it he might have enjoyed here, as by glorious, soul-cheering mirage, looming up from that distant world, had he been a man of stronger faith, and more in the habit, while not seeing, yet of believing.

How much more to be desired for its power of giving content and making happy, is the simple faith of many a private Christian like Carvosso, of far less reach of mind and power of thought than that great writer, who, doubtless, is wondering now in the other world, that he could have been so slow of heart to believe *here*, seeing so many things cleared up in eternal day, which in this life were involved in night. Blessed are those that have not seen, and yet have believed. The only secret of happiness here, for great minds as well as small, is strong faith, laying the foundation for, and giving birth to, strong love ; in other words, faith working by love. Hence we hear such a man as Baxter, in his old age, when reviewing his life and putting down notes of it for his friends, say, what, in this table of correspondences, may well serve as an offset and corrective to Foster's melancholy doubtings—"I was forced to take notice that our belief of the truth of God and of the life to come is the spring of all grace ; and with which it rises or falls, flourishes or decays, is actuated or stands still ; and that there is more of this secret unbelief at the bottom, than most of us are aware of ; and that our love of the world, our boldness in sin, our neglect of duty,

are caused hence. I easily observed in myself, that, if at any time, Satan, more than at other times, weakened my belief of Scripture and of the life to come, my zeal in every religious duty abated with it, and I grew more indifferent in religion than before. But when faith revived, then none of the parts or concerns of religion seemed small; then man seemed nothing, the world a shadow, and God was all. I must profess, for my part, that when my belief of things eternal and of the Scriptures is the most clear and firm, all goeth accordingly in my soul, and all temptations to sinful compliances, worldliness, or flesh-pleasing, do signify worse to me than an invitation to the stocks or bedlam; and no petition seemeth more necessary than, Lord, increase our faith; help thou my unbelief. Had I all the riches of the world, how gladly would I give them for a fuller knowledge, belief, and love of God and everlasting glory!"

This most instructive review, and the difference in Baxter's experience when young and when old, brings to mind an illustration of the workings of faith suggested on the sea, while we were observing the experience of a young ship-master. In first navigating a ship by chronometer and lunars, until he has learned to live by faith in his observations, and the few figures he makes daily on his slate by help of tables from the Nautical Almanac, you will find him uneasy, doubtful, anxious, and he will work his longitude over and over again, though sure there is no mistake; so hard is it practically to live upon faith, faith in that which is unseen, and for which we have no evidence of the senses, until a habit is formed; so strange is it to be steering one's way straight over the trackless ocean, without any way-marks, or sign-posts, or mile-stones, or anything whereby we can see that we are right or wrong. It is not until a captain has made two or three good land-falls, at wide intervals, and just according to his calculations; that living by faith in his chronometer, and observations, and the results upon his slate, begins to come easy. Even so, we thought, in the very nature of things, it is the experienced Christian only that can live perfectly the life of faith. Whatever be his theory respecting the provisions of the Gospel, use, after all, the use of faith, its experimental exercise, must have practically convinced him of the reliability of things unseen and eternal, before it can become the habit of his mind to navigate confidently the ocean of life, independent of sense.

The promises are to a Christian voyager's faith, what "life-lines" are to the sailor, for him to hold by to the yard when reefing or taking in sail, and to keep him from falling off. Yet, strange to say, many ships' yards are without this stay for ex-

posed seamen, by reason of which, many a poor fellow in a storm is shaken off, that might have clung to the life-line had it only been at hand in its place. In like manner do men sometimes attempt the course of a Christian, and go sailing over the troubled sea of life without being provided with the promises, without having learned how, or having them by, hidden in their hearts and memory, to use and cling to in a storm. In good weather and ordinary times they get along without them, and do not feel the want. But let a storm arise, the wind blow fiercely, the sails be flapping; then it is they want the life-lines, and are distressed and lost, without them. Yea, it is not possible for the oldest and most experienced Christian to live without a constant clinging to the promises; still less is it for younger and more recent pilgrims. Like a young sailor-boy, they must hold fast to the life-lines of God's Word, or they are sure to fall.

There is an effect produced upon Christian character by experience and age, by a long habit of faith, like the change that is wrought upon a portrait by time and smoke, which the painters call *toneing*. Just as it gives a rich mellow shading which no art of the pencil can equal, or even imitate, so does time give an inimitable hue and tone to the piety of a growing Christian, which no recent experience in religion, however refreshing and remarkable, can ever compare with. There will be a depth of coloring and richness to his faith, as well as strength and durability, and there will be a true humility and completeness of character which the beginner in the Christian life is usually a stranger to. When true believers, then, find themselves often wondering, as who sometimes does not? that they do not at once come into full possession of the spiritual graces and virtues they have set themselves to desire and seek after, they forget that the ravages of sin in our nature can be repaired only by degrees. They forget that man can return to Eden and innocence only by retracing, step by step, all the way whereby he came out from thence. Each evil act that has been committed, each evil word spoken, each evil thought or feeling indulged, when truly repented of, may by the blood of Christ be blotted out, so as no longer to appear as a witness and accuser demanding our condemnation. But every such act, and word, and thought, or feeling, has left behind a strength of evil inclination, which can only be neutralized and expelled by the sanctifying agency of the Holy Spirit, taking the things of Christ and showing them to us, and thereby forming a holy habit of mind just the contrary of that we are striving to get rid of. To be utterly eradicated, the inclination to evil must be gradually counteracted by the overmastering energy of a

holy will, first induced by faith, and invigorated and reinforced daily by Christ himself, in answer to prayer.

This point is admirably argued with the struggling, panting soul, in a few verses of great simplicity, from the German of Tholuck.

"Complainest thou of the *time* it takes
For sinners sanctity to learn?"
"Aye, this poor heart *hope oft forsakes*,
That e'er on earth such bliss 'twill earn."
"But each great work of human power
Requires, you know, full many an hour;
And what work more of might partakes,
Than when our God new men creates?
Now did the world six days require
For its formation by our Sire,
Why such a wonder in thy ears,
IF TO THY NEW-BIRTH HE USE YEARS?"

With most believers it is, indeed, only after years of schooling by trial, or slow formation, in the chrysalis of transition from the law to Christ, that the heart learns perfectly the lesson of faith, and at length comes forth from its long *Aurelian* period of discipline to the true and joyous use of its regenerated faculties, like another nature of love and light through and through, having no part dark. Some attain to this type of completeness, joyful assurance, and emancipation from self and legal bondage much earlier in their course than others, and blessed are they. But there is no doubt it might be arrived at by all far sooner than it is, through the power of faith in connection with the discipline of habit.

In this law of habit lies the real secret of a Christian's spiritual progress. The *principle* of reliance on God begins in the soul instantaneously with regeneration, but practical *habits* of reliance are not to be formed at once. So a man may have a principle of submission, the seed-grace of resignation, sown in his soul, which is the beginning of his religion, but the virtual habit of uniform acquiescence in the Divine will, as signified in Scripture and providence, is the fruit, and, by our own nature, it is a thing of time and discipline, of gradual, not instantaneous growth. Hence it follows, that in the formation of religious character, in a man's efforts to get inured to, and become welded with the temper and virtues of a child of God, and in the steadfast Christian's earnest aspiration and pursuit after eminent holiness, his reaching forth unto the state of assurance, and his earnest strife for the blessing of pure and constant love; in all this we have the co-efficient help of our Creator Jesus, through the plastic nature of which He has made us mouldable by habit.

Those who intelligently aim with hope at the highest per-

sonal exemplification of holiness possible in the present life, do it on this ground, and bearing all this in mind. Their hope is in the Saviour only, apprehended by faith, and carrying them forward from strength to strength, and victory to victory, by the law of habit. They have learned this as the practical rationale of holiness, that let earnest Christians only use themselves a while to faith, watchfulness, self-denial, prayerfulness, exercise of their gifts, and zealous activity in doing good, distributing alms, reproving sin, warning the wicked, comforting the afflicted and sorrowful, disseminating and applying truth; let them but perseveringly endeavor to inure themselves to all this, relying upon Christ, and by virtue of our inherent constitution, even the ordinance of God himself in the great law of habit, they find a blessed co-operation that insures, and is as bond and mortgage for success. Every repetition of benevolent and devout feeling and well-doing, every act of love toward God or man, will be a round in the ladder whereby the soul is climbing upward, and it will strengthen the principle from which that ascending movement springs, and make the next acting of it the easier; it will add so much fuel to the holy fire within, of which those acts are but the radiated heat without, and it will keep reacting in this benign way upon the moral agent, like the fly-wheel in machinery, as long as he shall keep up the good habit, to confirm him in his holy course, and propel him, as with wings, to the goal; until at length, here or hereafter, he shall become unalterably fixed in his course of obedience; and by the grace of God, in alliance with his holy habits, temptation shall no more make him swerve from duty, or deviate from the Divine providential track, than it will turn the stars from their courses.

When, for instance, the act of faith in Christ, as our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption, has been so often repeated as to be ripened into a habit; and when faith becomes the uniform disposition or state of the soul, it will secure to that soul a constant participation in all the blessings of the covenant of redemption. It is within the scope of faith, when constant, yea, this is its province, this its victory, to prevent all sin and make the soul steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord. This habitual reliance on the Lord Jesus Christ, this setting Him always before us by faith, is the perfection of all wisdom; it is the Ultima Thule of practical discovery in religion; it is the key, and the safe, and the safe-guard of all Christian excellence. The truly devout man of faith, cautious and self-distrustful as he has learned to be, does sometimes humbly exult, and his soul swells with gratitude at the indications he is permitted to see

in the augmenting force and constancy of his holy habits, the clearness and strength of his apprehensive faith, that he is planted immovably, as a tree of righteousness, in the garden of God. He feels this confirmed habit of holiness as the grasp of the great hand of the Almighty upon him, which will never let him go. From the advanced stage in his experience of constant faith, and consequent habitual serenity and holy living, to which it will hereafter be found, in the church of the future, that the Christian may arrive much oftener than he has done heretofore in the present life; from this point of observation, through the grace of Christ, he looks out with firmness and joy upon the ocean of eternity, and says with holy confidence, as a great and good man once did, "I carry the eternal mark upon me that I belong to God; and I am ready to go to any world to which He shall be pleased to transmit me, certain that everywhere, in height or depth, he will acknowledge me forever."

It is not that a habit of holiness, formed through the help of Christ, realized by faith, of itself merits heaven, or lays any claim to the Divine favor. By no means; but it shows heaven begun in the soul, and it is a proof of the special favor of God when faith and holiness, under the Divine discipline, have thus ripened into a habit; and we may rationally expect that such a soul will enjoy God and dwell in his presence forever, assimilation of character, the great end of his wise ratio discipline having begun here. Life, said Henry Möwes, in the true spirit of Reformed German Evangelism, is a tutelage under Christ; sacrifice and self-renunciation are the lessons the Master appoints; *inward strength and tranquillity the rewards we shall have when all is borne.*

How plainly now is faith the only key to this true Christian *Ἀσκησις* of self-sacrifice and self-renunciation; and how necessarily is it a hidden life to the uninitiated; hidden in its cause and its end, and hidden as to any proper appreciation of its symptoms and phenomena. What knowledge has the world of the secret of that victory which overcometh the world, even faith? What sympathy or correspondence has the world with the motions and pulses of spiritual life, that beat in the bosom of a man of God? No more than most of the stupid, sensual monks in Luther's convent at Erfurth had with the grief and strife of the reformer's mind under a sense of sin and desire for holiness, and his warfare with self, and vain efforts at keeping the law, and his agony for deliverance long before he found a Saviour. What acquaintance, too, has the world with the spiritual joys and triumphs of the man of faith? or what knowledge of his inward conflicts, trials, and temptations? There, in Cowper's own sweet words, who knew,

There, unfatigued,
His fervent spirit labors. There he fights,
And there obtains fresh triumphs o'er himself,
And never-withering wreaths, compared with which,
The laurels that a Cæsar reaps are weeds.
Perhaps the self-approving, haughty world,
That as she sweeps him with her rustling silks,
Scarce deigns to notice him, or if she see,
Deems him a cipher in the works of God,
Receives advantage from his noiseless hours,
Of what she little dreams. Perhaps she owes
Her sunshine and her rain, her blooming spring,
And plenteous harvest, to the prayer he makes,
When, Isaac-like, the solitary saint
Walks forth to meditate at eventide,
And thinks on her who thinks not of herself.

In the present period of outward activity and the Socialism of Christianity, we sometimes fear that Cowper's race of *solitary saints* is growing thin; the race of which each may say, like Paul, when I am weak, then am I strong; and of whom as a class, the proper motto is, Impotent in self—Omnipotent in Christ; despised often by man, but prevalent with the Almighty: by union with Christ they stand; divided they fall. Only let the ranks of these singular non-conformists to the world be largely recruited; let the whole church militant be of their number, in realized union with Christ, and how soon would the whole world be in their wake, walking, at one and the same time, by faith and by sight, even by faith in a spiritual Christianity, thus convincingly exhibited before their eyes in the holy living of its professors by virtue of real union with their invisible Head. The prayer of our Saviour would then be fulfilled, *that they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us, that the world may believe that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them as thou hast loved me*: as if it were by reason of the present want of oneness in Christians with the Father and with Christ, in other words, the known unlikeness of the church to its great Head, that the world does not believe. Because there is so poor a representation of Christ in the common Christian life and sentiments. Let the Saviour be exhibited more fairly in the characters and lives of his people, let the practical union here prayed for be once realized, and infidelity would cease, opposition to the gospel could not be maintained, but everywhere men would be becoming Christians. It is so partially, in local revivals, when the life of Christ is acted out by his followers, and their union with him is made apparent. It would be so generally, were the faith of the whole church revived; for it is joyful activity for Christ consequent upon a

revival of faith and holiness in living examples which may be seen, that is to convict the world, and, under God, to convert it. Just as the sun's rays, luminous and beautiful though they be in themselves, yet in order to become indeed calorific and light-giving, must strike upon and be reflected by some visible body, even so must the rays from the Sun of Righteousness, the Lord of life and glory, be gathered and flung back upon the world of apostate minds, from the lives and characters of believers, serving as the tin-foil of a mirror, before they can emit heat or light enough to vivify or illuminate the great mass of unbelieving, sensuous humanity.

How interesting is it now to trace the correspondencies of differently constituted devout minds upon this common theme of union with Christ and holiness by faith, and the divine method of bringing it to pass in the soul of man! The author of the *Windings* has somewhere very happily represented Paul, the inspired logician of Scripture, answering back to David the inspired poet, through the whispering gallery of ages. Let us, then, here show the Protestant mind revealed in the *Windings*, and the Catholic mind in the *Memoirs of Madame Guyon*, to be in the same close correspondence and sympathy; a correspondence all the more valuable for its being unknown to, perhaps disavowed by the former. In order that this correspondence may be the more apparent, we will place certain passages from both in parallel columns, passages eliminated here and there without indicating the breaks between, from the *Windings* of the River of the Water of Life, and from the *Life and Religious Opinions of Madame Guyon*.

FROM THE WINDINGS.

MADAME GUYON.

The history of faith, and of God's discipline for its increase and perfection, ever has been and ever will be a record of trials. Character is read and known in the temper of the soul sustaining them, and they themselves are the costly instruments of God in refining and establishing the soul. We are in the shop of the Great Jeweler, preparing for our places in his palace above; and they whom he means to make the most resplendent, said Leighton, in this beautiful figure, he hath oftenest his tools upon. Until this discipline of God have been applied to him, a man knows not of what elements his nature is composed, nor what hidden evils may be festering in his bosom. God must bring them out, and redeem him from them,

My little children, let Christ be all in all IN and FOR us; in order that the work of sanctification, resting upon the basis of divine truth, may be carried on and perfected in our souls. To Christ belongs all wisdom, all strength, all greatness, all power, all glory. To ourselves, considered as separate from Christ, belongs nothing but poverty, emptiness, weakness, and misery. If, in the spirit of self-reliance, we seek anything *out of Christ*, then we are not his true followers. We deceive ourselves, and in that state shall never become the true saints of God. He who speaks only of the all of God, and nothing of the creature, is in the truth; and the truth dwelleth in him; usurpation and selfishness being banished from his heart.

or he can never be prepared for the kingdom of heaven. A jeweler may find, in making up a casket, a magnificent stone in which there seems to be a flaw. If it extend through the stone, it is useless for his purpose, and must be laid aside for some inferior end. Therefore he begins to file it, to see how deep it goes; and it may be that after a little of this operation it will show itself clear; but if not, then it is unfit for the place he had designed it to fill. So it is with God in making up his jewels; there is much filing needed to prepare them for their heavenly setting. Sometimes there are such flaws, that a Christian's usefulness is well nigh destroyed, even if his hope of happiness hereafter be not ruined. How deep the interest; while the fires of God's discipline are at work upon a man to burn out his dross, or some keen file is applied to remove the evils in his character!

A man is driving on, and God takes off his chariot wheels, so that he drives heavily; withdraws the linch-pin, as it were, or takes away the main spoke in the wheel of his plan, so that he is compelled to lay it aside. But ordinarily God proceeds more indirectly. He does not speak in a voice from heaven; he is not going to say from the sky, or in a supernatural dream by an angel, you must not go this way or that, or do this or that. He relies upon the common sense of his children for the right interpretation of his providences, and he leaves every man to draw his own inferences; only he says, Be ye not as the horse or as the mule that are void of understanding, whose mouths must be held in with bit and bridle: That is not the way God takes to guide his children, but he deals with them as free moral agents, and sometimes relies greatly upon their tenderness of conscience to see and feel quickly his meaning. It is a very precious thing, a very heavenly attainment to have a quick and keen perception of God's meaning in his discipline, a tender and holy consciousness of its purport, and a sweet readiness to understand and obey its intimations, without forcing God to use greater violence. There is a child-

I have sometimes thought that the Lord deals with his friends who are dearest to him, as the ocean does with its waves. Sometimes it pushes them against the rocks, where they break in pieces; sometimes it rolls them on the sand, or dashes them on the mire. And then, in a moment, it retakes them into the depths of its own bosom, where they are absorbed with the same rapidity with which they were first ejected. The more violently they are dashed upon the rocks, the more quickly and impetuously do they return to the great centre. With others he deals more gently. There are many, far the greater number, whom he permits to live by consolations mingled with faith. How few are those, how very rare, who are driven and dashed where the Lord pleases, till their wills are wholly destroyed, and they can no longer demand anything for themselves!

It is sometimes the case that souls, in the experience of God's favors, are perverted by the very gifts which they receive from his hand. They mistake the gift for the giver, the joy for Him who is the source of their joy. And God then, if he has determined to sanctify their soul; so orders his providences, as to render it the subject both of inward and outward sorrow; and in such a degree and such a manner, that he will appear to it to have entirely withdrawn his favors. This is a very trying situation. It is impossible for the soul to live in it for any length of time without the experience of a very high degree of faith. The soul that can stand this test, that can drink the bitterness of this cup, especially when it is offered without any mitigating ingredient, cannot have anything less than an assured faith, a faith which fully purifies the heart, and overcomes the world. He who has this confidence in God is necessarily the friend of God, according to the promise, and cannot be separate from him, either in the affections or the will. It is from that moment that the death of nature is experienced; which is nothing else than the cessation of all wrong and inordinate desires and purposes, and entire union with God in everything he loves and everything that

like simplicity in the soul of a man walking closely with God, that finds out his meaning, even when others do not see how he is indicating it ; just as a little child, when it is doing wrong in company, will understand even a gesture of its mother, and not wait to be spoken to.

The ability to walk in simple reliance on God alone and his promise, is a great ability ; it is not the earliest thing by any means, but contrariwise, a very advanced and tried grace in Christian experience. The work of setting out for heaven, and of finding God, is a great enterprise ; and in the course of every great enterprise there must be difficulties. God himself will interpose them if man does not ; for without difficulties great enterprises would be without permanence and depth. Difficulties are as the ballast to keep the ship in trim. They are the cold days that set the vegetation, when uninterrupted sunshine and heat would bring it preternaturally forward. It is very easy even for the carnal mind to live half by faith, and half by sight. It is easy to walk when God's comforts surround the soul, when the soul mounts up as on eagles' wings, when God, as it were, takes the soul by the hand, and hurries it forward as the angels took Lot and hurried him out of Sodom to Zoar. When the candle of the Lord shines bright upon us, when he fills our hearts with his love, and shows us the glory, certainty, and blissfulness of his covenant, this is sight rather than faith, this is experience and enjoyment ; it is the earnest of the Spirit. It is easy to believe God when we thus see and feel the presence of God, when he sends forth the Spirit of his dear Son in our hearts, and makes us cry Abba, Father. But when these sensible comforts are withdrawn, then to rely upon God's promises, and go forward in duty just as if we experienced them, that is true faith, and that is the faith taught by trial. Blessings will teach gratitude, but not this kind of faith. Blessings, indeed, are so apt to accustom the soul to sight, that except by the very peculiar care and discipline of God's grace, a long uninterrupted continuance of them unfits the soul for

he wills. Thus is the declaration of Scripture made true, Whosoever is born of God overcometh the world ; and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.

When all that separated from God is taken away, when every inordinate desire has undergone the process of excision, so as to be reduced into its place, and to be put into entire position and agreement with the one great and over-ruling desire of conformity to God's will, then begins the new life in the higher sense of the terms. The soul no longer possesses anything which it calls its own ; but may rather be spoken of as a *subject*, and instead of possessing, may be said to be *possessed* by another ; God himself comes to it, and dwells in it, as in his holy temple. It is not only obedient to God, which is a high state of grace, even when it costs considerable effort to render obedience ; but its obedience is rendered in such a manner, so promptly and lovingly, that God may be said to be *its life*. The soul has become nothing in itself ; but it has gained all things *out of itself*. Disrobed of the life of nature, it is clothed with the life of grace. It has lost the inspiration and life of the creature, but it has gained the life of God.

And now all that has God in it, (and there is nothing which has not God in it, except sin,) is its delight. The sky expands with a purer beauty ; the flower opens with a sweeter fragrance ; in the forest, and on the river's banks, it finds food for contemplation and holy love ; it rejoices with those who rejoice, and weeps with those who weep ; it is young and buoyant with the child, and wise and reverent with the aged ; everything in human life is dear to it ; it pities and forgives its enemies ; like Him who is embodied in it, it does good to the evil and unthankful ; tears are dried at its approach ; and smiles bloom like roses at the presence of its loveliness.

Those who have never experienced the transformations of thoroughly sanctifying grace, know but little of the purity, the peace, and the blessedness of such a soul. It has but little to say of itself ; it has no dreams, no visions, no ecstasies. It lives by

faith; so that when the accustomed tide of blessings begins to fail, and a discipline of want or darkness intervenes, the soul begins to imagine itself deserted of God, begins to faint, forgetful of the exhortation which speaketh as unto children concerning the rebuke of God; perhaps stops short in the course of duty, just as if God's comforts, and not God, were its guide, its support, its index, and its impulse. But that is faith in sight, not faith in God. And the soul must be taught to toil on in the wilderness, without reaping, water, or no water, confident in God. This is genuine faith, and supposes a disposition sweetly resigned to God's will. If He leave but himself, the afflicted, sorrowing soul says, he may take what he will away. He has never promised in his Word any particular comforts at the particular times of my will; but he has promised himself to all who put their trust in him; and come what may, my soul resteth upon God.

The very trials and disappointments of a Christian, if God come with them, are better than all the blessings of the worldling. God's love in this world is a discipline, and the Mount of Transfiguration, if we are admitted to it, is not a place to stay in, but to be refreshed in for the trials and duties of our pilgrimage. There may be an encampment, but that is all. We must strike our tents, and go on in the daily simple following of Christ; self and all things connected with it being given up to Him. If you would be saved and be perfect, you must throw yourself on Christ for all, as a mere, guilty, death-deserving sinner, deserving of death, even though believing; and with neither love, nor faith, nor works as a ground of pardon, or title to mercy or assurance of heaven, but merely and submissively throwing yourself on Christ, forgetting everything but submission, but duty, but love, but Christ, losing self and self-anxiety in the sweetness of submission, in the happiness of trusting in Christ. The only way in which a man can thus have self put under and hidden from him is to come to Christ, and have the glory and love of God absorb him, being revealed to him in

faith, and not by sight. Believing, it asks nothing more. Its new life is all natural to it; a life which lives and acts of itself, without calculation and without effort. It is humble without knowing or speaking of its humility; it is divinely wise without analyzing its wisdom; it is full of kindness and love apparently without any consciousness how kind and loving it is. It worships God, even without formally thinking of God, because THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS WITHIN IT. Its yea is yea, and its nay is nay, without suspicion. It is not more full of faith, than it is full of holy simplicity. It is like a little child. It is an infant Jesus. This state of the soul is the true spiritual preparative for the various forms of duty: namely, a state of the soul, in which the soul is in harmony with itself, because it is in harmony with God; in which it is at rest in itself, because it has rest in God. A soul in this state is prepared for all times, places, and occasions; prepared for the intercourse of society, prepared for the seasons and duties of worship, prepared for outward and effective action. Cease, therefore, from the action of self, in order that the soul may rest continually upon the Great Centre. When, through weakness of purpose, or want of faith, we become, as it were, *uncentered*, it is of immediate importance to turn again gently and sweetly inward; and thus bring the soul into harmony with the desires and purposes of God. The more we are in this state, the more we shall be likely to be; that is to say, the more we exercise love and trust in God, the more we shall be likely to exercise them. The powerful law of habit, which is continually in exercise, gives new strength day by day, and the more the soul becomes like God, the more clearly it discerns God's excellencies; and the more distinctly and fully it feels his attracting power. And when we have become NOTHING and God ALL; when we have lost ourselves, then God finds us, not to despise and reject us, but to come into the heart which is now made empty and clean for his reception, and to set up his kingdom there forever.

But now our abandonment or entire

the face of Jesus Christ. It is easy to conquer self, when Christ and his glory fill the heart; impossible when the heart is not filled with and fixed on Christ. If Christ and heaven do not fill the heart, the world and self will; no man can get self out, but by letting Christ in; you cannot possibly remove the darkness, but by letting in the light; and where this heavenly light is not admitted to reign, spiritual depravity and darkness will reign. But when we lose our life, let self go, and care nothing about it, are content that anything should happen to it, then we save it; or, rather, Christ saves it for us, Christ gives it back to us, gives himself to us as a new self, takes up his dwelling in us as the self of self, the soul of our souls, the object and end of everything, and then we are happy. Where Christ abides and reigns, there is nothing but peace and happiness. Thou wilt keep him in *perfect* peace, whose soul is stayed on thee, because he trusteth in thee.

I thought, says the soul, in my romantic dreams of heaven without toil and suffering, without the need of purifying fires endured, that my path was to be all the way through the land *Boulah*. I never dreamed of the crucible, nor of the mortifying discoveries of dross, instead of Christ—dross which must rise to the surface before it could be removed, and which, in so rising to be removed, might conceal Christ from the soul, even while it was the virtue of Christ's grace in the soul that was separating the dross from it. To me it seemed *all* dross, when I was expecting solid gold and silver. I thought my Lord would new-create me at once into a jewel, without the fires and files and cutting instruments of such sharp discipline. But how can all this be done? God must make the soul itself the instrument in all this, if he would have the holiness of the soul to be a habit, and not an exotic, set as it were in a hot-house. The natural soil, in the air and climate of this world, must produce the plant, which God sows, which God causes to spring up, which God waters, if the plant would live and thrive. Or, if it is too much to say that the natural soil must produce it, we must say at least that it must

consecration to God is a matter of so much consequence, that God will not fail to give us opportunities to try or test whether it be a true one or not. No man can be wholly the Lord's unless he is wholly consecrated to the Lord; and no man can know whether he is thus wholly consecrated, except by tribulation. That is the test. To rejoice in God's will, when that will imparts nothing but happiness, is easy even for the natural man. But none but the renovated man can rejoice in the Divine will, when it crosses his path, disappoints his expectations, and overwhelms him with sorrow. Trial, therefore, instead of being shunned, should be welcomed as the test, and the only true test of a true state. Beloved souls, there are consolations which pass away; but ye will not find true and abiding consolation except in entire abandonment, and in that love which *loves the cross*. He, who does not welcome the cross, does not welcome God. Supposing, then, that God should smite you with afflictions without, and with temptations within, and should leave the soul, so far as consolations are concerned, in a state of entire aridity? Do, then, I would say, what God requires you to do, and suffer what he requires you to suffer; but in everything be resigned and patient. With humility of spirit, with a sense of your own nothingness, with the reiterated breathings of an ardent but peaceful affection, and with inward submission, and quietness, you must wait the return of the Beloved. In this way you will demonstrate, that it is God himself alone and his good pleasure which you seek, and not the selfish delights of your own sensations. Leave what is past in oblivion; leave what is to come to the decisions of Providence; and devote to God the present moment,—a moment which necessarily brings with it God's eternal order of things, and in everything, excepting sin, is a declaration of his will: By casting ourselves into the simple presence of God, in the exercise of faith, we shall find instant supplies of strength for our support. This was the succor sought for by David,—“I have set,” saith he, “the Lord always before me; because he is at my right

be produced by grace in the natural soil, and in spite of it, and it must be able to grow under all varieties of air and climate, or it will never be fit to be transplanted to heaven.

hand, I shall not be moved. Therefore my heart is glad, and my glory rejoiceth; my flesh also shall rest in hope." And it is said in Exodus, "The Lord shall fight for you, and ye shall hold your peace."

If now there be found a correspondency in the religious prose of the two authors in question, as here presented, it will be still more apparent in their religious poetry; of which we present a few fragments in parallel columns.

FROM THE WINDINGS.

O save me from myself, Saviour Divine!
Then only I'm redeemed, when I am thine.
Turn thou mine eye, my heart, my life to Thee,
That even in self, Christ only I may see.

Fain would I make my Lord my only aim,
In all pursuits still think on his dear name,
For Him prepare my soul, from sin forbear,
Aspire to Heaven, because my Lord is there.

Lord, Thou canst conquer self, but Thou alone!
Set up within my soul thy glorious throne;
Let every thought, wish, expectation be
Brought in subjection, by thy love, to Thee.

Then will I fly on angels' wings abroad,
All care dismissed, but just to please my Lord:
'Tis perfect freedom, if Thou reign in me,
And where Thou art, there shall thy servant be!

THE JOY OF THE CROSS.

1. It shall forever be my pride,
My comfort in all grief,
That Christ for guilty sinners died,
Of whom I am the chief.
Paul's boast was Jesus crucified,
And I'll count all things lost beside.
2. They tell me there's a thousand things
I ought not to forego;
That this world's estimate of things
Must not be slighted so.
But I know what my Lord will say,
He tells me 'tis a dangerous way.
3. Since this world never was his friend,
It never shall be mine;
His life was suffering to its end,
Nor was it his design,
That his own followers should be
Much happier in this world than he.
4. It is a world of toil and pain;
Because 'tis full of sin;
I sure have nothing here to gain.
If I my Lord would win.
A place of labor 'tis for me,
Since I his servant mean to be.
5. By faith I see my happy home,
'Tis built beyond the skies;
How fair that city's pearly gates
— And shining walls arise!
There never scowls come, nor night,
God is the everlasting Light.
6. And I, though vile, may enter there,
Because my Saviour died for me;
And in the fountain of his blood
From sin I shall be free.
He'll clothe me in a robe divine,
And make me in his image shine.

MADAME GUYON.

'Thou, Lord, alone, art all thy children's need,
And there is none beside:
From thee the streams of blessedness proceed;
In thee the bless'd abide.
Fountain of life, and all-abounding grace,
Our source, our centre, and our dwelling-place.

The love of thee flows just as much
As that of ebbing self subsides:
Our hearts (their scantiness is such)
Bear not the conflict of two rival tides.
Both cannot govern in one soul;
Then let self-love be dispossest'd:
The love of God deserves the whole,
And will not dwell with so despised a guest.
That we should bear the cross in thy command,
Die to the world, and live to self no more;
Suffer unmoved, beneath the rudest hand;
When shipwreck'd—pleased, as when upon the shore.

My soul! rest happy in thy low estate,
Nor hope, nor wish to be esteemed or great:
To take the impression of a will Divine,
Be that thy glory, and those riches thine.
Confess him righteous in his wise decrees,
Love what he loves, and let his pleasures please:
Die daily; from the touch of sin recede;
Then thou hast crowned him, and He reigns in-
deed.
Ah, then! to his embrace repair;
My soul, thou art no stranger there:
There love divine shall be thy guard,
And peace and safety thy reward.

THE JOY OF THE CROSS.

Long plunged in sorrow, I resign
My soul to that dear hand of thine,
Without reserve or fear;
That hand shall wipe my streaming eyes,
Or into smiles of glad surprise
Transform the falling tear.

Adieu! ye vain delights of earth,
Inspid sports, and childish mirth,
I taste no sweets in you;
Unknown delights are in the cross,
All joy beside to me is dross,
— And Jesus thought so too.

The Cross! Oh ravishment and bliss—
How grateful 'e'en its anguish is;
Its bitterness how sweet!
There every sense, and all the mind,
In all her faculties refined,
Taste happiness complete.

Jesus, avenger of our fall,
Thou faithful lover, above all
The cross have ever borne!
Oh tell me,—life is in thy voice,—
How much afflictions were thy choice,
And a cloth and ease thy scorn!

7. The cross! the cross! I ever will
 Make this my boast, my joy, my pride;
 To all the world proclaiming still,
 I'm saved because my Saviour died.
 My song through all eternity
 Redemption by His death shall be!

Thy choice and mine shall be the same,
 Inspirer of that holy flame,
 Which must forever blaze!
 To take the cross and follow Thee,
 Where love and duty lead, shall be
 My portion and my praise.

It were easy to extend this parallel of correspondencies to other writers, as, for instance, between Professor Upham and Jonathan Edwards, or between Archbishop Leighton and John Newton. But the limits of a single review will not allow it. We see, by the correspondence already traced, that it is a concord of mind on the great subject of evangelical faith which has caused all the resemblances of thought and expression between authors so different in constitution, temperament, education, and times, as those here compared. And it is this agreement of holy minds on faith that, under God, is yet to bring to pass the true Church Unity, to realize which has been the longing aspiration of the good in every age, and is pre-eminently their aim and hope in the present; that the disciples of Christ *may all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ; that we henceforth be no more children (as in the infancy of the church), tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive; but speaking the truth in love, may grow up into him in all things, which is the head, even Christ; from whom the whole body fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love.*

Now it is the unitive element of a common Scriptural faith in Christ, the Head, that is yet to cement and fuse together all the minds that hold it, by a process in morals like that of *cementation* in chemistry, wherein by surrounding the solid bodies to be united with the reduced powder of the uniting substance, and then heating the whole to redness, iron is converted into steel, and glass into porcelain. In like manner shall all-harmonizing Christian faith, quickened into a more intense fire of life by the expected plenary advent of the Holy Spirit, and ever adding to the number, and clearness, and doctrinal value of the analogies and correspondencies of faith, transmitted along from age to age, while burning up as *flux* the wood, hay, stubble, of discordant human philosophies and non-essentials of difference, shall at length result in that blessed union of all true believers, and that good issue for re-

ligion, which was the great hope and strong inward zeal of our Pilgrim Fathers in establishing the colony at Plymouth—"the propagating and advancing," to use the words of Governor Bradford, "of the kingdom of Christ in these remote parts of the world; yea, though they should be but as stepping-stones unto others for performing of so great a work."

It is their sublime faith in God, as meaning the enlargement of religion by their means, all unconscious, meanwhile, of the seed of empire they were sowing, with them a secondary thing, or of the great social Republic of Liberty they were founding,—it is this lofty religious faith of theirs that projects them, as it were, into the future so far beyond every other colony that ever was or will be established again in our world. And it is this century-long faith of the New England Fathers which their offspring in the present age are bound to realize and see fulfilled. Using them as the steady granite stepping-stones which they were so glad to be,—stepping-stones, and tried corner-stones, elect, precious, which God only could lay,—from that broad old Pilgrim base we, their sons, are, under God, to rear the church of the future in a glorious harmony of proportions and magnificence of outline, like the New Jerusalem which John saw coming down from God out of heaven, having the glory of God to lighten it, whereinto there should in nowise enter anything that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie; but they which are written in the Lamb's Book of Life.

In that Church and Theology of the Future—a form of expression which we use only because something like it begins to be common at this day in certain quarters—whose germ lay in Robinson's little band at Leyden two hundred and forty years ago, will not the great feature be, a new personal realizing of God by faith, as he is in Emmanuel, God-with-us, the Man-Christ-Jesus? Not the vague, pantheistic realizing, as some argue, or rather hazily poetize up in the airy regions of the mind, of God in man—the godlike in human nature—the Divine biography in humanity—the latent divinity in man—the realm of the Divine bosom laid bare, and the freedom of that realm given to man, in order to make him a saviour of himself by coming into a line with the Divine thinking; and so getting that piety which is defined to be but a stream of God's thoughts, made to flow through the soul by the motion of that Holy Spirit, which is again transcendently said to be but the Divine inspiration always resident, though latent, in the bosom of humanity. How can we tolerate such æsthetic babblement in theology, professing to be religious philosophy and

Christian thinking, when it is at best but the foam of transcendental mysticism? Is there not reason to fear that the late imagined discoveries in the speculative region of Christianity do all come as vapors from a deceived heart feeding on ashes, and from being vainly puffed up with the fleshly mind, and not **HOLDING THE HEAD**? Banished forever from the American pulpit be all illusory and artistic word-play like this, such a mockery to the soul's want, and such a dishonor upon God's holy Word, whose entrance to the soul giveth light; the clear solar light of truth and reason, not beautiful misty moonbeams, or the dim shadows of sublime gnostic darkness.

Thanks be to God, it is not of elements like these that the Christian thinking of the age to come is to be formed. The orthodoxy of the future is not to be spun out of cobweb or silkworm threads of thought in the cocoonery of men's minds that can see no absolute necessity of a vicarious atonement for sin, and nothing but an artistic form or dramatic display in the vast scheme of human redemption, nor aught but a demi-god in its great achiever. Nor is it to be woven in the logic-loom of any low system of self-complacent optimism that makes the prime end of all things rather the good of the universe than the development and display of the Divine character and glory; and that can see no excellence, or moral character even, in the world's Almighty Sovereign, or in any of his creatures, aside from his acts. No: the great feature of the theology and church of the future, we are persuaded, will be the better realizing, the clearer apprehending, admiring, loving, and adoring that incarnate mystery of godliness, God personally manifest in the flesh (not merely artistically expressed or painted), justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory, and now apprehensible by faith, as the soul's wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption, until He come. The nearer the world gets, in Time's solemn drama, to its last great Act, when He shall return in the clouds of heaven, with power and great glory, to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe, the more intense, doubtless, will be the aspirations of the regenerated human mind toward Him, and the clearer the faith of the Christian church in his Divine personality, godhead, reign, and glory, and victory over sin. It may be rationally expected, therefore, that the theology of the future will be re-illuminated,

Like another moon, risen on mid-noon,

by a fresh suffusion of faith from the great gospel sun of glory,

ere long to rise, in His second advent, full-orbed and glorious, upon a wondering, perhaps a scoffing world, in which there shall be the expecting few of God's people to say to him,—This is the Lord; we have waited for him; we will rejoice and be glad in him.

Is not this both a reasonable and Scriptural pre-conception of the theology of the future; and so warranted, too, by some of the signs of the times, as to appear natural as well as prophetic?

Even as the sun,
Ere it has risen, sometimes paints its image
In the atmosphere; so often do the spirits
Of great events stride on *before* events,
And in *to-day* already walks *to-morrow*.

The spirit of the future even now gilds the present; propitious rays from *to-morrow* are seen illuminating the shrines of "Liberal Christianity," and they redden in the light of a better morning, whose sun is yet to rise. Their pulpits begin to speak in a tone of earnestness and solemnity far beyond mere moralizing or sentimentality. And if the doctrinal basis of this new kind of Sabbath-preaching and social exhorting and praying, be not yet exactly defined, it must inevitably demand and lead to such exactness ere long. One, out of a volume of late discourses on the Christian life, from a Unitarian pulpit in Boston, has this significant passage, which we quote here as indicating, along with other symptoms, the reflux of the tide back to evangelicalism:—"Do you believe, once more, a thing so worthy of all acceptance as that Jesus Christ came to save and reconcile you to God? Take ancient statements of the doctrine, or modern ones, or put aside as faulty all the speculations upon it ever clothed in human speech; disbelieve what you will in theories respecting the cause or the process; but do you believe positively the thing? If you do, your faith will have irresistible power over you. It is proved to be but infidelity's dead profession if it do not. The sick man, hearing of sunny climes which have a balsam in the very air to pour healing through the avenues of disease, bids adieu to all, however dear, in home, and friends, and native land,—for the sake of the body, the poor, perishing body, that must here, there, or somewhere, find and fall into its earthly grave,—to seek the warm isle or southern continental shore. And, oh! the sinner, spiritually poor, empty, sickly, if he believe in a Redeemer who can break the power of sin, and raise him above his own selfish and wayward will into the life of virtue and of God, will not stay long in cool debate respecting the origin and person of that Redeemer, but will run to him, as, in all

his instructions and precepts, life and death, the enricher, benefactor, physician of his soul.”

As another of those signs of progress that are significant respecting the future, elaborate arguments are making their appearance in Unitarian Quarterlies, for the study of Systematic Theology; and something else is required now from the Professors and Doctors of Liberal Christianity, than “State-ments of Reasons for not Believing.” Creeds, if repudiated and denied in name, are wanted and sought for in fact. The great pillars of the Calvinistic faith are now blindly felt after, for support, not for overthrow, by theological Sampsons of the opposition, that have been vainly grinding in the bondage-house of Neology and Naturalism. The soul’s deep want of the doctrines of grace for its building-ground, begins to be realized by many thinking minds that have hitherto withheld assent to them in their dogmatic forms: The whole educated American mind has become thoroughly impregnated with, if not “dialectically imbedded” in the cardinal truths of orthodox theology. And although German pantheism may unsettle or mystify the faith of some, with its poetry and its babble of organic laws and channels of deific communication, and all-pervading impersonal inspiration throughout the bosom of organized humanity; yet do we believe that the clear common-sense element of the New England mind, not easily stultified by sophisms, or antitheses, or brilliant epigrams, will at length float free above it, defeated and unmixed.

And if the Orthodox American clergy be only true to Christ and his Church, the importations of false philosophy from abroad, in the taking costume of originality, will only do for our Puritan theology what, we trust in the all-wise providence of God, the influx of foreign immigration is doing for the race of Native Americans, that is, as we have seen it somewhere suggested, raising them in successive generations to higher spheres of Christian civilization, by *crowding underneath them successive strata* of yet uncultivated immigrant workers. In like manner, we believe, is the Puritan theology—or what some men please to call the rugged abstractions of Calvinism, that have inspired all their vigor and hardiness into the institutions of our giant Republic—after the same manner is it to be lifted to its place of power in the Church of the future, by the conflict with, and crowding under of successive forms of error; and these latter shall be themselves in due time heaved up and translated into the regions of truth by other crowding

¹ Discourses on the Christian Spirit and Life, by C. A. Bartol, junior minister of West Church, Boston.

proteanisms of falsehood and heresy, until error and evil shall be finally driven from the world.

To that blessed result in the good time coming do all things tend. We rejoice to recognize and point to its signs, which are also signs of the coming of the Son of Man. The present aspect of Unitarianism to Orthodoxy is one of those signs. It inspires the good hope that those definite views of revealed religion, and especially evangelical faith in Christ as an atoning, justifying new-creating, and sanctifying Saviour, through his being made a sin-offering for us, that God might be just, and yet justify the guilty—views which have been so long unknown to the Unitarian pulpit, because not contained hitherto in Unitarian theology—it inspires the good hope that they will yet be proclaimed with light and power, from the metropolitan citadel of New England Unitarianism. Ideas that have been dead-ripe, and lived upon as food among Presbyterians and New England Calvinists; ever since the days of Edwards, begin now, for the first time, to be plucked and eaten with pleasure, and commended as good fruits by those who style themselves the advocates of liberal Christianity. And would to God that as the effect of such food, the soul's very *pabulum vitæ*, upon our Unitarian brethren, that the electric religious fire which has been hitherto, for the most part, confined to that portion of the pulpit called orthodox, and there by no means perennial, would that it might now begin to leap, and lighten, and thunder from the rostrums of Liberal Christianity also. Let the ancient Promethean element of earnest faith in Christ be only seen to blaze from Unitarian pulpits as from old Kidderminster, kindled at the altar of God's Word, and by devout communion with that Holy Spirit who can enrich with all knowledge and utterance, and the people would swarm to hear. It were a cheering sight to see the cold moonbeams of a dead orthodoxy, whether in Old England or New, glowingly eclipsed by the auroral splendors of a new dispensation of light, love, and power, knowing nothing but Jesus Christ and him crucified. There are many things that indicate a glorious sun not far below the horizon, from which there are shooting from time to time most hopeful heralds of the dawn. Yea, may we not be altogether certain that an era is near, in which there shall be so much deeper an appreciation by faith, of Christ and him crucified on the part of his ministers, generally that, as of old, they shall *so speak* that which they know, and testify that they have seen of the good Word of God, and of the powers of the world to come, that a great multitude shall believe, and become obedient to the faith?

It is but rational to expect, in the providence of God, that

the evangelizing of the Unitarian Church and theology, and its return to the faith once delivered to the saints, shall be effected as the Reformation in the Church of Rome was, by men born and reared in that communion. Let the law as a schoolmaster bring heartily to Christ a few of its leading ministers; let them struggle up, as Luther did, from the abyss of self and sin into a clear and joyous view of Christ crucified, and justification by faith alone, and then they will so preach—earnest souls who have found to souls who are seeking—that they will carry their congregations along with them without knowing it, into the Church and Theology of the future, just as the Boston Exodus from Orthodoxy into Unitarianism was insensibly effected about the beginning of the present century. Under the law of action and re-action which governs all human progress, whether in liberty or religion, that portion of the church called Unitarian is now, we may believe, in the act of resilience from its lamentable defection fifty years ago. This happy recoil of the more serious and believing portion of the Unitarian communion is, no doubt, hastened by the late swing which the pendulum of Liberal Christianity has been taking into the regions of pantheistic transcendentalism and infidelity. It is clearly seen that nothing but a liberal swing the other way can now restore the balance and reclaim Unitarianism from mere hopeless neology and free thinking. Earnestness in religion, positiveness in belief, and aggressiveness upon sin, are, therefore, now loudly called for in its ministry, and they will be demanded louder still, until Melancthons and Zuingliuses, if not Luthers and Calvins, shall be heard from its pulpits, and seen in its theological chairs. And can it be doubted that the men are now in the process of training by the great Head of the church, in all its denominations, whose mission it shall be to inaugurate anew in the church the blessed era of evangelical holiness and philanthropy by faith? We fervently hope they are, and we believe, furthermore, that the study of such books on Christian experience as the Windings of the River of the Water of Life, and the Life of Faith, and the Memoirs of Madame Guyon, will do not a little, in the providence of God, toward training them.

And amidst much in the times to alarm, this is something to cheer, in the aspect of American Christianity, that there is a growing relish and supply of works like those on the Life of God in the soul of man; and that there is a manifest tendency to intercommunion in all sections of the church, on the Scriptural basis of one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism—or the three onlies of D'Aubigné,—the Word of God only, the Grace of Christ only, the Work of the Spirit only. Much has been done

during the half century which is now closing, to elucidate the meaning of the Divine Word, especially of its symbolical language, and to establish sound principles of Biblical criticism; much has been done also to systematize, condense, and simplify our theology; to give definitiveness and certainty to our doctrinal terms and statements, and to distinguish between things that differ and things that agree; and to draw the lines and plant the stakes between essentials and non-essentials. The barricades have thus been strengthened between truth and error: the great bulwarks of the Calvinistic faith, by ratiocination, by sound philosophy, and by the Word of God, have been rendered forever impregnable; true Protestantism has been more intensely Protestantized; Romanism has been made to come out of cover, whether in the Church of England, or in the apostate Church of Rome; and the way has been prepared among the nations for the *remnant of Jacob to be in the midst of many people, as a dew from the Lord, as the showers upon the grass, that tarrieth not for man, nor waiteth for the sons of men.*

The gain to the cause of spiritual religion by all this has been great. Let there now only become general in the church that personal affection to, and self-appropriation of Christ, which appears in the letters of Samuel Rutherford, Robert McCheyne, and often also in the familiar epistles of that rugged but hearty hero and man of God, Oliver Cromwell; and what then would be wanting to the ideal of a millennial church, but the actual millennial conquest of the world? And the promise of the plenary gift of the Comforter in such a case being supposed to be fulfilled, and our religious machinery for the transmission of that spiritual power, when communicated, throughout the world, being already so excellent and wisely adapted to its end, what then would hinder the world's rapid subjugation to that adorable Saviour, who is in our day, even as foretold in prophecy, so signally overturning the dynasties of earth, preparatory to his own glorious reigning the King of nations as he is the King of saints? Let there be only realized, then, more generally this personal union of believers, the members with Christ the Head, and the close of the next half century will find the church far gone into the promised millennium of holiness and joy: and what we now call the theology of the future will be the proven and joyous possession of the present by millions on millions of sanctified minds.

The great feature of that theology we have endeavored herein to exhibit in its true place *behind* and under it, like a rudder, giving its direction to the ethical progress of our age. Where now shall we look for the man to put at the wheel in

front, and with a clear out-look forward? Since God has taken to his place among the sanctities of heaven the mighty Moses of the Free Church of Scotland, is it not reasonable to look for some American Chalmers, that shall be as a Joshua to all Christendom, to put it in possession of the land of rest? Without being suspected of hero-worship, may we not justly look for the matured theologian of the age yet to appear in this world of the West, somewhere in the lineage of the Puritans, baptized and disciplined by the Holy Ghost and by fire, and not bound to any school or party, with whom, it shall be said hereafter in the theological world, under guidance of God,

Magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo.

From the depths of that future now not distant or unknown, we summon and hail the mighty master-spirit yet to come. Raised to a high vantage-ground by the appropriated eclectic wisdom of the past, God himself, in answer to prayer, shall pour into that mind a new influx of the truth and light which holy Robinson two centuries ago foresaw yet to break forth out of his Word. And the entire church of the Future, strongly united under the simplified and clear missionary theology of the Cross, shall make the earth tremble with its tread, as it advances joyously to the world's conquest for Christ.

The way is marked,
The guide appointed, and the ransom paid.
Alas! the nations, who of yore received
These tidings, and in Christian temples meet
The sacred truth to acknowledge, linger still;
Preferring bonds and darkness to a state
Of holy freedom, by redeeming love
Proffered to all, while yet on earth detained.
So fare the many; and the thoughtful few,
Who in the anguish of their souls bewail
This dire perverseness, cannot choose but ask,
Shall it endure?—Shall enmity and strife,
Falsehood and guile, be left to sow their seed;
And the kind never perish? Is the hope
Fallacious, or shall righteousness obtain
A peaceable dominion, wide as earth,
And ne'er to fail?—The law of faith
Working through love, such conquest shall it gain,
Such triumph over sin and guilt achieve?
Almighty Lord, thy further grace impart!
And with that help the wonder shall be seen
Fulfilled, the hope accomplished, and thy praise
Be sung with transport and unceasing joy!

ARTICLE II.

MILTON AND BUTLER—AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR PARTIES.

By PROF. E. D. SANBORN, Dartmouth College, N. H.

EVERY age has its conservatives and reformers. Cavaliers and Roundheads, Tories and Whigs existed in England, long before the age of Charles II. Such party appellations may be accidental and local, while the principles by which the respective parties are governed are necessary and universal. The struggle between the king's prerogative and the people's liberty, which brought Charles I. to the block, was by no means peculiar to that age and nation; such contests exist in every age and nation where there is a substantial middle class of citizens. Under despotic governments, where there are but two classes, nobles and slaves, the spirit of reform is easily stifled, and the cry of the oppressed seldom reaches the ear of the monarch. But where the power of the sovereign is limited, either by an enlightened public opinion, as in Prussia during the reign of the late Frederic William III., or by well-defined constitutional barriers, as in England since the accession of the House of Brunswick, there is always an incessant strife between the *claims* of the crown and the *rights* of the people. Men in power are usually conservatives. Whigs become Tories when they take the reins of government. While in the ranks of opposition; it is for their interest to advocate the rights of the many. A more elevated position cools their patriotism and their affection for the people. The rewards of office are generally sufficient to purchase the allegiance of time-serving politicians. *Rebellion* has often begun at court; *reform*, never. Disappointed and discarded favorites may, and often do, revolt and attempt to subvert their rivals; but full-fed and well-paid parasites have never been known to quarrel with their perquisites. They have too much humanity to bite the hand that feeds them. Henry VIII. reconciled his nobles to a dissolution of the monasteries and an illegal seizure of church property, by dividing among them the avails of this princely robbery. The nobles of that age were never troubled with tender consciences. Their religion was identical with their temporal interests. Their faith was like their robes of state, to be used only on gala days and in the king's presence. A noble martyr, for matters of religion apart from political

considerations, was never known in England. They could die for anything but their faith. The advocates of wholesome and judicious reform, and a majority of the martyrs of liberty and religion, were from England's untitled yeomanry. They rose from the midst of the multitude whose sufferings they shared and whose rights they defended. The honest and true-hearted advocates of political and religious reform are usually the victims of oppression. The satirical Butler teaches the same sentiment:

"For *True* and Faithful's sure to lose,
Which way soever the game goes;
And whether parties lose or win,
Is always nick'd, or else hedg'd in.
While power usurp'd; like stol'n delight,
Is more bewitching than the right.
And when the times begin to alter,
None rise so high as from the halter."

The best friends of humanity have ever been among the poor and persecuted. In all genuine reforms, the opposing parties are usually presented before the public in their very worst attire. They are arraigned at the bar of history for their *faults* and *excesses*, while their *virtues* are overlooked or forgotten. Decided opposition to expressed opinions always drives their advocates to the assumption of stronger grounds of defence; and, when the position assumed in the beginning is defective or radically wrong, a retreat to still stronger holds of wickedness often gives the public functionary as well as the reformer a bad eminence. Moreover, opposing champions always seize upon the most faulty characteristics and the most vicious arguments of their adversaries when they would hold them up to public contempt. Hence, in heated party strifes, it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain the truth. "He that is first in his own cause seemeth just; but his neighbor cometh and searcheth him." It is the office of the impartial historian to weigh the arguments of special pleaders and bring in a verdict according to the testimony. It is a rare thing, however, for a historian to lay aside his religious and political predilections when he assumes the office of critic. His sympathies incline to this or that party according to his previous education and habits. Hence it oftener happens that the facts of history are misquoted or distorted to prove the writer's theory, than that truth is elicited when overwhelmed by partisan misrepresentations. But the concealment of truth secures but a short-lived triumph. There are other sources of information respecting the character of active partisans besides the historian's perverted record. National literature is the true mirror of the

popular mind and heart. A book cannot be popular unless it reflects the true image of public opinion. Partisan literature may be presumed to represent the views of the party that patronize it. The character both of the writer and the reader may be learned from the *subject* chosen and the *arguments* adopted by the one, and approved by the other. Every author leaves the impress of his own character upon the page he writes. The political and religious opinions of an author may usually be learned from his works. The choice of a subject reveals his private predilections. The style of treatment he adopts discovers his prevailing tastes, and the very words and illustrations which he selects as the dress of his thoughts display at once his mental habits and his intellectual stores. The famous saying of Buffon, "*Le style—c'est l'homme*," is so undeniably true, that we may assume it as the basis of our argument. It is to be presumed that every writer will choose a subject which is agreeable to him ; his style; his modes of illustration and argument, will also have reference to his own taste as a standard of authority. An elevated subject can have no affinity with vulgar discourse. The converse of this is equally true:

"Versibus exponi tragicis res comica non vult:
Indignatur item privatis ac prope socco
Dignis carminibus narrari cena Thyestæ."

Consequently the *choice* and *treatment* of a subject cannot fail to indicate the moral preferences of the writer.

As appropriate examples of what we affirm, we would refer to the writings of Swift and Addison, who were contemporaries. Of the latter it may be said, "*Nihil tetigit quod non ornavit*;" of the former, "*Nihil tetigit quod non foedavit*." The refined taste, polished style, and elegant thoughts of Addison, made him the ornament of his own age and the model of succeeding ages. The keen wit, caustic satire, and vulgar dialect of Swift, made him the terror of his contemporaries and the aversion of posterity. Addison, by his winning eloquence and elevated sentiments, arrested the attention of the thoughtless, reclaimed the vicious, and confirmed the good. Swift, gifted with an intellect above his peers, employed it in the service of factious partisans, or for private revenge, while his innate vulgarity soiled every subject of which he wrote. His friendship was as polluting as his enmity ; his eulogies as indecent as his vituperations. He pandered to the lowest intellectual appetites of his age, and chose to float down the turbid stream of vulgar passion rather than to stem its current and resist its encroachments.

Addison stood on a moral eminence infinitely above him. In all that he wrote, he aimed at the improvement of the public taste and morals. He never stooped to flatter the crowd. Consequently he has left few lines on record which the severest moralist would wish to blot. What is true of the style of these two writers may be applied, with little change, to the writings of Milton and Butler. The age in which they lived was one of intense excitement. Both the good and the bad qualities of men were developed in excess. There was no moderation in the piety or profanity of the age. Society was stirred to its very depths. Great interests were at stake. Important principles were discussed. Nothing less than man's *rights* and *duties* occupied the mind of every thoughtful citizen. A nation had risen from a state of political depression and religious tyranny to storm the strong-holds of power.

The English had suddenly become a nation of reasoners and debaters. Such a scene of mental activity in discussing themes of momentous interests, both for time and eternity, was never before witnessed in the world's history. Every man chose his party according to his convictions of duty or his interest. The advocates of reform acted from a settled belief in the truth and rectitude of their principles. The Conservatives stood upon prescription and prerogative. Duty warred with interest; liberty with oppression; piety with formality; and truth with error. Multitudes of brave men were found ready to do battle both for the king's prerogative and for the people's liberty. But the valor of those who engaged in deadly strife upon the tented field was fully equaled by the moral courage of those fearless champions of popular liberty whose giant intellects elaborated, in the closet, those important truths which have since become the birthright of millions of freemen. It required no ordinary courage in the advocates of reform to publish the truth in the ears of the tyrant and his abettors; for on the part of their oppressors there was power. The wealth, the rank and fashion of the nation were with the king. To advocate the unpalatable doctrines of *equality* and *liberty* was for the writer to set a price upon his own head. The leaders of the rebellion were set, as a broad target, for the enemy's missiles. Those who wield the sword and those who hold the pen, in an aggressive warfare upon old abuses, are ever the aversion of tyrants. Among the defenders of civil and religious liberty, Milton stands pre-eminent. He is known and honored chiefly for his sublime poetry; but had he never penned a verse or "built the lofty rhyme," his prose compositions would have secured to him an immortality of fame. His mind was well stored with various learning. He had studied

and appreciated almost everything which was then available to the scholar, both in literature and science. Gifted with a peerless intellect, he applied his whole soul to the great problem of his age—the establishment of human freedom upon an immovable basis. He knew his mission. He felt the interests of the world resting upon his shoulders and, like Atlas, he nerved his manly form to sustain the burden. He was so far exalted above his coadjutors, in mental power, that he became the object of united assault from the foes of freedom. If he sometimes stooped from his elevated position to battle with his bitter assailants upon their own level, every man having human sympathies, and knowing his trials, can pardon the asperity of the writer on account of the principles he defended. All moral and religious progress is secured by conflict with error. The weapons of the warrior, in this struggle, must be keen and piercing, and, at the same time, strong and well-tempered. Milton, while conscious that the defence of truth against false and malignant foes required severity, felt bound to apologize for the use of it to his countrymen. "Surely," says he, "to every good and peaceable man, it must in nature needs be a hateful thing to be the displeaser and molester of thousands; much better would it like him, doubtless, to be the messenger of gladness and contentment, which is his chief intended business to all mankind, but that they resist and oppose their own true happiness. But when God commands to take the trumpet and blow a dolorous or a jarring blast, it lies not in man's will what he shall say or what he shall conceal."

We have thus briefly alluded to the active efforts of Milton in the cause of freedom and religion, in order to contrast his conduct, temper, taste, and, in a word, his whole life, with that of his contemporary, Samuel Butler, who, next to Milton, was perhaps the most learned man and the greatest poet of his times. These two poets may be taken as indices of their respective parties. In their tastes and habits they did not inaptly represent the great body of their associates. The Royalists were *gay, polite, profligate, and unprincipled*. The Republicans were *austere and rude in manners*, but, for the most part, *upright and honest in principles*. The two authors, whom we have chosen for comment, wrote for their respective parties. They knew what their patrons would approve, and while they pleased themselves in the choice of a theme, they were confident of pleasing those for whom they wrote by the discussion of it. Milton felt that the interests which he defended were too weighty to admit of vulgar levity, too solemn to allow the display of wit. Had he been commissioned from

on high to deliver his message to a profligate court, and to denounce the judgments of Heaven upon old transgressors, he could not have acted with a deeper sense of responsibility, or with more evident earnestness and devotion to truth. Accordingly, he uttered his convictions in the ears of waiting thousands with the dignity and sanctity of an inspired prophet, or an anointed king. While Milton was thus writing, not merely for his age, but for *eternity*, Butler, like a jeering Mephistophiles, employed his matchless wit in pouring ridicule and contempt upon the bold defenders of human rights. "Our author," says a writer in 1710, "lived some time with Sir Samuel Luke, who was of an ancient family in Bedfordshire; but, to his dishonor, an eminent commander under the usurper, Oliver Cromwell; and then it was, I am informed, he composed this loyal poem. For though fate, more than choice, seems to have placed him in the service of a knight so notorious, both in his person and politics, yet, by the rule of contraries, one may observe throughout his whole poem, that he was most orthodox, both in religion and loyalty. And I am the more induced to believe he wrote it about that time, because he had then the opportunity to converse with those living characters of rebellion, nonsense, and hypocrisy, which he so lively and pathetically exposes throughout his whole work."

The *loyalty* and *orthodoxy* of Butler were but the mark of his insincerity as a royalist and his infidelity as a churchman. He cared neither for church nor state, any further than these institutions promoted his private interests. These assertions we hope to verify from his own writings. He adhered to that party which he confidently hoped would triumph. The success of the king under a monarchy which had outlived the storms of centuries was to be presumed, especially where the interests of the partisans corresponded with his wishes. In such a crisis few have the hardihood to propound doctrines at war with time-honored usages. Most men prefer to submit to present ills, and pray "that there may be peace and truth in their days," rather than resist the abuses of long-established authority. "Pauoi," says Seneca, "sunt qui consilio se suaque disponunt, ceteri eorum more qui fluminibus innatant *non eunt, sed feruntur*."

Butler consulted self and not truth in the adoption of his party. He deliberately chose his field of action and the weapons of his warfare. Every step of his progress reveals *the man* and *his admirers*. Many of the royalists were, no doubt, courteous, brave, and loyal. But their loyalty was devoted to a bigoted and perjured monarch, whose violation of the public laws of the realm, as well as his own solemn pledges, rendered him

entirely unworthy of a nation's fealty. The old Cavaliers of the age of Charles I. worshiped the badges of power, after all those regal virtues which rendered them honorable, at first, had departed. From *habit*, rather than *affection*, they paid willing homage to the shrine after it had been deserted by the presiding divinity. They exhibited a certain polish and refinement of manners, which served as a cloak for the most heartless libertinism. There were, no doubt, honest and good men among them, yet as a party, they were essentially corrupt. No motive but selfishness could induce them to defend acknowledged abuses, and sell themselves as the tools of regal and sacerdotal despotism. Accustomed to feed upon the royal bounty, they could not consent to bring the people into power. Of this party, after the restoration, Butler became the favorite. He advocated their vicious principles. He sold himself for a reward. He prostituted his various learning and peerless wit to the abuse of the true defenders of liberty and law. He did not creep from his hiding-place till the storm was overpast. During the civil war he forged his weapons, and waited for an opportunity to assault a fallen and powerless foe. Though he wrote his satire upon the Puritans while they were battling for freedom, he did not publish it till after the restoration of Charles II. Opposed to the Cavaliers stood the Roundheads, men whose stern integrity and invincible heroism find no parallel in the annals of time. They were chiefly from the middle class in society, equally removed from the corruptions of the court and the brutality of the mob. They were not men of letters; but men of sound sense. They understood their rights, and they knew how to maintain them. The Bible was their vade mecum, their text-book in politics and religion. They did not despise human learning, but they exalted the inspired record above all. They deemed the orators of Greece and Rome

"Far beneath the prophets
As men divinely taught, and better teaching,
The solid rules of civil government,
In their majestic, unaffected style;
Than all the oratory of Greece and Rome;
In them is plainest taught and easiest learnt
What makes a nation happy, and keeps it so."

They did not intentionally make war upon refined manners, and the blandishments of social life, but finding corruption and profligacy everywhere associated with gentility, they rejected the "unbought courtesies" of refined society, on account of the vice which was constantly concealed beneath them. "The Puritan," says Macaulay, "was made up of two different men:

the one all self-abasement, penitence, gratitude, passion ; the other proud, calm, inflexible, sagacious. He prostrated himself in the dust before his Maker ; but he set his foot on the neck of his king. In his devotional retirement, he prayed with convulsions, groans, and tears. He was half-maddened by glorious or terrible illusions. He heard the lyres of angels, or the tempting whispers of fiends. * * * But when he took his seat in the council, or girt on his sword for war, these tempestuous workings of the soul had left no perceptible trace behind them." These men felt that they were doing a work for other times. It caused them no terror to contemplate *death* as the consequence of their struggle for freedom of thought and action ; for death to them had lost its terrors. Their labor was *in time* ; their reward *in eternity*. Of these men, Milton was the champion. His lofty soul entertained a cordial sympathy for their pure principles, though he had no respect for their long visages, rude manners, and uncouth dress. These harmless badges did not offend him so long as they were merely the external symbols of a party doing battle for truth and freedom. He girded on his intellectual armor and bade defiance to the united hosts of oppression. Cromwell never was defeated in battle ; Milton never yielded in argument. The one achieved his victories in the field ; the other in the closet. They were both equally benefactors of their race. Milton illustrated with peerless eloquence those principles for which Cromwell, with his sword, carved a place in the English Constitution. The whole human race are debtors to these champions of liberty. Truth, which is "the daughter of time," will yet crown them both with unfading laurels.

Milton was Butler's senior only by four years. They were both in the very prime of manhood when the civil war commenced. Milton at once espoused the cause of liberty, and labored manfully in its defence, till his own fortunes were merged in the common calamity of his country, occasioned by the Restoration. Butler rendered no efficient service to any party during the disturbed times of the civil war and of the Commonwealth. "Then came those days never to be recalled without a blush—the days of servitude without loyalty, and sensuality without love, of dwarfish talents and gigantic vices, the paradise of cold hearts and narrow minds, the golden age of the coward, the bigot, and the slave. The king cringing to his rival, that he might trample on his people, sunk into a Viceroy of France, and pocketed, with complacent infamy, her degrading insults, and her more degrading gold. The caresses of harlots and the jests of buffoons regulated the measures of a government which had just ability enough to

deceive, and just religion enough to persecute." Before such a community, the two poets, Milton and Butler, in their own chosen fields, appeared as candidates for popular favor. Milton was *poor, persecuted, and blind*. He chose for his greatest work, which he designed to be the solace of his declining years, a theme, the most sublime and comprehensive, which could occupy the attention of mortals. Shut out from all intercourse with the world, he turned his thoughts from the highest temporal interests of mankind, on which he had spent the strength of manhood, to those which are measured and limited only by eternity. From the top of Pisgah he soared, in imagination, to the pure Empyréan where the Almighty Father

—— "Sits
High throned above all height."

Though the work seemed above the grasp of a finite intellect, yet he achieved it and transmitted it to posterity for their verdict. But Milton was not the favorite of his age. Butler was the idol of the court, and the party that sustained it. The first part of *Hudibras* appeared in 1666, four years before the publication of *Paradise Lost*. Butler was caressed and flattered by fawning courtiers; Milton was neglected and almost forgotten. *Hudibras* was immeasurably more popular than *Paradise Lost*. Never did two distinguished poets more justly represent the parties that patronized them than did Milton and Butler. *Paradise Lost*, with its sublime imagery, its spiritual agents and their mighty conflicts, seemed to be a very appropriate appendage of those momentous scenes in which the Puritans had been the prominent actors in their struggle for religious and civil freedom. *Hudibras*, with its biting sarcasm and wide-mouthed ridicule, was an equally appropriate finale of that solemn mockery of soulless loyalty, which restored a perjured Stuart to the throne of England. Both these works are replete with extensive erudition. Milton uses his intellectual treasures to elevate and refine his readers. Butler employs the fruits of an equally extensive culture, to cast contempt upon seriousness, and gild the baits of folly. The one wanders among the stars, listens to the music of the spheres, and catches the very symphonies of Heaven; the other grovels in the mud, soils his noble acquisitions with earth-born pollution, and feasts his soul with the noisy acclamations of an unprincipled faction. Milton wrote for the virtuous few; Butler for the thoughtless many. The one employed religious truth as the basis of his lofty imaginings, and never did uninspired intellect sustain a bolder flight; the other built his matchless rhymes upon the prejudices of the great, and never were un-

rivaled wit and extensive erudition associated with a more unworthy subject. Regarding the Puritans as excessively austere, he chose the opposite extreme of levity, and thus verified his own words:

"So men who one extravagance would shun,
Into the contrary extremes do run;
And all the difference is, that as the first
Provokes the other freak to prove the worst,
So, in return, that strives to render less
The last delusion with its own excess."

Butler chose Cervantes for his model, and aimed to set the follies of Puritanism on a level with those of knight-errantry. Hudibras answers to Don Quixote, and Ralpho to Sancho. The Spanish mock hero is the natural product of chivalry and Catholicism, and we always love the amiable enthusiast while we laugh at his follies. The Puritan mock hero is an unnatural compound of pedantry, knight-errantry, and fanaticism. We cannot possibly imagine a real Hudibras, though we read his adventures and listen to his prolix dissertations upon law, religion, and love. The character and conduct of Don Quixote are always consistent with his times and his own professions; but the life of Hudibras is a contexture of absurdities and incongruities. "In forming the character of Hudibras," says Johnson, "and describing his person and habiliments, the author seems to labor with a tumultuous confusion of dissimilar ideas. He had read the history of the mock knights-errant; he knew the motives and manners of a Presbyterian magistrate, and tried to unite the absurdities of both, however distant, in one personage. Thus he gives him that pedantic ostentation of knowledge which has no relation to chivalry, and loads him with martial encumbrances that can add nothing to his civil dignity." "The diction of the poem," adds the same critic, "is grossly familiar, and the numbers purposely neglected, except in a few places, where the thoughts, by their native excellence, secure themselves from violation, being such as mean language cannot express."

Though Hudibras has been greatly admired, we cannot suppose that any man was ever made wiser or better by it. "If the talent of ridicule," says Addison, "were employed to laugh men out of vice and folly, it might be of some use to the world; but instead of this we find that it is generally made use of to laugh men out of virtue and good sense, by attacking everything that is solemn and serious, decent and praiseworthy in human life." The mind of Butler was intrinsically mean and vulgar. He had no conception of true honesty and

integrity. Constantly associated with men who ruled by intrigue and lived by shifts, he learned to look upon *honesty* as a *pretence*, and *religion* as a *mask*. We may not deny that he possessed a profound knowledge of the world as well as unrivaled wit, but his mistake consisted in making the morality and religion of his party the standard by which he judged of others. Our poet wished to make his talents available for his support. He wanted not sagacity to perceive that any abuse of an unpopular party would be acceptable at Court. He labored long and patiently in scouting the last remains of piety and reverence for law and religion from the realm; and he received his reward. But the fruit that was matured at Court, under his fostering care, proved to him as bitter as the clusters of Sodom. Charles and his courtiers were systematically treacherous and ungrateful. They employed the wits of the age to aid them in ascending the heights of despotism, but when they had attained the summit of power, they contemptuously spurned from their feet the very supports by which they had climbed. Butler, in common with others, experienced their ingratitude and meanness. He learned, too late, that vice is a poor patron, and that "the wages of sin is death." Late in life he turned his merciless satire *against his own party*, and poured out full vials of wrath upon the deceitful herd who had flattered his vanity and withholden the wages of his servility. No Puritan author has ever been so severe upon the vices of the royalists as Butler. He had used the whole weight of his mighty intellect to sink the Puritans to the lowest hell of infamy and crime; but like his great prototype, whom he and his associates so loyally served, while contrasting the times of the stern Oliver with those of the libertine Charles, he might with all propriety exclaim,

"And in the lowest deep, a lower deep
Still threatening to devour me, opens wide,
To which the Hell I suffer seems a Heaven."

Butler represents the men of his age as not only zealously engaged in the service of the father of lies, but even affecting a *reputation for crimes which it was beyond their power to perpetrate*. For, says the satirist, they had

"On all occasions sought to be as civil
As possible they could t' his Grace, the *Devil*,
To give him no unnecessary trouble,
Nor in small matters to use a friend so noble.
But with their constant practice done their best
T' improve and propagate his interest.
For men have now made vice so great an art,
The matter of fact's become the slightest part;

And the debauch'd st actions they can do,
 Mere trifles to the *circumstance* and *show*.
 For 'tis not what they do that's now the sin,
 But what they *lewdly affect and glory in*,
 As if preposterously they could profess
 A forc'd hypocrisy of wickedness."

Again, alluding to the open vices of his contemporaries, he charges them with acting

"As if the laws of nature had been made
 Of purpose only to be disobeyed;
 Or man had lost his mighty interest
 By having been distinguish'd from a beast,
 And had no other way but sin and vice
 To be restored again to Paradise."

He also bears reluctant testimony to the comparative purity of the age of the Commonwealth:

"When an old proverb or an end of verse
 Could more than all our penal laws coerce,
 And keep men honest than all our furies
 Of jailers, constables, judges, and juries;
 Who were converted then with an old saying
 Better than all our preaching now and praying."

The king himself does not escape chastisement. In a paper entitled "Hudibras at Court," he describes the monarch's excessive fondness for the poem and his surprising neglect of the author, as follows:

"This prince, whose ready wit and parts
 Conquer'd both men and women's hearts,
 Was so o'ercome with Knight and Ralph,
 That he could never claw it off;
 He never eat, nor drank, nor slept,
 But Hudibras still near him kept;
 Never would go to church or so,
 But Hudibras must with him go;
 Nor yet to visit concubine,
 Or at the city feast to dine,
 But Hudibras must still be there,
 Or all the fat was in the fire.
 Now, after all, was it not hard
 That he should meet with no reward
 That fitted out this Knight and Squire,
 This monarch did so much admire?"

The concurrent testimony of friends and foes is, that Butler shared the common fate of all Charles's admirers, who was wont

"To leave his friends to starve and die,—
 A poor reward of loyalty."

A poet of the next century thus pathetically commiserates the extraordinary sufferings of the author of *Hudibras* :

"On Butler who can think without just rage,
The glory and the scandal of the age?
Fair stood his hopes when first he came to town,
Met everywhere with welcomes of renown;
Court'd and lov'd by all, with wonder read,
With promises of princely favor fed;
But what reward for all had he at last?
After a life in dull expectation past,
The wretch, at summing up his misspent days,
Found nothing left but *poverty and praise*;
Of all his gains by verse, he could not save
Enough to purchase flannel and a grave;
Reduc'd to want, he, in due time, fell sick,
Was fain to die and be interr'd on tick:
And well might bless the fever that was sent
To rid him hence, and his worse fate prevent."

For sixty years no stone marked the place where the remains of this gifted poet rested. A monument was at length erected in Westminster Abbey by a Mr. Barber, a printer in London, and an admirer of the principles of Butler. This office of affection is thus noticed by an epigrammatist of that age:

"Whilst Butler, needy wretch! was yet alive,
No gen'rous patron would a dinner give;
See him, when starv'd to death and turn'd to dust,
Presented with a monumental bust.
The poet's fate is here, in emblem, shown;
He ask'd for *bread* and he received a *stone*."

Butler undoubtedly suffered from the neglect of his friends; but, considering that his whole life was simply a negation of virtue and holiness, we do not pity him. When his king was in peril, he shrunk from the defence of him. When his party was restored to power, he entertained no higher wish than to bask in the sunshine of court favor. When his friends proved unkind, he became their bitterest foe. He proposed to himself no praiseworthy object as the end of life. To please the fancy and excite the mirth of a profligate court was his highest aim. The very applause he won, which was the sole reward of vicious toil, was gained at the expense of suffering virtue. He succeeded in making piety repulsive and contemptible with his party, and received at their hands the only reward to which his service was justly entitled—*permanent neglect*.

Turn from this picture to the life of John Milton. The rupture between the King and his Parliament occurred while

Milton was at Naples. He at once appreciated the nature and importance of the approaching conflict. "As I was desirous," says he, "to pass into Sicily and Greece, the melancholy intelligence from England of the civil war recalled me; for I esteemed it dishonorable for me to be lingering abroad, even for the improvement of my mind, when my fellow-citizens were contending for their liberty at home." He consecrated his *time, talents, and estate* to the popular cause. He applied himself with unwearied diligence to the defence of liberty, and, by incessant application to study and writing, at length induced permanent ill health, with total loss of sight. Even now he shows no signs of despondency or ill temper. The manly sentiments of his noble heart are beautifully expressed in that touching sonnet addressed to his friend Cyriac Skinner.

"Cyriac, this three years day, these eyes, tho' clear,
To outward view, of blemish or of spot,
Bereft of light their seeing have forgot;
Nor to their idle orbs doth sight appear
Of sun, or moon, or star, throughout the year,
Of man or woman;—yet I argue not
Against Heaven's hand or will, nor bate one jot
Of heart or hope; but still bear up and steer
Right onward. What supports me, dost thou ask?
The conscience, friend, to have lost them overpld
In liberty's defence, my noble task,
Of which all Europe rings from side to side:
This thought might lead me through the world's vain mask
Content, though blind, had I no better guide."

Bitter adversity called forth no complaints from him. Neither the desertion of friends nor the persecution of foes could rob him of his inward peace and hope. In the midst of reigning corruption,

"On evil days though fallen, and evil tongues;
In darkness, and with dangers compassed round
And solitude,"

he still maintained the same lofty equanimity. Such was the even tenor of his life in retirement; calm and serene was its close. Like the setting sun encompassed with clouds, his greatness was enhanced by the misfortunes which eclipsed his glory.

ARTICLE III.

PANTHEISM.

By ENOCH POND, D.D., Prof. in Bangor Theo. Seminary.

I. ITS NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS.

PANTHEISM is that form of religion which makes God everything, and everything God. It differs from Theism chiefly in the following particulars :

1. The Theist believes that God created the world and all it contains from nothing ; or at least, that he formed it from a *previously existing substance*,—a substance distinct from himself, and whose existence is necessary and eternal, like his own. The Pantheist denies both these positions. He affirms that there is but *one* substance or essence in the universe, and that all existing things have sprung from that. All are but varied modifications and exhibitions of this one universal substance or idea.

2. The Theist believes in the *personal* immortality of the soul ; that it is immortal, not only in its substance, but its *individuality* ; that it is to exist forever, a distinct, conscious, intelligent, active being. Pantheists generally, if not universally, deny this ; believing that, as the soul came forth from the substance of God, and is a part of his substance, so it will ultimately return to him, and be swallowed up in him. It is a wave now on the surface of the great ocean, but it will subside at length, and be lost in the abyss from which it came.

3. The Theist believes in a *personal God*, an *intelligent, active being*, by whom the worlds were made, and all things are sustained and controlled. The Pantheist denies this, and accounts for the existence of what are commonly called created things, through the operation of certain processes and laws, which are strictly necessary and eternal. These processes and laws, being personified, are called *God*, and their results are so many manifestations of God. The God of the Pantheist is, therefore, a *personification*, and not a person ; a *figure of speech*, and not a reality. There is to him no personal God : there is *no God* distinct from the universal substance and its inherent powers,—distinct from the processes and laws of nature, and the things which, through their operation, exist. These are the leading peculiarities of Pantheism, by which it is distinguished from the different forms of Theism. Other

and lesser marks of distinction will come into notice, in the progress of this discussion.

In what respects does Pantheism differ from *Atheism*? We answer: From certain forms of *Atheism*, it differs in no respect whatever. It is a covert, concealed *Atheism*,—so artfully concealed, as often to impose upon its votaries themselves, as well as upon others. They have much to say about God, and of the blessedness of being swallowed up in him, and becoming one with him; while, aside from the absolute Idea, the universal Substance, the laws and processes of Nature, there is to them no God, and they mean nothing by the term.

On this point, we agree with the late Henry Ware, Jr., of Cambridge. "Pantheism," he says, or a denial of the strict personality of God, is "a virtual denial of God. Indeed, this is the only sense in which it seems possible to make that denial. No one thinks of denying the existence of principles and laws. Gravitation, order, cause, and effect, truth, benevolence,—no one denies that these exist; and if these constitute the Deity, he has not been denied, and cannot be. The only denial possible is by the exclusion of a *personal existence*. There *can* be no *Atheism* but this; and *this is Atheism*. There is a personal God, or there is none."

II. DIFFERENT FORMS OF PANTHEISM.

Some persons, in their conceptions, make everything *matter*. The inherent powers and laws of nature are those of matter. To such their God is material. To them, there is no God, aside from the operations of material nature.—Others conceive of everything as *spirit*. They know nothing about matter, and believe nothing about it. The outer world is all nothing, aside from the sensations and conceptions of those who live in it. Theirs is a world of pure idealism. This is all the God of which they have any knowledge.—Others make a distinction, in terms, between matter and spirit, and yet they seem to recognize no essential difference. It is all one substance, essence, or idea, developing itself in several ways. Of this *universality*, whatever it may be, every being and thing is an integral part.

Some persons make God a *law*, a *process*, and not a substance of any kind. Some represent him as an idea, a feeling, and not an objective reality. And what is more strange, some, almost in our own times, have deified *themselves*. The *I* with them is everything. They can conceive of nothing (and, of course, no God) aside from the almighty and all-absorbing *I*.

The God of some Pantheists is *immanent* in nature, where

¹ Sermon on the Personality of God, p. 13.

it is working out results, according to necessary and eternal laws. With others, the grand moving principle is *emanative*. The great source of being is continually sending forth its streams, to wander in fixed courses for a time, and then flow back to the ocean from which they came. This *emanative* system is, perhaps, the oldest and the most widely diffused of any of the forms of Pantheism. It has entered deeply into other systems of religion, and has been a means of perverting and corrupting them.

III. HISTORY OF PANTHEISM.

No sooner did the knowledge of the true God pass away from the minds of men in ancient time, than we find them beginning to deify *nature*; or (which is the same) to deify those *processes* and *laws*, in accordance with which existing changes were seen to take place. This was Pantheism. Accordingly, in the earliest notices which have come down to us of the workings of the heathen mind on the subject of religion, we come directly in contact with Pantheistic theories and views.

So it was in *Egypt*, that old cradle of superstition and speculation, from which the treasures of "science, falsely so called," were imported into the neighboring countries. In proof of the Pantheism of ancient Egypt, we quote the following passages from the Hermaic or Trismegistic writings; which, though not as ancient as they claim to be, are yet allowed to contain the genuine doctrines of Thoth, or the Egyptian Hermes. "All things are the One, and the One all things." For as much as all things existed in the Creator, before they were made, he is properly said to be *all things*, whose members all things are." "The sensible world is the receptacle of all forms, qualities, and bodies, none of which can be quickened and vegetated without God; for *God is all things*, and all things are from God, and all things the effect of his will. And without God, there neither was anything, nor is, nor shall be; but all things are from him, and in him, and by him. If you will consider after a right manner, you shall learn that this sensible world, and all the things therein, are covered over with that higher world, (or Deity) as with a garment."

"The invisible God is most manifest; for there is *nothing in the whole world that he is not*. He is both the things that are, and the things that are not; for the things that are, he hath manifested; but the things that are not, he contains within himself." "For what shall I praise thee (the Su-

¹ See Cudworth's *Intellectual System*, vol. i., p. 555. Warburton's *Divine Legation*, vol. iii., p. 189.

preme ?) For those things which thou hast made, or for those things which thou hast not made? For those things which thou hast manifested, or for those which thou hast hidden and concealed within thyself? And for what *cause* shall I praise thee? Because I am my own, as having something proper and distinct from thee? *Thou art whatsoever I am; thou art whatsoever I do or say. For thou art all things, and there is nothing which thou art not.* Thou art that which is made, and thou art that which is not made.”—“I would not say,” adds the writer of these remarkable books, “that God *hath* all things, but rather declare the truth, and say that he *is* all things; not as receiving them from without, but as sending them forth from himself.” “What is God, but the very *being* of all things that yet are not, and the *subsistence* of things that are?”

These extracts show what views of God very early prevailed among the Egyptians. Nor are we indebted for information to the Tresmegistic writings alone. We learn the same from ancient inscriptions, and from other records. The worship of the true God was supplanted in Egypt by the worship of universal nature. The creation took the place of the Creator, and received, in one form or another, that homage which was due to him alone.—Nor let it be thought that this form of religion was inconsistent with the polytheism and idolatry of the ancient Egyptians. They had, indeed, “gods many, and lords many; but these were all inferior divinities, —parts and manifestations of the *One Supreme, the One in All.*”

It is likely that the same form of religion prevailed among the ancient *Persians* as among the Egyptians. The following passage is from *the Desatir*, or writings of the most ancient Persian prophets, one of whom was Zoroaster. Mithras, or the first Cause, thus speaks to his worshiper: “My light is on thy countenance, my word is on thy tongue. Me thou seest, me thou hearest, me thou smellest, me thou tastest, me thou touchest. What thou sayest, that I say; and thy acts are my acts. I speak by thy tongue, and thou speakest to *me*, though mortals imagine that thou speakest to them. I am nearer unto thee, than thou art to thyself. Thy soul reacheth unto me.”

Brücker, after comparing the existing fragments of the ancient learning of the Persians, expresses the following opinion as to their theosophy: “It appears probable that Zoroaster,

¹ In Cudworth's Intellectual System, vol. i., pp. 586–592.

² See Dial, vol. iv., p. 61.

adopting the principle commonly held by the ancients, that from nothing, nothing can be produced, conceived *Light*, or those ethereal substances which partake of the active nature of fire, and *Darkness*, or the opaque and passive mass of matter, to be *emanations from one eternal source*; that to these derived substances he gave the names of Oromasdes and Arimanis; and that the first Fountain of Being, or the Supreme Divinity, he called Mithras. The active and passive principles, Oromasdes and Arimanis, the authors respectively of good and evil, of light and darkness, he conceived to be at perpetual variance; and this has led to the belief that the most ancient form of religion among the Persians was *Dualism*. Zoroaster believed, however, that through the mediation of Mithras, or the Supreme Cause, the contest would at length terminate in favor of the good principle.

According to Zoroaster, various orders of spirits, gods, demons, and the souls of men, have proceeded from the great Fountain of intelligence, and will one day return to their source and partake of its immortality. Even matter itself, the source of all evil, will at length be refined, and be gathered back to the Eternal Fountain from which it flowed."

The *Phœnicians* were early civilized, and contributed to the introduction of civilization and learning into Greece. Mo-sheim ascribes the same views of Deity to them as to the ancient Egyptians. After remarking upon several passages from Sanchoniathon, the Phœnician sage, he adds: "I am of the opinion that this nation ought to be associated with those who held that all things were produced from an eternal matter by a certain *power* and *law of nature*, and who exclude the Deity (i. e. an intelligent, personal Deity) altogether from the creation of the universe."

According to the theology of the Phœnicians, the origin of the visible world was in this wise: From eternity there existed a dark, turbid atmosphere, through which was diffused a blind principle of motion, denominated spirit. From eternity there existed, also, a rude, undigested chaos. At a certain period, the spirit in the atmosphere became inflamed with a love of chaos, and united itself with it; and from this union all existing things, gods and men, animate and inanimate, have proceeded. This process, with its results (comprising all things), was denominated God.

If we turn, now, to the ancient *Greeks*, we shall find the same theories, with circumstantial modifications, prevailing there.—Our earliest knowledge of the theosophy of the Greeks

is derived from the Orphic writings. As a specimen of these, we present the following: "Jove, the lofty thunderer, is the first, and the last, and the middle; all things proceed from him. The spacious earth and the starry heavens are Jove. Jove is the breath of all things; the irresistible energy of fire; and the source of the sea. Jove is the parent of all. There is one power, one divinity, one ruler of all; for *all things are contained in the vast body of Jove.*" "*Hiding all things within himself*, he at length sent forth divine productions from his bosom into the cheerful light."

From these and other fragments of Orpheus, the following summary of the Orphic doctrine concerning God and nature may be deduced: "God, from eternity, contained within himself the unformed principles of all things. At a certain period, he commenced sending forth from himself all material and spiritual existences, which partake, consequently, of his own divine nature or essence. All beings, proceeding originally from God, will, after certain revolutions and purgations, return to him. The world itself will be dissolved with fire, and afterward be renewed."

From the most ancient poets of Greece, we proceed to its philosophers. Of the majority of these, it is difficult to say whether they are more properly Atheists or Pantheists; certain it is, that while the name of God was often on their lips, they ascribed the endlessly diversified appearances in nature, not to an intelligent, designing Cause—a *personal Deity*, but to a certain *vital energy*, running through all things, and operating according to necessary and established laws.

This did the Hylopathians, who insisted much upon the inherent, plastic, generative tendencies of matter, and thought these sufficient to account for all things. This did the Stratonics or Hylozoists, who, in order to account for the changes in matter, invested every particle of it with a sort of vegetable, senseless life. The same, also, did the Stoics, whose soul of the world was regarded as a celestial *ether* or *fire*, and not as a designing, active Being.—A portion of the Stoics seem to have considered the world as more a vegetable than an animal, and its moving principle as a sort of vegetable life. Their idea of *Providence* was not that of a wise and good Being who freely directs and governs all things, but that of a necessary and eternal chain of causes and effects. Providence, in the Stoic creed, was only another name for *fate*, to which everything in the universe was subject.

Among the Stoics of Rome, none was more venerated than

¹ See Brucker's Abridgment, p. 66.

Cato, of Utica, yet Lucan, by putting the following lines into his mouth, represents him as a Pantheist :

"Is not the seat of Jove earth, sea, and air,
And heaven, and virtue? Where could we further trace
The God? Where'er we move, whate'er we see,
Is Jove."¹

According to Cicero, "Pythagoras believed God to be an active substance or soul, pervading all nature, from which human souls have emanated, and to which they will return."² The immediate disciples of Pythagoras held the prime moving principle to be "a *subtle, ethereal fire*, which gives being to all things, animates all, and into which all will be finally resolved." They believe not only gods and men, but even brute animals, to be portions of the Divinity. Hence their scruples about taking the life of animals, and eating flesh.

The leaders of the Eleatic philosophers were Zenophanes and Parmenides. These habitually called the Deity *One and All*, regarding him as one simple being or essence which containeth all things. They accounted for the existence of men and animals, from the joint operation of "heat and cold, or fire and earth; the former being the active, and the latter the material cause." "These philosophers," says Brücker, "held God to be of the same nature with the universe, comprehending all things within himself."

Very similar to these were the teachings of Heraclitus. "Fire," he says, "is the principle from which all things in nature are evolved. This consists of small, indivisible atoms, which are in their nature simple, and are eternal. From these fiery particles, which are perpetually in motion, all the varied forms of nature are produced, and into them all are, at certain periods, resolved."³—In short, we find a striking similarity in the opinions of these philosophers, as to the first moving, originating cause. This was not a conscious, active Being, like the God of the Bible, but an all-pervading energy—a subtle, ethereal fire, which warmed and stirred the chaotic mass, and thus generated the existing forms of life.

Such, for substance, was the philosophy of Father Anchises, as set forth by Virgil, in the Sixth Æneid.

"Know, first, a spirit, with an active flame,
Pervades and animates the mighty frame;
Runs through the watery worlds, the fields of air,
The pond'rous earth, the heights of heav'n, and there
Glows in the sun and moon, and burns in every star.

¹ Pharsalia, lib. ix., v. 578.

² Nat. Deor., lib. i., cap. 12.

³ See Brücker's Abridgment, pp. 284-285.

Thus, mingling with the mass, the general soul
Lives in the parts, and agitates the whole."

According to Cudworth, these ancient heathen philosophers generally regarded God, "not only as pervading all things, and diffused through all things, but as *being*, in a manner, all things. Hence, they looked upon the whole world as a kind of divinity, a sacred thing; it being, according to their theology, nothing but *God himself visibly displayed*. And thus was God worshiped by the Pagans, in the whole corporeal world taken together, or in the universe, under the name of Pan."¹

Bishop Warburton speaks still more decidedly respecting the Pantheism or Atheism of many of the philosophers of ancient Greece. They held, he says, to but *one universal substance*, of which the human soul was "a disordered part," and into which it was to be again resolved. And as they held to but *one universal substance*, not only the human soul, but *everything else*, must have been regarded as a part of the Divinity; and thus God was literally everything and everything God.²

From the philosophers of Greece let us pass to those of *India*. The Hindoo divinities are, in general, no other than deified sages and philosophers; and notwithstanding the incredible antiquity which is ascribed to them, they are supposed, and with good reason, to have flourished very little, if at all, earlier than the wise men of ancient Greece.

We begin with that form of religion which is taught in the Vedas, and is professed by the Brahmins, and by a great majority of the people. Sir William Jones represents the Brahmins as *pure spiritualists*; regarding what we call the external world as only a set of *sensations* and *perceptions*, much after the manner of some of the Germans of modern times. "The whole creation," they say, "is rather an energy than a work, by which the Infinite Mind exhibits to his creatures a set of *perceptions*; like a wonderful picture, or a piece of music, always varied, but always uniform." Again: they suppose "the Deity to be ever present, and constantly to support a series of *perceptions*,"—and this is all.—The Brahmins teach that "matter has no essence, independent of mental perception; that external appearances and sensations are illusory, and would vanish to nothing if the Divine energy, which alone sustains them, were suspended but for a moment." They also teach, that as "material substance is mere illusion, there exists in this universe *only one generic spiritual substance*, the sole primary cause of all secondary causes, and of all appear-

¹ Intellectual System, vol. ii., p. 261.

² See Divine Legation, Book iii., sec. 4.

ances whatever." All other spirits emanate from this, and are at length returned to it, and absorbed in it.¹

Dr. Ward represents the Pantheism of the Brahmins as purely *spiritual*. "The learned behold Brumha alike in the reverend Brahmin perfected in knowledge, in the ox, in the elephant, in the dog, and in him who eateth the flesh of dogs." "The man whose mind is endued with this devotion, and looketh on all things alike, beholdeth the Supreme Soul in all things, and all things in the Supreme Soul." . . . "This error-formed world is like a bubble on the water. . . We can never say that it does not exist, or that it does. Spirit is real entity, but not so the visible world. It is as unreal as a snail, when taken for silver; or as when the thirsty deer mistakes the reflected rays of the sun on the sand for a pool of water. There is one omnipresent, placid, all-pervading spirit. Wherever, in any forms, this is manifested, in those forms this agitated world appears extended in him."

Swallowed up in this one all-embracing spirit, the yogee, or religious devotee, can say, "*I am the unchanging; I am the ever-living; I am the pure, the inconceivable, the simple life; without qualities; the untroubled; the unchangeable; the mirror in which all is seen; and, through my union to all souls, the displayer of all things. Being the same in nature, I am every living creature, from Brumha and Vishnoo, down to inanimate matter.*" Entertaining opinions such as these, the yogee not only worships all other living creatures, but *worships himself*. "Menu calls the worship of self the grand method of obtaining Divine knowledge. He who worships self, viewing himself equally in all things, and all equally in himself, ascends to his own heaven." . . . "The whole meaning of the Vedantee is contained in this, that Brumha and individuated spirit are one. That which pervades all the members of the body, and is the cause of life and motion, is individuated spirit. That which pervades the universe, and gives life and motion to all, is Brumha. Therefore, that which pervades the members of the body, and that which pervades the universe, is *one*. As the distance between the separate trees in a forest, and universal space, are of the same nature, so Brumha and individuated spirits are *one*. They are both pure life."

"The Supreme Being," say the Brahmins, "is one sole-existent, secondless, entire, indivisible, sempiternal, ineffable, universal soul. All things are from him, and all, at the consummation, are resolved into him; as the spider spins his

¹ Works of Sir W. Jones, vol. i., pp. 239, 251.

² Ward's View of the Hindoos, vol. i., pp. 340, 350, 362; vol. ii., p. 5.

thread from his own substance, and gathers it in again ; as vegetables sprout from the earth, and return to it ; as hair and nails grow from a living body, and continue with it."

The following is spoken of as the summary of the Vedanti creed. "Excepting the Deity, *nothing exists*, the universe being only an appearance, without any reality ; just as a man in a dream sees imaginary objects, and in that state experiences ideal pleasure and pain. So the scenes and events of life are nothing but a dream ; there being only one *resplendent Light* which assumes different appearances."

The following passages are from the Laws of Menu. Speaking of the yogee, Menu says : "Equally perceiving the Supreme Soul *in all things, and all things in the Supreme Soul*, he sacrifices his own spirit by fixing it on the spirit of God, and approaches the nature of that Sole Divinity, which shines by its own effulgence." "Let such an one reflect, with exclusive application of mind, on the subtle, indivisible essence of the Supreme Spirit, and its *complete existence in all things*, whether high or low, small or great. Thus, having gradually abandoned all earthly attachments, and being indifferent to the pains of all opposite things, as honor, dishonor, and the like, he remains absorbed in the Divine essence."

The following passages are from the Vishnu-Puranu : "Do thou, O King, consider thyself as one with all that exists in the world ? That one, which is *all things*, is Vishnu, than whom there is none other. He is I ; he is thou ; he is all. This universe is his form. Abandon, then, the error of distinction."—p. 258. "Gods, men, animals, birds, reptiles, all are but forms of one eternal Vishnu."—p. 139.—"By study and devotion, a wise man may arrive at the truth of his identity with God ; and then—all the reason of his finiteness being removed—he is in truth God."—p. 251.

These extracts present the doctrine of the Vedas, or that professed and taught by the Brahmins. There are other schools or sects in the East, one of the most numerous and ancient of which is that of Buddh. This sect is found, not only in India, but in Burmah, Siam, Japan, Cochin-China, and in many parts of China itself. It differs from Brahminism, in that it has less of an *ideal* character, and it rejects caste. It is essentially a system of Pantheism, if not Atheism. "The Buddhs," says Dr. Ward, "do not believe in a first cause. Matter is eternal. Every portion of animated existence has, in itself, the element of its own rise, tendency, and final destiny." "The highest state of glory to be attained or aimed at, is

¹ Asiatic Journal, vol. xviii., pp. 98, 290.

absorption, or to be received back into the universal essence.”¹

The Chinese god Fo is generally understood to be the same as Buddh. The following are some of the profundities of the god Fo. “*Nothing* is the beginning and end of everything that exists. From nothing our first parents derived their existence, and to nothing they returned after death. All beings are the same in essence, the only difference is in their figure and qualities. All sprung from the same beginning, which is nothing. This universal principle is extremely pure, subtle, and simple, without change, without motion, without action, or desires. To obtain happiness, we must endeavor to secure a perfect likeness to this principle;—*to do nothing, to will nothing, to feel nothing, to desire nothing*. When once a man has arrived at this degree of perfection, he has no longer anything to fear. He hath ceased to exist, and become perfectly like the god Fo.”

The following indicates that Confucius, also, was a Pantheist. “How vast the influence,” he exclaims, “of the spirits or gods! If you look for them, you cannot see them. If you listen, you cannot hear them. *They embody all things, and the things which are cannot be separated from them*. Everything is full of them. They are above, beneath, on the right hand, and on the left.”

The Joinūs, a sect more numerous in the East formerly than they are, at present, are represented as Pantheists, or Atheists. “The earth,” say they, “is formed by nature, or it springs from inherent properties existing in itself. As the trees in a forest grow up without a cultivator, so the universe is self-existent; and as the banks of a river fall of themselves, so there is no supreme destroyer.” These philosophers further taught, that “there is but one individual spirit, in the whole universe of animated existence, from which all life springs, and to which it returns.”—From these passages it appears that pantheistic notions are not peculiar to any particular sect in the East, but, in one form or another, are common to them all; so that, as a returned missionary (Dr. Poor) recently remarked, “the public mind there is thoroughly pervaded and sated with Pantheism.”

Let us now view Pantheism in connection with the *Mahometan* religion. As Mahometanism continued to spread eastward, it soon came in contact with Oriental superstitions, and

¹ View of the Hindoos, vol. ii. p. 387.

² See Ward's View, vol. ii. p. 383, Note.

³ See Dial, vol. iv. p. 210.

⁴ Ward's View, vol. ii. p. 415.

imbibed from this connection a taint of Pantheism, which originally it did not possess.

The Soofies, the principal Pantheistic sect of Mahometans, are found chiefly in India and Persia. They are numerous at Shiraz, the chief seat of Mahometan learning and philosophy in the East. The following account of their religious principles is given by Sir William Jones: "They suppose that the souls of men differ not at all in *kind*, though infinitely in *degree*, from the Divine Soul from which they proceeded, and in which they will ultimately be absorbed. They believe that a sort of *covenant* was entered into between them and the Divine Soul, at the time of their emanation; that they would remember their celestial origin, and return to its embrace. They hold that naught exists in the universe but *mind* or *spirit*; that what the ignorant call material substances are no more than gay pictures presented to our minds by the eternal Artist; that we must beware of attachment to such phantoms, and cling only to the Supreme, who truly exists in us, as we exist solely in him; that we should retain the remembrance of our primeval covenant; and by abstracting ourselves from vanity, that we should hasten a complete and eternal union with the Divine essence, in which our supreme happiness will consist."

While Henry Martyn was at Shiraz, he was brought into continual contact with the Soofies, having one of their learned men for his interpreter. They talked much, he says, about "the unity of all being," and "considered the Brahmins as of the same school with themselves." One affirmed to Mr. Martyn "that himself, and every created thing, was God." Another said, "there is no distinction between the Creator and the creature, and no real difference between good and evil."—Some of the most learned men in Persia are connected with the Soofies. Their poets, Ferdoosi, Sadi, Hafiz, and some others, have a high reputation even in Europe. Not a few of their songs are of a sensual character; others are chiefly on the subject of religion. The writers mourn their partial separation from God, and long for a reunion, an absorption into the Divine essence, as the consummation of all their hopes. The following lines are a translation from Hafiz:

"This earthly mist conceals the eternal mind.
O! happy day, that shall the veil remove!
My soul, like Philomel in cage confined,
Pants for her native soil, the Elysian grove.

See Asiatic Journal, vol. xviik p. 290.

Though vestments rich and bright my limbs array,
 My breast conceals a fierce, devouring flame :
 O come, and Hafiz' being bear away ;
 Absorb'd in thee, shall vanish e'en his name."

Some Christians have mistaken the language of these hymns, as the breathing forth of holy desires. But Mr. Martyn was of a different opinion. He represents the Soofies as "a body of mystic latitudinarians," distinguished, not only for exuberance of fancy, and a wild enthusiasm, but for "gross sensuality and self-indulgence, incredible vanity, and universal skepticism." "Their professed religion," he says, is "no religion at all. It removes all the foundations, and unsettles religious belief everywhere."

Thus far we have investigated the history of Pantheism, as found in Pagan and Mahometan countries. Let us now inquire after its developments among those who have some knowledge of the Bible. We begin with the Jews.

The Cabbalistic philosophy of the Jews was clearly of an Oriental cast, and in its teachings concerning the origin of things, was naked Pantheism. Basnage, in his learned history of the Jews, insists that Spinoza, who was a Jew, learned his Pantheism from the Cabbalists, though he was too proud to acknowledge them as his teachers. (Book 4, chap. 7.)

"The universe," say the Cabbalists, "continues to exist by the Divine energy of emanation. While this energy is exerted, different forms and orders of beings remain ; but when it is withheld, all the streams of existence return into their fountain. The Deity contains all things within himself ; and there is always the same *amount* of existence, either in a developed or an undeveloped state. When it is undeveloped, *God is all*. When worlds are created, the Deity is unfolded or evolved, by various degrees of emanation, which constitute the several forms or orders of created nature." "Human souls are distant emanations from the Deity ; and when liberated from their material vehicles, will return, through various stages of purification, to the fountain whence they first proceeded."

Some have inferred, from a passage in Paul's speech on Mar's Hill—"In him we live, and move, and have our being"—that he was a Pantheist. But this is an unwarrantable inference. Paul taught on this occasion, as he did on all occasions, the existence of a *personal God* ; an intelligent, conscious, active Being, who is ever near us, but *not one with us* ; on whom we depend for life and breath and all things, but

¹ See Life of Henry Martyn, pp. 324—440.

² Brucker's Abridgment, p. 416.

from whose infinite and eternal *essence* we are forever distinct. That we are *part* of God—the *very substance* of God—the *incarnations* and *manifestations* of God,—Paul never taught; and no one who reads his discourses and epistles has any right to put such a meaning upon his words. The same may be said of all the inspired writers.

One might infer that the Gnostic sects, which troubled the church during the second and third centuries, were Pantheists, were it not that they seem to have believed in the distinct and eternal existence of *matter*, and ascribed to it all the sins and miseries of our race. With them, the great business of life was to deliver the imprisoned soul from the corrupting and debasing influence of matter. As to the origin and ultimate destination of finite *spirits*, the Gnostics were emanationists and absorptionists, and held to other peculiarities of Pantheism.

The Eclectic Philosophy, as taught in the school at Alexandria, partook largely of the Oriental, emanative system, and from this source it came directly into the Christian church. Hence, we hear Origen, in the third century, speculating as follows: "All things are in perpetual rotation, receding from, and returning to, the Divine fountain. Whence, an eternal succession of worlds, and the final restoration of the souls of bad men, and of devils, after certain purgations, to happiness. The souls of the good are continually advancing in perfection, and rising to a higher state. Matter will hereafter be refined into a better substance; and after the great revolution of ages, everything will return to its source, and God will be all in all."¹ These views were participated in by the followers of Origen, and more especially by the ascetics and monks.

The next development of Pantheism in the Christian church appeared in connection with the mystics. All the mystics believed that man possesses at least a *portion* of the Divine nature, which, being awakened by seclusion and meditation, becomes his sure guide to truth and holiness. And some of them (judging from their language) regarded man's spiritual nature as *all* Divine—a ray from the great fountain of light, which is destined, after certain obscurations and revolutions, to be swallowed up in that fountain again.

The most celebrated of the ancient mystics was the author of certain works, falsely ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite. This man, whoever he may have been, regarded the human soul as a *sundered particle of the Divine nature*; and it was the aim of all his exhortations to bring back the wandering spirit, by means of seclusion and contemplation, to its pristine, happy state.

¹ See Brücker, p. 463.

The writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius were brought into Europe, in the ninth century, and were translated by the celebrated Scotus Erigena. Erigena taught expressly that "*God is all things, and that all things are God*;" by which he meant, probably, the same with the Jewish Cabbalists and the Alexandrian philosophers, that all things have proceeded, by emanation, from God, and will at length return to him, as streams to their source. Accordingly he says, that after the resurrection, nature itself will return to God; that God will be all in all; and that naught will remain but God alone."

The mystic element, thus introduced into the church, has continued to show itself—in connection, often, with a sincere though mistaken piety—in every succeeding age. We have its most singular development, in modern times, in the person of Jacob Boehman. It appears in a far more intelligible and tolerable form, in the writings of Thomas a' Kempis and Madame Guyon. To by far the greater portion of the writings of Boehman, it is impossible to attach any consistent meaning. He says, however, as much as this, that "God is the essence of all essences, and that a long series of spiritual natures, and even matter itself, has flowed from the fountain of the Divine nature." His language on the subject is very like that of the Jewish Cabbala. "If," says he, "any one name the heavens, the earth, the stars, the elements, and whatever is beneath or above the heavens, he herein names *the whole Deity*, who, by a power proceeding from himself, thus makes his own essence corporeal."

"In mysticism," says Mr. Douglass, "there is one error, the belief in self; and one truth, *the identity of all things with the Deity*. The great aim of devotional mysticism is *self-annihilation*." "O Nothing!" exclaims Madame Guyon, "how happy, how infinitely happy thou art! *Thou* takest not from God his glory! It is only Nothing which takes nothing away!" These writers have little to say of sin or redemption, in the proper, evangelical sense of the terms, but rest the whole of religion, much after the manner of the Soofies, on an imaginary union of the soul with the great source of Being.

But we must not dwell longer on the case of the mystics,* but proceed to exhibit Pantheism in a less amiable connection, among the philosophers and infidels of modern times.

* See Brucker, p. 484.

* See Brucker, p. 572.

Even Spinoza was almost as much a mystic as a Pantheist. In his work on Ethics, he talks as devoutly and piously of the annihilation of self, and the *All-Oneness* of God, as any of his brother or sister mystics. See Hallam's Lit. of Europe, vol. ii., p. 338.

In the early part of the sixteenth century, certain philosophers in Italy (among whom were Pomponatius, Cremoninus, and Cæsalpin) indulged in speculations which, for the sake of peace with the church, they admitted to be *theologically false*, while, at the same time, they held them to be *philosophically true*. They taught, among other things, that "the Supreme God, being wholly absorbed in the contemplation of himself, neglects entirely the affairs of men. These are committed to an inferior Divine nature, the Soul of the world, of which nature all men partake. *Their* souls have no distinct existence, and will no longer subsist as such, than while the body continues to live. This mischief proceeded so far," says Brücker, "that the minds of many, both ecclesiastics and laymen, became deeply tinctured with atheism; the consequence of which was an uncommon depravity of manners. Having no fear of God before their eyes, men gave themselves up to the foulest wickedness. Not only their conversation, but their writings, were disgraced by the grossest impiety and obscenity."

Still another pantheistical development occurred in Italy, near the close of the sixteenth century, in the person of Jordano Bruno. Bruno was a philosopher, of a free and courageous spirit, who, by the strangeness of his opinions, and the boldness of his assaults upon the Romish Church, incurred the violence of the Inquisition, and was burned at the stake, A.D. 1600. "The system of Bruno," says Mr. Hallam, "may be said to contain a sort of *double Pantheism*." He taught that "all things have, from eternity, flowed from one immense and infinite fountain in the Divine nature. From this source he derives his *minima* or *atoms*, of which the visible world is formed. To these, like the Hylozoists of ancient time, he ascribes perception, life, and motion. In addition to these, he supposes a *soul of the world*, derived from the same infinite fountain, by which the forms of nature are produced and preserved. This intermediate agent—this soul of the world—which connects all the other emanations from the eternal fountain, Bruno calls *nature*. By means of this, and out of the infinite number of atoms which have been poured forth from the fountain of all things, infinite and eternal worlds are produced; whilst, in truth, only one Being exists; infinite, immutable, and indivisible, the uncreated Light which pervades all space, and which contains, within itself, one substantial form of all things." This doctrine is, indeed, "*a double Pantheism*"—one more than is necessary—embodying the absurdities both of the Hylozoio and the Stoic. It is a vain attempt

¹ Lit. of Europe, vol. i. p. 294. Brücker, p. 582.

to unite the atomic and the emanative systems, by which the philosophy of the age was perplexed, but not at all improved.

We come now to the great propounder and advocate of Pantheism in modern times, Benedict Spinoza. Spinoza was born at Amsterdam, in the year 1632. He was a Jew by descent and education; but he early discovered such dissatisfaction with the religion of his fathers, and advanced opinions so contrary to their established tenets, that he was excommunicated from the synagogue, and shortly after was exiled from his native city. He engaged early in the study of the Cartesian philosophy; and it was by pushing out the principles of this philosophy much farther than Des Cartes ever authorized or intended, that he was led to the adoption of those pantheistical opinions which are associated with his name. He has much to say, indeed, respecting God; so much, that he has been called "a god-intoxicated man." But who, what, is the God of Spinoza? "If," says Mr. Morell, who certainly has no prejudices against Spinoza—"if we take the common definition of Deity as valid, then assuredly we must conclude that the God of Spinoza is *no God*, and that his Pantheism is only a more imposing form of Atheism."

The following is an abstract of the opinions of Spinoza, as drawn out by Mr. Hallam, in his *Literature of Europe*. "There is, there *can* be, no substance but God. Whatever is, exists in God, and nothing can be conceived of as separate from him: for he is the *sole substance*; and modes cannot be without a substance, and besides substance and mode, nothing exists. Particular things are but the affections of God's attributes, or modes in which they are determinately expressed." Again: "As it follows, from the infinite extension of God, that all bodies are portions of his substance, inasmuch as they cannot be conceived of without it; so all particular acts of intelligence are portions of God's infinite intelligence; and thus *all things are in him*." "Man is not himself a substance, but something which is *in God*, and cannot be conceived of without him. He is an affection or mode of the Divine substance, expressing its nature in a determinate manner. The human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God; and when we say that the mind perceives this or that, it is only that God, so far as he constitutes the essence of mind, has such or such ideas."

Such are the opinions of Spinoza respecting God. On other connected subjects his views are as follows: "There is no contingency, but everything is determined by the necessity of

1 Hist. of Philosophy, p. 128.

the Divine nature; nor *could anything be produced by God, otherwise than it is.*" "The mind has no free will, but is determined by a cause, which is itself determined by some other cause, and so on forever." "Men have invented names to distinguish that as good which tends to their benefit, and that as evil which is the contrary; and thinking themselves free, have got the notions of right and wrong." But such notions are an illusion. There is no ground for them in the reality of things.¹

The most of Spinoza's works, and those of the most exceptionable character, were published by his friend, Dr. Meyer, after his death. It is intimated by Prof. Norton, that Meyer took the liberty to alter certain passages, and give them a less offensive form than that in which Spinoza had left them; in particular, that he often substituted the word God, where the author had written the word nature.² If this be true, the Pantheism or Atheism of the writer was less studiously concealed by himself, than it has been by his too officious friends.

Meyer was himself a Pantheist, and so were some other Dutch speculatists of that period. Nor is it likely that the doctrine has ever ceased to be cherished, in different parts of Europe, from the days of Spinoza to the present time.—It had an open advocate in England, in the person of John Toland, who died in the year 1722. In the year 1705, he published a pamphlet, entitled "*Indifference in Disputes, recommended by a Pantheist to an Orthodox Friend.*" Several years later, he published a Latin Tract entitled "*Pantheisticum,*" in which his views of the Deity are pretty fully set forth. "*All things in the world,*" says he, "*are the One, and the One is all in all.*" That which is all in all is God, eternal and infinite, without beginning or end. In him we live, move, and exist. From him everything has proceeded, and to him everything is destined to return. He is the beginning and end of all things." The following is part of the Epitaph which Toland prepared for himself: "The Spirit is united with the ethereal Father, from which it came. The body, yielding to nature, is laid in the bosom of its mother earth. It shall rise again at some period of eternity, but never again shall it be Toland."

Toland left a society of kindred spirits in and around London, by whom his memoirs and posthumous writings were published. By one of this Society, his praises were celebrated in a funeral hymn, from which we present an extract. After speaking of "Master Toland as being now a nonentity," his dust being turned to its native dust, and the fluids of his body

¹ See Hallam's *Lit. of Europe*, vol. ii. pp. 321, 322.

² See Norton's *Discourse*, p. 9.

gone to their mother ocean, and his eloquent breath as being lost in boundless ether, the writer adds :

"The purer genial powers, the vital flame,
That moved and quickened the mechanic frame,
Is flown aloft, a spark, a borrowed ray,
And re-united to the Prince of Day."

The chief seat and fountain of Pantheism, in recent times, is Germany. The great teachers of speculative philosophy in Germany, during the present century, have been Fichté, Schelling, and Hegel ; and each of these, with most of their numerous disciples, have been Pantheists.

Fichté's first philosophy was a system of pure *idealism*, or more properly, *egoism*. "Nothing really exists but the *I* ; and all our experience, and the external world as the object of that experience, is a creature of the *I*." It is just what we make it in our conceptions, and no more. God, he said at this time, is the *moral order* of the world. The *I* finds such a principle of moral order necessary ; nor does it need any other God.— Later in life, he improved upon his philosophy ; or, as some say, changed the ground of it altogether. Searching into the depths of his own consciousness, he thought he discovered there the idea of a something higher than himself, greater than himself, from which self was derived, and on which it was dependent. He evolved, in short, the notion of *one ultimate and absolute Existence*, from which all other existence flows. Still, he had no faith in the reality of an external world, and his theology (if theology it can be called) was more decidedly pantheistic than before. He now regarded human life and action, says his biographer, as "but the harmonious although diversified manifestation of the *One Idea* of universal being, the *self-revelation of the Absolute*, the infinitely varied forms under which God becomes manifest in the flesh." His doctrine at this period, says Morell, "had evidently a close affinity with the Pantheism of Spinoza. The only difference in the two lay here : that while Spinoza fixed his eye upon *substance*, until he made it the absolute and infinite essence, of which all things existing are but different modes, Fichté regarded *infinite reason*, or the *eternal mind*, or the *Divine idea*, as the absolute, all-real, self-existent essence, which manifests itself alike in the subjective and the objective world. According to this view, whatever we experience within ourselves, and whatever we see without, are both alike the manifestations of one and the same Absolute Mind ; not merely creations of his power, but modifications of his essence."—p. 431.

The grand peculiarity of Schelling's philosophy is what

¹ Smith's Life of Fichté, p. 186,

has been called his doctrine of *identity*; because he maintains "the perfect identity of the *knowledge* of things, and the *things* themselves, or the entire coincidence of the ideal and real the subjective and objective. It is also called the doctrine of the *All-One*; because it maintains that *the universe is God*, and *God the universe*; or that God, developing himself in various forms and according to general laws, is the only existence." This system does not differ materially from the revised and reformed speculations of Fichté, or from the Pantheism of Spinoza.

Mr. Hedge represents Schelling as "the poet of the transcendental movement, as Fichté is the preacher." "Both," he says, "endeavored to construct a philosophy of the absolute. Both set out with the principle, that there is but *one Being, one Substance*. Fichté sought it in the conscious self; Schelling finds it in nature." His is "the philosophy of *identity*. He holds that matter and spirit, the ideal and the real, subject and object, are identical. The absolute is neither ideal nor real, but the identity of both. There is but *one Being*, who may be considered at once, or alternately, as either wholly ideal, or wholly real. God is the absolute identity of nature and thought, of matter and spirit. And this identity is not the cause of the universe, but *the universe itself, a God-universe*."

This particular feature of Schelling's philosophy, we are told, was eagerly adopted by vast numbers in Germany. Many who did not follow him on other points, embraced his pantheistic views, regarding them as shedding a flood of light, not only upon philosophy, but religion.

The last of the great speculative philosophers of Germany is Hegel. He was, for a time, a follower of Schelling, but at length gradually deviated from him, and set up for himself. Both maintained the identity of God and the universe, and the perfect coincidence between subjective and objective knowledge. Yet Hegel's was a system of *absolute idealism*. He considered ideas or conceptions as the only realities of existence. By looking in upon itself, and analyzing its conceptions and ideas, the mind arrives at all philosophical knowledge.

Hegel was unwilling to be accounted a Pantheist, and yet he was one. "With him," says Morell, "God is not a person, but *personality itself*; the *universal personality*, which realizes itself in every human consciousness, as so many separate thoughts of one eternal mind. The *idea* we form of the Absolute is, to Hegel, the *Absolute itself*; its essential existence being synonymous with our conceptions of it. God is, with him, the *whole process of thought*, combining in itself the ob-

¹ Murdock's Sketches, p. 104.

² Prose Writers of Germany, p. 509.

jective movement, as seen in nature, with the subjective, as seen in logic, and fully realizing itself only in the universal spirit of humanity.”—According to this account of the matter, the God of Hegel is a *process*, and not a being—“the whole process of human thought;” or, as one of his followers expresses it, “the eternal *movement* of the Universal, even raising itself to a subject.”—Manzel, in his History of German Literature, says that “Hegel makes no distinction between himself and God, but gives himself out for God.” He charges Hegel with teaching that God first came to a clear consciousness of himself in “the philosopher who has the only right philosophy;” that is to say, *in him*.¹

It is admitted by all, that the speculations of Hegel are exceedingly obscure, so much so as to be scarcely intelligible. He is said to have affirmed, on his death-bed, that “but one man in Germany understood his philosophy, and that *he* did not.” But whatever else may be doubtful, one thing is clear: The God of Hegel is *just no God at all*. It is but a name, a figure of speech, and hardly that.

These several leaders in the transcendental movement have had their followers, who have participated more or less in their pantheistic views. Thus Prof. Bouterwijk, of Göttingen, supposed that “there is but one *real existence*, in the universe, and that this absolute existence pervades all things, and constitutes their reality. Whatever is real, whatever truly exists, is a development of the Absolute, or of this one real existence: all else is merely imaginary.”—Prof. Wagner, of Wurtzburg, says, “the Absolute is not the object of our direct knowledge, but the created universe is the living *form* of him, and the laws of the universe are *the type*, by which he displays himself.”—Schubert, Baader, and Steffens, the followers of Schelling, are engaged in showing that nature is but a living manifestation of mind; yea, that it is *nothing else than the Infinite Mind itself, in its various potencies and reflections*.” These philosophers believe that “the time is coming when, from our direct intuition of the Soul of the world, in its original essence, the whole theory and all the phenomena of creation shall be fully explained; that all experiment and observation may then be dispensed with; and natural philosophy find its completion in the deductions of pure reason.”

In the extreme Hegelians, such as Strauss, Bruno, Bauer, and Feuerbach, Pantheism has degenerated into the basest Atheism. In their system, no God is admitted to exist, out of and apart from the world; which is but saying there is no God at all. Feuerbach says, that “in imagining a Deity, man is

¹ History of Philosophy, p. 473.

² Vol. i. p. 259.

only deifying his own nature; and that in worshipping a Deity, he is worshipping humanity."—Nor is this error confined to the philosophers of Germany. It has reached their poets, their theologians, their literature in its various branches, and even the common walks of life: So that, as Mrs. Austen says, "There is not a fairy tale of Tieck, not a song of Goethe, not a play of Schiller, not a criticism of Schlegel, not a description of Humboldt, in which this undercurrent" of speculative, pantheistic philosophy "is not visible." Take, as a specimen, the following passage from Goethe's *Faust*:

"Who dares to say,
I believe in God?
 Who dares to name him,
 And to profess,
I believe in him?
 Who can feel,
 And yet affirm,
I believe him not?
 The all-Embracer,
 The all-Sustainer,
 Does he not embrace, support,
 Thee, me, *Himself?*
 And does not the All
 Press on thy head and heart,
 And weave itself around thee, visibly and invisibly,
 In eternal mystery?
 Fill thy heart with it, till it overflows;
 And in the *feeling*, when thou'rt wholly blest,
 Then call it what thou wilt,—
 Happiness, heart, love, *God*;
 I have no name for it:
Feeling is all."

This, then, is Goethe's God,—*feeling*: "*Feeling is all.*"

Not even the distinguished Schleiermacher are we able to clear from the imputation of Pantheism. Fifty years ago, he published his work "On Religion." He professed to have written it, not "through any determination of his own judgment," but "through a Divine call," a "heavenly impulse." "It is," says Prof. Norton, "a system of Pantheism, wrought up in a highly declamatory style, in which the language often soars beyond meaning, and in which there is scarcely any attempt at what may be called reasoning. Religion, according to Schleiermacher, is the *sense* of the union of the individual with the universe, with nature, or (in the language of the sect) with the *One and All*. It is a *feeling*. It has nothing to do with belief or action; it is unconnected with morality, their provinces being different; it is independent of the idea of a *personal God*. The idea of a *personal God* is pure mythology, and the belief and desire of *personal immortality* are *wholly irreligious*, as being opposed to that which is the aim of re-

ligion, viz., the annihilation of one's own personality ; the living in the *One and All* ; the becoming as far as possible one with the universe." In this same treatise, Schleiermacher introduces a glowing eulogy on Spinoza, commencing with an apostrophe thus : " Offer with me a lock of hair to the manes of the holy, the wronged Spinoza ;" who " stood alone and unapproached, because he was full of religion, and of a holy spirit."

Paulus, another German professor and theologian, collected and published the first edition of Spinoza's Works ; in the Preface to which, after lauding the old Pantheist, he congratulates his countrymen on being the first " to shake off the superstitious and ridiculous horror of the Atheism (so called) of Spinoza."

The Germans of the present day are not all Pantheists. There are some excellent Christians—Christian scholars, and Christian ministers, in that classic land. Still we must repeat what we have before said : The chief seat and fountain of pantheistic delusion, in modern times, has been Germany. Not only her philosophy and her literature, but her churches, her pulpits, and her seats of learning, have been deeply infected ; and from them have poured forth streams, which have infected and corrupted other lands.

The eclectic philosophy of France, at the head of which is Cousin, we are sorry to say, is *pantheistical* in its tendencies and results. Cousin disclaims the imputation of Pantheism, and yet, says Morell, who is partial to him, " it is difficult to see how his opinions can be altogether vindicated from it." He describes God as "*absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, essence and life, end and middle, at the summit of existence and at its base, infinite and finite together ; in a word, a Trinity ; being at the same time God, nature, and humanity.*"

" With regard to his notion of Deity," says Morell in another place, " we have already shown how closely it verges upon the principle of Pantheism. Even if we admit that his is not a doctrine, like that of Spinoza, which identifies God with the abstract idea of substance ; or even like that of Hegel, which regards Deity as synonymous with the absolute law and progress of the universe ; if we admit, in fact, that the Deity of Cousin possesses a conscious personality, yet still, it is one which *contains within itself the infinite personality and consciousness of every subordinate mind.* God is the ocean ; we are but the waves. The ocean may be one individuality, and each wave another ; but still, they are essentially *one and the same.*"

¹ History of Philosophy, pp. 660, 665.

"The system of Cousin," says Dr. Murdock in his *Sketches*, "is pantheistic. It resolves the universe into one primordial being, who develops himself in various finite forms. In other words, it supposes God, and the developments of God, to be the *only real existence*, the *το παν*, the entire universe."—p. 184.

The pantheistic results of German philosophy may not be as palpable in Great Britain as in France; yet the former country has not escaped. The poet Shelley was an idealist and a Pantheist. He regards the words *I*, *you*, and *they*, as mere "grammatical devices, totally destitute of the exclusive meaning usually attached to them, and no more than marks to denote the different modifications of *the One Mind*." He accepts the conclusion of those philosophers, who assert that *nothing exists, but as it is perceived*. "The difference is merely nominal between those two classes of thought, vulgarly distinguished by the names of ideas, and of external objects." Putting all this together, the God of Shelley turns out to be none other than Shelley's *idea* of universal nature.¹

James P. Greaves, an English philosopher and Pantheist, died in March, 1842. "The great design of his efforts," says his biographer, "was to awaken in the public mind the fact, that there is one universal Love-Spirit, which is the same to all individuals, at all times, in all places, and under all circumstances. This Love-Spirit is not a dead word, nor a thought to be expressed in dead words. It is the One Living Spirit, manifesting itself *in all things*; in the works of nature, in the clear thought, in the noble sensations of the human soul."

He left behind him a society of professed Pantheists in England; prominent among whom are Francis Barham and Goodwyn Barmby. Barham calls himself an *alist*. He is more properly an *all-ist*. He speaks of the Divinity as "the grand primary essence of all existence; the element which forms *the All in All*." Barmby publishes (or did publish, a few years ago,) a Penny Magazine, consecrated, as the cover informs us, "to Pantheism in religion; and Communism in politics."

The more distinguished English transcendentalists now on the stage are Thomas Carlyle and Mr. Morell; and though neither of these are professed Pantheists, or perhaps consciously so, yet they occasionally use the language of the sect. Carlyle speaks of God as "the great shoreless Incomprehensible," "the great Soul of the world." "Look thou—if thou have eyes or soul left—into this great shoreless Incomprehensible. In the heart of its tumultuous appearances, embroilments, and mad-time vortices, is there not a silent, eternal, an all-just, an

¹ See the *Dial*, vol. i., p. 478.

² *Dial*, vol. iii., p. 286.

all-beautiful, *sole Reality*, an ultimate controlling power of the whole? This is not a figure of speech; this is fact.”

Speaking of the dependence of the human spirit upon the Divine, Morell says: “We are all *emanations from the infinite Essence*; and though gifted with a distinct personality, yet *we are but waves in the great ocean of existence, ever rolling onward to our eternal home in the bosom of God.*”

The speculations of the Germans seem to have been regarded with more favor, and to have taken deeper root, in America, than in England. Accordingly, we have more decisive indications of Pantheism here, than there. Witness the following passages, taken promiscuously, from the published writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson.—“The world proceeds from the same spirit as the body of man. It is a remoter, inferior *incarnation of God*; a *projection of God* in the unconscious.” “If a man is at heart just, then, in so far, *he is God.*” Jesus “saw that *God incarnates himself in man.* In the jubilee of sublime emotion, he said, *I am Divine.* Would you see God, *see me, see thyself*, when thou also thinkest as I think.” “The currents of universal being circulate through me. *I am part or particle of God.*” . . . “There were moments, in the history of heaven, when the human race was not counted by individuals, but was *God in distribution—God rushing into multi-form benefit.*” Every man was born “to do an office which nature could not forego, nor he be discharged from rendering; and then to immerge again into the holy silence and eternity out of which, as man, he arose.” . . . “The Supreme Critic (or Judge) of the errors of the past and present is that *Great Nature* in which we rest; that Unity, that Over-soul, within which every man’s particular being is contained and made one with all other.” . . . “We live in succession, in division, in parts and particles. Meantime, within man is *the Soul of the whole*; the wise silence; the universal beauty, to which every part and particle is equally related; the Eternal One. This deep power in which we exist is not only self-sufficing and perfect; but the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and object, are one.”

Another American author, who has disclosed his Pantheism in a way not to be mistaken, is Theodore Parker. He speaks of God as “the being of all existence, the reality of all appearance, the background and cause of all things that are.” “He is the materiality of matter, and the spirituality of spirit.” He is “the Soul of all souls;” and “nature itself is but *the outness of God.*” Again: “All nature is but an *exhibition of*

1 Past and Present, p. 308.

2 History of Philosophy, p. 404.

3 Emerson’s “Nature,” pp. 8, 62, 116, 126, 199, 202, 245.

God to the senses. The sun is but a sparkle of his splendor. Endless and without beginning flows forth the stream of Divine influence, that encircles and possesses *the all of things.*" "The material world, with its objects sublimely great, or meanly little; its atoms of dust, its orbs of fire, the rock that stands by the sea-shore, and the water that wears it away; the worm which we trample under foot; the streets of constellations that gleam perennial over head; the aspiring palm-tree, fixed to one spot, and the lions that are sent out free;—these incarnate and make visible of God, all that their natures will admit."

Still another American author, who takes no pains to conceal his Pantheism, is A. Bronson Alcott. Witness the following passages from his "Orphic Sayings." "God is *instant*, but never wholly *extant*; in his works. Nature does not contain him, but *is contained* in him. She is *the memoir of his life*. Man is a nobler Scripture, yet fails to outwrite the God-head." . . . "The each is instinct with *the All*. The all unfolds and reappears in each: *Spirit is all in all*. God, man, nature, are a *Divine Synthesis*, whose parts it is impiety to sunder." "Nature is not separate from me. She is *mine*, alike with my body. In moments of true life, *I feel my identity with her*, and knew no duality of being." . . . "Every soul feels, at times, her own possibility of becoming a *God*. She cannot rest in the human; she aspires after the Godlike. This instinctive tendency is an authentic augury of its own fulfillment. *Men shall become Gods.*" "Man is a rudiment, an embryo of God; eternity shall develop him in the Divine image." . . . "Sense, looking at the historic surface, beholds what it deems matter; yet it is but spirit, in fusion. Neither matter nor death is possible. What seem matter and death are sensuous impressions which, in our sanest moments, the authentic instincts contradict. The sensible world is spirit in magnitude out-spread before the senses, whose synthesis is the soul itself; whose *prothesis is God.*"

American Pantheism was, for several years, bodied forth in a periodical called "The Dial." More recently, it has enshrined itself in the Massachusetts Quarterly Review. "The following are some of the utterances of these publications. "The perception is now fast becoming a conscious fact, that there is *One Mind*, and that all the powers and privileges which lie in any, *lie in all*. Moses and Confucius, Montaigne and Leibnitz, are not so much individuals, as they are parts of man—*parts of me*. My intelligence proves them my own."

¹ Discourse of Religion, *passim*.

² See The Dial, vol. i., pp. 87—96.

... "The only occupation of the true transcendentalist is to affirm *Being*. Of, from, and in Being, he constantly asserts Being. He is an instrument, a medium, of Being to Being. The Being *in him* utters to Being in other souls."

One of the contributors to "The Dial" represents the soul and body of man, and the whole world of matter, as existing only in "the *thought of God*." The universe, he says, "is but the *settled opinion of almighty God*." . . . "*God alone is Being*, or Life in himself. Man is not being, but only a subject of being; only a form or image of being. God is not a subject of being, but being itself; and therefore the *sole Being*."

One of the most remarkable exhibitions of American Pantheism, or rather Atheism, is contained in the Revelations of Andrew Jackson Davis. Mr. D. professes to have received his knowledge directly from the spiritual world; it having been imparted to him in a state of the most profound mesmeric slumber. He has as much to say as other Pantheists about "a Supreme Mind," "a Divine Mind," "a great positive Mind," &c., but he believes in no God but nature, and his deified nature is *wholly material*. He represents all worlds, and all the beings which inhabit them, as *emanations*, directly or indirectly, from "one boundless, undefinable, and unimaginable ocean of liquid fire." He acknowledges no God but this, and attempts to account for the endlessly diversified phenomena of the universe on the ground of the inherent tendencies and laws of matter.

IV. TENDENCIES AND RESULTS OF PANTHEISM.

Our limits will only allow of a brief sketch of the *tendencies and results* of this system. From the nature of the doctrine, it will be seen at once, that these must be of great moment, in respect both to principle and practice.

The doctrine in question relates directly to *God*—the author, sustainer, and governor of all things—the only proper object of religious worship, and supreme love. And not only does this doctrine relate to God; it is, as Dr. Ware well expresses it, "a *denial of God*." We would not be understood to say, that all those who have been pantheistically inclined—who have held to opinions involving some form of Pantheism, though perhaps unconsciously to themselves—were as bad as Atheists. But this we do say, that some of the forms of Pantheism are downright Atheism; and some of the forms of Atheism, especially those which prevailed in ancient times, may just as well be denominated Pantheism.

¹ The Dial, vol. i. 148; ii. 285; iii. 410.

² Mass. Quarterly Review, for Dec., 1849.

The two doctrines, in many of their forms, run into each other, and are identical. To deny the proper *personality* of God, is to deny that there is any God. Such a denial takes away our God from us, and leaves us only a figure of speech, a name, a nonentity. The bearing of such a doctrine, therefore, upon any system of religion must be *vital*. A religion based upon the existence of *God*—a *Being* of infinite wisdom, goodness, and power, is one thing ; a religion without any God, is quite another.

Pantheists in Christian lands have always set lightly by the *Holy Scriptures*. Some, as Toland and Shelley, have rejected them as a hurtful imposture. Others have put them on a level with the writings of Confucius, Menu, Zoroaster, and other Oriental sages. While most, if not all, have regarded them as of no greater authority than the promptings of their own inspired wisdom. The Pantheist is himself, as he supposes, a Divine man. He possesses a portion of the Divine nature, and when this is kindled up by inspiration and reflection, its promptings must not be disregarded. The greater light within must be implicitly followed, whatever may be the bearings of the lesser lights without.

There is another way in which Pantheism dishonors the Bible. It denies the fact of its *prophecies* and *miracles*. There is no actual, personal God, to look into the distant, contingent future ; to utter prophecies, to suspend the regular operations of nature, and perform miracles ; and no other being can do this. Hence, the predictions of Scripture, and its alleged miracles, are all a farce. They never took place, as they are recorded, and the argument derived from them, in support of the Divine authority of Scripture, is worthless. To be sure, our Saviour appealed to his miracles in proof of the truth and inspiration of his words ; but he probably did it for effect ; or it may be that he knew no better himself.

Pantheism has generally, and very naturally, stood connected with a rigid *fatalism*. The processes, powers, and laws of nature, (and Pantheism knows no God but these,) move steadily on ; one endless chain of causes and effects, of antecedents and consequents, binds everything ; there is no room left for moral freedom and responsibility ; they are gone forever. So it was with the old Pantheists of Greece and Rome. Divine Providence, in their creed, was only another name for *fate*, to which everything in the universe is subject. So it was in the creed of Spinoza. "Everything is determined by a necessity of nature, nor could aught be produced by God otherwise than it is." So it was with the poet Shelley. In his *Queen Mab*, he calls necessity "the mother of the world ;" and in

his appended Notes, expressly denies the freedom of the will. The God of Goethe, too, is a being subject to necessity, "who makes because he must."

With such views respecting God and fate, it is obvious that the Pantheist can have no proper conceptions of *sin*. On his principles we do not see that sin is possible. "If it is the Divine nature which lives and acts in all creatures and things, then all their action is Divine action. All created intelligences think, and feel, and act as God acts in them, and of course precisely as *he would have them*. Hence, there can be nothing wrong, nothing sinful, in the character or conduct of any rational being. There may be *imperfect* action, because the whole power of God is not exerted; but every act, so far as it goes, is *just what it should be*—just such as *best pleases God*." Nor do leading Pantheists, ancient or modern, shrink from this conclusion. Says the Egyptian Hermes: "Thou art whatsoever *I am*; thou art whatsoever *I do or say*; for thou art all things." An old Persian prophet thus addresses his Divinity: "*What thou sayest, that I say; and thy acts are my acts. I speak by thy tongue; and thou speakest to me, though mortals imagine that thou speakest to them.*" One of the Scoffies at Shiraz said to Henry Martyn, "There is no distinction between the Creator and the creature, and *no difference between good and evil.*" "Men have invented names," says Spinoza, "to distinguish that as good, which tends to their benefit; and that as evil, which is the contrary." But there is no ground of difference in the reality of things. "The Dial" sets forth the same doctrine. "Holding, as Pantheists do, but one essence of all things, which essence is God, they must *deny the existence of essential evil*. All evil is negative; it is imperfection, non-growth. It is not essential, but modal. Sin is not a willful transgression of a righteous law, but *the difficulty and obstruction which the Infinite meets, in entering into the finite.*" This is sin! We hope the definition will be remembered. Another writer in "The Dial" expresses himself thus: "Pantheism annihilates man, so far as *moral obligation* is concerned. Man's desires, thoughts, and volitions, good and bad, are *manifestations of God*; and if so, they must be good, and are bad only in appearance, if at all."

It follows, therefore, that Pantheists must deny all proper *punishment* for sin. The results of our actions, indeed, are not all alike. Some are painful, some agreeable. But aside from natural and necessary results, there is no such thing as reward or punishment. There is no such thing as a *penal infliction* under the Divine government, and never was, and never can be. There is no personal Sovereign, no God of jus-

¹ See Murdock's Sketches, p. 187.

² Vol. i. pp. 106, 424.

tice in the universe to inflict it. Hence, there can be no such thing as the remission of a penalty, no forgiveness, no justification. When persons cease from the performance of actions which naturally give them pain, the pain will be mitigated, and may soon cease; and this is all the forgiveness which Pantheism knows.

And what does the nominally Christian Pantheist think of Christ? Where does he place him? Just where it may suit his convenience. He may say with Strauss, that there is not, and never was, any *personal* Christ—that the Christ of history is but an ideal personage—the hero of the Christian myths. Or he may say, with Theodore Parker, that Christ is but a *man* like ourselves—the greatest man, probably, that has yet lived, though not so great as may be anticipated in future years. Or he may say, with some of the German Pantheists, that Christ is *Divine*. These men have no difficulty in subscribing to the Divinity of Christ. Every human being is Divine. Christ was truly “God manifest in the flesh;” and so was Schelling, so was Hegel, so is everything which partakes of flesh and blood.

As to the matter of the *atonement* by Christ, the editors of “The Dial” talk on this wise: “Pantheists hold to the atonement, or the *at-one-ment* between the soul and God. This is strictly a unity or oneness of *essence*, brought about by the incarnation of the Spirit of God within us. As we grow wise, just, and pure, we grow to be one with God *in mode*, as we always were *in essence*. This atonement is effected by Christ, only as he taught the manner in which it is to be accomplished more fully than any other, and gave us a better illustration of the method and result, in his own person.”—Vol. I. p. 424.

The views of Pantheists as to the future world have been indicated, in part, already. In one sense, they believe in the immortality of the soul, and in another sense, they do not. It is immortal as to its substance or essence. Partaking of the very nature of God, of course, it can never be annihilated. But as to its separate, individual existence, the soul is not immortal. It will cease to exist. It will, at length, be swallowed up in that great ocean of being from which it proceeded. It may come forth again, in some other connection or form, but never as constituting the same individual which now exists. This is what Toland meant in his heathenish epitaph: “It shall come forth again, at some period of eternity; but never again shall it be Toland.” Shelley, too, in his Essay on the Future State, argues against the future *personal* existence of the human soul.

As to the precise period of the soul’s absorption, Pantheists are not agreed among themselves. Some suppose that this

takes place, in all cases, at death. This was the opinion of most of the old Greek Pantheists. This, probably, was the opinion of Toland. But those who adopt the *emanative* system fix upon no definite time when the individual man shall become absorbed. It may be, as in the case of some of the Hindoo devotees, in the present life. The yogee may come into such a state, even here, as to be able to say, "*I am the unchanging; I am the ever-living; I am the inconceivable, the simple life, the displayer of all things.*" With those who are prepared for it, the absorption may take place in the moment of death. With others, it may be long delayed. They may be destined to go into several bodies, and to undergo long probations and purgations, before they shall be sufficiently purified to be swallowed up of Life.—But this glorious event shall come, at length, to all. No portion of the Divine essence can ever be lost. It shall return, in the appointed season, to the great Fountain of being, from which it flowed, and become one with the Deity, not only in essence, but in form, forever.

The morality which Pantheism inculcates has been uniformly of an *ascetic* character. Under its baleful influence, multitudes, not only in India and in other parts of the pagan world, but among the Jews, and in the Christian church, have been led to practice the most dreadful austerities, in the vain hope of self-purification, self-annihilation, and a preparing of the soul for its anticipated openness with the Deity.—Under the influence of the same system, others have been led off in the opposite direction. Having no fear of God before their eyes; no dread of a future, personal retribution, they have practiced every form of wickedness with greediness. So it has been among the heathen. So it was in Italy, in the early part of the sixteenth century. So it has been with multitudes in Germany, and more especially in the German Universities, during the present century.

Such, then, is Pantheism, theoretically and practically, as it showed itself in some portions of the ancient world, three thousand years ago. Such is it, as existing in India, in Persia, and (what is more strange) in some enlightened Christian countries, at the present day. Such is it, as existing (not extensively, we hope, but to some extent) in our own country. Its advocates among us talk of *progress*, and think themselves a century in advance of other Christians. But *progress where?* And *in what direction?* The progress they boast of is a progress backward, at least three thousand years. They would bring the religion of the world back to what it was in the days of Thoth, and Büddh, and Shiva, and Vishnu, and the seven wise men of Greece.

ARTICLE IV.

A LECTURE ON THE FIRST CHAPTER OF ECCLESIASTES.

By Prof. C. E. Stowz, D.D., Cincinnati, Ohio.

THE Book of Ecclesiastes is one of the most interesting relics of antiquity. The simplicity of its language, the depth of its truths, the pathos of its sentiment, and the exquisite beauty of its allegory, place it among the most splendid specimens of the gorgeous literature of the Oriental world. The Hebrew name Koheleth is well translated by the old English word *preacher*, taking the term in its largest sense to signify any one who solemnly harangues an assembly on moral and sacred subjects. The work is throughout a sermon on the vanity of the world, and the preacher is one who had explored to the utmost limit all the sources of earthly happiness, and found them unsatisfying.

It is the object of the book to give an exact picture of the experience of Solomon, and to teach by the example of this most illustrious and prosperous of all the Oriental kings, the total insufficiency of earth and all the good things of this world, when pursued for their own sake, and with views limited to the present life, to confer happiness; and to show that all happiness must be found in fearing God and keeping his commandments, and in using the things of this world with wise reference to a future life. If, now, we can ascertain the method by which this object is accomplished, we shall get a clue to the interpretation of the whole book, and avoid the difficulties and absurdities into which many commentators have fallen, by starting from wrong premises.

The method of the writer is the most vivid and effective that can be conceived. Instead of describing the various processes of thought and feeling through which Solomon passed in the course of his eventful life, the whole heart of the king is taken out and held up before our eyes, with everything it contains, both good and bad. The secret chambers of his soul are thrown open, and we see every thought and feeling as it arises in the mind, and in the exact shape in which it first presents itself, without any of those modifications by which men soften down the harder features of their first thoughts before they give them utterance to their fellow-men.

¹ As the following article is intended to be a *practical lecture*,—such a one as might with profit be preached to an intelligent congregation,—all elaborate linguistic discussions are avoided, and the book is taken just as it stands on the pages of the Bible; as a genuine work of Solomon's, who was the only son of David that was king in Jerusalem.

Solomon began his career under the influence of sincere piety; uninterrupted prosperity corrupted his feelings, and rendered him worldly. He began to seek his happiness in the things of earth, and eagerly pursued, under all the advantages which wisdom, wealth, and royal power could give, every earthly gratification to satiety. He is disappointed and disgusted; and instead of repenting of his errors, he becomes dissatisfied with the arrangements of Providence, misanthropic, and skeptical. His conscience, however, is not entirely asleep, but occasionally interposes to check his murmurings and reprove him for his follies.

In this state of mind he is introduced, and in the character of Koheleth, gives full and strong utterance to all his feelings. Hence, inconsistent statements and wrong sentiments are to be expected in the progress of the discourse; and it is not till towards the close of the book that all his errors are corrected, and he comes to "the conclusion of the whole matter," a humbled, penitent, believing, religious man.

As examples of the inconsistencies alluded to, we have 2: 15, 16, with 26: and 8: 15, with 7: 2, 3.

We will here give a brief analysis of the contents of the whole book.

Chap. i-iv. Koheleth, in the warmth of his disappointment and disgust, utters vehement complaints, asserting and proving the vanity of all earthly pursuits, and intermingling expressions of discontent and skepticism.

After chap. iv., Koheleth checks his vehemence, and, like a man trying to soothe his own perturbed feelings, he addresses himself in the second person *thou*; 5: 1-8; 7: 9-15; 8: 2, 3, etc.

Still he occasionally breaks out in complaints in the first person, though the vehemence of them is very much softened, 5: 13-18; 6: 1-8; 8: 15-17, etc.

In chap. v., &c.; therefore, the prevailing tone is sedative and preceptive, though they are of a mixed character, and exhibit Koheleth in the process of penitence, and gradually improving moral feeling.

In chap. vi-vii., Koheleth appears entirely repentant, subdued, and humbled. He exposes his conscientious conviction in regard to the whole subject, and gives the result of his entire experience. See particularly 12: 13, 14.

A strictly logical arrangement of thought is not to be expected in a work of this kind. The ideas are arranged as they happened to be associated in the writer's mind, and with just so much neglect of logical order as the agitated condition of Koheleth's feelings would naturally occasion.

There is another peculiarity altogether Oriental. Between the discussions of the different topics, various proverbs and wise sayings are introduced, which are only very remotely connected with the general train of thought or with each other. The Orientals delight to adorn their writings with strings of proverbs, as they do their persons with strings of pearls, and no matter how diverse from each other they may be, provided each by itself is beautiful.

In regard to the inconsistencies of sentiment in this book, we have many parallels in the books of the Bible. In that magnificent specimen of primitive Orientalism, the Book of Job, many of the sentiments uttered by the interlocutors, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar, are entirely wrong, and their wrong sentiments are reprov'd and corrected by the Almighty at the close of the book, as like sentiments in Ecclesiastes are retracted and repented of by Koheleth himself, when he comes to a better mind. The Bible gives us the most natural and vivid representation of all the feelings of man, and furnishes us with abundant means of distinguishing the good from the bad. The book of Ecclesiastes is a true picture of the naked human breast, in its progress from satiety and consequent discontent and skepticism to true repentance and a well-grounded faith, which afford the only solid foundation for permanent enjoyment. Unbelief is most commonly the child of misanthropy, the grandchild of disappointed ambition or satiated voluptuousness.

The book under consideration is a minute account of Solomon's religious experience, from the time he forsook his God and sought his happiness in the world, till at length, through a long process of the most painful and often exceedingly wicked exercises of mind, he was again brought to repent and seek his all in God.

The English poet Prior, in his elaborate poem entitled "Solomon," has amplified the leading ideas of Koheleth with splendid diction, harmonious versification, and copious imagery; but he takes up only a part of the book, and still the poem tires by its prolixity. Dr. Johnson, in his "Rasselas," has expressed much more felicitously the same general train of feeling of which every man has more or less experienced in the course of his life; and of all modern works, *Rasselas* is that which approaches nearest in its tone and spirit to the plaintive discourse of the Hebrew King. The first sentence of *Rasselas* would serve equally well as an introduction to Ecclesiastes: "Ye who listen with credulity to the whispers of fancy, and pursue with eagerness the phantoms of hope; who expect that age will perform the promises of youth, and that

the deficiencies of the present day will be supplied by the morrow, attend," etc.

Such are the persons who would read *Ecclesiastes*, and who are likely to find their own experience vividly delineated by the pencil of the Hebrew sage.

Having spoken thus far of the general character of this interesting book, we will now proceed to the composition itself. While adhering as closely as possible to the good old English of the common version, we shall endeavor to make a translation still more scrupulously literal than that, in order to give as exact an idea as possible of the precise scope and complexion of the Hebrew original.

CHAPTER I.

The first verse is the original title of the book, the second is the motto or text, on which the whole discourse is founded, (and which is repeated just before the close, 12:8,) and the third is the state of the particular question first discussed.

Vs. 1-3. The words of Koheleth, the son of David, king in Jerusalem.

Vanity of vanities, saith Koheleth, vanity of vanities, the whole is vanity. What profit hath a man in all his labor which he laboreth under the sun?

After this introductory statement, Koheleth proceeds, in answer to the question proposed to illustrate the general thought that the course of nature goes on inflexibly in its own way; and let man do what he will, he cannot produce the least change in it, to render it more agreeable to his own inclinations. In the first place, he can effect no change in the physical world.

Vs. 5-7. A generation goeth, and a generation cometh; but the earth standeth forever. The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and panteth towards his place whence he arose. The wind goeth to the south and turneth to the north; the wind goeth turning and turning; and the wind cometh back again on his circuits. All the rivers go into the sea, and the sea is never filled; to the place whence the rivers came, thither do they return again.

The sea particularly alluded to in the last remark, is evidently the Mediterranean, as that was the only one with which a king in Jerusalem would probably be familiar; and the facts in regard to this sea strikingly illustrate the truth of the observation, and show the acquaintance which the wise monarch of the Hebrews had with natural history. Seven large rivers, the Nile, Don, Nieper, Danube, Ebro, Rhone, and Po, are continually pouring their waters into the Mediterranean; and besides this, a strong current of nearly twelve miles in width, and seven hundred yards in depth, is continually setting into the sea from the Atlantic Ocean; and yet, with all this immense accumulation of waters, the sea, though it has no vis-

ible outlet, is never filled. Enormous quantities of water, therefore, must rise in vapor, descend in rain, and thus return to the springs of the rivers which feed the sea. It is now said that two lateral currents and an undercurrent set from the sea into the ocean, through the Straits of Gibraltar ; but these do not materially affect the result, and were probably unknown in Solomon's time. The Dead Sea also, into which the Jordan continually flows, has no visible outlet, and *is never filled*.

Solomon proceeds to illustrate the fact, that as no change can be effected in the course of nature, so in the moral world things go on in the same perpetual round ; the pursuits, dispositions, and anxieties of men are in all ages essentially the same ; and the only reason why any one imagines there are developments of human nature entirely new, is his ignorance of the past ; and in future ages also, the same ignorance of the past and the same apparent novelties will continue to exist. More especially does the remark apply to the turning-point of the discourse, the endeavor to make one's self happy in the world without God. On this point no new experiment remains to be tried ; everything which can be tried has been tried—and if any one supposes that he has discovered some new way in which he can be happy without God, it is only because he does not know the others who have tried exactly the same thing before him.

Vs. 8-11. All things labor weariously ; man cannot utter it : the eye is not satisfied with seeing, and the ear is not satiated with hearing. What hath been is that which shall be, and the thing that hath been done, is that which shall be done, and there is nothing new under the sun. Is there anything of which one will say, See, this is new ? It hath already been in old times which were before us. There is no remembrance of former things ; and also of future things there will be no remembrance with those who shall come after them.

Koheleth next proceeds to confirm what he has said by his own experience ; and as he has been particularly celebrated for wisdom, he first shows that wisdom avails nothing, not even under the most favorable circumstances for acquiring it, as it only enables a man to see existing evils the more clearly, without giving him the power to remedy them.

Vs. 12-18. I, Koheleth, was king over Israel in Jerusalem ; and I put my heart to search out and to deliberate by wisdom upon everything which is done under the heavens. This troublesome business hath God given to the sons of Adam, that they may busy themselves therewith. I saw all the doings which are done under the sun, and behold, the whole is vanity and empty effort. The crooked cannot be straightened, and the lacking cannot be numbered. I spake with my heart, saying, Behold I have made great and added wisdom above all which was before me at Jerusalem, and my heart saw very much wisdom and knowledge. And I put my heart to know wisdom and to know folly and madness. I know that this also is empty effort ; for in much wisdom is much trouble, and he who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.

Koheleth thus shows, from his own experience, that the pursuit of wisdom and knowledge as a source of happiness is vain, and can end only in disappointment.

In chap. ii. he proceeds to show, from his own experience, that the pursuit of the pleasures of sense, the gratification of taste, and even the union of intellectual action with sensual pleasure, are utterly insufficient of themselves to afford permanent satisfaction.

PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS.

This interesting portion of God's Word gives rise to several important reflections respecting human pursuits. We learn from it—

1. That it is vain for men to seek for happiness in the control of external nature.—This has always been one great object of human ambition, and one of the most earnest of human pursuits. There is not a power of nature which man has not attempted to control and render subservient to his own will. Even the fierce winds and the terrific billows of the ocean, whose very appearance would seem to bid defiance to human power, have been braved by man. He has ventured to lay hold on them, and attempted, if not to curb their fury, at least so to direct their power as to make them subserve his own purposes.

When the eye stretches over the boundless desert of the restless ocean; when we hear the howling wind moving over its immense surface, and see the waves rising in mountain cataracts, all human strength seems so weak, all human power so helpless, so hopeless, that it looks like madness for man to think of braving it; and yet the compact ship, with its simple machinery, with the aid of mathematical science and the help of a very small helm, carries man in perfect safety over this deathly waste, and the winds howl and the waters roar for their prey in vain. By the aid of steam, triumphs over nature still more wonderful have been achieved, and man now scarcely dares venture to set limits to his own power, and boasts that he can well-nigh annihilate time and space.

But there is a limit to the power of man over nature. After all that man can do, *the sun ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to the place whence he arose*; and no human power can, on any emergency, in the least degree haste or retain his steady march. *The wind also goeth towards the south and turneth about unto the north, and enlisteth about continually*; and no human power, however urgent the necessity may be, can for a moment hold it in check, and make it blow north when it chooseth to blow south. After all that human power can do,

the body will sicken, and die, and decay, according to the laws of nature; and all human works, even the strongest and most enduring, crumble under the tooth of time. Great as is the power of man over nature, miserable is he who seeks his happiness in the exercise of his power; for nature is the strongest and will triumph, and man at last must fall before her.

2. It is vain for men to seek happiness in the control of Providence.—God permits us to do much toward shaping our own destinies; but there is a point beyond which *it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps*. Prudence avoids many dangers, energy conquers many difficulties, perseverance surmounts many obstacles; and an indomitable will, in a strong muscular frame, would sometimes seem to put forth an efficiency almost irresistible. But, let men do what they can, *one generation passeth away and another generation cometh, but the earth abideth forever*.

At one time it seemed as if Napoleon had almost seized the attributes of the Almighty, and would make himself felt in all parts of the earth at the same time, by an almost omnipresent energy; but even Napoleon found himself helpless before the frosts and snows of a Russian winter; he found that men who had neither clothing nor food would freeze and starve, in spite of him, and that dead men were no defence against living Cossacks. He found that those whom he had insulted and abused in the days of his prosperity had no love for him in his adversity—he found that the Russians, on whom he had trodden so hard, were up again when his foot was off, and after him when his back was turned—and on the plains of Leipsic, and in the field of Waterloo, he experienced the uncontrollable power of human vengeance when Providence gives the opportunity to turn upon a remorseless oppressor, and he exclaimed, It is useless to struggle against destiny—and the resistless Napoleon was to the day of his death a poor, helpless fugitive and exile; as entirely powerless as the weakest of those who in the day of his greatness trembled at his nod.

Who can war against Providence? *When He giveth quietness, who then can give trouble? and when he hideth his face, who then can behold him? Whether it be done against a nation, or against a man only? Job 34: 29. The thing that hath been is that which shall be, and the thing that is done is that which shall be done; there is no remembrance of former things, neither shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come with those that shall come after. All things are built of labor. Man cannot alter it—but God sitteth quietly in the heavens, or looketh down upon the busy ant-hills of a world, and knows that all its multitudinous*

scrambling disturbs not a single joint in his great machine of the universe. The man who hopes for happiness in the control of Providence, will certainly be disappointed.

3. It is vain to seek happiness in the control of mind.—Nothing is more gratifying to human ambition than the power of controlling mind. He who can sway his fellow-men, and mould them to his purposes, he, in the world's view, is the great man; he is applauded and honored, and for the time thinks himself happy. But he comes to places which he can neither go round nor get over—some minds are too stupid to be impressed, or too obstinate to be moved—or their prejudices run in lines with which he is not acquainted, and some quite inferior genius, understanding those particular localities, outruns him entirely and baffles all his arts, and turns him completely out of the combat—and the winner of a thousand fields at length exclaims from the depths of his heart, *I have seen all the works that are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity and vexation of spirit. That which is crooked cannot be made straight, and that which is wanting cannot be numbered.*

He who seeks happiness in controlling the minds of his fellow-men, will be most bitterly disappointed; for when most absorbed in this species of ambition, and the gratification of it has become most necessary to him, he suddenly finds himself thrown out of influence, his banner set at naught, his exactions laughed at, and himself nothing to do but to lie down in shame and sorrow.

4. It is vain to seek happiness in the acquisition of knowledge.—This is indeed a source of pleasure most independent of external circumstances, and in the enjoyment of which it is least in the power of the world to disturb us. In this pursuit we depend on no man's caprice; we are not essentially affected by the state of the times, the rise and fall of political parties, the condition of ecclesiastical factions—in the reception of new thoughts, in the discovery of new truths, the mind is delighted, and it is a joy with which the stranger intermeddleth not.

But no man in this world is or can be entirely independent of his fellow-men. We are connected together by ten thousand ties which cannot be sundered; and if one rises too much above the level of his fellows, these ties only pull upon him to his hurt. If one acquire an exquisite ear for sounds, so as to be sensible to the nicest variations, and have a delicious relish for harmony, he is just so much the more keenly pained by discords; and in such a world as this there are a hundred discords to one symphony. If one cultivate his taste, so as to

have the nicest perception and highest enjoyment of beauty of any kind, he purchases his gratification at a dear rate, for he must pay for it by the deep disquiet which he feels at things which rarely excite the notice of ordinary men.

The man who knows, takes pleasure in knowledge, and ignorance pains him—and when he sees how ignorantly the world goes on, how foolishly the affairs of men are conducted, how grossly his fellow-creatures are imposed upon, and misled—his knowledge serves only to make him the more alive to the painful degradation of his species—it only discovers evils without giving him the power to remedy them—it is like sight to one who is tied to those who are both blind and deaf, and whose only privilege it is to see the abyss to which his companions are inevitably drawing him, and to suffer in anticipation the evils which they will not feel till they actually come upon them. He fully sympathizes with the exclamation of Koheleth, vs. 18 : “And I put my heart to know wisdom, and to know folly and madness. I know that this also is empty effort ; for in much wisdom is much trouble, and he who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.”

Where, then, is peace to be found ? Nowhere, O man, nowhere, but in God. Says Koheleth : *Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter—Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man.*—12 : 13. Says the Psalmist : *There be many that say, Who will show us any good? Lord, lift thou up the light of thy countenance upon us.*—Ps. 4 : 6. Says Christ : *In the world ye shall have tribulation, but in me there is peace.*

Let the state of mind be such as is indicated by these texts, then all the worldly advantages enumerated will be real blessings to the possessor, and actually means of grace. Then if we have power over nature, if we have skill to use providences, if we have faculty to sway mind, if we are able to make superior attainments in knowledge, it all goes to the cause of Christ ; the blessing of Christ is upon it all ; and it returns back to our own bosom with a seven-fold blessing to ourselves.

But what is the usual experience of Christians in this matter ? Alas ! they know much more of the struggles of Solomon while he was trying to enjoy the world without God, than of the peace of Solomon when he had abandoned the world and sought his all in God. To what extent do Christians usually abandon the world and make God their all ? Why, usually to this extent, and no more : they make up their minds in theory that they ought to do so—once or twice a day, while engaged in prayer, they tell God they will do so—and perhaps in times of great revival they feel almost as if they had done so—but if at any time God touches any of their earthly goods, their children, their

reputation—the feelings of their hearts proclaim, *Ye have taken away my gods, and what have I more!* But they read in the Bible of the *peace of God which passeth all understanding, dwelling in the heart and mind by Christ Jesus*—they read of *abiding in Christ as the branch abideth in the vine*—they read of that *perfect love which casteth out fear*—of that *joy unspeakable and full of glory* which is the present possession of those who really believe and love a Saviour whom as yet they have not seen (1 Peter, 1 : 8,)—and of all this they have just about as vivid and adequate a conception as a poor rustic who has never seen any dwelling but a log-cabin in the woods, has of the splendors of Buckingham Palace or Windsor Castle, when you describe them. Yet the Palace and the Castle are his own, and he may dwell in them if he chooses—but oh ! he cannot bear to leave his cabin unless he can load all its furniture on to his back and take it with him—he hates so to part with any of his earthly gear, that he cannot bear to go unless he can drag along after him the very logs of which his poor hovel was built.

Trust in Christ ? Make Christ my all ? Yes, I will, provided I can keep enough of the world on my shoulders to prevent their being galled by the weight of the cross ! Walk right onward in the narrow path of life which Christ has marked out ? O yes, but here is my precious camel, laden with the choicest of my worldly goods, and wishes and hopes—and first wait a little, till I can drive him, with all this load on his back, through the needle's eye, and then I will go with you.

Brethren, this is all that hinders you from enjoying that perfect and uniform peace, even that peace *that floweth like a river*, which the Bible promises to all who really believe and wholly trust !

ARTICLE V.

SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION.

By REV. ROBERT TURNBULL, Hartford, Ct.

It is one thing to see an object, another to observe it. In the one case there may be nothing more than an act of perception, instantly passing from the mind : in the other, there must be, in addition to perception, a feeling of interest and a process of reasoning. It may involve, even in the simplest cases, both analysis and synthesis, the quick perception of con-

trasts and resemblances, the rapid separation and equally rapid combination of particulars and generals, of phenomena and laws.

Many persons do little more than look at nature. A thousand things and a thousand changes pass under their eyes, but they neither observe nor understand them. Like Hamlet's ghost, they have "no speculation in their eyes;" and hence they know next to nothing respecting some of the most curious organizations and the most marvelous changes which reveal themselves to observing minds. Of course their mechanical employments and personal interest compel them to observe some things, and reason upon their nature and uses; but beyond this narrow sphere their minds seldom wander. Indeed, it may be safely said; that to many persons nature, and even their own immortal spirits, are a blank. Eyes they have, but they see not; ears, but they hear not; minds, but they perceive not, the reality of things.

"They eat, and drink, and sleep; what then?
They eat and drink, and sleep again."

The inferior animals do not observe nature; they only look at it. They bask in the summer sun, but do not observe the radiant finger which paints the heavens with azure and gold. In some cases their senses are more acute than those of man; but they have no intelligence to compare the various aspects and relations of things. The eye of the eagle may pierce the storm-cloud, or gaze upon the disc of the sun, but he cannot feel the sublimity of the one, or the beauty of the other. An unerring instinct, implanted by their Creator, guides such animals to their appropriate destiny; but they are destitute of reflection, consequently of improvement. The beaver builds his dam as he did a thousand years ago. The cuckoo utters the same unmeaning sound. But man has the power of observation and reflection, of analysis and comparison. His mind possesses the grand idea of unity; it mirrors the universe in its sacred depths. He looks at an object, marks its qualities and uses, its relations and capacities, traces its history to the great central cause, links it to the universe of being and thought, and treasures the remembrance of it forever. Thence is he capable of endless improvement. He advances with time; he rises constantly in the scale of being. For as nature is infinite and exhaustless, like the God from whom it springs, thought, intelligence, and feeling ever deepen and expand. Their range is boundless as the universe, their progress endless as the flow of eternity.

The man, then, who observes and reflects, who looks upon

nature with "a speculative" eye, who intermeddles with all knowledge, who becomes acquainted with the outward phenomena, as well as the more secret workings of nature, gazing there, in rapt wonder, upon the embodied thoughts of God, and opening his heart to the quickening influence of the great central Sun, feels himself advancing, with a majestic step, on and on forever to the infinite and the immortal. If "at peace with God through Jesus Christ our Lord," he sees the Divine everywhere, feels it everywhere. His mind grows and expands, becomes clearer and stronger, calmer and deeper, like a broad river, rushing in beauty and glory, through lofty mountains and sunny fields, to its far-distant home in the sea.

"Therefore is he still
A lover of the meadows and the woods
And mountains; and of all that we behold
From this green earth; of all the mighty world
Of eye and ear; both what they half create
And what perceive; well pleased to recognize
In nature and the language of the sense
The anchor of his purest thoughts, the nurse,
The guide, the guardian of his heart, and soul
Of all his moral being."

Although the great majority of mankind are little given to observation and reflection, except within the petty circle of their personal or pecuniary interests, yet it is owing to no natural deficiency either of intellect or taste, but to a neglect and perversion of their powers. Their education, if we may call that education which simply permits them to live and germinate, is the prolific source of this and many kindred evils. They are taught little that does not pertain to their physical wants; and hence they grow up mere machines for eating and drinking, digging and working, hoarding and spending. Their higher instincts are suppressed, their baser excited and matured. As they advance in years, they advance in selfishness, and cannot, therefore, be supposed to take much interest in anything not pertaining to their grosser interests. When you talk to them of studying nature for its own sake, or for the sake of those supernal truths which it everywhere teaches; when you tell them of the discoveries of science, and the importance of investigating fire, air, and water, the composition of minerals and soils, chemical changes and affinities, electrical agencies and astronomic revolutions, the marvelous mechanism of the human frame, the wonders of the brain, and the still greater wonders of the mind, how often will they frigidly put it all away from them, by contemptuously asking, *What's the use of it?* They cannot well see the use of studying the stars, observing the stratification of rocks, or being curious about shells, minerals,

and plants, birds, beasts, and insects, and especially of spending long years in their investigation. Yet who is ignorant of what science has done to promote the civilization, wealth, and happiness of the nations? The knowledge of astronomy, for example, enables us to navigate the seas with safety, and thus brings innumerable nations into profitable and peaceful intercourse. Its uses in other departments are well known, but its triumphs here have been especially striking. The Practical Navigator of Bowditch, founded upon the most accurate astronomical calculations, has been the means of saving an untold amount of property and life. Chemistry supplies us with medicines and paints, essences and oils. It enables us to bleach and to dye, to glaze and to stain, to print and to engrave. It supplies us with our pottery, our window-glass and soap, with a thousand things besides. It has furnished the safety-lamp, "which enables us to walk with light and security while surrounded with an atmosphere more explosive than gunpowder," the daguerreotype, with its endless pictures of face and form, and the gasometer which lights our cities with regal splendor. The knowledge of geology admits us to the inexhaustible treasures of the mineral kingdom; unfolds the principles of the formation and improvement of soils, and furnishes the materials for enriching and beautifying the face of the earth. It supplies our grates with fuel, our foundries with metals, our buildings with marbles and lime. Without its aid it would be impossible, with accuracy and ease, to cut our canals and railroads, so essential to the commerce of the world. An acquaintance with pneumatics, or the pressure and equilibrium of the atmosphere, with some knowledge of the nature and expansive powers of heated water, has constructed the steam-engine, the steamboat, and the rail-car. It has cheapened the price of all marketable commodities, which depend for their supply upon manufacture and transportation, turned the barren waste into a fruitful field, raised untold treasures from the bowels of the earth and the very heart of the granite mountain. The science of optics has given us the mirror, the microscope, and the telescope, the magic lantern, and the light-house, "with the capital improvements which the lenses of Brewster and Fresnel, and the elegant lamp of Lieutenant Drummond, have conferred, and promise yet to confer, by their wonderful powers, the one of producing the most intense light yet known, the other of conveying it undispersed to great distances." Observations upon "the magnetic fluid" and the nature and capacities of simple signs have given us the power of sending thought itself, with lightning speed, through a thousand

J. F. W. Herschel.

miles of suspended wire; a power yet destined to make the world one mighty whispering-gallery, in which the lightest thought or feeling will come and go with a velocity swift as that of an angel's wing.

But these are nothing to the influence which the sciences have exerted upon mind, blending their influence with the Christian form of civilization, and lighting up the universe with supernal glory. They have corroborated revelation and assisted in its study, revealed the regularity and uniformity of nature, the sublime courses of the Divine administration, the infinite wisdom, goodness, and might of that uncreated Mind which is above all, through all, and in all. In consequence of this, they have shed a radiance over the barren waste as well as the fertile field; they have left the impress of mind upon the desolate mountain and the sandy desert; they have filled air, earth, and sky with living wonders, revealed the riches of the "unfathomed ocean," and made the vast and illimitable space around, beneath, and above us teem with embodied conceptions of wisdom and love; they have given a voice not only to the hills and vales, but to the host of heaven,

"Forever singing as they shine,
The hand that made us is Divine."

Thus to the eye, the ear, the heart of the devout scientific observer, nature has a life and a soul with which it can hold converse, and by means of which it scales the infinite heights of God himself, and drinks deep and refreshing draughts from the stream which flows

"Hard by the foot of the eternal throne."

Hence we conclude that it is a narrow and unchristian view of the matter, which, with respect to the observation of nature and the pursuit of science, prompts the common inquiry, "What's the use of it?" which throws contempt upon books, cabinets of minerals, plants, and shells, philosophical and chemical apparatus, and exalts what is called common sense over all the learning and science in the world.

The principal reason why science has made such slow and painful progress, till within one or two centuries, is to be found in the unobserving disposition of mankind, fostered by false education and popular prejudice. Even the philosophers of former times were more engaged in discussing abstract theories than in observing nature. Passing the visible diurnal sphere, and not only so, but the limits of revelation itself, they reveled in the visions of transcendental metaphysics, discussed the nature of God and of angels, the essence of matter and of mind, and

reasoned about fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute. "What is the highest good ; whether pain be an evil ; whether all things be fated ; whether we be certain of anything ; whether we can be certain that we are certain of nothing ; whether a wise man can be unhappy ; whether all departures from right be equally reprehensible ? These, and other questions of the same sort, occupied the brains, the tongues, the pens of the ablest men in the civilized world during several centuries. Hundreds of such philosophers spent their lives laboriously in doing nothing. Science was a circle ever returning upon itself ; and the most simple and useful discoveries lay concealed by the thick veil of ignorance." Well has Sir J. F. W. Herschel observed, in his discourse on the study of Natural Philosophy, that five thousand years of the world's history had elapsed before men discovered the principal use of the moon ! It is only a few years ago that it was known that the element of oxygen existed, or that there were such substances as platinum, iodine, bromine, etc. Shells had been found on the tops of the highest mountains, or embedded in the deep strata of the earth's surface, but how they came there, and what truths they taught, none could tell. Water had always risen in pipes to the height of thirty-two feet, but the fact was not observed, at least not accounted for, till the sixteenth century. All material substances had tended to the centre of the earth, stones and apples had fallen to the ground, the moon had revolved around the earth, and the earth around the sun, but no one had discovered the law of gravitation till the time of Newton. We have met with individuals who even now seriously doubt the earth's diurnal motion. Most persons imagine that dew *falls* from the sky, and would find some difficulty in telling why smoke ascends in spiral columns into the atmosphere, and then descends to the earth ; how rain comes to be suspended in the air ; how it falls to the ground ; why it comes to be globed ; how it occasionally diffracts and reflects the light in such a way as to form the rainbow, not one in a thousand can give you anything like a satisfactory solution. "The power of beauty," as Akenside calls it,

"sits smiling at their soul,
How lovely, how commanding !"

but the power of philosophy has not yet erected her throne in their hearts.

Some philosophers have greater powers of observation than others ; and it is really singular to see how little things of the greatest importance have escaped their attention for years and ages. The deviation, for example, of the magnetic needle, by

the influence of an electrified wire, must have occurred innumerable times under the eyes of persons engaged in galvanic experiments; but it required the keen eye of Oersted to detect the fact, refer it to its origin, and thus connect two great branches of science.

Many persons imagine that they can make no progress in scientific observation, without extensive attainments in mathematics, and the use of philosophical instruments and chemical apparatus. These doubtless are important helps to observation; they widen its range and test its accuracy. Yet much can be done without them. Indeed, there is no situation in which the capacity for philosophical observation cannot be gratified with the most satisfactory results. Nature, indeed, has often to be forced by means of experiment, like the subtle and changeable Proteus, to declare her secrets; yet her great features are open to all, and invite their study. The barren heath, with its mosses, lichens, and insects, its stunted shrubs and pale flowers, becomes a Paradise under the eye of observation. To the genuine thinker the sandy beach and the arid wild are full of wonders, indicating the presence and power of the all-pervading Deity. The bare cliff, which has borne the storms of innumerable winters, glows with living interest under his fixed and ardent gaze. Shut him up in a dungeon; and he will find pleasure and profit in making the acquaintance of spiders and flies, and in studying their habits and history. Confine him to the house, and the light streaming in at the windows, the fresh dew gathering upon the cold tumbler, the steam pouring from the tea-urn, the rays shooting like innumerable radii from the burning lamp, supply ample materials for philosophic observation. It is said that the youthful Pascal was led into an interesting train of investigation by simply noticing the vibratory sound made by a tumbler, when struck with a knife at the dinner-table. Putting his finger upon it, the sound instantly ceased, and he never rested till he ascertained its cause. Throw sand upon the surface of a sonorous body, and it will arrange itself into regular mathematical forms, in correspondence with the nature and amount of the vibration. The observation of this fact has given rise to an interesting train of investigation in the science of Acoustics. Well has it been remarked by an eminent authority, that "as truth is single and consistent with itself, a principle may be as completely and as plainly elucidated, by the most familiar and simple fact, as by the most imposing and uncommon phenomenon. The colors which glitter on a soap-bubble are the immediate consequence of a principle the most important, from the variety of the phenomena it explains, and the most beautiful, from its simplicity

and compendious neatness, in the whole science of Optics. If the nature of periodical colors can be made intelligible, by the contemplation of such a trivial object, from that moment it becomes a noble instrument in the eye of correct judgment; and to blow a large, regular, and durable soap-bubble may become the serious and praiseworthy endeavor of a sage, while children stand round and scoff, or children of a larger growth hold up their hands in astonishment at such waste of time and trouble. To the natural philosopher there is no natural object unimportant and trifling. The fall of an apple may raise his thoughts to the laws which govern the revolutions of the planets in their orbits, or the situation of a pebble may afford him evidence of the state of the globe he inhabits, myriads of ages ago, before his species became its denizens.”

It is in this way that the Rev. Gilbert White, a kind-hearted, old-fashioned clergyman, with the fields and gardens for his study, collected such a curious mass of scientific information, in his “*Natural History of Selborne*.” Though its immediate details have reference to an obscure hamlet on the borders of a barren heath in Hampshire, England, it contains a more extensive and accurate description of animals than was possessed by most of his contemporaries, with much superior advantages. The good old man, full of love and wisdom; found, in his rambles about his parish,

“Tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything.”

Mechanics in their workshops have often made valuable discoveries, by simply observing what was going on under their eyes. To this we undoubtedly owe the first suggestion respecting the telescope. Small spheres of crystal or glass had been used by the ancient engravers of gems to aid their sight; and the transition from these to convex lenses was made by Salvini Armati, at Florence, in 1285. Subsequently, it is reported, a person casually looking through two of these lenses, in the shop of a spectacle-maker, found the building to which he directed his eye brought within a short distance of the spot where he stood.* Iodine was discovered in this incidental way, not, however, without keen and judicious observation and reflection. A soap-boiler observed that the residuum of the ley from which was extracted the alkali used in the manufacture of soap, produced a corrosion of his copper boiler—a circumstance for which

* J. F. W. Herschel.

* This account is given substantially in a work published at the Hague, in 1655, under the title “*De Vero Telescopii Inventore*.” The spectacle-makers to whom the invention is here referred were Zechariah Jans, or Jansen, and Hans Lippersheim, of Middleburg.

he could not account. He put it into the hands of a scientific chemist, who analyzed it, and by this means discovered the beautiful element to which we have referred. This being made the subject of further observation and experiment, many interesting facts and principles were discovered, which have exerted a great influence upon chemical science, in fact, given a new impulse and direction to its investigations. It was recollected that the ley for making soap was derived principally from the ashes of sea-plants, and here, consequently, the origin of iodine was discovered. It was also found in salt water, salt mines, and springs, sponges, and other substances of a marine origin. Galileo discovered the isochronism of the pendulum; a simple affair, but one of great importance in dynamical science, by observing the regular swinging of a large lamp in an old cathedral church. The polarization of light first revealed itself to Malus, in the absence of a figure in the painted window of the palace of Luxembourg, as he casually looked at it one evening through a doubly-refracting prism, while the rays of the setting sun were streaming through the panes.

Much of the difference between a scientific and a common thinker arises from the circumstance that the one has acquired habits of close and accurate observation; the former is on the look-out for the secrets of nature, and can refer them to their fundamental laws, while the latter permits his mind to wander over the fair face of nature, and sees nothing there but a heterogeneous assemblage of changes and appearances. Indeed, the principal distinction of modern science is, that it is founded mainly upon observation and experiment, being thence inductive and practical. It is a philosophy of facts, not of speculations; of ascertained laws, not of imaginary theories. It employs, indeed, the highest reason—is founded upon fundamental axioms, not simply of matter, but of mind, and suggests, if it does not absolutely prove, the existence of the infinite, of the spiritual and the eternal, as the true basis of all laws and of all phenomena; but it proceeds step by step from particulars to generals, from generals to particulars, from analysis to synthesis, and from synthesis to analysis, being at once inductive and deductive, a true science and a true philosophy. Bacon brought the minds of men from the cloudy regions of abstraction and theory, to look upon things as they are, and become familiar with nature in her ever-varying moods. He taught them to observe, or rather he taught them the indispensable use of observation, of founding science upon facts, of making it inductive, practical, and real; a simple affair, to be sure, but, like many other great principles, much hidden from the wise men of this world by the very fact of its simplicity.

It will thus be perceived that there is nothing occult or mysterious in scientific investigation. Neither is there anything in it really difficult—we mean *insurmountably* difficult, to minds of average capacity. Nothing is necessary to its successful prosecution but to have eyes and ears open, hands busy, minds intent and reflective. Look steadfastly and patiently at nature; note her varying appearances and changes, methods and laws; seize her products by means of experiment or reason; turn them over and over upon all sides; look, if possible, into her interior working, beyond her mere freaks and appearances, as we may call them, where the invisible power which circulates through the universe operates by fixed and unvarying laws, and it will not be long before you discover some of her grandest secrets. Your method—your classification or system, if we may name it such, may be very imperfect and limited at first; no matter, it will expand and become every day clearer and more perfect. Moreover, it is some consolation to know that science, even in its palmy state, must necessarily be fragmentary, a rude and unfinished outline, so to speak, of a vast landscape of untold grandeur and beauty. The most distinguished philosophers, after all, have only penetrated the surface of things; only gained some glimpses—glorious ones, we grant—of that boundless ocean of being and thought by which we are encircled. The motto, however, “Expect great things, attempt great things,” may be adopted by the philosopher as well as by the Christian. *Nil desperandum* is written at once upon the portals of science and of religion.

The history of natural science is little more than the recorded triumphs of observation, assisted and verified by mathematical reasoning. It is yet advancing by the same means, for the field of observation is only widened by means of scientific discovery. In this connection, some slight sketches of what has been done in two or three departments of scientific study will set the matter in a clear light.

Take, for example, Pneumatics, or the subject of the pressure and equilibrium of the atmosphere. Previous to the time of Galileo, it had always been supposed that nature abhorred a vacuum, just as if nature were a thing of conscious life, and that this was the reason why water rose in a pipe or common pump, from which the air had been excluded. Galileo, however, fixing his attention upon the fact that the water could not be made to rise beyond a specific height, was naturally led to inquire into the cause of this phenomenon. For if nature abhors a vacuum, she must abhor it at all heights. At first the true reason did not occur to his mind, but a variety of cir-

cumstances, connected with his own reflections upon the subject, subsequently satisfied him that it could be nothing but the pressure of the atmosphere. His pupil, Torricelli, proved the truth of the supposition, by filling a long glass tube with mercury, which he inverted into a basin of the same liquid. The fact that the mercury remained in the tube at a certain height, was then seen to be the effect of some definite, permanent cause, which could be nothing but the pressure of the external air. This was further verified by the delicate observation of the rising and falling of the mercury in correspondence with the weather, or the state of the atmosphere. The fact, however, was disputed by the learned world, till it was demonstrated by Blaise Pascal, who conceived the happy idea of carrying a barometer to the top of a high mountain, rightly concluding that the mercury would be depressed in proportion to the diminished weight or density of the atmosphere. It was subsequently observed that this would furnish an admirable method of measuring the exact altitude of mountains, an application of a scientific discovery at once simple and beautiful. The next step in the progress of discovery was to create a vacuum by artificial means, which was actually done by Otto Guericke, the true discoverer of the air-pump, which he applied to the investigation of various phenomena, and thus assisted in establishing the existence of atmospheric pressure. His instruments and methods, it is true, were imperfect; and the air-pump was greatly improved by Boyle, Haukebec, Hook, and others, who made extensive discoveries respecting the pressure and equilibrium of the air and other fluids.

At this point of scientific attainment, the world was prepared for the discovery and construction of the steam-engine; depending as it does upon the two great principles of the pressure of the atmosphere and the expansive power of steam, principles which had been established as the result of pure experiment and observation. It required, however, the keen perception, analytic and constructive power of James Watt, to bring it to perfection, and make it available for practical uses.

There are few sciences in which the triumphs of observation have been more striking than in that of Optics, one of the most fruitful as well as delightful departments of philosophic study. Though vastly aided by the demonstrations of geometry, it lies fully open to observation, and its first elements or principles were discovered wholly by this means.

Various theories have been proposed as to the nature of light, the most plausible of which is that of Euler, somewhat modified, that it consists in the rapid undulations of some kind of

"ethereal medium;" but whether it is this, or a modification of the magnetic or electric force, the laws of its transmission, and the changes which it undergoes, have been determined with great accuracy. Nay, so far has science carried its triumphs here, that the vibrations of light, in its various modifications or colors, have been counted with mathematical precision.

Newton may be called the father of the science.¹ Applying to it the analytical procedure, to him belongs the high honor of

"Untwisting all the shining robe of day."

Though mistaking its nature, as consisting of substantial particles of inconceivable tenuity, he discovered many of its most beautiful laws. He had made some simple and obvious observations upon the changes which light undergoes in passing from one medium into another. He had seen it "diffracted," bent or broken into the varying hues of the rainbow, by passing from air into globules of descending rain. He had witnessed a similar phenomenon in a tumbler of water, placed at a certain angle to the rays of light; also, in certain rock crystals, and probably in soap-bubbles as they floated in the air. He was led, therefore, as some, perhaps, had done before him, to conjecture its composition and refrangibility. Procuring a prism, he subjected these principles to the test of experiment. Then

"The flaming red
Sprung vivid forth; the tawny orange next;
And next delicious yellow, by whose side
Fell the kind beams of all-refreshing green.
Then the pure blue, which swells autumnal skies,
Ethereal played; and then, of sadder hue,
Emerg'd the deepened indigo, as when
The heavy-skirted evening droops with frost,
Whilst the last gleamings of reflected light
Died in the fainting violet away."²

He thus proved light to consist of several elementary colors, the combination of which forms the virgin white.³

¹ It is proper, however, to say, that Kepler and Des Cartes had made many interesting observations on the same subject, and Newton was greatly aided in his researches by Kepler's Optics.

² Thomson's poem on the Discoveries of Newton.

³ The poet Goethe, whose singular sagacity was equal to his vivid imagination, as is proved by his striking discoveries in Botany, Optics, &c., rejects the theory of seven colors, and endeavors to show, with much ingenuity, that every color is the blending of light and darkness in new proportions. How extensively his theory is received by scientific men, we are not informed. It is quite certain, however, that it is the difference in the frequency of the succession of the vibratory or periodical movements of light, or its modifications, which affects us with the sense of the diversity of colors, so many producing red, so many blue, and so on.

Newton also discovered its power of reflection, or of being thrown back from all bodies at a particular angle, thus furnishing a solution of the manner in which light reveals the presence and forms of all material substances. It is singular and interesting that Newton commenced his scientific investigations with light, and returned to it with ardor and delight, near the close of his life, as if this first-born of the material creation, the most beautiful and expressive symbol of truth and of God, possessed a peculiar affinity for his pure and lofty spirit.

The next decisive step in the progress of this science was the discovery of double refraction, which was observed by Bartolin and Huygens in the crystals of Iceland spar. Newton had noticed the same thing, and conceived the singular idea that light, in its transmission through such media, takes sides, much in the same way that the magnetic current takes sides when it becomes positive at one pole and negative at the other.

After the lapse of many years, this view was again taken up and investigated by Malus, Wollaston, Arago, and Dr. Brewster. Malus, whose attention was directed to the subject, as already intimated, by the absence of a figure in a painted window, as seen through a prism when illuminated by the descending sun, discovered and announced the principle of the polarization of light, a law of nature which accounts for the phenomenon of double refraction. It was subsequently observed that the same effect is produced in a degree much higher and in a form more splendid by the presence of thin films of air or other liquids in crystalized substances, when divided into flat plates and subjected to a ray of polarized light.

This fact not only throws great interest upon the science of optics, but opens a new field of observation and discovery in crystallography, supplying a rule for ascertaining the forms and structure of crystals, and the consequent principles of their formation. And since nearly all inanimate matter was originally composed of crystals or crystalized forms, and much of it even now exists in this condition; since, moreover, the principle or power of crystalization is constantly at work in nature, forming one of its elementary laws or processes, and ranking with gravitation, cohesion, and chemical affinity; nay, perhaps being only a modification of these, and these again a modification of some more general law or force, the successful investigation of this subject may throw light upon the fundamental principles of scientific investigation, and change the whole aspect of our philosophical theories. In a word, it may form a link to connect all the physical sciences in one harmonious whole.

In remarkable confirmation of this statement, it has recently

been announced that Dr. Faraday, by a series of the most delicate experiments and observations, has demonstrated the existence of an intimate relation between light and electricity. He passed a ray of polarized light between the poles of an electromagnet, and as often as the current of electricity rendered the iron magnetic, so often did the ray, previously invisible, appear. The effect appeared to be due to a rotation effected in the ray by the magnetic force. The general law is thus stated: "That when an electric current passes round a ray of polarized light in a plane perpendicular to the ray, it causes the ray to revolve on its axis, as long as it is under the influence of the current, in the same direction as that in which the current is passing."

Intimately connected, then, with the science of Optics is that of Magnetism, in which observation has achieved the most brilliant results. All are acquainted with that peculiar property in magnetic iron, as it is called, to attract common iron and steel. Observation had noticed this property, as well as its capacity of being communicated or transferred, and hence the discovery of the magnetic needle. Accident, in all probability, had first revealed the property, in magnetic bodies, when suspended freely in the atmosphere, of pointing toward the north. It was found, however, that the direction of the magnetic needle varied somewhat in different places, and that it had a tendency to dip, or point downward, at a particular angle. These variations have been observed and recorded in different parts of the world, and if uniform, as they may be presumed to be, must eventually discover the true cause of the earth's magnetic influence. It was observed, in process of time, that magnets not only attracted, but repelled each other in opposite directions. Hence it was concluded that a current of magnetic influence passes through both in a specific and uniform direction, and that, consequently, they attract each other when their opposite ends or poles are brought together, in other words, when the electric or magnetic currents in both are permitted to flow in one direction; and on the other hand, that they repel each other when their corresponding ends or poles are brought in contact, or when the currents of magnetic influence flow in opposite directions. This, as every one knows, has been abundantly verified. It would seem, therefore, that the whole earth is circumnavigated by magnetic currents flowing with some degree of regularity from all parts of the compass toward the north pole, and then, perhaps, returning by the opposite route.¹

¹ On the subject of Terrestrial Magnetism, see Humboldt's *Cosmos*, vol. i., pp. 167—180.

Dr. William Gilbert, of Colchester, England, whom Galileo entitled "great

Observation had also noted a number of interesting facts with respect to the presence of electricity in wax, amber, glass, etc. Its power of attraction and repulsion had been discovered, and its identity with lightning revealed and proved, in the brilliant experiments of the sagacious Franklin. Observation had seen the magnetic needle quiver and change its direction under the influence of an electric current, and this led many to suspect that magnetism and electricity were only modifications of the same principle. But it could not be proved at this stage of the science.

In the meantime, observation was sitting quietly in her watch-tower, gazing upon the changes and appearances of nature, ready to seize upon anything which might elucidate this interesting and difficult problem. Nor was it long before the whole matter was revealed in a manner the most imposing and beautiful.

to a degree that might be envied," and whom Sir Christopher Wren pronounced the true father of modern inductive science, made many acute observations and successful experiments on the subject of Magnetism. He suggested some of the greatest discoveries of modern times, in this department of observation. Among other things, he says, in his work on the Magnet, published at the commencement of the sixteenth century, "*Magnus magnes ipse est globus terrestris*,"—"The terrestrial globe is itself a great magnet." He suggested, also, the identity of magnetism and electricity. Proofs of this may be seen in Humboldt's *Cosmos*, pp. 331—340. "Bacon," says Whewell, *Hist. of Induc. Sciences*, vol. ii., p. 378, "showed his inferior aptitude for physical research in rejecting the Copernican doctrine which William Gilbert adopted." Gilbert's powers of observation, as well as of reasoning, were acute and comprehensive. Sir John Leslie, in his *Elements of Natural Philosophy*, vol. i., p. 47, speaks of him as the first successful scientific investigator in England. "His Treatise on the Magnet," he adds, "was a model of the application of philosophical analysis; it soberly reduced the various facts to a few leading principles, and threw occasional gleams on other branches of science. Gilbert not only established terrestrial magnetism, but laid the foundation of electricity." "This man," says Sir Christopher Wren, in his inaugural address, as Professor of Astronomy in Gresham College in 1657, "would I have adored, not only as the sole inventor of Magnetics, a new science to be added to the bulk of learning, but as the father of the new philosophy, Cartesius being but a builder on his experiments. This person would I have commended to posterity in a statue; that the deserved marble of Harvey might not stand to future ages without a marble companion of his own profession." (Gilbert was a physician.) He kept correspondence with the *Lyncei Academici* at Rome, especially with *Franciscus Sagredus*, one of the interlocutors in the Dialogues of Galilæus, who labored to prove the motion of the earth negatively, by taking off objections, but *Gilbert* positively; the one hath given us an exact account of the motion of gravity upon the earth; the other of the more secret and obscure motion of attraction and magnetical direction in the earth; the one I must reverence for giving occasion to *Kepler* (as he himself confesses) of introducing magnets into the motions of the heavens, and, consequently, of building the elliptical astronomy; the other of his perfecting the great invention of telescopes to confirm this astronomy; so that if one be the *Brutus* of liberty restored to Philosophy, certainly the other must be the *Collatinus*." Quoted by Sir John Leslie in his "*Elements of Natural Philosophy*."

The Italian philosopher Galvani was experimenting in his laboratory, and observed the convulsive movements of a dead frog in connection with an electric discharge in its immediate vicinity. He analyzed the phenomenon, and came to the conclusion that its occurrence depended upon the formation of a circuit, by means of a muscle, a nerve, and a metallic conductor. He stopped at what he considered the simple physiological fact, to which he gave the unfortunate name of animal magnetism. Volta examined it much more minutely, and arrived at the important conclusion that the animal excitement had nothing properly physiological in it, but was only a delicate indication of the presence of the electric power, and that the phenomenon was owing to the distribution of electrical equilibrium, by the contact of their different conductors, which, forming a circuit, sent a current of electricity in one direction through the whole. He concluded, by a delicate and profound analysis, that the amount and intensity of this current might be indefinitely increased by increasing the number of conductors, or rather the number of circuits. Hence the construction of that wonderful instrument which bears his name, the *Voltaic Pile*.

Chemists and natural philosophers now began to use this instrument; but some time elapsed before it was observed that chemical decompositions were effected by the electric current, as it passed through the conducting liquids, and that oxygen and acids were transferred to the positive, alkali and the metals to the negative poles of the circuit. These observations being once made and verified, Sir Humphrey Davy applied the power of the instrument to the alkalies and earths which had hitherto defied all attempts at decomposition. This application resulted in the brilliant discovery of the metallic bases, and effected a complete revolution in the science of chemistry.

Thus, by a series of careful observations and well-conducted experiments, the identity of magnetism and electricity was fully demonstrated, and a new and magnificent field opened for the investigation of philosophers.

It is now ascertained, with a high degree of probability, that the earth itself is a magnet, having its negative and positive sides, its poles of attraction and repulsion; that the whole atmosphere is under the control of electric power; that all bodies, organic and inorganic, are modified more or less by its influence; that it penetrates the inmost recesses of the globe, and thence works upward, by an inscrutable energy, to the last and loftiest peaks of snow-clad mountains; that it glows in the rays of the summer sun, hides itself in the heart of the Alpine glacier, and rushes in flood and tempest over land and sea; in a word, that "it lives through all life, extends through all ex-

tent, spreads undivided, operates unspent"—at once the image and agent of Him, "who maketh his angels winds, and his ministers flames of fire."

What an immense range has been given to our powers of observation by the recent improvements in the telescope and microscope! What a universe of marvels has been opened to our vision, in the vast regions of illimitable space above us, beneath us, and around us, ranging from our little world, as we may justly call it, in comparison with some of the magnificent orbs with which it is associated, to that mighty globe of light which forms their centre, whose diameter is over a hundred times greater than that of the earth, and whose mass is five hundred times larger than that of all the planets put together; and from the sun, on and on, through millions and millions of miles to the planet of Leverrier, on the furthest verge of our system, with a volume two hundred and thirty times that of the earth, attended by one, perhaps by two moons, and performing its vast circuit around the sun in a period of one hundred and sixty years; and from the planet Leverrier, through a stupendous and solitary void intervening between our system and the gorgeous hemisphere of stars beyond—a distance, says Dr. Brewster, of not less than twenty millions of miles—till we find ourselves amid new suns and systems, stretching through boundless regions of space; nay, more, moving and revolving together in one harmonious system, where we may revel amid stars and constellations of every form and hue, binary and tertiary, red, green, orange, emerald, and gold; one hundred millions of which, it is computed, are capable of being seen through a powerful telescope; and not only so, but resolve the far-stretching and luminous nebulae into distinct suns and systems, it may be more stupendous and beautiful than any that have yet greeted the vision of man.

But while the telescope places us, so to speak, on the battlements of heaven, and enables the eye thence to sweep over the vast assemblage of worlds which revolve, "in beauty and in glory," through the illimitable depths of space, the microscope discovers a universe within a universe, a world of wonders in the atom which we tread under our feet, or the dew-drop which glistens on the rose-bud, as striking and stupendous as all the starry heavens. A single globule of standing water is probably inhabited by no less than from one hundred to one thousand millions of animalcules, a population larger than that of all the human beings on the globe. These minute, and, to the unaided eye, invisible beings, swarm in every part of the air, earth, and ocean. They are found in the purest water and in the most foetid solutions—in plants and animals, in trees and

flowers, in dust and vapor—so numerous and diversified that the mind is confounded at the thought. They are of all forms and colors, habits and motions. Some of them are the monsters of their tiny world, and spend their brief existence in devouring millions of their fellow-animalcules. They come into existence by myriads; exist occasionally in clusters, with beautiful lustrous forms, like opaline vases or flowers, and some of them have a singular rotatory movement, and appear to dart through the waters as if by means of some invisible internal force. So numerous are they, that the accumulation of their exuviae, the coats and shells especially of a certain species, have formed mountains, and entered into the composition of large tracts of country. "Hence have originated," says a writer in the *Foreign Quarterly*, "the layers of white calcareous earth common in peat bogs and morasses, the tripoli or polishing stone of Bilin, consisting wholly of the silicious cases of animalcules; and the bog-iron, composed of the ferruginous shields of other forms of polygastria!"

Such are some of the triumphs of observation in the department of the natural or positive sciences. But there is an inner world, a universe, not of changing and visionary forms, but of spiritual realities, as capable of being discovered and classified as the outward and palpable forms and laws of material substances. The laws of mind—of thought, feeling, and affection—the laws of the spiritual world, are as definite and uniform as the laws of matter, and, as subjects of study, certainly of superior interest and value. Intellect, feeling, conscience, memory, imagination, reason, the forms and principles of ideal grandeur and beauty, conceptions and intuitions of the true, the right, the good; ideas of the vast, the unlimited, the absolute, the perfect, furnish materials for the most clear and beautiful classification of spiritual realities; nay, more, afford us glimpses of the divine and the ineffable, that is, of God and immortality. Observation, then, ought to be turned inward, and hold converse with the magnificent and ever-varying scenery of the mental world. It ought to watch, note down, compare, and classify the facts of spirit, with as much patience and perseverance as those of matter. From the lowest cravings of appetite to the loftiest aspirations of the soul, from the first dawn of intelligence in the infant mind to the last and loveliest creations of genius, observation will find abundant scope for its most minute and comprehensive investigation. Fact after fact, principle after principle, will grow bright and clear under its gaze, till the soul, in all its depths and harmonies, reveal itself to itself, as the noblest creation of the infinite Mind.

The power of spiritual observation, or of mental introspection, is more difficult, perhaps, than that of outward observation, but it is one of the noblest attainments, and marks the essential difference between a true philosopher and a mere man of the world. "The proper study of mankind is man." Each man is a specimen and mirror of the whole. To know one's self, therefore, is to reach the measure and fountain of all human knowledge. Moreover, it is the stepping-stone to the divine. Here we have the shadows and reflections, the ideas and images of something yet more august, more perfect and beautiful. Here commences for us the true, the right, the good. The idea of cause is here, the idea of the absolute, the eternal cause. In a word, the idea of God is here as the Creator, the Sustainer, the Judge of all. On this ladder, therefore, we rise to revelation; in other words, the knowledge of ourselves prepares us for the reception of those supernatural communications which God has been pleased to give us in his Word. By this means we are fitted to believe and appreciate the gospel. Our own deep consciousness of our spiritual and moral nature is the indispensable prerequisite to an intelligent and cordial reception of the truth as it is in Jesus.

But there are vast depths in the nature of man, which it is difficult to reach, which few comparatively ever fathom. We are apt to be satisfied with superficial and transient observation. It is wise, however, to penetrate beyond the surface. That, indeed, discovers to philosophical observation many wonders; but the interior depths, though apparently covered with shadows, are richer and grander by far. Here you reach the very fountains of thought and feeling, the very secrets and mysteries of reason and will. Upon this subject Coleridge, in his *Biographia Literaria*, discourses with great though somewhat fantastic eloquence. "It is neither possible nor necessary for all men or for many men to be philosophers. There is a philosophic (and, inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an artificial) consciousness which lies beneath, or, as it were, behind the spontaneous consciousness of all reflecting beings. As the elder Romans distinguished their provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness, *citra et trans conscientiam communem*. The latter is exclusively the domain of *pure* philosophy. The first range of hills that encircles the scanty vale of human life is the horizon for the majority of its inhabitants. On its ridges the common sun is born and de-

parts. From them the stars rise, and touching them, they vanish. By the many even this range, the natural limit and bulwark of the vale, is but imperfectly known. Its higher ascents are too often hidden by mists and clouds from uncultivated swamps, which few have courage or curiosity to penetrate. To the multitude below these vapors appear, now as the dark haunts of terrific agents, on which none may intrude with impunity; and now, all *aglow* with colors not their own, they are gazed at as the splendid palaces of happiness and power. But in all ages there have been a few who, measuring the rivers of the vale at the feet of their farthest inaccessible falls, have learned that the sources must be far higher and far inward; a few who, even in the level streams, have detected elements which neither the vale itself nor the surrounding mountains contained or could supply."

The common vale, then, of which Coleridge speaks, is accessible to all. The great elements of our common nature are here—our intellect, our feelings and affections, in a word, the philosophy of man in its concrete form. Here is what Kant terms "the practical reason," upon which rests the superstructure of our common faith; and here also is the will, that mightiest of all our powers, which, under God, shapes our character, and controls our destiny. In this region, "the common sun," may we not add, the *sun of righteousness*, "rises," but never "departs?"

But beyond this common vale, according to Coleridge, lies a region, purer and more beautiful, into which also the solar rays of the spiritual heavens can penetrate, and in which the philosopher may range, amid forms of spiritual glory to which the mass of ordinary men are strangers. Here are the primal elements of being; the sources of thought, feeling, and will, which seem to border on infinity and eternity. Wandering here, in solemn and believing mood, we hear the rush of the boundless ocean whence we come and whither we go. Far outward is "the visible diurnal sphere," of changeable forms and fleeting phenomena, the shadow, so to speak, of the Almighty, whose infinite spirit is "above all, through all, and in all;" while before us, "far inward," is "the mystery of mysteries," the centre and essence of being and of blessedness.

From this brief discussion we deduce the practical inference, that scientific attainments are within the reach of all who will employ the faculties God has given them to observe and compare to analyze and classify the various facts and phenomena, which, in the natural world, present themselves to the intellect and eye, as they range over the face of this fair and wonderful creation; and in the spiritual, to reason and reflect.

tion, falling back upon themselves and reduplicating their own conscious existence.

Let all, then, study nature, and not only nature, but themselves, and the entire world of mind. Philosophy as well as Revelation invite us to gather its stores, "without money and without price." Nay, more, she amply rewards us for our toil by the pure and salutary impressions which she conveys to our memories and affections. By studying nature, we acquire a love for her, and thus are *never* less alone than when alone. Trees and streams; shells and minerals, flowers and insects, clouds and sunshine, mountains and meadows, the sun by day and the moon and stars by night, become our friends and companions. Storm and calm, the garden and the wilderness, land and ocean—alike are welcome, together furnishing wisdom and solace. The beautiful and the true mirror themselves in our souls, as stars are mirrored in the deep mountain lake. And should Christian faith lend her aid, these material heavens will appear to us as the very face of God, and all the sounds and harmonies of the universe as the rhythm of eternal love and joy. Then will the fabric of our mental and moral nature be built up—

"Not with the mean and vulgar works of man,—
But with high objects, with enduring things;
With life and nature; purifying thus
The elements of feeling and of thought,
And sanctifying by such discipline
Both pain and fear,—until we recognize
A grandeur in the beatings of the heart."

ARTICLE VI.

THE DEATH OF CHRIST.

By REV. SAMUEL T. SPEAR, Brooklyn, N. Y.

THE fact involved in the title of this article presupposes the *humanity* of Christ. By this we mean, that he was a *man*—that he had a human body and a human soul. As such, Christ was a *reality*, a substantive existence; as much so as any one belonging to our species. He was not a mere theophany, but a real and proper man. The proof of this is conclusive. Hence we object to the remark: "He is in such a sense God, or God manifested, that the *unknown* term of his nature, that which we are most in doubt of, and about which we are least capable of any positive affirmation, is the *human*." Certainly "the *human*" is not to us an "unknown term." There

¹ God in Christ, pp. 123, 152.

is none we understand better. And if this is not truly predicable of Christ, then all the laws by which human nature is identified and known, must be set aside. The idea, that he was human only in *appearance*; that the language of the Bible, which affirms his humanity, "may well enough be taken as language of external description merely, or as only setting forth appearance as appearance," is without foundation. The supposition would be as legitimate in application to Pontius Pilate, or any other being admitted to be human. It assails the credibility of the senses, and implies their incompetency to identify human nature. It is not demanded by the fact that he was God "manifest in the flesh." It does not clarify our conceptions of his person. Indeed, it throws the whole subject into inextricable confusion. We may as well apply the same supposition to his divinity; and say, that he was Divine only in *appearance*. If Christ, though Divine, had not a human nature, including a body and a soul essentially analogous to the same in other men; then the uniform marks or criteria of such a fact furnish no proof of its existence anywhere.

The Evangelists, without mooted any questions growing out of his twofold nature, tell us that Christ died—was crucified. The statement conveys a definite truth, and looked at simply as an *event*, free from difficulties. There was such a person, known among his friends by this and other titles; he was seen by the people; he talked with them; he associated with them; he was marked out in their perceptions as a *distinct* being. Whatever else they thought, they at least thought him to be a *man*. His enemies denied that he was anything more. He was finally arrested, condemned, and put to death.

At this point speculation starts a curious question: Which of the *persons* was it that died; the human, or the Divine? We object to the *form* of the question. The Bible never represents Christ as compounded of *two distinct* persons. It speaks of him as *one* person, though it predicates of him such attributes and acts, and assigns to him such names, as indicate that he was God "manifest in the flesh." The constitution of Christ's person, as to its interior mode, is a mystery transcending all our powers of analysis. We take him as *one* person because so given to us in the Bible; and for the same reason, as Divine and human in a personal union, though totally incompetent to explain its mode. These are two different aspects of a Being, we cannot call two persons, for he is never so presented in the Scriptures. It is well to remember also, that in the case of Christ the *human* element of his being never had an existence *distinct* and *separate* from the Divine. Our

own personality is complex, made up of a body and a soul, whose union is as perfect a mystery as the incarnation of the Divine Logos. Yet no one man is ever called two persons; though of him may be affirmed things, which in the most rigid sense are true only of his body; while other things are with equal propriety affirmed of him, that are true only of his soul. We say that man is *mortal*; but this is true only in respect to his material part. We say also that man *thinks* and *reasons*; yet this is true only in respect to his mind. Hence our *own* personality is such, that what is true of one part of it is not true of the other; and yet we predicate all these truths of one and the same person. The Evangelists so wrote in regard to Christ. They speak of his personality as a unity, and never solve the problem of its mystery: they speak of him by his proper names, as doing this or that—as the one Lord Jesus under a variety of historical aspects. What they thus allege, leads us to believe that this Lord Jesus was human, and also Divine; carefully noting that the facts which prove his humanity, are not the facts which show his divinity.

We say, then, with the Scriptures, that Christ died. But in what respect did he die? In what respect does any man die? Does he die in respect to his *soul*? We say not. The cessation of life relates to his body; and yet it is correct to say, the man dies. Is it less correct to say that Christ died, though the event be true only in respect to his *human* nature? We are willing to say, that Christ died only as a *man*. Such, we believe, was the fact. As a speculative question, we must refer his death to the human element of his person. The Bible, however, never states the fact in this analytical form; it takes no pains to gratify a speculative philosophy. It reports the death of Jesus very much as it would that of any man; it gives the fact, the circumstances, and the name, and there leaves the matter.

In this death, viewed historically, there are peculiarities, to mark which may help our subsequent discussion of it in a doctrinal light. To some of these, we propose a brief reference.

1. It was the death of a *perfectly holy* being. Those who believe the Bible, believe in the absolute *sinlessness* of Christ. Inspiration asserts this of him, and the history it gives of him makes it manifest. Here, then, we have a question for those who object to the atonement, on the ground of its alleged injustice, since it represents the just as suffering *for* the unjust. How will they account for the fact, that Christ suffered and died at all? The fact of his perfect holiness and painful death remains historically true, though that death be no atonement for sin. So far as it is a subject of argument, in respect to the

justice of God, it is as difficult to conceive of "the just" as suffering and dying, as it is of the just suffering and dying *for the unjust*; in some respects more difficult. In the one case, we see no end to be answered, no reason for the event; in the other, the Scriptures assign a reason—"The just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God." Hence, the objection against Christ's death, considered as an atonement, is much more formidable, if we reject that view which thus regards it.

2. This death was *voluntary* on the part of Christ. He repeatedly apprised the disciples of the fact, that he was to die at Jerusalem, at the time when, and by the mode in which he did die. On one occasion, when he announced the event to his disciples, and his resurrection on the third day, Peter exclaimed, "Be it far from thee, Lord; this shall not be unto thee." Jesus answered, "Get thee behind me, Satan; for thou art an offence unto me; for thou savorest not the things that be of God, but those that be of men." Mat. 16: 21-23. Jesus positively declared his own *voluntariness* in dying. "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again." John 10: 17, 18. He declined all means contemplating his rescue in the garden. "Thinkest thou not that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels? But how then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be?" Mat. 26: 53, 54. Paul tells us, that "for the *joy* that was set before him," he "endured the cross, despising the shame." Heb. 12: 2. These texts settle the fact. Christ *chose* to die. He was in the hands of the Jews, and by them dragged to the cross, simply because he chose to be. He had some adequate reason for this choice—an end to accomplish, for which he was willing to give his life. What was it? This is a difficult question for those who reject the doctrine of his atonement for sin, as the means and the way of the sinner's pardon. He surely did not desire death on its own account; he chose it only as a means to an end. Discard the end which is assigned in the Scriptures, and no reason can be perceived why Christ should choose to die. Let it be true, however, that this death was designed as an atonement, to open the way of salvation to guilty men, and without entering into any philosophical speculations as to the *manner* of its efficacy, we can easily see why Christ, whose express errand was "to save sinners," should cheerfully die for this purpose.

3. This death occurred by a *Divine appointment*. Christ expressly says (referring to his death and resurrection,) "This

commandment have I received of my Father." John 10: 18. He says in another connection, "For I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me," 6: 38. The Father is represented as *sending* the Son; and here we have the testimony of Christ himself, that he had a commission from the Father to die and rise again. It was a part of his appointed work in doing the "will of him that sent" him. In direct allusion to his death, Christ said to Peter, "The cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?" John 18: 11. This cannot mean less than that his death was a matter of special Divine appointment. The testimony of Peter is itself conclusive: "Him, being *delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God*, ye have taken, and with wicked hands have crucified and slain." "But those things which God before had shewed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled." Acts 2: 23; 3: 18. In the latter passage the context shows, that by the word *suffer*, the apostle means the death of Christ. The whole company of the disciples join in the declaration, "For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever *thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done*." Acts 4: 27, 28. The circumstances incorporated in this declaration show its reference to our Saviour's death. ^{He} himself speaks in the same way. Amid the solemnities of instituting the Supper, he says, "And truly the Son of man goeth, *as it was determined*; but woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed!" Luke 22: 22. These Scriptures do not teach the general doctrine, that God ordains *all* events, but the specific doctrine that he ordained *this* event. Nor were they uttered with reference to the general idea, that God appointed the *mission* of Christ, but to the specific idea that he appointed his death. They apply to this one event, and declare the counsel of God that it should occur. For what was it appointed? Why did God determine that the Being whom he sent "to save sinners," should die—we will not now say, *for sinners*—but die at all? Let those answer who reject the explanation the Bible gives of the design of Christ's death. Paul says, that he "was delivered for our offences:" John, that he was sent to be "the propitiation for our sins." Dismiss these explanatory clauses, and then, on the authority of the Bible, give us the *reason* why God thus "delivered" him; why he fixed death in his work by a clearly revealed decree. This explanation is the only one the Bible gives us; and if we reject it, we have no light on the subject but that of human philosophy. We speculate in total darkness.

4. The death of Christ is spoken of as that which was *proper*—which *ought* to have been. “O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken! OUGHT not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory? And beginning at Moses, and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself.” “Thus it is written, and thus it BEHOVED Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day.” Luke 24: 24–27, 46. Paul speaks in the same way: “For it BECAME him for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings.” This is preceded by the declaration, that he “was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, * * * that he by the grace of God should taste death for every man.” Heb. 2: 9, 10.

Leaving out of view the fact that Christ was the “*High Priest* of our profession;” that he “offered one sacrifice for sins,” “through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once,” we ask, *Why ought* Christ to have suffered? Why did it *behoove* him to suffer? Why *become* God that he should? We have the fact of such propriety revealed, but with no reason, simply because we have discarded the reason of the Scriptures. Can we supply the defect? Did he need the suffering for his own improvement? This supposes his moral imperfection. Was it proper to establish the truth of his doctrines? The *external* evidence of that truth appears much greater in his *miracles* than in his death. Was it proper for him as a teacher? Let it be shown from the Scriptures that dying is essential to the office of a teacher. Was it proper that he might give a bright example of patience in death? If we reject the idea of atonement, and make his death a common death by crucifixion, his patience and resignation have been outdone by some of his disciples. The truth is, the affirmed suitability of this death is without explanation, until we take the simple reason of the Scriptures, in respect to its design. If this involves mystery, the negation of it involves more. We ask for the adoption of no human theory—adding its own to the explanation of the Bible. We simply say, that the suitability of Christ’s death is to us an *unknown* term, unless it be true that he “died for our sins according to the Scriptures.”

5. This death is often referred to in the New Testament, as a *fulfillment of prophecy*. Many of the incidents connected with it, as the fact and price of his betrayal, his scourging in the temple, his death among malefactors, the parting of his garments, the giving of vinegar and gall, his burial with

the rich, had been announced by prophets. See Zech. 11:12. Isa. 53:9, 12; 50:6. Ps. 22:18; 69:21. The New Testament repeatedly refers to this death as a fulfillment of prophecy. "The Son of man goeth, *as it is written of him*; but woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed!" Mat. 26:24. After his resurrection, Christ said to his disciples, "These are the words which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you, that all things must be *fulfilled* which were *written* in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me." Luke 24:44. When declining Peter's defence he says, "But how then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be?" Mat. 26:54. We need not cite more passages to show the current doctrine of the New Testament. That the death of Christ is one of the specific events, peculiarly and definitely marked by the finger of prophecy, is one of the plainest of Bible facts. The least, therefore, that can be said, whether we consider the prophecy in the Old Testament, or the reference to it in the New, is, that in the plan of redemption, peculiar importance is attached to the death of Christ. It is to act a distinguished part, and occupy a distinguished place in his mission. It is not a mere circumstance. It appears as a *leading* feature on the moral canvas, not in the shade, merely to fill up the background of the picture.

Two prophecies, to mention no more, will explain the prominence given to the death of Christ. We refer to the 53d chap. of Isaiah, and the last part of the 9th chap. of Daniel. The first is applied to Christ in the New Testament. See Acts 8:26-35. 1 Peter 2:21-25. Luke 22:37. The principal point at which the prophecy views Christ, is his death. Its language is perfectly conclusive, that this death was to be an atonement for sin. What shall be made of such expressions as the following: "He was wounded for our transgressions, bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed:" "the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all:" "when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin:" "he shall bear their iniquities:" "he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors?" What, according to any sound rule of biblical interpretation, shall we do with these prophetic pictures of the suffering Messiah? What did a Jewish prophet mean by them? They contain the current language of the Old Testament in respect to atonement for sin, and the remission of penalty thereby. It was not possible for a Jew to express the idea more clearly. Shall we torture the language, vacate its obvious sense at the call of modern philosophy, and set up a new and arbitrary rule of ex-

egesis to force out one meaning, that we may force in another?

The prophecy in Daniel is explicit as to the person to whom it refers. It announces the Messiah by name, and fixes the period of his birth. This Messiah in Daniel's vision was to "be cut off, but not for himself." He was "to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness." He was to be a suffering and dying Messiah, "but not for himself."

Now if we reject that view of Christ's death so plainly disclosed in prophecy, how shall we explain the *prominence* given to the death itself? In the absence of this view, what was its significance? What other theory is to be found in the Bible, which assigns to this event such importance? We confess a total inability to answer this question; we know of no Scripture that proffers relief.

6. Christ was put to death under the Jewish charge of *blasphemy*. The ground of this charge was the fact that he claimed equality with God. Mat. 26: 63-66. John. 19: 7. The Jews so understood his words and actions on several occasions. He permitted their construction to stand as that which he meant to affirm. He did affirm his divinity. This was blasphemy in *form*, and really so in *fact*, if Christ were not divine. Taking the form, and regardless of the evidence which certified to the *fact*, the Jews, according to their law, deemed him worthy of death, and procured his crucifixion. They had bad feelings to gratify; yet blasphemy, as now explained, was their charge. They were right, if it be not true that Christ is a *Divine* person. If he is not, he had no right to convey such an impression; above all, he should not have failed to correct it. He should not have died upon a mistake in the construction of his accusers. Such a supposition would destroy his credibility as a teacher, and sap the foundation of the Christian system.

The death of Christ being thus associated with the claim of *divinity*, is placed in such historical relations, that whoever receives him as an infallible teacher of irreproachable character, must also receive him as a Divine person, or be inconsistent with himself. We suppose his divinity was for *some reason* requisite to his atonement. We have that divinity affirmed by himself, in connection with, and historically as the antecedent of, the very death upon which the Bible lays so much stress. Immaterial what are the grounds rendering his divinity necessary to an efficacious atonement, we have the fact of such divinity professed by himself, on the very brink of that solemn event in which the atonement consisted. He appears at this

point as no other being ever did. We can understand, at least in part, the historical appearance, if we suppose him about to suffer for our sins according to the Scriptures. If we reject the supposition, we involve more mystery than we remove.

7. The *conduct* of Christ in reference to his death, and in the article of dying, presents some very *remarkable peculiarities*. These are his agony in the garden, and his dying exclamation on the cross. The least that can be said of them simply as facts is, that they indicate *extreme agony*, and cannot be explained on any *common* principles: i. e., that Christ's death was merely a common death by crucifixion. No ordinary supposition satisfactorily meets the case.

Did this conduct, and the suffering it indicates, arise from disappointment and despair, agitating the bosom of a deluded *enthusiast*, discovering too late the folly of his expectations and pretensions? Is it the language and conduct of saddened benevolence, contemplating the spectacle of human vice and misery? Not a word to this effect appears in the gospel narrative. Were this the true explanation, then no reason is apparent why these *peculiar* sorrows should be limited to the garden of Gethsemane, and the final struggle on the cross; no reason why they should suddenly commence, and as suddenly subside in the remarkable manner in which they did in the garden. The sufferer's language on the cross requires a different view: "My God, my God, why has thou forsaken me?" Will intense *bodily* suffering explain the facts? Surely not in the garden, for it did not then exist. Mere bodily pain could not have produced his dying complaint. He was not inferior to the purest of his followers in the grace of fortitude and patience; and many of these have hung on the cross for three days without a word of complaint. Many persons have endured sufferings far exceeding those of death by simple crucifixion, and borne them with perfect patience. If this were all, the thieves who hung by his side exhibited more composure than Christ himself. His death occurred too soon, to be the effect of merely bodily violence. It was not a death by the slow process of gradual exhaustion. This is shown by his "loud voice," and by the brief period of his sufferings. Simply the pains of crucifixion, therefore, explain neither the death nor the exclamation of the sufferer.

Can the scene be solved on the ground of highly-excited fears? What had Christ to fear from the event of death? Had he not just before calmly said to the penitent thief, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise?" Had he not spoken of his death often, and with the utmost composure? Was he afraid to die? Why, then, did he give himself up to the Jews,

fully advised of the result? Where was his fear, when, followed by the weeping multitude, he said, "Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for me; but weep for yourselves and your children?" This idea is in all respects inadmissible; it comports neither with the character of Christ, nor with the facts.

Can we explain the scene by saying that he was overwhelmed with public reproaches, and deserted by all human reliefs? A being of his purity, and uniform composure and courage, his knowledge of the worthlessness of man's applause, and profound supports in God, could neither be elated with human honor, nor despondent and oppressed in its absence. He knew the honors which awaited him. One thought of God or the glories of his own kingdom was infinitely sufficient against the severest reproaches of his enemies. He had unlimited resources to neutralize the power of so small a cause.

Hence, if Christ suffered merely as a virtuous and holy martyr, his extreme anguish in the garden, and a portion of his behavior in death, are unaccountable. If it was simply a martyrdom, then it was like any other martyrdom by the same mode—neither more nor less. Why was the sinless martyr, whose purity God had always approved, compelled to say in death, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" They who deny that there was anything peculiar in his sufferings, have a difficulty at this point. They have facts which cannot be accounted for by any of the ordinary principles we apply to virtuous sufferers. Every supposition built upon the hypothesis of mere martyrdom fails to explain the facts, considered as a development in such a person as Jesus. In every such supposition it is implied, that his power of endurance, resignation, composure, and hope, was far inferior to that of many others; that with no greater sufferings than others have endured, and, as we should suppose, with much higher means of consolation, he had less power to bear them. It is worthy of distinct observation, that while this theory rules out the atonement, it is involved in the most serious embarrassment, growing out of the mere history of Christ's death.

We believe that his sufferings were far more severe and awful than simple martyrdom can explain. We are drawn to this conclusion by the facts, to say nothing of those Scriptures which teach that Christ's death was an atonement for sin. We attempt no philosophical solution of the manner or degree of the infliction he experienced. Neither will we apply any figurative words to the scene, and speak of God as *frowning* upon him. His own language shows that, in a sense which he felt, though we may not comprehend, he was *forsaken* of God. "My God, my God, why hast thou FORSAKEN me?" We add

the prophetic language of Zechariah: "Awake, O sword, against my Shepherd, and against the man that is my fellow, saith the Lord of hosts; smite the Shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered." Zech. 13 : 7. Jesus speaks of this as a prophecy of his death. Matt. 26 : 31. Mark 14 : 27. It plainly implies a Divine agency, sustaining a connection with the sorrows and pains of the smitten Shepherd, the *modal* nature of which we cannot explain. Why should God smite the innocent Shepherd, as the prophet affirms, and Jesus himself reaffirms? Let those whose theory is that of mere martyrdom, precluding an atonement for sin, tell us, if they can. Why should God forsake the holy Jesus in his last agony? Here are facts not to be set aside by an appeal to our moral instincts, by declaring their repugnance to our ideas of God: they are *Scripture* facts. We must admit them, if we admit the testimony of the Bible. Admitting them, we have a clue to the pains of Christ's passion and death; denying them, we have none.

8. This death was attended with *miraculous* tokens. "Now from the sixth hour there was darkness over all the land unto the ninth hour." "And behold, the vail of the temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom; and the earth did quake, and the rocks rent; and the graves were opened, and many bodies of the saints which slept, arose, and came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many." Matt. 27 : 45, 51-53. These were miraculous signs, placed in conjunction with the Saviour's death. They mark it as the most *significant* event in the whole history of the Messiah. They form a great array of miraculous attestations, and suppose some peculiarity worthy of their presence. If we say this death was a common death, a mere incident in the mission of Christ, we cannot see why it should be so signally marked. But if we regard it as an *extraordinary* death, that for which Christ mainly came into this world, then the moral and the phenomenal scenes are in harmony with each other.

9. The death of Christ is the only thing to commemorate which he appointed a *memorial*. The Lord's Supper is a memorial of his death. "This is my body;" "This is my blood;" "For as often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do shew the Lord's death till he come." Mat. 26 : 26-29. Mark 14 : 22-25. Luke 22 : 19, 20. 1 Cor. 11 : 23-29. We omit any reference to those words which explain the character and design of his death, and refer simply to the fact, that to bring it frequently to the attention of his followers, the institution was appointed. Not his birth, not his miracles, not his public preaching—nothing but his death, is thus distinguished. The

meaning of this is perfectly simple. There is in the death of Christ something peculiar, of special importance and significance, not to be found in any other act or event of his life; something by which it is signalized, as a distinct point for observation. This is the language of the appointment. What is this peculiarity? They who reject the doctrine of atonement can give no satisfactory answer. How simple the question to one who takes the language of Christ to mean just what it expresses! "This is my body, which is *broken for you*:" "This is my blood of the new testament, which is *shed for many for the remission of sins*." The institution, as a fact *meaning* something, in these words is fully explained; in any others it is not. It is worthy of special remark, that the rite whose sole character is that of a memorial, should have been so expounded by Jesus himself. It makes error difficult, and truth simple.

We have treated the above particulars mainly in an historical point of view, founding upon them a probable argument in respect to the death of Christ. Taken in their collected significance, they compel a different verdict from that of Socinianism. This is a poor, spiritless, meaningless, repellent theory, to go along with such facts. It reduces the death of Christ so low in the scale of importance, that its incongruity with the Scriptures is upon its very face.

We have in view, however, more direct and conclusive evidence, in respect to the character and design of Christ's death. The inspired writers use a class of **TERMS**, in which, taken in their grammatical connections, is involved their teaching on this important subject. These terms do not all belong to the same lingual family, though applied to one subject. They also appear in a great variety of connections, dispersed over the whole field of Scripture. Hence, to collect and classify them, we must adopt some laws of affinity among them. This we shall attempt, so far as the convenience of this argument may require.

I. HISTORICAL APPELLATIVES.

This class of words points directly to the *death-scene* of Christ; hence we call them *historical*. They are founded upon that event, and borrowed from it. The following table points to the principal passages of the New Testament in which these terms occur.

1. ΘΑΥΑΤΟΣ—*Death*.

Rom. 5 : 10. We were reconciled to God by the *death* of his Son.

1 Cor. 11 : 26. Ye do shew the Lord's *death* till he come.

Philip. 2 : 8. And became obedient unto *death*, even the *death* of the cross.

Col. 1 : 21, 22. Yet now hath he reconciled in the body of his flesh through death.

Heb. 2 : 9. Made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death.

" " " Should taste death for every man.

" " 14. That through death he might destroy him that had the power of death.

" 9 : 15. He is the Mediator of the new testament, that by means of death for the redemption of the transgressions.

2. Ἀποθνήσκει—Die.

Rom. 5 : 6. In due time Christ died for the ungodly.

" " 8. While we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.

Rom. 6 : 10. For in that he died, he died unto sin once.

" 14 : 15. Destroy not him * * * for whom Christ died.

1 Cor. 8 : 11. The weak brother perish, for whom Christ died.

" " 15 : 3. How that Christ died for our sins.

2 Cor. 5 : 14. That if one died for all, then were all dead.

" " " 15. But unto him which died for them.

1 Thess. 5 : 9, 10. To obtain salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, who died for us.

3. Σταυρεῖται—Cross.

1 Cor. 1 : 17. Lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect.

" " " 18. For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish.

Gal. 5 : 11. Then is the offence of the cross ceased.

" 6 : 12. Persecution for the cross of Christ.

" " 14. Glory save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Eph. 2 : 16. Reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross.

Philip. 2 : 8. Became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.

Col. 1 : 20. Made peace through the blood of his cross.

Heb. 12 : 2. For the joy that was set before him, endured the cross.

4. Σταυρῶνται—Crucify.

1 Cor. 1 : 13. Was Paul crucified for you ?

" " " 23. But we preach Christ crucified.

" " 2 : 2. Save Jesus Christ, and him crucified.

Gal. 3 : 1. Evidently set forth, crucified among you.

5. Σφαίρειται—Slay.

Rev. 5 : 6. Stood a Lamb as it had been slain.

" " 9. For thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood.

" " 12. Worthy is the Lamb that was slain.

" 13 : 8. The Lamb slain before the foundation of the world.

6. Παύσκειται—Suffer.

Mark 8 : 31. That the Son of man must suffer many things, and be rejected.

Mat. 16 : 21 ; Luke 9 : 22.

Luke 22 : 15. I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer.

" 24 : 26. Ought not Christ to have suffered these things.

" " 46. It behooved Christ to suffer.

Acts 3 : 18. God before had shewed * * * that Christ should suffer.

" 17 : 3. Christ must needs have suffered.

Heb. 9 : 26. For then must he often have suffered.

1 Pet. 2 : 21. Christ also suffered for us.

" " 3 : 18. Christ also hath once suffered for sins.

" " 4 : 1. Forasmuch then as Christ hath suffered for us.

7. Παθῶναι—Suffering.

Heb. 2 : 9. A little lower than the angels for the suffering of death.

Heb. 2 : 10. Perfect through *sufferings*.

1 Pet. 1 : 11. Testified beforehand the *sufferings* of Christ.

" " 5 : 1. A witness of the *sufferings* of Christ.

8. Αἷμα—Blood.

Mat. 26 : 28. This is my *blood* of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins. Mark 14 : 24 ; Luke 22 : 20.

Acts 20 : 28. Which he hath purchased with his own *blood*.

Rom. 3 : 25. Through faith in his *blood*.

" " 5 : 9. Being now justified by his *blood*.

1 Cor. 11 : 25. This cup is the new testament in my *blood*.

Eph. 1 : 7. In whom we have redemption through his *blood*. Col. 1 : 14.

" " 2 : 13. Are made nigh by the *blood* of Christ.

Col. 1 : 20. Having made peace through the *blood* of his cross.

Heb. 9 : 14. How much more shall the *blood* of Christ * * * purge your conscience.

" " 10 : 19. Boldness to enter into the holiest of all by the *blood* of Jesus.

Heb. 10 : 29. Hath counted the *blood* of the covenant an unholy thing.

" " 13 : 12. Sanctify the people with his own *blood*.

" " 20. Through the *blood* of the everlasting covenant.

1 Pet. 1 : 2. Sprinkling of the *blood* of Jesus Christ.

" " " 9. (redeemed) with the precious *blood* of Christ.

1 John 1 : 7. The *blood* of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin.

Rev. 1 : 5. Washed us from our sins in his own *blood*.

" " 5 : 9. Hast redeemed us to God by thy *blood*.

" " 7 : 14. Made them white in the *blood* of the Lamb.

9. Ψυχὴ—Life.

Mat. 20 : 28. To give his *life* a ransom for many. Mark 10 : 45.

John 10 : 15. I lay down my *life* for the sheep.

1 John 3 : 16. Because he laid down his *life* for us.

10. Καρὰ—Curse.

Gal. 3 : 13. Being made a *curse* for us.

We place these terms in a single class, because they point by a direct historical allusion to the death of Christ. What view do they, taken in their grammatical connections, give of it? It is a death by which we are "reconciled to God;" to which Christ became "obedient;" "for the suffering" of which he was "made a little lower than the angels;" which he tasted "for every man." "Christ died for the ungodly." "In that he died, he died unto sin once." We obtain "salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, who died for us." This is the way in which apostles speak of the death of Christ. Of what other death or dying do they speak in a similar way? Nothing is plainer than its relation as a means or mode to our salvation as an end. The idea is upon the face of the language; and to reject it is to rescind all the laws of interpretation.

The Saviour's death was by *crucifixion*. Hence the phrases "cross of Christ," "Christ crucified," while they indicated this mode, were used by the apostle to signify the doctrine of salvation resulting from this death. What does Paul mean by "the preaching of the cross;" by the purpose not to glory "save

in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ ;" by the determination to know nothing among the Corinthians "save Jesus Christ and him crucified ;" by preaching "Christ crucified ;" by peace as effected "through the blood of his cross ;" by reconciliation "unto God in one body by the cross ?" Why does he place such emphasis upon this cross ? Merely as a *mode* of death, it does not deserve such prominence. As a symbol of the *doctrine* of salvation resulting from it, it is significant. Clearly this is Paul's meaning. "Christ CRUCIFIED," is his form of expression, when representing the whole gospel system. This is inexplicable except on the supposition that Christ's death is peculiarly, and by way of distinction, the basis of a sinner's salvation. Why did he not say Christ a *teacher*, Christ an *example* ? For the plain reason, that in neither of these respects would he be a Saviour, if he had not "DIED for our sins according to the Scriptures."

The word *slay*, *σπαστω*, in application to this subject, occurs only in Revelation. Christ is praised in heaven as "the Lamb that was *slain*"—"slain before the foundation of the world." The redeemed salute him with the address : "For thou wast *slain*, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood." The slaying, the blood, the death of Christ, is here spoken of as the *means* of their redemption to God. He redeemed them by being slain, by dying. If the language mean anything, it means this.

When Christ is spoken of as having *suffered*, the chief reference is to his *last* sufferings. "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things ?" "It behooved Christ to suffer :—" "I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer :—" this refers to his death. He was "made a little lower than the angels for the *suffering* of death"—that he *might* suffer death. The relation of this suffering to our salvation is thus expressed : "Christ also suffered *for us* :—" "Christ also hath once suffered *for sins*, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God :—" "Forasmuch then as Christ hath suffered *for us*." Here we have the same sentiment. The eye of inspiration is fixed on his death ; and this death is treated as the suffering of "the just for the unjust," in order to the salvation of the latter. Did not Christ suffer for our sins ? The Bible answers in the affirmative.

The *blood* of Christ, *αμα*, is another term whose Scriptural predicates and relations can hardly be mistaken. It is the "blood of the new testament, which is *shed for many for the remission of sins* :—" "the blood of the covenant," to count which as unholy or common is so great a sin—"the blood of the everlasting covenant." Justification "by his blood :—" the

purchase of the church "with his own blood:" "redemption through his blood:" "made nigh by the blood of Christ:" "faith in his blood:" "having made peace through the blood of his cross:" "boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus:" redemption "with the precious blood of Christ:" these are the chosen formulas of apostles in expressing the efficacy and relations of his death. The *sacrificial* nature of many of these allusions we shall consider hereafter. For the present we view them only as *historical*, pointing as they do to the death of Christ. To that death they assign salvation as an effect. The current phraseology of the New Testament, in which this idea is conveyed, is brought into connection with the death, the blood of Christ, so as to associate the two in the relation of cause and effect, means and end. Christ tells us, that his "blood is shed for many for," in order to, "the remission of sins." Is the remission of sins an essential idea of salvation? Then to procure this his blood was shed. This explains the manner in which the inspired writers refer to his blood. Discard this, and their language is unaccountable. Reverse it, and we have man's wisdom in opposition to God.

The term *life*, $\psi\chi\eta$, is used in relations equally significant. Death is a surrender of life. The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to *give his life* a ransom for many:" "I *lay down my life* for the sheep:" "Because he *laid down his life* for us." This *giving* of his life, this *laying it down*, alludes to his death. For whom?—"For the sheep"—"for us." For what purpose? As a ransom. Can this mean less than that the death of Jesus is the means and the medium of the sinner's salvation? Of what other meaning is the language capable? It is perfectly adapted to convey this idea, and no other.

The word *curse*, $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$, is applied to Christ, considered as engaged in the work of our redemption. "Christ hath *redeemed* us from *the curse of the law*," is the apostle's statement of the work. How? By his example? by his teaching? by the moral influence of his gospel? by revealing the perfections of God? by the renovation of our hearts? Neither, so far as here stated; but by "*being made a curse for us*." For the sense in which he was made a curse, the apostle refers to his death on the cross: "Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." Hence Christ redeems us from the curse of the law by dying for us. Whatever may be true of the power of his example, or the excellence of his precepts, it is nevertheless true that this is the way in which we are saved by him from the curse of the law. To this, and this only, does the apostle allude. No theory can be Scriptural which overlooks or pre-

cludes this truth. The apostles never predicate any such property, or relation, of any other part of Christ's work. Where have they said that he redeems us from the curse of the law, by teaching, by his example, by increasing the motives to holiness? Nowhere. They refer to his example as our *model*, but never as the means of our redemption.

What, then, is the meaning to be drawn from the first class of words, taken in the connections in which they occur? How can we account for their use in such grammatical relations, unless it be true that Christ died on account of sin, and in behalf of sinners, in their room—as a substitution for the curse due to them, by Divine appointment made the antecedent and means of God's forgiveness? If this is not true, the language of the inspired writers is totally unaccountable.

II. COMMERCIAL APPELLATIVES.

We give this title to a class of terms which, in the New Testament, are applied metaphorically to the work of Christ. They are commercial metaphors, used to describe the great transaction of Christ in saving sinners. The following table comprises the passages in which they occur :

1. *Αυτορω*—*Redeem*.

Tit. 2 : 14. That he might *redeem* us from all iniquity.

1 Pet. 1 : 18, 19. Ye *were* not *redeemed* with corruptible things, * * * but with the precious blood of Christ.

2. *Αυτρον*—*Ransom*.

Mat. 20 : 28. The Son of man came * * * to give his life a *ransom* for many. Mark 10 : 45.

3. *Αντιλυτρον*—*Ransom*.

1 Tim. 2 : 6. Who gave himself a *ransom* for all.

4. *Αυτροσις*—*Redemption*.

Heb. 9 : 12. By his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal *redemption* for us.

5. *Απολυτροσις*—*Redemption*.

Rom. 3 : 24. Justified freely by his grace, through the *redemption* that is in Christ Jesus.

1 Cor. 1 : 30. Who of God is made unto us * * * *redemption*.

Eph. 1 : 17. In whom we have *redemption* through his blood. Col. 1 : 14.

Heb. 9 : 15. That by means of death, for the *redemption* of the transgressions.

6. *Αγοραζω*—*τιμη*—*Buy, price*.

1 Cor. 6 : 20. For ye are *bought* with a *price*. 7 : 23.

2 Pet. 2 : 1. Denying the Lord that *bought* them.

Rev. 5 : 9. Hast *redeemed* us to God by thy blood.

" 14 : 3. Which *were redeemed* from the earth.

" " 4. These *were redeemed* from among men.

7. *Εξαγοραζω*—*Redeem from*.

Gal. 3 : 13. Christ *hath redeemed* us from the curse of the law.

" 4 : 5. To *redeem* them that were under the law.

8. Περικουίμαι—*Purchase, or acquire.*

Acts 20 : 28. Which he *hath purchased* with his own blood.

9. Περικουήσις—*Purchased possession.*

Eph. 1 : 14. Until the redemption of the *purchased possession.*

1 Pet. 2 : 9. A *peculiar people* (literally, of acquirement to himself).

These terms were originally borrowed from commercial transactions among men. The first five are derived from the verb λύω, which signifies *to loose, to release, to set free*. Λύτρον and ἀντίλυτρον mean the *loosing-money*, the price paid for the deliverance of a captive. The preposition ἀντί, in composition, denotes *substitution*, i. e., the λύτρον is set over against the captive as the price of his release. Hence, λυτρόω literally means to set free by the payment of the λύτρον, the ransom-price; and λυτρώσις and ἀπολυτρώσις, the *deliverance* or release thus accomplished. The terms αγοράζω and εξαγοράζω are derived from αγορά, a *market-place*. They mean *to buy*, and do not necessarily apply to the redemption of a captive. The terms περικουίμαι and περικουήσις are of the same import.

These terms represent the work of Christ in behalf of sinners. The grand and central point of analogy between the *literal* and *metaphorical* sense, is the *deliverance* implied in both senses. The fact that the apostles apply other words to the same work, which simply signify deliverance, indicates the leading analogy in these commercial metaphors. "Who gave himself for our sins, that he *might deliver* (ἐξαίρω) us from this present evil world." Gal. 1 : 4. "Jesus, which *delivered* (ρυσμαί) us from the wrath to come." 1 Thes. 1 : 10. "That through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, * * * and *deliver* (ἀπαλλάσσω) them who through fear of death," &c. Heb. 2 : 14, 15.

With the apostles, then, we say, that Christ *redeems* sinners; they are *bought* with a price; his church is *purchased*; in him his people have *redemption*; for them he has obtained eternal *redemption*; of God he is made redemption unto them; by him they are redeemed. "to God," "from the earth," "from among men." These are Scripture forms of expression; they declare Christ to be a Deliverer, and his people to be delivered.

From what does he redeem or deliver sinners? According to the Bible, "from all iniquity," and "from the curse of the law," "the wrath to come," which plainly means the dominion and penal consequences of sin.

With what does he redeem them? With a *price*, τιμή—a *ransom*, λύτρον, ἀντίλυτρον. —What is this price or ransom? His "life" given—his "blood"—"the precious blood of Christ"—"himself a ransom for all." "In whom we have redemption

through his blood ;” “ which he hath purchased *with his own blood*.” This is the explanation which lies upon the face of the Scriptures, in respect to the fact and manner of our redemption by Christ. The *literal* ransom given for the release of a captive, as a means of rescue, corresponds to the death of the Saviour as the means of a sinner’s forgiveness and salvation.

Hence, Christ does not redeem us by teaching, by preaching, by his example, but by DYING. Whatever the apostles meant by redeeming, this they connected with his dying as the antecedent and procuring cause—as the *mode*. In Eph. 1 : 7, and Col. 1 : 14, Paul explains ἀπολυτρώσις, *redemption*, to mean τὴν ἀφεσιν τῶν παραπτωμάτων, “the forgiveness of sins.” This we have in Christ ; and we have it διὰ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ, “through his blood”—as a consequence, an effect, a fruit of his death—as that to procure which he died. Hence, we are said to be “justified by his blood.” Hence, his propitiation becomes effective “through faith in his blood.” The whole plan of salvation, as taught by apostles, involving forgiveness, justification, redemption, is thus based upon the death of Christ its Author. How this doctrine shall be brought into harmony with human reason, it is not our present business to inquire. We simply declare that in Christ “we have redemption *through his blood*”—adding, in his own words, that this blood was “shed for many for the remission of sins ;” that by dying, the just suffering for the unjust, he redeems or saves men from sin and its curse. The fact that sinners must repent and believe, and that in the gospel God brings about this result by other agencies, and that when present he justifies them freely by his grace, does not militate against the doctrine of redemption as thus explained. It is consequent upon, and not a substitute for, or incompatible with, the death of Christ, as the ground and primary means of salvation. It always refers back, in the order of nature, to what Christ has done in dying for us. His death prepared the way for such a fact.

III. SACRIFICIAL APPELLATIVES.

Under this head, we include that large class of terms, found in the New Testament, and evidently borrowed from the sacrificial system of the Old, by which the office and work of Christ in saving sinners are set forth.

1. Ἀρχιερεὺς—*High Priest*.

Heb. 2 : 17. That he might be a merciful and faithful *High Priest*.

“ 3 : 1. *High Priest* of our profession, Christ Jesus.

“ 4 : 14. We have a great *High Priest*, that is passed into the heavens, Jesus the Son of God.

“ 5 : 1. For every *High Priest* taken from among men, is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins.

Heb. 5: 10. Called of God an *High Priest* after the order of Melchisedec.

" 7: 26. For such an *High Priest* became us.

" 8: 1. We have such an *High Priest*, who is set on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens.

2. *Ιερεύς—Priest.*

Heb. 5: 6. Thou art a *priest* for ever.

" 7: 11. Another *priest* should rise after the order of Melchisedec.

" 10: 21. An *high priest* over the house of God.

3. *Ιερωσύνη—Priesthood.*

Heb. 7: 14. Hath an unchangeable *priesthood*.

4. *Ιλασμοί—Reconcile by expiation.*

" 2: 17. A merciful and faithful *High Priest* in things pertaining to God, to *make reconciliation* for the sins of the people.

5. *Ιλασμός—Propitiation.*

1 John 2: 2. He is the *propitiation* for our sins.

" 4: 10. Sent his Son to be the *propitiation* for our sins.

6. *Ιλαστήριον—Propitiation.*

Rom. 3: 25. Whom God hath set forth to be a *propitiation* through faith in his blood.

7. *Άρνός—Lamb.*

John 1: 29. Behold the *Lamb* of God which taketh away the sin of the world.

1 Pet. 1: 19. Blood of Christ, as of a *Lamb* without blemish and without spot.

8. *Άρνιον—Lamb.*

Rev. 5: 12. Worthy is the *Lamb* that was slain.

" 7: 14. White in the blood of the *Lamb*.

" 13: 8. The *Lamb* slain from the foundation of the world.

9. *Θω—εσχα—To sacrifice—Passover.*

1 Cor. 5: 7. For even Christ our *passover* is *sacrificed* for us.

10. *Θυσία—A sacrifice.*

Eph. 5: 2. Hath given himself for us an offering and a *sacrifice* to God.

Heb. 9: 26. Hath appeared to put away sin by the *sacrifice* of himself.

" 10: 12. After he had offered one *sacrifice* for sins.

11. *Προσφορά—An offering.*

Eph. 5: 2. Hath given himself an *offering* and a sacrifice to God.

Heb. 10: 10. Through the *offering* of the body of Jesus Christ once.

" " 14. For by one *offering* he hath perfected.

12. *Προσφέρω—Offer.*

" 9: 14. Who through the eternal Spirit *offered* himself without spot to God.

" " 25. Nor yet that he *should offer* himself often.

" " 28. So Christ was once *offered* to bear the sins of many.

" 10: 12. After he had *offered* one sacrifice for sins.

13. *Αναφέρω—Bear.*

Heb. 9: 28. So Christ was once *offered* to bear the sins of many.

" 7: 27. For this he did once, when he *offered* up himself.

14. *Εντυγχάνω—To make intercession.*

Heb. 7: 25. Seeing he ever liveth to *make intercession* for them. Isa.

53: 12.

" 9: 24. But into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us.

15. *Παρακλητος—An advocate.*

1 John 2: 1. We have an *advocate* with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous.

The view here presented of Christ's work, as to its style and

form, is borrowed from the sacrificial system of the Old Testament. Several particulars deserve to be noticed.

1. The sacrificial system of the Jewish theocracy was a type or shadow of the great atonement by Christ. The proof of this consists in the express declarations of Paul, and also in the fact that the New Testament writers borrowed so freely from that system the terms and forms, in which they represent the work of Christ. The apostle, after showing the superiority of his priesthood to that instituted by Moses, observes: "Now of the things which we have spoken, this is the *sum*: We have such an high priest, who is set on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens." Heb. 8: 1. Of the "priests that offer gifts according to the law," he says: "Who serve unto the *example* and *shadow* of heavenly things." 8: 5. After referring to the "ordinances of divine service" performed in the first tabernacle, he says again, "Which was a *figure* for the time then present;" and then proceeds to declare the thing signified, i. e.: "But Christ being come an high priest of good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building; neither by the blood of goats and calves; but by his own blood, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us." 9: 9, 11, 12. In the same chapter, he speaks of the things of the first tabernacle, under the title of *patterns* and *figures*. "And almost all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is no remission. It was, therefore, necessary that the *patterns* of things in the heavens should be purified with these; but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these. For Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are *figures* of the true, but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us." 9: 22-24. The *symbolic* character of the Jewish system of sacrifices is here clearly taught. The whole current of the apostle's reasoning in Hebrews, with reference to the priesthood of Christ, implies this. He not only uses the terms of the former system, but traces out certain analogies and contrasts between the two priesthoods. He teaches the entire abolition of the former, by the coming and work of Christ. It was imperfect also, requiring "oftentimes the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins;" and in this respect unlike the "one sacrifice for sins" in the person of Christ, by which "he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified." 10: 11-14. Its whole design, as treated by the apostle, was to *prefigure* the office and work of Christ, not as a teacher, but as a priest. Its other uses are not mentioned.

2. Assuming the typical character of the Jewish sacrifices for sin, we note the following *characteristics* of these symbolic atonements. (a) There was always a *transgressor*, in whose behalf the offering was made. Sometimes this transgressor was a single person, and at others the whole nation was taken to be the sinner. (b) There was a *victim* immolated or slain in the tabernacle, as a sin or trespass-offering. (c) There was a *priest*, whose official duty consisted in presenting the sacrifice, sprinkling the blood of the victim upon the altar, and on the great day of atonement upon the ark of the covenant. (d) The sacrifice was accepted by God as the civil ruler of this people, as a substitute for the penalty due to the guilty. It was the way in which remission of sin was obtained, and the only way known to a Jew. The imposition of hands upon the head of the victim to be slain, the confession of sin over that victim, the symbolic transfer of sin to the sacrifice, the slaying of the victim, the pardon of the offender, the declaration of God that the offering shall be accepted as an atonement, and the sinner forgiven; all this expressed to the mind of a Jew the doctrine of forgiveness by the *substitution* of a sacrifice for sin. It was not enough for him to repent; a victim must be slain as an expiation for his sin. Both the ritual ceremony of the slaying, and the acceptance of the offering by God, as well as the resulting remission, conveyed to his understanding the idea of substitution. He could have no other. The *facts* were those of substitution. The victim was brought to the altar, and slain for a sinner; and through this medium he was pardoned. This is substitution upon its very face. For the evidence supporting this view of the expiatory sacrifices of the Jews, see the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 16th chapters of Leviticus.

3. Christ is declared to be a *priest*, the *High Priest* of our profession. This title is borrowed from the sacrificial system of the Jews, on account of some analogy between the Jewish priests and Christ as a priest. The specific point of this analogy the apostle refers to in the following passages: "That he might be a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God, to make *reconciliation for the sins of the people*." "For every high priest taken from among men, is ordained *for men* in things pertaining to God, that he may *offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins*." "For such an high priest became us, who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, and made higher than the heavens; who needeth not daily, as those high priests, to *offer up sacrifice*, first for his own *sins*, and then for the people; for this he did once, when he *offered up himself*." Heb. 2: 17; 5: 1; 7: 26, 27. The great duty of priesthood, as here conceived, consisted in making expiatory

sacrifices for sin. It is the only view of its duties which appears in this Epistle, and consequently the only aspect in which Christ is spoken of as a priest.

4. The title applied to one of the victims to be sacrificed, is in the New Testament transferred to Christ. He is "the *Lamb* of God which taketh away (beareth) the sin of the world." His people are redeemed "with the precious blood of Christ, as of a *lamb*, without blemish and without spot"—their robes made "white in the blood of the *Lamb*." He is worshiped in heaven as "the *Lamb* that was slain." This title was doubtless borrowed from the lamb of the daily sacrifice among the Jews; and as applied to the Messiah, refers to the sacrifice of Christ, exhibits him not as a priest, but as a *victim* to be offered. What is said of this Lamb, clearly shows the offering to be a sin-offering, a sacrifice for sin. He "taketh away (beareth, *αἰρῶν*) the sin of the world"—one of the established formulas among the Jews in application to victims sacrificed for sin. As the Lamb worshiped in heaven, Christ is thus addressed: "For thou wast *slain*, and hast redeemed us to God by *thy blood*." "Worthy is the Lamb that was *slain*." No language could be more expressive of the nature of Christ's death. Whenever he is called a Lamb, it is with reference to his suffering and dying for our sins, like a *victim* on the Jewish altar.

5. The death of Christ is expressly declared to be a *sacrifice for our sins*. "He is the *propitiation* (*ἱλασμός*) for our sins;" "set forth to be a *propitiation* (*ἱλαστήριον*) through faith in his blood;" as "our passover (*πᾶσχα*) is *sacrificed* (*θύω*) for us;" "hath given himself for us an offering (*προσφορά*) and a sacrifice (*θυσία*) to God:" hath "appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice (*θυσία*) of himself:" "offered (*προσέφερω*) one sacrifice (*θυσία*) for sins:" "was once offered (*προσέφερω*) to bear (*ἀναφέρω*) the sins of many:" "offered (*προσέφερω*) himself without spot to God." These expressions point very clearly to the death of Christ. What is this "one sacrifice for sins," this "one offering," this "offering of the body of Jesus Christ once," if it be not his death? For *whom* and for *what* was he thus offered or sacrificed? "For us;" "for sins." To whom? "To God." For what purpose? "To put away sin by the sacrifice of himself:" "to bear the sins of many:" "to declare his (God's) righteousness, that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." To one who has no human philosophy to conciliate; and who takes the language of God's Word in its obvious import, nothing can be clearer than the *sacrificial* or *expiatory* character of Christ's sufferings and death, as the medium through which God remits penalty and treats sinners in the way of mercy.

It is worthy of remark, that the writers of the New Testament were Jews, and their Epistles addressed to churches consisting mainly or in part of Jewish converts. Both were familiar with the system of expiatory sacrifices established under the Jewish theocracy. The priest, the victim brought to the altar and slain as a trespass or sin-offering, the remission of sin by the substitution of the bloody sacrifice, and propitiation in this sense, were both familiar and venerable objects of thought. Hence the fact that the sacrificial and expiatory language applied by the apostles to the death of Christ, was borrowed from this source, is decisive as to what it means. Those to whom they wrote could not understand this death, thus described, otherwise than as a real sacrifice for sin, a substitution of Christ's sufferings for theirs, with a view to their pardon. We must admit the doctrine that Christ's death was a sacrifice for sin with a view to its remission, an instance of the just suffering as a substitute for the unjust; or call in question the authority of the inspired writers. We see no other alternative.

6. The work of *priestly intercession* is assigned to Christ. An apostle declares, that "he ever liveth to make intercession for them," *εἰς το ἐντροχῶσιν ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, to interpose for them, in their behalf.* This is affirmed of Christ considered as sustaining the office of a *priest*—as having "an unchangeable priesthood," distinguishing him from the Levitical priests, who "were not suffered to continue by reason of death," and rendering him "able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him." Paul views him as having ascended into *heaven*, and acting in the heavenly tabernacle as the *internuntius* between God and his people, as the Levitical priests did in the earthly. "We have such an high priest, who is set on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens; a minister of the sanctuary, and of the true tabernacle which the Lord pitched, and not man." Of this tabernacle, i. e., heaven, the earthly sanctuary was "a figure for the time then present." "But Christ being come an high priest of good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building; neither by the blood of goats and calves, but *by his own blood*, he entered in once into the holy place, (heaven) having obtained eternal redemption for us." Heb. 8: 1, 2; 9: 9, 11, 12. Here Paul refers to the high priest under the Jewish dispensation, who entered the holy of holies, on the great day of atonement, (Levit. 16: 14, 15,) and sprinkled the blood of expiation on the mercy-seat, procuring thereby a remission of sin. So Christ hath once for all entered "into the *holy place*," "the *true tabernacle*," *heaven*, not with "the blood of goats and calves,

but by *his own blood*" obtaining "eternal redemption for us." The former was a symbol or emblem of the latter, the *material* being treated as a type of the *heavenly*. The apostle recurs to this same subject in the closing verses of the ninth chapter of this Epistle. "For Christ is not entered into the holy places *made with hands*, which are the *figures* of the true; but into *heaven itself*, now to appear in the presence of God for us." The Jewish high priest appeared (εμφανίζω) before God in the holy place conceived as seated upon the mercy-seat, and offered the blood of atonement for the sins of the people. Christ hath also appeared in the heavenly sanctuary "in the presence of God for us," το προσώπω του θεου υπέρ ημών. This picture is founded on a similitude between the Jewish high priest entering the earthly tabernacle with the blood of atonement, and Christ entering the heavenly with "his own blood." Both appear in the presence of God for, in behalf of, others. The apostle adds: "Nor yet that he should offer himself *often*," that is, *repeat* the offering, "as the high priest entereth into the holy place *every year* with blood of others." This was not necessary in the case of Christ. Had it been, "then must he *often* have suffered since the foundation of the world." He suffered only *once*: "once in the end of the world (Jewish economy) hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself," εις ἀθέτησιν αμαρτίας δια της θυσίας αυτου. By this "sacrifice of himself" the apostle clearly refers to his death, in order to which Christ "appeared" in this world, and after which ascended into heaven, "now to appear in the presence of God for us." There is *one suffering* on earth, and *one* all-sufficient appearance of the sufferer in the heavenly sanctuary. He came here to die as "the Lamb of God;" he has gone into heaven to complete his priestly work, presenting himself before God as our *internuntius*, and for us procuring, "by his own blood," by virtue of "the sacrifice of himself," a remission of punishment. Such is the conception the apostle gives of Christ in heaven. He connects his work in heaven with that on earth, the one following the other.

John's language is in harmony with this view. "And if any man sin, we have an advocate (παράκλητος) with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous." The apostle here regards Christ as in heaven, "with the Father," προς τον πατερα. This is equivalent to the το προσώπω του θεου υπέρ ημών of Paul. He is there as a παράκλητος, an *advocate*, an *intercessor*, one who pleads for another. His advocacy respects the case of *sinners*, being suggested by the hypothesis, "if any man sin." The advocacy suggested the antecedent. Hence John adds: "And he is the propitiation (ίλασμος) for our sins," referring to Christ's

death for our sins. This grouping of objects is intelligible only on the supposition that we admit that view of Christ in heaven, so clearly taught in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

In the light of these observations, we see but one way to escape the admission that Christ suffered and died for our sins; that his sufferings were in the room of the penalty due to sinners, a substitution for it as the Divinely-appointed mode of its remission; and that sinners are saved from the curse of the law upon this principle, and upon no other; and that is to deny the Divine authority of the Scriptures. They do not more clearly exhibit the existence and attributes of God, than they do the doctrine of man's salvation in this way.

IV. TERMS OF OBJECTIVE OCCASIONAL AND PERSONAL RELATION.

The death of Christ had some relation to *persons*, and to some *circumstance* or *occasion* predicable of those persons. What is this occasion? And who are the persons? The following table of passages solves these questions.

1. Ἀμαρτία—Sin.

Mat. 26 : 28. Which is shed for many for the remission of sin.

John 1 : 29. The Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world.

Acts 13 : 38. Through this man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins.

Rom. 6 : 10. In that he died, he died unto sin once.

" 8 : 3. In the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin condemned sin in the flesh.

1 Cor. 15 : 3. That Christ died for our sins.

2 Cor. 5 : 21. Hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin.

Col. 1 : 14. Redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins.

Heb. 1 : 3. Had by himself purged our sins.

" 2 : 17. To make reconciliation for the sins of the people.

" 9 : 26. To put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.

" " 28. Once offered to bear the sins of many.

" 10 : 12. After he had offered one sacrifice for sins.

1 Pet. 2 : 24. Bare our sins in his own body on the tree.

" " 3 : 18. Hath once suffered for sins.

1 John 1 : 7. The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin.

" " 2 : 2. He is the propitiation for our sins.

" " 3 : 5. Manifested to take away our sins.

" " 4 : 10. Sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins.

2. Ἀπαρτημα—Sin.

Rom. 3 : 25. Set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past.

3. Παράπτωμα—Offence, trespass, sin.

Rom. 4 : 25. Who was delivered for our offences.

Eph. 1 : 7. Redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins.

4. Παράβασις—Transgression.

Heb. 9 : 15. That by means of death for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament.

5. Ἀνομία—Iniquity.

Titus 2 : 14. That he might redeem us from all iniquity.

6. Ἀμαρτωλός—Sinner.

Rom. 5 : 8. While we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.

1 Tim. 1: 15. Christ Jesus came into the world to save *sinner*s.

7. Ἀσβης—*Ungodly*.

Rom. 5: 6. In due time Christ died for the *ungodly*.

8. Ἀδίκος—*Unjust*.

1 Pet. 3: 18. For Christ also hath once suffered for *sins*, the just for the *unjust*.

9. Ἐχθρός—*Enemy*.

Rom. 5: 10. When we were *enemies*, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son.

10. Τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον—*Those under law*.

Gal. 4: 5. To redeem *them that were under the law*.

11. Ποίβατον—*Sheep*.

John 10: 15. I lay down my life for the *sheep*.

12. Εκκλησία—*Church*.

Acts 20: 28. The *church* of God which he hath purchased with his own blood.

Eph. 5: 25. Christ also loved the *church* and gave himself for it.

13. Λαός—*People*.

Heb. 2: 17. To make reconciliation for the *sins of the people*.

" 13: 12. Wherefore Jesus also, that he might sanctify the *people* with his own blood, suffered without the gate.

14. Πολλοί—*Many*.

Mat. 26: 28. Which is shed for *many* for the remission of *sins*.

" 20: 28. To give his life a ransom for *many*.

Heb. 9: 28. So Christ was once offered to bear the *sins of many*.

15. Πας—*παντες*—*Every one, all*.

2 Cor. 5: 14. If one died for *all*.

" " 15. And that he died for *all*.

1 Tim. 2: 6. Gave himself a ransom for *all*.

Heb. 2: 9. That he by the grace of God should taste death for *every man*.

16. Κόσμος—*World*.

John 1: 29. The Lamb of God which taketh away the *sin of the world*.

" 6: 51. And the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the *world*.

1 John 2: 2. And he is the propitiation for our *sins*, and not for ours only, but also for the *sins of the whole world*.

We have already commented upon the relation of Christ's atoning work to *sin* and *sinner*s. He died for *our sins*, on account of them; they were the *occasion* of his death. He died for *sinner*s, in their behalf, for their sake, in their stead, "the just for the unjust." The prepositions ὑπὲρ, ὡς, and ὑπὲρ, translated *for*, were used by the apostles to indicate the relation of Christ's sufferings and death to *sin* and *sinner*s. The first is of most frequent use. "Christ died for our *sins*," ἀπέθανεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν, 1 Cor. 15: 3; here the sense of ὑπὲρ plainly is that of *because*, *on account of*, implying that our *sins* were the *ground* or *occasion* of his death. In this sense the preposition repeatedly occurs. "Christ died for the *ungodly*," ὑπὲρ ἀσβῶν ἀπέθανε, Rom. 5: 6: "Who died for us," τοῦ ἀποθανόντος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, 1 Thess. 5: 10: "For Christ also hath once suffered for *sins*, the just for the unjust," ὁ μὲν ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων, 1 Pet. 3: 18. In these and parallel cases, the sense of *for*, *in behalf of*, *for the*

sake of, is evidently the one intended. The preposition *περι* also is used as equivalent to *υπερ*. "For this is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many," *το αιμα μου * * * το περι πολλων εχθυνομενον*, Mat. 26 : 28: here the preposition occurs in the sense of *for, in behalf of, for the sake of, on their account*. "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins," *περι αμαρτιων*, 1 Pet. 3 : 18: "And he is the propitiation for our sins," *περι των αμαρτιων ημων*, 1 John 2 : 2: here we have *περι* in the other sense of *υπερ*, implying the *ground* or *occasion*, that *concerning* which Christ suffered. *Αντι* occurs but once in application to this subject. "Even as the Son of man came * * * to give his life a ransom for many," *λυτρον αντι πολλων*, Mat. 20 : 28. This preposition implies the relation of *substitution, in place of, instead of*. The life given is substituted for the life of the many. This is implied in the noun *λυτρον*, and equally in the preposition *αντι*. The apostle uses this preposition in composition: "Who gave himself a ransom for all," *εαυτον αντιλυτρον υπερ παντων*, 1 Tim. 2 : 6. This is a very decisive passage, as it combines the expressive power of both prepositions, *αντι* and *υπερ*:—*υπερ παντων, in behalf of all, for the sake of all; εαυτον αντιλυτρον, himself a ransom-price, an equivalent, a substitute, in their room.*

The objective occasional and personal relation of Christ's death is not wholly dependent on the use of prepositions. The apostles exhibit the same relation in other forms; as when they represent him as having "by himself purged our sins"—made "*reconciliation* for the sins of the people"—*putting away* sin by the sacrifice of himself—"offered to bear the sins of many"—*bearing* "our sins in his own body on the tree"—"made to be sin for us"—redeeming "them that were under the law"—purchasing the church "with his own blood"—sanctifying "the people with his own blood"—as being "delivered for our offences"—reconciling men to God by his death. No intelligible sense can be placed on these expressions, without assuming that the work of Christ in his death had reference to *sin* and *sinner*s. Something was to be done in respect to the former, and in behalf of the latter. To bear the sins of another, in the Bible sense, is to suffer on account of those sins, and for the sake of, and in the room of that other. This Christ did as "the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world."

V. TERMS OF REMOTE RELATION OR FINAL DESIGN.

We apply this title to a class of words which express that to accomplish which Christ came into the world, and suffered on account of sin and in behalf of sinners. This idea has in-

identally appeared; yet we wish to present this point by itself.

1. *Σωζω—Save.*

Mat. 18: 11. For the Son of man is come to *save* that which was lost.

John 3: 17. That the world through him *might be saved*.

" 12: 47. I came not to judge the world, but to *save* the world.

1 Tim. 1: 15. Christ Jesus came into the world to *save* sinners.

2. *Σωτηρ—Saviour.*

1 John 4: 14. The Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world.

3. *Αφεσις—Remission, forgiveness.*

Mat. 26: 28. Which is shed for many for the *remission* of sins.

Acts 5: 31. Him hath God exalted * * * to give repentance to Israel, and *forgiveness* of sins.

" 13: 38. Through this man is preached unto you the *forgiveness* of sins.

Eph. 1: 7. In whom we have redemption through his blood, the *forgiveness* of sins. Col. 1: 14.

4. *Ἰαψις—Pretermission.*

Rom. 3: 25. For the *remission* of sins that are past.

5. *Δικαιω—Justify.*

Acts 13: 39. By him all that believe are *justified*.

Rom. 3: 24. *Being justified* freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.

Rom. 5: 9. *Being now justified* by his blood.

Gal. 2: 17. But if, while we seek to be *justified* by Christ.

6. *Δικαιοσυνη—Righteousness.*

Rom. 3: 25. Set forth to be a propitiation * * * to declare his *righteousness*, that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.

" 10: 4. Christ is the end of the law for *righteousness* to every one that believeth.

2 Cor. 5: 21. For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the *righteousness* of God in him.

7. *Καταλλαγη—Reconciliation.*

Rom. 5: 11. By whom we have now received the *atonement*.

8. *Καταλασσω—Reconcile.*

" 5: 10. We were *reconciled* to God by the death of his Son.

2 Cor. 5: 18. Who hath *reconciled* us to himself by Jesus Christ.

" " " 19. In Christ *reconciling* the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them.

9. *Αποκαταλλατω—Reconcile.*

Eph. 2: 16. That he *might reconcile* both unto God in one body by the cross.

Col. 1: 21. Yet now hath he *reconciled* in the body of his flesh through death.

These passages exhibit very clearly the purpose of Christ's mission and death. The general form of the idea is, that he "came into the world to save sinners"—was sent to be "the Saviour of the world." To him acting in this capacity is assigned the *remission* of sins, the release of a believing sinner from the penalty of the law. This remission is attributed to his death as the procuring cause or means. His blood was shed "for (εἰς, in order to,) the remission of sins." Redemption, explained to be "the forgiveness of sins," comes "through (δια, by means of,) his blood." Hence the more general truth, "that through (δια) his name, whosoever believeth in him, shall receive

remission of sins"—that "through (*δια*) this man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins." The doctrine of the apostles is not that Christ simply preached forgiveness, but that he died to procure it. They preached it in his name, assigning it as a result of his death.

Justification, in the Scriptures, is always regarded as essential to a sinner's salvation. He must be justified, or suffer the penalty of the Divine law. By the deeds of the law he cannot be justified. The law condemns him. He must be released from its penalty, and on some principle treated as if he had never sinned, or he must perish. It is an act of *grace*. It is God's act, and not his experience: "It is God that justifieth." What is the relation, affirmed in the Scriptures, between Christ and this justifying act of God? Christ is the *medium* of the act. "And by him (*ἐν αὐτῷ*) all that believe are justified from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses." "Being justified freely by his grace, through (*δια*) the redemption that is in (*ἐν*) Christ Jesus." "But if, while we seek to be justified by (*ἐν*) Christ." How is Christ this medium? "Being now justified *by his blood*," *ἐν τῷ αἱματι αὐτοῦ*. What the apostle means when attributing justification to the blood or death of Christ, is fully explained in other passages. "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, (referring to the death of Christ as the *ἱλαστήριον*, and the doctrine of faith in applying that death) to declare his righteousness (the direct proximate object of the death being a declaration of God's righteousness) for (*δια*, on account of,) the remission (*ἁρξιν*, pretermis- sion, passing over) of sins that are past (*προεργασμένων*, committed in former times) through the forbearance of God: to declare, at this time, (*ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ*) his righteousness, that (*ὥς το εἶναι*, in order to, that it might be) he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." This text explains in what way justification comes through Christ. He is first presented as a sacrifice for sin in his death. This sacrifice is a declaration of God's perfect righteousness, both in respect to his passing over sin in former times, and also in respect to what is now proposed in the gospel plan, namely, to justify a believing sinner. Christ being set forth, and dying for the object named, God can now be just, and yet justify the believer. Hence we see in what way we are "justified by his blood;" it is the *means* through which justification is made possible, and becomes real when we believe. This shows also what the apostle means, when he declares Christ to have been made "*sin for us*," "that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." The phrase, "*made to be sin for us*," cannot mean less

than that Christ suffered for sin, in our behalf—was for our sakes treated as if he had been a sinner. This was done “that we might be made the righteousness of God in him”—through him treated as if we were righteous. Thus, by his sufferings and death, Christ becomes “the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth.”

We have the same view, when this death is referred to as the means of our *reconciliation* to God. Unitarians have greatly misapprehended Paul’s doctrine of reconciliation; and we regret to find Dr. Bushnell laboring under the same mistake. They represent it as consisting wholly in the reconciliation of *man* to God, laying aside his enmity, and becoming obedient to the Divine laws. The latter says: “To sum up all in one condensed and luminous utterance, every word of which is power, *God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself*. The apostle says nothing here, it will be observed, of reconciling God to men; he only speaks of reconciling men to God.” “And I affirm, without hesitation, that whenever the question is about the *end* of Christ’s work, that end to which he stands related as the wisdom and power of God, the answer of the Scripture will be, that he comes to *renovate character*.” This, then, is the Scripture reconciliation, the whole of it. Let us see.

(a.) This supposes, contrary to the Scriptures, that a sinner, as such, is not the object of the Divine displeasure. It misrepresents both the *placability* and the *implacability* of God. God is not pleased with sinners; he abhors their character; and as their lawgiver, is arrayed in a just and holy opposition to them. This is not like the resentments and evil passions of men: it is the just and holy displeasure of Jehovah, arising from his character as God, and his relation as lawgiver. Sinners are its objects, made so by their sins. They are exposed to the penalty of his law. This exposure, according to the Scriptures, is not canceled simply by their repentance, their renovation of character. It is a *legal* exposure. Heb. 10 : 26–31.

(b.) In the Saviour’s use, the phrase *to reconcile* means more than the reconciliation of the *offending* party. “Therefore, if thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath *ought against thee*, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; first *be reconciled* to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift.” Matt. 5 : 23, 24. Here the *offending* is directed to seek reconciliation from the *offended* party. The latter is to be reconciled to the former.

(c.) Paul’s definition of the reconciliation of which he is treat-

1 God in Christ, pp. 189, 191.

ing, shows that he did not mean simply the sinner's reconciliation to God. He declares that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself," adding the exegetical clause, "NOT IMPUTING THEIR TRESPASSES UNTO THEM." This is the reconciliation, "the word of reconciliation," as explained by the apostle—the sense in which God was "reconciling the world unto himself." Not to impute trespass, is to forgive it, to remit its penalty, and bring the sinner into the Divine favor. It is God's act, as a lawgiver, granting pardon—a very different thing from a simple renovation of character.

(d.) The apostolic doctrine in regard to the *manner* of this reconciliation is equally decisive of its nature. God is the *reconciler*, and not man: "Who hath reconciled us to himself." He does it by the mediation of Christ: "By whom we have now received the atonement"—the reconciliation. He does it not by the example, the teaching, but the *death* of Christ. "If, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the DEATH of his Son." "Yet now hath he reconciled in the body of his flesh through *death*." The apostle speaks of Christ's death, and this only, as the means—never of the sinner's repentance and renovation of heart. Those who resolve the reconciliation into a simple change occurring in the sinner, forget what the apostle says of its *method*, as well as his definition of its *nature*.

(e.) The connections in which this subject is considered, equally show the doctrine of Paul. "But God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." If God gave this proof of love to us as sinners, "much more then," reasons the apostle, "being now justified by his blood," pardoned and brought into a state of favor with God, "we shall be saved from wrath through him." Continuing the same subject in a little different form, he adds: "For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son; much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life." Rom. 5 : 8-10. Here the "sinners" of the one verse, and the "enemies" in the other, mean the same persons. "Being now justified by his blood," and "reconciled to God by the death of his Son," clearly mean the same thing. Hence, the apostle adds: "By whom we have now received the atonement"—the reconciliation, the justification, the favor of God. In this reconciliation Christ secures God's favor, by procuring, as a medium, the sinner's forgiveness and acceptance. This is its nature—"not imputing their trespasses unto them."

(f.) When Paul, as an ambassador, exhorts men to be reconciled to God, he adds, as the argument, this very doctrine in

respect to God's reconciliation to men: "For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." 2 Cor. 5 : 20, 21. He does not discuss the evil of sin, or the injustice of a sinner's opposition to God; but exhibits God as offering mercy through Christ, as having "made him to be sin," that we might be accepted and treated as righteous. He asks men to accept this great favor of God in the way proposed, and for the reason assigned—to receive the atonement, the reconciliation.

Unitarians entirely misstate Paul's doctrine of reconciliation. They take the *word* from the apostle, and then frame a theory totally different from his. True, there is no passage containing the exact formula, *God is reconciled to sinners*; yet the Bible teaches his displeasure with sinners, their amenableness to the penalty of his law, and equally their pardon by the death of Christ. The infliction of God's curse upon them is averted in this way. This is the sense in which "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not *imputing their trespasses unto them*." Why not imputing? Because "he hath made him to be sin for us."

VI. TERMS EXPRESSIVE OF DIVINE ACTION.

The New Testament refers to God as *acting, planning, designing, ordaining*, in respect to the mission and death of Christ. We give a few passages of this character.

1. Δίδωμι—Give.

John 3 : 16. For God so loved the world, that he *gave* his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.

2. Παράδωκεν—Give up, deliver.

Rom. 4 : 25. Who *was delivered* for our offences.

" 8 : 32. He that spared (σφεδάρει) not his own Son, but *delivered* him up for us all.

3. Εξδοσος—Delivered up.

Acts 2 : 23. Him being *delivered* by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain.

4. Προορίζω—Determine before.

Acts 4 : 28. For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel *determined before* to be done.

5. Αποστέλλω—Send.

John 3 : 17. For God *sent* not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved.

1 John 4 : 9. *Sent* his only-begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him.

" " " 10. *Sent* his Son to be the propitiation for our sins.

" " " 14. The Father *sent* the Son to be the Saviour of the world.

6. Προτίθημι—Set forth, appoint.

Rom. 3 : 25. Whom God *hath set forth* to be a propitiation.

7. Ποιῶ αμαρτίαν—Made sin.

2 Cor. 5 : 21. For he *hath made* him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.

These texts establish the following points: 1. That God the Father gave and sent Christ to be the Saviour of men. 2. That he appointed, or *pre-determined* his sufferings and death. 3. That in the fulfillment of this decree, Christ was "*delivered* for our offences,"—was not "*spared*" from suffering—was delivered up "for us all"—was "set forth to be a propitiation," "the propitiation for our sins"—was by God "made to be sin for us." 4. That all this proceeded from the benevolent purpose of God to save sinners. The sufferings and death of Christ, declared to be "the one sacrifice for sins," "an offering and a sacrifice to God," "the propitiation for our sins," were by God's appointment. He furnished the "high priest" and "the lamb," the Saviour fixing the end of his work, and ordaining its method, with the events of it. So the Scriptures teach. "The Lord," and not man, "hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." "It pleased the Lord to bruise him. He hath put him to grief." God "made him to be sin for us."

The historical fact that Christ died by the hand of *human* violence, is not inconsistent with this account of God's agency, does not prove that his death was simply a martyrdom. The passages we have quoted conclusively show that God, sending Christ into this world to be a Saviour, appointed, pre-determined, in the counsels of eternity planned and foreordained his death, in the character and for the purposes so fully explained in the New Testament. The agency of wicked men in the event did not, in the view of apostles, disturb its character as the "one sacrifice for sins." They were aware of this agency; yet they never treat it as an obstacle to the expiatory nature of Christ's death in the design of God. Philosophy has sometimes made difficulties on this point: the apostles never. They evince no hesitation in declaring that Christ "died for our sins," that God "made him to be sin for us," on the ground that this death occurred in connection with the agency of evil men. This agency, as they expressly affirm, was a part of the Divine appointment, both foreseen and pre-determined by God himself.

The fact, also, that there was no visible altar like the Jewish, and no priestly rites performed, created no difficulty in their minds. The Jewish sacrifices for sin were *typical* of the "one sacrifice;" and were, therefore, but the *figure*, while it is the *reality*, the sacrifice in the true and proper sense. To argue against the latter from a want of exact conformity to the former, is to use the shadow to destroy the substance. It needs to be shown that such a want affects the reality and literality of Christ's death, as a real "sacrifice for our sins," occurring by the special appointment of God. So the apostles describe it. Did they mean what they said?

We have now before us the doctrine of Christ's death, as stated in the New Testament. Viewed historically, we find it to be the death of a *perfectly holy* being; a *voluntary* death on the part of the sufferer; a death by a special Divine *appointment*; a death which was *proper*, which ought to have been; a death in fulfillment of *prophecy*; a death connected with his claim of Divinity; a *peculiar* death, in respect to the behavior and language of the sufferer; a death attended with *miraculous* signs; a death provided with a commemorative appointment. In vain do we seek in any *other* death such a combination of circumstances. They demand a solution; and it is given in those Scriptures which declare the purpose, character, nature, relations—in a word, the doctrine of Christ's death. Will the reader cast his eye over the six tables of Scripture passages given in the preceding pages? How was it possible for the apostles to have stated, in a clearer manner, the essential ideas of atonement, as held by orthodox Christians? What nouns, verbs, adjectives, prepositions more definite, could they have used? In what grammatical relations more decisive could they have placed these terms? They have taxed language to its utmost capacity. That the ideas which are component of salvation from sin and its curse, are, in the order of nature, dependent upon the death of Christ; that he endured this death in our behalf, for our sakes, on account of our sins, with a view to their remission, as a substitution of Divine appointment in the room of the penalty due to the guilty; and that salvation is offered to our world on this basis, and this only—this is the teaching of the apostles, the key-note of the gospel.

Dr. Channing, though a Unitarian, makes an important confession: "Many of us are dissatisfied with this explanation, ('that it procures forgiveness by leading to that repentance and virtue which is the great and only condition on which forgiveness is bestowed,') and think that the Scriptures ascribe the remission of sins to Christ's death, with an *emphasis so peculiar*, that we ought to consider this event as having a *special influence* in removing punishment." Here is a ray of light in a region of darkness. Had Dr. C. gone to the Scriptures to find the import of this "emphasis so peculiar," this "special influence," possibly he might have seen that Unitarianism is essentially and fundamentally false; that Christ's death is the appointed ground upon which God proceeds in the forgiveness of sin, while repentance and faith—the one having reference to sin, and the other to this very ground—are but the *conditions* of the act; that an efficacy—a fixed relationship of antecedent

¹ Channing's Works, vol. iii., p. 89.

and cause—is assigned to the death of Christ, not to be found in any other event of his life, or any act of the creature. This is the emphasis peculiar, the influence special. For the idea we are indebted to God's Word. To believe it as there taught, is simply to trust his testimony.

In order definitely to mark the Scripture view, orthodox theologians use terms, some of which are biblical, and others not. They speak of this death as VICARIOUS. Such it was in some sense. Though not the *exact* penalty of the law, it was a *substitute* for it, and endured by a *substitute*—"the just for the unjust." By it, through it, as a medium, the sinner who deserves to die, is saved. This is *vicariousness* in point of fact. We grant there are shades of difference among orthodox theologians, as to the exact sense of this word; yet there are none as to the facts which form the essence of its import. Christ's death is called a PROPITIATION. This is authorized by the Scriptures. The meaning is not that it literally *appeases*, satiates, and in this sense suffices to soothe and exhaust, the anger of God, by working a change in his attributes or moral dispositions. This is not what orthodoxy means by the term. Symington says, "It is never supposed by those who understand the subject, that the work of Christ is, in any sense, the *cause* of divine love, mercy, or grace; but the *medium* through which these perfections of God find expression to guilty creatures. It is never regarded as necessary to *produce* in God love toward men, but as necessary to his love being *manifested*. It is not looked upon as that which *renders* God placable, but as that which renders the *exercise* of his placability consistent with the other perfections of his nature." God acts propitiously toward men through this medium, himself appointing it that he may do so. This is the doctrine of propitiation, of sacrifice, as held by orthodoxy, as taught in the Bible. Rom. 3: 25, 26. It is propitiation as a *medium*, and therefore in *effect*. The infliction of penalty is averted by a sacrifice for sin. When the death of Christ is spoken of as a SATISFACTION *to the justice of God*, the meaning is not that God takes pleasure in punishment for its own sake, but that the *purposes*, the *ends*, of inflicting penalty, as demanded by his justice, are so far realized in the appointment of Christ's death, that God can now be just, and yet the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus. Symington observes, "What Christ endured was not the precise penalty of the law, but something equally *satisfactory*, serving the same purpose, as far as the rectoral honor of God is concerned." The elements of this conception are given in Rom. 3: 25, 26.

¹ Pres. Tract and Sund. School Soc., No. xiii., pp. 12, 13.

We leave this subject with the single remark, that if our religious faith is to be drawn from the Bible, then atonement for sin, by the death of Christ, must be placed at the foundation of all our hopes. Remove this, and the gospel plan is no more; we are afloat—have superseded God's wisdom, incurring all the perils of our OWN SAD EXPERIMENT!

ARTICLE VII.

THE BOOK OF PROVERBS.

By PROF. TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., Union College, Schenectady.

THERE is no part of the Hebrew Scriptures where the common version more frequently fails to bring out *all* the meaning, than in the book of Proverbs. We say *all* the meaning, for the fault, where it exists, is one of deficiency rather than of false translation. A number of satisfactory reasons could be assigned for this. The peculiarities of the proverbial style must necessarily render every translation imperfect, unless, in fact, it ceases to be strictly a translation by becoming a paraphrase, or an exegesis. The book consists of detached and wholly unconnected sentences. Some few cases, indeed, occur, where there is the appearance of associated thought, or some slight likeness of an argument extending through several verses. We may take, as an example of the first, such a passage as Prov. 16: 10, 12; where we have three continuous proverbs with the same subject; a good specimen of the latter may be found in the well-known exhortation against intemperance, 23: 29. But such cases are not common, except in the first ten chapters, which differ essentially in their style from those that follow, (being rather rhetorical and exhortatory than aphoristic or sententious,) and in the two or three concluding chapters that partake of the same character. In general, there is so little connection between the various proverbs, that, to all appearance, they might have been placed in any other order as well as that in which they have been handed down to us. In consequence of this, there are no helps to be derived from the context. Each sentence stands by itself. In case, therefore, of difficulty and obscurity, we can only derive aid from the parallelism, and from a consideration of those qualities which seem necessarily to belong to this style of writing. But although there is little connection, or

The Author had carefully written the Hebrew in this article with the vowel points. Circumstances beyond our control compel us reluctantly to print it without them, in this instance. We hope in future to be relieved of the difficulty.—EDITOR.

none at all, between different *sentences*, there is, on the other hand, a very strong bond of union between the two parallel parts of the same proverb. It may not exist in every case, (since occasionally they seem to be joined together in the most arbitrary manner), but in general, the assuming that there is such a connection, either by way of antithesis, comparison, amplification, or climax, will furnish the best guide to the true point, or emphatic force, as well as to the general significance. Hence there is no part of the Hebrew Scriptures in which the parallelism is of more importance in furnishing a clue,—and sometimes the only clue,—to a right interpretation.

In all languages, the force of the proverb depends very much on certain verbal excellences, which require the utmost care, in translating, to prevent their being lost. These valuable precepts do not all belong to the class of חֲדָשִׁים, "*dark sayings*," or profound enigmas, in which the difficulty is in the depth or in the transcendency of the thought. They often set forth a truism, a most valuable truism, indeed, (for such sometimes form the very staple of our best and most available knowledge)—a truism, too, that cannot be too often repeated or kept in mind, but which would not be so retained without some verbal attraction to give additional interest to the homely yet precious truth conveyed. There may be selected, for the sake of illustration, a proverb which occurs repeatedly throughout the book, and yet would *seem* to possess less pointed significance than almost any other. "*A faithful witness will not lie; a false witness will utter lies.*" As far as the naked thought merely is concerned, it would hardly appear to rise to the dignity of a proposition,—even a tautological or identical one; and yet it occurs, with some unimportant variations, Prov. 14: 5; 6: 19; 19: 5, 9. These repetitions show that it must have been a favorite saying of the old Hebrew moralists,—a well-acknowledged, practical aphorism, supposed to possess much of pointed significance, and to be of great value as a caution in the conduct of life. In the English dress given to it in our common version, we fail to discover any such merit. To speak with all reverence, and yet express the true critical conviction,—it seems the baldest of all truisms. One part appears to be a mere negative repetition of the other, and in each member, the predicate to be but a repetition of the subject. It is as though we should say, "*A false witness will lie*," which is equivalent to saying, "*A liar will lie*," or "*one who lies, lies*." Even such a truism as this, however, bald as it may seem, as far as the thought is concerned, has a moral value. It may be useful, either as a definition or a caution, if it can only be presented in connection with some verbal beauty that will give it interest, and fix it deeply on the mind. In

such a dress it might be the more strongly remembered, and the remembrance of it might keep a man from perjury, where more profound reasoning would wholly fail. We might, therefore, conclude, *a priori*, that some such verbal beauty this proverb must actually possess in the original, although it might be difficult to ascertain in what it really consisted. There is some undiscovered antithesis, or comparison; or there is some hidden metaphor; or there is an intended emphasis on some particular word that escapes our first notice; and is not presented in the translation, which gives only the naked general thought. In this case, which we have merely selected by way of example, it would seem to be some peculiar force in the word פִּי, which is always found, however the proverb may vary in other parts of its phraseology. It is rendered, in our version, *utters*. There would be an emphasis in this which would suit pretty well what might be supposed to have been intended in the original, if we should restore the word from its ordinary unmeaningness, (as a mere synonyme of say or speak,) or give it a more *distinct* significance by bringing it back to its primitive etymological or Anglo-Saxon force as connected with *out* and *outer*. A false witness *utters* lies—that is, sends them abroad, puts them in circulation,—just as the term is used in its old legal acceptation; as when a man is charged with *uttering* false coin or counterfeited notes. The verb נָפַח means, in Hiphil, to *blow*, to *breathe*, to *pant*, to *puff*, (being, in fact, an onomatope like our own word *puff*, *puhh*, *pough*); and if from this it had come to be used generally in the sense of respiration, we might express the supposed hidden metaphor by saying—The false witness *breathes* lies—it is his very breath of life,—the atmosphere in which he lives. This, however, would hardly be sanctioned by the Hebrew *usus loquendi*; either as respects this particular word, or the metaphor which such a meaning might seem to involve. There is, also, in the word, the idea of *rage* and *scorn*, as in Ps. 10: 5; 12: 6. It would come from the conception of hard and quick breathing, and thus might give to the proposition the sense of recklessness and vindictiveness. From the primary sense to blow (*to flare*), comes also the secondary meaning of *flame*, *inflammation*, just as the Greek verb πνέω also means to *blow* and to *burn*. Hom. II. I. 480; XVI. 350; Odys. II. 427. Thus it is evidently used Prov. 29: 8. אִישׁ לִצְוֹן יִפְחוּ קִרְיָה, “*Mocking, or restless men blow up a city*,” instead of “*bring it into a snare*,” as our translation has it,—they *inflamm* a neighborhood,—they set the town on fire. This sense admirably suits Prov. 6,—“A false witness *blows out* lies; he sendeth strife among brethren.” The latter member of the verse makes it

almost certain that the term is used to denote just that kind of moral inflammation or incendiarism that we would express by a similar metaphor. In the example Prov. 14 : 6, there may be also a verbal emphasis in the word צִמּוּם, as denoting *fixedness, firmness*, in opposition to the predominant idea of the other term. But as we have only selected this proverb by way of example, or illustration of some general views, we pass on to a more definite statement and application.

The defects of our version, if such defects do exist, would seem to have arisen from the neglect of certain peculiarities which exist more or less in almost all the proverbs,—in some, so plainly that the meaning cannot be mistaken (almost any words which convey the general thought, bringing out the verbal point and emphasis)—in others, constituting almost exclusively the significant force, and yet so disguised, that unless they are prominently presented, even although it can only be done by means of a paraphrase, the meaning almost wholly evaporates. It sinks down into a truism without any verbal or antithetical beauty to give it power or dignity.

We will only mention a few of these peculiarities, and then give examples of what may be regarded as defective translation arising from their neglect—premising, however, that in some of them the difficulty could not, perhaps, have been avoided without sacrificing the necessary conciseness of a translation to a paraphrastic fullness.

Errors have sometimes arisen from neglecting or not discovering—

1. The antithesis. This is the most essential and universal characteristic of this kind of writing. There are hardly any proverbs without some trace of it. It is sometimes double, and not unfrequently do we find examples even of the triple form. When nothing antithetical appears in the translation, either by way of contrast, resemblance, or comparison—or when the two members of the proverb, as expressed, might just as well have been each connected with something else as with each other, it may be strongly suspected of having failed to reach the true emphatic meaning.

2. The subject has been mistaken for the predicate, and the predicate for the subject, or they have been reversed in the two members of the parallel. The article here does not perform the office which it has in Greek ; and we cannot be guided by the collocation of the words. Nothing will avail but a careful search for that in which the emphatic verbal force may consist. Examples of this transposition of the subject and predicate may be found in such cases as Prov. 6 : 23 ; 11 : 17 ; 14 : 15, *et al.*

3. The seeming opposite of this,—as where one subject, or one predicate, belongs to both members of the parallel, but is expressed only in one of them, whilst it is understood in the other. This might be thought to weaken the antithesis; but, in fact, by binding the two members more closely together in consequence of this common term, it places in stronger contrast those expressions that are distinct in each.

4. There is sometimes a want of attention to the true force of the conjunction *vau* (ו). The fewness of the Hebrew particles makes it necessary that some of them should perform a variety of offices. *Vau* always connects; but in various ways. Sometimes it is as a mere copulative, sometimes as denoting contrast, or even opposition, when it may be rendered, *though*,—and sometimes as expressing comparison, which, next to its general connective use, is perhaps its most frequent office.

5. There occur, occasionally, cases of paronomasia, or play upon words. No translation can give this, in another language, without destroying the point or proverbial force by being too diffuse and paraphrastic. Something, however, may be done, in the way of compensation, by giving emphasis to the words from which the paronomasia arises.

6. The same word is sometimes both subject and predicate, or, it may be, the predicate is a different derivative of the same root. In such cases, the word must be regarded as having a *different* meaning, or a *larger* meaning in the one than in the other,—or the identical proposition which is the apparent result may be taken as the most emphatic mode of expressing the peculiarly *sui-generic* nature of the thing described or condemned. There is a good illustration of this in Prov. 14: 24. אִלּוּל כְּסִילִים אִלּוּל—*stultitia stultorum stultitia*—*The folly of fools is folly*. אִלּוּל has in it the idea of *sin* and *impiety* as well as of *foolishness*. The one may be regarded as belonging to the subject, the other as intended for the predicate. Or it may have been meant to assert, with the strong emphasis of a peculiar expression, that folly, in the Bible sense of the term, can be denoted by nothing more descriptive and impressive than folly itself; there is no other predicate large enough to embrace such a subject,—no other term but what would fall short of its exceeding foolishness; or, in other words, it is so foolish and so vile a thing, that

Nought but itself could be its parallel.

Other sources of defective translation might be pointed out on a more rigid analysis, but these are sufficient to illustrate the general view that has been taken. They will present themselves more or less in the examples we have selected for criti-

cism, and which are taken mainly from the portion of the book that follows the first nine chapters.

CHAPTER X.

V. 1. "A wise son maketh a glad father ;
But a foolish son is the grief of his mother."

There is no difficulty about this. It is only presented as a beautiful specimen of triple antithesis. A similar example, among others, may be found ch. 12 : 5. "The *thoughts* of the *righteous* are *justice* ; the *counsels* of the *wicked* are *fraud*."

V. 2. "Treasures of wickedness profit nothing ;
But righteousness delivereth from death"

The predicate of the second member (תציל ממות) may be regarded as belonging also to the first,—if not the very words in their grammatical forms, at least in their logical force. In this view, also, יעיל may be taken, as it is sometimes elsewhere, for a helping verb, like *prodest*, *potest*, and *valet* in Latin, and δύναται or συμφέρει in Greek. *Treasures of wickedness avail not ; but righteousness can deliver from death*. That is, *they avail not to deliver*, &c. This is to be preferred, not only as better bringing out the antithetical force, but also as giving a more spiritual or evangelical meaning. The term *death*, as will appear from an examination of other and similar proverbs, cannot be here used *exclusively* for natural dissolution, nor for the penal death of human laws. In the first sense, taken exclusively, the second member of the parallel is not true, whilst in the other sense, the second clause is often equally false. Treasures of wickedness, or the wicked man's wealth, do avail to deliver him from the sentence of human tribunals, and sometimes even innocence is no protection against an unjust judgment. Compare our Saviour's declaration, Mat. 16 : 26 : *What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul—his eternal life?* The view here taken is strengthened, and in fact confirmed, by Prov. 11 : 4. "*Riches profit not in the day of wrath*, but righteousness delivers from death." It is only a varied expression of the same thought.

V. 6. "Blessings upon the head of the just ;
But violence covereth the mouth of the wicked."

The antithesis here seems feeble, unless there is a force in the expressions as phrases rather than in the words taken singly. In our version, it is only the most general contrast of the opposite results of opposite characters. We find, however, that חסס has sometimes what may be called a personal, or subjective sense. It denotes the wrong or violence which one commits, instead of that which is done to him. Thus, Ps. 58 : 3, and Ps. 7 : 17—"His violence (or wrong) shall descend upon

his own head." It is used also for the effect of violence, or rather, for that which is procured by violence,—*plunder*, wealth gotten by violence and wrong. As in Amos 3 : 10, *האצרים חטם, who treasure up violence in their palaces.* In a similar manner, *ברכה, blessing*, is sometimes used for that which procures blessings, *beneficia, munera*, liberal or benevolent deeds, as in 2 Kings 5 : 15, or *presents*, 1 Sam. 25 : 27. Hence, it comes also to mean *liberality*, generally, or the liberal disposition, as Prov. 11 : 25, *נפש ברכה, the soul of liberality*, or the *liberal soul*. Compare also the last member of Prov. 11 : 26—*Blessings upon the head of him who distributeth corn.* In this view of the contrasted terms, the sense is obvious, and the antithesis comes forth with point and clearness. By combining the meanings, as they would come united to a Hebrew ear, we may thus paraphrase without any false enlargement of the thought. The righteous man's benevolence, or good deeds, shall come down in *showers* of blessings on his head, whilst his own violent wrong-doing, or injustice, shall *overwhelm* the mouth of the wicked, put him to shame and confusion of face. Taken in almost any way, it is the expression of a truth (a *truism*, if any choose thus to call it) simple, yet significant; plain, yet beautiful; obvious in its meaning, yet suggestive of a wide and deep range of thought; trite, indeed, yet oft to be repeated, and never to be forgotten, because of more real value than much that might seem to be more profound.

V. 9. "*He that walketh uprightly walketh surely;
But he that perverteth his ways shall be known.*"

To relieve the apparent feebleness of the second member, some of the older commentators, and the Jewish Rabbi, Solomon among them, would read *רע* (*resh* for *daleth*), as though from a root *רע*, supposed to be cognate with *רע*, to break. In accordance with this, they would render "*He that perverteth his ways shall be broken.*" The antithesis, however, is far better brought out by keeping the usual reading, and giving close attention to the word *יום* in the first member. *Uprightness* is generally a deficient rendering. It may convey the idea, but only by connecting it with other associations. *Integrity* would do better, had it not become too vague, and lost its original meaning in the general sense of *just* or *virtuous*. The word more properly denotes the man that walks in *simplicity* of heart, or sincerity, in *openness*, without disguise—the frank, *open-hearted* man (*απόφρων*) who never *conceals* his thoughts, because they are all honest, and kindly, and *well-wishing*. Such a man walks safely; but he that studies *disguise*, and thus perverts his way, *shall be known*. His refuge of concealment shall be laid open, his perverse wind-

ings shall all be tracked, however crooked he may make them; all his dishonest artifices shall be brought to light.

V. 15. "*The rich man's wealth is his strong city;
But the destruction of the poor is their poverty.*"

A proverb (and the same may often be said of other passages of Scripture) is sometimes without meaning until circumstances have fitted us for a more thorough understanding of its import. A man needs a peculiar schooling to appreciate the bald and pointless truism—as it might at first seem—which constitutes the second member of this parallel. In such a school, however, many have learned, and learned indelibly, that there is indeed a significance in the declaration—*The destruction of the poor is their poverty*. To them it is indeed neither feeble nor pointless. It calls up most vividly the difficulties, the perplexities, the soul-sinking anxieties and embarrassments through which poverty itself becomes the insurmountable obstacle to all escape from poverty. There is not, therefore, much need of any attempt to amend this well-understood aphorism; and yet a conjecture may be offered in regard to the word כחיה, which, if correct, will give more vividness to the second member—in itself,—and bring out with more distinctness the contrast it must have been intended to make with the first. This word, although signifying *destruction* and *desolation* generally (from a root meaning to *break*, to *break down*), is also very naturally employed to denote the object made desolate. Hence it is used,—just as we use our word *ruin*,—for a ruined or desolate town, broken down, without walls, defenceless, solitary. Thus, Ps. 89 : 41 : *Thou hast broken down all his defences; thou hast made his strong-hold a ruin*—כחיה. So also Jeremiah 17 : 17 : *Be not as a desolation, a ruin unto me; be thou my refuge* (my shelter, מוסד, *id ad quod confugitur*), *in the day of evil*. The wealth of the rich is his *city of strength*, his *strong-hold*; the poor man, in his poverty, is as a town broken down and without walls, subject to aggression, and liable to be trampled upon by every invader. The word occurs in the general sense of destruction, or desolation, Prov. 21 : 15; 18 : 11. In Prov. 10 : 29, there seems to be something of the same metaphor that we have supposed to exist here.

V. 18. An example of one predicate belonging to both members of a parallel, although expressed only in the second.

V. 21. "*The lips of the righteous feed many;
But fools die for want of wisdom.*"

The contrast would be better brought out by rendering the last member—"famine of soul."

V. 23. "It is as sport to a fool to do mischief;
But a man of understanding hath wisdom."

The comparison between the two members (made by the conjunction *vau*) is not attended to, and, as a consequence, the second member is reduced almost to a bare tautology. "As mischief is the joy of the fool, so is wisdom (joy) to the man of understanding."

V. 28. "The hope of the righteous shall be gladness;
But the expectation of the wicked shall perish."

There is only one antithesis here, namely, that in the predicate, unless we may venture the supposition of an intended contrast between *חָכָם* and *תָּוֹם*. These words seem nearly if not quite synonymous; and yet a careful examination of passages in which they occur will show a difference. Both signify *hope*, but in different aspects. The latter would seem to refer mainly to its element of *patience* (*ὑπομονή*), the other to its element of *desire* (*ἐρεξίς*),—just as *חָלַל* seems to agree with *μέλω*, and *קִוּ* with *ἐπέγω*, in respect to their primary senses. The one has more of *enduring trust*, the other of *passionate or longing expectation*,—or *looking forth*. The former sense comes to view more or less, in all the passages where *חָכָם* occurs; as in Prov. 13: 18, which should be rendered "*patience drawn out, or too severely tried, maketh the heart sick*,"—Lam. 3: 8, Ps. 39: 6, Prov. 11: 7, and Job 41: 1, where it should be translated "*endurance, fortitude, or courage utterly fails at the sight, &c.*" Prov. 11: 7, might be thought an exception to this. It is there rendered in a way that might seem to make it synonymous with *חָכָם* here. But in that passage it is more likely that *אֲנִים* is the plural of *אָן*, *vires, vobur*, than of *אָן*, and should be rendered, *the strong, or strength*, or rather, as the superlative plural, *great strength*. There is, then, an antithetical climax: "*In the death of the wicked man hope perishes, yea, the patience, the endurance, of the strong—that is—the strongest fortitude, or courage, gives way.*" In Ps. 39: 7, both roots occur: "*And now, Lord, what can I expect, (קִייתִי) or desire (from these)? my patient trust (חָכָם) is in thee.*"—Most beautifully and faithfully paraphrased by Watts,

Now I forbid my carnal hope,
My fond desires recall;
I give my mortal interest up,
And make my God my all.

In Ps. 40: 1, we have the other root, which does not, in that place, so much denote *patience* as earnest expectation: "*I earnestly looked to the Lord, and he inclined unto me, and heard my calling.*" It may mean to *wait*, but chiefly in the aspect of *longing desire* for deliverance, although without excluding

the other idea. So also Ps. 130: 5, where both roots occur: "*I looked with expectation to the Lord; my soul did look; and for his promise did I wait, or, in his word did I trust.*" The distinction here is manifest. The *longing desire* is succeeded by the *patient* hope of resignation. Otherwise we cannot satisfy the law of the parallelism, which seems to demand such an amplification of the idea. From the affinity of its root to חל the noun חולה would seem also to derive a shade of sadness which does not appear in the other word. This, however, is consistent with the truest idea of serious happiness, and would make the contrast still more marked. "*The patience of the just is joy; the expectation of the wicked man perishes.*" There is happiness in the enduring resignation of the one; there is destruction and disappointment for the highest hopes and most passionate desires of the other.

V. 29. "*The way of the Lord is strength to the upright;
But destruction shall be to the workers of iniquity.*"

מַחֲזֵק here may more properly be rendered a *strong-hold*, as in Prov. 18: 10, where we have a similar phrase,—"*The name of the Lord is a strong tower,*" &c. This suggests that there may be also here the same metaphor in the parallel word מוֹחָל, that was found, or supposed to be found, in verse 15th. "*The way of the Lord is as a strong-hold to the pure in heart, but as a ruin or desolation to the workers of iniquity.*" This would require that the subject of the first member should be regarded as common to both, although but once expressed. Such a construction could easily be defended by a citation of similar examples. The main objection would be to the apparently strange comparison of the way of the Lord to a desolation or ruin. It might be said that there is nothing like it to be found in any other parts of the Hebrew Bible; to which it might be replied, that there is no reason why Solomon may not have used a simile that occurs nowhere in the Psalms, or Job, or the Prophets. But let us look for a moment at the sense that would be conveyed. Why may not the way of the Lord be termed מוֹחָל as well as מַחֲזֵק? not *in itself considered* in either case, but as representing the different aspects under which it appears to these two classes of men. To the one, the *derek Jehovah*, or way of the Lord, (the Hebrew expression for practical religion) appears as their only hope, their *strong-hold*, "*into which the righteous run.*" To the other it presents a view just the reverse. It has for them no safety, no defence, no rest. It is as a dismantled and ruined town, affording no security, and suggesting nought but images full of gloom and desolation. There is, however, a good and clear antithesis in the common translation; and its rendering of the

first member would suggest some such metaphor as implied in the second, even to a reader who knew nothing of the usage of the Hebrew word.

CHAPTER XI.

V. 16. "*A gracious woman retaineth honor ;
And strong men retain riches.*"

The comparative force of the particle *vau* is neglected here; and, consequently, the proverb seems to consist of two members having only an arbitrary connection. A very striking comparison is lost: "A virtuous woman is *tenacious* of her honor, *even as* the strong *hold fast* to their wealth." That is, her honor is her riches, her very precious treasure, in losing which she loses herself. חן נשׂא—the noun used for the adjective—a woman of grace—a gracious woman,—or rather a virtuous woman. חן however, when thus used, has respect rather to the estimation of virtue, its outward aspect or value in procuring favor, in other words, its εὐκαλόν. In the similar phrase חן נשׂא, Prov. 31: 10, Ruth 3: 11, there is more properly denoted the *intrinsic strength* of virtuous principle, or εὐδαιμόν. Both expressions are used with apparently the same meaning. In this place, חן suits best with כבד, and the general comparison intended. This is also strengthened by the use of the word ירעץ—the strong, the violent, the terrible ones—those who have obtained their wealth by lives of great peril and hardship—like the old buccaneers or ληστήρες of Homer's times, who roamed about—

ΰλας παρόντες, καὶ ἀλλοδαποῖσι φέροντες.

Such a mode of acquiring property had not, in ancient times, the same stigma that is now attached to it. The law of nations seemed to legitimate a kind of freebooting under certain circumstances. *Conquest* became *acquisitio*; the right of the sword, by a sort of common-law acquiescence, became the strongest and best acknowledged of all titles, to be defended with the utmost resolution and pertinacity. Of this description were the expeditions of David from Ziklag (1 Sam. 27: 10); when he was driven forth by Saul and compelled to sustain himself and his adherents in the *border country* of the Philistines, "to the south of Judah and against the south of the Jerahmeelites and against the south of the Kenites." Those, however, with whom he carried on this private war were, almost constantly, the public enemies of his native land. We have dwelt upon the word, because the courage and resolution with which such men would defend their conquered booty is the main element in the comparison. In its strongest primary sense, the word denotes men of the most desperate

¹ Odyss. IX. 255. Periling their lives in bringing evil upon others.

valor engaged in the most perilous enterprises. As in Isaiah 25: 4, "When the blast of the *terrible ones* is as a storm against the wall." The idea on which the comparison is founded appears prominently Isa. 49: 24, "Shall the *prey* be taken from the mighty? yea, even the *prey* of the *terrible ones* shall be released." Compare also Jerem. 15: 21; Job 6: 23.

V. 17.—*The merciful man doeth good to his own soul;
But he that is cruel troubleth his own flesh.*"

As a translation, this perhaps could not be much improved. Any attempt to do so would run more or less into a paraphrase. There is, however, a contrast in the words נָלַךְ and עָרַךְ which deserves a brief consideration, although the main antithesis is in the terms for *soul* and *flesh*. נָלַךְ has three principal modifications of its primary idea. It means, 1, to *do good to*, or to treat kindly; 2, to *wean* as a child; 3, to *ripen* as fruit. It may be regarded as selected here with some reference to all these modifications, or rather to be taken in that primary sense of *nourishing*, *cherishing*, or *nursing* which includes them all. Compare the use of the word, Ps. 131: 2, "Surely I have composed and quieted myself," &c. The beauty of the passage is very much marred there by the tame rendering "*self*," although proper in many cases where *nephesh* is used. Rather "I have composed and quieted my soul as a child *weaned* of its mother; even as a weaned child my soul." What can more beautifully express the *hushing* of every uprising emotion of pride, the *lulling* of every angry and malevolent passion? See also Isa. 11: 8; 38: 9. The use of the word occasionally *in malam partem*, is derived from the general idea of recompensing or doing something to one in return, which, as is found to be the case with other terms, passes in the course of time to the opposite sense. It is at first by a species of irony, that afterwards becomes established in sober speech, and is a mode of derivation to be met with in all languages—as, to *pay a debt*, or *do one a deserved turn*, comes in time to be a legitimate phrase for retaliating an injury. Taking, however, the good senses of the word, we may say, that they all seem to combine to make a most agreeable picture, and a most striking contrast. The man of kindly deeds *does good* to his own soul. He *nurses* it in goodness; he *weans* it from evil. Through the cherishing of benevolent feelings, and the practice of corresponding actions, he renders it still more gentle and benevolent. It grows by that on which it feeds. The exercise of the good affections delivers it also from the power of evil passions—keeps it composed, quiet; like a weaned child. And so, too, does such a course produce effects which may be expressed by the third modification of this primary idea. It renders the soul soft,

mellow, ripe, rich in the exuberance of all kind and tender emotions. Whilst this is the result on the one hand, the effect of the opposite state and temper is not only to ruin the soul, to breed in it spiritual death, but also to leave its very marks in the sympathizing body. אכזרי, the fierce and cruel indulger of evil passions (for the word has a wonderful uniformity in all passages where it occurs), *troubles* his own flesh. It not only takes away the enjoyment of the soul *per se*, but also all satisfaction in those pleasures which might rationally be derived through the body. Nay, more—it not unfrequently deranges the carnal constitution, and brings disorder and disease into the very flesh itself.

V. 19. "*As righteousness tendeth to life;*

So he that pursueth evil pursueth it to his death."

There is great variety in the manner in which this idea is set forth in the Proverbs. Without commenting particularly on this passage, which calls for no critical exegesis, we will simply present a number of others in connection with it, all marked by a similar use of the terms *death* and *life*.

Ch. 14: 12. "There is a way which seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of *death*."

V. 27. "The fear of the Lord is a fountain of *life*, to depart from the snares of *death*."

Ch. 8: 35. "Whoso findeth me (wisdom) findeth *life*, and shall obtain favor of the Lord. He that sinneth against me does violent hurt to his own soul; all they that hate me love *death*."

15: 24. "The way of *life* is above to the wise, that he may depart from *Hades* beneath."

15: 31. "The ear that heareth the reproof of *life* abideth among the wise."

15: 4. "A wholesome tongue is a tree of *life*, but perverseness therein is a *death* (שׁוּן, *fractio, corruptio, διαφθορά, interitus*) in the spirit."

16: 22. "Understanding is a well-spring of *life* unto him that hath it." Compare our Saviour's "well of water springing up to everlasting *life*."

19: 23. "The fear of the Lord tendeth to *life*."

21: 16. "The man that wandereth out of the way of understanding; shall remain in the congregation of the *dead*."

21: 21. "He that followeth after righteousness and mercy, findeth *life*, righteousness, and honor." Compare Paul, Rom. 2: 7, "To them who seek for glory, and honor, and immortality—*eternal life*."

22: 4. "By humility and the fear of the Lord, are riches, honor, and *life*."

Ch. 3: 22. "So shall they be *life* unto thy soul, and grace unto thy neck."

4: 13. "Take fast hold of instruction; let her not go; for she is thy *life*."

14: 12. "There is a way which seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of *death*."

4: 23. "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of *life*."

5: 5. "Her feet go down to *death*; her steps take hold on *hell*."

6: 23. "For the commandment is a lamp; and the law is *light*; and the reproofs of instruction are the way of *life*."

Other passages of the same kind could be brought from the Proverbs, and many similar ones from other parts of the Old Testament. The questions come up: Are they all to be taken in the sense of natural life and death? Is the one term figura-

tive merely of *temporal* prosperity, and the other of temporal adversity? Is the death the penal death of human law? Is it the *natural* effect of sin in producing disease and consequent dissolution? Is the *life* a prolongation merely of days upon the earth, as the reward, or rather *consequence*, of obedience? Do the terms contain allusion to the eternal life beyond the grave, secured by covenant to the righteous seed, and to the eternal death of the legal penalty? Or lastly, is there any reference to the idea of a *moral* or *spiritual* life and death, regarded as being *in the soul*, even in the present state of being, and containing the seeds of an eternal development in another and eternal existence—the one ever tending *upward*, the other *downward*; the one presenting the idea of our drawing nigher and nigher unto God, the other of a way ever departing farther and farther from him; the one (whether figuratively or not) leading to heaven *above* (see Prov. 15: 24); the other to *hell*, or *hades*, or the “congregation of those that remain among the dead *beneath*?” Prov. 21: 16. If there are difficulties in the way of what may be styled the more evangelical answers to these questions, there are other, and, we think, much greater difficulties, in the way of those that would give them merely a temporal and earthly aspect. We have grouped together these passages, in this place, for the purpose of presenting at a glance their distinguishing features. Let any one read them carefully over, with others that might be taken from the Psalms and Prophets, and then consult the impressions of his own soul in answering the question,—whether there is not that in the style and language which must be pronounced unmeaning or extravagant if we adopt only the lowest and most temporal interpretation. If figurative,—figurative, we ask, of what? What is the reality back of the figure? What is there in the soul to which these terms, thus drawn from the bodily life and death, express a resemblance so near, a parallelism so perfect?—if, indeed, they are so drawn, and are not equally *primary* and *literal* when applied directly to the Spirit. But the subject demands a most thorough investigation by itself. We can only allude to it here, and do so, because the terms so often occur in any critical examination of this book of Proverbs.

CHAPTER XII.

V. 10. “A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast;
But the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel.”

The latter member of this proverb has passed into very common use; and yet we may doubt the propriety of its more general applications. In itself it would seem a direct contradiction; and could only be supposed to have point and force by

being taken ironically or comparatively. The tender mercies of the wicked would thus be an *oxymoron*, as the critics call it, an ironical phrase for their cruel dispositions. Or we might say their best affections, even in their best moods, are *comparatively* harsh; they have ever a tinge of malevolence. The proverb, as it stands, finds also a good application to much of that abstract, inflating, philanthropy which is not unfrequently professed by very bad men. Some of the most ferocious revolutionists, whose subsequent power has been distinguished by a revolting inhumanity, commenced their career of blood as flaming philanthropists. Robespierre is known to have been a warm advocate for the abolition of capital punishment as unsuited to the benign spirit of his merciful age. The tender mercies of such men are indeed cruel.

We think, however, that the proverb has been mistranslated. The word רחמים, though generally taken for the *kindly* affections, may denote any *warm* and *strong* feeling of the soul. Its well-known primary sense is σπλάγχνα, the *bowels*. Hence the phrase, "*bowels of compassion*." The Greeks use their term in the same way, not only for the tender emotions, but also for any strong or burning affection; as for violent anger, Aristoph. Ran. 844.

Καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὀργὴν σπλάγχνα θερμότητος.

Compare also Ran. 1006. It also expresses *anxiety*; and is sometimes employed for the disposition generally, as in Eurip. Med. 220. Hence it may be rendered here literally—*The bowels of the wicked are cruel*; they are the seat of the burning, malevolent passions; their *inmost soul* is inhumanity and wrath; just as the similar word קֶרֶן (*viscera*, *cor. animus*) is to be taken, Ps. 5: 10, "*Their inward parts are mischief*; their throat is an opened sepulchre."

V. 23. "*The prudent man concealeth knowledge;*
But the fool's heart proclaimeth abroad his folly."

A beautiful example of a triple antithesis.

V. 26. "*The righteous is more excellent than his neighbor;*
But the way of the wicked seduceth them."

One might almost conclude, *a priori*, that there is some defect about this translation. There seems little or no meaning in the first member, and a want of all antithetical connection between it and the second. The difficult word is נִרְ. The translators have regarded it as being from the root נִרְ, which in Niphal means *to remain*, *to survive*, and hence, *to excel*. Such also is the view of Martin Geier in his commentary on the passage. The Latin version of Tremellius gives the same sense. The Septuagint, as is usually the case in difficult passages in the Proverbs, is a loose paraphrase, having little or

no meaning, and rambling almost out of sight of the Hebrew text. We have, however, the authority of Gesenius for regarding the word as the future Hiphil of *חָרַר*, *circuize, investigate*; hence, in Hiphil to *show the way*, or act as a *guide* in conducting others. The Kal form occurs in a number of places. In Eccles. 7: 25, it is in connection with *חָרַר*, *to seek, to search diligently*, and may be rendered to *explore*. So also Eccles. 1: 13. It is the word that is used of the *explorations* of the spies who were sent out to examine the promised land, and to whom there may have been some reference here. The rebellious Israelites *lost their way* for nearly forty years, whilst Joshua, one of the faithful scouts, guided the people at last to Canaan. Thus the historical fact may have passed into a proverb, or rather, become the ground of the proverb. "*The way of the wicked seduceth them*," rather *causes them to err*, or, more correctly still, *takes them out of the right road*. Compare Prov. 10: 17, and the remarks above. There is, then, a good and clear sense to each member, and a fine contrast. The righteous man not only keeps himself in the way, but explores the right path for others; even as Caleb and Joshua explored the promised land. On the other hand, the very course of the wicked and rebellious is ever leading them farther and farther astray. There is one other instance of the use of the word in Hiphil, and that is the disputed passage 2 Sam. 33, where we have *חָרַר*, which is supposed to be for *חָרַר*—*patah* with *dagesh* supposed to be equivalent to *quamets*. The great argument for this is the exigency of the place, the derivation from *חָרַר* failing to give any suitable sense. The meaning, then, becomes the same as in this passage. *He guides the upright in the way*, and both places mutually confirm each other.

V. 28. "*In the way of righteousness is life;
And in the pathway thereof there is no death.*"

There are some strong objections to this rendering, even though all efforts should fail in bringing out a better. It presents the appearance of the baldest of tautologies. The second member seems but a repetition of the first in an enfeebled negative form; for if there is a negative, it has not, when thus taken separately, any such emphasis as would result in English from rendering *no* instead of *not*. But the main critical objection is to the view taken of the word *חָרַר*. This is universally in Hebrew the *subjective* negative, used before the future and imperative when expressive of a prohibitory or deprecatory sense. It corresponds to the Greek *μὴ*, and, like it, is sometimes used when the subjective is implied or concealed under what is apparently a denying assertion. It may also, like *μὴ*, imply a sort of *caution* or *direction*, by the aid of some govern-

ing word understood; as the Greek particle in Hom. Odys. v. 415, where μή is equivalent to *οἶδω μή*. *I fear, lest, &c.* So, too, the helping word itself may be taken negatively, as though equivalent to *μή δέσσης μή*; or in Latin, *ne metuas*. There is, however, no case to be found in the Hebrew Bible of לֹא used objectively in a direct negative assertion incapable of being resolved into a subjective sense, unless it be the passage, Prov. 30: 31 (קֹץ לֹא), which is so utterly uncertain in its meaning as to be worth nothing by way of authority. If לֹא is to be treated as a *separatē* negative particle, the view above mentioned furnishes the best translation of which it is capable. "*And as for the way of its path (ne metuas) have no fear of its being death, or of there being death in it.*"

This, however, at best, seems unusual and far-fetched. But why should the Masoretic punctuation be regarded as absolutely conclusive, or entitled to any higher consideration than what it justly has as one of the oldest, and the most careful of versions? It is not a part of the *text*, strictly, although of the greatest authority in ascertaining what the text is. If we read לֹא for לֵא, and keep in mind the true force of נתיב, there comes forth a rendering which has strong claims upon our attention. There is said to be a Hebrew Codex¹ in which this reading occurs; and the Chaldee rendering could only have come from such a punctuation; which the LXX. have also followed, although in a very paraphrastic manner—*οδοὶ δὲ μνηστράων εἰς θάνατον*. Such a view is helped by a consideration of the true and most common import of נתיב. In distinction from דרך, a *way, course, or journey*, generally (as ארחות ימים, Ps. 8: 9, *Via marium*, ὁγὰ ἀλυσθα, the ways of the sea), it means a *beaten path, a well-trodden path*, the broad, well-traveled, and well-known road. It may be made from the unused root נתב, whose supposed primary sense, *calcandi proculcandi*, Gesenius regards as being an imitation of the sound, like *tab, tap*—with which compare the Greek σσιβω and our *stamp, stub, &c.* This, in connection with the other view, brings out a clear and impressive contrast: "*In the way of righteousness is life; the course of the worn and traveled road is to death.*" Compare the λήθη ὁδός of Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 265,—and especially our Saviour's metaphor, Mat. 7: 13: "*Broad is the way that leadeth unto destruction, and many there be that go in thereat.*"

Another view may regard לֵא as actually joined to what follows, so as to make one word אלמֵת, *al-maveth*, forming such a compound as צלמֵת, *tzal-maveth*, or like the very

¹ Codex Hebræus in forma quarta Venetiis editus A. C. 15. 18, in cujus margine pro *al*, nota Masoretica ponitur *el Mart*. Geier. 635.

doubtful word אִלִּים, Prov. 30 : 31. The effect of this, it will be seen, would be to give point and strength to the assertion, and to make, moreover, an amplification of the first member, instead of a falling off, as is felt to be the case in our common version. The word thus assumes a *positive* form, and with it a positive force, although coming from a negative in composition, like the Greek ἀθάνασία and our word *im-mortality*. Such terms, especially in Greek and Latin, have far more power and meaning than the mere negative idea resulting from the un-compounded separate parts. The Greek ἀχρεῖος, for example, —*unprofitable*, the *unprofitable servant*,—means much more than would be expressed by οὐ or μὴ χρησίμος. See Clark's note on the word, Iliad, II. 269. There, as applied to Thersites, it denotes the lowest degree of vileness. Our Saviour also uses it to express an extreme degree of depravity, Mat. 25 : 30 ; Luke 17 : 1, where it is applied to the *unprofitable servant*. We have the same thing in the Hebrew, as may be seen in the word גלעל and the phrase, *men of Bellal*, which, although its un-compounded parts would seem simply to denote *one who does not profit*, expresses, nevertheless, the strongest idea of wickedness that can be represented in the Hebrew language. Such is the effect of the composition. Like the union of certain chemical substances, it seems to produce a new combination, a new and more intense idea, distinct from the parts, and far exceeding the sum of their mere aggregate power. So also in the Latin—such words as *inimicus, immitis, improbus, infelix, impius*, mean far more than *non-amicus, non-mitis, non-felix, non-pius*, &c. The same principle is also found applicable to negative compounds carrying a good sense, such as *innocens, inculpatus*, &c. They have a stronger sense than *non-nocens*, or *non-culpatus*, as also our word *blameless* means much more than *not blamed*. And so, too, the Latin *immortalis*, and our *immortality*, have a depth and largeness of meaning altogether transcending that of the mere separate negative phrases—such as *non-mors*, or *not-death*. In this view the proverb becomes a climax, or amplifying parallelism. The second part, by this peculiarity of expression, rises above the first—"In the way of the righteous there is *life*,—its course is the pathway to *im-mortality*"—even that "*eternal life*" (or ἀθάνασία) which knows *no death*,—that everlasting *health* (ἀσθασία) which knows no disorganization,—that never-failing and never-forfeited *inheritance* which Peter describes by negatives of similar intensity, as ἈΦΘΑΡΤΟΝ, ΑΜΙΑΝΤΟΝ, ΑΜΑΡΑΝΤΟΝ—*in-corruptible, un-defilable, un-decaying*,—"reserved in the heavens for those who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation."

CHAPTER XIII.

V. 8. "*The ransom of a man's life are his riches;
But the poor heareth not rebuke.*"

The connection between the two members (which is not obvious at first view) will be seen by looking closely at the first. כֶּסֶף נִפְשׁוֹ may refer to the power of wealth in delivering its possessor from almost every species of worldly difficulty; but by taking it with special reference to judicial proceedings, we discover the antithesis at once. Riches may buy a man off from justice; they have often done so; but they are not unfrequently, too, the cause, or occasion, of drawing down accusations against him as the very ground of exactions for his deliverance. This was peculiarly the case in the extremes of democracy and despotism. In the one, the rich man's wealth was a continual temptation to the tyrant, in the other an object of jealousy to the mob,—or rather to the demagogues who ruled the mob. Of this Lucian gives us a lively, though not overdrawn picture, in his dialogue entitled "*Somnium seu Galus*," 194 Lip. If such a view be correct, the latter clause of the proverb furnishes an offset to the first. It is a contrast of reciprocal advantages. The rich man's wealth buys him off from condemnation; the poor man's insignificance is his security against assault. נִפְשׁוֹ may be taken in the sense of *accusation, charge, increpatio*, κατήγορία. "But you," says Lucian in the sketch referred to, "have no apprehensions from robbers; you have no reckonings with wicked and unfaithful stewards; you have no fear of the informer,"—which seems to be just about what is intended in the second member of this proverb. Baronius says that the early Christians used this proverb by way of defence of their conduct, when, in persecution, they appeased the rage of their adversaries with presents.

V. 19. "*The desire accomplished is sweet to the soul;
But it is an abomination to fools to depart from evil.*"

"The desire" of the good would seem to be opposed to the aversion of the bad; and yet there is nothing but very general and vague inference to show whose desire it is, or of what. There is, moreover, a want of symmetry in the antithesis. The subject and predicate in the two members, respectively, stand in an inverse order. There is but little contrast in the whole thought, although there is something of euphonic resemblance in the commencing words, תּוֹכַחַת and תּוֹכַחַת, with which compare תּוֹכַחַת, Ps. 119: 20. On the whole, the proverb, thus translated, lacks that point and neatness which would seem to be an essential quality of this kind of writing.

תּוֹכַחַת may signify, in general, any strong desire, or longing, either good or bad. But a close examination of passages with a concordance, would show that it is most commonly used,

either *in malam partem*, for some wrong object; or if not bad *in itself*, that it gets that aspect frequently, in consequence of its inordinate exercise. It is most naturally to be taken in one of these ways when there is nothing in the context to determine it to a good sense. It is generally sensual (*concupiscentia*), to say the least. Taking this view, we get a clear antithesis and an instructive sense, if we can only accommodate נהיה to it. This word, as the Niphal of the substantive verb, does not so much denote here what is *accomplished*, in the sense of factum, as what is simply and absolutely past—*præteritum*. Hence it gets what might seem to be its unfavorable sense, and which some grammarians and lexicographers have regarded as differing so widely from the common signification, as to denote a different root to which they have given the senses *fractus*, or *debilitatus est*. As in Daniel 2: 1, where it may be rendered—not “*his sleep brake from him*,” as our translation has it, or *was broken*, but, *his sleep was gone*—it was *all over* for that night—he could sleep no more. Hence also, in Dan. 8: 27, it is joined with נחלתי (*I was sick*), and may be rendered, *confectus eram*, or, to use a common expression—*it was all over with him*—he was spent, exhausted, *gone*. There is a very striking example of this use of the passive of the substantive verb to denote the absolute past, Ezek. 21: 12—הנה באה ונהיתה, “Lo it is *coming*, and *gone*, saith the Lord.” In the prophetic vision, it is regarded already as among the things that were—

*Fuimus Troës, fuit Ilium, et ingens
Gloria Tæderorum—*

compare also Ezek. 39: 8.

Giving the word here this sense of absolute *pastness*, or *præterition*, and taking נהיה *in malam partem*, or in the sense of concupiscence or inordinate desire, we have a clear and significant rendering—one that commends itself, we think, to critical attention. The desire when past, that is, the temptation successfully resisted, the inordinate appetite conquered and numbered among things that *were*, is pleasant, very pleasant to the soul. Every man's own experimental philosophy may teach him the truth of the maxim, and every man may have the pleasure if he wills it. There is no feeling more delightful than that which succeeds such a victory, especially if connected with a triumph over some *malevolent* as well as *sensual* passion, or coming after some act of resolute self-denial. It is not simply a feeling of release, but of *absolute* freedom. It is a consciousness of growth, of enlargement, of increased and increasing spiritual strength, of progress in the true ἀρετή—the true and *absolute* good. It may be on this count that our Saviour so commends and enjoins it, namely:

as a *good per se*, irrespective of any Epicurean or utilitarian value it may have as the means of averting a greater pain, or securing the unhindered enjoyment of some stronger "passional attraction" than it yields. Christ's teachings on this subject must certainly have been something more than that nicely calculating maxim of the sensual philosophy—*hac usurum compensatione sapientem, ut voluptatem fugiat, si ea majorem dolorem effectura sit, et dolorem suscipiat, majorem efficientem voluptatem.*¹

Epicurus and his school maintained that there was happiness in the recollection of sensual pleasures that were past. Quocirca gaudere (inquit) tamdiu, dum præsentem sentiat voluptatem—prospicere quoque venientem, nec *præteritam* præterfluere sinere: ita perpetuas et contextas voluptates in sapiente fore semper, cum expectatio speratarum voluptatum *perceptarum memoriæ* jungeretur. Cicero,² however, without any ceremony, charges him, and justly, too, with giving the lie to the plainest assertions of our common human nature. Pleasure *coming* (בא, as the word should be translated, Prov. 13: 12) is pleasant; and this is the only state in which it maintains itself unchanged and unalloyed. Pleasure enjoying, if we may use the word, or in the act of being enjoyed, begins already to die; it expires with gratification; it passes its maximum point the very moment fruition commences, and then is suicidal, or self-destructive, as Plato shows in the *Gorgias*; where he proves that on this account it cannot be *the good*. This is the law of sensual enjoyment. Much less can it exist in the past. On the contrary, it leaves satiety and weariness, and often remorse, as a sting behind it when it is "accomplished;" as every sensualist's experience would fully testify. But the desire past—the temptation resisted—the warfare over—the victory won—the soul is filled with a happiness, not merely *superior* to sensual pleasure, and of a higher degree of purity, but altogether of a different nature. It is that calm and solid bliss that no word could have so well expressed as the Hebrew עֵרֶב. It has in it a feeling of eternity, of substantiality, of incorruptibility, of immortality, of that unclaying freshness which our Saviour compares to a well-spring, ever rising up to everlasting life.

¹ Cic. Tusc. Q. v. 33. The wise man would thus balance the scales, as to deny himself a pleasure, if it was going to produce a greater pain, and to undergo a pain, if it would be the means of securing a greater pleasure.

² Wherefore he has joy whilst he is feeling the pleasure that is present; with joy he contemplates the pleasure that is approaching; *nor does he suffer even the past to flow by and escape.* Thus there is for the wise man a round of perpetual and closely-connected delights. Together with the present, he has the expectation of joys yet existing in hope, joined to the pleasant memory of those that are past. Cic. Tusc. Q. v. 33.

לַיְלָה is well rendered here—"is sweet"—"is sweet to the soul." We cannot think it extravagant to regard this sense of the verb as having come from, or as having some connection with, the noun לַיְלָה, the evening (*vespera*), as associated with the ideas of calmness, of meditation, of reflection, or some such conception as gave rise to that beautiful word for night which occurs in the Greek poetry—*εὐφροσύνη*—the hour of good feeling, of serene thoughtfulness, of serious happiness. Compare Ps. 104 : 34 : "My meditation of him shall be sweet ; I will be happy in the Lord." See also Prov. 3 : 24, where it is used in a connection beautifully appropriate to the idea of such an etymology—"When thou liest down thou shalt not fear ; thou shalt lie down and thy sleep *shall be sweet*."

If this view of the first member can be sustained, there is presented a significant antithesis in the second, "*But fools cannot bear to depart from evil*." They cannot overcome temptation ; they cannot practice self-denial. They, therefore, know nothing of its happiness ; and not of its happiness merely, but of the exceeding desirableness of that resulting state which is the freedom, the power, the true *virtue* of the soul, as well as its highest rationality.

CHAPTER XVIII.

V. 14. "The spirit of a man will sustain his infirmity ;
But a wounded spirit who can bear ?"

It is said by some that the distinction between soul and body, as two separate entities, is nowhere presented in the Old Testament. We think, however, to say nothing of many other places, that it is to be found in this very proverb, although not so fully brought out in the translation as it might be. But little objection can be taken to the particular words of the common version ; and yet, as a whole, it seems to obscure the point, if not the essential thought of the original. The position of the terms perverts the emphasis : "*But the wounded spirit who can bear ?*" We get from this the sense of *endurance* merely. The answer is—No one can bear it—no one can endure it—it is beyond the human *patience*. This is the thought that would be generally suggested, although the translation, even as it stands, is capable of a higher meaning.

May it not rather be rendered—*But who shall sustain (or bear up) the wounded spirit*—or more correctly still—"The wounded spirit, who shall sustain it ?"—with that emphasis on the pronoun which would appear to be demanded by the manner in which it is suffixed (almost redundantly, it would seem,) to the verb in the original. The change may seem slight, and yet it conveys a striking difference of meaning, or at all events, a more enlarged and elevated significance. מַחֲלָה and its kindred nouns always presents the idea of *bodily* infirmity, and

the antithesis absolutely requires that idea. כלל may sometimes have the sense of patient *endurance*, where the subject and object are the same, although, in most cases, it refers to the sustaining of something ab extra, by way of nourishment, support, or defence; as here the bodily disease may be regarded as something *extraneous* to the spirit. The same may be said of נשׂא. In some few cases, when the context requires it, (as Isa. 1: 14; Mich. 7: 9,) it may have the simple subjective sense of *enduring* (*patiens*), *bearing with*, but most generally denotes the supporting power of something foreign to the thing supported. This, too, would seem to be demanded by the emphatic repetition of the pronoun. We have, then, a *double antithesis* (or, rather, antithetical climax,) one part of which is the silent answer implied. "The *spirit* or higher part of man can sustain the *bodily infirmity*, or the body in its infirmity; but *who* shall sustain the stricken spirit?" Answer—a higher spirit; something out of man, above the spirit of man, even as the human soul is above the body. In other words, it is the קדוה קדש, the Divine Spirit, ὁ Παράκλητος, the Comforter. The silent answer has more power than the strongest affirmative. The stricken spirit (נכאד) cannot be sustained by itself. It must look out of itself, and above itself, to the Great Physician of souls, "*Who healeth the stricken in heart and bindeth up their wounds.*" Ps. 147: 3. Compare also Isa. 57: 16: "I would not always contend with them, neither would I be always wroth; for the very *spirit* would faint (or swoon, עטף) before me, and the souls which I have made." In such expressions, we may find something of a key to the very difficult passage, Gen. 6: 3, rendered, "*My spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he is flesh.*" Whether we regard רוח there, as denoting the human spirit breathed into man by God, as we are told, Gen. 2: 7, (and which he might, therefore, properly call *my spirit*, my spirit which I have given him), or as intending the Divine Spirit *per se*,—and whatever view we may take of the difficult word רוח, as expressive, either of *striving*, or *indwelling*, or *lordship*, still we have the clear distinction between the spiritual and the material, as well as the great ascending progression of dependence; or, in other words, that as the *flesh* is dependent on the *spirit*, so is the *spirit* dependent on the *Divine*. For a more hopeful and cheering presentation of the same truth, in its more moral or spiritual aspect, see Isa. 40: 30, "Even the youths shall faint; the young men shall utterly fail; but they that wait upon (or look to) the Lord shall *renew their strength* (יחליתו) shall get new vigor from the parent root, see Job 14: 7; Isa. 9: 9); they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run and not be weary; they shall walk and not faint."

ARTICLE VIII.

VESTIGES OF A REDEEMER IN THE RELIGIONS OF THE
ANCIENT WORLD.

By ASAHEL ABBOT, New York.

In tracing man's primitive knowledge of a Redeemer through all his wanderings, we regret that we cannot please such as take low and humanizing views of him, or deny the necessity of such a work as the church, through her prophets and apostles, has learned that he should accomplish. In all the ancient world perpetual prayers ascended, and perpetual hecatombs bled upon myriads of altars, so that the sun never set upon the world's sacrifices; even as it now shines on forever round the globe, affording perpetual light to the worship of Christ, while Sabbath by Sabbath, and morning by morning, they offer prayer and praise to Him that is alive and was dead, and "hath by one offering forever perfected those that are sanctified." Indeed, we have only to lift up our eyes to the heavens for witness; for upon the very forehead of the sky itself the most ancient people of the first dispersion in Chaldee land or Egypt have engraved the fall and recovery of man. In all the older constellations we have clear traces of the contest foreshadowed in the curse of Satan. In all these the serpent has his part. Perseus uses his victory over Medusa to deliver Andromeda, and holds in his hand the terrible head surrounded with serpents. Hercules crushes the Dragon's head. Ophiuchus bears a serpent. In later times the serpent denoted other things, and in particular the Agathodæmon, or Good Genius; as well as the Deluge, that they have commemorated on the sphere by the Hydra, as among the Egyptians it was represented by a crocodile bearing an ark or ship in which stands the figure of a God. It may, indeed, appear strange that the same figure should be found with so many significations. Still this alters not the fact. As it was customary to denote eternity by a serpent drawn in a circle and biting his tail, so it became an emblem of the Divine Wisdom and Providence; and hence we have on ancient gems and medals an eye surrounded by a serpent to set forth the Divine care and preservation of mankind from the deluge; and according to Horu's Apollo, the world under Divine Providence is pictured by a palace surrounded with a serpent. But it will not be difficult to show that all these serpent-emblems are really from one and the same stock, and refer to one person alone.

None can have failed to notice that *in all ancient nations the Deity was held to consist in a Trinal Unity*, according to that saying in the Magic or Chaldee Oracles cited by Patrius out of Damascius, "in all the world shines forth a Trinity, wherein

a Unity is first." Damascius and Eugubinus cite from Eudemus a saying that, according to the mystic theology of the Egyptians, the Godhead was invoked by name of "the unknown darkness," to be thrice repeated. And that this was done in some form amid the service of the Jewish temple there can be no doubt, since in the Cherubic hymn (that is most evidently drawn from the temple worship) both Isaiah and the author of the Apocalypse heard say, "Holy, holy, holy, Lord God of Hosts." The Persian theologists agreed with the Pythagorean and Jewish idea of three persons in one God, of which the first was Ormuzd, the second Mithras, and the third named Psyche by the Greeks, i. e., the Spirit, that proceeds from the first and the second; according to a Chaldee Oracle in Proclus, next the Paternal Mind I Psyche dwell. This Paternal Mind, we are told by Psellus, is the second person, (Θεός), and Pletho says that the first person (ὁ πρῶτος Θεός) is Oromasdes. To this agrees Plutarch, (De Iside and Osiride), when he says that "Zoroaster assigned the first place to Oromasdes, who in the Oracles is called the Father, and the middle to Mithras, who in the same Oracles is called the second Mind; though he makes the third to consist not of Psyche, (as the genuine Oracles do,) but of Ahriman or Arimanius, the same with Hades or Pluto, or the Oriental Siva, the Destroyer; a form of the Trinity mixed up of the primitive idea with that of Noah's three sons, the Baalim of the Scriptures; the generated Cabiri of the Egyptians and Phenicians, the Jove, Neptune, and Pluto of Western mythology; while among the ancient Persians, according to the Arabians, (as Abulfeda) God or Light is Kadiman, the eldest of beings, while Darkness or Arimanius was a creature, exactly answering to Satan, the head of fallen spirits, named in the Chaldee Oracles, "beasts of the earth," (Θῆρες χθονός), or "terrestrial dogs," (χθόννιόυνες), and by Empedocles "Demons hurled down from heaven and pursued by Divine vengeance," (οἱ θεήλατοι καὶ οὐρανὸς ἐκείνους δαίμονες). In the proclamation of Cyrus for restoring the temple at Jerusalem, the God of the Jews is named by him "the God," and "the Lord God of heaven." Ez. 1 : 2.

What we have here advanced concerning the ancient doctrine of the philosophers that God is a consubstantial Trinity, is upon grounds that cannot be subverted, though many of the Fathers may be cited to show that there was less of accuracy among heathen than among Christian writers in all things pertaining to theology. But by thus presenting the Trinity as of universal reception among the ancients, we are now prepared to show in what point and in what person all the oldest serpent-emblems centre. *That point is the seduction of mankind*

by the infernal serpent, and that person is the Son of God, the second person of the Trinity among all nations, who, after a mortal conflict, overcomes the serpent, and so out of death brings forth life. Among the heathen who had less knowledge of the ancient enigmas, the serpent, being ever found complicated with man's Redeemer, became an emblem of the Redeemer himself, as the Agathodæmon, or Good Genius, the Creator and Preserver of the world, the Divine Wisdom, the Eternal Deity. The serpent (or some other destructive animal) is complicated with man's Redeemer, and not with either the Father or the Eternal Spirit.

Thus Apollo, the Pæan or god of healing, is named Pythius, for slaying the serpent Python. Esculapius, another name of the same deity, (or, as Julian and Apuleius will make him,) the eternal idea of the healing art manifested in the human form, bears the serpent upon his wand; and after death is transformed into, or commemorated by, the figure of a serpent. Hygeia, who is a feminine form of the same divine healing Power, bears bound about her shoulders, like Mithras, the shape of a serpent. Jason (*Ἰησών*, the Healer,) as chief of the Argonauts, overcomes a serpent, and yokes to the plough fiery-breathing bulls. Cadmus, the instructor of men in arts and science, encounters a serpent and an army of giants before he can rear Thebes, and with his spouse Hermione is changed at death into a serpent. For Cadmus is the same with Osiris, not a mortal man; and instead of Thebes, he taught men to build the Theba or Ark after he had given Satan his death-wound, and by the flood he destroyed the giants, allowing none to escape but the three families of the Ark, to repeople the earth. Orpheus in Damascius figures Hercules (the God-Man, Ourchol or Arcoles, the fire god of the Orientals,) as a dragon with golden wings, having three heads, whereof one was like that of a lion, another like that of a bull, and in the midst the countenance of a god. Hermes, the interpreter between God and man, holds a wand and serpents intertwined. Perseus, by divine power, slays the Gorgon, and bears in triumph the head of Medusa twining with serpents before he can deliver Andromeda from "the dragon of the sea." Minerva, the Divine Wisdom, bears upon her breast and upon her shield the same head of Gorgon, the "neck cut off, yet rolling eyes in death." Osiris is slain by Typhon, the Destroyer, and again rises from the dead. Adonis is slain of a wild beast, and afterward returns from the grave. At his festivals they bore vases of flowers mingled with serpents, to commemorate Eden and the infernal serpent. The worshipers of Bacchus bear a Thyrsus twined with snakes, and bind about their looks with

flowers and serpents. The priests of Osiris wear the figure of a serpent in their head-dress; and the Trinity of Egypt is formed of a winged globe and serpent; the globe, according to Sanchoniatho, denoting the Father as self-existent, eternal, incomprehensible, without beginning or end; the serpent, the Divine Wisdom and creative power, and the wings that active and loving Spirit which gives life and joy to all things created. Serapis, like Vishnu, is bound in the folds of a serpent, or with his dead body, as a chain holds the triplasian Cerberus; as our Messiah, through the sufferings of death, has been raised to rule over all things in heaven, and earth, and hell. The statues of Isis (as the wife of Osiris) were adorned with a tiara, wherein were twined asps; and this the kings, as well as the priests of Egypt, imitated by wearing high bonnets surrounded by figures of serpents, and surmounted by a globe. Here, too, we are to assign the origin of that Oriental figure whereby the earth is made to rest upon a serpent, that in turn rests upon a tortoise. The tortoise represents the original ocean from which the earth was raised; the serpent is the Divine Demirgus, who raised the earth from the sea; and the whole is identical with that of the fable of Delos, raised up from the sea to become the birth-place of Apollo, the Divine Humanity. So, to contradict the pretences of the heathen in regard to their gods, the Almighty says by his prophet, "The earth and all the inhabitants thereof are dissolved; I bear up the pillars thereof." Ps. 75 : 3. For that the ancients well understood the sphericity and self-supporting power of the earth there is no question, since Pythagoras and the Greeks learned it from them, and in the oldest books known there is no other view of it. See Job 26 : 7; 38 : 6.

And as the second person of the Trinity has been thus complicated with the serpent in Oriental imagery, so it has been to a great extent customary to unite the serpent with other distinguished characters who after death were honored as Heroes and Demi-gods, or mediatorial Spirits of an inferior grade. Thus they say that Cecrops (i. q. Cyclops, the sun,) was of a double nature, having the mixed form of a man and a dragon: and the same was true also of Erichthonius; the holy man Nun (or Noah, the same with Cecrops or Inachus,) is said by Lilius Gyraldus (Syntag, 1.) to have been born in the form of a serpent, and this was in a place named by Epiphanius Idal Baath. For it is well known that in all the heathen world there has been a settled opinion, from the earliest times, that the Deliverer of mankind should be born of a woman through the power of God; and hence every remarkable person became honored as either

that Deliverer himself, or some distinguished type of him, sent into the world in a similar manner with him. To this day the Grand Lama is regarded as an incarnation of him who is to be born of a Virgin. Virgil compliments the son of Pollio with the character of that God-Man under whose reign the golden age shall return. Dionysus or Bacchus (the same with Silenus in his human form) is born of Semele or Thyone, (named also Ino and Hermione,) as Apollo of Latona, or the Dioscuri of Leda, Mercury of Maia, Hercules of Alcmene, and Adonis of Myrrha; all of whom were born of mortal mothers, but they had one common father, the Creator of heaven and earth. For Cinyras, the father of Adonis or Tammuz, was Kiun Arez or Kiun Ur, the Lord of the sun, even as Adonis was the sun itself; so that Cinyras answers to Helios, in like manner as Adonis to Apollo, and both are the same with Hyperion and Phæton.

Nor, in tracing these resemblances and correspondencies between the Son of God and many personages in the heathen Pantheon, are we to be hindered by the fact that in the heathen world these gods and demi-gods were in part the paragons of all that is most lawless and loose; for, since heathenism was invented that men might enjoy unbounded license in sinning, we are to expect to find the very gods to be such as were raised to heaven for their crimes; and Paul asserts as much when he sums up the proofs of human depravity, in his Epistle to the Romans, by saying that though the whole world knew the transgressors of God's laws to be worthy of death, yet all continued to transgress, and had pleasure in such as were like themselves. Still the truth of God is not altered through their perverseness, but is illustrated the more by the lies of his foes. Light is only dimmed, not destroyed, when it is reflected from the surface of some noisome pool; nor is the body of the sun less real, or some grand figure seen in his light less perfect, because seen through some window of stained glass cut into many forms and mixed with artificial shapes no way homogeneous, or reflected from a thousand mirrors distorted, and various, and discolored to infinity. And though the Varros, and Scævolas, and Platos, and Tullys of the heathen world may have been unable to contemplate the original truth in its purity without effect from the perversions and distortions of an inextricable Mythology, yet the great lights of Judaism and Christianity are encumbered with no such difficulties; and among them there has ever been a well-settled persuasion that the fables of heathenism are based in religious rites and enigmas of a date far more ancient than the founding of Athens, Memphis, or Babylon, or even the building of the ark itself; and

through all their variations we see clearly shadowed forth the Son of God and his works. And, even as the Fathers of the church used those fables to shame the idolists of their times, so there have not been and will not be wanting in later times such as know how to use the same fables to the confutation and shame of such as slight the Divine Word, by showing that "the doctrine of Christ," though clearly exhibited in the church by her Scriptures alone, is yet witnessed and confirmed by the universal consent of mankind in all ages.

Thus the old Persians represent Ahriman as taking the form of a serpent to destroy, by his venom, the man-bull, the first head of our race, whence he corrupted the whole world, and rendered necessary the deluge to wash out the stains of evil, when another man-bull became a second head to the race. Pherecydes, of Syra, calls the serpent Ophioneus, and says he is the leader of those evil spirits who warred on Cronus and were cast down to Tartarus, there to dwell in mutual hatred forever. Here Cronus, or Saturn, is God; and, as God, is the Redeemer who vanquishes the Powers of Darkness; even as he is named "their first estate" by the apostle Jude, and for their rebellion against him, the rebel angels are reserved under chains of darkness against the judgment. The Persian Ahriman fought against Ormuzd and the fixed stars, with the intent to ruin the world, and was cast down to hell with all his associates. The Gothic Scalds sing how the Serpent was cast down to the bottom of the sea, but he grew to such a magnitude as to encircle the earth, and was slain by Thor, the first-born of God, and Mediator for men, who himself expired in the conflict.

The Mediator-God is also held to have been translated in his own body. Ganymede is borne to heaven upon the wings of Jove's own eagle, and sits as Aquarius, to pour from his cup the stream of life. The Hindoo Buddha is taken alive to heaven from the summit of Adam's Peak, in Ceylon, and Hesperus, the son of Atlas, ascends from the summit of his paternal mountain, and shines as the star of evening upon the verge of the western sky. Orpheus goes alive into the world of death to rescue his lost Eurydice, who was slain by a serpent, and returns again to the earth. Hercules also passes over the Styx and returns with the triple-headed dog—that is, with the dominion of the whole world as the Divine humanity glorified. They tell us that the lion was placed upon the celestial sphere to commemorate his first labor and victory over the Nemæan lion, while, in reality, the lion is of unknown date, and is probably the same with the man-lion of Oriental fables—that is, the Divine humanity; the same that the Hindoos will have as one

of the incarnations of their Vishnu, when he tore in pieces the tyrant and atheist, Hiranakaspu ; the same as he whose statues are found in the ruins of Nineveh ; the same, doubtless, with him whom Jacob named as the sign of Judah ; that gave the name Ariel, the Lion of God, to Jerusalem by the prophet Isaiah ; the same that in the Apocalypse is named the Lion of the tribe of Judah. Next to him, also, sits his virgin mother, formerly pictured as having in her hand two ears of corn, and among the Chinese Buddhists, as holding in her arms a child that bears a cross, while after her are poised the scales, that in later times have been called the Scales of Apollo, wherewith he weighs the actions of men in the spiritual world. In like manner the Eagle represents Hercules under figure of Me-rops (i. q. Mar. Ob, the Serpent-Lord), the father of Phæton, and the same with Helius, the father of Apollo. In that strange romance named the Second of Esdras, we have the Eagle to signify the empire of the Cæsars and the Popes, and the Son of God, as a fierce lion from the forest, roars upon her and she vanishes, while he shall stand up to judge the world. At the period of the flood Taurus led the signs of spring, and Leo coincided with the summer solstice. As this sign was that under which the family of the ark began to cultivate the ground (for they came out of the ark toward the end of May), so there is a special appropriateness in making it the sign of him who should be manifested as " the Son of God," and " the Lion of the tribe of Judah," under whose providence they had been brought out from the ruins of a former world to the possession of the new, in which he should be known as the " Head of the creation of God ;" and were confirmed in their possession of it by a special covenant, to which the showery bow sitting upon clouds opposite the sun remains a remarkable and perpetual witness ; whence also the heathen have their Iris to be the daughter of Thaumus or Thammuz, the " Secret" or the " Wonderful " of prophetic visions.

Having thus identified the person in whom all serpent-emblems centre, we may add also concerning his leading characteristics, that the heathen were not without some clear vaticinations of what is more fully revealed in the Scriptures. Plato knew of him as one whom men would not suffer long to live, but would put out his eyes, and hale him by violence to a disgraceful death. So in the Fables, we find him the son of a persecuted mother. Latona, pregnant of Jove with Apollo, is interdicted from all places where she may bear her immortal progeny till Delos, once floating at random, be fixed and raised above the sea-level. So Rhæo, when pregnant by Apollo, is driven from her father's house to wander over the world until she

bears Anius in the cave Eubœa ; a fable of the same import as the other, and the persons are the same. So Semele and others, pregnant by Jove, were persecuted by the jealousy of Juno ; and Hercules, when an infant, was beset with the force of two powerful serpents. Bacchus must be, when a child, exposed in an ark upon the waters, or hid of his father with his nurse Amalthea in the isle of Nysa, to save him from the fury of Rhea, or Juno. Myrrha, when about to bear Adonis, is doomed to death by her own father. Thus the heathen agree with our own sacred writers, who predict for the Son of God all the hatred of men and devils, and describe how he came into the world with a price set upon his head, and how he was born of a woman doomed by the laws of her country to a disgraceful death.

Then, though this Divine progeny possesses the right of governing the whole world, yet shall he not for a long time rule over the nations without active and potent foes to dispute with him the empire of the earth. Thus, in Virgil, they shall bring presents from the whole world to the cradle of the young God ; the serpent shall die, and all hurtful plants shall grow no longer. He shall see gods and heroes ; and when he grows up to the capacity of knowing good and evil, there shall still be frauds and hatreds, ships of war, and cities defended by walls. Another Argo shall bear heroes over the sea, and a second Achilles shall war upon a new Troy. But when he comes to full manhood, all things shall be changed, and the former state of the world return no more. There shall be no more any ships upon the sea laden with the merchandise of every clime ; for all lands shall bear common fruits without toil, as in the first ages of time under the rule of Ophion or Saturn, and all things shall be clad in beauty and filled with ineffable and never-ending joy. To the same effect our Messiah is sung by all his prophets as after his glorification sitting long upon his hill of Sion, "expecting until his enemies shall be made his footstool," while the "Mystery of iniquity," like another Babylon, rises and rules the earth to the wearing out of his saints through ages, until at last his foes are consumed by the sword of his mouth, and the earth is filled with peace and rejoicing under his undisputed rule forever.

Nor were the heathen at all ignorant of the moral conditions whereby man finds favor before the offended Majesty of heaven. Thus Longianus, in St. Augustine, says, "We are to approach the supreme God through the inferior gods, not without purifying rites." Thus the Gentiles and the Jews alike expected deliverance through a Mediatorial Power, and used purifying rites and expiations, that they might find peace according to

the conditions of that service ordained of God from the beginning of the world ; whose leading signs were always water and blood : the latter signifying the expiating of sin, the former by the blood of Christ, the purifying of the soul from the pollutions of sin, through the sanctification of the Spirit. Thus Æneas, in Virgil, sacrifices victims to the infernal gods, when about to enter the land of the dead, and sprinkles himself with running water at the portals of Elysium, when he comes to behold the countenances of the just. And, lest any in these days of lawless speculation should rail upon our doctrine of Christ crucified as a shred of the old heathenism, an apostle clearly affirms that Christ came "not by water only" (as they will have it), "but by water and blood." That is, the work of Christ is not only to wash away the filth and remove the ignorance of men, but also to expiate by his blood the guilt of our offences before the justice of the Father, that "God may be just and the justifier of them that believe."

And what, in general, the mediation of dæmons among the heathen really implied we are told by Plato in his book *De Legibus*, when he says they are placed in the midst between God and man to be the bearers of sacrifices and the prayers of men to the gods, and also of all good gifts and benefits from God to men, including a right interpretation of his mind, and will, and precepts for the direction of life ; so that by their means there is kept up a friendly correspondence and communion between men and God that were otherwise impossible ; and these demons he will have to be (*συνάρχοντες*) co-rulers with the Supreme God. Also that some influence from without man is necessary to lead him to the practice of virtue is evidently taught by Socrates, in Plato, when he makes human corruption natural (*κατὰ φύσιν*) from our origin, and denies that virtue is by nature, or teachable, whence it must come by Divine inspiration, and needs not the concurrence of man in those that receive it. And Plato again says that the original divine nature prevalent in the golden age became afterward so tempered with the mortal part of man as to lose its control, and be given up to the lusts of the flesh, whereby all has been debauched and ruined. He makes man fall into a state of emptiness and inhumanity, and from the divine first estate into that of atheism ; even as Paul also tells the Ephesians that men are by nature (*ἀθέοι*) godless. He also compares the soul at first to a winged chariot, that once moved at will through heaven and earth ; but now, being confined with the body, it has lost its wings, and is retained as a prisoner under the tyranny of unlawful lusts. Again, in *Timæus* Locrus, he affirms that we follow in the way of our first parents, and that

the cause of our depravity is rather to be sought in them than in ourselves; adding, that we are in a state of death, and the body is but our sepulchre.

And since we have already seen that the Mythological fictions of the heathen contain evident and numerous marks of a Divine Redeemer, the God-Man (Σωτὴρ πᾶντος), who is also the second person of the trinity under all known forms, so we shall find in Plato most evident glimpses of the covenant of grace by the trinity, whereby man can be restored to his lost holiness and bliss. For in one of his Epistles he says, "Let there be a compact framed with an oath witnessing by the God of all things, the Ruler of things present and future, and the Father of that Ruler and Cause, whom, according to our philosophy, we make to be the true being, and may all clearly know, so far as is possible, to favored man." Hence we may perceive by what means man is to escape from this miserable state, according to Plato, when he will have us to conform to the Divine nature and let grow again the golden wings of virtue and truth; for which escape we have in ourselves no power, but all our sufficiency is from above. And though there may have been to the heathen a most painful uncertainty in regard to the way by which we are to gain complete exemption from all our ills, yet this could never at all restrain them from the persuasion that we may so escape; and we have Plato saying again, that though justice and temperance and other virtues may have but little splendor in our present state, yet in the life to come we shall behold the beautiful in its perfection: neither could he find reason to question the actual indwelling in man of the Divinity (ἐν δαίμονα); which indwelling he makes the only condition of true and rational liberty.

Thus far we have traced the vestiges of a Redeemer among the heathen, with occasional note how they symbolize with the views taught concerning him in the Scriptures. But when we come to the Scriptures themselves, we shall be able to show with still greater clearness what was the most ancient faith of men in the Messiah, and how that doctrine of him which was known to the first men received its true development from age to age until he came in the flesh, and, after suffering death for our sins, ascended up to heaven to sit as "head over all things," and to make all things "work together for good to those that love him." We shall thus ascend to an age far higher than the origin of the oldest fables, and trace by their side the views of such as in their own times were led by the Divine inspiration into all the truth it has pleased God to reveal.

When man, driven out of Paradise, beheld far off the light of that flaming sword wherewith the cherubim turned in per-

petual circle about the tree of life, then, too, sounded in his ears the promise of the old serpent's bruise through "the seed of a woman." Sabbath by Sabbath, before the place where God had revealed the sight of his glory as a devouring fire, arose the smoke of a sin-offering, that by its sacred shade should render the Shechinah more tolerable to mortal eyes. And when atheist Cain refused the holocaust of fed beasts, and placed instead upon the consecrated turf a thank-offering of fruits and flowers, the Majesty of heaven disdained not to argue with inexcusable man, and show with what offering he should own the guilt of his soul and man's only hope of a true expiation for sin before God. "A sin-offering lies couched before thy door; he comes willingly to thee, and by him shalt thou prevail." Cain preferred to slay his own brother, and leave uncelebrated the sacrifice that should have humbled his rebellious heart; and he went away trembling before the Divine wrath to raise up a nation without God and without a Redeemer, bound by their own perverseness to worship the stars and the spheres, until the incensed arm of the Almighty rolled the waters of a flood over the earth for their destruction.

And when the family of the Ark descended from the Armenian summits to take possession of the new world, then also went up the smoke of the fat of lambs as a sweet-smelling savor before God, and he was pleased to make the rainbow to sit upon a watery cloud, to be the sign of a covenant of peace. Thus near the sacred mount of that first paradise, and in sight of that same ineffable glory whence he had conversed with man through sixteen hundred years, and whence they saw his young servant ascend the heavens, we have again the sight of the Son, first instructing Noah how to build an ark "for the saving of his house;" and then renewing to man his covenant, whereby, as the adopted Son of God, he might obtain right to inherit the forfeited earth, and expect in his own race through the line of Shem to receive the Divine humanity manifested fully to the sight of all nations. With a single step, also, he reaches the plain of Shinar to smite that impious race gathered in defiance of his laws; and with one stroke cleaves alike their temple to its base and their infidel speech to its roots; whence they are scattered at large over the earth.

But scarce has the dust cleared away from the rifted bricks of Babel, and the lawless rabble of Nimrod, half alive, have gone hence to found Nineveh upon a safer shore, when we find the same visible Deity once more communing with Abram concerning his departure for a distant land, where his altars shall smoke with accepted victims, and the son of his old age shall be redeemed by the sacrifice of a ram whole in the flames,

as a figure of him that in the end of the world shall take away sin by the offering up of himself. Again he touches the shores of the sea, and the cities of the plain go up in smoke and ashes, when his angels have led away just Lot from among the ungodly, as a sign that God "knows how to deliver the godly out of temptation, and to reserve the unjust to the day of judgment to be punished." Then hearing the cry of the fugitive Egyptian, he descends to deliver her son from death, and to make of him the father of twelve princes and a great nation; or, no less attentive to the anguish of Bethuel's daughter, assigns the lot of her twin progeny among the nations of the earth, and afterward comes in the smoke of the fat of lambs to counsel her husband in times of distress. And when her younger son has fled from the presence of his incensed brother, and lies stretched upon the bare earth beneath the open sky in the field of Luz, then, too, he lets down the steps of light whereon his angels move up and down to tend the affairs of men and himself, as in the mount of paradise, stands visible above, nor suffers the terrible Ophanim once to raise their thunderous wings beside the living wheels, until he can renew with the fugitive the covenant of peace, that of his race may spring the long ranks of prophets, priests, and kings that shall herald the advent and rejoice in the glory of Messiah, their antetype, who, with his apostles and martyrs, shall prevail over the refractory powers of the world and subdue all things to the obedience of faith. Then taking a human form, he wrestles with the patriarch, and consoles him against his fears of the fierce array of Esau, coming to plunder all his dear-bought wealth and slay his whole race with the sword; or coming in the shape of a fugitive dream, he forbids the madness of the pursuing Syrian; and afterward affords his servant a long rest upon the consecrated ground of Bethel, and renews with him his covenant of peace, that assures the blessing of all nations upon his race through ages.

Then disturbing with mysterious dreams the sleep of an Egyptian king, he makes way for the captive son of Rachel to be lifted from stocks and a dungeon to distribute bread to nations, and afford the afflicted Hebrews a place and rest where they may grow up to a nation that shall move the jealousy of future kings. Then standing by for a brief period, like the intermission of sleep to men, again "he touches the hills and they smoke." The adopted son of Pharaoh's daughter, now long time a fugitive, stands awe-struck before the sight of his glory among the trees of Horeb, and receives from the lips of Israel's Redeemer his commission that turns waters into blood, and with the force of ten supernatural plagues renders famous

among gods the deities of Egypt; until they come to the open sea, and gather in Sinai to hear from amid intolerable darkness the thunders of his law.

Or turn we aside to the quiet vales of Uz, where the malice of man's great Accuser prevails to lay upon Job insufferable griefs; there, too, we shall find the knowledge of the same Divine Humanity no less clear, as the "Daysman" that can lay his hand upon both God and man for their reconciliation; "the Messenger," the Interpreter, one of a thousand" that can stand up to show unto man his uprightness, and say of him, "Preserve him from going down to the pit, for I have found a ransom;" as "God" the "Redeemer" that "shall stand at the latter day upon the earth" to raise the dead, and afford his faithful servants the reward of the beatific vision and a never-ending life. Here, too, the just man, sitting in dust and amid the ashes of his once hospitable hearth, learns to suffer in silence and abhor himself; when he is appointed intercessor for his accusers, and commanded to offer for the sign of their expiation the carcasses of rams and bulls whole in the flames, that they, too, may find a forgiving God where they have sought a God who rewards every man in this worldly life according to his works, and be themselves absolved from receiving in their own bodies that recompense which was due to their error who had made God to rule the world in righteousness without the temperament of mercy, and without any true recognition of that Almighty Deliverer, with whom his most chosen saints are often they that suffer deepest through the inconstancy of the world and the malice of hell, that they, too, at length may the more rejoice when they come to reign with him, and receive in their own bodies the never-ending and ineffable delights he has prepared for them that love him.

But God comes from Sinai, where he has communed face to face with Moses amid the thick darkness, and leads the chosen race to the borders of their promised land. Here he sends anew his Holy Spirit upon Moses, that he may sing the mercoies with the judgments of God upon them, and prepare to die as becomes the head of a state destined to long renown, and at length to give place unto another when Shiloh shall come, and gather to himself all nations. And when the sons of Israel are come to the banks of Jordan, there again the same filial Godhead sits above the face of the waters, that they may part before the steps of his priests and the ark of his covenant; or with drawn sword stands visibly nigh the walls of Jericho; those devoted walls that shall so soon be broken down without hands.

But there is almost no end if we will proceed to enumerate the Theophanies of the Old Testament times, that an apostle

declares to have been but so many appearances of the Son of God to men before his advent in the flesh ; until at length " the seed of woman " comes heralded by angels, and preserved by miracles ; and the perfected church, as " the pillar and ground of the faith," bears upon her front and her sides the whole " mystery of Godliness " in this inscription, " GOD MANIFESTED IN THE FLESH, JUSTIFIED IN THE SPIRIT, SEEN OF ANGELS, PREACHED UNTO THE GENTILES, BELIEVED ON IN THE WORLD, RECEIVED UP INTO GLORY."

ARTICLE IX.

LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES OF BOOKS.

BY THE EDITOR.

1. *The Life of John Calvin. Compiled from Authentic Sources, and particularly from his Correspondence.* By THOMAS H. DYER. 12mo. pp. 458. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

THIS Life of Calvin has an interest and a use beyond its real merits. It views him from a new point of observation ; the author, manifestly, had no partialities to conciliate ; no doctrinal affinities to enlist his sympathies or sway his judgment ; no appreciation of the times in which the Reformer lived to influence the verdict rendered or mitigate the severity of the sentence. It is written, also, with no little ability. Its materials are abundant and well arranged ; its style vigorous and pleasing ; and it wears the air of philosophical impartiality and great candor. And those who hate Calvinism, will pronounce it unanswerable in its conclusions. And yet, in our judgment, it is about as unfair, uncandid, and one-sided a life of Calvin, as could well be written by one not openly hostile to him. A little examination shows that Mr. Dyer is bent on *making out a case*. Beneath the surface of these calm, philosophic pages, there is a strong under-current of prejudice, if not of secret hostility, palpably manifest. In spite of himself, the author's personal views and feelings color many of the most important facts which he has woven into his narrative. He seeks throughout to make as *dark* a history as the facts can possibly be tortured to sanction. For instance, in every case of *doubt*, where the authorities conflict, instead of giving Calvin the advantage of it, and putting the most *favorable* construction which is reasonably admissible (which not only a manly, Christian charity demands, but pure right itself), he puts the *worst* construction possible upon his conduct. (See pp. 33, 109, 127, 158, 185, and his account of the trial and burning of Servetus, as specimens.) There is neither fairness nor justice in such a course. No man's reputation is safe if such principles prevail. They would disgrace any law court.

He gives a long and laborious history of the case of Servetus, and spares no pains to throw the main part of the blame of his death upon Calvin. And this part of his work is specially unfair and unsatisfactory. He does not in the least appreciate Calvin's position in Geneva at the time, nor the political aspect of the question ; he takes no notice of an important fact which M. Rilliet, though by no means sympathizing with Calvin's theology, has brought to light, or at least shown in its important bearings, viz. : " That the heresy of Servetus had assumed, in the eyes of the Council of Geneva, the two-fold character of blasphemy and *sedition* ;" that with the council it was no longer

a question of dogmatic theology, but of the gravest political moment also; that the position of Servetus, if he were set at liberty, and permitted to combine with the Libertines, who, for their own purposes, had exchanged signals with him during his trial, and given him their counsel and assistance, was such as to insure, in all probability, the overthrow of the Reformation, and revolutionize the Republic.¹ He holds Calvin mainly responsible for the death of the arch-heretic; represents him as actuated by personal and malignant hostility; charges him as the means of his previous arrest at Vienne, and as cherishing for "seven years the purpose of putting him to death;" slurs over the unquestioned fact that Calvin exerted himself to mitigate the sentence; and does not hesitate to question the Reformer's own calm and solemn averment in the case.

Henry's and Beza's life of the great Reformer may be too partial and eulogistic, and Rilliet's imperfect; but Dyer's, in spite of its pretensions, is too unfair and prejudiced to be worthy of confidence, and can never be received with favor by those who revere the memory of John Calvin.

2. *The History of the United States of America, from the Discovery of the Continent, to the Organization of Government under the Federal Constitution.* By RICHARD HILDRETH. In three volumes. Vol. III. 8vo. pp. 592. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

The first two volumes of this elaborate and voluminous work cover the period of our colonial history, and were noticed by us in the *Biblical Repository* for Oct., 1849. The third and last volume is occupied with our revolutionary period, and brings the history down to the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution. It contains, also, a long list of Authorities consulted, and a complete Analytical Index.

We see no reason to change the opinion we have already expressed of the merits of this History. We doubt not it will come in time to be considered as the *standard* history of our colonial and revolutionary existence. For minuteness and fullness of detail, for accuracy of statement and general impartiality, for convenience of arrangement and typographical appearance, it has not its equal. It is all *history*; there is no fancy or romance about it; no philosophy in it; no rhetorical display: it is a clear, straightforward, impartial, concise record of the facts which constitute the early history of our nation. It is a work, not to captivate, but to instruct; not to read for entertainment, but to have at hand for constant reference. No library can be perfect without it. We congratulate the author and the publishers on the completion of so valuable a history.

3. *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Thomas Chalmers, D.D. LL.D.* By his Son-in-law, the Rev. WILLIAM HANNA, LL.D. In three volumes. Vol. I. 12mo. pp. 514. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

This volume embraces the period of Chalmers' growth, and of his preparation for the conspicuous and extended sphere which he afterward filled. His early life—his college course—his settlement and ministry at Kilmany—his bold conflict with the professors at St. Andrew's—his devotion to mathematical studies—his aversion to the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel—his remarkable conversion—his marriage—his early publications—and his farewell of his rural charge, and peaceful retreat, where twelve years of his life were spent, for the Tron Church of Glasgow,—are here narrated, vividly and most faithfully, and mainly in Chalmers' own language. Dr. Hanna has certainly executed the delicate task, thus far, with a taste and judgment deserving all praise.

We need not say that this is no *ordinary* memoir in point of interest. It

¹ See a very lucid and able article on Calvin and Servetus, in the *British Quarterly*, London, for May, 1849, in which this vexed question is calmly and impartially discussed, and a very different conclusion arrived at as to Calvin's share in the guilt.

gives us Chalmers as he was in his training—in his early ambition and struggles—in his ministry, without an experimental knowledge of Christ—in private and in social life—and as he was after his change; the portrait is a striking one, and rigidly faithful. Many of his admirers will wish that certain portions had been left out—that his early faults and errors (and they were many and great) had been concealed or glossed over—but we are glad that the whole story has been told. The contrast which the memorable change of 1810 produced is the greater for it. The rival mathematical lecturer of St. Andrew's, the ease-taking literary pastor of Kilmany, and the ambitious aspirant after literary honor and preferment, has little in common, in a spiritual point of view, with the incessant and spiritually powerful preacher of Glasgow, and the luminous and transcendently able professor of Theology. We earnestly commend these memoirs to the attention of all, and especially to the study of the younger portion of the ministry; and we doubt not that the work will have a more extensive sale than any similar work which has appeared in this generation.

4. *Posthumous Works of the Rev. Thomas Chalmers, D.D., LL.D.*
Vol. IX. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

This will be regarded as, in some respects, the most valuable of this great man's productions; it is a worthy companion of his "Institutes of Theology." It contains two introductory lectures on the use of text-books in theological education, and advice to students on the conduct and prosecution of their studies; seventeen on Butler's Analogy, of whom he remarks in the preface to his *Bridgewater Treatise*, "I have derived greater aid from the views and reasonings of Bishop Butler, than I have been able to find besides in the whole range of our existent authorship;" ten on Paley's *Evidences of Christianity*, of which he says, "On the whole, however, it is the best text-book I know of for a theological class on the subject of the Christian Evidences;" forty-nine on Hill's *Lectures in Divinity*; and four Addresses delivered as principal of the new College, Edinburgh, at the opening of the classes, in 1843, '44, '45 and '46. Those lectures are mostly very brief—mere notes or fragments of thought on the topics chosen; still, they are valuable, many of them peculiarly so—as furnishing Dr. Chalmers' most deliberate and matured opinions, convictions, and reasonings on a great variety of subjects, connected chiefly with the evidences of natural and revealed religion. His lectures on Butler's Analogy are especially good: they are discriminating, abound with just and able criticisms on its defects, and make a happy use of the analogical argument therein indicated, to the establishment and elucidation of the truths of religion.

5. *The Annals of the English Bible.* By CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON.
Abridged and continued by SAMUEL IRENÆUS PRIME, *Secretary of the American Bible Society.* 8vo. 549 pp. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1849.

It is a little surprising that no work in this line has appeared till this late day. It was an unoccupied and inviting field; the author has gathered a great mass of materials, many of them rich and valuable, and woven them into a connected history of the English Bible, from the earliest translation to the present time. It embraces a rapid survey of the state of the world preceding the printing of the Scriptures in the English tongue—a brief notice of Wicliffe's version and its effects—a full history of the noble and martyred Tyndale's translation, its various editions, its introduction into England and other European countries, and the persecutions of the civil and ecclesiastical powers, etc., connected with it—an account of Coverdale's version and its temporary success—a history of Cranmer's Bible and its reception—and a full history of our present version, from the time of James downward, and of the circulation of the Scriptures in England, Scotland, America, and wherever the English language is spoken—embracing the modern glorious movement to give universal circulation to the sacred volume. The Providential history of the Bible as here given, is certainly a very mark-

ed and instructive one. How many noble men, of blessed memory, have toiled and bled to give us the Scriptures in our mother tongue! How many kings and dignitaries, from the Pope downward, have warred against the effort to furnish the Bible to the common people; and yet how God has baffled and overruled their opposition, so that his Word might grow and multiply! How many benighted sinners have read and loved the *English Bible*; and how many more will, in coming ages of the world! What has the English Bible done for England and America!

Mr. Prime has not only abridged the original English work, but added a summary of what has been done in this country for the circulation of the Holy Scriptures.

6. *The Memoirs of the late Hannah L. Murray.* By GARDINER SPRING, *Pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church, New York.* 8vo. pp. 312. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1849.

Whoever takes up this volume will read it through, and wish there were more such memoirs. Miss Murray was a woman in every way superior. Blessed with wealth, of a peculiarly happy natural disposition, possessing high intellectual endowments, a highly cultivated taste, great versatility of genius, and most attractive social qualities—a poet of no mean power—"the admiration of many a circle of fashion and splendor,"—a meek, humble-minded, consistent, active Christian—an energetic, all-contriving and eminently useful leader in every benevolent enterprise—the loved of all and the enemy of none,—we are not surprised at the language of her biographer and long-loved pastor,—“her life, her unobtrusive counsel, her Christian sympathy, were among his greatest joys; her death was among his greatest griefs.” Such a character deserved so beautiful a tribute. May thousands read it, to aspire after her loveliness and worth, and to copy her bright example—

“The cross my all,
My theme, my inspiration, and my crown.”

7. *Expository Lectures on the Epistle to the Ephesians.* By the Rev. ROBERT J. M'GHEE. 8vo. pp. 640. New York: Carter & Brothers. 1849.

We are glad to see this English work reproduced here, and in so attractive a form. It is a rich and instructive exposition of one of the most comprehensive epistles of the New Testament. It is not designed or offered as a formal commentary on Ephesians, but rather as a plain, unadorned, familiar, and practical exposition of it. The author adheres with the closest simplicity to the letter of the text, and seeks to develop its true meaning, and give it a wise and faithful application. It embraces fifty-two lectures, each founded upon one or more verses of the text. They are eminently Scriptural in their character; are generally able and always sound; are pervaded with the spirit of piety and Christian love; and are often searching in their analysis and powerful in their appeals. It is an admirable book for the preacher to read and study, and equally for the private Christian. The Carters deserve the thanks and patronage of the Christian community for bringing out so many good books. All their publications are superior, safe, and worthy of a place in the library of every minister, and every Christian.

8. *Elements of Natural Philosophy; designed as a Text-book for Academies, High Schools, and Colleges.* By ALONZO GRAY, A.M., Professor in Brooklyn Female Academy. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

The author has had much experience in teaching, and therefore knows the kind of text-book needed on this subject. This book is the fruit of mature experience, and careful and thorough preparation. It is designed as a medium between the larger works and those generally used in our academies and col-

leges. The main features of the work are—the addition of much valuable science not found in ordinary text-books, an analysis of each section in the form of propositions, the introduction of examples in the form of problems to render each principle familiar, and each branch of the subject is very fully illustrated by diagrams and representations of the apparatus for experimental illustration. It is remarkably clear and concise in its arrangement and execution, and is altogether the best text-book on natural philosophy we know of for our primary schools.

9. *The Provincial Letters of Blaise Pascal. A new translation, with Historical Introduction and Notes.* By the Rev. THOMAS M'CRIE, Edinburgh. 12mo. pp. 392. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1849.

Bayle commences his life of Pascal by declaring him to be "one of the sublimest geniuses that ever lived." The character and fame of the Provincials would seem to make good his declaration. The work has justly acquired a world-wide reputation; and nothing ever yet produced on the prolific subject of the Papal controversy, begins to equal it in point of logical acuteness, keen satire, subtle analysis, deadly thrusts, and irresistible effect. No man, even at this day, can read these Letters and wonder at the prodigious effect which they produced at their first appearance, in unmasking the real principles and character of the Jesuits, and overwhelming them with chagrin and defeat. Their extensive circulation, now that this wonderful order is again restored, and is rising into power throughout the Catholic world, and making headway in this country even, is loudly called for. It is the best weapon with which we can arm ourselves for their defeat and final overthrow. We are glad to see so good an English translation of the work, and hope it will speedily find its way into tens of thousands of families, which it would do, if the mass of our people knew its merits, and the designs of the Jesuits upon our liberties, and upon all that is dear to the Protestant and the Puritan.

10. *The Young Man's Closet Library.* By Rev. ROBERT PHILIP, of Maberly Chapel. *With an Introductory Essay,* by Rev. ALBERT BARNES. Third edition. 12mo. pp. 347. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1849.

The writings of Mr. Philip are among the very best of the kind which exist, and they have been received with special marks of favor by the religious community in Great Britain and in this country. His writings are full of strong, manly, original thought. His style is clear, concise, pointed, nervous. The extensive circulation of such works speaks well for the rising generation, and is highly auspicious to the cause of pure and devoted piety.

The arrangement of the author's thoughts is striking: we have "Manly Piety in its Principles, Manly Piety in its Spirit, and Manly Piety in its Realization." And under each of these divisions the subject-matter appropriate to it is strikingly arranged, and most happily and ably treated.

11. *History of the Puritans in England and the Pilgrim Fathers.* 12mo. pp. 508. London: Thomas Nelson. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers.

The History of the Puritans is by Professor Stowell, of Rotherham College and that of the Pilgrim Fathers by D. Wilson, author of *Cromwell* and the Protectorate, both of which are here given in one large and neat volume. The former "is designed to compress within narrow limits the story of the English Puritans, by weaving into the tissue of the general narrative some biographical details respecting the men who bore that name." The history embraces all the leading Puritans; it is authentic, and generally impartial. He seeks not to exaggerate their virtues, or load them with excessive praise, and make them out heroes, but simply to do justice to their memory. It is a good service that he

has done, and he has done it well. The book embodies a vast amount of historical knowledge respecting some of the most remarkable men the world has known. This history occupies about two-thirds of the volume.

We cannot say much of the history of the Pilgrim Fathers, excepting that it profoundly appreciates their character and services. It is altogether inferior to many of our own—little more, indeed, than a hasty and popular narrative. It adds nothing to the value of the book to the American reader, though doubtless it does to the trans-Atlantic.

12. *A Memoir of Lady Colquhoun.* By JAMES HAMILTON, D.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1850.

This is one of the most interesting and edifying memoirs we have read in many a day. It is refreshing to the soul, and elevating to the mind, to come in contact with the spirit, life, and thoughts of one so intellectually superior, so eminent for piety of the most happy and inviting stamp, and so active and generous in benevolent labors for the souls of men. Lady Colquhoun was a Scottish lady of rank and rare accomplishments, who long adorned the Christian profession in the most brilliant circles, preserving her integrity, her simplicity of character, her love and devotion to Christ, and growing in grace amidst all the temptations and hinderances of high life. She presents a noble specimen of womanly character, and a beautiful exemplification of the Christian religion. Dr. Hamilton has performed the delicate service exacted of him with admirable taste and judgment. May the beautiful narrative which he has given us be blessed to the reproduction of many characters equally pure and lovely.

13. *Memoirs of David Hale, with Selections from his Miscellaneous Writings.* By JOSEPH P. THOMPSON. New York and London: John Wiley. 1850.

DAVID HALE was no ordinary man. His labors in connection with the Journal of Commerce were abundant and eminently useful. His influence in this sphere was wide-spread and beneficial. His pure example, straightforward course, and lofty principles of aim and action, administer a wholesome rebuke to the spirit and maxims too prevalent in the commercial world, and ought to be well weighed by every man who would build up for himself an enduring prosperity. As the able Editor of a leading commercial paper, governing his life and course by the principles of a stern and unyielding Christian integrity, we revere and honor his memory. In this sphere, he belongs to no party or sect, in church or state, but to the great brotherhood of man and of Christians, battling manfully for all that is holy in principle and pure in life.

Viewed ecclesiastically, however, Mr. Hale must be judged by another standard; and very different opinions will be formed, even among good men, in regard to the wisdom of his course, and the fruits of his beneficence and labor. None will deny his right to the free and full exercise of his own opinions and preferences as to church polity; but many think, and not without reason, that he went farther than Christian charity and expediency justify, in magnifying the differences between Congregationalism and Presbyterianism, and in efforts to gain over individuals and churches to his way of thinking on this subject. Greatly do we deprecate the work of disturbing the friendly and mutually beneficial relations which have so long bound these sister churches together, and we would not have a hand in it for all the mines of California.

And this is our only objection to the labors of his estimable biographer. His sympathy with this aspect of Mr. Hale's character, we think is a little too decided and apparent. We see the wish betrayed in more ways than one to use the occasion to subserve and advance other ends than the simple one which the biography of such a man ought to seek. We say this in all kindness, and on other grounds than our personal Presbyterian views. It robs this memoir of very much of its power to do good. It confines its influence to a very narrow sphere. It will make thousands of ministers and churches distrust it, as adapted

to engender strife. It does not hold up DAVID HALE, in this respect, in his own high-minded, comprehensive, and catholic elements of character, for the study and profit of the present and coming ages, but narrows him down into a sectary, and takes away all that is immortal in his name and writings.

14. *The History of William the Conqueror.* By JACOB ABBOTT. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

Another still of Abbott's popular and useful histories. It is similar in character, and equal in interest to the previous numbers of the series. He gives anything but a favorable character, on the whole, to the great Norman Conqueror.

15. *Dark Scenes of History.* G. P. R. JAMES, Esq. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

This is really a book to interest and instruct, sent forth without a preface or even a table of contents. It is a series of historical sketches, the principal of which are—The last days of the Templars, Perkin Warbeck, the Albigenses, the Conspiracy of Cueva, Wallenstein, and Herod the Great. They are truly dark and harrowing tales; yet the author has adhered strictly to the facts of history. We see nothing in the book to censure, but much to commend. The sketch of the Albigenses is specially attractive and valuable.

16. *Memoir of the Life of Rev. James Milnor, D.D., late Rector of St. George's Church, New York, abridged by the Author, Rev. Dr. STONE.* American Tract Society. pp. 549. 12mo.

We are informed that five thousand copies of the elegant octavo edition of this work have been already sold, and we doubt not, in its present form, it will be issued by tens of thousands. Certain passages, referring to Dr. Milnor's political and ecclesiastical relations, and other portions which were justly obnoxious to many in non-Episcopal communions, are omitted; but all the prominent facts remain; all that could interest, edify, and bless the church at large. Few memoirs are more charming than these; few will be more extensively read. They will find their way into thousands of circles in which Christ is little known or honored—in which the memoirs of holy living and pious labors seldom find their way, and exhibit religion there to the ignorant and unbelieving in a winning and impressive manner.

17. *The Apocalypse Interpreted in the Light of "The Day of the Lord."* By Rev. JAMES KELLY, Author of Lectures on Prophecy, &c. Vol. I. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1849.

"The day of the Lord" in Rev. 1:10, according to this author, denotes not the weekly recurring season for Christian worship, but refers "to the great crisis of the world yet future;" in other words, to the personal reign of Christ on the earth. And the whole of Revelation is interpreted in the light of this single thought. Thus, John's vision of the seven churches of Asia are not "to be contemplated *historically*, and as relating to churches constituted after the present Gentile pattern. Strict interpretation, I repeat, requires us to treat them *prophetically*, and in reference to Jewish gatherings;" i. e., the seven churches of Asia are still among the things that are *to be*; they were not living churches, which the seer of Patmos addressed, made up of Gentile converts, and founded after the apostolic pattern; they existed only in prophecy, and the prophecy relates to converted Jews under the personal reign of Christ! This, too, from a *literalist*! And this fanciful, far-fetched, unnatural interpretation made the chief foundation of this entire work on the Apocalypse! The superstructure built upon such a foundation we believe to be a work of folly, and utterly worthless, however ingenious and imposing. And yet there are many good things in the book. The author is a scholar and a Christian minister of no mean repute. The book is in the form of an exposition or commentary, and the first volume embraces the first seven chapters of the Apocalypse.

18. *The Second Advent; or, What do the Scriptures teach respecting the Second Coming of Christ, the End of the World, the Resurrection of the Dead, and the General Judgment?* By ALPHEUS CROSBY. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1850.

Professor Crosby's defection from the truth was known some months since. This book is put forth specially to vindicate his new views. But it cannot fail to disappoint his friends, and certainly will not convince any who consider him essentially unsound in the faith. We admire the style, the spirit, the logical arrangement of his book; but in argument, as to the point at issue, he totally and singularly fails. Several of his six propositions are believed by all Christians; we have no dispute with him here. The whole argument turns on a single point: Are the Scriptures which declare the Second Coming of Christ, the End of the World, the Resurrection of the Dead, and the General Judgment, to be explained in a FIGURATIVE or a LITERAL sense? These items are embraced in the 5th and 6th propositions. Prof. Crosby says they are to be explained in a *figurative* or spiritual sense, and "must have already taken place." But he gives us not even the *form* of an argument to support such an opinion—an opinion, too, which sweeps away at a dash the profoundest realities of Christian revelation, and runs counter to the received opinions of the entire Christian world: will you believe it, reader, not even an *attempt* at an argument—not so much as *one* text of Scripture, when the argument professes to be from the Scriptures alone! What does it mean? Really we are at a loss to know. The book is certainly harmless. Universalists, if they are wise, will not be over-anxious to circulate it.

19. *A Copious and Critical English-Latin Lexicon. Founded on the German-Latin Dictionary of Dr. Charles Ernest Georges, by the Rev. J. E. Riddle and Thomas Kerchever Arnold. Revised, and containing a Dictionary of Proper Names.* By CHARLES ANTHON, LL.D. Harper & Brothers. pp. 754. 8vo. 1850.

The facility which the access to a work of such completeness and accuracy as this affords, we trust will promote the use of translations from English into Latin, as a part of educational discipline. It has been greatly neglected in our schools, partly for reasons which this volume will remove—the want of adequate lexical helps, and much to the pupil's disadvantage. There is no method by which a radical knowledge of the structure, idioms, and philosophy of a language can be more rapidly and accurately acquired; and it appears to us as one of the encouraging aspects of our educational history, that with the best teachers, and in the highest grade of preparatory schools, this important feature begins to be more highly prized. The world of teachers and learners are under great obligations to the Harpers for an edition so beautiful and so accurate of a work that will make the business of translating not only possible, but agreeable.

The work itself is one of masterly scholarship and skill. In presenting the Latin equivalents, it traces the historical development and changes which these words have undergone, and puts the student in possession of the nicest shades of meaning, and gives him at the same time the history of the word through all the different eras of Latin authorship. In addition to this, the editors have carefully detected and presented the peculiarities and *usus loquendi* of all the principal authors, and so classified them that the true use of a word, in its relations, can be ascertained. The labor and the comprehensive scholarship which such an examination of the whole range of Latin literature must involve, can be readily imagined. It is very safe to say that a more creditable specimen of lexicography—as great as have been the improvements made of late years in this department of study—has not yet been presented to the world, and the skill and beauty of the typography are especially to be admired. The various divisions and distinctions which the authors desired to introduce, are des-

ignated by such typographical indications, that the eye meets them at once and without confusion. Consummate accuracy has also been apparently attained, as well as a truly elegant execution.

Prof. Anthon has superintended the issue of the work—a pledge of its scholarly accuracy—and has added a dictionary of Proper Names, derived from the best sources, and completing the idea of the learned English editors.

20. *John Howard and the Prison-World of Europe. From Original and Authentic Documents.* By HEPWORTH DIXON. *With an Introductory Essay, by R. W. DICKINSON, D.D.* 12mo. pp. 501. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1850.

Howard has had several biographers, not one of which can be said to have executed the task satisfactorily. Aiken had no sympathy with the religious aspect of his character. Brown, though abundant and judicious in his materials, is exceedingly dull. Taylor is insipid and intolerable; and Mr. Dixon, whose work is before us, is singularly faulty. He has none of the simplicity and modesty of the grand and simple character which he portrays. He is wholly unqualified for such a task. He has a false idea of a biographer's duty; he has no correct taste, and no discrimination; he strains every point, and over-colors the picture; his personal vanity and conceit are boundless; his style stilted, and often sickening. The Preface is too bad to criticise. Nor has he added anything to the common stock of materials, though he professes to write from original documents. Howard needs still a biographer. And yet the commanding interest of the subject will make this a popular book. Dr. Dickinson's Introduction is judicious and valuable. A recent number of "Blackwood" contains an able article on Howard, in which Mr. Dixon's work is severely criticised.

21. *The Complaint; or Night Thoughts on Life, Death, and Immortality.* By EDWARD YOUNG, LL.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1850.

It were superfluous to say a word in praise of Young's Night Thoughts. No one is a stranger to their fame, and few persons of any literary taste or pretension have not read and admired the immortal production. It is only necessary to say that the Carters have issued an elegant, and by far the most finished edition of Young that we remember to have seen, and offer it at a very reasonable price.

22. *Sketches of Minnesota, the New England of the West. With a Map.* By E. S. SEYMOUR. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

A readable book, and what is better, full of information relative to this new Territory, which has sprung up like a mushroom of the night. The author gives a very graphic and intelligent description of its natural features and resources, and the progress of its settlement to the beginning of the present year, together with the history of the early discoveries connected with that immense region. The book is an admirable guide to any who may wish to emigrate, and is accompanied by an accurate and useful map.

23. *The Kingdom of God: A Discourse preached before the Synod of New Jersey, Oct., 1849.* By C. K. IMBRIE, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Rahwao, N. J. New York: Franklin Knight. 1850.

Mr. Imbrie is a millenarian, and maintains these views in this little book. We agree with the worthy author, that to "those who have studied the point, the discourse will offer nothing new." He first states some points on which we are all agreed; next, some points on which we are at issue; and finally, on

what points of difference it is desirable that critical skill and ministerial study should be brought to bear; with lengthy notes replying to objections. He urges his views with great earnestness and considerable ability; but for our part, we totally dissent from his conclusions. We have not yet met with a second advent writer whose peculiar views could not be refuted by his own chosen and favorite principle of exegesis.

24. *The Divine Law of Beneficence.* By REV. PARSONS COOK. American Tract Society.

This is an able discussion of a very important subject. God's design in requiring beneficence, the Old and the New Testament law of charity, and the reasons for complying with it, are herein set forth in a light that cannot fail to affect the heart of the Christian reader. If this little book were generally read, there would be more beneficence in the church, and more system and efficiency in our plans of doing good.

25. *Cosmos. A Sketch of the Physical Description of the Universe.* By ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT. Translated from the German by E. C. OTTE. 2 vols. 12mo. Harper & Brothers. 1850.

Humboldt has probably no equal in the department of the natural sciences. He has pursued the study of nature enthusiastically during a long and industrious life, and in every part of the world. The accuracy and extent of his knowledge are surprising and wonderful. The "Cosmos" is the sum and substance of the result of his useful and persevering labors—the great work of his life—which he has long contemplated, and happily lived to accomplish. The Chevalier Bunsen—than whom no living man is better qualified to express a judgment—pronounces it the great work of the age. It is certainly a work of rare interest and stupendous research. The facts, innumerable, which are scattered through the immense and varied field of nature, are here collected and arranged into systems. It embodies a complete and comprehensive view of the physical universe, according to the most recent discoveries, and the broadest and best instructed philosophy. It has been received with marked favor in the most learned circles of Europe. Two elaborate and interesting reviews have already appeared in the North British Review, probably from the pen of Sir David Brewster. And while it is confessedly learned, it is still sufficiently popular in its style and subject-matter to be understood and relished by any well-read mind. The translation is well done. The Harpers have brought it out in two beautiful volumes. We commend it as a rare treat to all who love the study and science of nature.

26. *The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Abdication of James the Second, 1688.* By DAVID HUME, Esq., Vol. I. 12mo. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

The sad defects and errors, as well as the many admirable qualities of Hume's History of England, are generally known. We have only to announce a cheap, and yet neat and substantial edition, of this standard work from the enterprising press of the Harpers, of this city, in six volumes, uniform with their cheap edition of Macaulay. It is matter of rejoicing that our best histories are produced so astonishingly cheap as to bring them within the means of almost every man. The fault will be the people's, if they are not well versed in history. We hope the publishers will add to their cheap edition list Hildreth's finished and valuable History of the United States, of which they have already given us a beautiful octavo edition.

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ARTICLE I.
THE NATURE AND PROVINCE OF ECCLESIASTICAL
AUTHORITY.

BY PROF. H. N. DAY, of Western Reserve College, Ohio.

THERE are three permanent social organizations subsisting among men which are generally recognized to be of divine appointment,—the Family, the State, and the Church. That there would be much in the nature and working of these institutions, founded as they are on the same social principle in man, and originating from the same divine source, common to them all, is nothing more than might rationally have been anticipated. And accustomed as we are to interpret things in the light of analogy, obtaining a great part of our knowledge, indeed, by comparison of properties and relations, it will not appear strange if we should find, on examination, that a great part of our notions respecting any one of these institutions is derived, in fact, from the resemblances and analogies that are supposed to subsist between them. Nor will it be questioned that in this process, carried on gradually and imperceptibly during the whole development of our opinions under the continual influence of these institutions, there is a great liability to mistake and error,—a liability to regard as common that which in fact is peculiar, or as peculiar that which is common, and also to confound and misplace distinctive characteristics.

If we turn now from these *a priori* probabilities to actual facts, we shall find our anticipations realized. We shall find ourselves perpetually reasoning from one of these institutions to another, explaining the functions and the workings of one from resemblances or analogies in the others. How much of the idea of government in a family, or a church, is derived from the civil constitution or administration? How much is

carried up into the interpretation and estimation of the influences of state measures from the experiences that have been silently gathered up in the family? How much of what is peculiar and characteristic in the civil polity of these United States can be traced directly to the ecclesiastical notions that were inculcated by the Puritans? Perhaps it would be safe to conclude that our chief concessions, and those which are most trustworthy respecting any one of these institutions, are given us, or at least are greatly modified, by this light of analogy. And as our theories here become, almost necessarily, practical principles with us, we may generally see, in the domestic training of a man, much of his type of an ecclesiastical and civil constitution and administration; so, on the other hand, it cannot be doubted that error and mistake have largely entered into the current notions and apprehensions respecting each of these institutions through the channel of mistaken analogies. This is sufficiently proved, perhaps, by the disagreements and controversies that prevail. There are some general forms of mistake and error, however, which may safely be specified as proofs of this observation. Not to anticipate too far the results of the discussion we now propose, we shall here only present some suggestions in the form of inquiry.

Is there not reason to suppose that very much of that reformatory movement, which would exclude from the state all physical violence in the administration of its authority, is to be traced back to false analogies derived from the church? That the gospel is characteristically reformatory and recovering in its design and legitimate influence; that the church, in so far as it is a designed instrumentality to carry out the great ends of the gospel, is consequently a reformatory, recovering institution,—that it is, throughout its entire constitution and structure, an institution of grace, not of justice, intended to save the offender, not to try and condemn him, is generally admitted.

How natural and easy is the conclusion from this, that the other great social institution given from Heaven should resemble this,—that the state should only seek to reform and recover, never to try and judge except for this end of reform; that hence it should accept evidence of repentance as full satisfaction and atonement, and should never ordain sanctions which are incompatible with this principle,—should never, therefore, inflict capital punishment: how natural and easy such a conclusion, if the distinctions inherent in the respective designs and structures of the two institutions are not carefully kept in view. So, also, through these false analo-

gies and mistaken resemblances, the family is made by some to be but a little church, into which mere suasion, mere counsel with affection, is to be admitted in its government; and by others, a little state, in which stern justice, with its code of rules and laws, is to preside alone at the hearth, dealing out impartial measures of reward and penalty; kindness, love, forgiveness, never to be admitted in the treatment of offenders.

Has not the church, misled by this influence of mistaken resemblances and analogies, introduced into its administration much that legitimately belongs only to the civil sphere? Has not its action, especially toward offenders, savored too often of the state spirit, and been little else than a proper legal, judicial administration, fitted only to try and pass awards upon offences, not to recover and save the offender? Has not its very organization, in too many particulars, been determined in its form and structure by inferences from mistaken state analogies?

These general remarks will suffice to show the importance and bearing of the discussion upon which we now enter. If we would correct those errors that now prevail to so great an extent in the practical administration of the church, the state, and the family, inasmuch as there is reason to suppose that they result from false analogies, we must at the outset settle in our minds the true distinctions between these institutions, that we may expose the grounds of the mistake. We can confute the advocate of reform in the state who would make all civil administration merely recovering and healing, so far, at least, as his error has proceeded from a misapplication of church characteristics, only by showing him that no such property belongs in common to the two institutions as that upon which he builds his theory; that he has mistaken a distinctive for a common attribute. And so of the family and the church: if, as we suppose, the errors have arisen from similar false analogies or mistaken resemblances, or are sustained by them, they are to be corrected only by exposing the source of the error.

In endeavoring, therefore, to set forth the true idea of ecclesiastical authority, we shall direct our attention first and chiefly to the fundamental distinctions between the three great social institutions, and especially between the two more extended of these organizations—the church and the state;—trusting that, if our labor prove successful here, the fortifying considerations from other sources to be advanced afterward, will appear the more weighty and conclusive.

What, then, are the specific characteristics which distinguish from one another the three great social institutions sub-

sisting by divine ordinance among men,—the family, the church, and the state? We shall proceed with more safety if we first determine what is common to all.

In the first place, they are all alike societies; they are all founded on the social nature of man, and are forms in which that nature develops itself and acts. As societies, they all have their respective forms of polity; their forms of constitutive, organic, and functional or administrative law.

Each has its polity. This is implied in the very idea of a society. If the profound observation at the opening of the great work on the Spirit of Laws, that "Laws are the necessary relations resulting from the nature of things," be received as just, then the very existence of men in the relations of society implies laws. Out of these social relations there spring at once reciprocal obligations and rights, which involve by necessity laws or regulative principles. Whatever may be the stage of development toward a perfect declarative system or code which these laws may have reached, even if they be in their earliest embryo state, there is still a polity. As soon as the social relations exist, the rights and obligations are in being, and with them the laws which collectively constitute a polity. It is not, in our apprehension, a perfectly correct view which a late author¹ seems to advocate, that the state is founded distinctively on "the jural principle,"—on the principle of right. The jural principle lies at the foundation of every society as such; and polity is nothing more than the development of this principle in the form of laws. Just so far, therefore, as the church or the family has a polity, it involves and presupposes the jural principle as its basis and source. But, farther, each of these societies has a polity embracing all the three great departments of law as we have enumerated them, constitutive, organic, and functional or administrative. Each has its constitutive law founded on its intrinsic nature,—on that which constitutes it what it is,—makes it a distinctive society, by which it is characterized and defined in relation to all other societies. Each has its organic law,—that law which determines the form of its existence, its particular limits and boundaries, its membership, its officers, and the like. And each has, also, its functional law, which regulates its operations as an organic body.

Inasmuch, therefore, as these three institutions are social in their essential nature, and alike have a polity complete in all the three great departments of a polity, they have much that is common to all. Rights, obligations, dependencies,

¹ Dr. Lieber, in his *Political Ethics*.

they alike involve. The support of these rights, the enforcement of these obligations, the regulation of these dependencies, they all alike must recognize as duties resting upon them. Forms of constitution, of organic existence, and of social action, they must all have in a more or less perfect degree of development. Their common social nature spreads out a vast field of resemblances and analogies; so vast that it is not strange it has appeared to some to be unlimited, and to admit of no peculiarities or distinctions beyond it.

Again, they are all alike of divine origin, and exist, therefore, for a wise end and intent, while they conspire together in accomplishing the ulterior designs of infinite wisdom and goodness—Being ordained of God, who is no respecter of persons; further, they are all alike designed for the race. It is by a physical or a moral anomaly,—by an exception from a general natural law, or a resistance of a moral law, if any are not included in them all.—They all bear this common characteristic of being designed and fitted for all. They all conspire in effecting the ultimate design of God in reference to the race. If we may assume this to be their elevation to holiness and blessedness, then in this adaptedness to a common end and design we shall find the ground of manifold resemblances and analogies.

Not to proceed farther in the specification of common attributes and relations, we will pass now to what is distinctive and peculiar. We shall be enabled to ascertain this better in the light of the comparison we have already made; since specific differences must rest upon generic resemblances.

First, then, the polity in each of these social institutions is marked by specific peculiarities and characteristics.—The CONSTITUTIVE LAW in each is different. The church is a very different society from the family and from the state. It is constituted on a very different basis. It rests on a different department of our social nature. We shall not run much danger of exposing ourselves to assault from any quarter, if we assume that the church is distinctively a spiritual society, and that the family and the state are temporal societies. We shall only need to fortify some particular positions that we shall insist on holding within this general field. We advance the position, then, that the church, as a society, rests on purely spiritual relations, while the family and the state, as societies, rest on purely temporal relations.

That the church is purely a spiritual society, and rests on purely spiritual relations, we regard as having been definitively settled by its great Head and Founder, when he taught that "his kingdom is not of this world." It admits, as of

itself, of no temporal ends, no temporal ingredients, no temporal relations. It is wholly above the world ; except so far as being in the world, it affects it incidentally and by consequence, and moreover, is necessitated to recognize its own temporary existence as on earth ; all temporalities, however, it makes mere subservients, and judges them only by their bearing on its own spirituality.

Its ends are not of this world. Its great, peculiar, comprehensive end is to recover to holiness. *Its membership* is determined purely by spiritual characteristics. Faith in Christ, obedience to God, holiness, is the sole and essential qualification ; it receives all saints, and of itself and knowingly receives none but saints. *Its relations* are likewise spiritual. Its internal relations, lying in its own nature and in its membership, we have seen, are purely spiritual relations. Its external relations are also spiritual. Its relations to the world, to human society generally, its relations to the state, to the family, and to individuals, are, so far as determined from the church, still spiritual. In so far as they partake of a worldly character, it is because this is necessarily imposed upon them from the worldly nature of those objects to which it is thus related. As existing in the world, it must so far be subject to the conditions of time and place. Its organic existence, its outward action, must be limited by these conditions. It does not lose the pure spirituality of its nature, however, by this relationship, as neither does the spirit of man cease to be spirit because limited by the conditions of a fleshly body. It is related to the state, in so far as its organic existence and its outward activity are necessarily under those outward forms which come within the proper cognizance of the state. It is limited here so far that its action may not violate the rights which the state is bound to protect, and that it may claim, in return, from the state a protection of all its civil rights from violation from without. Yet here its proper spirituality is not invaded or destroyed. It suffers these external limitations and conditions, not from anything worldly in its own nature, but from its necessary relationship to a worldly institution. If a spirituality meet a temporality, the relation must necessarily be of a mixed character ; the spiritual element of the one must blend with the temporal element of the other. Such a bond does not necessarily imply, however, a mixed nature in either by itself. So, also, the church and the family, being universal institutions designed for the entire race of man, necessarily come into relationship. The church must recognize the existence of the family ; and the family that of the church. Whatever, in the family organization

and action, the church can turn to spiritual ends, it legitimately may, without detriment to the spirituality of its own nature; and the family may, in reciprocity, employ church influences to effect its own proper end. But neither in imparting nor in receiving does the church suffer any admixture, so far as it concerns its own nature, of any temporal element.—Every view of the church, thus, discovers its pure and proper spirituality.

On the other hand, the state and the family are proper temporalities. Their existence is wholly confined to time; their end is a temporal end; their membership is determined by temporal characteristics; its relations are all temporal.

To take first the state; that its existence is bounded by the limits of earth and time, none will question.

The proper ends of a state are, also, purely temporal. That the state, in its legitimate effects and results, has a moral, or, if it be preferred, a spiritual bearing, if its institution was designed by God to be a spiritual instrumentality, if its whole worth and value are to be estimated by this spiritual bearing; if, moreover, its true constitution and legitimate working may be tested by its spiritual results, still it may be, as we insist it is, a purely temporal institution, and its proper end, a purely temporal end. We are to distinguish here between such ends as are proper and immediate from such as are remote and general. The proper end for which the wing is given to the bird is to enable it to move in the air. A remoter end is to enable it to procure for itself protection and sustenance; and the wing is good for nothing but as it is instrumental to this remoter end. Still we judge of the fitness of the wing to its end only by reference to the power thus given to move in the air. This is the only peculiar end of the wing. So we are to determine what is the end of the state. That it has a spiritual ministry when it fulfills its proper end, is most true. From the end fulfilled, there arises a most important spiritual efficiency. This is true of every physical agency. There are moral lessons in books and stones, and spiritual good in everything through its fulfilled end. It is not necessary to our purpose to determine what the next higher end is which is effected by the state when it has fulfilled its proper end and ministry. It has been said that that end is the exhibition of the idea of justice, and its inculcation on the minds of men. We believe this to be a part of its design, but only a part. Whatever that may be, however, the immediate proper end of the state, that end which being fulfilled, it has accomplished its proper design, that end to which all its action is immediately to be referred,

by which all its action is to be tried as to its propriety and fitness, that through which alone its spiritual ministry can be effected, is still not such a moral end. It is not the office of a legislator to refer every measure directly to that moral end as the standard by which it is to be ascertained to be worthy of adoption or rejection. Such an immediate reference could not decide the question ; any more than could the proper structure of a bird's wing be determined by an immediate reference to its fitness for procuring protection and sustenance. Nor let it be hastily concluded that, if this be true, then legislation is beyond moral control and guidance. The nature of the proper end of an act does not of itself exclusively in all cases determine the proper mode of performing it. The taking of food has, unquestionably, a purely physical end ; but in eating and drinking men are yet to glorify God. How absurd, however, would be the endeavor to determine directly and immediately from its moral bearing the quality or the quantity of food that should be taken, without a controlling reference to the wants of the body ? It being borne in mind that, even supposing the immediate and proper end of the state to be a purely temporal end, still the fulfillment of that end may efficiently promote spiritual interests, and that, moreover, in fulfilling its proper end, the state is still bound to a moral procedure, there will be less hesitation, perhaps, to receive the doctrine that the proper, immediate, and legitimate end of the state is to protect and foster the temporal interests of men. We would thus go beyond the narrowness of the Warburtonian principle, that " the sole end of civil society is the conservation of body and goods," in regard to two of its limits. The state, in our apprehension, is something more than a " conserving " power ; its legitimate function is fostering and developing by a direct positive action, as well as protecting and sustaining. Its range, in the next place, is somewhat wider than mere " body and goods." It comprehends all the temporal interests, the entire temporal well-being of men. If intelligence and sound morality be essential to the temporal well-being of men, then it lies within the proper province of a state to foster and encourage education and a moral training among its citizens ; and its ministry so far will be a spiritual ministry. But it is legitimately so, only so far as its ministry is subservient to the temporal well-being of a state. In allowing to a state deception, Plato proceeded on a right principle so far as this, that the constitution and administration of a state are to be determined by their bearing on the temporal condition of the people ; he erred in supposing that dishonesty can ever be the

best policy—in admitting that the state can move towards true greatness and prosperity in a path of deception and fraud.

To take another view. If the immediate and controlling end of a state be not a temporal end, it must, if there be any at all, be either a spiritual end or one of a mixed character, partly temporal and partly spiritual. But the latter supposition is tantamount to the denial of any end; for such a mixed end is wholly inconceivable and self-contradictory. If the end of a state be a spiritual end, it can only be so on the ground that there is no distinction between secularities and spiritualities; that what we call secular is but spiritual viewed in another aspect. This is Arnold's doctrine, although, in our apprehension, utterly irreconcilable with his own admission that "the immediate object of every earthly society must be present good." We shall not turn aside to discuss here the propriety of this distinction. We shall rather assume it; and shall maintain our position, which it seems Arnold himself does not deny, but explicitly teaches, on this very ground, that to deny the temporal nature of the immediate end of a state, is to reject the well-received distinction between secular and spiritual.

We urge only one additional consideration. It is derived from the best and wisest administration of a state. If the history of the best civil administration the world has known be studied, it will be found that it has ever been directed in reference to a temporal as the governing end. Where, in prosperous states, a spiritual end has been regarded at all, it has been but partially, and just so far, is it now admitted, the administration was imperfect. In case of continued prosperity in such states, the spiritual has gradually given way and finally disappeared. Such has been the experience of those civil organizations in our own land, in which such a spiritual end has been aimed at. On the other hand, in those states in which a spiritual end is recognized as the governing end of the administration, we are sure to find misrule, civil depression, and general prostration both of temporal and spiritual interests. The Jewish theocracy furnishes no valid exception to this view. If that civil constitution be examined on the supposition of a spiritual end being the immediate,

¹ The Church Mis. Works, Amer. ed., p. 14. His words are: "A pretended distinction between spiritual things and secular, a distinction utterly without foundation." As this distinction was seen by him to be "utterly inconsistent" with his notion of a perfect church, which notion identified it with the state, it was important for him to reject it. This, certainly, is true, that his notion of a church and this distinction are so incompatible with each other that the admission of either excludes the other; and the denial of either necessitates the admission of the other.

governing end, with no temporal end intervening as that through which exclusively the spiritual end is attained, many things must be condemned in it as unwise, inexpedient, and unrighteous. We can explain and vindicate that divine system only on the ground that the immediate governing end was the temporal welfare of the Jewish nation; that the great spiritual ends to be accomplished through that nation, were attained only through a more immediate temporal end. So everywhere, state measures, legal ordinances, and legal sanctions ever receive commendation or reprobation only as tested in reference to a temporal, not a spiritual end. The more remote spiritual end subserved by the civil state in the divine arrangement, governs only indirectly and negatively; as the structure of the bird's wing must not be incompatible with a power to defend itself and to obtain its food. The immediate temporal end controls with a direct, positive control, as motion in the air is the immediate test of fitness in the structure of the wing.

The membership of the state is determined on purely worldly grounds. Nothing spiritual enters into the determining principles. Men are born into the state. It is by a natural society of the purest kind that they become members. The notion of a compact lying back of civil society is now justly exploded; and with it all notion of anything moral or voluntary—any free-will in determining whether a man shall be a member of the body politic or not. Mere place settles the question by nature's necessity for him. If he is born within this or that political sphere, he is incorporated into it at once, before he thinks, before he breathes even. He takes his first breath subject to the control, and entitled to the protection of civil society. The form of government may change—one system of political institutions may be set aside, and another system, radically different in its principles, may be set up, and all without his concurrence, against his strongest wishes and his utmost endeavors, but his relationship remains unaffected. He who is born and abides in France remains a member of the French civil society, whatever revolutions may take place. He is a Frenchman politically, whether Charles X. by the grace of God, King of France and Navarre, or Louis Philippe, King of the French, or Louis Napoleon, President of the French Republic, be at the head of affairs; yes, or even if the supreme rule be in the hands of a self-constituted Provisional Committee. So all international law recognizes the fact, whatever wrong is done to other nations, for instance, by the French civil society, under Louis Philippe, must be redressed by Louis Napoleon, although committed by the

monarch in power in his very contests with the revolutionary party, and entirely disowned by it.

The relations of a state are all temporal, also, so far at least as determined in their character from itself. Its internal relations are determined from the character of its membership, which we have seen to be temporal. Its external relations are to other similar temporal societies, or to spiritual societies. In the former case, the relations between temporalities are of course temporal. In the latter case, so far from the relationship imparting anything spiritual, it gives a certain mixture of worldliness to that which in itself is purely spiritual, as we have seen.

Everywhere, whether regarded in its ends, its membership, or its relations, the nature of the state appears as a temporality. Nothing appears which reveals in it anything but a temporality; a temporality, however, which, as embracing moral natures, must so far proceed in a moral way, and, as instituted by God, must through its fulfilled temporal end and ministry promote a higher moral aim.

We shall see, in like manner, that the constitutive law of the family is determined from its nature as a temporality. It is impossible to conceive of a family as constituted on any other basis than a temporal one. As the civil society is founded on special relations—on vicinity or contiguity in place—so the domestic society is founded on consanguinity, implying identity of parentage or of source, in other words, ultimately and abstractly on relations of time. Precisely here do we find the constitutive law of the family, as determined by this identity of paternity, or identity of source and origin. It is of course a purely temporal relation. Fulfilling its own temporal end, it by this promotes a higher moral aim. It is only by ever making this temporal end the immediately controlling end in its structure and administration that it can subserve this higher moral interest. Spiritualize it, and we subvert its nature and end; and, as we have too lamentable evidence in our own time, it becomes a ministry to the wildest fanaticism, and ends in the grossest sensuality.

Again, THE ORGANIC LAW, in each of these social institutions, is different; that of the church differing essentially from that of the state and the family, as that of a pure spirituality should differ from that of a pure temporality. The organic law, as we have already indicated, is that part of a polity which defines the form of existence and of action to a society. It appears under the name of a constitution when applied to civil society, and of a creed and covenant when applied to a

church. Domestic polity, unhappily, has not yet been developed so fully into a system, as to have gained distinctive names for its different departments.

It is the part of a civil constitution, and of a church creed and covenant, to set forth the particular sphere of the society, or the range of its activity, and the particular organization through which its action shall be expressed. They prescribe the limits or boundaries of a state, with its officers and their duties; and, in like manner, the membership of a church, and the range and mode of its organic action.—We shall find, now, that the received evangelical notion of a church, and the republican notion of a commonwealth, give to the church an organic law, everywhere revealing the spirituality of the church as a society; and on the other hand, to the state an organic law that as uniformly reveals the temporality of its nature.

What determines the sphere of organization to a church, but spiritual principles? Who, but isolated theorists, or obsolete legitimists, now claim the sphere of a church to be determined by strict special bounds? Who, but for sectarian or other temporary ends, now rejects the "elective affinity" principle in the organization of churches? Who now questions the right, or, we may say, the duty of a man to prefer those ecclesiastical connections which his spiritual profit or usefulness shall prescribe? Even purely spiritual considerations impose some regard to local conditions; but these aside, on how exclusively spiritual principles is a church organized in regard to the sphere it shall fill as an organic body?—So the range of its activity is limited by solely spiritual considerations. Wherever the spiritual good of man can be favorably affected by the activity of a church, there is its legitimate field. Emphatically and unrestrictedly, the field of ecclesiastical activity is the world.

Not so with the state and the family. Their spheres are determined by outward limits—the state by local boundaries enclosing and covering an entire determinate portion of space, a limited territory; the family, by the circuit of consanguinity. Honorary citizenship and domestic adoption need not be regarded as essentially infringing upon the integrity of this principle.

The legitimate range of the activity of these temporal societies is also determined by similar outward limits. No state can extend its jurisdiction into the territory lawfully covered by another distinct civil organization; and no family may penetrate into the shrines of a neighbor's household with its authority and control.

The official organization of these institutions varies in the same way. That of the church is determined for it by its fitness for purely spiritual functions. The ministers of the church are required to possess, as the first requisites, personal piety. Everything else is second to this. Every other qualification is estimated in reference to its subserviency to these spiritual functions. In the state, on the other hand, morality and piety are required as qualifications in its officers and ministers, only as measures and aids of a capacity to administer mere temporalities. The doctrine, that only a pious man can be a fit civil functionary, is the worst and most dangerous article in a church and state platform. Unquestionably, piety should be a decisive test of fitness for office between two candidates otherwise equally eligible, with all well-wishers of the state; but only because piety is a positive qualification for office, or perhaps because every man should, in all his action, so far as he legitimately may, indicate his preference for virtue and religion over their opposites. Still the true tests of fitness for civil office, are capacity and fidelity, measured relatively to merely temporal functions.

So in the family, the official organization is determined by a purely physical law. By nature's necessity, not by any free-will, in no spiritual way, domestic rule and authority are in the parents, the head and source of the family.—The organic law of the church differs, thus, from that of the state and of the family as widely as a pure spirituality differs from a pure temporality, with this sole modification, that as existing on earth, the church must, in its organic law, conform to the conditions of time and place.

The same characteristic difference will be found to mark THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR FUNCTIONAL LAW of each of these institutions. The measures and proceedings in a church, so far as the temporal conditions of its being will allow, will partake everywhere of a spiritual character; those of the state and the family, on the contrary, of a temporal character.

The functional law of a society distributes itself into two distinct branches;—one relating to the enactment and enforcement of law in its more proper and restricted sense; the other, to the adoption and execution of measures of policy. This distinction will be recognized as one, if not everywhere definitely drawn and observed, yet more or less practically adopted in both ecclesiastical and political administration. We will exclude from our consideration here that portion in each branch which respects the procedure of the organic body itself,—that portion which generally passes under the name of by-laws and rules of proceeding.

We have already intimated that a polity belongs vitally to every society, as it must necessarily have regulative principles to direct and govern its action. These, reduced to a system, and formally set forth, constitute a formal polity. The principles may exist and exert a virtual control, however, without being systematically codified. Let us see now what such a polity prescribes in regard to the proper legislation of a church.—Legislation, in the stricter sense, is the authoritative declaration of specific applications of right. It does not directly create right. The right grows necessarily out of the relations that are established in the nature of things. These relations may be changed; then what was before right, may cease to be right so far, and a new law of right may arise. A church may, for instance, provide, in its organic law, that it shall have officers who shall perform certain duties, and be clothed with certain power and authority. Rights necessarily and at once grow out of the relations thus established between the officers and the private members of the church. If those duties be changed by a change in the organic law, the relations so far are changed, and with them the rights. It is the legitimate province of the supreme authority in a society to declare, by formal legislation, what those rights are; and all such declarations being accompanied with the authority of the society, are laws. It is unnecessary to undertake to show that all such ecclesiastical legislation must be spiritual in its character. The only doubt that hangs over the subject respects the character of the sanctions of law. By the sanctions of law are meant the forms in which the authority of the society is expressed for the enforcement of its enactments. They declare the determination of the society or of the government in the particular ways specified to sustain the law—to exert itself to the degree and in the mode defined in the law, in rewarding and punishing. They express thus the authority of the society, or the identification of the society with the law to the utmost degree of its power, so far as the sanction may require. They are measured, accordingly, by the nature and kind of authority which belongs to the government; in other words, by the nature and degree of the power which it legitimately possesses.

From the very nature of the church as a society, now, we might determine unhesitatingly, that its authority must be spiritual only in its nature. It may not express its displeasure at the violation of its enactments by any temporal sanctions. It may not inflict bodily penalties; it may not sequester worldly estate; it may not exact pecuniary forfeitures. It may not lay a violent hand on body or estate. It

may not, further, disturb temporal relations. It may not put out of civil or domestic connections; or it may not thrust its members into the power of any to impose civil or domestic restrictions or annoyances of any kind. All temporal power it excludes, of whatever form it may be, in the exercise of its jurisdiction. May it, however, use the power of disgrace, mortification, of mental disturbance of any kind? It may not, certainly, use any power which is not given it, expressly or impliedly. The power to exclude from its fellowship such as are unworthy of it, is given it both expressly and impliedly: expressly, in the very word of its founder and head; impliedly, in the very allowance of its existence on earth as an organic body. All such as are in legitimate ways, found to be radically wanting in the essential qualifications of church membership, it is bound to declare to be thus wanting, and to exclude them. Excommunication is not, however, to be regarded as the execution of a sanction. It is true that inasmuch as the qualifications of membership in the church are purely spiritual, the want of these spiritual qualifications implies wrong; and so far as excommunication is an act of society that follows on ascertained wrong in the subject of it, it resembles penalty. But this resemblance respects only the form and accident, not the essence of the act. It answers precisely to that act of the civil society by which it should declare the relations of citizenship to be annulled in case of voluntary and final removal from within its proper territory. There is nothing essentially penal in this. Excommunication from any society may, indeed, be made penal. The loss of citizenship may be the punishment for civil offences. But expatriation simply for want of the requisites of citizenship is not necessarily penal. May the church, then, excommunicate penally, or must excommunication in the church ever be limited to the mere declaration of want of the essential qualifications of membership; in other words, to the mere expression, in its practical applications, of its strictly spiritual nature as an organic body?

The spirituality of the church forbids, we have seen, all temporal sanctions. Is the church still further limited, so that it may not impose any penalties whatever, even such as are strictly spiritual? Such limits are not put upon it, certainly, by the spirituality of its nature. There is, however, another limitation attaching to the administration of a church which has an important bearing here. It is this: that unlike the state and the family, it has its supreme head not on earth, and, moreover, that its supra-earthly head rules over men on earth, not in law and exact justice, but in mercy.

How much, then, of the spiritual power, which might belong to it if it were supreme and absolute in its sphere, is retained to the head himself, and withheld from the church on earth, and how far does the restriction of the merciful character of the rule of that supra-earthly head, in this respect, extend? We answer, so much and so far as to exclude all sanctioning, all avenging power whatever from the legitimate administration of the church. God has reserved to himself the right to punish,—to impose and execute sanctions. “Vengeance is mine; I will repay,” is Jehovah’s declared principle in determining by what regulations the Christian brotherhood should be controlled. And still more than this, Christ, as mediatorial king and supreme head of the church, has himself laid aside from his administration all vengeance. His mission, according to his own express teaching, is not to judge, but to save. In exact accordance with this, and of itself entirely decisive on the point under consideration, the law of forgiveness on simple repentance is made by Christ a fundamental principle in the disciplinary administration of his church. As laid down by him, this principle is remarkably wide-reaching in this respect. The church is to forgive, “not until seven times, but until seventy times seven,”—ilimitably, provided there be repentance. This fundamental law, it will be observed, is set forth in connection with the very ordinance and institution of church discipline in the eighteenth chapter of Matthew. Repentance, thus, is made by Christ the sole ground of forgiveness in all ecclesiastical administration. The church has no right to regard its own interests, its reputation, its authority; in short, anything whatever but simple repentance in the offender, in order to forgiveness. It is a gross violation of the fundamental law of church discipline, as laid down by Christ, to require any conditions whatever of the offender who is believed to be a true penitent before he shall receive full pardon. Now, we need not spend time to show that this principle of forgiveness on simple repentance, exclusively of all regard to the authority of the church, is totally incompatible with the exercise of a sanctioning power. For the very notion of a sanction implies the absolute determination of the government to sustain the law at all hazards, and at whatever cost, to the full extent defined by the sanction. If a foreign principle may come in and of itself at once arrest the execution of a sanction, then the authority of the society is so far infringed or limited; and as forgiveness waiting on repentance, forgiveness waiting on the mere will of the offender, is a universal, fundamental law of Christ’s church, all sanctioning power is set

aside. The power to enforce its authority by disgrace, humiliation, by any mental suffering whatever, is as truly withheld from the church as the power to inflict bodily suffering. These two striking characteristics in the divine ordinance of the church need to be borne in mind in all comparisons between it and the state: that, first, the church has only spiritual power; and that, secondly, this spiritual power is so far limited as to exclude all sanctioning authority, or all right to impose penalties.

As it regards that department of the functional law of the church which respects measures of policy, we need not say they should be all of a spiritual nature,—in other words, be directed to spiritual uses. By this test must all its measures be estimated. If, in order to attain its legitimate spiritual ends, it must employ and sustain men, erect and hold buildings, manufacture and circulate books, it must yet ever regard these only as necessary instrumentalities, and keep them in strict subserviency to its high spiritual aims. To buy, to build, to manufacture, to contract for pecuniary ends, for profit, is aside from its legitimate sphere. The extreme liability to secularize spiritual things, should render the church watchful in the highest degree over all such worldly operations, lest, in the use of the worldly instrumentality, the spiritual end itself be hindered or defeated.

To turn now to the functional law of the state, we see at once that, while the relations it sustains give origin to rights, the observance of which is a moral procedure, the nature of the foundation upon which they rest,—a foundation, as we have seen, purely temporal, necessarily bounds and characterizes these rights. All legislation, declaratory of these rights, must regard temporal ends. Its sanctioning power is, however, unrestricted in respect to the mode of enforcing its enactments, provided, at least, that the principle of right itself be not invaded. The state, as such, recognizes no higher jurisdiction which overrules and limits its procedures. While the only "sword" allowed by God to the church is "the sword of the Spirit which is the word of God," no such limitation is put upon the state. The sanctioning power, "the sword" in its fuller sense, is expressly given to the civil functionary. "He beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." In perfect consistency with this scriptural view of the state, it is never recognized by any as a recovering, reforming institution. It hence is not professedly and characteristically, like the church, "forgiving." Pardon is bestowed not in reference to the convict's mind,

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as penitent, as the controlling end, but in reference to state interests. It simply withholds punishment when state interests do not require that it be inflicted. While in the church the fundamental principle is, that pardon be bestowed on simple penitente, without regard to ulterior interests or bearings, in the state repentance is never of itself allowed to command pardon, and is regarded or not, in dispensing pardon, only as state interests may require.

Here, then, we find a radical distinction between the church and the state in their respective functional laws. The church is under a supra-earthly head who has reserved to himself all right to avenge or punish; the state is in this respect supreme. The state is bound to weigh out and execute its sanctions as it may judge the ends of the state to require. It is bound to express the full measure of its disapprobation of transgression, and the full measure of its approbation of obedience in its sanctions. No limit whatever is assigned it. It bears "the sword" by God's ordinance, and is bound to wield it even to its most proper function, the taking of life, if that degree of severity it may deem necessary to the ends of its being. On this basis would we rest the decision of the much disputed question whether the taking of life be lawful in the state. If God may, in the administration of his government, take life, then may the state, supreme and absolute in this respect, take life, if the end of its being require. No higher principle, at least, forbids. On this basis, too, we could put the question as to the power of the church to execute any sanctions. God has reserved it to himself; and the end of the church on earth, which is to recover and save, forbids its exercise. The state has received from God an avenging power; the church has not only not received such power, but it is expressly bound to forgive—an obligation which necessarily and of itself excludes all proper vengeance, all punishment, all sanctions.

The same distinction, substantially, lies between the church and the family. The domestic head, like the state, is in its sphere absolute and supreme. It is true the state supervises domestic rule to a certain extent, and disallows the severer penalties. The more immediately personal relations subsisting between the members of the family, also, forbid the sterner executions of justice. But even the extremest inflictions of penalty were allowed to the father in Roman society—a society in which, while the state was ever regarded as absolute, the principle of right received its fullest development and exactest expression. With the exceptions indicated, the sanctioning power resides in the family

head. No higher authority extends a jurisdiction into its circle so as to limit its control. No bound has been put upon its power. It possesses all which may of right belong to a society, which is presupposed and involved in a polity, and which is necessary to its ends. Physical and mental suffering it may rightfully inflict. It is a false analogy taken from the church which would confine the disciplinary power of the family and of the state to moral suasion.

It will not be needful for any purpose we now have in view to extend our comparison of the functional law of the church with that of the state to the other department which embraces measures of policy. The general observation is sufficient that this part, also, respects purely temporal interests; as does that of the church, purely spiritual interests. If the state ever respect spiritual ends, or the church temporal ends, it must be ever in subserviency, not as controlling and final ends.

We conclude, then, that there is a fundamental distinction, running through all departments of their polity, between the church on the one hand and the state and the family on the other—a distinction which must be carefully kept in view in all conclusions and inferences founded on resemblances or analogies subsisting between them as societies alike of divine origin. The church is essentially and characteristically a spiritual society. The state and the family are essentially and characteristically temporalities. While in fulfilling their temporal ends the state and the family thereby subserve moral purposes, while as administered by moral beings and for such, they are subject, in their procedures toward their own proper ends, to the control of moral principles, they are yet but temporalities, and must be so regarded.

Particularly does it appear that while the state and the family are in their sphere entrusted with the unlimited exercise of legislative authority, subject to unimportant exceptions, that of the church is greatly limited. The church has no power to enact or to execute sanctions of any kind whatsoever. Its subjection to a supra-earthly head, in the first place; the very design of its existence, in the second place, as a society designed under God ruling as a God of grace to recover and save offenders, not to condemn or punish, bound to bestow forgiveness on simple repentance irrespectively of all other conditions whatsoever,—bound in this specific way ever to promote purely spiritual interests, forbid, absolutely, the exercise by it of any proper sanctioning authority, either as legislative, judicial, or executive. These distinctive peculiarities forbid in these respects the applica-

tion to it of all state or family analogies, and equally the application of church analogies to the family and the state.

If we turn now from this general view of the relations between the three grand social organizations subsisting among men to history as exhibiting the development of the divine will in regard to the nature and extent of ecclesiastical authority, we shall find the views already advanced still further confirmed and illustrated. Entertaining the supposition that the erroneous views, that have obtained currency in regard to the nature of church authority, have originated and still find their chief support in mistaken analogies between these institutions, we shall continue our discussion more or less in this light of comparison.

It is apparent on the first glance at history that these social institutions have been developed in a divinely-appointed order and system; and this development will help us indetermining the designs of God in regard to each of them. At first, the family existed as the sole social organization among men. The state and the church were enfolded in it, and existed only as germs or as capabilities of development. The head of the family was priest and king. The term "patriarch" conveyed the complex idea of a domestic, civil, and religious head. Yet all civil and all religious authority was exercised in subordination to the paternal, and was in the proper forms of family rule. With such foreign elements, however, incorporated into it, the domestic government could not but be greatly modified, although still retaining its own integrity.

Out of the family was gradually evolved the state. In its infancy, civil government was patriarchal in its form. Immature and weak, it leaned upon the stronger arm of domestic rule for support. Civil authority was strengthened and sustained by domestic ties.

The religious society knew still no distinct existence. It lay enfolded a germ in the family. Yet the Abrahamic covenant directly recognized its embryo existence. Even circumcision was confirmed, in the application of the rite, to the peculiarities of the family constitution. It was a merely domestic rite, confined to the sphere of consanguinity, and coextensive with that. Only through the family did it symbolize an initiation into a religious society.

When the state had developed itself into maturity from the family, the church appears enwrapped in that. Both among the Jews, and also in Greece and in Rome, where civil polity had attained its fullest development, religion was regarded as lying in the state. The state regulated all re-

ligious observances, all religious offices, all religious sanctions. So true was this, that religion was too generally regarded as the mere handmaid and minister of the state; and its ministry and power were made subservient to mere state purposes. Theorists, indeed, in their endeavors after a system and a unity in their conceptions of society, were led to regard the state as the only proper social organization for man. The spiritual Plato indulged the beautiful but Utopian dream that in a perfect condition of man, all family distinctions as well as religious organizations must be absorbed in the state,—that the state would constitute the only realization of the idea of society for man. The religious form of the social element lay thus enwrapped in the womb of the family, and subsequently of the state, with only here and there an imperfect and premature attempt at a spiritual organization, as in the case of the Therapeutæ, the Essenes, and other similar religious social abortions. These labors of humanity, abortive as they were, yet prove most conclusively, that there was in it an element and a force wholly distinct and foreign from any other in full development,—a force and element which in its very nature did not admit of being assimilated to the state, or of being brought into subserviency to its ends or to its legitimate operations; which craved a different aliment, and required a different sphere for its growth and working. At last, when, according to the orderings of divine wisdom, the fullness of times had come, the spiritual form of the social element unfolded itself and assumed a distinct and peculiar existence. It is important to note the mode of this evolution of the Christian society. Its immediate birth and origin was from the Jewish theocratic society. In that society, the germ had been nourished, and had grown until the time came for its independent being. From this accident of its origin,—accident in this sense, that the Jewish society had been chosen out of all civil societies to be the honored instrumentality of ushering the church into the world for reasons not founded in any necessary relationship between the church and that society, but for others known to Infinite Wisdom when it determined on the choice,—from this accident of its origin, it is pertinent to observe here, very erroneous apprehensions have arisen in regard to the polity of the church in all its departments. The theories of its identity with the state, of its being invested with state forms of rule and authority, as well as with Jewish forms of organization, have severally been founded and supported on this circumstance of its origin. But two particulars in the case will serve to show the baselessness of these theories. First, the theocracy

was in no proper sense of the expression an identification of the church and state. It was no more so than the patriarchal family was an identification of the family, the state and the church. The only true conception is that the church lay enfolded, undeveloped, a germ only, in the bosom of the theocratic society; just as the church and the state lay thus enfolded in the patriarchal family. That this is the true conception appears not only from the nature of the case itself and the analogies of providence, but also from the very constitution and administration of the theocracy. It was a pure temporality, as were the Grecian and Roman states. The church element as a spirituality did not rule at all in it; but in subserviency to state temporal ends. The theocracy was not designed to further spiritual interests, except by fulfilling proper state ends, which we have seen to be of a purely temporal nature. Hence Jewish legislation never regarded directly spiritualities for their own sake. The language of Jahn is decisive on this point. "The law with the penalty attached to it, as may be learnt from other sources, had reference only to the *overt* acts of idolatry; it was rather a *civil* than a religious statute, and the judge, who took cognizance of the crime, while he had a right to decide upon the *deed*, the undeniable *act* in any given instance, evidently went beyond his province, if he undertook to decide upon the thoughts and feelings of a person implicated, independently of an *overt* commission of the crime. Deut., 13: 2-19; 17: 2-5." The theocracy thus proves its identity with the state, and its radical distinction from the church, in that it possessed the most characteristic external peculiarity of the former involving an internal essential feature, and at the same time lacked the most striking peculiarity of a church polity. With the state, the overt act is everything, and draws in of itself the malice. With the church, the overt act is nothing but as it imports a right or a wrong intent. Civil discipline begins with the outward deed, and from it presumes the intent; church discipline begins with the spirit and the character, and uses the outward life only as the sign and evidence of the character.

In the second place, the Christian church did not evolve itself from the Jewish civil society, as the state did originally from the family, by a gradual elevation and expansion of the social principle into a higher sphere. This would be natural in the evolution of one temporality from another. But the spiritual could not thus spring from a temporal. At least, the providence of God, in ordering a peculiar development of the

1 Biblical Archaeology, § 214. The italics are taken from the work itself.

church from the state, would seem to teach us that a wide distinction subsists between the two societies. The church was not a direct offshoot from the national polity; it derived its immediate origin from the synagogue, and sustained an organic relation to the Jewish society only through that remarkable institution,—an institution which, while it derived its life and sustenance from the civil society, was yet rather an excrescence than a proper member. If the Christian church had been designed by God to be identical with the state, to be national, or even provincial, we cannot but believe that it would have been evolved from the national society, or have merged the theocracy in itself, carrying all along with it to a higher stage of social elevation. The synagogue origin of the Christian church is a valid argument alike against a triple hierarchical order, an outward ceremonial system, and a national or provincial church organization.

The providential ordering of the birth and development of these institutions thus shows that no analogy between the church and the state authorizes the action of a sanctioning power in the church, like that in the state, but the contrary. The primitive church, accordingly, derived no legislative power from the synagogue, except so far as was indispensable to the very existence of the society, and exercised none. It held the power to excommunicate; but excommunication was not a proper punishment, but a declaration of a want of the essential qualification of church membership, and the corresponding withdrawal of Christian confidence and fellowship, not for the purpose of maintaining authority, but for the reformation of the offender. To use the language of a late writer, whose work well nigh carries the weight of an original authority, when summing up the results of his investigations: "Ecclesiastical censure is not a penal infliction, but a moral discipline for the reformation of the offender and the honor of religion. * * * Church discipline seeks, in the kindness of Christian love, to recover a fallen brother, to aid him in his spiritual conflicts, and to save him from hopeless ruin."

The Scriptural testimony will go to corroborate the view presented of this radical distinction between the church, and the state or family in regard to the kind and extent of its authority.—We need not say that the Scriptures nowhere deny, everywhere recognize, a sanctioning power both in the state and in the family,—a power to enact laws with penalties, and to execute them both in bodily and mental evil upon transgressors. Civil and domestic rulers are, by the express

; Coleman's Apostolical and Primitive Church, p. 117.

ordinance of God, as learned not only from the clear teachings of reason, but also unequivocally from revelation, "the ministers of God, revengers to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." They are commissioned to maintain, by the necessary judicial sanctions, the authority of all their proper enactments. They stand thus in the place of God, in regard to the promotion of their proper temporal ends; and are bound to sustain their divinely entrusted authority by the fullest measures of penal displeasure required by the necessities of the case.

How different from all this is the Scriptural representation of ecclesiastical power and authority? In the first place, not the slightest intimation of any such sanctioning power in the church is given throughout the Word of God. In the only instances in which it is supposable for a moment that such an intimation is given, it will be found, we believe, on candid investigation, that there is none in fact. Lest it be imagined that we may have overlooked such instances, we will consider a few which are in our judgment the strongest.

The passage in Matt. 18: 15-20, might possibly be regarded by some as conveying a sanctioning power to the church. A Christian brother who deems himself aggrieved is there required, on failure in a private endeavor to gain this offending brother, to tell the matter to the church; and the church, if the offender prove himself to be refractory to its counsels, is to excommunicate him. We are aware that this passage has been sometimes practically interpreted to warrant application to the church on the part of an aggrieved member for redress of his grievance, and an interposition of the authority of the church to enforce such redress. But we are persuaded that this is a most gross and pernicious perversion of the passage. In the first place, there is not the slightest intimation that our Saviour intended to make in these instructions any provision for redress of wrongs. On the other hand, the whole scope of the passage looks to the simple recovery, "the gaining" of a lapsed brother. He would not have any perish. "It is not the will of your Father that one of these little ones should perish." If any, therefore, he proceeds, offends, he would have his disciples seek to reclaim him; to labor for this end in all ways, privately and socially; if, at last, all measures prove unavailing, then they are to regard him no longer as one of Christ's flock, no longer as possessing the qualifications of membership of his church, and to treat him accordingly. In the second place, the excommunicating power here conferred on the church has no appearance of being designed to be a sanctioning power. The excision of

the irreclaimable offender is not a penal infliction at all; it is but the exercise of a prerogative which is essential to the very integrity of the Christian society,—the maintenance of its essential spirituality. So far from being penal in its character, the entire context shows that it is designed to be recovering, reformatory. And this view is in accordance with the entire spirit of the Saviour's instructions and practice, and with the teachings of the apostles.

The word used in connection with the notice of the offender at Corinth, 2 Cor. 2: 6, *scriptura*, may possibly be supposed by some to imply a penal nature in ecclesiastical excommunications. But this supposition is forbidden by the very words of the apostle in directing the proceedings in this case. Here was a man openly, officially, recognized as a Christian, who was notoriously guilty of crimes which proved an entire want of Christian character; and the church was asleep over the fact, doing nothing to recover and save him. The apostle sharply reproves them for this negligence, and charges them to put away the delinquent from among them. But for what purpose? "*That his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus,*"—to recover and save him. So long as he was openly recognized as a true Christian, nothing of course could be done to recover him. The first step was to declare to him that he was wanting in the very essentials of Christian character, and that he could not hope to be saved, continuing as he was. The word itself, moreover, does not necessarily convey any notion of a penalty. It properly means merit, equivalent, due. If it even signify a legal sanction, it must derive this import from the context. The proper interpretation to be put on the passage is: Sufficient to this man is the merited suffering which he has experienced from the decision of the whole church in excluding him from their communion as wanting in Christian character; therefore, they should comfort him, and forgive him, and confirm their love to him. How irreconcilable is such treatment with the idea of a penal infliction!

In 1 Cor. 5: 12, further, we find the words: "Do ye not judge them that are within?" These words might seem to some to import a judicial authority in the church. But the context shows that "the judging" here is limited to that investigation of character which is necessary in order to maintain the essential spirituality of the church.—In 1 Tim. 5: 20, occur the instructions to Timothy: "Them that sin rebuke before all, that others also may fear." Here is what might seem to be a countenance given to spiritual censures; to such sharp and painful rebukes and admonitions, coupled with pub-

lic exposure and disgrace, as would cause others to fear exposing themselves to them. But it is altogether more consonant with the spirit of the Scriptures to regard the displeasure of God, which would of course form the chief element in all Christian rebuke, as the object of the fear spoken of here, and not merely in the shame and mortification of a public censure.

In the absence of any positive testimony as to any sanctioning power being vested in the church, a long array of express instructions may be adduced which exclude all such ideas. These instructions we shall cite only in the briefest and most summary manner.

1. We are taught that Christ himself, the Head of the church, disclaimed all judicial power. "I came not to judge the world," he says of himself, "but to save the world." Jno. 12: 47. "God sent not his Son to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved." Jno. 3: 17. When James and John urged him to exercise a vindictive power upon the offending Samaritans, he "rebuked them and said; Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of." Luke 9: 56. The great head of the church, himself, in his mediatorial sway, lays aside, thus, all judicial power, as being incompatible with the end of his reign. How much less can the power be supposed to reside in the church, which has nothing but what is derived from him?

2. We are taught from Christ's example that no such sanctioning authority was intended by him to be vested or to be exercised in his church. Uniformly, when offenders were complained of before him, he sent the fault-finders away without condemnation of the offenders. He even refused to be an arbiter, to interpose his authority for the redress of real or imaginary grievances. "Who made me a judge?" is his summary disposal of applications for such interposition.

3. His general instructions to his disciples forbid the supposition that any judicial power was to be exercised by them. "Judge not," is the express command he gives them,—a command which the apostle reiterates in his Master's name, "Judge nothing."

4. His frequent and earnest inculcation of a forgiving spirit, as indispensable to true discipleship, is irreconcilable with the idea of a sanctioning power. The church, as we have seen, is required in the fundamental article of its disciplinary law to forgive on simple repentance, with no ulterior regard to the purity of the church, the maintenance of its authority, or any consideration of expediency. This funda-

mental principle in the kingdom of Christ is utterly at war with all proper judicial or sanctioning power. To suppose that they are compatible for a moment, proves a radical misconception of the nature of law and of judicial authority. A legal sanction that waits on repentance to receive its validity, or its annihilation, is no legal sanction, in any proper import of the term. Such a notion, extended to the government of God, would be subversive of all true subjection and allegiance, and be fatal to the interests of true religion, as is proved by lamentable experience in the history of Christianity.

We conclude, then, that no analogies between the state or family, and the church justify at all the supposition of any sanctioning authority being vested in the church; that the whole polity of the church, as a society, is limited to the adoption of such regulations as are needful for its own being and action, which in no case are to be enforced by penal sanctions, of any kind whatsoever. It is involved in this, that all judicial authority, in the proper sense—an authority to measure out rights and dues between individuals, is excluded from the church,—that all the power it possesses of a judicial nature is simply the power of investigating character with a view of ascertaining it to be such as Christ requires in his church. Its excommunicating power is not a sanctioning, but a reformatory power. With the rejection of this penal character from the act of excommunication, falls away, also, the inference some make from this higher power, that the less of suspension, of censure, and the like, is vested in the church. In like manner, the practice of suspending from church privileges, *as a punishment*, is entirely uneclesiastical, and aside from the spirit and doctrine of Christ. The creation of spiritual judicatories to try spiritual offences, to redress grievances by penal inflictions, is all foreign to the evangelical idea of a church polity, and opposed to the proper end of a church, which is to save, not to try or judge. In the exercise of its disciplinary power, just so far as the reclaiming end is lost sight of in the proceedings, just so far as a litigating spirit rules, one party striving to prove guilt, another to prove innocence, the design of the proceeding is hindered or frustrated; and the church reduces itself to the level of a civil tribunal, and has laid aside the spirit of its Master. So, on the other hand, the idea that the family and the state are merely reformatory institutions, in the sense that this reformatory end is the immediate governing end, is an unauthorized transfer of ecclesiastical polity into the state and the family, and so far is subversive of the true end of the civil and

domestic institutions. The practical carrying out of the notion would be fatal to the true happiness and well-being of states and of families.

In our conceptions, accordingly, of the "church of the future," we discard utterly, as not merely visionary and Utopian, but as positively erroneous and dangerous, the Bunsen and Arnold idea of an identification of the church and the state, involving but one society, and one order of functionaries, with common laws and common administration. We place it side by side with the dream of Plato respecting "the state of the future," absorbing into the state the family and all other social organizations. This notion is at war with all the essential ideas of a church and a state. It annihilates the well-received distinction between secularities and spiritualities. It is contradictory to the order of Providence, which has ordained first the family, then the state, then the church; each, as it evolves itself into distinct and independent being, assuming features and characteristics that imply perpetual separation. We indulge no idea of a retrogressive Providence. We look, rather, as the world advances to a consummation of God's gracious designs, for a fuller and clearer recognition of the peculiar design and being of the state, the family, and the church. We look for a recognition of the temporal character of the state; of its destination to effect a spiritual end through its fulfillment of a more immediate temporal end, of its investiture by God with a full power of legislation for this end,—with a full power of enacting and inflicting penal sanctions. Rejecting alike the narrow conception which Lord Bacon hands down with his endorsement from the ancients, "that a state is contained in two words, '*premiu*' and '*poena*,'" and the false and pernicious notion of some modern reformers that all physical violence is foreign to the design of the state and the family, we look for the time when true ideas of both as constituted, indeed, for temporal ends, but working under moral regulative principles, shall secure for them their legitimate ministration for the advance of the kingdom of God. We look for the time when, with Whately, the church will believe that "a pure morality and religion are precisely what cannot be produced by the coercive power of the civil magistrate," and will lay aside the exercise of such power in every form of its action; when it will seek to effect the design of its great founder's mission to save the world, by the use of that spiritual instrumentality which he has appointed,—the instrumentality alone of TRUTH AND LOVE.

ARTICLE II.

FUNDAMENTALS OF DOCTRINE.

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WHAT IS A FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINE.

THAT doctrine is fundamental which lies at and constitutes the foundation, so that if it be removed, the whole system of doctrine or religion to which it belongs, falls with it. It is therefore that, the denial of which involves a denial of the distinctive and characteristic features of the system of which it is a part. This may be taken in a doctrinal, or a practical sense, having respect to Christianity either as a system of truths, or a mode of life. That is a fundamental doctrine of Christianity, considered as a scheme of doctrine, which, being rejected, involves *by direct and immediate consequence*, the rejection of the scheme itself, or of whatever is most precious and distinctive in it. We say, *by direct and immediate consequence*; for since all truths are mutually harmonious and self-consistent, a rejection of any portion of the scheme of Christian doctrine, if followed out to its logical consequences, would lead to a denial of the whole. In this view, every error in religion would be fundamental, as we know it must be, to the full extent of its operation, mischievous. But it is not in such a sense that we use the word fundamental, or that the Christian church has used it. Errors which reach the foundation only by remote inference, though hurtful, are not fundamental. In our present imperfect and fallible state, none are wholly free from such spots and wrinkles, which, if they blemish, do not destroy the body of Christian truth. All can see the difference between the thrust of the sword which lops off an arm or an ear, and one which plunges into the heart, or severs the head from the body. The one only maims and mars; the other kills. Thus many Christians believe that not only the exercises of the heart possess moral quality, but also the inward states whence these exercises proceed; and that the "exercise scheme," as it is called, tends to a superficial and one-sided sort of piety, although this supposed pernicious tendency is often checked and neutralized by other healthful tendencies in combination with it. Yet few would presume to call this a "fundamental," however they might deplore it as a dangerous error. On the other hand, he who denies the divinity or personality of Christ, or the universality of human corruption and guilt, does deny the possibility or the necessity of such an atonement as the Bible represents to be the central doctrine of Christianity, and the only basis for human salvation. His

denial involves this, not by remote inference, but by immediate and necessary consequence, and so it is a denial of a fundamental doctrine.

Considered in a practical point of view, a fundamental doctrine is that, the belief of which is necessary to salvation. This test is virtually the same as the foregoing, except, possibly, in one aspect. Some Christians may possibly hold and live by the substance of a fundamental doctrine, while through ignorance, prejudice, or misapprehension, they reject the words, or the formal proposition, in which it is commonly expressed. Here they reject the words, but not the thing. In such a case, the only evidence that they receive the truth, while they disown the words which express it, is, that their whole inner life and being appear to be shaped in conformity to it. It may be a question to what lengths we may lawfully go in receiving to Christian communion those in whom ignorance and piety seem to be intermixed in such unseemly proportions. One thing, however, we must require, viz., that they "discern the Lord's body," or the vital import of his incarnation and atonement. But there can be no question what is our duty with respect to Christian teachers. If they deny the words which express any fundamental Christian doctrine, the plea of ignorance or prejudice is no defence to them in their official capacity. The very fact, if not of itself decisive proof of their want of piety, is proof of their incompetency for their office; that they are not qualified to be the spiritual guides of men, and were never called of God to be his ambassadors. To admit to, or retain in the ministry, men who deny fundamental doctrines, is virtually to proclaim to all men that we do not deem such doctrines fundamental; that it is safe to reject them; to live without any regard to what God has made a condition of salvation. It involves the guilt of treason to the truth of God, and treachery to the souls of men. And it is difficult for any body of men who are set for the defence of the gospel, and charged to commit it to faithful men, to perpetrate a more flagrant wrong.

HAS CHRISTIANITY ANY FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES?

It is unnecessary to labor the answer to this question. If we consider it in its first aspect as a body of doctrines, requirements, institutes, then it must contain some principles which make it what it is, as distinguished from other systems; which are the basis of all its peculiarities; in the removal of which Christianity itself is removed. There must be doctrines, in short, to reject which is to reject the gospel.

Considering it again as presenting a rule of life, and terms of salvation, to disbelieve the essential parts of this rule, or of these terms, is as certainly to refuse compliance with them. It must, then, contain doctrines the belief of which is indispensable to salvation. Nor are these mere deductions of reason. The Bible abundantly asserts and corroborates them: "He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned." As the previous verse shows, it is the gospel, on the belief of which our Saviour, in his last words on earth, declared that the salvation of men depends. Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God. 1 John, 4: 3. The Scriptures set forth that there is a doctrine according to godliness; a truth by which we are sanctified; a form of sound words to which we are commanded to hold fast. "Other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ." We are commanded to prove all things and hold fast that which is good: to turn away from those who are "reprobate concerning the faith." "Ever learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth;" to reject a "heretic after the first and second admonition." Those churches are commended which would not endure false apostles, and those are rebuked which tolerated a false prophetess. Rev. 2: 2, 20. It is needless to cite further testimonies. It is clear beyond all question that God teaches in his Word that there are fundamental doctrines, to reject which is to reject Christianity and ruin the soul.

WHAT DOCTRINES ARE FUNDAMENTAL.

Most men will admit that the positions thus far taken are irrefragable. But there are others who, while they concede that there must be some fundamental doctrines, virtually deny that it is possible to know what they are, and on this ground contend that the propagators of the most anti-evangelical sentiments cannot lawfully be dealt with as heretics. But we submit, whether to say that we cannot tell what are the fundamentals of Christianity, be not equivalent to saying that we do not know what Christianity itself is? It is the same as to say, we know not in what its essence or essentials consist. But if this be so, then how is it worthy of God its author, or how can it avail for the consolation or salvation of man? Is it not egregious trifling with the dearest interests of man, to present to him a method of salvation so enigmatically expressed, that it is impossible for him to know, and know assuredly, its vital import, what it is to accept, and what to reject it?

Is it not the severest possible reflection upon the Bible and upon God its author, to say that it demands of us faith in certain things on pain of eternal perdition, and that we cannot *know* what those things are; know when we receive them ourselves, and what in another constitutes a profession or rejection of them, a visible believer or an unbeliever? Must not the judgment and practice of evangelical Christendom, yea, all our simplest and most rudimental ideas in religion, be revolutionized before they can harmonize with such an hypothesis? Does it not also falsify the Bible, which declares itself able to make wise unto salvation; that if any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God; that believers know in whom they have believed; know the things that are freely given them of God, and may know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error? Does it not nullify the injunction to admonish, reject, and turn away from heretics; that if any man come bringing not the doctrine of Christ, we receive him not into our houses, neither bid him God speed; that we witness a good confession, and hold fast the profession of our faith without wavering?

Beyond a doubt, Christianity has its fundamental articles. And what they are may be known with sufficient accuracy. Among them unquestionably are the following:—

1. The plenary inspiration of the Scriptures. By this is meant that they were all written under the direction of the Holy Ghost, and are to be received, not as the word of man, but as the testimony of God; and as such constitute the supreme standard of doctrine and of appeal in religious controversies. All assaults upon the inspiration of the Scriptures; whether by attributing parts to a human origin, according to our liking, or by placing the inspired writers on the footing of the other great authors and master-spirits of our race; or by an exaltation of philosophy, or tradition to an equal rank or authority with them, are assaults on a fundamental doctrine. "To the law and the testimony; if they will not hear them, it is because there is no light in them." If the divine authority of the Bible falls, Christianity most clearly falls with it.

2. The universal depravity of mankind. This doctrine, as a fact, is not, indeed, peculiar to Christianity, or first revealed in the Bible. But like the being of God, it is a fact vital to Christianity, without which its provisions are unmeaning, and the whole system falls to the ground. The Bible, indeed, discloses the origin of it in the Fall of our First Parent, and our connection therewith. It may be every way reasonable to demand that Christian teachers should adopt the scriptural

view on this subject, since a doctrine which ceases to be held in its integrity, is apt sooner or later to be lost as to its vitality. But the main thing on which we now insist is, that whoever denies human sinfulness, denies the gospel, which is exclusively a remedy for this sinfulness. Whoever denies that all our race are sinful in such a sense that unless saved through the gospel, they are justly doomed to eternal perdition, denies that they who are not thus sinful, are in need of a Saviour. So Christ himself teaches: The whole need not a physician, but they that are sick. He who believes himself free from damning sin, can never embrace Christ. He who believes that any portion of our race are thus guiltless, can never come before his fellow-men, declaring to them, Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish: Except be born again, ye cannot see the kingdom of God: He that believeth not shall be damned. In short, it cannot be necessary to argue with Christian men, that the gospel stands or falls with the doctrine of universal human depravity.

3. The doctrine of the Trinity is a fundamental doctrine, and has so been held and treated by the church in all ages and nations—the doctrine, viz., of three coequal, coeternal, unconfounded Persons, in the undivided substance of the Godhead. This is the essence of the Catholic doctrine on the subject. The eternal Generation of the Son and Procession of the Spirit have been regarded by many communions as Scriptural, as adapted to preserve the doctrine in its integrity and soundness, and hence proper to be exacted of their authorized ministers and teachers. But this appendage of the doctrine, so far as we know, has never been insisted on in any communion as a term of fellowship, either in the case of their own private members, or as respects the Christian recognition of either members or ministers of other communions. But the church has never yet acknowledged either individuals or bodies as Christian, who denied that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are three coequal, coeternal persons in one God. And if the doctrine be vital, these points are vital to it. For if the persons be *real* persons in the Godhead, they must be eternal, else God is no longer immutable. If each person be eternally God, they must needs be equal. They must be One God, or we contradict the Bible and fall into polytheism. They must be real persons, i. e., capable of being the objects and sources of reciprocal intelligent and voluntary action. For this is the essence of personality. Wherever such a property is found, whether existing in three instances in a single nature, as in God, or in but one instance in two distinct natures united, as in Christ, there is a person, the essence of all

that makes an individual man a person : that makes one a proper subject of the terms I, thou, he, in their literal application. Wherever it is wanting, though there were forty beings, there is no person. This is precisely what the Scriptures attribute to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Thus explained, their separate, real, eternal personality is vital to Christianity, and a fundamental article of faith. For if they be not persons, how is it possible or conceivable that they should perform the various reciprocal, personal offices severally ascribed to them in the work of redemption? How is it possible that the Father should send the Son, or the Son should offer himself a sacrifice to the Father for the expiation of human guilt, or intercede for his people, or send his Spirit to renew and sanctify them? These are all personal acts, and require real persons for their performance.

If atonement and regeneration be realities, then no mere dramatic impersonations, got up for mere temporary appearance and effect, can work them. As no Trinity results in no atonement, so a mere dramatic Trinity results in a mere dramatic Atonement. Atonement and Trinity go together as to reality and unreality. All history does but echo this affirmation. The attempt to get rid of the difficulties and retain the advantages of a Trinity by substituting a mere appearance of it for the reality, is a failure. If we are to have any deviation from it short of downright Socinianism, Arianism or Tritheism were more tolerable, since these give us a real Person who can offer an atonement, although the former gives us an inadequate one. The doctrine of the Trinity is, therefore, fundamental, and has ever been treated by the church as such, because it enters vitally into every other evangelic doctrine on which our salvation and Christian life depend. So the venerable Confessions of the church declare: "Which doctrine of the Trinity is the foundation of all our communion with God, and of all comfortable dependence upon Him." If it be not fundamental, then, what is or can be fundamental? The Baptismal formula containing the Trinity is immediately followed by the solemn declaration—He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned. Whatever else, then, this threatening respects, it must include disbelief in the Trinity. That without the Trinity and the truths dependent upon it, the *sinner* can find no comfortable or acceptable access to God, is unquestionable.

4. The doctrine of vicarious atonement by Christ is fundamental in the Christian scheme, as it is indispensable to the Christian life. By vicarious atonement, we mean that Christ

suffered and died for, and instead of, sinners; that his sufferings and death are accepted in lieu of the merited punishment of believing sinners; that they were offered as a satisfaction to divine justice, and a vindication of the divine law, in freeing the believer from the curse of sin; in short, that they are substituted for the punishment of the believer, and constitute a real expiation. The doctrine implies further, that this was the first or main end of Christ's death: not that he suffered death chiefly as a martyr, or example, or as an incident to the accomplishment of some higher work, whether dramatic, æsthetic, or artistic; but that he died for sins, the just for the unjust, as bearing our iniquities, becoming a curse, offering himself to God for us. That this is the view of the object of his death constantly exhibited in the Scriptures, we shall not stop here to argue. It would require a treatise to marshal all the evidence which might be adduced in this behalf. We can only refer to any standard treatise on the Atonement. There is one work, however, devoted to this point exclusively, now nearly out of print, to which we wish to call attention. It is entitled, "The Death of Christ," by S. Edwards Dwight, and was published in Boston, in 1826. It shows with masterly force, with an almost mathematical conclusiveness, that Christ died as a substitute for sinners. Without designing to endorse every sentence it contains, we think its republication now would do good service to the cause of evangelical religion. If this was the end of Christ's death; if his death is the ground of the pardon of our sins; if the Scriptures require us to believe and trust him in this aspect, in order to justification and peace with God, then this doctrine is, past all doubt, fundamental. But certain it is that we are justified by faith—"faith in his blood"—"blood shed for the remission of sins." This is the high and glorious distinction of the Bible that presents a sufficient propitiation for sin, and meets the conscious wants of sinners. Nothing less than a believing view of such an atonement made for men can ever quiet the awakened sinner's guilty fears that justice must take its course upon him, in the pains of eternal retribution. Nothing less than this can bring him to God in child-like confidence and love. There is no other way by which he can come to God, and serve him with a true heart and right spirit. He must purge his conscience from dead works to serve the living God at the fountain opened for sin and transgression, before he can get beyond slavish fear, or presumptuous self-complacency in religion. It is not only Christ, but CHRIST CRUCIFIED, that is the wisdom of God and the power of God. Hence this doctrine lies at

the root of the Christian life. It is fundamental. He who rejects it, and builds on any other foundation, must roll to destruction. He becomes "a debtor to do the whole law." He who supposes that he can attain the favor of God, or escape his curse, otherwise than through the merit of Christ enduring the curse, for us, is grossly and fatally deluded, in regard to the evil of his own sins, the authority and sanction of the divine law, and the truth and righteousness of God. This doctrine is the life of Protestant and evangelical piety, nor has such piety ever prevailed where it has been rejected.

5. Resulting from this is the great Protestant doctrine of Justification by Faith. This was the key-note of the Reformation; not only Luther, but the whole Protestant evangelical church, have held it to be "the article of a standing or falling church." It is in this that the doctrine of atonement reaches its practical application,—its priceless efficacy in purging the conscience of the sinner, and giving him access to God. This doctrine is simply this, that we are justified, *i. e.*, accepted and dealt with as if just before God, solely out of respect to the merits of Christ, which inure to our benefit, when we trust in them, or receive them for this purpose, by faith in them. If this be the Bible method of acceptance with God, then it is plain that it excludes all other grounds and ways of justification. So we find that the Scriptures pronounce us justified by faith in Christ, and not by works, or by the law, will not here be disputed. As plainly do they assert, that "Christ is become of no effect" unto such as "are justified by the law," and that they are "fallen from grace." While this faith respects the whole person, offices, and work of Christ, yet in its formal character as justifying, it respects or trusts in his blood, his expiatory and redemptive work. "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood." "He that believeth not is condemned already." This, then, must needs be a fundamental doctrine.

6. The incarnation of Christ is thus shown to be a fundamental doctrine. Indeed, we are expressly taught this. "Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God," says John. It is vital to the atonement and mediatorship of Christ. As Mediator, it was requisite that he should represent each of the parties at variance, God and man. As a propitiation, it was requisite that he should be man in order to suffer after the manner of the nature to be redeemed from the curse; that he should be God in order to impart the requisite value to his sufferings. Thus it was necessary that he should be "very God and very man,"

two distinct natures in one person," and that he should become man by taking a true body and a reasonable soul into personal subsistence with his divinity. That such is the Scriptural representation, none can deny. That Christ was God; that he became man; that he possessed a true human body, and a true human soul, marked by all the distinct and peculiar activities of the human soul, is patent on the face of the evangelic narrative. Nor can this mystery be impugned in any of these its essential parts, without to an equal degree vitiating the whole doctrine of the atonement. The church has uniformly rejected all material variations, with which errorists have from time to time sought to corrupt it. The first of these is that of the Nestorians, who held that there were two Persons as well as two Natures in Christ; from which it would result that his sufferings and death had none of the infinite worth which they acquire from the union of divinity and humanity in the same Person. Then there is the Apollinarian heresy, which denies to Christ a proper human soul, the consequence of which would be, that the God-head itself could be the subject of that mental ignorance and growth in wisdom, and anguish, which the evangelists ascribe to Christ, and that he did not truly take the nature of the seed of Abraham. Then we have the Eutychean heresy, deriving the two natures in Christ, which must result in making him man only or God only, or a *tertium quid*, neither God nor man, having none of the qualifications for the Mediatory office which are contained either in his manhood or his divinity.

There is also the error of the Docetal, who taught that his incarnation, his human actions and sufferings, were mere appearances, having no reality; akin to which is the modern Pantheistic heresy, which makes the Incarnation a mere theophony, or divine manifestation, the same in kind, though higher in degree than that before made in the creation of the world and of man. It is needless to say that either form of this error is destructive of the Christian atonement and the Christian religion. We can scarcely wonder, then, at the stress which the Bible and the church have put upon the doctrine of the Incarnation, and the promptness with which every assault upon its purity and integrity has been repelled.

7. The doctrine of spiritual regeneration is a fundamental doctrine of Christianity. He who denies it, denies the main office of the Spirit in our salvation. He denies that human nature is under that bondage to sin which this divine agent alone can remove. He sees not the depth of his spiritual malady. No one ever truly sees his need of Christ to deliver

him from the curse, who will not also see his need of the Spirit to deliver him from the power, of sin. Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.

8. We shall only mention further the doctrine of the Resurrection of the body, the General Judgment, the life everlasting, and eternal retributions. Says Paul: "If there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen; and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." Not only, if this doctrine be abandoned, must we cease to believe that Christ has fully retrieved the ruins of the fall, by restoring our whole nature to the integrity which it had lost; but we must no longer believe in Christ's resurrection, which the Bible places on precisely the same footing with that of his people; and in the loss of this glorious truth, we lose an indispensable proof of his divinity and messiahship, his word and his religion. "Our faith is vain." It must, then, be a fundamental article. We know of no instance in which men have persisted in denying the resurrection of the body, who have not sooner or later made shipwreck of the faith.

The doctrine of the judgment to come lies at the foundation of human accountability. Religion cannot outlive, it never has outlived, its rejection.

That the awards of the judgment, whether of bliss or woe, will be eternal, is a fundamental doctrine. No other view adequately exhibits the evil of sin, the holiness and justice of God, in his hatred and punishment of it; the vastness of the love he shows, and of the boon he confers, in our redemption from it. No lighter estimate of the consequences of our course in this life, will arouse men to any effective pursuit of religion. But it is unnecessary to argue the case. Evangelical piety has never continued or extended itself beyond the belief of the doctrine of eternal punishment.

And this may be asserted as an undeniable fact in regard to each and every of the doctrines which we have marked as fundamental. Vital religion has ever disappeared just in proportion as these doctrines have disappeared. The church, amid all its diversities as to minor and circumstantial points, has always clung to these, and treated them as fundamental. They are therefore fundamental, not only to a consistent scheme of Christian doctrine, but to the Christian religion as a mode of life.

Rev. S. E. Dwight, in the treatise already referred to, observes, that they who deny the Atonement by Christ's death, also deny, "what have been regarded by the great body of the church in every age as the Fundamental Doctrines of Christianity; particularly the Depravity of Man, the Deity of Christ, the Reality and Necessity of Regeneration, the Personality and Agency of the Holy Spirit, Justification by Faith, and Eternal Punishment."

This is no random assertion. It is proved by the creeds and catechisms and recognized formularies of every accredited Christian body in existence. It is proved by the whole current of Christian literature; the tenor of all treatises enjoying the sanction of the Christian world, whether in polemic, didactic, or practical divinity; by the spirit and tone of all evangelical preaching, of all discipline, training and examinations, and whatever other requisites have been demanded for the ministerial office. Much more than an acknowledgment of these doctrines is often and justly required of candidates for the ministry, who must be not only sound in the faith, but apt to teach others also, and may reasonably be required to give their assent, not only to the fundamentals of Christianity, but also to whatever is requisite for the due exposition, defence, and enforcement of the same. But whatever room for diversity may be allowed in other things, we take it, that it cannot be admitted, that the foregoing doctrines are not fundamental, without also allowing, that the people of God in all generations have been mistaken as to what constitutes the essence of the religion he has revealed in his Word; which is not far from admitting that he has not in any true and proper sense made a revelation, and is a complete surrender to infidelity.

Have we, then, come to this, that we do not know what are the fundamental articles of our religion? that we have no recognized standard by which we can know what they are, and can hold such an attitude toward those who respectively accept or deny them, as their cases may respectively require? Is there any acknowledged Christian communion or church in the world, that does not acknowledge and treat these doctrines as fundamental, and reject at least from its ministry those who deny them? Have not nearly all of them public formularies which are decisive on this point? And for the rest, are not the creeds of individual churches, the examinations for licensure, the proceedings with respect to ministers, and often with respect to private members, who deny them, equally decisive?

It has been alleged, indeed, that the Congregational churches of New England can have no public standards of faith, because they acknowledge no ecclesiastical authority, or judicatories above individual churches. But whatever may be the theories and subtle refinements of any with respect to the seat of technical ecclesiastical jurisdiction, it still remains true that the New England churches maintain and exemplify the great Christian principle of the fellowship of churches. On this ground, in various ways, they recognize each other,

and are knit together as one communion. This principle lies at the basis of their Associations, Conferences, and Councils, smaller and larger, permanent and occasional. It is undeniable that a common faith, an agreement in the fundamentals of the Christian religion which we have noted, has been at the foundation of this communion, and of these unions. They have included within them none, they have excluded from them all, who have denied any of these fundamentals. Nay more, the recognized standard of theology among them has been Calvinistic, as appears not only in the fact that it is conspicuous, in all their public symbols (to which we shall presently advert), but in the writings of every standard divine who is recognized as an expositor of their principles; in the confessions of faith, adopted by individual churches as the basis of membership; in the prevailing tone of their preaching, doctrinal and practical; in the fact that the Assembly's Catechism is the universal manual for indoctrinating their youth; that a candidate rarely passes the ordeal of an examination for the ministry who is not made to approve himself as sound in regard to "decrees, election, and perseverance;" in the fact that the recent type of theology, known as "New Divinity," did not come in without confronting the most earnest and determined opposition, because it was supposed in some particulars to deviate from the Calvinistic formulas toward Arminianism and semi-Pelagianism; and that its friends insisted that they maintained every distinctive tenet of Calvinism intact and entire, thus showing, by the consent of all that Calvinism is the recognized divinity of the denomination. Many instances have occurred in which candidates have been rejected for their deficiencies on points of Calvinism, who even supposed themselves to be Calvinistic. The Creeds subscribed by the Professors of all the Theological Seminaries in New England are also conclusive to the same effect. Not only so, but the churches in New England, assembled in councils for the purpose, have formally adopted the Calvinistic formulas, in repeated instances. In 1648 such a council met, and pronounced the Westminster Confession "very holy, orthodox, and judicious, in matters of faith," making exception only to matters of "church government and discipline." Another council, assembled in Boston in 1680, voted their approval of the Savoy Confession, and ordered it to be printed "for the benefit of the churches in the present and after times." Speaking of the advantages of Confessions, this council, among other things, say: "Nor are they worthy of the name of Christians who refuse to declare what they

believe.” In 1708 a General Council of the churches of Connecticut was held at Saybrook, in which they adopted the Savoy Confession as the declaration of their faith. They also adopted a Platform of church government, which is the basis of the Associations and Consociations in that State. They further adopted the “Heads of Agreement” framed by a meeting of Congregational and Presbyterian ministers held in England in 1690, designed to reconcile circumstantial differences in church discipline among those who were fully agreed as to Christian doctrine. One of these “Heads” was the following :

“As to what appertains to soundness of judgment in matters of faith, we esteem it sufficient that a church acknowledge the Scriptures to be the word of God, the perfect and only rule of faith and practice, and own either the doctrinal part of those commonly called the Articles of the Church of England, or the Confession or Catechisms, shorter or larger, compiled by the Assembly at Westminster, or the Confession agreed on at the Savoy, to be agreeable to the said rule.” The intent of this Council, and the spirit of the Platform they adopted, are therefore plain. They designed to establish a regimen liberal enough to embrace the different varieties of Calvinists, and sufficiently strict and rigorous to exclude heresy. And considering all the circumstances of the case, it evinces in a high degree the wisdom of its framers.

THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF THE NEW ENGLAND CHURCHES ON
THESE SUBJECTS.

If it be a wonder that a question should be raised, whether these churches have any definite standard of faith, it is no less a fact that it is seriously raised by one class who deem it the glory, and by another who deem it the reproach, of Congregationalism, that it raises no barrier to the encroachments of heresy. We find the following in a recent pamphlet :—
“We ask now, with these conflicting theories standing out before us, what is orthodoxy ? What is that determinate faith of the church whose rejection is to be regarded as the rejection of Christianity ?”

We in our turn ask, we put it to the ministers and churches of New England, nay, of evangelical Christendom, whether the articles we have specified, viz., the plenary inspiration of the Bible, the fall and corruption of man, the Trinity, incarnation and atonement, justification by faith, repentance, spiritual regeneration, the resurrection of

¹ See Pres. Clap's Brief History and Vindication of the Doctrines of the New England Churches.

the body, the final judgment, the life everlasting, and eternal retributions, are not fundamental articles? And is not the rejection of them the rejection of Christianity? Nay, however ignorance or confused apprehensions of some of them may coexist in some cases with real piety, can any one of them *be intelligently rejected*, or by a minister rejected at all, *salva fide et salva ecclesia*? Does not such rejection involve the most imminent peril?

Moreover, is not this evinced to be the judgment of Congregationalists by every method in which the standard of faith among a people can make itself known? Has the Westminster Catechism been disowned? Has the Saybrook Platform ever been abolished? Was it not adopted in form as the recognized standard of the Congregational body in Connecticut? When has this act of adoption ever been revoked? But if no instance of its revocation can be found, there are repeated instances of renewed assent to it, and of renewed assertion of the importance of adhering to it. This the General Association did at Guilford in 1742, and again at Fairfield in 1753, in the following words:

"We recommend it to the particular Associations, that they be very careful that the true and great Doctrines of the gospel, agreeable to the Confession of Faith, be maintained and preached up, against the Arminian, Antinomian, and other errors, and that especial care and pains be taken with our youth, to instruct them in the principles of our holy religion and Articles of our Faith." *President Clap's Brief History, &c., p. 17.*

At a meeting in Middletown in 1755, they voted among other things as follows:

"This Association earnestly recommend it to the particular Associations in this Colony, to agree among themselves, frequently to insist upon these doctrines contained in our Confession of Faith, which are contrary to the prevailing errors of the day; and particularly that they would bear a sufficient testimony against Socinianism, Arminianism, Arianism, Pelagianism, Antinomianism, or any other errors that may arise among us. * * * We freely declare our adherence to the doctrines contained in our Confession of Faith." *Ibid. p. 18.*

But is it said that although this is in form and name the Confession of Faith of the General Association of Connecticut, yet it has been tacitly suffered to fall into disuse, and to lose its binding force? We ask, in what particular? We ask, if the doctrines common to the Westminster formulas, shorter and larger, the Savoy Confession, and the Thirty-nine Articles, are not now the doctrines of the churches and ministers in Connecticut and New England, and if any one can find access to the ministry among them who does not avow

his belief in them? It is doubtless true, that the doctrines of Imputation, of Particular Redemption, and of the Eternal Generation of the Son, and Procession of the Spirit, are not insisted on. But is not the last of these doctrines omitted in the Shorter Catechism, and are not the two former left out of the Thirty-nine Articles? Much more we may ask, has any man ever yet been allowed to keep his place in the ministry who has openly rejected the doctrines that are cardinal and fundamental in all these confessions, such as the articles that we have proved to be fundamental? So far from this, the only ministers who have ever been known to deny them, or any of them, have been promptly censured, and proving incorrigible, have been deposed. With respect to Massachusetts, we may appeal to the rejection of the whole Unitarian body, and the recent refusal to license Mr. Leslie, on account of unsound views of Inspiration. In Connecticut, Rev. Mr. Abbot of Coventry, and a Mr. Sherman were deposed for denying the divinity and vicarious atonement of Christ. In common with the churches of all New England, those of Connecticut hold no fellowship, direct or indirect, with those denominations that deny either these doctrines, or eternal punishment. Nay, private members of churches have often been excommunicated for these heresies. We remember that a communicant in the First Church in New Haven (Dr. Bacon's) was, some years ago, cast out for espousing Universalism. How, then, can it be claimed, that the Saybrook Platform is no longer in force, when it is in form the symbol of the Connecticut churches, and for the substance of it, it is in fact their standard in ecclesiastical proceedings? When we say it is in force, we mean not that it takes the place of the Bible as the supreme rule in matters of faith, but that it is the authorized declaration of the sense in which these churches understand the Bible. It is the confession, the testimony which they give to the world for the gospel. In this sense, it was originally adopted, as appears from the Preface to the Confession itself. In this sense, how has it become obsolete? Has it not been of late years reprinted by the direction, and under the superintendence of the General Association, and with such explanations and comments appended to the governmental parts of it, as serve to illustrate the usages which have grown up under it? How and when, then, has it become obsolete, or in any manner ceased to be recognized as a symbol declaratory of the received faith of the churches?

Moreover, at the last meeting of the General Association of Connecticut, recently in most of the New England Associations votes have been passed earnestly recommending that

the children of the congregations be instructed in the Assembly's Catechism. What could more strongly indicate an adherence to the ancient formulas?

But it has been said that it is no part of the functions of a General Association to interfere for the suppression of heresy among the churches and district Associations, though it may declare the doctrines which it, on its own part, accepts as Christianity. This, like all plausible errors, contains a half-truth. That half-truth is, that it is not a judicial body, before which persons are to be tried for heresy or other scandals. But as a Christian body associated for the promotion of Christianity within its bounds, it is its right and duty to declare, as such bodies have abundantly declared, what it deems to be Christianity. This necessarily involves the right, and may involve the duty, of declaring negatively what it does not admit to be Christianity. It may, and it must, as occasion requires, fix conditions of membership. Until it ceases to deserve the name of a Christian body, it must take the ground that to hold or abet anti-Christian sentiments, disqualifies for membership in it; and if any of the local bodies connected with it persist in espousing or countenancing such heresies, it must, in order to self-clearing, after the first and second admonition, reject them. This right and correlative duty are inherent in it as a Christian body, by force of principles that lie deeper than all written constitutions. Not only so, but it is an advisory body, whose especial duty it is to counsel and admonish the ministers and churches in regard to whatever concerns their welfare, and especially to sound the alarm to them on the approach of danger. This service these bodies constantly perform in reference to subjects innumerable: And is it to be pretended for a moment that the interests, the perils, and the duties pertaining to our holy faith, which is the very foundation of the churches, and of religion itself, are alone to be excluded from the scope of their faithful watch and care, their admonitions and counsels? This pretence vanishes on the very statement of it. In these ways General Associations have repeatedly interfered for the suppression of heresy. They have refused fellowship with the Unitarians of Massachusetts, and given their fellowship to the Orthodox who separated from them, taking joyfully the spoiling of their goods. In former times, as we have already shown, the Association of Connecticut sounded the alarm to the churches, and charged the district Associations to guard against various heresies which it specified by name as stealing in unawares. And more recently it has not failed to perform this duty, as occasion has required. Thus,

in an address to the churches in 1808, urging them to the practice of gospel discipline, they urge the discipline of heretics, "who obstinately adhere to some essential error, subversive of the atonement by Christ, or rendering his cross "of none effect." Among these, they class those who "deny the divinity, personality, and messiahship of Christ." They appointed a committee to examine the proceedings of the Tolland consociation in deposing Rev. Mr. Abbot, some forty years since, who reported among other facts, that he was deposed for denying the Trinity, the incarnation and vicarious atonement of Christ. This report was referred to a committee consisting of Dr. Dwight, Dr. Beecher, and Rufus Anderson, who recommended that the Association pass the following, among other votes, which was accordingly done :

"That in the late proceedings in Coventry, the Elders and Churches in Tolland County have, in the opinion of the General Association, borne a judicious, faithful, and highly commendable testimony to the truth."

"That according to the firm belief of this General Association, a denial of the deity of Jesus Christ is heresy."

"That a profession of faith made in the words of Scripture is no real exhibition of the real faith of the professor; since all persons who acknowledge the divine origin of the Scriptures would, although some of them are in their faith directly opposed to others, make the same profession in the same words."

It results inevitably from the nature of the case, and from the whole past history of these Associations, therefore, that it is their duty to interpose, in appropriate ways, for the suppression of heresy, when the necessity for it unhappily occurs. So far as judicial action is necessary in counteracting false doctrine, this devolves on the local Associations and Councils which pertain to the Congregational system; and ever has been, and still is used, when occasion requires it. But suppose that a particular local body is deficient in this particular, is there any remedy? Unquestionably. It is open to the fraternal labors and admonitions of other like bodies in fellowship with it. If these prove unavailing, and the case seem to require it, they may be pressed to the extent of non-communication, as the desperate remedy for a desperate case. This was the final issue in the case of the Massachusetts Unitarians.

We think, then, that it has been made apparent that there are fundamental doctrines in Christianity: that it may be known what they are: that there is a general agreement respecting them among evangelical churches: that the evangelical communions in New England form no exception, whether we consider their formulas of faith, their standard Christian literature, or their uniform practice and discipline:

that notwithstanding the weak tirades of ambitious innovators against creeds, they still, in common with all Christians and the Bible, present a *credendum* somewhat to be believed, even the fundamentals of Christianity, as the condition of admission to their fellowship. Nor can we doubt what will be the issue of attempts to obtain tolerance among them for anti-Christian heresy, glossed though it may be with the fascinations of genius and eloquence. They will never sacrifice the faith of God's elect.

ARTICLE III.

THE END OF GOD IN CREATION.

By REV. W. C. WISNER, Lockport, N. Y.

CREATION is the power of God causing beings and things to spring into existence from nothing, and thus filling immensity with the works of his hand. The creations of man (as they are termed) are wonderful. But they are confined to casting into new forms, and bringing into original combinations, materials furnished to his hands. He cannot originate a single particle of that matter upon which he exercises his skill. The power of causing something to exist from nothing belongs to Omnipotence alone.

The magnitude of creation is beyond the conception of finite mind. Think of eighty millions of suns, the centres of systems like our own, already discovered—and the myriads of such systems which doubtless lie “beyond the ken of the eye and of the telescope”—and the whole revolving in silent and solemn grandeur around the point where God has fixed his throne as the physical and moral centre of the universe. No wonder the Psalmist should exclaim in astonishment and almost in fear lest he should be overlooked in the immensity of God's works: “When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers; the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained; what is man that thou art mindful of him, or the son of man that thou visitest him?”

The creation of God suggests to the rational mind of man the pertinent and important inquiry, What was the *design*, the *ultimate objective end* of the Creator, in bringing this immense system into being? It is the object of this paper to furnish, if possible, a satisfactory answer to the question.

I. Let us first explain what we mean by the end of God in creation.

The end for which an intelligent being performs an act, or a

series of acts, is either ultimate or subordinate. An ultimate end is that which the being desires for what it is in itself, and not that he may use it to accomplish something else. As when a miser seeks gold for what it is in itself, to gratify his avaricious desire of hoarding, and not for what he can obtain by means of this gold. So, when one visits his distant friends to gratify the social tendencies of his nature, without reference to any other and after benefit to result therefrom, this social visit is the *ultimate end* of the journey. A subordinate end is, as the term indicates, an end to an end; or an end for the accomplishment of some other end. As when a man resolves to become a merchant, to make property to support his family. In this case the becoming a merchant is an end subordinate to that of making property, and both these are subordinate to the ultimate end, viz., that of supporting the family. So in the case of a man who purchases a riding establishment to take a journey to see his friends—the purchase is an end subordinate to that of taking the journey, and both these are subordinate to the ultimate end, viz., enjoying the society of friends.

It will be seen at once that an ultimate end, or that for which all other ends in the series exist, and from which they derive their importance, is in the mind of the agent his *chief end*. Thus in the case first supposed above; the becoming a merchant is an end valued only on account of its relation to that of making property,—and both these ends are valued only on account of their relation to that of supporting the family, which is both the ultimate and chief end in this series.

It is contended by some that the same series of subordinate ends may have more than one ultimate end, of which one may be chief, and the others inferior ends. This was the opinion of Edwards. He says: "Two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their own sake, and both sought in the same work or acts, and yet one valued more highly and sought more than another. Thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoyments, both which may be agreeable to him in themselves considered, and so both may be what he values on their own account, and seeks for their own sake; and yet one may be much more agreeable than the other; and so be what he sets his heart chiefly upon, and seeks most after in his going a journey. Thus a man may go a journey partly to obtain the possession and enjoyment of a bride that is very dear to him, and partly to gratify his curiosity in looking in a telescope, or some new-invented and

¹ Worcester edition, vol. vi. p. 11.

extraordinary optic glass. Both may be ends that he seeks in his journey, and the one not properly subordinate, or in order to another. One may not depend on another, and therefore both may be ultimate ends; but yet the obtaining his beloved bride may be his *chief* end; and the benefit of the optic glass his *inferior* end. The former may be what he sets his heart vastly most upon; and so be properly the *chief* end of his journey." Our view differs somewhat from that of Edwards upon this point. As these different objects are to be obtained by the same course of action; or by the same series of subordinate ends; we believe it would be speaking more correctly to represent them as forming *one compound ultimate* end, rather than two distinct ultimate ends.

We see not why ultimate ends may not be divided into simple and compound. Simple when confined to a single object. Compound when they consist of more objects than one. Thus, that which is to be obtained or accomplished by the same series of actions or events, should, as we think, be viewed as *one* end, although composed of several objects. To make this the more apparent we observe (a). That two objects may go to form a part of the ultimate end for which a certain course is pursued or adopted, it is necessary that both move the mind of the agent to the adoption of the course; and not that while one moves the other comes in as something to be enjoyed in consequence of the course. Suppose, for illustration, an individual to visit Boston to attend the annual meeting of the A. B. C. F. M.; and being there, he improves the opportunity to inspect the various objects of interest which are to be found in that city, and is delighted with what he sees. In this case, the seeing of Boston, and the delight which the view afforded, formed no part of the ultimate end of the journey, for it exerted no moving influence upon the mind before the agent left home. He would have visited any other city as readily as Boston, provided the Board had held its Sessions there. The pleasure of seeing Boston was merely incidental to, and formed no part of, the object of the journey. But if we suppose that this individual had previously been seized with a desire to see that city, yet not so great as to induce him to visit it for this purpose alone, but still so great as to cause him to attend a meeting of the Board more readily, because of its being held there, then the seeing of Boston would form, not a distinct end or motive, for it had not power of itself to move, but an ingredient in or a part of the end which did move. Attending the Board formed the principal part of the motive power, and it would have moved by itself alone; but the other consideration, although compara-

tively feeble and unable to move by itself, when combined with the first, adds strength to the motive; and thus from being simple it becomes compound.

(b). Of two objects which go to form a compound ultimate end, neither may have the power to move when by itself: as when an individual undertakes a journey to see friends, and to attend to some items of business. Both objects, taken together, are sufficient to move him to the journey; but neither, separately, would be sufficient. Here are not two ultimate ends, for it takes the influence of both, conjointly, to move to action; but the *one* end is *compound*, made up of the united motive power of both objects. Nor is the case materially changed where each object has motive power in itself sufficient to move to action. Suppose the intercourse with friends a sufficient motive of itself to cause the journey; and likewise that the business to be attended to was of sufficient importance to produce the same result; although no friends were to be seen, still it would seem that, as they exert their influence in the same direction, and lead to the same course of action, they should not be called distinct ends, but component parts of the same ultimate end. They go to form the cord of motive which draws the agent in that direction. This cord may be composed of a variety of objects, which go to make up the strands of which it is formed. These strands may differ in size, and strength, or power, but they are all united and twisted together, so as to form but one cord. Thus, in the case supposed by President Edwards, of an individual undertaking a journey to "obtain a bride," and to "look in a telescope," instead of making these two objects distinct ultimate ends, the one the inferior, and the other the chief end, as they blend their influence, and lead to the same result, we should call them a *compound ultimate end*, composed of these two parts, one of which was altogether inferior in magnitude and power to the other. It seems to us that the same series of subordinate ends can have but one ultimate end, which may be either simple or compound; and this ultimate is always the chief end of the series. It should be borne in mind that what we seek to ascertain in this paper is God's ultimate, and, of course, *chief* end, in creating the universe, or in adopting the present physical and moral system.

Again: The ends or purposes of intelligent beings are divided into *subjective* and *objective* ends. The subjective end has reference to the feelings and desires of the agent or being, which are to be gratified by the selection and accomplishment of the objective end. It consists in the gratification of these

feelings and desires. The objective end is the thing to be done or brought to pass, and to the accomplishment of which the agent is prompted by these feelings, affections, or desires. To illustrate this distinction, let us recur again to the miser who toils to obtain gold for its own sake, that he may hoard it up. In this case, it is avarice of the most debasing kind which prompts him to labor for gold, and the gratification of this feeling forms his *subjective* ultimate end; while the *possession* of the gold which he labors to obtain, and which he desires for what it is in itself, forms his *objective* ultimate end.

It is not the subjective end of God in creating the universe that we seek. We know this must have been based in the perfections of his character; it must have been for the gratification of his infinite benevolence, his boundless love, that he adopted and spake into being the present system of things. But there must be some objective end toward which he is impelled by his benevolence and love, and for the accomplishment of which the present system was caused to exist. It is this *objective* end that we are endeavoring to ascertain.

II. We proceed to point out what we consider God's end in creation to have been.

And here we premise that whatever this end was, it was something in the order of time *future*; that is, something yet to be obtained or accomplished. It would be absurd to suppose a being to adopt and carry out a plan to obtain a good, or to accomplish an end which was already obtained or accomplished. It is therefore evident that the end for which a course is pursued must be something in the order of time future—something yet to take place. This fact we shall find to be important in our after discussion, and the reader will bear it in mind.

We are now prepared for the general statement that, according to our view, the end of God in creation is not to be found in himself—that God is not his own end. In assuming this position, we take ground somewhat different from that of Edwards: This we do with great reluctance and no small share of diffidence. We are not among those who believe that antagonism to greatness insures to one's self a portion of that greatness. It would, however, be weak and pusillanimous, from modesty, or reverence, to surrender what we consider important truths to the authority of great names. The difference between Edwards and ourself upon this point may be traced mainly to a distinction which he has omitted to make, but which we deem of great importance. We mean the distinction which exists between the *display* of the attributes and perfections of God, and the *effect* produced by that dis-

play upon the mind of the beholder. These attributes and perfections belong to God; their display is the act of God; but the impression made upon the mind of another, by this display, forms no part of God; it is not the act of God, but the result of that act; it is an effect which was not produced, nor does it exist in the mind of God, but which was produced and exists in the mind of the creature. The importance of this distinction will be made apparent hereafter.

That God could not have been his own end in creation, we argue from the *infinite fullness of his nature*. We can conceive of but one way in which a being can become his own objective end in anything he does, and that is by supposing that he is destitute of something of which he feels the need, and consequently desires for himself. To illustrate: take the scholar who pursues with diligence his studies; he may do this because he delights in knowledge, and his ultimate objective end may be an increase of knowledge; or he may do it because knowledge will render him more worthy of esteem. In either case, the ultimate end is to be found in himself, and in both the idea of defect on the part of the agent is prominent. Were his knowledge already perfect, there would be no need that he should study to increase it. Nay, to increase it would be impossible, and he would be as worthy of esteem as knowledge could make him. So a man may feel the need of a new habitation; he may deem such a one as he proposes necessary to his comfort, and he may proceed to erect one accordingly. In this case, the ultimate end of his proceeding to build is that he may occupy a dwelling fitted up with convenience, elegance, and taste, i. e., in this act he is *his own end*. But this supposition carries upon its face the idea of *defect*—of something needed by the man, which he does not possess. Nor can we suppose a being to make himself the end in what he does, without supposing that he lacks something which he deems necessary to his completeness, which always implies defect.

Now until some defect is found to exist in God—until it can be shown that he does not possess, and has not from eternity possessed; infinite fullness; that there is in his case some personal want unsupplied, it is impossible to show that God is his own end in creation. The infinite perfection of his character, and the infinite fullness of his being, utterly preclude that such should be the case.

But it may be well to dwell more at large upon this part of the subject.

1. God's own happiness could not be his ultimate end in creation. It will be borne in mind, that the ultimate end is

something in the *future*, something yet to be accomplished. God's happiness can be made his end in creation in only two ways—by increasing it, or by continuing it. But this happiness can never be increased, for it is already perfect in kind, and infinite in degree. And the only way in which the continuance of this happiness can be made God's end in creation is, by supposing it necessary in order to the continued gratification of his benevolent feelings. While the feelings of God's heart are fully gratified he must be happy; and we admit that his failing to accomplish any purpose, and thus failing to gratify these feelings, would disappoint and render him unhappy. So that the continued gratification of these feelings; and thus the continuance of his happiness, was undoubtedly an end of God in creation; but, as we have seen, this was his subjective, and not his objective end. We perceive, then, that God's happiness, either in its increase or continuance, is not the end for which we seek.

2. God's attributes, natural or moral, could not have been his end in creation. The only ways in which we can conceive the attributes of God to be his end in creation, are to increase them, to exercise them, or to display them. The first could not have been his end, for the increase of attributes already infinite is impossible. The second, that of exercising his attributes, is considered by Edwards a part of God's end in creation, or, as he would prefer to call it, *one of God's ends*—perhaps not his *chief* end, but still one of his *ultimate* ends.

"It seems," says he, "a thing in itself fit, proper, and desirable, that the glorious attributes of God, which consist in a sufficiency for certain acts or effects, should be exerted in the production of such effects, as might manifest the infinite power, wisdom, righteousness, goodness, &c., which are in God. If the world had not been created, these attributes never would have had any exercise. The power of God, which is a sufficiency in him to produce great effects, must forever have been dormant and useless as to any effect. The divine wisdom and prudence would have had no exercise in any wise contrivance, any prudent proceeding, or disposal of things, for there would have been no objects of contrivance or disposal. The same might be observed of God's justice, goodness, and truth. Indeed, God might have known as perfectly that he possessed these attributes, if they had never been exerted or expressed in any effect. But then if the attributes, which consist in a sufficiency of correspondent effects, are in themselves excellent, the exercise of them must likewise be excellent." Vol. VI. pp. 29, 30.

It will be seen from this that Edwards makes the exercise of God's infinite attributes a thing desirable in itself, and one of his ends in creation. If we understand him, he teaches that God exerted his infinite power and wisdom in creation for the *sake of exerting them*; their exercise was in itself excellent, and one ultimate object or end which Deity had in view in exerting them, was that they *might be exerted*.

That is, the exercise itself, and the end of that exercise, are the same thing. To show the absurdity of this position, we remark :

(a). The moral attributes of God were not exercised at all in the work of creation. Benevolence cannot create, nor justice, nor mercy. The only attributes which were, or could have been exerted by God in the work of creation, are his infinite wisdom to contrive, and his eternal power to execute. We admit that the gratification of the benevolent feelings of God's heart led him to exercise these natural attributes in one direction rather than another ; but the gratification of these feelings, as has been already shown, is the *subjective* end of God in creation

But it may be asked, Did not the work of creation furnish an occasion for the exercise of God's moral attributes, viz., his benevolence, justice, and mercy ? Certainly it did. But that which is a mere incident of creation cannot be its end. It would be absurd to suppose beings created and a government established simply for the sake of exercising justice and mercy, without any farther and ulterior end. But upon this point we need not dwell ; for Edwards himself admits that this was no part of God's end in creation.

"God," says he, "before he created the world, had some good in view as a consequence of the world's existence that was originally agreeable to himself, in itself considered, that inclined him to create the world, or to bring the universe with its various intelligent creatures into existence, in such a manner as he created it. But after the world was created, and such and such intelligent creatures actually had existence, in such and such circumstances, then a wise, just regulation of them was agreeable to God in itself considered. And God's love of justice and hatred of injustice, would be sufficient in such a case to induce God to deal justly with his creatures, and to prevent all injustice in him toward them. But yet there is no necessity of supposing that God's love of doing justly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what originally induced God to create the world, and to make intelligent beings ; and so to order the occasion of doing either justly or unjustly. The justice of God's nature makes a just regulation agreeable, and the contrary disagreeable, as there is occasion, the subject being supposed, and the occasion given : But we must suppose *something else that shall induce him to create the subjects, or order the occasion.*" Vol. VI. p. 16.

Here, then, we have the admission of Edwards, that the occasion which God's act of creation afforded him to exercise his moral attributes was not his ultimate end in creation, or any part of it. In his own language : "We must suppose something else which should incline him to create the subjects, or order the occasion." If, therefore, God's moral attributes were not exercised in the work of creation ; and if the occasion creation afforded for the exercise of these attributes

formed no part of his ultimate end in creating, then it follows that the exercise of these attributes could not have been his end in creation.

(b). To suppose God to exercise his natural attributes or powers, simply for the sake of exercising them; or that this forms any part of his ultimate end in exercising them, is a supposition entirely unworthy of Deity. We deny that there is anything excellent in itself in the exercise of natural powers, simply for the sake of exercising them: and this denial holds good whether these powers are finite or infinite; whether they belong to the creature or to the Creator. For a man to exercise his powers simply for the sake of exercising them, without any other end or design, would be absurd and foolish; and shall we attribute to God what would be beneath the dignity of man? Besides, were there any excellency in the simple exercise of powers without reference to the design, object, or result, then this excellence would inhere without respect to the direction in which these powers were exercised, and their exercise would remain excellent although put forth in such a direction as to produce *malevolent* results, i. e., the exercise is *in itself excellent*, although the results produced are infinitely *hateful*. Those who can may believe such a doctrine; we cannot.

The truth is, that all the excellence which attaches to the exercise of natural powers, depends upon and is borrowed from, their designed results. If the designed results are excellent, the exercise taken in connection with these results is excellent; but if they are malevolent and hateful, then is the exercise taken in connection with them hateful. While the exercise of natural powers has no moral character—no excellence of its own, it borrows such a character from its intended result. The exercise of God's wisdom and power in the work of creation is excellent, because the designed result is excellent, and for no other reason. It is evident, then, that the mere exercise of God's attributes, whether natural or moral, forms no part of his ultimate end in creation.

Nor can the mere display of his attributes form any part of God's end in creation. One definition of display is "to spread out," to furnish signs of, or evidence concerning, without reference to any effect produced upon mind by this spreading out or furnishing of evidence. Another definition is, "to exhibit to the sight or mind," taking in both the spreading out, or exhibition of an object, and its being perceived or apprehended by an intelligent agent.¹ We use the term in this

¹ We are sustained by the best lexicographers in this double rendering of *display*. We mention this because its correctness has been doubted by some

place in the former, and more limited sense. What we mean to assert is, that it was no part of God's end in creation to spread out, furnish, or display the evidence of the existence and nature of his attributes, *simply* for the sake of making such a display, and without regard to the effect it would naturally produce upon intelligent mind. An author, for illustration, publishes a work which bears the impress of his mind; it displays a heart full of benevolence, a genius of the first order, and the workings of a mighty intellect. Now, according to our present use of the term, this *display* is made, although the book is never read, or these attributes understood and appreciated by a single individual. The book contains the marks of genius and intellectual power just as really as if it were read. Could we suppose Daniel Webster to have made his great speech against Haynes alone in his study instead of the Senate Chamber, it would still contain or display all its present evidences of the mental powers of the man; the only difference would be, that no one being present, the display would have produced no effect upon mind. The fact that multitudes have never read this speech, or been affected by it, does not lessen the display it contains of the powers of its distinguished author: nor would this display be lessened if it had never been heard or read by a single individual. And so likewise the attributes of God are displayed just as perfectly in the work of creation, whether or not there be mind to be affected by this display. This earth, with its plants and animals, displayed the wisdom and the power of God just as really before man was created to apprehend and be affected by them, as afterward. Now the position we take is, that such a display as this, considered *separately from any effect to be produced upon mind by it*, formed no part of God's end in creation.¹ We are led to this conclu-

who contend that the use of this word always implies the presence of intelligent agents to be effected by the "unfolding," or "spreading out." Johnson defines "display" to mean, "1. To spread wide." "2. To exhibit to the sight or mind." Webster, "1. Literally, to unfold; hence, to open; to spread wide; to expand." "2. To spread before the view; to exhibit to the eyes, or to the mind; to make manifest." Here we have the best authority for the distinction we have made, and we consider it of no mean importance to a correct understanding of the present argument.

¹ It may be said that divines, who have held that the display of his attributes forms a part of God's end in creation, have used the term in its secondary and more enlarged sense, including the effect upon mind. Admitted; but the question returns, of which of the two parts of this definition do they predicate this end? If of the first part, we take issue with them, and deny its correctness. If they confine it to the second part, viz., the effect which the "unfolding" or "spreading out" produces upon the minds of intelligent agents, then, we ask, why not make the distinction instead of confounding the two things? We can see no reason why, unless it is because this distinction

sion, because such a display, simply in the light of a display, and aside from the effect it produces upon intelligent mind, is entirely valueless. God understood and delighted in his own attributes just as perfectly before this display as afterward, and, aside from its effect upon other minds, it must be made in vain; which is unworthy of the GREAT SUPREME. What would be thought of an author who should write and publish a book simply to display the powers of his mind, without any idea of having it read to produce an effect upon other minds? What should we think of a Webster, if he had delivered the speech already referred to in his study, alone, simply to display the attributes of his great mind, without any reference to the effect such a display might produce upon others? Who does not know that such a course would be considered extremely absurd? And yet even from such a course good would result to these authors, which, from the nature of the case, could not possibly result to Deity. No author could compose with ability a book, and thus display powers of mind and heart, without increasing or enlarging those powers; the exercise they would receive in the act, would render them larger and stronger. And a similar result must follow the preparation and delivery of such a speech as Webster's, although it were delivered in solitude. But such an effect is not supposable in the case of the Infinite One. His powers can never be increased by exercise. They were from eternity infinitely great; and infinitude precludes increase. It follows, therefore, that God would not reap the benefit from such a course which would accrue to man. And shall we attribute to the INFINITELY WISE AND HOLY GOD that which we should consider absurd in finite man? It seems to us perfectly evident, that the simple display of God's attributes, for its own sake, can form no part of his end in creation.

We can conceive of but one other way, by which this display of the attributes or powers of a being can have the being himself for its end; and that is by receiving some good, real or supposed, from the effect produced upon other minds by such display. A man, for example, may make a display of his abilities, and produce a powerful effect upon others, not for the sake of the display, nor for the sake of the impression produced; but for the sake of some gain to himself, or to feed his vanity. In such a case, the ultimate end of the being making the display would be found in himself. But such a supposition is not admissible in regard to God. To

shows so clearly, that the end for which we seek, is not in God himself; for surely this effect is not produced in God's mind, but in the minds of his creatures.

suppose that he can receive good from his creatures, or that he is in any sense dependent upon them for his happiness, so that impressions made upon their minds can either increase or diminish it, would be to deny at once his own infinite fullness and independence. It is therefore evident that God's end in creation could not have been any good he expected to receive from his creatures, in consequence of the display he should make of the attributes of his glorious character.

Let us recapitulate, and see to what point we have arrived. We started with the proposition, that God was not his own end in creation; or that God's end in creation cannot be found in himself. We have shown that God's happiness was not his end; that his attributes, natural and moral, whether we consider their increase, their exercise, or their display, were not, and could not have been his end. We have shown that his end could not consist in any good which he expected to receive, or was capable of receiving from his creatures, owing to impressions made upon their minds by the display of his attributes in the work of creation. We know of no other way in which God can be his own end in creation. And if there is no other way, then the end which we seek is not to be found in God, and we must look for it in some other direction.

To this view it is objected by Edwards, that the supposition that God's end is out of himself militates against his entire and absolute independence. "We must," says he, "conceive of the efficient as depending on his ultimate end. He depends on this end in his desires, aims, actions, and pursuits; so that he fails in all his desires, actions, and pursuits, if he fails of his end. Now if God himself be his last end, then in his dependence on his end, he depends on nothing but himself. If all things be of him, and to him, and he the first and the last, this shows him to be all in all: He is all to himself. He goes not out of himself for what he seeks; but his desires and pursuits, as they originate from, so they terminate in himself; and he is dependent on none but himself in the beginning or end of any of his exercises or operations. But if not himself, but the creature, be his last end, then, as he depends on his last end, he is in some sort dependent on the creature."¹

To this objection we remark: (a.) The only possible dependence of God upon his ultimate end consists in the fact that if the end fails his desires are not gratified, and he is

¹ Vol. VI., pp. 47, 48.

rendered unhappy. That this is the dependence intended by Edwards is evident from his own words: "We must conceive of the efficient as depending on his ultimate end. He depends on this end in his desires, aims, actions, and pursuits; so that he fails in all his desires, if he fails of his end." This clearly shows, that the dependence here intended consists in that relation which exists between the happiness of a being and the gratification of his desires in the accomplishment of his end.

(b). If this relation constitutes dependence, then it applies to subordinate ends, as well as to ultimate ends. For if a being is thwarted in the accomplishment of any one, or any number of his subordinate ends, he is disappointed, and rendered unhappy: especially must this be the case when he knows that the subordinate ends he has chosen to effect his ultimate end are the best possible. It follows, therefore, from the reasoning of Edwards, that, as a being is more or less dependent for happiness upon his subordinate ends, so that if he fails in their accomplishment he is rendered unhappy, to be entirely independent, all his *subordinate* ends, as well as his ultimate end, must be found in himself.

(c). Such a supposition as the above would subvert entirely the doctrine of God's independence. It would make him more dependent by far than any of his creatures, because he would be dependent upon many more objects than they. No one in his senses will pretend that all God's subordinate ends are in himself. Our earth forms one of these ends, but certainly it is no part of God. The brute creation forms another, but who, save the blasphemous pantheist, pretends to hold that brutes are a part of God? Man forms another of his subordinate ends, but is man a part of the God who made him? We might enumerate to any extent the subordinate ends of God, which are out of himself: they are vastly more numerous than the subordinate ends of his creatures—as much more so as his plan is more extended and comprehensive than theirs. If, therefore, a being is dependent upon his ends, and if God's ends which are out of himself are vastly more numerous than those of his creatures, it follows that he is dependent upon more objects than they. The reasoning of Edwards leads irresistibly to this conclusion.

(d). The fallacy of the position assumed in this objection lies in the supposition that the relation which subsists between the happiness of a being and the accomplishment of his ends has to do with his independence. The question of independence is based upon entirely a different principle, viz., that of the power or ability of the being. If he possesses in himself the

power to accomplish his ends, without aid from any other source, then, as far as they are concerned, he is entirely independent; and this is equally true, whether these ends are within or without himself. If a being had no power, or not power sufficient to accomplish his ends, were they all within himself, he would still be dependent: on the other hand, if he has within himself absolute power to accomplish all his ends, although these ends are out of himself, he is still independent. The question of independence has nothing to do with the position of these ends; but it has everything to do with the ability of the agent to execute them. So the question of God's independence does not depend upon the position of his ends, but upon his *perfect ability* to accomplish them, whatever they are, and wherever they may be located.

Having shown that God's end in creation is not in himself,—and having answered the objection of Edwards to this position, the question returns, Where and what is this end? We shall now attempt to answer this question by the following train of reasoning:—

1. The attributes of God are most wonderfully displayed in the work of creation. His power and wisdom are everywhere conspicuous. So, likewise, the moral excellencies of his character are written in sunbeams upon the works of his hand; and to minds not darkened by sin, these excellencies stand out in bold relief. Now a display of this character must produce a powerful effect upon intelligent mind; and upon the supposition that the mind is perfectly formed and rightly attuned, the effect must be blessed indeed. No mind, that is correct in its workings, can behold the infinitely perfect character of the GREAT SUPREME, without being filled with wonder, admiration, and love. And these feelings of delight would naturally lead to imitation and assimilation; and thus the being delighted in would become the great pattern for all rightly-constituted intelligences; and their most ardent desire would be to take on, as far as possible, the moral perfections of his character. The effect produced by this display would be as easy and natural as the effect produced by the rays of the sun; when they reveal the image of the object from which they are reflected. Thus, by means of it, the perfections of Deity would be daguerretyped upon the hearts of his creatures. But this impression must be finite, because its recipient is finite. The size of the daguerretyped image does not depend upon the size of the sun, nor of the object to be represented, and from which the sun's rays are reflected, but upon the size of the surface of the plate upon which these

reflected rays fall. Thus the magnitude of the impression made upon the minds of his creatures, by the display of the attributes of God, does not depend upon the capacity of the being making it, but upon the capacity of the being upon whom it is made. This impression, owing to the infinite nature of the source from whence it emanates, and the perfect and undisturbed organization of the mind or heart receiving it, must be as vivid and extensive as the capacity of the recipient will allow; but still *it must be limited by that capacity*. The result to which we come, then, is, that the display of the Divine perfections would produce an effect upon mind, *perfectly organized*, and *undisturbed by adverse influences*, which would cause the recipient to admire and love the Lord his God with all his heart, mind, and strength; and this effect would be limited only by his capacity.

2. There is another display or exhibition secured by, or consequent upon, the work of creation, viz., that of the attributes, both natural and moral, of the creatures themselves. All the creatures of God have certain attributes or characteristics. This is true of angels, and also of the human race; and the work of creation has secured not only the possession, but the display of these attributes; which display must produce its impression upon intelligent mind. In this case, the being whose attributes are displayed being finite, and the mind upon which the impression is made being perfect in its organization, and prepared to receive it to its full extent, the impression will be limited only by the worth of the being whose attributes are displayed. This statement is based upon the supposition that there is a full display of the attributes of the being, and that there is not such a disparity between finites, but that the worth of any finite being may make its full impression upon the mind of any other finite being. It is easy to see that the result of this impression would be, that the being making it would be esteemed and loved by the being upon whom it was made, in proportion to his value in the scale of being.

3. There is still another effect secured by the work of creation, and the display consequent upon it, viz., that produced upon a being by the display of his own powers, attributes, or qualities. These he becomes acquainted with by consciousness, and by a careful observation of their workings in various directions. The impression which these attributes of self must make upon the mind of self, provided this mind is perfect in its organization, and undisturbed by adverse influences, will be in exact proportion to the worth of self in the scale of being. This is *self-love* as distinguished from selfishness;

which is self-love overleaping its boundaries, or overflowing its banks. We have arrived, then, at the following result, viz., that the effect which the display of character consequent upon the work of creation is calculated to produce upon perfect mind, is admiration of, love toward, and delight in God, to the full extent of the powers of the creature, and love to self, and all creature intelligences, measured by their worth in the scale of being. In other words, it is *entire conformity* to the *moral law*, which consists in loving God with all the soul, mind, and strength, and our neighbor as ourself. This is the result of the action of perfect mind in the direction of perfection itself. It is easy to perceive that perfect bliss, happiness, or delight must inhere in, or constitute a part of such action—and this, not merely in the sense of an effect, but that it must be woven into its very texture, so as to form a part of its web and woof.

This effect is denominated *holiness*; and as it is produced in the mind of the creature, and not in the mind of God (who was perfectly and infinitely holy before creation began), we call it creature holiness, i. e., holiness belonging to the creature; and the happiness which inheres therein and forms a part of it is, for the same reason, creature happiness.

The *production of this effect upon the minds of intelligent creatures*, we believe to have been God's *end in creation*—*that end without which the universe would not have existed*. This position thrown into the form of a proposition would run thus: God's last end in creation was to secure the greatest possible amount of creature holiness, and of that happiness which inheres in and forms a part of such holiness. Or thus: The ultimate, objective end for which God created the universe, was the production of the greatest possible amount of creature holiness and happiness.

We use the term *creature holiness*, and happiness, in opposition to the position of Edwards, that this holiness and happiness are emanations from God in such a sense, that they are communicated to the creature from his fullness; so that, in fact, they are God's holiness and happiness diffusing themselves among the creatures of his empire. He holds that the communication of holiness and happiness formed a part of God's last end, or one of his ultimate ends, in creation. But then, to carry out his theory, which makes God his own end, he calls this holiness and happiness an emanation from Deity himself, like a fountain overflowing its banks, or sending forth its waters in streams. We have not mistaken Edwards upon this point, as a few sentences will show.

"As there is an infinite fullness of all possible good in God, a fullness of

every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happiness—and as this fullness is capable of communication or emanation—*ad extra*; so it seems a thing amiable and valuable in itself that it should be communicated, or flow forth,—that this infinite fountain of good should send forth abundant streams,—that this infinite fountain of light should, diffusing its excellent fullness, pour forth light all around. And as this is in itself excellent, so a disposition to this in the Divine Being must be looked upon as a perfection or an excellent disposition, such an emanation of good is, in some sense, a multiplication of it.—So far as the communication, or external stream, may be looked upon as anything besides the fountain, so far it may be looked upon as an increase of good. And if the fullness of good that is in the fountain is in itself excellent and worthy to exist, then the emanation, or that which is as it were an increase, repetition, or multiplication of it, is excellent and worthy to exist. Thus it is fit, since there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light should shine forth in beams of communicated knowledge and understanding. And as there is an infinite fountain of holiness, moral excellence and beauty, so it should flow out in communicated holiness. And that as there is an infinite fullness of joy and happiness, so these should have an emanation, and become a fountain flowing out in abundant streams, as beams from the sun.” Vol. VI. pp. 32, 33.

Again he says :

“Thus it appears reasonable to suppose that it was what God had respect to as an ultimate end of his creating the world, to communicate of his own infinite fullness of good; or rather it was his last end that there might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fullness of good *ad extra*, or without himself, and the disposition to communicate himself, or diffuse his own fullness, which we must conceive of as being originally in God as a perfection of his nature, was what moved him to create the world.” Ibid. p. 33.

Once more :

“But the diffusive disposition that excited God to give creatures existence, was rather a communicative disposition in general, or a disposition in the fullness of the divinity to flow out and *diffuse itself*. Thus the disposition there is in the root and stock of a tree to diffuse and send forth its sap and life, is doubtless the reason of the communication of its sap and life to its buds, leaves, and fruits, after these exist. But a disposition to communicate of its life and sap to its fruits, is not so properly the cause of its producing those fruits, as its disposition to communicate itself, or to diffuse its sap and life in general. Therefore, to speak more strictly according to truth, we may suppose, that a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fullness, was what excited him to create the world; and so that the emanation itself was aimed at by him as a last end of creation.” Ibid. p. 34.

Our objection to this language and sentiment is, that, without the author's intending it, they savor much of pantheism.

The idea that creation is an emanation from God is not strictly true. It is a *production* of God, and a production of something out of nothing, not an emanation from him. We need not wonder that the ancient heathen, who could not conceive of a creation of something out of nothing, should speak of the universe as an emanation from God. Thus Aristotle held, “That it streamed by connatural result an emanation from God, the Infinite and Eternal Mind, as the

light issues from the sun—so that there was no instant of duration assignable of God's eternal existence, in which the world did not also coexist." But that an eminent Christian divine, in a rigidly logical and metaphysical argument, should speak of creation as an *emanation* from God, is to us passing strange.

The position of Edwards, in the above quotations, would lead inevitably to the conclusion of Aristotle, that *the world was not created, but existed from eternity*. For if the universe is an emanation from God, and if this emanation is in consequence of an original disposition, or tendency in him to communicate of his infinite fullness, then this original disposition or tendency must have existed from eternity; and it must have been gratified as soon as it existed, or there would have been an ungratified disposition, or tendency in God, which is not supposable. If God's tendencies from all eternity were to overflow or stream out, and thus communicate of his fullness,—then this overflowing or streaming out must have been from eternity, or these tendencies would have been restrained and ungratified.

If, therefore, the universe is an emanation from God, as the light is an emanation from the sun, and is based upon an original tendency or disposition in him to communicate, this emanation must have been from *eternity*; for as we cannot suppose the sun to exist without shedding his beams of light, so we cannot suppose God to exist without those communications which emanate from him, and are based in the original tendencies of his nature.

We can see how the benevolence of God could lead him to purpose from all eternity to create the universe at a certain time,—in which case, the universe would not exist until that time arrived. But we cannot see how an original tendency can exist in God, for something to flow out of himself, as water streams from a fountain, unless the flowing out co-exists with the tendency; and if so, then the universe has co-existed with God, that is, it has existed from eternity.

The phraseology used by Edwards would go to show that the universe is a part of God; and that the holiness of the creature is simply God's holiness communicated to the creature. He says: "The disposition to communicate himself, or diffuse his own fullness, which we must conceive of as being originally in God as a perfection of his nature, was what moved him to create the world." . . . "But the diffusive disposition that excited God to give creatures existence was rather a communicative disposition in general, or a disposition in the *fullness of the divinity to flow out and diffuse ITSELF*."

If these statements are correct, then the creation must be a part of the fullness of God. If the act of creating was the *flowing out and the diffusion of the DIVINITY ITSELF*, then the result must have been *a part of that divinity*; or, in other words, the universe *must be a part of God*.—Again, in speaking of the knowledge, holiness, and joy of the creature, he says: “These things are but the *emanations* of God’s OWN KNOWLEDGE, HOLINESS, AND JOY.” So that the universe is not only a part of God, but the very attributes of his intelligent creatures, their perfections, their holiness and happiness, are only communications of the perfections, the holiness and happiness of God: they are God’s perfections, God’s holiness and happiness, communicated by him to the creature.

The illustrations used by Edwards, in the foregoing quotations, lead to the same conclusion. They are, the sun radiating its beams—a fountain sending forth its streams—and a tree producing its buds and fruits. Now, the beams of light which proceed from the sun are a portion of the great source from whence they emanate, the streams which flow from the fountain are a part of the fountain itself, and the buds and fruits of a tree are a part of that tree. If, therefore, these illustrations are applicable to the subject under consideration—if the universe *emanated* from God, as beams from the sun, streams from their fountain, and buds and fruits from the tree, then, indeed, is the universe a part of God. We do not say that these conclusions were held by Edwards; but we do contend, that they result naturally and irresistibly from his reasonings and illustrations. A pantheist scarcely need ask for better, to establish his position, that “all that is, is God.” Hence the necessity, that, when we speak of holiness and happiness, as forming God’s ultimate objective end in creation, we should carefully guard this point, and speak of it, as creature holiness and happiness, in distinction from the holiness and happiness of God.

We believe that the universe, instead of being an emanation from Deity, is the work of his hand; instead of being the overflowing of his fullness, it is a creation of his omnipotence—a causing *something to exist out of nothing*; and the holiness and happiness of creatures, instead of being the holiness and happiness of God communicated to them, consists in their conformity to the rule of right, and that delight which inheres in and is consequent upon such conformity. The production of these, or the securing them to the greatest possible extent, we hold to be God’s last end in creation. We repeat, then, that the ultimate objective end of God in creating the uni-

verse was, to secure the greatest possible amount of creature holiness and happiness. Our reasons for this opinion are as follows:

1. As we have seen, God's ultimate end must be something desirable in itself, and not desired merely as a means to an end. It is likewise true, that it must be something more excellent than all things in the universe besides; for to suppose anything more excellent, which might be accomplished by him, than that which he has chosen for his last great end, would be to impeach his benevolence. It would be charging him with preferring a less good to a greater, which would seriously implicate the holiness of his character. What, then, is the *most excellent* thing in the universe? Is it to be found in any of the phenomena of matter? We admit that every creature of God, as it came from his hand, is perfect in its kind,—so perfect that Infinite Wisdom has pronounced it very good. But still there is nothing in the various formations or developments of matter, which render any of them worthy to be considered the ultimate end of God in creation. Besides, they bear, upon their every feature, the impress of *subordination*. Who supposes that the earth we inhabit goes to make up any part of the ultimate end of him that formed it? Who does not perceive that it was created and fitted up as a residence for man? And thus it is with vegetation, and the brute creation; they are not ultimate, but subordinate ends. This fact is apparent, when we contrast their natures with the character and attributes of God himself.

Let us, in imagination, carry ourselves back to a period before creation, when God existed alone; and let us take our stand-point of observation where we may witness the results of the creative energy of the Almighty, as they appear in their order. Now we gaze into vacuity; for God alone fills immensity, and he to us is invisible. But as we gaze, one star after another appears, until the whole material universe is presented to our view, in all its beauty, grandeur, and magnificence. These massive globes are, as yet, unclothed and uninhabited; but they are in themselves perfect, and, obeying certain laws impressed upon them by their Maker, revolve in their orbits with such order and harmony as to challenge our wonder and admiration. Still they are all inanimate, senseless balls of matter, which can move only as they are moved upon; and the laws which control them are purely physical, and belong not to the higher order of intellectual and moral forces. They possess not a single attribute which renders them worthy to be considered that ultimate

end, which Infinite Wisdom has selected for Infinite Power to effect.

We look again, and behold, these globes are clothed with vegetation; and thus a vital organism of the lowest order comes into existence. The grass, the herb, the flower, the tree, unfold themselves with beauty and perfectness. Here is vegetable life; but it is a life without sensation, or the power of motion. The living thing remains stationary, and has only the ability to develop itself. Thus it is, but a little removed from matter without life. The vegetable kingdom is fitted to accomplish the purpose for which it was designed; but, manifestly, that end is subordinate. It may delight the eye, and feast the palate of higher orders of existences; but it can form no part of the Creator's ultimate end.

We see another order of beings, in the ascending series, spring into existence, viz., the brute creation. They are superior to the vegetable kingdom; but still, are low in the scale of being. Mere animalism, governed, not by reason, but by instinct, while it is perfect in its kind, is very far from the perfection of created being. Mere animal life is subordinate to, and adapted to subserve the purpose of a higher spiritual life. Whatever form it may assume, it is only the servant of spiritual existences; and thus, being designed as an *end to an end*, it cannot form the *ultimate* end.

But while we continue to gaze and wonder, we are startled by the presence of an order of beings far exalted above any we have yet seen. They are spiritual and immortal. They are intellectual and moral. They possess mind, and heart, and will. Their affections are pure and elevated, their reason clear and powerful, and their actions are possessed of a voluntariness, which renders them responsible for their conduct. These are the "morning stars," which celebrated in song the wonders of creation. They constitute but one order—the order of intelligent, free, moral agents. It comprises a great variety of rank; lowest in the scale is man, and then angel and archangel, cherubim and seraphim. They possess essentially the same attributes, but differ in their capacities. They are separated from the lower orders by their intelligence and moral character. These attributes shadow forth the image of the Deity himself, and bind them to his throne; so that they form a sort of connecting link between the Creator and the inferior portions of creation. They are said to be made in the image of God; and are dignified by him with the name of children. These form the highest order of created beings; and the whole range of inferior existences seems

to have been subordinated to them, and intended to subserve their purposes, as ends to an end. We must, therefore, seek God's ultimate end in his intelligent creatures. The question resolves itself into this, What is there in created intelligences, which possesses *supreme excellence*? To make the answer clear, let us reason from the original to the image or likeness, and inquire, What constitutes the supreme excellence of *Deity himself*? This is not to be found in his natural attributes. These attributes are perfect in their kind, and infinite in degree; they possess a physical perfection, or excellence; but they do not form the crowning excellence of God. This consists in his *moral character*, in the infinite holiness of his nature. "Holy, holy, holy," is the ascription of angels, as they cast their crowns at his feet. The apostle comprehends the transcendent excellencies of the Infinite One in that brief sentence—"God is love." The Scriptures abundantly show that the diadem of glory upon the brow of the Almighty, is the *infinite purity of his moral character*. And the same is true of created intelligences. Their natural attributes are perfect in kind, and possess physical excellence; but their crown of glory is the holiness of their character.

The holiness of God is the most excellent thing in the universe; and next to it, is the holiness of his creatures. God's end in creation could not have been to promote the former, for it was perfect from eternity. It must, therefore, have been to promote the latter, which is so excellent in itself, and so much to be prized for its results, that it is entirely worthy to be the ultimate end of Jehovah.

But it may be asked, May not God's end in creation have been to display his own holiness, on account of the delight he takes in having that holiness praised, loved, and adored? No doubt God delights to have the perfections of his character praised, loved, and adored; but, is this delight *selfish*, or is it *benevolent*? If selfish, then it is *sin*. If benevolent, then it is a delight in *holiness*. God delights to be praised, loved, and adored, because this praise, love, and adoration, form the principal ingredient in holiness; and as it is the creature who praises, loves, and adores, so that this effect is produced in the mind and heart of the creature, we call it *creature holiness*. The question to be decided is simply this, Does God delight to be praised, loved, and adored, because to praise, love, and adore him, is *holiness*?—or does he delight in holiness *because* it consists in praising, loving, and adoring him? If the latter, then is it impossible to defend Jehovah against the charge of supreme selfishness. If God delights in holiness *because* it consists in self-praise and adoration, and no

further than it consists in these, then he is supremely selfish : and, as his capacities are infinite, he is infinitely more selfish than all created intelligences together, if they were all actuated by the same principle. But if God delights in *self-praise*, because of his *worth in the scale of being* ; because to love him with all the soul, and mind, and strength, is to obey the law of benevolence, which requires love to every being according to its worth in the scale of being, then does he delight in self-praise, only because of its relation to holiness, and from no principle of selfishness whatever.

It is no answer to the charge of selfishness against God to say that, by seeking his own interest, he seeks that which will promote the happiness of his creatures. This may be true, and yet God be selfish. He may seek his own selfish ends in such a way as to promote the ends of others, and, at the same time, do it without any regard to their ends, simply because it is the best way to promote his own ends. But if his plan of operations has been adopted from regard to the interests of others, as well as his own, and that regard corresponds with the intrinsic value, or real worth of the interests of all, then is it benevolent, and not selfish, for self is valued only on account of its *relation to holiness*.

2. We argue that creature holiness is the end of God in creation, from the fact that for God to promote his own glory, or to promote such a state of mind in the creature as will lead the creature to glorify him, is the same thing as to promote holiness in the creature. The Scriptures teach that God does what he does *for his own name's sake*, or, which is the same thing, *for his glory's sake* ; and we are commanded, "whether we eat or drink, or whatever we do, to do all to the glory of God." Agreeably to this, our excellent Catechism teaches that "The chief end of man is to glorify God, and enjoy him forever." If, therefore, "God's glory," and "God's being glorified," as they are set forth in the Scriptures, differ from creature holiness, then his holiness is not the end of God in creation ; but if they can be shown to be the same thing, then is it his last great end in creating the universe.

God's glory consists either in that which constitutes his intrinsic glory, or in that in which he delights and glories, as something which he desires and seeks to accomplish above everything else ; or in that state of mind in others, which leads them to praise and glorify him. That God's *intrinsic* glory was not, and could not have been his end in creation, is evident from the fact that it was and is the same from eternity,

before creation existed ; it has never been in any sense changed or altered, nor is it possible that such change should take place : and it is perfectly evident that that which existed *before* an event, and is not in the least *changed* by the event, could not have been the end or object of that event.

Again : If we mean, by God's glory, that in which he delights and glories, as something which he *desires and seeks to accomplish above everything else* ; then, as we contend, this *something* is *holiness* : and as it cannot be his own holiness (for he cannot seek to accomplish what is already accomplished), it must be creature holiness.

That holiness is what God delights in above everything else, and desires to promote, is evident from the following considerations :

(a). It is the most excellent or desirable thing in the universe, and, therefore, God must delight in it supremely ; it must be that in which he *glories*. This we have already illustrated. (b). The moral law contains the foundation and essence of true holiness ; and, if this law is (as it is universally admitted to be) a transcript of God, then does he delight supremely in holiness. (c). The rewards and penalties which God has attached to his law, and the development which he has made of his feelings in the death of Christ, and the work of the Spirit, all go to show that he has set his heart supremely upon holiness, that he delights and glories in it, and seeks, above everything else, to promote it. (d). The Scriptures teach that, without holiness, it is impossible to please God ; and that faith is peculiarly pleasing in his sight, because of its relation to holiness ; it appropriates the righteousness of Christ ; it purifies the heart, and produces good works. (e). It must be evident to every student of the Bible, and close observer of the providences of God, as they are developed in the history of the church, that the whole economy of grace has for its object the production and conservation of sanctification or holiness ; and that, when this is accomplished, the gracious economy will be exchanged for one purely legal. (f). The transcendent glory of heaven consists in its holiness—nothing unclean or impure shall be admitted into it.

These considerations go to show that God delights supremely in holiness, and that its production to the greatest possible extent is the thing upon which he has supremely set his heart.

Again : If we mean by God's glory, the impression made upon the minds of others, which leads them to praise and glorify him, then we say, this impression is *holiness*, and as it is made in the minds of creatures, it is creature holiness.

When we love the Lord our God with all our soul, mind, and strength, we glorify him for what he *is in himself*; and when we love his creatures, according to their worth in the scale of being, we *glorify him through his creatures*, as the servants of his household, and the subjects of his empire. If we are holy, we shall glorify God; and if we glorify God, we shall be holy. The one cannot exist without the other; and they resolve themselves into the same thing.

God, by the display he made of himself in the work of creation, intended to produce in the minds of his intelligent creatures either a true or a false impression. No one will affirm that his object was the latter. And if the former, then he must have intended that the impression should be according to the intrinsic worth of beings in the scale of being. This impression is *holiness in the heart*; it is to love the Lord our God with all our soul, mind, and strength, and our neighbors as ourselves; and to govern the conduct by this impression, is *holiness in the life*.

This view perfectly accords with the Scriptures. As our limits forbid an extended examination, we will select from those passages quoted by Edwards, to prove that God is his own end in creation.

The first class are those which speak of God as the first and the last, the beginning and the end. "Thus saith the Lord the King of Israel, and his Redeemer the Lord of hosts; I am the first, and I am the last; and besides me there is no God."—(Isa. 44: 6.) "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty."—(Rev. 1: 8.) "I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last."—(Rev. 1: 11.)

These passages simply teach the *eternity* and *absolute sovereignty* of God. They have nothing to do with his end in creation; and the wonder is that a divine like Edwards should have quoted them for such a purpose.

A second class of passages are those which declare everything to have been created for God:—"For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him, and for him."—(Col. 1: 16.) "For it became him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings."—(Heb. 2: 10.) These texts teach that God is the Creator, and proprietor of all things—that they were made by him, and for his use; but they do not decide what use God intends to make of them, nor

what end he means to accomplish by them. They have no sort of bearing upon the question under discussion.

A third class, are those passages which speak of God's glory as the end of all things. They may be arranged under three heads:—(a). Those passages which speak of what God does as being done for his name's sake, or for his own glory: "I will say to the north, Give up; and to the south, Keep not back: bring my sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth; even every one that is called by my name: for I have created him *for my glory*, I have formed him; yea, I have made him."—(Isa. 43: 6, 7.) "Thy people also shall be all righteous: they shall inherit the land forever, the branch of my planting, the work of my hands, that *I may be glorified*."—(Isa. 60: 21.) "And what on enation in the earth is like thy people, even like Israel, whom God went to redeem for a people to himself, and *to make him a name*?"—(2 Sam. 7: 23.) "Nevertheless he saved them for *his name's sake*, that he might make his mighty power known."—(Psalm 106: 8.)

These texts teach that God does what he does, to lead his subjects to praise and glorify him, and to magnify his great and holy name; in other words, to love him with all their soul, mind, and strength: and what is this but creature holiness?

(b). Those passages which enjoin it upon the creature to do what he does to the glory of God: "For ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are God's."—(1 Cor. 6: 20.) "Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, *do all to the glory of God*."—(1 Cor. 10: 31.) The teaching of the first passage is simply this, that as the death of Christ has provided a ransom for us from sin and its consequences, we should consider ourselves as belonging to God, and adore and love him with all our hearts, and so exhibit the power of the gospel over our bodies and spirits, as to lead others to do the same. The other passage teaches that whatever we do, we should do it with direct reference to perfecting the love of God in our hearts, so that we may adore and praise him with all the soul, mind, and strength; and to advancing his kingdom, by perfecting this love in the hearts of others, and thus leading them to do likewise. Thus the state of mind and course of conduct inculcated by these passages, would be *holiness in ourselves*, and an endeavor to promote it in *others*.

(c). Those passages which speak of the glory of God as

the result of certain acts of the creature: "Being filled with the fruits of righteousness, which are by Jesus Christ, unto the *glory and praise* of God."—(Phil. 1: 11.) "Herein is my Father *glorified*, that ye bear much fruit; so shall ye be my disciples."—(John 15: 8.) But how is it that, "being filled with the fruits of righteousness," and "bearing much fruit," glorifies God? It does this in two ways: These fruits are holiness embodied in the life, and they present the transcendent excellence of God's ultimate end in creation.—They produce their effect upon *other minds*, and lead them to praise and glorify God, and thus promote holiness in them.

To love and adore God with all the heart, is to glorify God; and to love and adore God with all the heart, is holiness in exercise: so that, in this sense, God's glory and the exercise of holy affections are the same thing. And to lead others to love and adore God with all the heart, is to lead them to *glorify* God; and to lead others to love and adore God, with all the heart, is to lead them to exercise holy affections: so that to promote the glory of God in others, and to promote holiness in them, is the same thing.

The end of God in creation, then, as we think we have shown, is not in himself, but consists in the promotion of *creature holiness*, and that happiness which may appropriately be called the HAPPINESS OF HOLINESS.

ARTICLE IV.

GOD'S LAW OF SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT.

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By the law of spiritual development, we mean the rule which God has prescribed to himself in building up true religion among men. It is, of course, a question, not of philosophy, but of fact and history. By an appeal to these sources of information, we shall find some of the peculiarities of this law to be as follows: 1. It is gradual. 2. It combines in itself all the agencies of history, thus making the wrath of man to praise God. 3. Its indirect mode of reaching results is often the most direct, as the *death* of Christ is the *life* of Christianity, and the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church.

In illustration of this great law, let us notice;

I: Those developments which were *introductory* to Christianity.

The Cross is the key-stone of history, from which the two

wings of the stupendous arch extend either way, one reaching backward to the fall of man, and the other onward to the consummation of all things. This is the central luminary which holds all human events in their place, spreading light and glory over the whole scene. Apart from Christianity, history would be a book without index, order, or arrangement, covered in the darkness of impenetrable hieroglyphics.

The process introductory to Christianity contains a series of facts four thousand years in extent, to explore which we shall content ourselves with a few of its outlines, such as—how the idea of God was developed—how diffused among the nations—how they became united by a common language—and how their political amalgamation was ultimately effected.

1. *How the idea of God was developed.*—A moment's reflection will show that the new truths concerning God and his government which our Saviour came to impart, were grafted upon the Jewish theology, and were a further expansion of what had been previously revealed through Moses and the Prophets. Jesus came not to abolish, but to fulfill; not to explode, but to explain and expand. The New Testament is the key to the Old, without which it could not be understood, or, as the apostle expresses it, "we could not look to the end of that which is abolished," because of the veil which covered the face of Moses.

If the Jewish theology had not been previously given, how different must have been our Saviour's work! In that case, he must have created by miracle a new religious terminology, and by miracle have grafted it upon the thinking of those with whom he wished to communicate, before he could have imparted the ideas peculiar to Christianity. The whole process would have been forced and unnatural, like producing at once a full-grown oak in all its pride and stateliness, instead of doing it by a gradual series of developments from the acorn. Without the Jewish theology, Christianity would have begun its life in a vacuum, as to its means of expansion and perpetuity.

God, therefore, had been preparing for the dawn of Christianity through all the previous night of the world, by the stellar light of the Patriarchal dispensation, by the lunar effulgence of Moses and the Prophets, by an imposing ritual, by the messages of holy seers, by the devotional effusions of pious men with the fire and in the flowing style of poetry, and by the various events of a civil government which he condescended to administer in person. In this way, the true idea of God's unity, in opposition to the universal polytheism of the

heathen, of his living or life-giving, intelligent, almighty and omnipresent agency, in opposition to the dumb idols and dead divinities of the nations, came at length to be restored to the mind of man, from which it had been expelled by ages of corruption and debasement.

And with the growth of these ideas was that of a religious terminology suited to express them, from which such words as law, sin, holiness, sacrifice, throne of grace, atonement, justification, purification, and so on, have been derived, and wrought into the New Testament to become the permanent types and vehicles of thought to the pious men of all ages and nations. Some attempts have lately been made to invalidate this terminology by showing its indeterminateness, which cannot succeed, however, because they are against the nature of things, and which, if they should, would bring into discredit God's long course of labor in giving it to mankind.

Who will fail to recognize in this whole process of four thousand years' continuance, the working of one Supreme Intelligence, educating the mind of man to a knowledge of Himself, and giving him appropriate symbols and modes of thought and expression to assist him both in conceiving and communicating those truths which are essential to salvation? It was by this long training that Christianity was introduced.

2. *How this theology became diffused among the nations.*—

The Jews conceived the idea, to which they still adhere, that it was designed exclusively for themselves, because to them the living oracles were committed. But God designed it for all nations, in whose behalf he appointed the Israelites to officiate as a kingdom of priests. The Gentiles needed to be prepared for the gospel as much as the Jews, and hence he forced the latter, much against their will, to impart the light of their theology.

In connection with the process of elaborating that theology out of the Jewish mind, there was from the first a gradual diffusion of it, and Moses speaks of God's wonders upon Israel and upon Egypt as designed "to declare his name throughout all the earth." But it was not till war and captivity had scattered the Jews among all nations to establish their synagogue worship, that their theology became the property of mankind. So much interest in their literature was thus excited among the heathen, that the Old Testament was translated into Greek by order of an idolatrous court, so early as 285 years before Christ.

These events produced a ripeness in the heathen mind to receive the gospel, and the synagogue audiences, made up of native Jews and proselyted Gentiles, everywhere afforded a

vantage-ground of which the apostles availed themselves with triumphant success. Though it was a season of night to the world, it was night everywhere illumed by scattering rays of theological truth, betokening the dawn of a better day. And thus, that adverse and most unfortunate train of events over which Jeremiah poured out his scalding tears, was really an essential part of God's plan in his great work of spiritual development. Without the violence of fire and sword and involuntary bondage among distant nations, how could the barriers of Jewish prejudice have been so far broken down as to ensure a fulfillment of their destiny as the teachers of mankind, in scattering their theological ideas broad-cast over the world?

3. *How the nations became united by a common language.*—The obstacle which a diversity of language interposed to the prevalence of common ideas, must also be removed in this onward career of spiritual knowledge and improvement. In this part of his plan, God called to his aid the ingenious Greeks, who added to the most finished language in the world, the most ample stores of thought and literature. In taste and literature, they are the world's arbiters, as the Jews are in theology. God had many ages been preparing them for their destiny. To him the muse of Homer owed its inspirations as well as that of Isaiah; to him Solon and Moses were alike indebted for the wisdom of their legislation, though in a different sense; from him both Aristotle and Solomon learned to speak of trees, from the cedar-tree that is in Lebanon to the hyssop that springeth out of the wall, as well as of beasts and of fowl, and of creeping things, and of fishes. Yea, Ezekiel and Demosthenes alike owed their forensic thunder to him whose inspiration giveth us understanding. God watched over the developments of Grecian civilization with the same general purpose in view as that of the Jewish, viz., the elevation of man to a higher and holier destiny.

But how shall streams so remote from each other become confluent? How shall the Grecian mind be made to blend with that of the Jewish to produce one new man, so making peace, or one concurrent power of literature and theology to unite and bless all nations? Greece and the Grecian race scarcely equalled a single province of those vast empires in the East, over which Sardanapolis, Nebuchadnezzar, and Cyrus exercised absolute dominion. How, then, are their language and literature to become universal? Great as this problem is, the solution is greater. You have heard of Marathon, Salamis, and Thermopylæ, those battle-fields of ancient freedom and glory, where Grecian valor, animating a few hundred or a few thou-

sand brave souls, met and vanquished the countless multitude of their Asiatic invaders. Take Thermopylæ as an example of God's mode of working out his decrees. Thermopylæ is a narrow pass between the mountain and the sea, through which Xerxes had to march his army. On the one hand Mount Æta lifts its rocky summit 600 feet above the level of the sea which laves its base. Between the two is a pass but twenty feet wide at its narrowest point. Here Leonidas and his dauntless band, dressed like girls, direct from the toilet, as was the manner of their country in going into battle, had boldly posted themselves.

"What!" exclaimed the Persian scouts, "do these weak girls think to withstand the great king with his embattled legions?" Little did they think that those sleek-haired youths were the choicest spirits of Lacedæmon, who never fight but to conquer or die. They stood there as victims filleted for the slaughter, a willing sacrifice on the altar of their country's freedom and their country's glory. The cowards had all gone home. Only those remained who sought a grave under the carnage of slaughtered Persians. They were men of great resolve, and greater execution.

What adds sublimity to the scene is, that Noah's oracle, of "Japheth dwelling in the tents of Shem," is now laboring for its fulfillment. Hitherto Shem had borne rule, and golden-throned Asia had been sole arbiter of the world's civilization. Japheth, or the European race, was in total barbarism, all except Greece, whose rising genius this Oriental armament had come to crush as a giant in its cradle. Leonidas, with his handful of men, and Xerxes with his countless legions, stood as the representatives of the two races of Japheth and Shem, Europe and Asia, who have met here, in the pass of Thermopylæ to contest the palm of pre-eminence, three hundred laboring for the fulfillment of Noah's oracle against three millions who were invoking all the gods of war to effect its overthrow. Three hundred fighting *for*, and three millions *against* the eternal decrees of God.

The crisis for action comes. It is a moment pregnant with the world's destiny. "Rush on! rush on!" cry the Persian leaders at the head of multitudinous columns; while Leonidas, noiseless, cool, intrepid, gives the signal for onset, and his daring host begin the work of havoc and death, piling Persian upon Persian in one wide scene of carnage and death. The proud Ægean, tinged wide around with Asiatic blood, is choked with the falling fragments of humanity. Shem, abashed, withdraws his cumbrous hosts, and leaves little Japheth in his glory. Again arms bray upon arms; again

and again the tug of war is renewed, and not till the power of Asia is broken, and that of Europe has gained a prospective triumph, does the dauntless band resign the last drop of life's blood.

We read of the event in our schoolboy days as a thrilling instance of martial courage and patriotic devotion, without seeing in it the hand of God, or taking into account its influence upon that kingdom which is not of this world. Greece thus acquired the energy to conquer Asia, a work which was finally consummated by 30,000 trained Macedonians under Alexander, who afterward supplied the civilized world with kings and courts, thus raising their language to the elevated position of a universal medium of cultivated thought. Hence the Greeks reached by conquest that general influence in the world of mind which the Jews obtained by defeat and captivity. A general language was in this way provided for the propagation of the gospel.

4. *How a political amalgamation was effected.*—Next to the confusion of speech, national antipathies were a strong barrier to the propagation of common ideas and influences. Travel was insecure; trade was unprotected; intercourse was repelled by the prejudice of belligerent tribes, and such an enterprise as that in which the apostles were engaged could not have been prosecuted till about the time of our Saviour's advent. Then Rome, after seven hundred years' conflict, had succeeded in establishing universal dominion, and the temple of Jannus was closed to denote a general peace. Peace prevailed because none were able to cope with imperial Rome, whose iron-handed dominion, stretching from Britain to Mesopotamia, held in political unity all the forms of civil and social life, and the ægis of its protection was a universal safeguard to travel and trade. Thus as stars last in the train of night, these events led on the dawn and establishment of Christianity. By agencies the most remote and conflicting, God carried forward the introductory process of Christianity, through the gradual unfoldings of a long line of ages.

II. We pass to notice the developments which respect CHRISTIANITY AS A SYSTEM and the CONSUMMATION of its work. The same general law governs here as in the *introduction* of the gospel day. As a system, Christianity was gradually unfolded to the minds of men like the dawn which begins in the feeble pencilings of light on the dusky east, and ends in the full effulgence of the risen sun. At the time of our Saviour's appearing, the old luminaries of the world had faded, so as to render the darkness even more visible than ever. The time

had been when the religion of the Jews had in it the vigor of life. But now the rigidity of death pervaded all its forms—a scene of decay—a valley of dry bones. No response was heard from the mercy-seat, no fire descending, consumed the victim, no living hand evoked from lyre or harp its ancient inspirations, no sign or sound of life manifested itself in the ritual exactitude of scribe and priest: all, all was cold as those who have been long dead. The profession of godliness had degenerated into a mere lure of the widows' houses which avarice sought to devour; prayer, aspiring not after communion with God, posted itself at the corner of the streets to be seen of men; and the only heaven-inspired ritual had waxed old and was ready to vanish away. The time had been, also, when Grecian civilization had produced characters who were an honor to human nature. But now how changed! Its philosophy had ended in sophistry, its poetry in fustian, its oratory in grandiloquence, and its devotion to the gods in infidelity. All the proud responses of ancient genius had died away, leaving an echo too feeble to be heard, and too false to be endured.

Out of this state of things it was that the Christian system was developed. The Simeons and Annas who waited for the consolation of Israel, were a starry fringe on the edge of its dawn, though their number was too few, and their light too feeble, to offer a visible contrast to the prevailing gloom. The vision of Zachariah, the birth of the Baptist, and then that of the Son of God, hymned by angels, visited by wise men, persecuted by Herod, carried into Egypt; and then returning and living to the age of thirty in retirement; afterward baptized, tempted, preaching, working miracles, and finally dying, rising again, ascending on high, and bestowing gifts upon the rebellious, that the Lord God might dwell among us,—such were the visible unfoldings of a new and potential life, which is eternal, and, therefore, the sum of Heaven's dispensations to man, and destined to endless progression.

By this process, Christianity, as a system, or organic whole, gradually grew into form in the minds and hearts of men, beginning like the dawn, and terminating in the full effulgence of the Spirit's baptism on the day of Pentecost. Then Christianity, as a system, reached its perfected life, embodying all the truths and influences necessary for the world's regeneration.—What followed made no addition to the thing itself as a power working among men, but was simply the unfoldings of its life and energy. Henceforth, the apostles spake, and wrote, and acted, as moved by the Holy Ghost, whose influences were then permanently incorporated

with the elements of this lower world. All previous foreshadowings of Messiah's kingdom, whether by type or by prophecy, found their substance and their realization in the events which supervened between the birth of John and the baptism of the Holy Ghost. The subsequent history of Christianity is but the fruit of its then perfect power.

We turn, therefore, from the system itself to its *consummated mission among men*. What does it design to do? What has it done? And what is the prospect of its completing its work?

1. What does it *design* to do? It is fashionable at present to look for the fruits of Christianity, not upon earth, but in heaven. So far as individual character is concerned, we see so much to deplore in those who profess to act under its influence; and in the general course of its history so little has been done, as yet, to correct the giant evils of the world, that we begin to think that there can be no consummation of Christianity this side of heaven, or at least this side of the second advent of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and the new heavens and earth. These dubious feelings in reference to the earthly work of Christianity, united to a false interpretation of the prophecies, have led to the growth of a new sect, who have taken the name of Adventists.

But we are not of the number who despair of a distant and glorious consummation of Christianity in the present life. We believe it is destined yet to conform the general ideas of mankind to its own criterion of truth and obligation; that its golden rule, of doing as we would be done by, is yet to become the basis of government, legislation, domestic life, of all our moral judgments, and of the business and commerce of mankind, so that, in the future civilization of the world, the moral, and spiritual, and good, will take the place of physical prowess and valor in the early ages, and of intellect, family, and station, in the present regards of mankind. We believe that war, and slavery, and oppression, and cruelty, are yet to be known no more. This is the mission of Christianity, and, as Dr. Channing has said, "It is equal to its work."

2. But what *has* Christianity *done*? We grant that there are points from which we may look at this question, which are full of discouragement to our weak faith and limited view of things. But we must consider that the wheel of Providence is a great one, and each revolution covers a cycle of ages. The Patriarchal dispensation had not expended itself till a period of more than two thousand years. The Mosaic ritual did not finally vanish away till nearly two thousand

more. Grecian history reached its destiny through a course of undefined ages. The freebooters of Rome, within the fastnesses of the seven-hilled city, battled it for empire for twelve or fourteen hundred years, before their iron dominion finally crumbled to ruin. These are a few specimens of the vast reach of God's plans, with whom a thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years.

Because so small a segment of the mighty circle is subjected to our inspection, we are always vexed lest things should not come out right. All goes wrong; piety is low; missions among the heathen have but a limited success; adverse currents roll back the sun of improvement more than fifteen degrees upon the dial of the world; and everything conspires to dash the fondly-cherished hopes of universal peace and holiness.

But what a history of failures is recorded in the two Testaments! Eden was a failure; the old world a failure; Noah's ministry a failure; the patriarchal dispensation a failure; the expected perfection of Hebrew dominion in the Holy Land under the Messiah a failure; the reign of the judges a failure; the reign of the kings a failure; the prophets all complained of failures, and poor Jeremiah had not tears for all his grief. And yet with God is no failure. He wrought out by each the precise result which he intended. And the weeping prophet might have spared his tears, if his mind had grasped the mighty results to ensue from the captivity of his people, in the dispersion of a true theology among the nations. God giveth not account of any of his matters.

But we return again to the question, What has Christianity done? We answer this question with a view to our Saviour's representation of it, as leaven hid in meal, dividing its work into three parts, that of *infusion*, that of *fermentation*, and that of *expansion* or *purification*.

Its work of infusion was compressed within the three first centuries, during which period it had fairly wrought itself into the aggregated mass of general society as the most potential agency which was known on earth. Coming out full-fledged with the Spirit's baptism on the day of Pentecost, how mighty was its onset! The ritual refuse of previous ages vanished before it. The dead conscience of the masses was quickened into palpitating life, sending forth the despairing inquiry, "What must I do to be saved?" A new form of spiritual development started into being, which it was reserved to Bunyan to dramatize and to clothe in the forms of outward life. Thrones tottered to their fall, and the seeds of a wide-spread political revolution indirectly fell from its hands. The old

forms of belief gave way, and religion came to be understood in its true character of peace on earth and good-will toward men. Ten persecutions produced martyrdoms enough to overawe the human mind, and to extort its reluctant homage for a faith which inspired such constancy, such valor, and such heroic contempt of suffering and death, in men, and women, and children, who otherwise appeared the weakest of the weak, and least competent to deeds so magnanimous, so glorious. By this process the infusion of the heavenly principle was fairly effected, and Christianity became a fixed fact, a controlling agency in general history.

And now begins the period of fermentation. It is a peculiarity of leaven and of the fermenting principle in liquids to do its work out of sight, covered by elements contrary to itself, which it is secretly assimilating and preparing to appear under a new form. This was the work of Christianity from the fourth to the fifteenth century. The social elements, the old civilization and the old barbarism of the world in the person of the cultivated Romans, and the northern hordes by whom they were conquered, yea, all the forms of superstition and idolatry, and every possible variety of philosophical opinion and belief, to which time had given birth, were thrown into that great seething-pot of the nations—the Papal Church—which was the Apocalyptic Beast to which the dragon gave his power and his seat. Let no one suppose that in this vast fermentation, Christianity was a dormant element. Though concealed, it was not dead. Deep down in monastic cells, in sunken valleys guarded by contiguous mountains from the assault of the universal enemy, or hid among the musty libraries of an unlettered and a corrupted priesthood, were still conserved in the living hearts and in the dead languages of the world, those truths and influences which in due time were destined to work themselves into view, and thus to occupy the high places of society. The Papacy concealed in its bosom the thunder which has brought such ruin to itself, and such hope to mankind. At the appointed time uprising from the ashes of its desolation, that phoenix of the Reformation and of modern civilization which has commenced the onward flight of eternity.

The work of *expansion* or of *purification* has been going on now for three hundred years only, and yet how prodigious the results! Keeping to the figure of this fermenting process, who does not know that, after a time, the foul ingredients of the liquid gradually separate themselves in the form of sediment or scum, which, when removed, leaves the main body

limpid as water and transparent as crystal? This process has been going on ever since the Reformation. First the inherent efficacy of the sacraments, or justification by works, was thrown off; then priestly tyranny; then the absurd right of governments to interfere in matters of conscience; then a Bacon arose to reform the laws of philosophy and investigation; and thus a process of purification or expurgation has been going on in human thought, conviction, and practice, in government, science, and religion, whose results are too prodigious to be conceived.

Hence we have arrived at a certainty of the *consummated mission* of Christianity, greater than ever before. We see, we know, from the influences now abroad, that progress, progress the most extended and glorious, awaits the future destiny of man in this life.

What are we to think of the *individualism* of our times? Does it not foreshow the triumph of man over society? A voice comes up deep from the lowest stratum of the social mass, like the cry of the souls under the altar, saying, "How long, O Lord, holy and true, wilt thou not avenge our blood and relieve our oppressions?" Down in the deepest depths a convulsive throes is felt, and the slave, clanking his chains, dares to look his master in the face and to say, "Am I not a man?" In Europe the battle waxes hotter and hotter. The Northern Bear growls from his seat at the awakened liberties of the people. The Papacy, like an exorcised demon, after wandering through dry places seeking rest and finding none, has taken seven spirits more wicked than itself, and entered upon its ancient seat of warfare upon the liberties of the world. Allying itself to French bigotry or ambition, or Austrian bayonets, as the case may be, they may endure for a while, but in the end both will be choked together in the sea. As sure as there is a God in heaven the individual must have his rights, and the organization by which they are distrained must fall.

What is to come of this *amalgamation of races*, growing out of our modern emigration and our colonial system? Must it not eventuate in a new style of humanity itself? Are not all the most powerful races, the Grecian, Roman, Anglo-Saxon, the result of a similar amalgamation? Who can anticipate what the race is to be, made up of the confluent blood of all the races, which two hundred years hence are to overspread this continent, from its most northern to its most southern inhabited point, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific, having enriched themselves with the full measure of its de-

veloped resources, and with all the results of those principles of discovery in science and invention and art which have led to achievements so magnificent during the last thirty years?

Is there nothing cheering in the present *popularity of beneficence*? Even the crusade against capital punishment, however it be regarded, is the offspring of a widely excited sympathy which cannot quietly see suffering inflicted upon a guilty brother. Is this tendency toward relief for the various forms of human woe ominous of no good?

And can we fail to see in multitudes of Christians, earnest breathings after a purer state, and a more efficient working of their religion? They cry after knowledge, and lift up their voice for understanding, yea, they seek for her as silver, and search for her as for hid treasures; and how can they fail to realize the promise, that then they shall understand the fear of the Lord and find the knowledge of God?

Thus the whole history of God's law of development in his spiritual kingdom—its gradual nature—its wide reach as to time and particulars—and its coercion of adverse agencies into subserving its ends, as well as the present posture of human affairs, is full of promise, that the earth shall yet be full of the knowledge of the glory of the Lord.

ARTICLE V.

MATERIALS FOR A FUTURE JUDGMENT IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN MIND.

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WE closed our last article on the indications of a Future Retribution in Natural Theology with the consideration of that part of the constitution of the human mind through which conscience itself works, and upon which the reality of the future judgment would in some respects seem to depend, that is, the Memory. It is that part of our intellectual constitution, the power and certainty of which ensure the supply and presentation of materials for conscience and the judgment to act upon. With respect to the past, conscience must act by remembrance, and without that, would be divested of all retrospective power.

Now for guilty beings, looking toward the judgment, the consideration of the power of Memory is an intensely interesting and awful thing. Every unwonted development of this power, as demonstrating by fact in the present world what the remembering faculty can do, is invested with an all-comprehensive and never-ending significance. For what one

mind can do is a property of the whole race: a man observing such instances of vastness and minuteness in others' recollections, cannot help saying to himself, the same power resides in me, needing only to be quickened, and to have the present hindrances to its exercise taken away. All things that I have ever seen, heard, read, known, thought, felt, experienced in any way; all processes of reasoning, sensibility, volition; all modes in which I have either acted upon others, or been acted upon, with all the minutest details of self-consciousness, though they may have passed like the lightning, I can revisit. All that ever has been mine is still within my power, and may belong to me forever, through the working of this mighty, indestructible element of my immortal being.

The argument from memory for a future judgment is powerful, because, on every excursion of the mind into the past, there is *now* a judgment of conscience, and an expectation of a righteous award. The soul of man is forever reasoning in this circle: what is, what has been, what shall be. The first affirmation of the human mind is this: *I am*; the second, *I was*; the third, *I shall be*; and the mode of this third is held to be determined by the nature of the first and second. *What I was* and *what I am*, determines what *I shall be*. It is in this way that all mankind reason, whether willing or not. They cannot help it. From the contemplation of the *is*, and the *was*, in human existence, conscience declares *a judgment to come*. God's Word explicitly declares the same. Now if there be within the circle of our natural knowledges or capacities the prediction of any event, we look inevitably for some grounds of the prediction, or some signs that it is a probability, and that the event promised will take place. If it be rumored among the people of a vast city that a new and magnificent Hall of Justice is to be built, and if there be seen a multitude of workmen collecting materials at the stated place of the proposed building, those materials are a strong proof of the truth of the common rumor. And just so, when the conscience of all mankind tells of a judgment to come, and we see how the materials for that judgment are accumulating, and the demand and necessity for it increasing, and how the busy memory is occupied with collecting and arranging those materials, the proof becomes very strong: the common rumor of the world and of the individual conscience is so corroborated, that one who looks fairly at the light of nature, even apart from that of Revelation, cannot doubt. And every instance of the power of memory, every elucidation of the laws under which the mind acts in its operations of remem-

brance, and every instance of the manner in which conscience accompanies this work, affords additional conviction.

The first instance we shall give of the involuntary power of memory, is that noted one presented by Coleridge, which shall be related mainly in the words and with the conclusions of that eminent man. The fact that the case may be so familiar to some of our readers, as to be almost a truism, does not lessen its importance: a young woman, he says, of four or five-and-twenty, who could neither read nor write, was seized with a nervous fever, during which the priests and monks in the neighborhood supposed that she became possessed of the Devil. She continued incessantly talking Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, in very pompous tones, and with most distinct enunciation. The case had attracted the particular attention of a young physician, and by his statement many eminent physiologists and psychologists visited the town, and cross-examined the case on the spot. Sheets full of her ravings were taken down from her own mouth, and were found to consist of sentences coherent and intelligible each for itself, but with little or no connection with each other. Of the Hebrew, a small portion only could be traced to the Bible; the remainder seemed to be in the Rabbinical dialect. A trick or conspiracy was out of the question. Not only had the young woman ever been a harmless, simple creature, but she was evidently laboring under a nervous fever. In the town of which she had been a resident for many years, as a servant in different families, no solution presented itself. The physician, however, determined to trace her past life, step by step; for the patient herself was incapable of returning a rational answer. He searched out the place of her nativity, and from a surviving uncle learned that the patient had been charitably taken by an old Protestant pastor at nine years of age, and had remained with him some years, till his death. Of this pastor the uncle knew nothing, but that he was a very good man. With great difficulty he at length discovered a niece of the pastor's, who had lived with him as his housekeeper, and had inherited his effects, and who remembered the girl. Anxious inquiries were made concerning the pastor's habits, and the solution of the phenomenon was soon obtained. For it appeared that it had been his custom for years to walk up and down a passage of his house, into which the kitchen door opened, and to read to himself with a loud voice out of his favorite books. A considerable number of these were still in the niece's possession. She added, that he was a very learned man, and a great Hebraist. Among the books were found a collection of Rabbinical writings, together with several of the

Greek and Latin Fathers; and the physician succeeded in identifying so many passages with those taken down at the young woman's bedside, that no doubt could remain in any rational mind concerning the true origin of the impression made on her nervous system.

"This authenticated case," Coleridge concludes, "furnishes both proof and instance that relics of sensation may exist for an indefinite time in a latent state, in the very same order in which they were originally impressed; and as we cannot rationally suppose the feverish state of the brain to act in any other way than as a stimulus, this fact, and it would not be difficult to adduce several of the same kind, contributes to make it even probable that all thoughts are in themselves imperishable; and that, if the intelligent faculty should be rendered more comprehensive, it would require only a different and apportioned organization, the body celestial instead of the body terrestrial, to bring before every human soul the collective experience of its whole past existence. And this, perchance, is the dread book of judgment, in whose mysterious hieroglyphics every idle word is recorded. Yea, in the very nature of a living spirit, it may be more possible that heaven and earth should pass away, than that a single act, a single thought, should be loosened or lost from that living chain of causes, to all whose links, conscious or unconscious, the free will, our only absolute self, is coextensive and copresent." This last remark respecting the copresence of the will in all our intelligent life, conscious or unconscious, is of the utmost solemnity and importance.

Now there might be multiplied indefinitely the narration of instances of this kind, all pointing to the same demonstration of the capability in our immortal frame of having every experience of our existence preserved to be disclosed at the judgment. Dr. Abercrombie relates the case of a young girl, who at an early period in childhood occupied an apartment next to that of a musician, who spent much of his time in performing musical pieces on the violin. About six months from this period she was taken to live in the family of a lady, where, several years afterward, there was heard during the night a succession of strains of fine music, the sounds of which were at length traced to the apartment of this young girl, who, though fast asleep, was pouring from her lips strains exactly resembling those produced by a small violin. She would utter tones like the tuning of the instrument, and then pass to the execution of elaborate pieces of music; and this was repeated so often, that there was no possibility of mistake or delusion in the phenomenon. This young person after-

ward became insane, but her experience is an evident, though incomprehensible, case of the power of involuntary memory.

Dr. Abercrombie relates another example, which he puts under the phenomena of dreams, but which is in reality a development of memory. It occurred with one of his own intimate friends, a gentleman connected with one of the principal banks in Glasgow. He was at his place at the teller's desk, when a person entered, demanding payment of the sum of six pounds. There were several waiting, who were entitled to be attended to before him; but he was extremely impatient, and rather noisy; and being likewise a remarkable stammerer, he became so annoying that another gentleman requested the teller to pay him his money and get rid of him. He did so, accordingly, but with an expression of impatience at being obliged to attend to him before his turn, and thought no more of the transaction. At the end of the year the books of the bank could not be made to balance, the deficiency being exactly six pounds. He spent days and nights in endeavoring to discover the error, but without success; when at last one night retiring to bed much fatigued, he dreamed of being at his place in the bank, where the transaction with the stammerer passed before him in all its particulars. He found on examination that the sum paid had not been inserted in the book of accounts, and that it exactly amounted to the error in the balance. His memory, which had failed him during the day, had wrought during sleep with perfect exactness.

This was simply an instance of the revival of old associations, which had passed for a season from the mind and been forgotten. Thus it is that all mistakes in our accounts for eternity, arising from forgetfulness here, will be rectified when the mind acts with its full power in the spiritual world. The stars come out by night that were hidden by the day, and ten thousand thousand worlds of transactions and of consequences will be revealed in the firmament of men's consciousness, when the delusions of time and sense shall have given way to the realities of eternity.

From the experience of Niebuhr, the celebrated Danish traveler, Dr. Abercrombie relates an instance of the vividness with which, as the light of the day of this world is retiring, the past realities, that are to encircle our being in the judgment, throng upon the mind; whether they be scenes of innocent delight, or of guilt and terror. When old, blind, and so infirm that he was able only to be carried from his bed to his chair, he used to describe to his friends the scenes which he

had visited in his early days, with wonderful minuteness and vivacity. When they expressed their astonishment, he told them that as he lay in bed, all visible objects shut out, the pictures of what he had seen in the East continually floated before his mind's eye, so that it was no wonder he could speak of them as if he had seen them yesterday. With like vividness the deep intense sky of Asia, with its brilliant and twinkling hosts of stars, which he had so often gazed at by night, was reflected, in the hours of stillness and darkness, on his inmost soul. Now these were simply the beautiful images of nature, that, having once made their impression on a sensitive soul, could never be forgotten. But if pictures daguerreotyped, as it were, upon the soul from abroad, can thus be reproduced after the lapse of a lifetime, as vivid as when the soul first received into its depths, as in a mirror, the reflection of the glory of God's universe, how much more certainly, with how much greater exactitude, must everything which the mind itself has originated, every spontaneous movement of thought and feeling, every development of character, be treasured in the memory, to be reproduced when conscience calls for it! If Niebuhr's memory had been filled with scenes of sin, or with the recollection of sensual and sinful pleasures, instead of those exquisite images of oriental scenery, how intensely painful would his old age have been in the reproduction of such accumulated forms of evil, with conscience passing judgment on them all!

Sometimes the acquisitions, the knowledges, of the earliest period of life, long utterly disused and forgotten, come suddenly and spontaneously again into power and exercise, as indestructible possessions of the soul. Dr. Rush relates the case described to him by a good Lutheran pastor, of Swedes and Germans under his pastoral care, who, when dying, prayed in their native languages, though they could not have spoken them for sixty years, must, indeed, have disused and forgotten them from childhood. Cases are on record of persons under the effect of injury upon the brain speaking in the Welsh language, which had been disused for thirty years, and forgetting English, and again, on recovery, losing the Welsh and recovering the English. It is impossible to account for such operations; but they all go to show that nothing is lost or really forgotten, which has once passed through the mind.

Sometimes it seems as if an invisible power were busy removing or replacing at will, as in a camera obscura, the pictures in the memory. Sometimes those that lie lowest, at the bottom of the pile, are placed uppermost, excluding all others, and sometimes the last drawn are the last seen. But

how easy for the Divine Being, acting simply by the laws of the mind, to bid the soul stand still, and to draw forth before it, plate after plate, the impressions of every moment, hour, day, week, of existence, and let the conscience meditate upon it! And what an employment for a guilty and unpardoned soul! Even a single scene of guilt may fully arrest and occupy the mind for almost any period. There are cases of persons, whose sane and healthy action of mind has been disordered, having their consciousness arrested upon one single event or idea, and remaining involved in that event, or revolving that idea, for the period of near fifty years. This we call insanity. But suppose an immortal mind to stand thus petrified as it were in the eternal world for a similar interval of time, brooding in guilty consciousness over some one scene, idea, or act of guilt. Would not this be one of the direst images by which the mind can body forth its conceptions of the misery of hell?

We may adduce one more instance of the power of memory, instructive for other reasons besides the light thrown upon the great point now before us, the adaptation of memory to the judgment. It is found in the life of that holy man and faithful preacher, the Rev. John Flavel. On one occasion he was preaching from these words in 1 Cor. 16: 22.—If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema maranatha. The discourse is said to have been unusually solemn, especially the explanation of the terms anathema maranatha, Cursed with a bitter and grievous curse; devoted to destruction, when the Lord shall come. At the conclusion of the service, when Mr. Flavel should pronounce the benediction, he arose and said, looking with unspeakable tenderness and solemnity over the congregation, How shall I bless this whole assembly, when every person in it, who loveth not the Lord Jesus Christ, is anathema maranatha? The audience were so deeply affected by the sermon, and by this conclusion of it, that some among them were entirely overcome by their feelings, and sank down quite senseless beneath the powers of the world to come.

In the congregation there was a lad named Luke Short, then about fifteen years of age, a native of Dartmouth. It does not appear that the sermon made any unusual impression upon him. He became a sailor, and afterward came to this country, and passed the remainder of a very long life. At the age of a hundred years he possessed such vigor of body as to be able to work upon his farm, while his mental faculties were very little impaired. But he was a careless, hardened man; he was, in the language of the prophet, "a sin-

ner a hundred years old," and apparently destined "to die accursed." While in the field one day he found himself insensibly carried back in reflection over the events of his past life. The incomprehensible current of association among the events of his youth drew him once more within the chapel of Mr. Flavel at Dartmouth, and the whole solemn scene rose up around him. He saw the man of God, with his affectionate earnestness, power, and solemnity. He heard again the discourse as it fell from his lips; saw him rise to pronounce the benediction, remembered the fearful anathema maranatha, and its powerful effect upon the congregation. And now for the first time he felt the meaning of the preacher, and heard the voice of God. He felt that he had not himself loved the Lord Jesus Christ, not in all the course of a life prolonged to more than a hundred years. He was terrified at the dreadful anathema; he became at length a true penitent, and died in his 116th year, having given pleasing evidence of true piety.

Now this is one of the most remarkable instances on record of the power of memory, the power of Divine Truth, the power of faithful preaching, even though it may seem at the time unavailing, the power of the Holy Spirit, and the greatness and patience of God's mercy and grace. Eighty-five years had passed away in this case, before the seed sown by Mr. Flavel had taken root, or gave the least sign of preservation and existence. Eighty-five years of busy, sinful, hardening life had laid their successive accumulations of thoughts and things, of Providence and truth, of prayerlessness and unconcern, over that inscription engraven by the hand of Mr. Flavel on the man's memory; but it was still there; and in the open field, where perhaps for half a century the man had worked on in disregard of God and eternity, with the same heaven above him, and the same earth beneath, and the same voices of warning around him unheeded, suddenly the coverings of habit and of thoughtlessness are thrown off, the stone, as it were, is lifted from the sepulchre, and the man is taken down into the recesses of his own being. The inscription, Anathema Maranatha, flames out, and sheds a gloomy, terrible light on the forms of guilt filling those recesses. In respect to the power of recollection, the eighty-five years are as though they were not; they are no veil before the truth; but in respect to sin, they add the accumulation of a lifetime to that anathema maranatha, and the inscription is, as it were, reverberated in letters of flame all along the successive chambers in the gallery of the man's existence. The Spirit of God convinces him of guilt, and brings him to repentance, by the power of memory; but who can trace the mysterious associ-

ation that in the open field suddenly carried him back to his seafaring youth, beneath the sound of the voice of a man of God, who himself had for more than half a century been dwelling in heaven ?

That inscription from the Word of God traced by the instrumentality of Flavel on the man's mind, was brought out in this world, after even that long lapse of years, for the soul's salvation. If it had *not* been brought out in this world ; if the soul had never remembered it here, still it was not lost, could not have been obliterated ; but then, if it had not arrested the soul here, it would have flamed out amid the fires of the last day, ANATHEMA MARANATHA, for the soul's perdition. And thus it is that the sins of our careless life, if we suffer ourselves to become hardened from God and insensible to the Divine mercy, are written as in invisible ink, and the events, the business, the anxieties of years cover them ; but they are not gone ; the inscriptions are there, and they only need to be laid open to the light of eternity, or come to the fires of the second death, when the Anathema Maranatha will flame out forever. For that inscription is written on every soul in its sins, on every soul that loves not our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity, and it can be removed only by the Lord Jesus himself in a world of probation.

There is in this last instance a proof of the peculiar power, with which the truth given from God for the guidance of our immortal being, clings eternally to the memory. Truth from heaven is probably more unforgettable than all things else. As our blessed Lord declared that heaven and earth should pass away before one jot or tittle of the law should fail, so it may be easier for heaven and earth to be annihilated, than for one ray of the light poured from God upon the soul ever to fade from the memory. But if it be disregarded, it must remain there only with an avenging and agonizing presence. God's revealed truths will be the most terrible of all things, if they were trampled under foot. They carry an eternal Anathema Maranatha for the soul that in this world despises them. They are life unto life, or death unto death. And all degrees of light, truth, warning, are to be treasured up, the consciousness of them is to be eternal. They are essential to the processes of a perfect judgment.

When the missionary, Mr. Moffat, had once been preaching to the natives in Africa, his attention was arrested by a young man in the midst of a group that had gathered around him, to whom he was preaching over from memory the sermon he had heard, imitating Mr. M.'s gestures, as well as repeating his language, with great solemnity. He repeated the sermon

almost *verbatim*, and when Mr. Moffat remarked to him that he was doing what he himself could not have done, he did not appear conscious of any superior ability, but touched his forehead with his finger, and remarked, "When I hear anything great, it remains there." By *great*, he evidently meant in the sense of solemnity as connected with the soul's destiny in the eternal world. And indeed there is nothing great but with reference to eternity, nothing worth preserving or remembering but in its relation to that. But all things that have the stamp of that greatness remain *there*, as the poor untutored negro observed, there in the mind, and can never pass from the memory.

Now if we bring this to our own case, in considering the vast amount of impressions from religious truth, of which we have been the subjects, that are to be past again in review before us, it becomes exceedingly solemn. All the realities and circumstances of Divine revelation and providence, with all their heavenly associations and tendencies, and all the Sabbaths that have ever intervened to draw us near to God; these solemn truths, and these accompanying feelings and impressions of the soul, whether deep or evanescent, these warnings of God and of conscience, these inward admonitions and movings of the Spirit, perhaps unheeded, these tendencies to better things neglected, resisted, despised; these pictures of God and heaven, made to give place in our minds to the glaring, gaudy things of the world, to its business, amusement, folly, and sin—all these experiences of the truth and providence of God, and all forms, indeed, in which we have ever seen the light of his mercy, although it may have been in flashes of thought and feeling as transitory as the lightning, are to pass before us again, to gather around us, to swear that they have known us, and to show beneath what a discipline of God's restraining, expostulating, awakening, and redeeming love we passed into the eternal world. And if unreclaimed in this world by that discipline, who can confront it there?

The instances of memory we have presented are most of them involuntary, spontaneous; they are instances of power, of activity, which could not be checked, or prevented. Had it been ever so much against the will of the master of the faculty, that would have made no difference. The busy operator, with the utmost *indifference* to the soul's wishes, would have brought out and displayed the mind's innumerable stores. It is no matter whether they be full of sin and shame, or such as the mind would delight to avouch and greet again as its creations or possessions. The memory does

not ask whether the mind be pleased with them, but starts them into being. Nay, the more displeasing they are, the more certain they are to be recalled; for this is one manifest way in which the law of association acts, and anything which the mind greatly fears, is for that very reason held tight to it. If you put by an article of your experience, and say that it is proscribed, debarred from remembrance; if you say, I never wish to see that again, let it be buried and never have a resurrection—it may be a single word, deed, look, event, or incident—the very label which you put upon it, *never to be revealed*, the very burial service which you perform over it, the very act of your will, consigning it to eternal banishment and forgetfulness, secures its eternal existence and power over you. Your unwillingness to look at it compels you to look. Your dread and unwillingness give it, in fact, an additional, morbid, torturing action within you, and attraction over you.

The reader may possibly be reminded of the descriptions of that terrific power, which some deadly species of snakes possess, of charming by the eye, or by some mysterious influence, the birds or other living creatures they are intent upon seizing, and of thus drawing them within reach of their fangs. Is there not something fearfully similar in our experience of the power of every sinful fact in our existence to attract us to itself? Every deadly incident of guilt in the life of a sinful being is as a serpent rearing its head and darting its forked tongue with a dreadful hiss of fascination. "He held him by his glittering eye." Every sin has a glittering eye fixed upon the soul.

Hatred is, in some respects, a stronger bond than friendship. What we hate and dread we remember with a dreadful energy, and so long as the hatred and dread exist, the object of it cannot be forgotten. We have reason to believe that even to a guilty soul nothing will be more dreadful, more hateful, than the realities of past sins.

The state of a man's system in health may not attract his notice. It seems the very plenitude of health to be in such enjoyment of it, that no particular sensations excite notice. But let there be a festering wound in any organ in the system, and it shall excite more notice than the healthful state of the whole system besides. If there could be such a thing as a coal of living fire wound up as a ganglion in a man's nervous system, it would compel and concentrate all his attention. But every sin, unforgiven, is such a coal of fire. The secretions of evil, of guilt, in our experience, are secretions of irritating, painful action, secretions of remorse, compelling the remembrance. The more painful they are, the

more we would forget them ; but of course the more we would forget them, the more certainly we remember them.

We can quicken memory, but we cannot dispossess it of any of its stores, we cannot make ourselves forget. The very attempt at forgetfulness does but startle the memory. There is much meaning in that common phrase of *jogging* the memory. If a guilty person could unconsciously, indifferently, look away from his sins, and let his memory alone, quiet, still, busying himself with other things, he might possibly forget, and keep forgetting. But the *effort* to forget does but *jog* the memory; so does the dread of remembering. Every thrust, made by the soul against the hated image, inspires it with life ; every effort to wipe out the record, or to veil the glittering hieroglyphic, makes it burn up and glare out. It is like attempting to extinguish a fire by turning oil upon it ; or to ward off the lightning by flashing the sword of steel against it. There is no security against a guilty memory, but deliverance from sin ; none, but when God says, Thy sins are forgiven thee, and I will remember them no more.

The involuntariness of memory is the security for its full and impartial action at the judgment. The involuntariness of memory grows out of the nature of the law of association. By this law of our being, one thing, by having been connected with another, suggests and recalls it. In this way all events and all thoughts may be so linked together that if one be preserved the whole are inevitably in existence. Now there being a connection between every thought and thing in God's universe, and some other thought or thing, and between every experience in our nature and some other experience, it is impossible, under this law, but that all should come to light, impossible that anything whatever should be lost. So, while in one sense our memory, with all its stores, is ours eternally, in another sense it is not ours. It is not ours at will, to say what we will remember and what we will not. We cannot banish, at will, unpleasant and annoying recollections. A thousand things may bring them up. And above all, this is the case with our sins. A man may wish he could forget. He may be willing to give his whole fortune, his present enjoyment, the whole universe, if he had it, could he but forget. But no ! the spring is touched, the key-note is sounded, and the whole scene rushes on his soul. Unexpectedly, perhaps even amidst his revelry, the guilty person hears, as it were, the bell toll, and then the sheeted ghosts of buried and forgotten crimes come trooping around him. It is as if a church-yard had discharged all its past generations into noon-day. He sees a hand you cannot see ;

he hears a voice you cannot hear ! Sometimes it is a bloody hand ; sometimes it is a voice that calls up all the energy of remorse within him, sets open the dungeons of his soul, and the pale, haggard forms of crime and despair, Cain-like, come hurrying out of them.

But it does not need a bloody hand ; it does not require the buried voice of murder, thus to disturb the sinful mind, thus to rouse up and harrow the conscience. Any sin may do this ; any fraud, unrepented of, that the man wishes to forget, any guilty indulgence, any sin against his fellow-man, any sin against his God ; and although under the consciousness of guilt, he might wish to plunge into darkness, to drink the whole oblivious Lethe, to hide, even though it were in the bottomless pit, in forgetfulness, happy forgetfulness, he cannot do it. He lives it all over again, and every effort to fly from it and forget it makes him remember it the more.

Sometimes the universal air
Seems lit with ghastly flame ;
Ten thousand, thousand, dreadful eyes
Are looking down in blame.

Terrors are upon him, and the darkness hid in his secret places. A fire not blown, needing no fuel, nor breath of the avenger, shall consume him. His own iniquities shall take the wicked himself. The heavens shall reveal his iniquity, and the earth shall rise up against him. He fleeth from the iron weapon, but the bow of steel shall strike him through.

Now if this experience be carried into eternity, and there memory and the sinful man's conscience play the tyrant over his soul, it is clear that there is no place in the universe but would be a hell. This present life might seem a small circle to be going over and over again through eternity ; and yet, for aught we see, this must be, in part, the sinful man's occupation. With the law of association as his guide, with memory as his master, and conscience with her whip of scorpions running at his side, so must he sweep on, in the involutions of remorse, forever and ever !

Is there, then, a conceivable point in the universe where a man can get beyond the reach of this law ? Why ! if we take the wings of the morning, and fly to the uttermost bounds of space, and into the depths of hell and chaos, with every moment and interval of our progress, this law of association, as absolute as our own existence, goes with us. There is nothing isolated and alone. Let Time, Space, all the abstractions our nature has the power to conceive of, surround us,

as the deep blue of heaven surrounds the most distant star ; we are not alone, not unassociated with other beings and things in creation. The time and space between us and all things else, are but steps enlarging our existence—links of connection, longer or shorter, through which the universe comes to us, and we visit the universe. Even if there could be a total gulf and disconnection between us and everything else of being and of form, still, the omnipresence of God the Creator would bind the created universe in one vast harmony and simultaneousness of relation. I cannot be apart from God, and, in God, I am apart from nothing that he has made. If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there. If I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there. The wings of the morning, the depths of the sea, the darkness of midnight, can neither convey nor hide me from thy presence, nor withdraw me from the relation of intelligent responsibility, in which, as thy creature, I stand connected with thy creation !

The minuteness of this connection, as revealed by the demonstrations of philosophy, is so fearful and wonderful as to be startling, for it shows a far-spreading, complicated, interminable succession of effects, both in the physical and moral constitution of the world ; making everything and all things perpetually operative, as both effects and causes, to the end of time and through immeasurable space, and for aught we can tell, through eternity. No one element put into this complicated system can be taken out, or kept from operating. Even as a stone dropped into the ocean creates an agitation that is propagated and makes its way, in spite of the seeming incredibility of the thing, through the multitudinous heavings and warrings of the tempestuous abyss, to its uttermost limits, so the movements of our moral being stand related, or rather live and act related, forever and illimitably in the moral universe. In the nature of things, moral influences must be indestructible and eternal. The good is eternal, under all circumstances, and God alone can by his grace prevent the evil from being eternal also. To live and act in such a universe is, in this view, such a thing, that a man had better never have been born, than live and act in carelessness of his responsibilities. The whole universe is as a wondrous living organ, the keys of which are brought to every man's hand, and he touches them. He plays upon them, according to his own character ; and though he hears not now the reverberating thunder of the tones he so carelessly flings into existence, he *must* hear it, all along the path of his endless being, either in holy, happy harmonies, or in conflicting, crashing,

revengeful peals of discord, that bring back upon him nothing but the shame and misery of his own guilty nature.

Philosophers have traced the nature and operation of this law of association, as an investigation of the deepest intellectual interest, but seldom in the pursuit of its great eternal consequences, as to our moral being. This law of association is at the foundation of all our habits, or rather, it is busy in the formation of them. The principle itself is the simplest matter of fact, and the law is an inevitable induction from countless observances and experiences of the fact, that a person, a thing, or idea, once seen in connection with another, becomes associated with it in the mind, so that, if one be presented or recalled, the other is also. The bare circumstance of being seen together may create such a lasting and inevitable association; but if there be also an intrinsic relationship, the mind is fixed upon that, and that holds the two together, in such wise, that the one can never come up without the other.

If two persons, or things, or ideas, are seen but once in proximity or relation, the association may be weak; one may not now necessarily suggest the other. But if seen often, the association becomes so strong, as to be inevitable and irresistible. Thus, if a man be a notorious drunkard, every time you see that man, you will think of his habit of drunkenness; or if a man be a profane swearer, every time you see that man, or ever hear of him, you will think of his habit of profane swearing. The thought of a man conspicuous in a page of history which is well known, brings up the details of that history. What person ever thinks of William Tell, without seeing the child, the arrow and the apple? If there be an alarm-bell, which we are accustomed to hear rung only on occasions of danger, the sound of the bell will always suggest the image of the danger; so, the moment we hear the fire-bell, the mind inevitably pictures the evil, of which it is the warning. In the country, when the bell tolls slowly and at measured intervals, you instantly think of death and a funeral. On the other hand, the noise of sleigh-bells brings to the mind all ideas of life and activity; a bracing atmosphere, a fine road covered with snow, the laughter of merry parties, the health and activity of winter. Again, you can scarcely hear the sound of the violin, but it suggests the dance; of the drum, but it brings before you all the excitement and fury of war. A case of surgical instruments tells you of ghastly wounds. The smell of camphor in a room makes you inquire if any one be ill; so does the sight of a physician entering the house. These are common instances of the operation of the

law of association, in regard to things seen or known in connection or relation.

It is a law, which, even viewed merely in an external operation, as a cord, binding our knowledges in bundles, may be as powerful for evil, as for good. We may lay hold upon it for the accomplishment of a happy and useful training of the mind and heart, or an education in all folly and misery. The law of association is at the foundation of most of our prejudices and superstitions. Children, whose minds are filled with nursery tales of ghosts and goblins, are afraid to be left alone in the dark; darkness has become associated in their mind with frightful images. Now it is possible to conceive of its being associated with nothing but images of security and repose. The degree of activity and wideness of sweep in this law, in different minds, may make a genius out of one person, a dull plodder out of another. It has much to do with the development and power of the imagination. The might and majesty of its action, amidst sublime materials, may be seen in the poetry of Milton, whose imagination combined, in such intensity and comprehensiveness, the associative and aggregative faculty.

The constitution of the mind of John Foster was remarkable in this respect. His associations were intensely vivid, so that words affected him with all the power of realities. In one of his Essays he speaks of a young person, (and he is supposed to refer to himself, at a period when he was enchanted with the stories of Gregory Lopez and other recluses,) with whom at any time the word *hermit* was enough to transport him, like the witch's broom-stick, to the solitary hut, surrounded by shady, solemn groves, mossy rocks, crystal streams, and gardens of radishes. The words *woods* and *forests* are said to have produced in his mind the most powerful emotion. In one of his letters he says, "I have just been admiring the marvelous construction of the mind, in the circumstance of its enabling me, as I sit by my candle here, in a chamber at Chichester, to view almost as distinctly as if before my eyes, your house, the barn, the adjacent fields, neighboring houses, and a multitude of other objects. I can go through each part of the house, and see the exact form of the looms, tables, maps, cakes of bread, and so on, down to my mother's thimble. Yet I still find myself almost three hundred miles off. At present I take no notice of the things now about me; but perhaps at some future time, at a still greater distance, I may thus review in imagination the room in which I now write, and the objects it contains; and I find that few places where I have continued some time can be thus

recollected without some degree of regret ; particularly the regret that I did not obtain and accomplish all the good that was possible at that place, and that time. Will it be so, when hereafter I recollect this time, and this place?"

This is exceedingly striking, and we are here brought from mere external things, whether of knowledge or imagination, to inward experiences, the voice of conscience, the goings on of our inward and permanent being. Here it is, and in the circle of the sweep of connection between the moral responsibilities of that permanent being and the world around us, that the law of association acts for eternity ; and if it be true, as Wordsworth declares, that the faculty of imagination was given us to incite and support the eternal part of our being, equally true it is that the associative law and faculty bears reference to the same. It is with reference to the responsibilities and realities of eternity, and to the materials which we ourselves have gone on voluntarily providing for eternity, that it possesses such indestructible and unlimited dominion. Without this law, the memory would be a thing of chance, a perfect chaos. By this law, all things are connected, so connected, that, begin at whatever part of the chain you may, be sure of whatever link you please, all the rest will follow, or may be regained. There can be nothing lost, nothing forgotten.

One of the most interesting instances of the operation of the law of association in quickening the memory, and even recalling to life and vigor the apparently dying mind, has recently come to our notice. It is too remarkable to be neglected. A lady of advanced age had so completely lost all intellectual life and consciousness as not to know her own children or nearest relatives, nor could anything produce a gleam of recollection or intelligence. They would often endeavor to recall some individual to her attention, whose name she might recognize, but in vain. At length it happened that they mentioned the name of Dr. Strong, the early pastor and friend of this lady, and a man of some marked peculiarities. Among other things he had acquired the habit of using the phrase, *I had well nigh said*, in expressing any emphatic or important affirmation. In his sermons, instead of saying to the sinner, *If you die in your sins you will assuredly be lost*, he would be overtaken by his accustomed phrase, and would put the threatening in a form almost ludicrous, *I had well nigh said, you will be lost*. The peculiarity was a marked, known, distinctive characteristic. One day the name of this clergyman was mentioned in the presence of the lady, and her son said to her, *Mother, you know Dr. Strong, certainly you must re-*

member him? She paused a moment, and then answered, with a sudden flash of combined remembrance and humor, *I had well nigh said, I do.* In this case, the operation of the law of association in the mind was like the play of a current of electricity or galvanism in the nervous system. It was a singularly interesting phenomenon.

But this law is not that of mere connection, by evident and known links or circumstances; it is also that of suggestion. One idea, or train of ideas, that may have been introduced by direct connection with some present person or thing, shall suggest to the mind another, by mere resemblance or contrast, or by an abrupt transition, of which, at the time, we can give no account. The causes by which the law of association is thus rendered active and powerful are multitudinous almost beyond computation. And they respect almost equally the power and activity of memory, and the processes of present thought. If I see a face resembling that of a dear absent or departed relative, or friend, I say, it *reminds* me of that beloved individual; it may also *suggest* to me a thousand busy thoughts in the present or for the future. If I hear a striking incident, or event, or train of thought related, I say it *reminds* me of my own experience in a similar case, at a time long past, and perhaps almost forgotten; it may also *suggest* to me present trains of thought, questions, conclusions, courses of action; it may possibly make my mind as active in the present and future as in the past. The tenor of this language, *reminds*, is striking and expressive. It reminds me of, that is, renovates my mind, or as it were creates it anew in regard to that past possession, making that past reality again present, as mine. *Suggestion* also, as derived from the Latin, *sub*, and *gero*, to bring in, underneath, underhand, as it were, is also expressive; meaning the secret notification of the mind in regard to things, either past or present, belonging to the subject, or related with it.

Now the occasions on which this suggestive power is exercised are as multiplied as the experiences of our being. The various innumerable and interminable relations between external things; cause and effect, resemblance and contrast, nearness of time and place, position; preceding or succeeding, high or low, first or last, order or disorder; and in moral and intellectual processes and experiences, the same and other relations, influenced and varied by everything that can have power in building up our being, in developing our character; as the home and discipline of childhood, the instructions and examples of the family circle, the tenor of our pursuits and studies, the books read, the kind of minds conversed with, the

habits of sentiment, opinion, feeling, action, formed and indulged ; all these are occasions and influences, on and under which the law of association works. Hence the great difference in individuals in regard to the operation of this law. Nothing more distinguishes minds of a different order, than the differing wideness and vastness of the sweep of their associations. While some minds seize only upon the unimportant, the common, the trivial, the superficial, others fasten at once upon the grand, the solemn, the all-encompassing, the eternal. Hence the value of a suggestive writer, and the wonderful difference, in this respect, between books that merely rock or lull the mind as in a cradle, and that make it active. One writer is eminently suggestive, because in him the relations of things stand out, or it is evident from his style and manner that he sees them, and is excited by them, and this makes us look earnestly in the same direction. Another suggests nothing at all, but confines us to the bare common-places he is uttering, and uttering in such a way, that we feel that he himself sees nothing more, and therefore we ourselves look for nothing more. So powerful is this principle of being excited, and made curious and active by what excites another, that if a man, no matter who he be, will stop in a crowded street, and look steadfastly up to a particular point in the sky, without saying a word, he shall have, in a quarter of an hour, the street filled up with a multitude, gazing earnestly at that same point. This principle is of vast importance in respect to our gazings into the future world. If we see a mind intensely absorbed with eternal realities, wrestling with them, powerfully exercised by them, gazing upon them with a piercing, solemn earnestness, we cannot help being affected in the same way. And thus, if all Christians would be themselves solemnly occupied with the things of God, we had almost said, if they would merely stand still in the world, and earnestly gaze at them, the world would be affected likewise. And thus the wider the sphere of association in which a man's excited vision sweeps the horizon of his being, the more power he shall have over other minds, to put them in a posture of the like solemnity.

A man's habits of association depend greatly upon his habits of passion, upon the things that mainly interest him. And he may govern his associations by the government of his passions, and by a voluntary attention to things that are of an elevated and real importance. A man interested in religious things, or who will give himself resolutely and prayerfully to their consideration, shall at length have them spontaneously presenting themselves to his mind ; he shall be

possessed by them ; he may, by God's grace, wear the channel of religious feeling so deep in his soul, that every rill of thought and interest shall pour into it, bearing his soul triumphantly on to heaven. A man's waking interests get such hold upon his being, that they characterize his dreams. What he loves and pursues by day, pursues him by night, and shows him that he is establishing in his own being, either for evil or good, a supreme illimitable despotism. The dreams of prayerful men are often prayer. And God himself, according to his own Word, visits the soul in dreams.

Indeed, a man's sleeping thoughts are so well known to be under the power of his daily trains of association and of passion, that men whose souls are burdened with crime have feared to be in the same room with another in the hours of slumber. By day, although the thoughts of evil, the reproaches of conscience, may be rankling in the breast, a man can conceal them ; but by night they often come spontaneously to the lips, revealing secrets. There have been instances of fearful crimes discovered in this way. The tremendous scene in Macbeth is no mere fiction. True it is that guilt gives sleep a tongue :

Infected minds

To their deaf pillows will discharge their secrets.

The part which this law of association, therefore, is to play in men's future judgment, and in the determination of their state for eternity, is evident. Without it, except by an external manifestation of things, as in a book, there could be no judgment, and but a weak self-condemnation. If, for example, when a man sees a fellow-being with whom, in time past, he has had transactions, the sight of that person did not recall those transactions, if each particular were a thing to be remembered by itself, and had no associating links of thought and feeling, no power of relation to bring up other things, a man might meet a person whom he has greatly injured, and yet not meet again the memory of that injury. A man might meet another, against whom he has borne false witness, so as to fill the slandered man's life with misfortune and misery, and yet might feel little or no compunction at the meeting, because of the want of this law of association, whereby things that have been together, or related together, suggest each other. Accordingly, because of the weakness of this law of association in some persons, there is a great defect in memory ; and of course the vividness of one's recollections must be greatly dependent on the energy and power with which this law acts. A man's compunction or remorse for sin will depend greatly on his remembrance of the circumstances and

feelings with which the sin was committed. And if by any means it could be possible to evade this law of association, if you could break up the inevitable chain that connects every part of a man's being with all his feelings and memories, and with him every creature and thing he has ever had to do with, if you could loosen some link, and part the series, then a man's condemnation and misery on account of sin might be not so inevitable, that is, his self-condemnation, and his misery from compunction and remorse. So much of the essence of this article of remorse depends on the remembrance of things in their order and connection, on the remembrance of associated feelings, on the remembrance of little circumstances that surrounded any act, and made up what might be called the scenery of it, that if a man could succeed in getting rid of these, if he could break the links of association, if he were not bound inevitably and forever to them, or if he could make a chaos or confusion out of them, he would be comparatively secure.

But there is no possibility of this. In being judged, a man is to be thrown back, not on the bare recollection of his sins, but on all the circumstances and feelings in and with which they were committed. Not merely the sin will be remembered, but all the then reproaches of conscience, all the light under which it was committed, all the self-deception exercised will be made plain, all the aggravations of the sin will come to view, and all the dreadful feelings that followed it will be renewed and deepened. Every sin of injury against others, against the feelings of others, against the interests of others in any way, will be connected with all the materials of compunction and remorse that preceded, accompanied, or grew out of it. And sometimes little circumstances, or what seemed little at the time, shall have extraordinary power, be invested with a world of feeling and of meaning. A single look, a single word, a circumstance that passed like a flash of lightning, shall have meaning and feeling enough connected with it to be dwelt upon forever and ever. We might consider this in the case of the murderer; a dying word, a dying look of his victim, shall have more horror to him in the recollection, than the bare remembrance of his crime could ever have. And there may be cases, in which the exercise of a cruel, severe, or hard-hearted disposition, the turning away from the cry of a fellow-being in distress, the infliction of a pang on the feelings by a cruel or contemptuous word, shall be followed by the face of the man so grieved, by the picture of the wounded spirit with the arrow festering in it, in the soul of the sinner, to dwell there forever. For it must be

that every injury shall have a time for its revenge ; every violence done to the feelings, or the welfare of others, shall be perfectly remembered, and in this very way memory shall have its revenge. So that a dying murdered man, if he wished for eternal vengeance on his murderer, wished to make it secure beyond escape and forever, and had the command over the mind of the assassin to write there whatever he pleased through eternity, need only say that one word, remember. And every poor, oppressed bondman, and every individual helplessly borne down by a man greedy of gain, and every creature, indeed, unjustly treated in any way, need only say, *remember*. For this law of association makes such remembrance eternally perfect. And this law, though it be less active and apparently less perfect now in some persons than in others, and sometimes exceedingly deficient, yet is perfect and universal in the very structure of our being ; and when the peculiar causes that now hinder its perfect operation in some minds shall be removed, will bring everything together.

We often look with surprise in this world at some men's carelessness in regard to sin, at the hardness of their conscience, at the utter absence of conviction. It is principally because this law of association is not now in active operation in regard to the past. And hence a man sometimes thinks he has escaped from his past sins, or that the remembrance of them, if it comes, will not be so severe and terrible, the consciousness of them not so fresh, so lively, so powerful. But it will. And, moreover, there are things on which, at the time, he dwelt but for a moment, flashes of thought and feeling, gone as soon as experienced, and movements of the soul covered and put out of view by other successive movements, on which he is to dwell, and which he is to experience again, at leisure. Flashes of thought, feeling, judgment, that passed at the time like lightning, although with a voice as of God's thunder ; he is to see them again and deliberately ; he is to hear the peal again, and dwell upon it ; he is to listen to the voice of conscience again, and dwell upon it. And he is to do this with larger associations still, a more comprehensive circle of associated considerations, than he then deemed himself encompassed by. His connections with the universe, his place under God's government, his attitude in regard to God's law, his place under the atonement, his relation to Jesus Christ, all his relations as a spiritual being are to be dwelt upon. How the law of God, and the character of God, and the weight of his own infinite obligations to God were connected with his own sins, with every one of them, he did not care to consider, when he committed them. What light

they threw upon them, how much more aggravated they made them than they were when considered merely with reference to society or to one's self, he had not time, in the whirl of sin, to think of. What they were in the light of the cross of Christ, in reference to the suffering of Christ, in reference to the scheme of redemption, their associations with this scheme, and the condemnation they draw forever from it, he had neither time nor inclination to examine. He would not have had inclination, if he had had time; and this was a part of the operation of the law of association, from which, above all else, if he had seen it, he would have desired to be released. But he will have plenty of time for its consideration. And the law of association in his mind will carry him, in all these directions, into an infinitude of conviction and remorse. In the direction toward God, as well as toward men, toward Christ as well as toward God, toward the law and the gospel, the associated relations, consequences, and condemnation of his sins will be boundless and eternal. This is the structure of our being. What subject, exclaimed Mr. Burke, on one occasion, does not branch out into infinity? This is especially the case with the moral relation of our being. We are fearfully and wonderfully made.

How single circumstances connect worlds of dreadful meaning, we sometimes see developed in a striking manner. And how many more instances, and how much more extraordinary and powerful, there are to be known in eternity, we cannot even imagine. We remember the story of a hardened wrecker on the coast of England, whose son went from him to a distant country, and was gone for years. Meantime the hardened, wretched parents pursued their career of crime, watching for wrecks, sometimes causing them by false lights, stripping the dead bodies cast on shore, sometimes killing their victims, when but half dead. At length one night, after a long cessation of storms, there came a dreadful gale, and in it a large ship was cast upon the shore. The wrecker hastened to his work, and encountering a body with jewels and riches upon it, to make sure of his prey, he stabbed the unfortunate victim, and then, among other things, drew from his finger a costly jewel. When, after his midnight work, he returned home, and came to the light with his spoils, on showing the ring it was found to be that which he had given to his own son on his departure, and that son was the captain of the wrecked ship, and that son the father had murdered! This was retribution, terrible and stern, even in this life. And this was a revelation by one circumstance! How much hung upon that ring! What knowledge of crime and woe were

connected with it! But what innumerable associations of this kind remain to be revealed! What revealing circumstances will come up in eternity, if not before, full of just such worlds of conviction and remorse to the conscience!

A man's sins in this world are often like old forgotten, buried, coins. They have grown rusty and illegible. They are laid away in the mind like the lumber in the shop of an antiquary. But they all have an image and superscription. They have dates and hieroglyphics, full of meaning. And there is a process by which they may be restored. The rust can be rubbed from the surface, and by fire, if no way else, the letters can again be read. So it is with men's forgotten sins. They are to have a resurrection. Some of them shall rise even with the body, shall pass from this earthly body into that spiritual body, which is to spring from it. For as the body that is laid in the grave is to be in some sense the germ of that body which is to be raised, so the character of the body which is to be raised shall be determined by the character of the body which is interred: He that soweth to his flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption. Sin is the seed, sin and death shall be the harvest. Neither can the sins, which are not written in a man's constitution, be forgotten; any more than those which, in their consequences in his spiritual body, are to rise with him in the resurrection. All shall come to light. The image and superscription shall be visible.

We know but little of the mysterious connection between soul and body. But one thing we know, that the habits of the soul act upon the body, and the habits of the body act upon the soul. A worldly man thinks very little of this; a man of sin and pleasure thinks of it very little; and yet it may be in this very way that he is engraving the letters of his own future judgment on his own being. No man knows, when in a course of sinful or sensual indulgence, no young man, in a career of sensual passion, no middle-aged man, in the pursuits of ambition, or the greedy grasp of gain, what lines he is tracing, as with the pen of a diamond, or burning in, as with a pen of solid fire, upon his spiritual being, hidden perhaps now, but by and by to come out, and to be read through eternity. It is said that the wicked shall be driven away in his wickedness; and so the wicked soul may be launched into eternity, seared and scorched, in the sight of all the universe, with the deep-burnt engraving of his own sins, so that no book of judgment would be needed to read them out of, either to himself or to angels.

The consideration of this law of our nature suggests some

solemn admonitions, not only with reference to the inevitable memory and production of all our past experience at the judgement, but with reference to the character we are forming now. What *are* our habits of association? Do they bind us to God and salvation? Are we linked by them to the cross and the Saviour? We have the power to connect ourselves everlastingly with the elements of heaven or hell. A man may surround his soul with the scenery of either world, may live with fiends or angels beforehand. With what thoughts does he keep company? What are the habitual trains of association in his ideas and feelings? They bind him to themselves, whatever be their nature, every day, month, year, more closely, more unalterably, more indissolubly. If they are evil, and they *are* evil, if God be excluded from them, then they grow stronger and stronger, till a man is taken in his own iniquity, and holden with the cords of his sin. And at length it were as easy to change the very laws of nature as to change the current of association, which has become indissoluble habit.

Of what infinite importance is it that the train of a man's habitual associations be elevated and holy! Let him remember that his daily habits of association are his education for eternity. They may grow up and steal upon him as imperceptibly in progress as the green blade steals from the ground and passes into the ripe full corn in the ear, ready for the harvesting. But their daily tenor is developing and fixing his character for eternity. Therefore, with what tender care and mercy does God surround us with truths, providences, and influences, to win us to himself, to gain for his love and grace the ruling place in our affections! How many glorious objects has he placed before us in his own fair creation, to connect the soul with God, to suggest his Divine attributes, to bring ever before and within the mind the image of the loveliness of the Creator of so much glory! And how delightful that habit of the soul which, by this natural power of association, allies itself in holy fellowship with faith, in beholding the invisible God, and as it were experiencing a translation into his continual presence, by the medium of these visible realities! When we go forth upon a starry evening, and lift up our eyes to those countless bright orbs in their solemn silence and lustre, what a source of refreshment and spiritual power is it to the soul, if they speak to us of God, if they lift our thoughts to his divine abode! Let us, then, remember that it is in our power to form this heavenly association. There is nothing in God's creation, nothing in God's providential arrangements, which may not prove a step or link of

intercourse with God. There is not a tree, not a flower, nor a cloud, nor a breath of wind, nor a dawn, nor noon, nor sunset, but may be so connected with God, that the soul by the very processes of nature, as well as the mercies of providence and grace, shall be ever reminded of him, ever present with him. The man who comes to God by the cross of Christ, and receives upon his soul the baptism of a Saviour's love, shall thus delight in God's presence now, and be educated for his immediate presence in eternity.

The power of association is fearful to contemplate, when, instead of being thus filled with God, instead of giving to everything the power of leading the soul spontaneously and joyfully to him, it is simply through a man's hardened and impenitent heart, the linking together, and the power of recalling, innumerable sins, sins positive and negative, sins of the neglect and abuse of God's boundless mercies. The scenes of such mercies will be places of dreadful interest to revisit, if, for the purposes of retribution, a soul is ever brought back to stand in judgment, in destiny, where it stood once in probation. No local associations, it has been remarked, are so impressive as those of guilt. There is a common consciousness of this among mankind. The places where crimes have been committed have a dread power of appeal to the guilty conscience. In one of the cities in Spain, in a very remarkable case of murder, we knew this principle to be appealed to with terrible effect. The murdered man was struck down in a dark lane, and his blood remained upon the walls. In the trial of the murderer, which took place with awful swiftness, he was carried in chains along with the dead body to every locality of the scene of crime, and there the corpse was set down, and the murderer confronted on the spot with solemn adjurations. This power of local association is manifested in a thousand ways; and although God's Word says of the places that now know us that we shall know them no more forever, when we die, inasmuch as we quit this world as our dwelling-place, yet we may see again and know the many, many places of our sins; that house, that field, that wood, that street, that room, that hall of revelry, that place of business; the scenery, in fine, be it limited or vast, over which the footsteps of our life have traced our pilgrimage, need only be recalled; when there would rush upon the soul the memory of all the transactions, of whatever hue, connected with them; all the privileges we have enjoyed, and all our abuse of them; all the sins we have committed, and all the duties we have neglected to do.

Now it is to be remembered that God makes use both of

association and memory in this world for his purposes of mercy. When Job says, Thou writest bitter things against me, and makest me to possess the iniquities of my youth; thou puttest my feet in the stocks, and lookest narrowly into all my paths; thou settest a print upon the heels of my feet; and when Jeremiah says, Thine own wickedness shall correct thee, and thy backslidings shall reprove thee; and when Job says, The terrors of God set themselves in array against me;—they are describing the operations of God's discipline, which may be a discipline of mercy in this world, to bring men to repentance, even by the power of association and the memory of sin. But if remembrance fail in this world in the purpose for which God now quickens it, and shows the sins of life to the conscience, and if the man goes unreclaimed into the eternal world, then manifestly the very remembrance of these quickenings of the memory, these unavailing processes of judgment and conviction beforehand, will be among the most terrible stores, which the mind will hereafter produce for its own condemnation and punishment.

It is clear, then, on every side, in every view, how, as sinful beings, the very faculties of our nature may be to us the ministers of inevitable woe. The penal power of association and remembrance is terrible, the more so, when it is proved inevitable. The law of association will not stop, the process of memory will not be quiet, at the sinner's bidding. No man can say to the forms of varied sin, which memory evokes from what he might have dreamed would be an eternal sepulchre, Retire! They will neither be commanded nor persuaded, but the moment the associative signal beats, will rise and speak. Even now the memory treasures a thousand things which we wish could be forgotten, as well as forgets a thousand things we wish could be retained.

It is said that in the blank pages of an early copy of Rogers' Poem on the Pleasures of Memory, some lines were once found, singularly illustrative of the truths we have been contemplating. The soul of the individual who penned them we would hope may have been awakened by the Spirit of God, and redeemed from unbelief and irreligion by the salutary conviction of sin, and the timely application to a Saviour. The lines are gloomily impressive.

"Alone, at midnight's haunted hour,
When nature woos repose in vain,
Remembrance wakes her PENAL POWER,
The TYRANT of the burning brain.
She tells of time misspent, of comfort lost,
Of fair occasions gone forever by,
Of hopes too fondly nursed, too rudely crossed,
Of many a cause to wish, yet fear, to die!"

For what, except the instinctive fear
 Lest she survive, detains me here,
 When all the life of life is fled?
 What, but the deep, inherent dread
 Lest she beyond the grave resume her reign,
 And realize the hell, that priests and beldames feign!"

Here is tremendous truth wrung from the self-torturing experience of a guilty soul, even in the very battle against the instinctive fear, the deep, inherent dread, of the future life and activity of Memory! Yes! that is indeed the terror of eternity to a sinful mind, the immortality of remembrance with her penal power, the indestructibleness, the everlasting memory of the past! The prospect of living over the past again, in judgment beneath the eye of God! If that be done without Christ's mercy in eternity, all indeed is lost. But in this world the memory of the past, the guilty past, is one of God's merciful expedients to bring us to Christ. It is the simplest process of conviction of sin, and every man, who finds his soul impelled into this process, ought to feel that the hand of God is on him for good. And although a man were ever so miserable in the review of time misspent, of fair occasions gone forever by, and cups of anguish drained to the bottom by self-madness, with others still to be drained, as the consequence of unutterable folly, though he were so miserable as to feel that all the life of life has fled, and that nothing is left but the deep, inherent dread of something worse in the power of memory beyond the grave; yet still there is a remedy in Christ for all this, and all this, thus far, may be even God's mercy in Christ to save the soul; a bitter experience now, but a deliverance from an infinitely more dreadful, because eternal and immutable, experience hereafter; a conviction of guilt by the power of memory now, to save the soul from memory's penal power and scorpion whip hereafter.

ARTICLE VI.

EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR STUART,

ON THE *δύωσις*, OR DOUBLE MEANING OF SCRIPTURE.

By REV. T. M. HOPKINS, Racine, Wis.

THE simple question we propose to discuss is this: Are there any passages of Scripture which are to be understood in a twofold sense? any of which it can be said, "their first and secondary meaning are obviously given, and given, too, by the Spirit of inspiration?" This is a fair statement of the ques-

tion at issue between Professor Stuart and many other interpreters of the sacred Scriptures.

Our definition of a double, or occult sense, will be given in the words of Professor Stuart himself. "If we ascribe to any passage of Scripture a literal, obvious, historical sense, and interpret it as conveying the meaning which its words naturally and obviously convey—and yet, at the same time, ascribe to the same words *another* meaning which is occult or obscure, but still is designed to be conveyed by those same words, we then make out a double sense."—"For example," he says, "If the second Psalm is construed as a description of the coronation of David, or Solomon, on the hill of Zion, and all that is there said be literally and historically applied, and still we go on to find in this same Psalm, that is, *in the words of it*, a secondary, or spiritual sense (as it is sometimes called)—then we give to it a double sense. We first ascribe to it an obvious and historical meaning; endeavoring to make this out in the best way we can, and then we suppose there is an *ἐκρόσια*, i. e., an occult, or secondary and spiritual sense, by virtue of which the Psalm becomes applicable to Christ, the true and spiritual Messiah."

Let us select for examination, with the view of testing Professor Stuart's rule of interpreting this entire class of passages, Matt. 1: 22, 23: "Now all this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying, Behold, a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name Emmanuel, which, being interpreted, is, God with us." This passage is plainly a quotation from Isaiah 7: 14. Now the question is, Has this Scripture been but *once* fulfilled, or *twice*? Did the event predicted take place "literally and historically" in *Isaiah's* own day, and did also another similar event occur in the time of *Matthew* the evangelist, which his inspired pen has recorded as also a fulfillment of Isaiah's prediction? We are constrained to answer in the affirmative.

The facts in the case are these:—The king of Syria having confederated with the king of Israel, laid siege to Jerusalem. Ahaz, king of Judah, and many of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, were filled with fear for the result, and the prophet Isaiah was commanded to go and assure Ahaz, that notwithstanding the confederacy, Jerusalem was safe; the conspiracy should be broken up. Ahaz meets the cheering message in the spirit of unbelief; and then the prophet responds: "If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not be established." Jehovah condescends to offer the king a *pledge* of his deliverance if he will but ask it: "Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God:

ask it either in the depth, or in the height above." Ahaz refused, assigning as his reason, that he would not thus put the Lord on trial; while the true reason probably was, that he had formed an alliance with the king of Assyria, and was already robbing the temple of its treasures, to defray the expenses of the war. (Compare 2 Kings 16: 7, 8.) His proud, unhumiliated heart refused the proffered aid of the Lord, confiding in his own wisdom and resources to save the city. Isaiah demands to know if he will persist in his unbelief till God shall be weary, at the same time declaring that the Lord, *unasked*, would give him a sign: "Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel. For before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good, the land that thou abhorrest shall be forsaken of both her kings." The meaning of which is plainly this: Within the time required for a woman, then a virgin and unmarried, to enter into marriage, and give birth to a child, and that child come to years of understanding, the land of Syria and of Israel, confederate though they were, should be left without a king. Was this pledge of speedy deliverance actually given, and was it redeemed?

The first four verses of the succeeding chapter, it seems to us, settle these questions beyond dispute. The prophet is required to make a legal and public record of the whole transaction; the prophetess bears him a son, and the Lord declares, that "before the child shall have knowledge to cry my father and my mother, the riches of Damascus, and the spoils of Samaria shall be taken away before the king of Assyria."

Chap. 9: 6, 7, announces the birth of the child. Nor is it any objection to the plain, "literal, historical" accomplishment, that the mind of the prophet was evidently directed forward to the period when the Messiah should be born, and that his prophecy should terminate with an explicit reference to that event. See Barnes on Isaiah, i. p. 265.

In support of this, as the true interpretation, we remark, in the language of the writer just cited: "It is *the obvious* interpretation. If the passage stood by itself, if chapters vii. and viii. were all we had; if there were no allusion to this passage or event in the New Testament, and if men were to sit down and look directly at the circumstances, the unhesitating opinion of the great mass of men would be, that it *must* have such a reference. This is an important rule of interpretation. Besides, it is evidently demanded by the exigencies of the case. The point of inquiry was not as to an *ultimate* and *far distant* deliverance; it concerned a *present* matter; a deliverance from an impending evil. The threatened

invasion is then over Jerusalem. Ahaz is gone forth to inquire for deliverance ; Isaiah is commanded to go out and meet him, to assure him, of what ?—that there would come a deliverance at the distance of some seven or eight hundred years, in the birth of a promised Messiah ? No : it was to assure him, that within a short space of time, the threatened evil would be withdrawn. Nothing short of this could have been the sign or pledge which the prophet proposed to give. This argument we regard unanswerable : it is so obvious and so strong that all attempts to answer it, by those who take a different view of the passage, are and have been utter failures."

A consideration of no small weight, is the fact, that the prophet evidently regarded himself and his children *as signs to the people*. Not only are their names significant, but the signification of each has a direct reference to such an event. Besides, as we have already remarked, chap. 8 : 1-4, evidently refers to the birth of a child, as an event that had actually taken place *before* the threatened evil was removed ; and that birth was to be the public assurance of a predicted and promised deliverance from an invasion with which the land was then threatened.

Here is clearly a fulfillment of the prophecy under consideration, at least to the extent of the birth of the promised child. The reality of the transaction is placed beyond a doubt. We feel confident, therefore, that we have made out a "literal, historical," real transaction—one that in all respects meets the *first* part of the definition, which Professor Stuart gives us of a double sense. (*quod vide.*) A literal, historical sign is given of an event which none but God could foresee, and which none but he could bring about. This sign or pledge is redeemed, at least to a sufficient extent to ensure the end for which it was given ; and a careful record is made of the whole.

We have, then, in the case before us, *one* "literal, historical," real fulfillment of this prophecy ; let us see if there be not another.

From the manner in which he quotes this same passage (Isa. 7 : 14), we think it quite evident that the Evangelist regarded it as referring to the miraculous birth of the Messiah. He seems not to entertain the idea that it had reference to any other event. He quotes the prophecy as meaning, that when Christ, the promised Messiah, should be born, it would be, as then it was, of one who had never known man, but who was of child by the Holy Ghost. The manner in which he introduces the prophecy shows that *he* regarded it as having a perfect fulfillment in the birth of Christ : and, moreover, that the view which he had taken of it was the current,

if not exclusive interpretation of it in his day. The birth of Christ was so remarkable, so mysterious, so unlike any other that had ever occurred, that nothing short of so marked an event could have been regarded as the complete fulfillment of the prophecy in question. He was born of a virgin, in the sense that no other man ever was; but his miraculous birth had been described by the prophet in language that admitted of a *first* application to the birth of a child in his own day; yet, it was a language designedly used, which would be applicable to a future, more glorious birth,—one which should introduce the Messiah into the world.

It is a consideration of no little weight, that this passage has ever been regarded as having been truly and properly fulfilled *ONLY* in the miraculous conception and birth of Christ. So confident have the readers of the Bible been, that the event recorded in Matthew was a fulfillment of the prophecy in Isaiah, that few have ever entertained the question that it admitted of any other meaning. We admit the possibility that this belief may have been an error; but we deny that it is probable. A communication from God, in order to be a revelation, must be intelligible; but that which misleads a thousand generations cannot have much in it that is intelligible. We ought, therefore, to be cautious how we reject the interpretation of any Scripture which has received the concurrent and general sanction of the Christian church in all ages.

Mr. Barnes adds still another consideration, which we give in his own words: "The great and unanswerable argument in favor of the Messianic interpretation of this passage is derived from the conclusion of the prophecy in chaps. viii. 8, and ix. 1-7. This *last* is so connected with what precedes it, as evidently to form a part of it; and yet it *cannot* be applied to a son of Isaiah, or to any other child that should be born to him. In fact, if there is a single passage in the Old Testament which must be applied to the Messiah, *this is the passage*. If so, it is plain, that though the prophet at first had his eye on an event which was soon to occur, and which would be to Ahaz a full demonstration that the land of Judea would be safe from the impending invasion, yet, that his mind was thrown forward to future times, and, accordingly, he employed language which would describe a future, most glorious event; one that would be a fuller confirmation and demonstration that God would" (at all times) "protect his people. The prophet became fully absorbed in that more distant event; insomuch, that at last, he referred to that event alone. The child that was about to be born to him would,

in respect to many of the circumstances of his birth, be an apt emblem of Him who should be born in future times ; and *both* would demonstrate the Divine power and protection over the people of God. To *both*, the name Immanuel would be given,—though not the common one by which either would be known, both would be born of a virgin ; the first, of one who was then, *at the time of the vision*, a virgin ; and consequently, the birth of whose child none but God could know ; the latter should be born of one who should appropriately be called THE VIRGIN, and who should *remain* a virgin, notwithstanding the birth of a child. In accordance with the law of suggestion, one event suggests the other ; the prophet appears to be wholly absorbed in the contemplation of the latter ; and to have given, finally, in chap. ix. 3-7, *a description that was applicable to none but the Messiah.*”

“This,” as he afterward adds, “appears to be the meaning of this difficult passage. The considerations in favor of referring it to the birth of a child in the time of Isaiah, which should be to him a pledge of the safety of his kingdom *then*, seem to me to be unanswerable : and those in favor of *an ultimate* reference to the Messiah,—a reference which becomes in the issue total and absorbing,—are equally unanswerable, as I must think. If so, the twofold reference and import of the passage is clear.”

If, now, it can be fairly made out that Matt. 1: 22-23, is clearly a case of ὑπόνοια, or a double sense, and the principle of interpretation, which is to be applied here as well as in other cases of a similar nature, fully settled, we shall accomplish our end.

Professor Stuart, it is well known, takes the ground that there is no such case in the Bible. The discussion of this question forms no small portion of his book, (*Hints on the Prophecies*) ; and the arguments which he advances in support of his bold position are urged with a zeal and an energy characteristic of him. We think, however, that we have shown that the prophecy in question *had* a fulfillment, a primary and literal fulfillment, in the days of the prophet that uttered it. And if the arguments which we have already brought forward have not proved that this same prophecy has had *another*, and to us a far more important fulfillment, we hope to accomplish this in the considerations that follow.

Many are the passages in the New Testament, especially in the Gospels, which are introduced by the common formula of a quotation—“that it might be fulfilled”—or, “then was fulfilled that which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet.” On all these, so far as yet appears, Prof. S. pro-

poses to stretch one and the same line. His rule is: "Where something was transacted, done, or performed in former days, —or where an event *happened*, if they, *i. e.*, the writers of the New Testament, found an *antitype*, or corresponding resemblance under the new dispensation, they regarded it, and accordingly *called* it, 'a *ᾠλήρωσις*, a fulfillment.'" Again: "Anything which happened or was done in ancient times, and which, for substance, is repeated, or which takes place under the new dispensation; anything later, which presents a lively resemblance to another and an earlier thing, may be, and often is, spoken of as a *ᾠλήρωσις* of that earlier thing. It matters not now," as he expressly affirms, "whether the word *ᾠλήρωσις*; by strictly critical and classic usage, would *bear* this latitude of sense or not. Enough that such is New Testament usage."

It strikes us as a somewhat singular circumstance, in respect to the meaning of this word, that it is a matter of such decided unimportance, whether it were ever used in the sense assigned to it by classic writers or not. There *may* be some cases of this description; but we should greatly dislike to hang the fate of an argument,—especially, of one that we cared anything about,—upon a matter so exceedingly questionable and suspicious as this. True, the Greek of the New Testament, as a whole, differs widely from that of the classics; but still, we think it admits of a question, whether *any* term therein used has strayed so far in its meaning from that which it originally had, as to be in all respects out of sight of its primitive import. There is, we believe, in every case, a *shadow* of resemblance in the meaning assumed, to that which it *once* had, but which has been now laid aside.

In order to free this principle from all embarrassment, the Professor maintains, with Tittman,¹—that the Greek particle, *wa*, in nearly all cases, but especially when combined with this particular formula, is used in its *ecbatic* (*ἐκβατική*) sense; *i. e.*, in a sense which designates *the end* which actually is accomplished; and that *the meaning* of the evangelist is: "Now all this was done, *so that* it was fulfilled, or *in a way* that was a fulfillment of that which was spoken, etc. But, by fulfillment he here means only as before, that an event occurred in the days of the New Testament writers, which, in respect to some circumstances connected with it, so much resembled *another* event, one recorded in the ancient Scriptures, either as an historical fact, or one predicted, as to admit of being described by, or *in*, the words of ancient prediction, or description. Thus, Matt. 2: 15: 'That it might

¹ Biblical Repository for Jan., 1835, p. 84, et seq.

be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying, Out of Egypt have I called my Son,'—means only, that as in ancient times, the Hebrews came up out of Egypt in obedience to the call of God, and under his special care,—so now the Son of God came up out of the same country,—being guided and protected by his Heavenly Father." (Hints, p. 36.)

To state the rule full and explicit, we quote once more from the same. "God often calls ancient Israel his child, his son; because he was in fact a special object of his love. The Hebrews were exiles in the land of Egypt; they were delivered from that state by a special providence and brought to Palestine—the Promised Land. Jesus, the beloved Son of God, in a higher and nobler sense, was an exile in Egypt. He was delivered from this state and brought to Palestine; and all by a special providence. *Angels* interposed to accomplish his deliverance. Here, then, is a case in which that Son in whom he was well pleased, was brought down to Egypt, and, afterward, up out of Egypt, in a manner not unlike that recorded in ancient history. What happened in *later* times, happened in a higher, nobler sense in *ancient* times: And might it not be said, on this account, that there was in this case a *πληρωσις*, a fulfillment? It is said, and why not *justly* said, and in a way full of meaning?"

We accord most fully with the Professor in the opinion just expressed, excepting so far as relates to the *ground* of such an assertion: We have serious doubts whether there be a single passage in the New Testament in respect to which there is an intimation from men inspired, that such passage is a fulfillment of an ancient prediction in any sense, solely or mainly on the ground of certain resemblances in the circumstances connected with the things related. The Evangelist, beyond a doubt, had better reasons for affirming that the return of Joseph and Mary, with the child Jesus from Egypt, was a fulfillment of a certain prophecy, than the consideration of a few circumstances in the one, which were analogous to some in the other case. Were these the *only* three that ever went down into Egypt, and after sojourning there for a time, returned to Palestine? And why not say in every case, as in this, that each separate one is a fulfillment of Hosea 11: 1, as truly as was this? If lively resemblances in the one, to things in the other, are sufficient to justify the affirmation of the Evangelist, let this affirmation be repeated as often as these resemblances are seen.

And what are Professor Stuart's reasons for affirming what he does on this point? Not that this event was ever predict-

ed in any sense ; nor on the ground that the prophet Hosea ever knew anything of the sojourn of Christ in Egypt, or of his return from thence : but solely for the reasons that the parents of Christ were driven there by persecution ; that having sojourned there till "they were dead that sought the young child's life," they returned in safety to Palestine. These fortuitous circumstances, as we must call them, are sufficient, in Professor Stuart's judgment, to justify the declarations of Matthew concerning the matter. These "resemblances," whether they be those which Mr. S. would call "lively" or not, are sufficient in his view for designating the return from Egypt a fulfillment of a most explicit prophecy.

We deem it proper here to repeat the rule : "Anything which happened, or was done in ancient times ; and which for substance, is repeated, or takes place again under the new dispensation ; anything *later*, which presents a lively resemblance to another, and an *earlier* thing, *that* may be, and often is, spoken of as a *παραβολή*, or fulfillment of that earlier thing."

Here is latitude enough to enable one to proceed without embarrassment in the exposition of almost any passage. Why, with so convenient a rule as this, the Professor did not make some disposal of the important passage upon which we have mainly based our arguments, we are at a loss to conjecture. "Now, all this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying, Behold, a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name Emmanuel ; which, being interpreted, is, God with us."

What "was done, that it might be fulfilled?" Was it literally and historically true, that a virgin *did* conceive and bear a son? Beyond all manner of doubt, and in a sense never before known, and never again to be known: A virgin before, and a virgin after the birth of the child, so far as relates to intercourse with man ; so that there is not in fact *the shadow of a resemblance* in this event to anything that ever did, or ever will take place. True, here is a female, a virgin, like the espoused wife of the prophet ; in the language of the Bible, she is found with child by the Holy Ghost, before she has known man. Here, then, the analogy fails ; and it is a most fatal defect in the application of the rule. Resemblances, "lively resemblances," are demanded, but they are not found. It is not even intimated, that any such thing took place in the case of the wife of the prophet. Everything is natural, common ; and of course not mysterious. But in the

birth of Christ there was nothing of the kind ; everything was above, or beyond the course of nature. A virgin, truly and properly, is with child ; “ not by man, nor by the will of man,” but by the Holy Ghost : one of the most mysterious, remarkable events ; one of the greatest miracles ever wrought. In every respect, (so far as the exigencies of the case are concerned,) unlike anything that ever had occurred, or ever would occur. That Holy Child, thus begotten of God, thus born of a virgin, thus becomes the Son of God.

What is there now in all this, which is like unto something that literally took place in ancient times ; which, as is admitted, was neither miraculous nor mysterious ? And what becomes of an argument which is founded upon analogy here ; upon “ lively resemblances,” when there are no resemblances at all ?

But, admitting there *were* resemblances—and in respect to some things there *were*—for in both cases there was a female, a virgin, with child, the child was born, he was the *first-born*, and a son. But in how many millions of instances may the same points of resemblance be found ? And are all these cases fulfillments, according to the Professor’s rule ; or in any sense whatever ? It would have been equally proper to have fixed upon any other circumstances, common to this class of cases, as upon these. If “ lively resemblances ” are all that is required by this rule, it were the easiest thing in the world to supply them.

It must be palpable to every candid mind, that an argument based on resemblances here, is hopelessly subversive of the whole theory. What *are* the resemblances ? They are those which are, and which have been common to ten thousand thousand cases : and are they all fulfillments ? Are we at liberty in every instance in which a virgin marries and is blessed with a son for her first-born, to apply the rule under consideration, and declare as in the passage before us, “ Then was fulfilled,” &c. ? The rule, in fact, demands only resemblances, provided they be “ lively ” ones ; why, then, are we not as fully justified in applying it in every instance where these resemblances are found as the Evangelist was ? If he meant no more by the application of the prophecy to the birth of Christ than that there were circumstances—such as the espousal of a female, her marriage, and in due time, her bearing a son for her first-born—wherein is it improper for us to affirm, whenever these circumstances do occur, “ here is plainly another *ἰσχυρισμὸς* of that which was spoken by the prophet Isaiah ?”

So far, then, are we from finding this a correct principle of

interpretation, that we doubt if there can be a worse one. We know of none among all the fanciful theories which German Neology has introduced for expounding the Word of God, more sure to mislead the humble and devout inquirer after truth than this. And yet we are obliged to say this; well knowing that it has been advocated by some of the ablest men in the church, and out of it; a declaration which cannot or *ought* not to subject us to the charge of "thinking more highly of ourselves than we ought," for we cannot yield our convictions to the authority of great names: such a principle of interpretation makes sad havoc with the New Testament quotations. We are constrained to believe "either the Bible is a fable, or the rule is an absurdity."

Our space will not allow us to go into an extended examination of any other passages. We will briefly refer, however, to another. Compare Dan. 11: 31 and 12: 11, with Matt. 24: 15 and Mark 13: 14. Here, if we mistake not, will be found an application of the more ancient record to an event which was even then *future* when Christ applied it; and if so, the fact must go far to settle the question of a double application of at least some passages of Scripture.

Prof. Stuart remarks upon this case as follows: "I must conclude, therefore, that the abomination that maketh desolate, mentioned in Matt., etc., as above, refers to Daniel, as just quoted. *In either of which cases, the original must have designated Antiochus Epiphanes.* Thus much I feel compelled to acknowledge, on the simple grounds of criticism, although the admission apparently makes *against* the cause I am now advocating; or, at least, it seems to concede a *δράσιμα*, or occult sense in the passages referred to."

Still, he proposes to inquire at some length whether the use which is here made of the passage does necessarily imply one. "The general principles of exegesis, on such grounds, need not be repeated. Enough for the present to say, that the application of the phraseology in question (so far as it belongs to the book of Daniel) to the wasting of Jerusalem by the Romans, no more proves that such was *the original* object of the words, than the application by Matt. 2: 15, of Hosea 11: 1, was originally a prediction respecting the child Jesus. In fact, it is no prediction at all, but simply an historical declaration."

"But then," he adds, "how natural and appropriate for Matthew to say, that the words, 'out of Egypt have I called my son,' found a *πληρωσις* in the sojourn of God's greater Son there, and in his recall from that country! A certain event happened in ancient times, viz., the calling of God's Son (a

collective designation of the Israelites,) out of Egyptian exile; a like event had *recently* taken place, when the Son of God, in a higher and *nobler* sense, was called out of exile in the same country. Was there not now a *πληρωσις*—a fulfillment of the ancient declaration by the prophet, such as would compel almost any mind to feel the congruity of adapting that declaration to the recent events?"

Most certainly there was, but not on the ground maintained by Prof. S., viz., that of mere resemblance between the two cases; for in several points this fails. And what if it did not? What if the resemblance were in all respects perfect? Would the sacred historian have been justified in saying the latter was a fulfillment of the former? Would the following language have been truthful: "There was a certain event happened a long time ago, viz., our fathers went down into Egypt, and after sojourning there about the space of 400 years, came up again out of Egypt: an event has taken place in these *latter* days, very similar to it; Joseph and Mary, with the child Jesus, have been down into Egypt, and tarried there for a season, and then returned. In reference to the former, the law by the mouth of the prophet Hosea declared: 'When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt;' therefore, this *last* case is a *πληρωσις* of the first."

And why may not the same be affirmed of every similar case? If the mere circumstances of going down into Egypt, and tarrying there for a season, and thence returning, warranted the inspired historian in saying, "this is a fulfillment of an ancient prediction," there may have been a thousand such fulfillments instead of one. We cannot but think that it is an unwarranted and dangerous use of the term *πληρωσις*, to say that it means only the occurrence of an event similar to one which took place some time before it!

In the last passage named (Matt. 24: 15, 16) Christ himself, we think, plainly recognized a double sense. "When ye, therefore, shall see the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the prophet, stand in the holy place (whose readeth, let him understand), then let them which be in Judea flee into the mountains." Now "the abomination of desolation," to which Christ here refers his disciples as the sign of the speedy coming of his own predicted judgment upon Jerusalem, "in its primary, literal, historical sense," was undoubtedly the statue of Jupiter Olympus, which Antiochus Epiphanes set up in the Temple 590 years before the time of Christ. And that to which Christ clearly referred, in the instructions given to his disciples, was the symbol of Roman power,

the banner, probably, of that warlike people, with the images of their gods and emperors upon it. (See Calmet.) And yet, according to the express declarations of Christ, these melancholy emblems of Roman domination,—these unwelcome witnesses of Jewish subjugation and departed glory, were named by Daniel 590 years before, and the place where they were to be looked for, designated.

In justice to Prof. Stuart, it must be admitted that many of his arguments against a double sense are formidable, and, at first sight, they seem quite conclusive. In his "Hints on the Prophecies"—the work to which we have so often referred—he asks: "Why merely *a* DOUBLE *sense*? Why not three, seven, ten; or (with the Jewish Rabbis)—forty-nine? Fancy can make out all these with little difficulty; why not give to the Scriptures, as Cocceius maintains, all the meanings which they are in every sense capable of bearing?"

There is more plausibility than real force in this objection. It does not by any means follow that a thing must have "forty-nine" sides, nor "three" even, because it has two. The purpose of God respecting it, or the fitness of things, may require that it have *two*—neither more nor less. The fact is, no intelligent man reads the parable of the Good Samaritan, or that of the Prodigal Son, or that of the Rich Man and Lazarus, without deducing from them several considerations, each of which is not only important in itself, but is distinct the one from the other. Take, for example, the Prodigal Son: What is its scope; what its object? "To set forth the hostility of the Jews to the idea of mercy being shown to the Gentiles!" Is this all? Does it mean nothing more? Does not every expounder of the Scriptures feel warranted in selecting the history of the Prodigal before "he came to himself," as descriptive of the life and course of a sinner? But, if the main object of the parable be as above, what has the history of a sinner to do with it; and what right have we to use it as descriptive of an unregenerate man?

Again: Take the history of the children of Israel, from the call of Abraham to their settlement in Palestine. Follow them into Egypt; and then on their way to the Land of Promise, as God led them about from day to day. The points of a "lively resemblance" to the history of a true convert are so clear and marked as to form something more than an *apparent* resemblance, we think: it looks very much like an arrangement on the part of God to set forth some great and important truths to those who should afterward regard themselves as his people. So in respect to the "bush" which Moses saw burning, yet unconsumed: it was God's symbol of

representing to him the condition of his church at that time ; and its language to his church in every age, as well as to Moses, is, "Though enveloped in an element capable of destroying it, it shall still be indestructible ; and the secret of its preservation is, God dwells in the bush."

And is there anything unreasonable in supposing that God has selected other things, as well as the bush, to set forth important truths to men ? The birth of a child, as a pledge of God's protection of his people in the days of Isaiah, may certainly answer the twofold purpose of assuring that generation of the fact, and also of indicating, in the dim distance of the future, the birth of another child, more glorious than the first, and one that should be a pledge of a far more glorious deliverance to the people of God. In like manner, the "abomination that maketh desolate," might shadow forth the insignia of bloody desolation to Jerusalem and all Judea. The sojourn of Joseph and Mary, with the child Jesus, in Egypt, and their departure therefrom, as has been described, may have been, and undoubtedly was, shadowed forth in the going down of Jacob and his family to dwell there, and their departure thence to Canaan.

It seems to us extremely hazardous to insist that the same rules of interpretation in all respects are to be applied in determining the meaning of the Scriptures, that we apply to any other book. It is like attempting to prove a mathematical problem by arguments which are purely moral. It is like affirming, that "the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the square of the leg and base ; because, the relations which exist between two individuals are the basis by which we determine the duties which one owes to the other." A Revelation from God is a work by itself : it has no equal, no parallel in the whole range of science or letters. The subject-matter which it communicates is unlike anything else, either known or conceived by man. And therefore it is, that God has seen fit to employ a kind of *hieroglyphics*, in revealing his mind and will to man. And will Professor Stuart, or anybody else, maintain, that we must use the same principles of interpretation in explaining a group of characters copied from the pyramids or tombs of Egypt, that we use in interpreting a paragraph from Herodotus or Pliny ? Are we not expressly and most solemnly assured, by a higher authority on this subject than man, that "the natural man receiveth not the things of God ; for they are foolishness unto him : neither *can* he know them, because they are spiritually discerned ?"

Of what use would be the common laws of exegesis—those

which we apply in deciphering a document of a worldly nature—in explaining the Jewish ritual? And why, if “the patterns of things in the heavens” are to be explained by the application of the common laws of hermeneutics,—why did it not occur to Moses, that he might easily understand that which was so mysterious, which had been committed to him, instead of putting on a veil, by which to express the impenetrable obscurity that rested upon it? It seems also not a little strange, that Moses should have been so particularly directed to make everything according to the pattern showed him in the mount,—unless it was true, that there was *a meaning* to those things which no man, at that age of the world, could understand—the key to which was to be given, not literally nor exclusively to Peter; but in a pre-eminent sense to Paul, and to those who labored with him in the gospel. In a word, there is not, in the whole compass of this world’s literature, a rule, or a set of rules, by which one may spell out the mysteries and privileges of the gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, from the rites and ceremonies of the Mosaic economy. And yet this “glorious gospel,” in all its richness and excellence, is to be found in them; and they are the heaven-appointed media for communicating it to the world.

Professor Stuart boldly affirms: “Even more than half of the passages which are regarded as fulfillments in the New Testament, are just no fulfillments; but are clearly ranked under those which are so called by reason of some lively resemblances to others more ancient.” And here the matter is left. Neither Professor Stuart, nor Tittman, nor Hengstenberg, nor any one of the school to which they belong, has told us how we are to distinguish those which are real fulfillments from those which are so only in appearance. And in the light of such a declaration, we would respectfully ask, What is the value of this whole class of New Testament quotations? We are gravely told by men whom we reverence, and in whom we have had great confidence, that more than half of those New Testament passages which seem to be, and which are generally regarded as fulfillments of ancient predictions, are no fulfillments at all. And if they are not fulfillments, they have no meaning at all; possess no sort of interest or value.

We are completely set adrift by Prof. S. on this point, and know not which way to steer our course. We have always, in our simplicity, in common with the great mass of Bible readers and expounders, taken this last class of Scriptures to mean what they seem to mean; we have regarded them in

that light in which they seem to possess their chief, if not only significance and interest; but now we are told, as if by authority, that the majority of these very passages mean no such thing; their language is the language of mere "lively resemblances" to some past events, and not the language of ancient predictions fulfilled: nor is there a hint given to aid us in our attempt to distinguish those that are fulfillments from the mass of those that are declared not to be. Now what is this, but to cast suspicion upon them all? Not a few of these passages point to Christ, in his Deity, his character, and his work; and we deprecate the effect of surrendering them up at the bidding of such a theory of interpretation, although advocated by men venerable and renowned. Having done so much to unsettle other minds in regard to these passages, it seems to us that Prof. Stuart was bound to give some clue by which we might distinguish the ones that may remain from those that must be swept away. He has gone too far in this direction not to have gone *farther*.

ARTICLE VII.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS.

By H. P. TAPPAN, D.D., New York.

THE primitive idea and form of education is that of a preparation for the ordinary and necessary occasions of human life. The world was given to man as a vast store-house of materials, capable of being wrought out and adapted to his uses. As originally given in their rude condition, they met only his most necessary wants. But he had within himself the principle of a higher utility, leading to conceptions of convenience, comfort, elegance. The development of his nature in this direction gave birth to agriculture, the mechanical arts, manufactures, and commerce—the forms of human industry. This idea is the basis of what is strictly popular education. In its rudest state it presents merely, and in different degrees, mental invention, contrivance and adaptation, and physical skill—where instinct and spontaneous

1. Report of the Corporation of Brown University. March 28th, 1850.
2. Of a Liberal Education in General; and with particular reference to the leading studies of the University of Cambridge. By William Whewell, D.D., Master of Trinity College, and Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. London: 1845.
3. Edinburgh Review, April, 1810; June, 1831; and April, 1849.
4. Quarterly Review, June, 1840.

thought work together, and where the wonderful instrumentality of nature is perfected by use and ripened into habit. Thus we have unpolished men quick in calculation, and nice and skillful in mechanical works.

But human industry, in order to accomplish its most useful works, and to bring the physical conditions of the world to the highest perfection, calls in the aid of the loftiest sciences, both pure and physical: Mathematics, Mechanics, Astronomy, Chemistry, and the science of Nature, in its widest extent, are all brought in to aid and perfect human industry. The few here direct and govern the many. The people do not all become men of science, but they work by rules of a higher order which men of science have provided for them, instead of committing themselves to their own ingenuity, and to experiments more or less fortunate. But the employment of these scientific and determined rules quickens thought, excites curiosity, and leads to the knowledge of many scientific truths, and to some rational comprehension of the system of the universe, and of the power and scope of the human faculties.

Men, too, as members of the social organization, as subjects of government, as moral and religious beings, must acquire notions of social and civil law, of moral and religious duty. The cultivation of a people in this direction will depend upon the condition of their social state, the nature of the governments under which they are held, and the religious beliefs under which they have been nurtured.

We have in all the above particulars that form of education of which all men must more or less partake. It is the education of utility and necessary duty. It embraces what may be called a popular or practical system of education. Institutions which are established to promote this form are popular or practical institutions.

In nations, however, where the fine arts and literature are cultivated, the whole people feel the genial influence. Specimens of the arts in public buildings, in statuary, and in the diffusion of poetry and music. And since, wherever the art of writing appears, a knowledge of written language becomes itself a matter of the highest utility in the ordinary commerce of life, there will be an effort to make this knowledge general. But this must bring along with it the possibilities and means of some degree of literary cultivation. Among the ancients, indeed, with whom books were scarce, the people in even the most cultivated states were dependent upon orations delivered in public assemblies, upon the recitations of poets, and upon dramatic exhibitions in the theatres, and not upon reading,

for literary cultivation. But the effect of these was very great, as we see exemplified in the Athenians. Among the moderns, the immense multiplication of books and periodical publications throws the influence of ideal and æsthetical education over even the lower orders. Popular education thus unavoidably advances beyond the mere demands of utility and necessity in industrial, social, civil, and religious life.

The second form of education relates to the arts of the beautiful, or whatever refines and embellishes human life through the influence of æsthetical tastes. The power of the arts is, indeed, felt by the whole people, but education in the arts properly belongs to a class. They are the men who are impelled by natural genius, co-operating with circumstances which often appear accidental, to devote themselves to an ideal life. Schools of art spring up with the spontaneity of the artistic life. Solitary endeavors—bright stars shining alone amid a wide-spread darkness—at first appear. Then the first great works form inspiring calls to kindred geniuses in after times, and stand as models of perfection and taste. Thus artists are multiplied. Next enthusiastic disciples collect around the great masters, and schools of art come into being.

The third form of education relates to professional life. The three great professions of Law, Medicine, and Theology, have their origin in the deepest necessities of man. They are *the professions* in distinction from all others as of paramount importance.

The first stands connected with ethics and civil jurisprudence—with the rights of man, the relations of individuals, communities, and nations—with social, civil, and moral order. Hence it demands a profound knowledge of moral science, of history, civil, political, and juridical.

The second is based upon multifarious observation and experiment, and involves a knowledge both of the physical and mental structure of man, and of the system of nature as containing both the causes and remedies of diseases.

The third, as developed in the Christian church, embraces a wide range of knowledge. The classical languages of Greece and Rome, together with their Hellenistic, Patristic, and Mediæval developments; the Hebrew and its cognates; History and Antiquities, sacred and profane; Metaphysics, Natural Theology and Ethics; and, since Christian doctrine has been mixed up with almost every form of philosophy, the fullest knowledge of philosophical opinion, and the history of dogmatic construction and modification, from age to age. These three professions collect as remedial powers around the cardinal interests of humanity. The first wars with wrong

and injustice, and ministers to law, government, and the natural rights of man. The second wars with disease and death, and ministers to health, to the prolongation of life, and to human happiness. The third wars with error and sin, and ministers to the moral perfection and the immortal hopes and well-being of man. And they all demand high gifts of intellect, and the noblest and profoundest accomplishments of learning. It is not surprising, therefore, that systems and institutions of education for the especial preparation of men for the learned professions should have grown up, and become paramount to all others; and that even the cardinal idea of a liberal education should have identified itself with the idea of such a preparation.

The fourth form of education is the ideal or philosophical. Here the capacities of the mind are considered, and the system of education is shaped simply for *educating*—leading forth—unfolding these capacities. We now leave out of view the mere utilities of life, the demands of particular arts, the preparations for a particular profession. We ask, what man is—what he is capable of becoming? We find him endowed with high powers of thought, observation and reasoning—with imagination and taste—with conscience and moral determination. And in all these he is capable of growing indefinitely—of becoming more and more intellectual, more and more beautiful in his imaginative and tasteful functions,—more wise and good, without an assignable limit. And then we ask, for the laws and means of promoting and leading on this growth? And we find that all knowledge is adapted to this great end,—that in knowing and reasoning he comes to know more easily and accurately, and to reason more rapidly and surely; that in forming an acquaintance with the great works of literature and art, and in producing these works, the imagination and taste are continually unfolding and ripening; and that the liberal professions and any employments entering into the life and well-being of society, while in their objective offices they are multiplying benefits on every side, react subjectively and form the discipline by which the soul grows into every form of intellectual power and moral worth, and becomes a partaker of the Divine nature.

Philosophical or ideal education does not abstract itself from the pursuits and ends of our human life, or lose sight of any of the great interests of the social state; on the contrary, it embraces them all, and that, too, under the highest points of view. It contemplates every man as having some proper work to perform for the common weal; but that, in

order to perform it well, he requires the cultivation of all his faculties, while in the doing of his work he shall ripen more and more. It has thus two states—the preparatory and the executive.

The preparatory is formal and scholastic, and comes under the direction of institutions of learning. Herein is comprised that education of the mental faculties in general, of which we have spoken above. Man is a creature of reason, and therefore, his capacity of reasoning should be developed through all the forms and processes of logic in the prosecution of such studies as are judged best calculated to this end. He is a creature of language, and therefore should he be taught the full power and beauty, and the ready and apt use of language in speech and writing by the study of the most cultivated languages, as presented in their classical works, whether of poetry, oratory, history, or philosophy, and by original efforts. He is a creature of imagination and beautiful tastes, and therefore should these be drawn forth in studies of the arts, and by poetry and music. He is a creature of passions and will, and therefore should be instructed in morality, and be disciplined to self-government. He is immortal, and therefore should he learn that system of religion which brings life and immortality to light.

Under the philosophical, or ideal point of view, Education is the cultivation, the improvement of man, in respect to the capacities wherewith he is constituted; it is the nurture and development of his soul. Nor do we here forget his physical being, and neglect a training in all those manly exercises which give noble proportions, and hale vigor and strength. The ideal of a man is a true and cultivated soul dwelling in a sound and active body, prepared for all proper duties.

After a right worthy discipline of the man, by this preparatory course, we next proceed to the executive part of his education. Under this denomination we embrace professional studies, such as Law, Medicine, and Theology, or the studies relating to any course of life for which the individual may design himself. So much of these studies as are necessary to fit him for undertaking professional duty may also be pursued at literary institutions. But they require ever to be followed up and extended through life—as a workman would be ever handling his tools.

The education which we thus indicate by the philosophical or ideal is the most thorough, liberal, and extensive, and designed to make sound, disciplined, and amply-furnished men for the state and the church, and for all the arts, duties, and offices of life.

This conception of education is not that of merely teaching men a trade, an art, or a profession ; but that of quickening and informing souls with truths and knowledge, and giving them the power of using all their faculties aright in whatever direction they choose to exert them. It seems, indeed, to belong only to the few who enjoy prolonged leisure for study, and a full supply of means and appliances to carry out this conception fully ; but it contains a principle of universal application ; for in even the lower grades of education, the true idea of education as the development of the soul in all its faculties, may be held up to view and acted upon. The reasoning powers will not be profoundly cultivated by the elementary branches of a common school, nevertheless they will be somewhat cultivated, and a taste may be acquired through them of the great end of study. Besides, let this higher notion of Education be adopted, and the human soul be treated not as a thing for secular uses, but as the lofty, lordly, and immortal subject for whose improvement and good all secular things are to be used, and then will the conception of its own value be infused, and it will aspire after its true cultivation, and those who direct popular education will aim to adapt studies to this end, unfolding it even under a limited education on those high and intellectual grounds, which its innate powers and best appropriation alike demand.

The conditions of human life may forever limit a thorough education to the few, but we see not why a valid principle of education should not govern every form and degree of it. With respect to those who design themselves for the learned professions, and for high and influential positions in the State, there can be no question that they require all the discipline of their best powers which they can possibly attain to, as well as that particular discipline and knowledge which relates to their peculiar calling. The first rears up men to their full stature : and the commanding places of society demand men of full stature.

Since some men are strongly determined by peculiarity of genius and taste to particular pursuits, and since the constitution of the world makes so loud a call for a division of labor, there will always be many who will press into professional studies without a thorough antecedent philosophical culture. Nor will we deny that eminent men in particular branches of science, and skillful men in art, and men of ability and efficiency in professional life, will thus be made. We will grant also that Educational Institutions ought to make provision for such cases.

But on the other hand, we ought to aim to make apparent the difference between a mere professional and technical education, and that large and generous culture which brings out the whole man, and which commits him to active life with the capacity of estimating from the highest points of view all the knowledges and agencies which enter into the well-being and progress of society. That is not really the most practical education which leads men soonest and most directly to practice, but that which fits them best for practice. It is not the mere use of implements of art which makes an artist, but the proper and artistic use of them. There are men who paint sign-boards all their days. In learning a trade, in gaining an art, in acquiring an education, there is some definite end in view, or there ought to be; time, means, and painstaking can be estimated only by this end. No one may arbitrarily say, there shall be so much time spent, so much labor performed, and then we shall have the trade, the art, the education; nay, but we must do all that is necessary to compass the end.

Now those Institutions of Education which are designed to stand pre-eminent, while they may give suitable scope to peculiar geniuses, and to those who set out to be eminently practical according to their own notions of a direct and ready method, must be so ordered as to lead, in the general, to a solid and thorough method. There never will be extraordinary wits enough to make a general law: and those who are bent upon the so-called practical method may do good service by their failures. But it is required of a great Institution of learning to make and vindicate a rule of education which takes its rise in the very constitution of man, and which calmly and majestically walking over the plausible but fleeting expedients of a day, meets with a sound heart and a strong hand the permanent exigencies of mankind.

Men ever prone to measure themselves and to measure each other, will also measure the character of institutions of learning by mere *success*. Now there is a great deal of success which is sheer good fortune, and much also that comes from keen-sighted but ignoble policy. Its emptiness is demonstrated by the fact that it sooner or later disappears and leaves no permanent good behind. Multitudes have no higher ambition than to gain a present success at whatever expense,—an element of human nature which has been set forth in that legend of a thousand forms—a blood-written compact with the Devil, by which the future is sold for the present. There are many who are so eager to grasp the bargain, that they allow themselves to be cheated even in the present conditions of it, by becoming so intoxicated with ambitious projects at the first

taste of prosperity, that they run against great principles which God has established in spite of the Devil, and thus are overturned in mid career. So frequently does this happen that a sage maxim has sprung up, that "honesty is the best policy." But this maxim, although it serves to restrain some, and to comfort others, is nevertheless left behind like a guide-board by the mad racers after success.

An Institution of learning may do a successful business in the way of multiplying empirics in Medicine, Law, and Theology; in furnishing men with just knowledge enough to make them political demagogues, or keen operators in all sorts of enterprises in this enterprising age. But there comes up before us in strong contrast with this, the idea of an Institution furnished with an ample and well-selected library, with a complete scientific apparatus, with well-filled cabinets, and with all the material of learning—an Institution with an enlightened and devoted corporation, with eminent professors, "many-sided" men, who, while intent upon their particular departments, are smitten with the love of all knowledges and spiritual accomplishments, and so co-work together for the great purpose of building up human souls after a true and noble ideal, and preparing thoroughly-disciplined men to go forth into the world as ministers of truth and virtue, to adorn every profession, to labor in every sphere of duty, to sustain the state as majestic pillars, to carry forward every science with an earnest devotion, to add great works to a nation's literature, and to pour through every channel of society streams of influence to refresh, beautify, and invigorate. Such an Institution will stand upon its own merits, and justify itself by its works. Its sublime position elevates it above the noisy region of mere success. It will do more for mankind if it should send forth only a few men of the right kind, than if it should pour forth a rabble multitude of sciolists.

In reviewing the history of literary Institutions, there are two facts which at once arrest our attention. The first is, that the highest schools of learning were chronologically first. Schools for the people were not the elements out of which Universities took their growth; on the contrary, Schools for the people grew out of the Universities. The second fact is, that Universities were not created originally by the State, but were the work of individuals. Solitary scholars commenced courses of public lectures which attracted pupils. Here was the beginning of the Universities. Afterward Colleges were endowed by benevolent patrons. The State gave its influence and authority only after eminence had been attained. "William of Champeaux opened a School of Logic

at Paris, in 1109; and the University can only deduce the regular succession of its teachers from that time."¹ "The University created patrons, and was not created by them. And this may be said also of Oxford and Cambridge in their incorporate character, whatever the former may have owed, if in fact it owed anything, to the prophetic munificence of Alfred."²

"Colleges with endowments for poor scholars were founded at the beginning of the thirteenth century, or even before, at Paris and Bologne, as they were afterward at Oxford and Cambridge, by munificent patrons of letters. It ought, however, to be remembered, that these foundations were not the cause, but the effect of that increasing thirst for knowledge, a semblance of knowledge, which had anticipated the encouragement of the great. In the twelfth century, the impetuosity with which men rushed to that source of what they deemed wisdom, the great University of Paris, did not depend upon academical privileges, or eleemosynary stipends, which came afterward, though these were undoubtedly very effectual in keeping it up."³ It must be remembered, too, that this very enthusiasm for learning was created by the lecturers. So powerful was the fascination which Abelard exercised over his disciples, that the rude walls of the Paraclete in the Solitude was no less thronged than the Schools of Paris.

In these two facts we have comprised the history of Educational development. Some solitary man gives himself to thought as the great end and interest of his being. He compasses the learning of his age, he advances beyond it, he attains a deep consciousness of intellectual growth and power. The truths of which he feels himself possessed, the new system of philosophy or science which he believes he has unfolded, stir within him like an inspiration, and he is impelled to give fresh expositions of old truths, to correct current errors, and to proclaim his new doctrines. Other minds of similar tendencies, quickened into intellectual life by the fascination and power of his teaching, gather around him. He becomes the Doctor of a School. In some town or metropolis, or in some sacred retreat, he establishes himself. The number of his disciples increases, his fame spreads more and more, and he becomes a conspicuous object in the public eye. At length the noble and wealthy, ecclesiastics and princes, patronize the rising Institution, charters and privileges are granted, endowments are made, and it attains a permanent foundation.

Those who were disciples, now themselves become Doctors or Masters, and instead of the solitary man, there arise many

¹ Hallam.² Ibid.³ Ibid.

lecturers in different departments of learning, and as rivals in the same departments.

In other places similar institutions arise, sometimes beginning with an exclusive devotion to a philosophy, or to the civil and canon law, or to a scholastic theology, and from thence in time branching out into all kinds of known learning.

The University now becomes the seat and fountain of knowledge. Here scholars resort. Here learned men are bred and take up their residence. Here from age to age the sciences are carried forward to greater ripeness. From hence go forth men to fill every profession, to hold the great offices in the State, and to lead on the advancement of civilization and refinement.

The growth of a popular system of education out of the higher institutions is very evident. In the first place, it is plain that an unenlightened population will not themselves take measures for their own education. The very fact of a general ignorance, and a consequent want of taste and inclination for learning, precludes this. There must be certain enlightened individuals who are capable of appreciating and undertaking the great movement. The beginning of popular education must therefore, of necessity, lie in a higher region.

Now the communication of a University with the masses of the people is twofold. First, they draw individuals from the bosom of the people within their cloisters, there to be nurtured as scholars. Secondly, they send forth among the people educated men in the different commanding offices of life. Every educated man among the people becomes the centre of a genial kindling influence, manifesting the power and diffusing the charm of intellectual cultivation. The stream of educated men constantly flowing out, leads to a constant influx of youths to be educated. Thus by two currents is the highest intelligence keeping up a communication with the lowest, multiplying the number of the learned, and narrowing the boundaries of ignorance, and making a sure and constant approximation to general education.

There were, indeed, formidable impediments in the way of the early consummation of this great and beneficent object. Among these may be mentioned the slow progress of the Universities themselves during inauspicious ages of superstition, tyranny, violence, and war; the extreme degradation of the people under the feudal system; and the appropriation of the Universities to the learned professions, and particularly to the education of the clergy. In some countries the Universities have never been emancipated from priestly dominion, and the influence of antiquated dogmas. Thus until lately the study

of philosophy was prohibited in the Universities of Spain. Of course, where the Universities became the mere instruments of upholding systems opposed to human freedom and the general illumination of mankind, we can find no connection between them and popular education. But then let it be recollected that in these countries there is no popular education, while, on the other hand, it is just in those countries where the Universities have received the most extensive and thorough development, that schools for the people have been most multiplied and carried to the greatest perfection.

The history of our educational development must take for its starting-point the ancient schools of Greek philosophy. These schools were created by individuals who freely thought and freely taught. Disciples collected around them, received the light, and struck out new paths, and arrived at new truths for themselves. These schools existed without the patronage of the State. And it was a strange atrocity when the State, as in the case of Socrates, arrested the freedom of thought by persecution and death. Indeed, the schools rather patronized the State, for they gave that impulse to thought and disseminated those vital truths which, be they ever so abstract in the formal exposition, do, nevertheless, contain the springs of national greatness, for they make those great men the philosophers, the historians, the statesmen, the poets, the orators, the heroes who alone make a nation great.

The Grecian life was a life of thought, art, and heroism—and they co-worked together. Æschylus was a soldier. Alcibiades was a disciple of Socrates. Socrates was a sculptor, a soldier, a philosopher. Pericles was the orator and the hero. Pythagoras, the philosopher, the mathematician, the astronomer, by his political wisdom supplanted with his associates the ancient senate of Croton, and gave political constitutions to surrounding cities.

In these Schools of Philosophy, from Thales to Aristotle, was comprehended the metaphysics, the natural theology, the mathematics and astronomy, the logic, the physics, and the political wisdom of the ancient Greeks. They gave a manly discipline, they enlarged the boundaries of thought, they gave out truths which can never die. From these schools we have at least the imperishable philosophy of Plato, the imperishable geometry of Euclid, and the imperishable logic of Aristotle. We have also a form and method of education which has ever since been perpetuated, and lives to-day in our Universities.

The Romans only reproduced the philosophy of Greece. The school of Alexandria, the new school at Athens under the Romans, the Neo-Platonic—all the schools that came af-

terward had their prime fountains of thought, their methods and power, from the ancient schools. Oriental elements were indeed introduced, but the Grecian mind predominated. The schools of Law, of Medicine, and of Theology—all arose under the same controlling doctrines and modes of thought. Galen even attempted to apply the demonstrative method of geometry to the science of medicine. Christianity came into conflict with the Schools of Philosophy, but she did not silence them. On the contrary, there was an interfusion of Platonism with Christian doctrine, and the logic of Aristotle moulded the forms of dogmatic theology.

The authority of the church, however, prevailed. What she had received from the philosophical schools she baptized and called her own. The invasion of the Barbarians annihilated everything but the church, and what the church had taken into her repositories, or under her protection. The schools of learning established by the Emperors were converted into ecclesiastical societies, and all science and literature were merged into theology. The beginning of the VIIIth century showed the universal triumph of ecclesiastical power.

The theological education of Europe, from the fifth century to the beginning of the twelfth, was the mere study of the Fathers, and commentaries upon them. Every doctrine was received upon authority. There was no free action of the human mind.

At the close of the XIth century, Roscelin, the founder of the Schoolmen, appeared. Next followed William of Champeaux, the founder of the University of Paris. Now came the long reign of Scholasticism. With the rise of Scholasticism is identified the rise, or the commencement of the modern development of European Universities. Scholasticism was really a struggle of the human mind for freedom and enlargement of thought against the authorities of the Church and the State. There could not be an open rebellion, there was not even the idea or the wish of an open rebellion. But the human mind, confined within the awful circle of ecclesiastical prescription, aimed, by Scholasticism, to make the most of its material, to find the best discipline of its faculties, and the widest range of thought. This was attempted by starting upon the received doctrines of theology, metaphysical questions, and deducing from them logical consequences. The Schoolmen were indeed nothing less than rationalists, who endeavored to present religious dogmas under the forms of the reason.

The great error of the Schoolmen lay in receiving both their religious dogmas and their philosophical systems upon authority. They studied neither the Scriptures, nor philoso-

phy, independently. They relied upon the Fathers for their theology ; and upon Plato and Aristotle for their philosophy. Their intellectual acumen appeared in attempting to reconcile the former with the latter. But it must be admitted in their justification that this error was forced upon them. The church would not permit them to transcend authority by independent research. It was an age of authority. The Platonic and Peripatetic philosophies were curiously intermingled. The former had early influenced theological dogmatism, while yet the latter was excluded. The heretics were the first to introduce Aristotle. They made a skillful and powerful use of his dialectics. The Orthodox were therefore compelled to furnish themselves from the same armory. Thus in time Aristotle became the great authority, and the influence of Platonism apparently declined. Nevertheless, the Platonism already incorporated could not be discarded, but it was retained, and that, too, to a great extent, ignorantly, as the teaching of the Fathers. Aristotle was therefore the acknowledged authority of the Schoolmen, while in bringing him into union with the Fathers they were fusing the Platonic and Peripatetic systems together.

This will explain the celebrated controversy of the Realists and Nominalists. They were both wrong and both right. The former occupied the Platonic side of the question, and the latter the Aristotelian. Plato's ideas are realities—and must be acknowledged as such by every one who receives his philosophy—they are the seminal potencies of all knowledge in the human reason, and therefore as real as the reason itself. Aristotle's genera and species are but the names of classifications which may be natural, but are often arbitrary. They express only the common qualities which we take into view in conveniently arranging the particulars of the objective world. The Platonist, occupied with general terms as expressing ideas, the Aristotelian, occupied with the same as expressing a mere classification, are at issue only while they misunderstand each other's ground. It is plain that, contending under this misunderstanding, they could never arrive at a common decision. Hence the power of the Church and the State was called in to settle by decree, what no logical skill could terminate by the syllogism.

It was the prodigious interest created by these discussions, in an age when no other intellectual activity was possible, that drew together thousands of disciples around profound, acute, and eloquent lecturers. It was these discussions that brought the University of Paris into being; and gave new life to the old Universities, such as Oxford and Cambridge.

To estimate properly University education under the Schoolmen, we must conceive of theology as the grand subject of study, and the logic of Aristotle as the grand organon. There were, indeed, seven departments of study—seven being determined upon because the number seven was mystical and sacred. The first three, called the *Trivium*, were Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric. These were elementary. The remaining four, called the *Quadrivium*, or the *Mathesis*, were Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, and Astrology. The last comprised both astronomy proper and the art of divination by the stars. These were studies of the highest order. But all alike were pursued in subserviency to Theology, and all were wrought into a vast speculative system determined by the forms of the syllogism.

Universities were thus an outgrowth of the church, and destined for the service of the church. They “seem usually to have grown out of cathedral or abbey schools, taught by the *Chancellor*¹ of the church; but his office became gradually external to it, and the teaching was carried on by persons who received his license; certain of whom were retained within the school itself, while by degrees, as these licenses became customary at the end of a certain course of study, a sort of external body grew up around the original school, yet within its precincts and under its protection. We have here the germs of many things. The *licenses* are the future *degrees*. The *esoteric* teachers foreshadow the University professors; and the *exoteric* lead us gradually to the lecturers in right of their degree, presiding over inns, halls, or hostels—and thereby mediately or immediately to the tutorial system.”

The Colleges are not a part of the *University proper*. When students flocked to the lectures of the University professors, it was necessary to make provision for their lodging and board. For this purpose, inns, halls, and colleges were established. The inns and halls were temporary, and finally gave way to colleges. These were endowed by benevolent individuals, and became permanent institutions. They were at first designed primarily for aliment and habitation; afterward there were cloisters “for studious men to retire to, to devote themselves in leisure and freedom from the cares of daily subsistence, to meditation and the studies of the arts and sciences in general; always, however, as the

¹ The Chancellor, *Latin* *Cancellarius*, so named from the lattice-work behind which he sat, or from *canceled* or crossing out writing, under the Roman Emperors, was a notary and scribe. In the cathedrals he originally was probably nothing more. In the Bishops' Court he is the Bishop's lawyer, versed in canon law.

² Quarterly Rev., June, 1840.

handmaids of the *architectonic* science of theology, to which they were bound both professionally and academically." The University, "original and essential, is founded, controlled, and privileged by public authority for the advantage of the State." The Colleges, "accessory and contingent, are created, regulated, and endowed by private munificence, for the interest of certain favored individuals."

"In the original Constitution of Oxford, as in that of all the older Universities of the Parisian model, the business of instruction was not confided to a special body of privileged professors. The University was governed, the University was taught, by the graduates at large. Professor, Master, Doctor, were originally synonymous. Every graduate had an equal right of teaching publicly; for a certain period, the subjects competent to his faculty, and to the rank of his degree; nay, every graduate incurred the obligation of teaching publicly, for a certain period, the subjects of his faculty, for such was the condition involved in the grant of the degree itself. The Batchelor, or imperfect graduate, partly as an exercise toward the higher honor, and useful to himself, partly as a performance due for the degree obtained, and of advantage to others, was bound to read under a master or doctor in his faculty a course of lectures; and the master, doctor, or perfect graduate, was, in like manner, after his promotion, obliged immediately to commence (*incipere*), and to continue for a certain period publicly to teach (*regere*)¹ some, at least, of the subjects pertaining to his faculty. As, however, it was only necessary for the University to enforce this obligation of public teaching, compulsory on all graduates during the term of their *necessary regency*, if there did not come forward a competent number of *voluntary regents* to execute his function; and as the schools belonging to the several faculties, and in which alone all public and ordinary instruction could be delivered, were frequently inadequate to accommodate the multitude of the inceptors; it came to pass that in these Universities the original period of necessary regency was once and again abbreviated, and even a dispensation from actual teaching during its continuance allowed. At the same time, as the University accomplished the end of its existence only through its regents, they alone were allowed to enjoy full privileges in its legislation and government."

In time, salaried graduates or regents became permanent teachers; and these were peculiarly the *professors*. As the colleges multiplied, they rose in importance. They were

¹ Quarterly Rev., June, 1840.

² Ed. Rev., June, 1831.

³ Ibid.

placed under the care of masters, and finally lectures were delivered in the particular colleges in distinction from the University lectures.

The instruction given in the Colleges was at first a matter both of convenience and utility, and afforded individual students an opportunity of pursuing particular branches, whether from choice, or to make up deficiencies in those branches. With the exception of Germany, however, the Colleges finally obtained a preponderance over the University proper. On the Continent the Colleges did not become independent of the Universities. On the contrary, the regents of the colleges were appointed from the university schools, and were always under the control of the faculties from which they were taken. "They formed, in fact, so many petty universities, in so many fragments of a university." Or rather, the university distributed itself into the Colleges. In England it was quite otherwise. Originally the government of the University had been exclusively committed to the masters and doctors in congregation and convocation; and the heads of colleges and college fellows shared in the academical government only as they were full graduates. Under the Chancellorship of Laud, the heads of the colleges were clothed with supreme authority. In the Continental Universities, the University governed the Colleges; now, in Oxford, the Colleges governed the University. Hence it followed that the fellows of the colleges became the tutors in their several houses by the consent of the heads of these houses. The professors of the Universities and the tutors of the Colleges now became rivals, and as the heads threw their influence on the side of the latter, the former declined. We cannot here enter upon the particulars of the process by which this great revolution was produced. But such was the fact.

The influence of this change seems to have been disastrous, and served to introduce into the English Universities an incompetent teaching. The Continental Colleges became petty Universities by receiving competent professors from the University itself. The English Colleges became petty elementary schools by exchanging learned professors for fellows, who were often made tutors by chance or by favor.

Leaving now the forms under which the University system was developed, let us return to the subjects of study. The reign of pure Scholasticism gradually yielded to branches more liberal—the ancient classics, mathematics, and physical science. The study of the ancient classics received a powerful impulse through the Italian schools, which produced many scholars of great eminence. The transition to the ancient

classics was natural, from the common use of the Latin tongue. There was an affinity also between the logic of Aristotle and geometry. The study of the Peripatetic philosophy introduced the physics of Aristotle. The application of the Scholastic method to physical investigation made this branch of science indeed of little worth, and laid it justly open to the scornful denunciation of Bacon. Nevertheless there was progress, and the human mind was working up from the subtleties of the scholastic philosophy to a region of greater freedom and light. The Universities were the centres of intellectual activity, where great men from time to time appeared, leading on the march of thought until the philosophy of Bacon changed the method of investigation, and Kepler and Newton revealed the true system of Nature.

It might have been expected, that with the advance of science, the Universities would have thrown off all the old scholasticism, and sprung forward in a new and glorious career. This, however, does not appear to have been the case so generally as the new era seemed to promise.

The changes in the French Universities were the effect of the convulsions of the Revolution, and the energy and patronage of Napoleon, rather than the result of a natural progress. The modern school of science and philosophy at Paris has been eminent; and the lectures of such men as Royer Collard, Cousin, Guizot, Jouffroy, Biot, and Arago, well nigh realize the ideal of a University.

In the English Universities the old tutorial and collegial system has continued to prevail. Oxford has been charged with the almost entire neglect of the mathematics; and Cambridge with a corresponding neglect of the classics. The Edinburgh Review of April, 1810, remarks: "We believe ourselves warranted to say, that the examinations at Oxford, till within a very few years, so far as they were scientific at all, and not confined to the learned languages, turned entirely on the Aristotelian and Scholastic logic. The college lectures, according to the best of our information, were guilty of this same neglect; they gave no account of the great modern discoveries, or of the method that had led to them. Some few individuals might pursue natural philosophy to a certain length; but it entered not at all into the general plan of education. To judge, so far as we have been able to learn, from the subjects of public examination, or from the general course of study, one would have thought that the fame of the great discoveries which had been made during the last hundred and fifty years, had never reached the University of Oxford."

Improvements have since been introduced, and greater im-

provements are in progress, particularly in the University of Cambridge ; but it appears an indisputable fact, that the system of the English Universities has been lamentably deficient, and has by no means yet attained a completeness demanded alike by their long standing, and the character of the age to which they have come down. The *Edinburgh Review* of April, 1849, asks : " But, even as a preparatory training, is the actual benefit ever found to justify their high pretensions ? Is there any man alive who can say, not with truth, but even with conviction, that the best or most laborious scholars and mathematicians of the University are the best lawyers, physicians, philosophers, or statesmen of England ? The very reverse is the plain, if not the acknowledged fact. It would be difficult to find at present, among the most eminent leaders in Westminster Hall, any whose academical course was distinguished by studies, or crowned with honors, either mathematical or classical. The extent to which academical distinctions have lately been thrown into the background in the professional and public life of England, has gone lengths which really surprise us."

As a general system, the English Universities present us only courses of Collegial study of a very limited extent, pursued under tutors, and followed by examinations for a degree. The attainment of the degree appears to be the great end of study. Neither a principle of utility, nor of philosophical education, governs. There are indeed higher honors, the reward of higher studies. And unquestionably profound and elegant scholars are made on the foundations of the fellowships. We are speaking of the tendency of the system, and not of the opportunities afforded in these venerable seats of learning, to those who are disposed to study and learned retirement. But the men who should be permanent professors, like Whately and Arnold, can find at the Universities no amply-endowed professorships, or thronging classes yielding adequate fees ; and hence are compelled, with few exceptions, to take the head masterships of schools, or to retire into the church ; and leave the instruction to the fellows of the colleges. The truth is, that the English Universities still feel the incubus of the old Scholasticism, and reap the effects of the changes introduced under the Chancellorship of Laud. They are antiquated institutions, which do not meet the requirements of a new age.

As the Universities grew out of the church, are in their origin church institutions, their condition will be found to keep pace with that of the church. Hence, in Spain, where the schoolmen were longest cherished, and where the power of

the Priesthood extended over everything, the Universities, instead of advancing with enlightened Europe, have remained fixed in scholastic and ecclesiastical stolidity. In Italy they have retrograded.

On the other hand, in Protestant Germany, what an advance has been made! In no part of the world has university education been so enlarged, and been made so liberal and thorough. The Universities of Protestant Germany stand forth as model institutions, if there be such to be found; and the whole system of education, from the Common School upward, exhibits an intellectual progress which commands our admiration. In Germany, the emancipation of the church was the emancipation of the universities. The rationalism which now prevails, whatever may be its errors, is a symptom and a consequent of the intense reaction which there took place against the prescriptions of ecclesiastical and academical authority; and which must ultimately correct itself by the same force by which it came into being. The Universities of Scotland have exhibited a similar freedom and independence, without running into a similar excess. With a high tone of general scholarship, they have had also a distinct philosophical school of distinguished merit, and no country has contended more nobly and steadfastly for civil and religious freedom.

Now the English Universities exhibit the same correspondence to the church out of which they have sprung, and to which they belong. Two strong elements in the English Church have ever been, a zeal for the prerogative, and a stiff adherence to the apostolical succession. Many of us Protestants who have no great regard for either, think that the forced reformation of the English Church, by Henry VIII., and the modifications which he gave it, never separated it sufficiently from Rome. It indeed received a new head, but retained many of the old errors. The Universities have in like manner been the strongholds of Toryism and high-churchism. The part which Oxford in particular has acted in our own times by her publications of a Romish tendency, and by the defection of some of her members, shows the direction and strength of her ecclesiastical bias. Oxford is governed by church influences, and these hold her in scholastic bondage, and bind her under a reverence for the past, instead of leading her onward with the awakening spirit of philosophy, and the enlargement of the sciences,

Neither Oxford nor Cambridge have ever had a school of philosophy. In this they have been left behind by France, Germany, and Scotland. England has had philosophers, but

they gave no lectures, and formed no schools at the Universities. What had Bacon, Locke, and Coleridge to do with the Universities? What had the Universities to do with them? Ecclesiastical prescription can never allow a free philosophical movement. We can understand at this point of view the fact affirmed by the writer in the Edinburgh Review, that the examinations at Oxford, "so far as they were scientific at all, and not confined to the learned languages, turned entirely on the Aristotelian and scholastic logic; and that the new logic, such as is explained in the *Novum Organum* of Bacon, was never mentioned." Professor Whewell, of Cambridge, the learned author of the *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, and of the *History of the Inductive Sciences*, has done much to awaken a philosophical spirit in that University, and has contributed essentially to the bringing about of manifest improvements in the course of education. His work, which we have placed among others at the head of this article, is one of great value and interest. The distinction which he makes between *permanent* and *progressive* studies, is important and suggestive; the view which he takes of the discipline of the human faculties is philosophical and lofty; the proportions in which he distributes classical and mathematical studies, strike us as judicious; and his recommendation of the geometrical method in preference to the analytical as a discipline for the reasoning faculty, is wise and worthy of all attention.

That the English Universities are improvable, and improving, we fully believe. But never, while paralyzed by high-church influence, can they fully develop their great capacities, and collect within their precincts, and under their government, schools of philosophy and science formed of the great wits and profound thinkers of England. It is easy to get up scholasticism under prescription, but investigation and productive thought must be free as birds upon the wing—they must bear themselves along by their own native vigor, in their own native element. And we must run the risk of flying in the wrong direction sometimes, or we can have no flying at all, unless it be the wretched flying of a decoy-pigeon—fluttering within the limits of the string held by the hand of its master. Universities may, indeed, make learned men; but their best commendation is given when it can be said of them, that furnishing the material and appliances of learning, setting the examples in their professors and graduates, breathing the spirit of scholarship in all that pertains to them, they inspire men, by the self-creative force of study and thought, to make themselves both learned and wise, and thus ready to put their

hand to every great and good work, whether of science, of religion, or of the state.

We have spoken of the German Universities as model institutions. Their excellence consists in two things : first, they are purely Universities, without any admixture of collegial tuition. Secondly, they are complete as Universities, providing libraries and all other material of learning, and having professors of eminence to lecture on theology, law, and medicine, the philosophical, mathematical, natural, philological, and political Sciences, on history and geography, on the history and principles of Art, in fine, upon every branch of human knowledge. The professors are so numerous that a proper division of labor takes place, and every subject is thoroughly discussed. At the University every student selects the courses he is to attend. He is thrown upon his own responsibility and diligence. He is left free to pursue his studies ; but, if he wishes to become a clergyman, a physician, a lawyer, a statesman, a professor, or a teacher in any superior school, he must go through the most rigid examinations, both oral and written.

Collegial tuition in the German Universities does not exist because wholly unnecessary, the student being fully prepared at the Gymnasium before he is permitted to enter the University. Without the Gymnasium, the University would be little worth. The course at the Gymnasium embraces a very thorough study of the Latin and Greek languages, a knowledge of the mathematics below the Differential and Integral Calculus, general history, and one or two modern languages, besides the German, and Hebrew, if the student design to study theology. The examinations are full and severe, the gradations of merit are accurately marked, and no one below the second grade is permitted to enter the University.

The Gymnasias thus guard the entrance of the Universities. Besides, the University course would not be available to him who had not prepared himself for it. It presumes certain attainments, and passes by the elements of the sciences. It is true, indeed, that a student may neglect his opportunities in the University, but then he throws away all hopes of professional life, and of employment in the State.

The Educational System of Germany, and particularly in Prussia, is certainly a very noble one. We cannot well be extravagant in its praise. Thorough in all its parts, consistent with itself, and vigorously sustained, it furnishes every department of life with educated men, and keeps up at the Universities themselves, in every branch of knowledge, a supply of erudite and elegant scholars and authors, for the

benefit and glory of their country, and the good of mankind.

In comparing the University system of Germany with that of England, it is worthy of remark that Germany has also admirable common-school systems for popular education, while England is strikingly deficient in this respect. In the one case a properly-developed University system has reached its natural result of invigorating general education; in the other the priestly privilege of a cloistered learning is still maintained.

The Colleges of America are plainly copied from the Colleges of the English Universities. The course of studies, the President and Tutors, the number of years occupied by the course, are all copied from the English model. We have seen that in the English Institutions, the name of University alone remained, while the collegial or tutorial system absorbed all the educational functions. In America, while Colleges were professedly established, they soon assumed a mixed character. Professors were appointed, but they discharged only the duty of tutors in the higher grades of study; so that the tutors were really assistant professors, or the professors only tutors of the first rank. Our Colleges also have from the beginning conferred degrees in all the faculties, which in England belongs only to the University. By establishing the faculties of Theology, Law, and Medicine, some of our colleges have approached still more nearly to the forms and functions of a University. By assuming the title of University and College indifferently, as we are prone to do, we seem to intimate that we have some characteristics belonging to both, and that we deem it in our power to become Universities whenever we please. Sometimes the only advance made to the higher position, is by establishing a medical school; which, however, has little other connection with the college than its dependence upon it for conferring the degree of Doctor of Medicine.

If we understand aright the distinction between a College and a University, the latter is not necessarily constituted by collecting together schools under the different faculties. These may be merely collegial schools. A University course presumes a preparatory tutorial course, by which the students have acquired elementary knowledge, and formed habits of study and investigation, to an extent sufficient to enable them to hear the lectures of professors with advantage, to consult libraries with facility and profit, and to carry on for themselves researches into the different departments of literature and science. A University course may be indefinitely extended at the pleasure of the student. He may here undertake the

fullest philosophical education possible—passing from one branch of study to another, and selecting courses of lectures according to the state of his knowledge, and the intellectual discipline which he requires; or, having accomplished a satisfactory general education of his powers, he may next, either enter upon professional studies, or devote himself to some particular branch of science as the occupation of his life. In the German Universities any one, whether he designs to give himself wholly to a student's life, or to fit himself for a professor's chair, may, after undergoing the requisite examination, obtain from the faculty to which he belongs, permission to teach, without receiving any compensation, and only as a form of education. The professors extraordinary are selected from these licentiates, and receive a small salary. From these again the professors of the different Faculties, are usually selected. Every person of these three classes may lecture upon any subject he pleases: but professors are obliged, besides, to lecture on the branches particularly contemplated in their appointment. In this way at a University alone can the intellectual life be varied and enlarged. A University is literally a *Cyclopædia* where are collected books on every subject of human knowledge, cabinets and apparatus of every description that can aid learned investigation and philosophical experiment, and amply qualified professors and teachers to assist the student in his studies, by rules and directions gathered from long experience, and by lectures which treat of every subject with the freshness of thought not yet taking its final repose in authorship, and which often present discoveries and views in advance of what has yet been given to the world. In fine, a University is designed to give to him who would study every help that he needs or desires.

A College in distinction from a University is an elementary and a preparatory school. A College may be directly connected with the University, or it may not. Its original connection with the University was partly accidental, and partly necessary. It was necessary to provide convenient habitations for students who flocked to hear the lectures of the doctor or professor. Many of these students might require private tuition, in relation both to preparatory and additional studies, and thus the colleges would become places of separate study, under masters appointed for that purpose. This must especially have been demanded in the early period of the Universities, when preparatory schools were not common.

In Germany the Gymnasias are really the Colleges. The education which they furnish is more thorough, we believe, than what is obtained at the Colleges of either England or of

our own country. In England, schools like that of Rugby, under the late Dr. Arnold, and in America, those schools commonly called *Academies*, and indeed other classical schools, are of the nature of a college, only of a still lower grade, and more elementary. In passing from the classical school to the college the studies are not essentially changed; nor is the kind of discipline. Hence, a student in our country can prepare at the academy for the second, third, and even fourth year of collegial study. In college there may be less of juvenile discipline, and there generally are greater advantages. What gives the college, however, its chief distinction, is the power of conferring academical degrees. We may say, therefore, the academy prepares for the college, and the college prepares for a degree. In England the colleges are directly connected with the University. But, it appears the University has fallen into desuetude, and colleges alone remain.

In our country we have no Universities. Whatever may be the names by which we choose to call our institutions of learning, still they are not Universities. They have neither the libraries and material of learning, generally, nor the number of professors and courses of lectures, nor the large and free organization which go to make up Universities. Nor does the connection of Divinity, Law, and Medical Schools with them give them this character. For law and medicine a thorough preparatory classical discipline is not required. In this respect the last is the most deficient of the two, and great numbers receive the academical degree of Doctor of Medicine who have never received an academical education. The degree of Doctor of Laws is more sparingly bestowed than any other; and this, as well as Doctor of Divinity, is never bestowed introductory to the entrance upon professional life. The schools of Theology approach more nearly to the University character than any other, since a collegial discipline is generally required preparatory to an entrance therein. The course of study in our colleges, copying from the English, was, at their first institution, fixed at four years. The number of studies then was far more limited than at present, and the scholarship was consequently more thorough and exact. There was less attempted, but what was attempted was more perfectly mastered, and hence afforded a better intellectual discipline. With the vast extension of science, it came to pass that the course of study was vastly enlarged. Instead of erecting Universities, we have only pressed into our four years' course a greater number of studies. The effect has been disastrous. We have destroyed the charm of study by hurry and unnatural pressure, and we have rendered our

scholarship vague and superficial. We have not fed thought by natural supplies of knowledge. We have not disciplined mind by guiding it to a calm and profound activity ; but, we have stimulated acquisition to preternatural exertions, and have learned, as it were, from an encyclopædia the mere names of sciences, without gaining the sciences themselves.

"There are, in the whole four years, one hundred and sixty weeks of study. Suppose that the student pursues twenty of these branches of learning, this will allow eight weeks to each. Seven-eighths of the first year, and one half of the second, are devoted to Latin, Greek, and Mathematics. If we subtract this amount, fifty-five weeks from one hundred and sixty, it leaves one hundred and five weeks to be devoted to the remainder. This will give us six weeks and a fraction to each of the other studies. But this is not all. In order to introduce so many sciences into the period of four years, the student is frequently obliged to carry on five or six at the same time ; some occupying him three times, others twice, and others once in a week. In this manner, all continuity of thought is interrupted, and literary enthusiasm rendered almost impossible. Such has, to a greater or less degree, been the course pursued by all our colleges. The greater the number of studies prescribed in the curriculum, the more generous is believed to be the education imparted. When a college is not able to exhibit so extensive a course of instruction, it is considered as a misfortune which nothing can palliate, but its pecuniary inability to relieve it."

At the same time that we have been enlarging this course of study, there has been a tendency to lessen the amount of preparation for admission into college, considered proportionally to the course to be pursued. We undertake to do more, with a worse preparation for doing it. But this is what might have been expected. A superficial system of study in the college will necessarily beget in the community a habit of superficial preparation. The highest institutions will set the tone of education. And this we see realized in schools of every grade, and for both sexes. Our schools for boys, our schools for misses, present on the prospectus a formidable curriculum of studies, and immature beings of sixteen or seventeen are carried through the mathematics, the natural sciences, general history, the philosophy of history, belles-lettres, and metaphysics, together with two or three languages and polite accomplishments. The popular conception of education is not the orderly and gradual growth of mind according to its own innate laws fixed by God himself, but an immense and

¹ Report of Brown University, p. 15.

voracious deglutition of knowledges where the mental digestion is estimated according to the rapidity with which the subjects are disposed of. The more masters, the more books, the more branches of knowledge in a given time, the faster the process goes on. We educate as we make money, as we dig for gold, as we build ships and houses, as we make railroads and canals. Even in these the rapidity of our execution is not the sure sign of excellence and stability; but if it were, we forget that although we can quicken the labor of our hands, and increase the power and scope of our machinery, we may not overlay the organic power of nature; and that as trees must have their time to grow, and harvests their time to ripen, so the mind of man must grow from infancy to childhood, from childhood to youth, and from youth to manhood, and that as each period has its peculiar strength and capacities, so each requires its own nurture; that many things may be accomplished at one stage of growth which are impossible at another; nay, that as the mind hath an immortal growth, there are some things that will be reserved for the discipline of eternity itself.

We have increased the number of our colleges to one hundred and twenty, that is, about four for every State. We have enlarged greatly the number of college studies. We have cheapened education—we have reduced it to cost—we have put it below cost—we have even given it away. The public has given money so liberally, and made education so nearly gratuitous, that, taking Harvard College as an illustration, every graduate costs the public nearly one thousand dollars. And, yet, it would appear from the Report of the Corporation of Brown University, we have lowered rather than elevated the character of our scholarship. "All of them (the colleges) teach Greek and Latin, but where are our classical scholars? All teach mathematics, but where are our mathematicians? We might ask the same questions concerning the other sciences taught among us. There has existed for the last twenty years a great demand for civil engineers. Has this demand been supplied from our colleges? We presume the single academy of West Point, graduating annually a smaller number than any of our colleges, has done more toward the construction of railroads than all our one hundred and twenty colleges united."—p. 18.

"The effect of this system on the mind of the teacher is equally obvious. He must teach, generally, from text-books composed by others. His mind can act but imperfectly on the mind of the pupil. The time of the recitation is commonly quite occupied in ascertaining whether the pupil has

learned his daily task. He cannot mark out such a course as he would wish to teach, but must teach as much as he can in the fragment of time allotted to him. The books which he teaches soon become familiar to him. He has no motive to increase his knowledge, derived from the business to which he has consecrated his life. He already knows more than he has opportunity to communicate. There is no stimulus to call forth exertion. There is no opportunity for progress. The result is easily foreseen. Sometimes an instructor becomes interested in other pursuits, and his real business takes the place of only a secondary occupation. This is fatal to professional success. In other cases he becomes reconciled to, and finally in love with, his monotonous course; or, lastly, he throws up his calling altogether, and enters another line of life."—p. 19. From the same Report it appears, also, that notwithstanding the efforts made to enlarge the course of study and to cheapen education, the number of educated men has fallen off instead of increasing. The calculation is based upon statistics of the New England Colleges for the last twenty years.

It is argued, again, that so far from the intellectual character of the professions being elevated by the same causes, there is reason to believe that "the rank and file of every profession contains a smaller proportion of remarkable talent than in the last generation. The inducements to enter the professions seem to address themselves less successfully to young men of ability and enterprise. The other departments of life are continually alluring men from high places in Law, or even in Divinity. The productive professions are commonly filled with men who have not enjoyed the advantages of a collegiate education; nay, for whose benefit no schools whatever have been established, and yet, in influence, ability, and general intelligence, their position in relation to the professions is far in advance of that which they held some thirty years since."—p. 31. "The most coveted positions in society, seats in our highest legislative chambers, and even foreign embassies, await the successful merchant or manufacturer, no less than him who has devoted his life to what is called a learned profession. And yet more; the number of those who consider a collegiate education indispensable to a profession, has, for some time, been rapidly decreasing. Men have come to doubt whether the course which we pursue is that best adapted to prepare men for the duties of even professional life."—p. 21. The inference is, that men of distinguished talent avoid the colleges, and adopt some other mode of education.

The Report also shows, that notwithstanding the colleges have had in their organization an especial eye to the education of ministers of the gospel, and have been aided by Education Societies, the number of young men entering the sacred profession has by no means kept pace with the increase of our population. One fact is sufficient on this point. Six New England Theological Seminaries have together only eight more students now than they had twenty years ago.—p. 33.

But the condition of our colleges is represented to be such as to require relief not only to render the course of instruction more attractive and better calculated to meet the wants of the community, but also in many instances to save them from bankruptcy. The deficiency in the number of students, taken in connection with the low rates of tuition, renders their income inadequate to meet the current expenses, notwithstanding the endowments which they have received. This is shown to be the case of Brown University.—pp. 47, 48.

It is argued that if they be better adapted to the condition of our country, they will draw together a larger number of students; and that to make them better institutions, will be to increase their resources.—p. 50.

The particulars in which they are defective are,—First, The superficial education afforded by pressing too many studies within the four college years. Secondly, The requiring of studies which are calculated only for the learned professions, and particularly the ancient languages. Thirdly, The omission of those branches which are especially adapted to the mercantile, the manufacturing, and the agricultural classes.

The Report proposes to remove these defects by reorganizing the colleges on the following principles:

First, That the fixed term of four years be abolished, and that instead thereof courses of study be established in the different branches of learning, the time to be devoted to each course to be determined solely by the nature of the course itself. Secondly, That each student be allowed, within limits determined by statute, to select his studies for himself, and the number of courses he is to pursue at the same time, unless, in respect to these, the parent or guardian should place him under the direction of the Faculty. Every course, when entered upon, is to be completed without interruption; but any other course may afterward be added thereto, if the student so desire. Thirdly, Any student may take a degree upon sustaining an examination in such studies as may be ordained by the Corporation; but no student shall be required

to take a degree. Every student shall be entitled to a certificate of the proficiency he may have made in every course that he has pursued.

The number of courses proposed is fifteen. These embrace the ancient languages, modern languages, pure mathematics, natural science generally, the science of law, the English language and rhetoric, moral and intellectual philosophy and political economy, history, the science of teaching, the principles of agriculture, and the application of chemistry and of science generally to the arts.

If the proposed changes should serve to increase the number of students, and thus both to sustain the Colleges and to multiply the number of educated men, they would accomplish necessary and important ends. If they should farther break up the projects of distinct agricultural and mechanic schools, and collect the whole educational apparatus and all the candidates for education of the higher kind and degree in our colleges, they would effect an important concentration. Still more, if they should elevate the standard of education and give birth to more solid scholarship, they would claim our highest consideration.

An increase in the number of collegiate students, a concentration of the educational apparatus and of candidates for education at the colleges, might, however, be only a temporary success. New tastes and projects might arise and diminish again the number of students, and give rise to mere popular institutions. But a change that should permanently elevate the standard of education, and give birth to solid scholarship, would be a benefit to be calculated by some other standard than the success expressed by the number of students. A few men of great and cultivated powers may do more for a nation than hosts of mere expert empirics, who without learning succeed in gaining a reputation for learning, and without principle, dare to invade the most sacred offices of society. The changes in Brown University may, through the effect of mere novelty, produce a rush of students to that institution at the beginning of the experiment. This, therefore, will not be accepted as a test of their value. But, on the other hand, when temporary popularity shall have passed away, should only the few great and commanding minds come forth and continue to come forth under these new auspices, then their character will be settled.

The question in education, as in religion, is not what men desire, but what they need. This must govern us in determining the form and quality of our educational institutions. Now when it is asked, What we need in the way of educa-

tion? We may reply, either, that we need to fit men well for professional life, and for the general business of the world in the mechanical arts, in agriculture, and commerce; or, that we need to cultivate the human mind according to the philosophical or ideal conception; or, we might reply, that we need all in due order and proportion. The last reply would, unquestionably, be the correct one. We do need all in due order and proportion. Mere professional institutions will not meet our wants, for we do not all mean to be professional men. Mere agricultural, mechanical, and commercial schools will not meet our wants, for we do not all mean to act in these departments of life. Nor would we have the last without the former, for we generally mean to apply our education in the practical affairs of life.

It is a more serious and difficult question when we come to inquire after the due order and proportion. We believe that the due order and proportion exists only when the philosophical or ideal conception of education is made the architectonic conception, when the higher institutions represent it, and when, as an all-pervading light and warmth, it reaches to every grade of education. Human souls are to be educated because they are human souls: they are to be disciplined—to think, to reason, to exercise all the faculties wherewith they are endowed; they are to gain character and worth, to be fitted for duty, as human souls. This should be the leading thought of all education—of education in every degree, and for every purpose of life. When the lower ground is taken—that of making preparation for a particular art or profession, we shall fail of developing the full strength of the mind and of communicating the highest principles of action: when the higher ground is taken, we aim directly at the accomplishment of both. Nor do we in this way remove from education its practical character, since the development of the mind cannot be effected without setting before it its duties in general, and the particular offices in which society claims the services of human beings, and especially of educated men. We now, as before, enter upon the learned profession, or select some useful art or business, but we do it as men who know and who have cultivated their best capacities. However limited the discipline may be, it may still be conducted on right principles.

As to the defects in the system of education in our country, we have already given our assent to the Report of Brown University, in respect to the first; we believe that education has become superficial by attempting too much in the short period allotted. The other defects do not strike us

so forcibly. A review of the college studies does not show an especial adaptation to the learned professions, unless it be in the space given to Latin and Greek. Indeed, the Report admits that it is not well adapted to the learned professions, and that good classical scholars under the received system are as rare as good mathematicians and civil engineers. Some of our colleges, too, have introduced a scientific course in distinction from a classical, to afford an opportunity to prepare for the other forms of life besides the learned professions. We think, too, that the idea of accomplishing a general discipline of the mind preparatory to any sphere of active duty, has not been absent from our collegiate systems. We confess, however, that this idea has not been well carried out and made effective. We have been aiming to do great things; we have called our colleges universities; we have tried to enlarge our course of studies more and more; we seem to have been struggling to afford every imaginable facility; and yet we have only a superficial and inadequate education. Must we not seek for our great error somewhere else? We inspire no general desire for high education, and fail to collect students, because we promise and do not perform. Hence we fall into disrepute, and young men of ability contrive to prepare themselves for active life without our aid. In connection with this, the commercial spirit of our country, and the many avenues to wealth which are opened before enterprise, create a distaste for study deeply inimical to education. The manufacturer, the merchant, the gold-digger, will not pause in their career to gain intellectual accomplishments. While gaining knowledge, they are losing the opportunities to gain money. The political condition of our country, too, is such, that a high education and a high order of talent do not generally form the sure guarantees of success. The tact of the demagogue triumphs over the accomplishments of the scholar and the man of genius.

Put these causes together, and the phenomena we witness and lament are explained. Our colleges are complacently neglected when they neither afford the satisfaction and distinction of a thorough and lofty education, and yield no advantages in gaining wealth and political eminence.

We have multiplied colleges so as to place them at every one's door; we have multiplied the branches of study so as to give every one enough to do, and to satisfy the ambition of learning, if all are to be acquired; we have cheapened education so as to place it within the reach of every one; we have retained the short term of four years, so that a great portion of life need not be spent in study; and we have made

the terms of admission quite easy enough. Now all this would tend to the popularity of these institutions, if the education acquired helped us to gain money and political influence. But as it does not, it is not valued by a commercial people, and a people of political institutions like ours.

And even if our educational systems should be made more thorough, requiring more time, we see not that it would make a strong appeal to the commercial spirit and to political ambition, while men continue to succeed so well without high education. The idea of fitting our colleges to the temper of the multitude does not, therefore, promise great results. They do not answer to the commercial and political spirit of our country; nor to the philosophical or ideal—the architectonic conception of education: To attempt to make them answer to the former would be of doubtful success. But we can make them answer to the latter; and doing this, we shall meet every want of the human mind, and of society; for if we educate men as men, we prepare them for all the responsibilities and duties of men. And educating men on this principle, we should in due time have great examples of the true form; and the charm, and power, and dignity of learning would become apparent to all. And then education would stand out, as in truth it is, not as a mere preparation for the facile doing of the business of the world, but as the highest aim of the human being; as Milton has nobly said, “The end of learning is to repair the ruins of our first parents, by regaining to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love him, to imitate him, to be like him, as we may the nearest by possessing our souls of true virtue, which being united to the heavenly grace of faith, makes up the highest perfection.” In this way we should raise up a powerful counter influence against the excessive commercial spirit, and against the chicanery and selfishness of demagogueism which now prevail. Men thus worthily built up would get into all the relations of society, and throw a new aspect over the arts, commerce, and politics, and a high-minded patriotism and philanthropy would everywhere appear. Then it would be seen how much more mighty and plastic are great ideas and fundamental principles than all the arts, tact, and accomplishments of expediency. Then the host of penny-a-liners, stump orators, discourses upon socialism, bigots, and partisans would give way before sound writers, true poets, lofty and truthful orators, and profound philosophers, theologians, and statesmen. We should have a pure national literature, and a proud national character.

To bring about this great change, we must do something

besides multiplying colleges after the same model, pouring forth a tide of school-books, and making experiments upon a facile system of education full of pretension and fair promises, but containing no philosophical and manly discipline.

The multiplication of colleges after the same model only serves to increase our difficulties. We set about putting up the same kind of buildings; we create the same number of professors, to teach the same things on the same principle; we get together a few books and some philosophical apparatus; and then we have the same annual commencements, with orations and poems, and the conferring of degrees; and we get under the same pressure of debt, and make the same appeals to the public to help us out of it; and then, with our cheap education, to induce many to get educated, we experience the same anxiety to gather in as many students as possible; and, since where we cannot get money it is something to get appearance, we shew the same readiness to educate for nothing those who will submit to be educated, but who cannot pay. In all this we are improving nothing; but we are taking away all dignity from our system of education, and proving its inadequacy.

It were well to commence about this time some experiment of a different kind—a new experiment, and yet one of no doubtful issue, if we can carry it out to its issue. If we can give it a beginning and a middle, we know what its end must be. The establishment of Universities in our country will reform, and alone can reform our educational system. By the Universities we mean such as we have before described—*Cyclopædias* of education: where in libraries, cabinets, apparatus, and professors, provision is made for studying every branch of knowledge in full, for carrying forward all scientific investigation; where study may be extended without limit, where the mind may be cultivated according to its wants, and where, in the lofty enthusiasm of growing knowledge and ripening scholarship, the bauble of an academical diploma is forgotten. When we have such institutions, those who would be scholars will have some place to resort to; and those who have already the gifts of scholarship will have some place where to exercise them. With such institutions in full operation, the public will begin to comprehend what scholarship means, and discern the difference between sciolists and men of learning. Then we shall hear no more inane discussions about the expediency of discarding Latin and Greek; for, classical scholars there will then be, who will have an opportunity of showing the value of the immortal languages, and the immortal writings of the most cultivated nations of antiquity. Then we shall have

mathematicians prepared for astronomers and engineers. Then we shall have philosophers who can discourse without textbooks. Then, too, we shall have no more acute distinctions drawn between scholastic and practical education; for, it will be seen that all true education is practical, and that practice without education is little worth: and, then there will be dignity, grace, and a resistless charm about scholarship and the scholar.

The philosophic idea of education being thus developed in the highest form of an educational institution—where alone it can be adequately developed—it will begin to exert its power over all subordinate institutions. There will now be demanded a preparation suitable for undertaking the higher degrees of scholarship, and schools and colleges will receive a new impulse and will be determined to their proper form. We shall not now attempt to learn a little of everything in the lower institutions; but we shall learn that which is requisite to prepare for the higher, and we shall learn that well. The influence of the higher will be to give limitation, order, consistency, and thoroughness to the lower. And there will be diffused through all schools of every grade, and for both sexes, new ideas of intellectual discipline, and the sense of an elevated life and duty. Education now will have an authority to define it, examples to illustrate it, and the voice of a Divine spirit to call it forth.

We might have had Universities ere this, had we not wasted our means and energies in unfruitful schemes and misappropriations. We have wasted large sums in erecting expensive buildings in many different places for small collections of students, which, had they been concentrated, would have given for several uncertain colleges a stable University, with ample provision of books and the whole material of learning, and with endowed professorships.

Some of the States, like the State of New York, have made large appropriations from a literature fund to common schools, where, scattered in feeble streams through a thousand channels, it has produced no other effect than cheapening a little more what was cheap enough already. Massachusetts, with no literature fund, has a common and free school system no less, if not more complete and efficient, than New York. Common schools required no such attenuated patronage. But this fund, on an obvious principle of political economy, might have been concentrated into a power that would have given to the State of New York Colleges or Gymnasias, and Universities on an organized and connected system that would have justified her claim to be the Empire State, in a high and noble sense;

and have made her, in her educational development, second to no country in the world.

The proposed changes in Brown University set forth in the Report of the Corporation, and which we understand have since been adopted, indicate that it is not preposterous to hope that some of our colleges may be brought under a higher organization. This Institution has hitherto been only a college, but it has been one of the best in our country in respect to its endowments, its library, and its faculty. It has also been one of the most respectable in point of the number of its students; nevertheless, it finds a change necessary, and it dares to make it.

There are some features of this new organization, which have very much the air of a University. The number of courses of instruction, the freedom of choice allowed to the student, and the abolition of the fixed term of four years, and the graduation of the time allotted to each particular course by the nature of the course itself—all these seem to point to a University. But the Corporation do not, after all, propose to do away the collegial character of their Institution, but only to modify it. Their leading conceptions are, first, the introduction of a better scholarship, by giving to each study more time, or not attempting to do more than can be well done; secondly, to adapt the Institution to the wants of all classes; thirdly, by this wider adaptation to call in a larger number of students.

The experiment alone can determine whether the modifications introduced will realize these conceptions of an improved and more widely-diffused education. We believe that an attempt to modify our collegiate institutions emanating from so respectable a source, cannot but have weight in determining other institutions to consider the necessity of introducing reforms into our educational system. We sincerely desire that the experiment may prove successful. And since the Corporation, in making the present changes, reserve the power of making still further changes, if called for, we shall entertain the hope that, in carrying forward this experiment, they may be led to form the purpose of making Brown University a University proper.

The very conception of adapting the Institution to the wants of "young men who are devoting themselves to the productive professions," intimates that pupils will be received who have made very little scholastic preparation, and that, therefore, the courses intended for the "productive professions" will be quite elementary. The courses here proposed will undoubtedly be very useful to young men engaged in commerce

and manufactures, and who propose to cultivate farms on scientific principles. The increase of students anticipated is likely to be chiefly from this class of youth, and thus, instead of the old college with its Greek and Latin, and Mathematics, shall we not have a large commercial institution, which, instead of gathering around itself classical associations, and impressing us with the worth and dignity of scholarship, shall only give us the hum of preparation for the business of life in the industrial and productive direction? The Latin and Greek scholars—the old-fashioned plodding students seeking after science and philosophy for their own sake, and dreaming of high mental development and profound learning, will be rarely seen, we fear, when candidates for the “productive professions” form the overwhelming majority and create the *esprit du corps*.

We do not feel confident that this new organization will elevate the tone of scholarship. One of the principles laid down reads thus: “The various courses should be so arranged, that in so far as practicable, every student might study what he chose, all that he chose, and nothing but what he chose.” This principle is intended to obtain universally, unless the parent or guardian should place his child or ward under the authoritative direction of the Faculty. Now it is possible for a student to choose either too much or too little, and either to renew the old evil of attempting so much as to lead to superficial acquisition, or to fall into the opposite evil of undertaking so little as to leave over much leisure on his hands. And we must not forget that these students are of no higher grade than those who usually enter college; youths, whose habits of application are yet to be formed, and their judgment ripened, and not, like the students of the German Universities, young men grown, and formed under the discipline of years spent in the Gymnasias, and who, therefore, may be presumed to have some ground to stand upon when they make choice of the kind and the number of the courses they are to pursue.

Nor do we feel confident that the colleges can be made the best institutions for all those who are devoting themselves to the “productive professions.” Some who wish to become particularly scientific, would find such an institution congenial. But of the multitude who contemplate the productive professions, the majority will feel inclined to take a more limited course, and to enter as early as possible upon their apprenticeship. Indeed, we are doubtful of Agricultural and Commercial Colleges, however developed. We believe that the common schools, generally, can be so improved, or schools

of a degree higher, branching directly out from them, can be established, where instruction in the principles of Agriculture embracing Chemistry, and in the application of Chemistry and of other sciences to the arts, can be more fitly and successfully given.

It appears to us that this plan of the Corporation of Brown University is defective, inasmuch as it attempts a union in one institution of three different grades of education, which can be more philosophically and successfully conducted in three different kinds of institutions. We have here combined something of the University, a good deal of the College, and a good deal of the Commercial, Manufactural, and Agricultural School, in which the one element may preponderate over the others, but in which a harmonious action of the three, and a suitable development of all, it is hard to conceive of. But, granting that this scheme should be followed by a reasonable measure of success; that, at least, it should sustain itself by the number of its students, still it cannot meet the highest educational want of our country, which, indeed, is the highest educational want of every country. It will not form the University where philosophical education can be carried out to its last results.

We feel no hostility to the experiment of Brown University. The better it turns out, the better pleased we shall be. We shall even be happy to confess our error, if it shall appear that we have erred in any part of our criticism. The Report of the Corporation is an admirable one, and points out in a strong and lively manner the defects of our College system. The friends of the institution are now making a generous effort to place under its control the means of developing the new scheme. We cannot but feel a strong sympathy with this, and whatever may be the defects of the incipient movement, we repeat, that we shall cherish the hope, that eventually the noblest form of a literary institution may come out of it.

In the meantime, all scholars, and all true friends of learning, will do well to inquire if there really be any good reason why we should not now create in our country at least one great institution of learning that may vie with the best of the old world. Shall the little principalities of Germany surpass these wealthy and powerful States?

It is required, for the successful development of such an institution, that it should neither cheapen its education, nor be tempted to do so; that it should be adequate to educate the many, and yet not be destroyed, if, for a time, compelled to educate the few; that it should be removed alike from the

conflicts and jealousies of sects in the church, and of parties in the state; and that it should be faithfully consecrated to science, literature, and art.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE LAW OF VERACITY.

By REV. J. W. McLANE, Williamsburgh, N. Y.

RECTITUDE is something fixed and immutable. It is not the creation of the Divine will, but has its everlasting foundation in the moral character of God. Whatever in human action, therefore, is conformed to his image, is holy, just, and good—all that is contrary thereto possesses no such character. Actions, consequently, have some positive quality—are essentially right or wrong. The law of God is a transcript of his character—an expression of his infinite nature, giving direction to the conduct of beings made in his image—superintending all their movements, and bringing them into an unbroken harmony with truth and righteousness. The law of veracity, therefore, has its origin, its eternal residence, in the truthfulness of God—in his infinite attachment to what is true, and abhorrence of all that is false. Hence, we conclude with Calvin, that “we ought to preserve the truth without the least disguise.” The command presses us to this. It is directed against every species of falsehood—enjoins the most sacred and universal regard to truth in all our thoughts, words, and actions.

We feel no difficulty here in determining the path of duty—in discerning between right and wrong. Truth is the reality of things. Logically considered, it is the exact conformity of an assertion, however made, to the facts in the case. But in a moral aspect, it is the conformity of our words and actions to our sentiments. In other words, it consists in an *intention* to convey to others the real conceptions of our own minds. While, therefore, logical truth respects the reality of what is asserted, moral truth, that is, veracity, has reference to the person who acts, and consists in his communicating to others, as far as he is able, his conceptions of a fact exactly as they exist in his own mind; or, in the language of jurisprudence, in his telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. A falsehood, therefore, is easily defined. It is the violation of ethical or moral truth. It consists in conveying, intentionally, to another, in any way, an impression respecting a fact different from that which obtains in the mind of the person conveying it.

It is claimed, however, by some that such action is not in all cases sinful. They maintain that deception is sometimes justifiable. This we do not believe. We regard the position as entirely untenable—as fraught with evil. Once admit this, and all things are thrown into chaos. Definition becomes impossible. No one can draw the line of distinction between right and wrong, or say with any exactness how far men may depart from the truth, or where falsehood commences. The advocates of this loose morality are wont to select some instance of a trivial nature, where the evil is apparently very small—some case where the deception is in mere sport, and to argue from this the innocence of such acts. But what if we lessen evil a thousand times, and even fritter it away until the morally bedimmed eye of man cannot perceive it, does it, in its diminished form, cease to be evil? Can any diminution of evil become right? As a test of character—as a proof of principle, the less the departure from truth may be, the greater is the strength of virtue which detects it, and abstains from it. Hence the Saviour makes fidelity in that which is least, a sure criterion by which to judge of a man's adherence to principle in matters of far greater moment.

The more common resort, however, is to the consequences of an act—to the *end* gained by it, and as this is good, to conclude that the way in which it is gained is good also. The end justifies the means. Hence, in the view of Paley and others of this school, when little or no inconvenience will result from falsehood, asserted for a good end, the act is not sinful. The general principle laid down is, that if, in any case, the happiness of others may be more effectually promoted by falsehood than by truth, then the act ceases to be wrong—is right. Now, to us, there is a fearful arrogance in this supposition. It arrays the imagination of the creature against the intelligence of the Creator—affects to make man wiser than God. He commands us to speak the truth, and assures us that all things work together for good to the obedient. But in this supposition a man takes the ground that under certain circumstances deception will result in greater good than the communications of truth. How does he know this? Does he see the end from the beginning? Is any part of God's providence so framed as thus to countenance falsehood—to throw discredit upon the sacredness of truth? What, then, is the language of his conduct? This, that he is wiser than the Lawgiver—that falsehood is safer in the case supposed than truth—and that a higher end can be gained by deception in that instance, than can be secured by confidence

in God, and by action in accordance with the directions of his Word.

We cannot, for one moment, admit the *premises* in this case. The supposition is monstrous—is an utter and eternal impossibility. There is no instance, no circumstances, in which deception can effect more good than the truth. God's providence, in its issues, is coincident with his Word. The results of the one accord with the teachings of the other. His command to us is to speak the truth. Obedience to this will promote the happiness of men in all possible cases more than any departure from it can do. Truth says in exactly with all the working of his providence, and comes out in eternal issues of good. Hence, the man who walks uprightly, walks safely. And the direction given to him, who would see good, is to keep his tongue from evil, and his lips from speaking guile. We are on dangerous ground, therefore, when we thus let go our confidence in God's protection, and begin to balance between right and wrong; when we put our wisdom in the place of God's, and introduce into the scale of falsehood some imagined good, and thus make it outweigh the eternal securities of truth, linked as they are, in the providence of God, with its utterance. We have lessons of warning on this subject, which ought never to be forgotten. Abraham, when in the country of Abimelech, thought that he had found in the difficulties of his situation, a fulcrum on which the lever of prevarication would work better and more to his security than that of truth. But the result showed him his great mistake. And so it will be in every case, when we see the end from the beginning.

There is, then, no possible ground for the case supposed. Deception has a character independent of any issues consequent upon it. By this it must be judged. It is an act in which we intentionally mislead another, causing him either to believe what is false, or to disbelieve what is true. In either case, this can be done only by conveying to him an impression of something different from that existing in our own minds respecting it, that is, by an infraction of the law of veracity. The very cases, cited as justifiable acts, prove this. Take the case of the man traveling through a country beset with robbers; and who arms himself with *empty pistols*, carefully concealed. When the robbers approach him, he reveals his weapons, and makes them believe by his acts that, if they venture further toward him, he will shoot them. Now he has no such intention. His pistols are empty. His actions, therefore, speak one thing, his heart another. What, then, is the character of that act? Does it tell the truth in this case? Not at all. The man has a right to defend himself—to shoot

those robbers, if need be, but he has no right, by word or deed, to say what is untrue. He is under no obligation to speak. He may remain silent—may do nothing, but if he does act, he is bound to speak the truth—to act the truth.

Again: A mother sees her child near the verge of a precipice. A step or two more and it is gone. She resorts to deception to save it. She attracts its attention, and allures it to her by the promise of that which she has no intention of giving to it when rescued from its perilous condition. This, we are told, is all right, inasmuch as no injury results from it to the child. No injury! How do we know this? Does not deception injure it? Does it not tend to undermine the confidence of that child in the veracity of its mother, and to lead it to deceive? But translate that act into words, and what have we? A promise made, and *made with the intention of not fulfilling it suppressed*. And is this justifiable? Is it right to promise another to do what we at the time do not intend to perform? Such a transaction is below par in the estimate of the most vulgar honesty, and is scouted from the business of all honorable men. And yet a mother may thus treat her child!

As a specimen of those stratagems, which we are told may be practiced in war, we take that much applauded *ruse de guerre* of Washington, by means of which he detained Sir Henry Clinton in New York, while he concentrated all his forces at Yorktown in Virginia. In this case one thing was said and another meant. If, therefore, we take from the transaction the glare of the successful result, we have what no man, in his sober judgment, can for one moment approve—a plain, positive infraction of the law of veracity. The apology is, that it was done in war, and in reference to an enemy. But truth is the same at all times, and in all possible relations. Circumstances cannot change its character, nor make the violation of its sacredness a virtue.

But the advocates of the view we are opposing appeal to the Bible, and contend that there are cases of deception mentioned in that book which were practiced with the Divine sanction. Before referring to these cases, it may be well to remark, that the Bible is consistent with itself throughout, and can never be rightly construed, therefore, when one part is made to clash with another. Again, what is plain and obvious in the Bible must always be allowed to explain what is obscure. In this book we are commanded to keep ourselves far from a false matter—we are not allowed to deal falsely or to lie one to another—but are to have our conversation in all simplicity and godly sincerity—to keep our tongues from

speaking guile, and to abstain from all appearance of evil. This is all plain—perfectly clear. In this light, then, let us examine some of the more prominent cases adduced from the Bible to prove that deception, in certain cases, is right.

Much stress is laid on the conduct of Joshua in taking the city of Ai. In this case there seems, at first view, some appearance of plausibility, but when placed in its true light, no conclusion can, we think, be fairly drawn from it in favor of deception. The direction given to Joshua was to lie in ambush, that is, not to reveal at first his whole strength to the enemy. He certainly was under no obligation to reveal this. The enemy had no right to know from him what forces he could bring into the field. Withholding a fact is one thing, denying its existence by words or acts is quite another. In defending himself against an assailant, a man may choose his own time and manner of bringing out all his means of defence. So in the case before us, Joshua simply withheld from the enemy what they had no right to know from him. He appeared before the city with a part only of his forces. There was here consequently, as Matthew Henry very justly remarks, “no untruth told. Nothing was concealed but their own counsels; nothing was dissembled, nothing counterfeited but a retreat, which was no natural or necessary indication at all of their inability to maintain their onset, or of any design not to renew it.”

But still greater emphasis is laid upon the instance of Samuel's appointing David at Bethlehem. In this case the prophet was commanded to go to Bethlehem and anoint one of the sons of Jesse; and when he objected through fear of Saul, he was directed to take with him a heifer, and to say to the inhabitants of that place, when asked by them the object of his coming, that he came to offer a sacrifice unto the Lord. And so he acted. Here, therefore, the prophet had a twofold object to accomplish in going to Bethlehem. The main design of his coming to that place he did not reveal. He was under no obligation to reveal it. In the answer he gave, he did not give a feigned reason. He came to do what he stated, just as really as if it had been his sole object in coming to Bethlehem. He had, indeed, a further and greater end to accomplish, but both objects were alike real. A man may have a dozen ends to accomplish in coming to New York, and if asked by the people here, wherefore he comes, he tells no untruth, surely, if he gives any one of the twelve as the object of his visit. He is under no obligation to assign any reason at all. He may, therefore, give any one or none of them, just as he may deem it wise to do. So Sam-

uel acted. There was no deception on his part. All that can be said is simply that he did not reveal the chief object of his coming to Bethlehem. But this he was not bound to do. He came to do all that he affirmed as his object. And he made his word good.

Some go still further, and assert that God acts upon this principle—that he deceives men. The cases adduced in proof of this, however, when properly understood, give no countenance to any such idea. The instance of Nineveh is mentioned. God threatened to destroy that city, we are told, and yet he did not do it. But was this deception? The people of Nineveh surely were not deceived by it. They understood the import of God's message to them. They felt that it was conditional—that if they turned every one of them from his evil way, and from the violence that was in their hands, the threatened evil would not come upon them. This was implied in the commination. The design of it was to lead them to repentance. They viewed it in that light, and turned from their iniquities and were spared.

Again, we are told that God has said that he foreknew wicked men would mistake, and by which they would deceive themselves. But was this the object of God in saying what he has? He foreknew that the gospel would be tortured, and made the means of deceiving men, and yet this was not his object in giving men the gospel. The perversion of his goodness by men is no proof that he deceives them. The design of an act is what we must look at, not the abuse of that design. But it is claimed that God avows in his Word that he deceives men. We are pointed to Ez. 14: 9, where he says, And if the prophet be deceived, I the Lord have deceived him. True: God is often said to do what he permits to be done. Thus he is said to create evil—to do evil, where the meaning is, he suffers others to do it. So in this case. God says, If any prophet should flatter idolaters, and lead them to hope for his favor, he has deceived that prophet, that is, he has suffered the temptation to be laid before him, and suffered him to yield to it. He has given him up to the delusions of his own heart—left him to his own way, to be deceived, and to deceive others. This is the only sense in which God can be said to do evil—to deceive any one.

We will refer only to one case more. The action of the Saviour in reference to the disciples, on their coming into the village of Emmaus, is often cited as an instance of deception. *He made as though he would have gone further.* He seemed to them to be going further, and such unquestionably was his intention, unless pressed to tarry with them. There

was consequently no deception here, not even the semblance of it. The friend who joins us in our walk, and who comes with us to our door, may wait for an invitation, and some urgency even, to tarry with us, without being a deceiver. His intention may be to go on, unless entreated to stop, and he may make as though he would do this, that is, he may signify his intention to do so by his actions, and yet convey to us nothing but the real state of his mind—the simple truth in the case.

The Bible, then, does not countenance the idea that deception in any instance is right. So far from this, it everywhere condemns it in all its aspects. It binds us to the utterance of the truth whenever we speak—to keep ourselves far from a false matter—to lay aside all guile. It calls us up to the high places of an unfaltering confidence in God; and with the assurance that they alone are the places of honor and of safety. The great temptation to deceive is in the wretched idea that a better result will thus ensue than will by the opposite course. But the highest issues of good come from right action. God's providence demonstrates the positions of his Word. Hence, it is a manifold experience, says Chalmers, that the humble, the upright, the believing, as if shielded by an invisible hand, do walk the most safely and the most prosperously through the world.

We cannot conclude these remarks without adverting briefly to some things in the benevolent movements of our day, which, however good the end intended is, are nevertheless of very questionable propriety. There is no doubt a very strong temptation often to the use of deception. Feeling as we do that the truth of God should be scattered all over the earth—that his precious Word should be in every human habitation, and be proclaimed to every creature, we are in some danger of not sufficiently regarding the means by which we seek to gain these glorious ends. The Bible has long been a proscribed book in Italy, and as the government has no right to keep it from the people, some tell us that it is perfectly proper to introduce it there by *stealth*. Hence, a good Christian brother, in going to that country not long since, took with him a number of Bibles for distribution, which he put into a jar, and had the jar *labeled as containing sweetmeats*, and *as such* it passed into the country.

Again: a benevolent society, thinking that its excellent publications may be read more extensively and do more good, if some of them are issued without the society's imprint, lay aside that, and put in its place the name of some one, who is no more *the real* publisher, than the man in the moon. Take

another case. The friends of truth in Italy, in concert with Christians elsewhere, are in the habit, it is said, of circulating little tracts, or fly-leaves, as they are called, by rolling them up and dropping them in the streets and thoroughfares *as refuse paper*. These instances may be taken as specimens of the tendency to which we are adverting. The end in all of them, we admit, is very good, but are the means right? It grieves us to see any semblance even of deception or craft in the work of benevolence. We dislike any approach to those arts and disguises practiced by some, and which show a want of confidence in the goodness of their cause, and especially in the protecting, sustaining providence of God. We can never bring our mind to the point of attacking the enemy of righteousness with his own weapons—of meeting him as he meets us. We abhor his ways, and can feel no complacency in any resemblance to them, however remote.

The apostles acted very differently. They were of the day, open, frank, and without disguise. They went straight forward to their work. They planted themselves on the high elevations of unwavering confidence in God, and did what he commanded, feeling that he would take care of them, and of his own cause. When persecuted in one place, they went to another. There was no guile—no cunning in their plan of operation. They never smuggled a Bible into any place under cover of a false label. They never put any other imprint upon their epistles but that of their own names. They never dropped a leaf of truth as if they were throwing it away. No; they stood up like men—proclaimed the truth—were clear as the sun, and therefore terrible to their enemies as an army with banners. One chased a thousand, and two put ten thousand to flight. Like them, the friends of truth should be “so clear in their great calling, that their virtues may plead like angels, trumpet-tongued,” against all unrighteousness of men, and in behalf of the truth as it is in Jesus. What if such a course exposes them to insult, let it come. What if it kindles the fire of persecution, let it burn. It has always filled the world with light—it always will. The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church. God’s truth has often been saved as by fire, and it may be again.

ARTICLE IX.

LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES OF BOOKS.

By the EDITOR.

1. *THE PSALMS TRANSLATED AND EXPLAINED.* By J. A. ALEXANDER, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. Vol. 1, 12mo, pp. 436. New York: Baker & Scribner. 1850.

Hengstenberg's voluminous and masterly exposition of the Psalms is acknowledged by the author to be the basis of the present work. Few men are so well qualified as is Professor Alexander for the work he has here undertaken; and all that eminent scholarship, patient and thorough preparation, pious feeling, and love for the truth can do to explain this wonderful and instructive book, we know will be done. This volume embraces the first L. Psalms, and will be speedily followed by two more, embracing the entire Psalter.

The plan of the work is somewhat limited. Not only is all devotional and practical remark excluded, but all attempt to give the history of the interpretation, together with a great mass of materials which would naturally find their place in a Critical Introduction. A wide range of topics is thus excluded. "The idea which he has endeavored here to realize is that of an amplified translation." This plan has many advantages over the one usually adopted. The meaning of the sacred text is more clearly and fully developed, and is left to speak in its own divine simplicity and directness, and the work is brought within a smaller compass. Still, we heartily wish that the *devotional* feature, which so strikingly characterizes the original, had been preserved in this work. It would have given an additional interest and value to it. We read the Psalms, not so much for doctrine—to learn the anatomy of truth, or the law of Christianity—as for devotional and practical uses; and there is no part of the Bible richer, more varied to suit every phase of Christian feeling and experience, or more powerful to quicken and invigorate the life of God in the soul. This is the peculiar charm, the crowning excellence of the book of Psalms, and we regret that we have here only the bare skeleton of the original text. But as it is, the volume is a mine of pure gold.

We regard it, in its way, as a model exposition or commentary on the Scriptures. There is no parade of learning, and yet it bears on every page the marks of rich and varied scholarship. It is equally removed from unappreciable profundity, and from common-place superficiality. It is not wanting in the matter and style of literary merit, and yet the execution is perfectly unambitious, and the language the finest of good old English. The Christian of humble parts will read it understandingly, while the erudite scholar and profound thinker will be profited by it.

Professor Alexander adopts and vindicates the position, (denied by many), that the *titles* affixed to the several Psalms form an integral part of the sacred text, and he treats them accordingly. He classifies the Psalms on the principle proposed by Hengstenberg, and founded on the tone of pious feeling which they severally express. As to a formal division of the Psalter, he repudiates the ancient division into five parts, which modern German critics have tasked their ingenuity to prove are distinct collections, contemporaneous or successive, of detached compositions, afterward combined to form the present Psalter. A much more probable hypothesis, though coupled with a very doubtful theory, he thinks, is that of Hengstenberg, who regards the actual arrangement as that of Ezra, or some other skillful and authoritative hand. But "the best arrangement for the ordinary student of the Psalter," says the author, "is the actual arrangement of the book itself; first, because we have no better, and the efforts to invent a better have proved fruitless; then because there are sufficient indications of a principle or purpose in this actual arrangement" (in the title or inscription, in resemblance of subject or historical occasion, or in some remarkable coincidence of general form or of set phrases), "whether we can always trace it there or not; and lastly, because uniform tradition and

analogy agree in representing it as highly probable that this arrangement was the work of Ezra, the inspired collector and *rédacteur* of the canon, so that even if nothing more should ever be discovered with respect to his particular design or plan, we have still the satisfaction of relying, not on chance, but on a competent, or, rather, an infallible authority, as well as the advantage of studying the Psalms in a connection and an order which may possibly throw light upon them, even when it seems to us most fortuitous or arbitrary."

The work, when complete, will unquestionably rank among the very best specimens of Biblical exposition, and prove a most valuable aid to the better understanding of this portion of the Scriptures.

2. A TREATISE ON THE PHYSICAL CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF CHRIST, and its Relations to the Principles and Practice of Christianity. By WILLIAM STROUD, M.D. Large 12mo, pp. 496. London: Hamilton & Adams. 1847.

This work, we believe, has been quite recently republished in this country; but the splendid copy before us is a London one, for which we are indebted to the kindness of the respected author.

It is really a most learned and valuable Treatise on the deeply interesting and somewhat novel subject of which it treats. The whole execution of the work is masterly. It embodies very many facts gathered from the author's extended medical studies, which are of importance to the Biblical student, and especially to the gospel minister. The argument is purely inductive; it is fairly conducted, and thoroughly fortified; and in the end we must think amounts well nigh to a demonstration. Its chief object is to demonstrate the immediate cause and mode of the death of Christ. And his explanation presents that death in the most impressive and affecting point of view.

Having satisfactorily shown that neither the ordinary sufferings of crucifixion, nor the wound inflicted by the soldier's spear, nor an unusual degree of weakness, nor the interposition of supernatural influence, was the immediate cause of the Saviour's death, he proceeds to demonstrate his main position, that the immediate cause was AGONY OF MIND, PRODUCING RUPTURE OF THE HEART. To establish this conclusion numerous details are given, and many high authorities are cited, in favor of his general view. He gives several well-attested instances of death in a similar form and from a similar cause, as well as instances of persons sweating blood; and by an unbroken chain of inductive reasoning he establishes, we think, his conclusion, and shows its harmony with all the facts of the case. We have space for only a single paragraph. "It may, therefore, with certainty be affirmed, that between the agony of mind which the Saviour endured in the garden of Gethsemane, and the profuse sweat mixed with clotted blood which so rapidly followed it, violent palpitation of the heart must have intervened; this being the only known condition which could have been at once the effect of the former occurrence and the cause of the latter. In like manner, when on the cross this agony was renewed, and by the addition of bodily suffering was increased to the utmost intensity, no other known condition could have formed the connecting link between that mental anguish and his sudden death, preceded by loud exclamations, and followed by an effusion of blood and water from his side when afterward pierced with a spear, than the aggravation even to rupture of the same violent action of the heart, of which the previous palpitation and bloody sweat were but a lower degree, and a natural prelude. If, whilst every other explanation hitherto offered has been shown to be untenable, the cause now assigned for the death of Christ, namely, RUPTURE OF THE HEART FROM AGONY OF MIND, has been proved to be the result of an actual power in nature, fully adequate to the effect, really present without counteraction, minutely agreeing with all the facts of the case, and necessarily implied by them, this cause must, according to the principles of inductive reasoning, be regarded as demonstrable."

Having established this point, the author proceeds to an extended elucidation of Scriptural truth by the foregoing explanation of the death of Christ. We commend his labors as judicious and thorough, and as shedding much new and important light on the stupendous scene of the crucifixion.

We are happy to learn that the same author has in press a New Greek Harmony of the Four Gospels, which will soon be published by Bagster & Sons, London. From the ability and character of the present work, as well as from a specimen of the forthcoming Harmony embracing the evangelical narrative of the Resurrection of Christ, with which Dr. Stroud has favored us, we have no doubt that it will prove to be a work of rare value; and we hope it will speedily find its way across the waters.

3. JOURNAL OF THREE YEARS' RESIDENCE IN ABYSSINIA, by Rev. SAMUEL GOBAT, Bishop of Jerusalem. With an Introduction, Geographical and Historical, on Abyssinia, by Rev. S. D. CLARK, accompanied with a Biographical Sketch of Bishop Gobat, by Dr. BAIRD. 12mo. pp. 480. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1850.

A much needed and valuable book. It gives a pretty full and intelligent view of this almost unknown, yet for many reasons, peculiarly interesting portion of the world. The information, too, is perfectly reliable; it comes from one who had the best means of knowing; who had no motive for misrepresenting; and who is admirably qualified for the service he has rendered.

And it is a service which lays the whole Christian world under obligation to Bishop Gobat. His are not the hasty sketches of the traveler, nor the colored pictures of the professional book-maker, nor the poetic rhapsodies of the sentimentalist; but the sober records of the actual experience and extended observation of a self-denying and noble-souled Christian Missionary. Dr. Baird says of him: "Few men of our times are more worthy of our profound respect than Bishop Gobat. It is the testimony of all who have seen him, that he is a man of extraordinary talents, great humility, and devoted piety and zeal. We do not believe that Henry Martyn was a more remarkable man."

Mr. Gobat was educated at the celebrated Missionary Institution at Basle, and sent out to Abyssinia by the English Church Missionary Society in 1830, where he labored three years most faithfully, but with little apparent success. He went out the second time in '35, and remained a year and a half; but disease prostrated him, and he could do nothing. He subsequently spent six years at Malta superintending the publication of the Scriptures in the Arabic and other oriental languages. After the death of the first Bishop of Jerusalem, Dr. Alexander, he was appointed to that post, and still remains in that hard and sterile field of missionary toil.

Mr. Clark has given us, in a lengthy Introduction, a good translation from the French, of a Geographical and Historical work on Abyssinia. Christianity was introduced into Abyssinia as early as the 4th century, and is still the religion of the majority of the people; and although it "has sadly fallen from the high eminence to which its dignified nature and glorious destiny aspire, some slight traces of its excellence still remain stamped on the character of the inhabitants."

The volume is accompanied with a portrait of Bishop Gobat, and also a map of Abyssinia to illustrate his Journal; and Mr. Dodd has given it a very attractive dress, so that every man who desires a correct idea of the temporal and spiritual condition of the Abyssinians, and who feels any interest in the prophecy, "Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands to God," is strongly tempted to buy it.

4. DISCOURSES ON THE RECTITUDE OF HUMAN NATURE. By GEORGE W. BURNAP, D.D., Pastor of the First Independent Church of Baltimore. 12mo. pp. 409. Boston: Wm. Crosby and H. P. Nichols. 1850.

The doctrine of this book is aptly and truthfully expressed in the title given it—RECTITUDE OF HUMAN NATURE. It boldly denies the orthodox doctrine of original sin and total depravity, and stoutly maintains the essential rectitude of man. It is a cool and deliberate attempt to set aside the testimony of the Scriptures, of the Westminster Confession, and of the entire evangelical church, on this fundamental doctrine, and to give currency to the views of a "liberal Christianity." We have seldom seen more error that is specious, yet radical—flattering to man, yet contradictory to the Word of God, and subversive of the entire system of grace, brought into the same space. We can scarcely speak of the book in terms sufficiently severe to express our deep-seated conviction of the utter falsity of its teaching and of its soul-ruining tendency, and yet be courteous and dignified.

We agree with the author as to the importance of the subject. "It underlies all theology, it enters into all preaching. It modifies all Christian enterprise. It makes the basis of every system of religious education. It determines the type of all piety, it colors all our views of life. It has an important influence on the temper. It has occupied a large space in all theological speculations since the days of the apostles." A religious system, therefore, if such it can be called, based on the radical soundness of human nature, is quite "another gospel"—a gospel without an atonement for sin or the necessity of one—without a Divine Jesus—without a regenerating Spirit, and of course without a resulting holy nature and life as the fitting and indispensable preparation for heaven.

It is a little remarkable that the *Scriptures* have very little to do in the construction and management of the entire argument. Though they are religious discourses, and each is introduced with a text of Scripture, yet it is mainly a course of independent reasoning and theorizing throughout. A few of the passages which teach an opposite doctrine are referred to, but liberties are taken with them that are surprising and painful.

A few sentences will show that we do not misrepresent. They are the *leading and emphatic* passages of the book, and mostly put in italics or capitals.

"Human nature as it *now is*, is our law." "All that can be expected of man is that his career should be *progressive*; that his choice should be fixed on good after *wavering awhile*." (!) "VIRTUE, not vice, is the congenial element of man." "Revelation may confer great advantages, it cannot be indispensable." "There is no such thing as the wrath of God manifested in the evils which men suffer in this world." "A good man is human nature perfected." "The *Scriptures* assume and take for granted the rectitude of the moral nature of man, and recognize the dictates of that nature, the reason, the conscience, and the religious convictions of men, as co-ordinate and of equal authority with themselves." "Adam left human nature just where he found it." "The temptation and fall of Adam is evidently an *Oriental apologue*, the object of which is to give a symbolical account of the introduction into the world of moral and physical evil, without casting any imputation upon God."—The conclusion to which he comes is, "not that *human nature is fallen*, but that every individual man is *liable to fall*, and *does fall so far as he sins*; but that God has provided in *human nature itself*, and the discipline to which it is subjected, the means of deliverance and restoration."

It follows that human nature needs no *Saviour*. "All the influence that Christ has ever exerted in this world has been upon *character*." No *regeneration*, in the sense in which orthodox men use the term, is necessary. "The doctrine of regeneration, as it is usually taught, is not only false, but exceedingly pernicious. It is a libel on God and man: It makes God partial and unjust, and man a mere machine. It subverts the very foundations of character and responsibility."

The author has a very short way of getting rid of opposing proof-texts; e. g. "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." "This

may be, and doubtless is, intended as a description of deep and almost universal depravity; but we must consider it *hyperbatical*, and not intended to be taken literally." David's strong language in the 51st Psalm, is "poetic exaggeration." "It is not necessary to suppose that Paul actually *believed* in the doctrine of original sin, or the introduction of death into the world by the transgression of Adam, because he *refers* to such a superstition."

His views of *inspiration* are of the loosest sort. "Some persons may be alarmed at the admission, that there is such an element in the Bible as the *floating opinions of the age*." The introduction of sin into the world, a part of the Mosaic record of the creation, the demonology of the New Testament, and the existence of the Devil, are placed in the category of "*traditionary opinions*, which the Bible records, but for whose literal truth it is not responsible."

As a specimen of sophistry and rhetoric this book has considerable power, but as a creature of sound logical reasoning or Scripture interpretation, it has none. Take a single specimen of its reasoning, (on p. 236). "If they had no good thoughts," referring to the antediluvian world, "conscience had become wholly extinct and annihilated. If so, men were no longer moral agents, and no longer *capable* of sinning, let them do what they might. The existence of conscience is indispensable to the existence of sin." We suppose the Devil has very little conscience left, but is he not "*capable* of sinning?" Is he not "a moral agent," though he has no good thoughts? And is not the same true of every lost spirit in hell? Can a moral being, do what he may, so annihilate his moral nature as that his perfect depravity shall be his innocence? reach a degree of wickedness beyond which further sinning is impossible?

Deeply do we regret the issue of such a book. We had begun to hope better things of those who advocate a "liberal Christianity." It takes, we think, the very lowest view of things that has ever emanated from the Unitarian ranks. Its spirit and sentiments are very different from those which now often characterize the discourses of such men as Bartol, Osgood, and others, and such papers as the Christian Inquirer and the Christian Register.

5. THE HAND OF GOD IN HISTORY; or, Divine Providence Historically Illustrated in the Extension of Christianity. By Rev. HOLLIS READ. 12mo, pp. 402. Hartford: H. Huntington. 1849.

Although this book made its appearance nearly a year since, it has but just fallen in our way. Even at this late day we cannot forego the pleasure of commending it. We could point out imperfections in it, if so disposed. The style is a little too ambitious; it lacks unity; the mass of facts is not reduced to order and system; and in some places, there is a little straining of the point. But it has many excellencies, and it is far more congenial to our feelings to speak of them.

The idea itself which the book seeks to realize is a grand one—THE HAND OF GOD IN HISTORY. God is the soul of History. His power is the all-controlling agency in universal matter and in mind. "The Philosophy of History" is but the efficacious agency of the Almighty, ordering all things after the counsel of his own will, and rolling on the tide of subsidiary agencies and events to accomplish his eternal purposes of wisdom and grace. And this is a pious attempt to trace that unseen Hand in its ever-busy and marvelous ministries on this earthly scene of action. The author, imbued with the spirit of Divine philosophy, takes his post of observation by the cross of Christ as the centre of all Providential agencies, and thence surveys the broad and interesting field of History, and following in the path of its triumphs in its circuit among the nations, marks the Hand of God in the extension and establishment of Christianity—now preparing the way by a long series of events—now fulfilling prophecy, now interposing to rescue his people and punish his enemies, now working out reformatations and developing new agencies and facilities, now planting missions and opening new doors for the spread of the

gospel, and now turning and overturning among the systems of religious error and of political government and of heathenism—one spirit animating the entire scene—all earthly affairs a unit, because one Hand controls them—and all the lines of providence fast converging to some grand point of consummation not far distant in the future. The history of this world is but the history of Christianity, and it gives faith and courage to the heart of piety to study that history in the light of this thought. This volume will greatly aid one in this delightful task. The array of historical facts, illustrative and confirmatory of his main position, is strong and cheering. Many of them are exceedingly striking and valuable, as are many of the author's views herein expressed. The impression of the book is decidedly good. We have space for a single paragraph, which occurs in the author's summing up, and expresses a great and most instructive truth.

"In working out the stupendous problem of the redemption of men and of nations, *God takes time*. Moral revolutions are of slow development. The works of Providence, more especially, perhaps, than those of creation, have a direct reference to the display of the Divine character, and to the exhibition of man's character. It was needful, therefore, that those works be prolonged—that the book of Providence lie open continually for perusal. It had been easy for God to speak the heavens and the earth and all therein into existence in a moment of time—instantaneously to give form, fertility, and beauty to the earth, and matured perfection to the animal, mineral, and vegetable world. But God chose to lay open his works to inspection, that they might be examined piece by piece. It had been easy for God to have brought his Son to die a sacrifice for sin immediately on the fall of man. But a thousand sublime purposes had then failed—God's glory had been eclipsed, and man's redemption been another thing. Four thousand years should be filled up in preparation—not a change or a revolution should transpire which was not tributary to the one great purpose. The Hand of God was all this time busy in well-directed efforts—not an abortive movement, not a mistake, not a retrograde motion did he make. All was onward, and onward as rapidly as the nature of the work permitted. There was neither hurry nor delay."

We are happy to learn that the work is sufficiently appreciated abroad to have been republished in London. And, by the way, it is not a little gratifying to know that such compliments are being very frequently paid to American authorship—more so, by far, of late, than formerly. Very many of the better class of our books are now incorporated into the London catalogues, and form a part of the regular issue of her great publishing-house, in some instances giving us credit, but in many withholding it. Among the rest we see a volume entitled, "**TWENTY-FIVE ESSAYS ON THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY**," selected chiefly from the **AMERICAN BIBLICAL REPOSITORY**," of which the title-page is kind enough to add—"The most valuable publication of a Theological character which issues from the American Press." Of this work the *British Quarterly Review* says: "The Essays on the Ministry present, in our judgment, a larger amount of wise thinking concerning the duties of the preacher and the pastor than has ever been brought together within the same compass."

6. **MONTAIGNE; THE ENDLESS STUDY**, and other Miscellanies, by **ALEXANDER VINET**. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by **ROBERT TURNBULL**. 12mo, pp. 430. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1850.

VINET is styled the **CHALMERS** of Switzerland, by one so well-informed as **Merle d'Aubigné**. Mr. Turnbull, in tracing the resemblances and differences of these distinguished men, says: "Every one familiar with the writings of both men, will readily allow that they resemble each other in breadth and energy of mind, originality of conception, and vigor of diction. Chalmers, we think, has more of energy and passion, but less of philosophical acumen and delicacy of perception; more of oratorical force and affluence of imagery,

but less of real beauty, perspicacity and power of argument. His discourses resemble mountain torrents, dashing in strength and beauty amid rocks and woods, carrying everything before them, and gathering force as they leap and foam from point to point, in their progress to the sea. Vinet's, on the other hand, are like deep and beautiful rivers, passing with calm, but irresistible majesty, through rich and varied scenery; now gliding round the base of some lofty mountain, then sweeping through meadows and corn-fields, anon reflecting in their placid bosom some old castle or vine-covered hill, taking villages and cities in their course, and bearing the commerce and population of the neighboring countries on their deepening and expanding tide. The diction of Chalmers is strikingly energetic, but somewhat rugged and involved, occasionally, too, rather unfinished and clumsy. Vinet's is pure and classical, pellucid as one of his own mountain lakes, and yet remarkably energetic and free in its graceful flow."

"The present volume presents Vinet mainly in the light of a profound, original, philosophical thinker, being made up of some twenty essays on themes of the highest interest, and containing many of his most valuable thoughts. It is less popular than his "Gospel Studies," but none the less interesting and valuable. It dissects the false systems of Montaigne and other moralists, and philosophyists, and religionists, with the skill of a master of true science. It discusses the profound subjects of Revelation with a breadth of view, and a freshness of thought, and an affluence of argument, and a power of analysis, that is seldom wielded. And the whole is imbued with a thoroughly evangelical spirit, and is all aglow with sanctified emotion. It abounds in "the seeds of things," and cannot fail to quicken and expand the mind that reads and studies it.

"The translation, we need not say, is admirably done. Mr. Turnbull's own thoughts, embodied in an elaborate Introduction, in numerous Notes, and in Sketches of Montaigne, Jouffroy, etc., add not a little to the value of the volume. Our country is under great obligation to Mr. Turnbull for introducing Vinet so favorably to us, in his "Vital Christianity," "Gospel Studies," and, now, in "Montaigne," as well as for his own original volumes on the "Genius of Scotland," the "Genius of Italy," and the "Pulpit Orators of France and Switzerland." Our friend Dodd has given the book a very tasteful and substantial form.

7. *MOTHERS OF THE WISE AND GOOD.* By JABEZ BURNS, D.D. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1850.

"This is an English work republished here, and yet it is extensively indebted to American authors for its matter. Its design is to show the success of pious maternal influence in training men for God, and usefulness, and to urge the duties and responsibilities of the Christian mother. It embodies a series of striking instances of maternal fidelity with its corresponding reward, interspersed with brief accounts of distinguished mothers, and select essays on various topics, all bearing on the one subject in hand.

"The precious influences of maternal piety, love, and fidelity, can never be fully appreciated till their results shall be seen in eternity. Oh, that we had more such mothers as are here exhibited! A nobler race of sons would then grow up around our altars, and go forth to sustain the duties and responsibilities of life. We can heartily say of the volume with Dr. Beaumont: "I am constrained to say that it is full of interest, and that of the most pleasing and useful kind. It presents to the reader a bouquet of charmed names—a cabinet of choice reminiscences—a tissue of facts and morals, of incidents and principles, at once delightful and edifying. As a gallery of 'elect ladies' and their sons, it would be a profitable study for all who fill the important relations of son and mother."

It contains some gems of poetry:

"Oh! in our sterner manhood, when no ray
 Of earlier sunshine glimmers on our way;
 When girt with sin and sorrow, and the toil
 Of cares, which tear the bosom that they soil;
 Oh! if there be in retrospection's chain
 One link that knits us with young dreams again—
 One thought so sweet, we scarcely dare to muse
 On all the hoarded raptures it reviews;
 Which seems each instant, in its backward range,
 The heart to soften, and its ties to change,
 And every spring untouched for years to move,
 It is—THE MEMORY OF A MOTHER'S LOVE."

8. WHITE-JACKET; OR, THE WORLD IN A MAN-OF-WAR. By HERMAN MELVILLE. 12mo, pp. 465. New York: Harper & Brothers. London: Richard Bentley. 1850.

MELVILLE appears more at home in a man-of-war than in "Typee," or "Omoo;" and his year's "experiences and observations" on board the United States frigate *Neversink*, as an "ordinary seaman," as here delineated, are not only intensely exciting as graphic sketches, but they are really worth something, and cannot fail to produce effect in certain quarters. The volume is brim-full of the author's characteristic faults—a swaggering air, extravagant speech, and outrageous sentiment, profane expressions, amounting at times almost to blasphemy, and a reckless, care-for-nothing manner of life. But as a sketch of the real world on board a naval ship, from the "king-commodore to the cabin-boy," it has wonderful power. The life of a man-of-war's-man is painted with such consummate skill and intense energy of expression, that its horrible features glare upon you like a living being, and can never be effaced from the mind. In this line lies its chief value; and for power in this respect it surpasses any book we ever read.

As an *exposé* of the wickedness of many of our "Articles of War" in their practical workings—of the bad tendencies and effects of "Flogging," and "Grog-rations" in the Navy—of the trials, temptations, and hardships of naval seamen—and of the utter hatefulness of the spirit and whole system of war, as cherished and maintained in this "man-of-war world of ours," it is really withering, and often heart-rending. It must powerfully second the efforts now making to bring about a reform in our Navy. Its keen wit, pointed irony, sarcastic humor, biting invective, and fearless exposure of wrong, do prodigious execution, and generally on the right side of things. It is a formidable enemy to all customs, laws, and authorities, that would degrade, and tyrannize over, and kill out the life of men-of-war's men. We can compare the book only to a seventy-four line-of-battle ship, in perfect trim, well manned, and armed to the teeth, fearlessly and proudly ploughing the deep broad sea of humanity, floating high the banner of Liberty, Reform, and Good-will to the sailor—ready to give battle on any tack, with any craft, on any sea—now slyly aiming a solitary thundering death-shot at some ceremonious Commodore, or tyrant Captain, or transcendental faithless Chaplain, or stark-mad-with-science, heartless Surgeon, which is sure to hit the mark—and now boldly letting off, without warning and without mercy, a whole broadside of hot-shot into the midst of "grog-rations," "cat-o'-nine-tails," cruel and murderous "Articles of War," and the whole beleaguering forces of naval iniquity, threatening to sweep the seas; and win a more glorious victory than that of Trafalgar, or Navarino. We commend Melville's "White-Jacket" to all the friends of seamen, and to the special regards of our Naval Authorities.

9. THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND. By DAVID HUME, Esq. In six volumes. Large 12mo. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

10. THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND. By THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY. In two volumes. Large 12mo. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

11. THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

By EDWARD GIBBON, Esq. With Notes by Rev. H. H. MILMAN. A new edition. In six volumes. Large 12mo. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

The respective merits of these three standard Histories are so well understood and appreciated, that a single word on this point, at this late day, would seem out of place. The world has made up its mind fully in regard to them, and will never change its opinion. While History is read and appreciated, they will be regarded as among the choicest and ablest productions of the human mind, and referred to as leading authorities, notwithstanding their faults.

The *cheapness* of this new edition is a marvel. The three works are uniform in size (averaging over 500 pages each) and general appearance; are printed on fair type and good paper; and are neatly and substantially bound in cloth—making a really fine library edition. And yet they are sold at the astonishingly low price of *forty cents* a volume! Macaulay's brilliant history complete, as far as published, for 80 cents! What must John Bull think of Yankee enterprise! We doubt if the world can match it. The enterprising publishers deserve an extended patronage:

We view this cheapening of such important standard histories in a higher light than that of dollars and cents. It is a direct temptation to multitudes to buy and read them who would not otherwise think of it. It must tend to crowd out of the market much of the vile and corrupting literature of the day, which is bought as much for its cheapness as for any other motive. When, for \$5 60, a man can buy three splendid Histories, in fourteen beautiful volumes, containing more than 7,000 pages of intensely interesting and valuable reading, and making of themselves quite a Library, he will decline "the last novel," and not waste his money on the "yellow cover" literature, that is dear at any price.

12. HISTORY OF CYRUS THE GREAT. By JACOB ABBOTT. With Engravings. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

The character of this series of personal Histories is so well established that we may well spare our criticism. The present volume is not quite equal in interest to some of the former ones, and mainly for the reason that we have some doubts whether we are reading veritable history all the while or not. The Greek historians—Herodotus and Xenophon—the chief sources whence our knowledge of the great Persian monarch is derived, it is well known differ essentially in their narratives—both are evidently greatly embellished for effect—and the opinion of the world is divided in reference to their credibility. It is the Cyrus of Herodotus and Xenophon, whose story Mr. Abbott so gracefully narrates—a story which has, been read these two thousand years with unabated interest, whether it be true or false.

Cyrus has a grand prophetic character and Scripture interest. He it was who took Babylon on the night of Belshazzar's impious revelry. He was the deliverer of the Jews from their long captivity. He possessed many noble traits of character, and seems to have had many just ideas of the true God. We can but drop a tear over his melancholy end.

13. SYSTEMATIC BENEVOLENCE—Three Premium Treatises. The Divine Law of Benevolence, by Rev. PARSONS COOK: Zaccheus, or Scriptural Benevolence, by Rev. SAMUEL HARRIS: and the Mission of the Church, by Rev. EDWARD A. LAWRENCE. New York: American Tract Society.

14. THE FAITHFUL STEWARD; or, Systematic Benevolence an Essential of Christian Character, by Rev. S. D. CLARK. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1850.

Instead of one treatise, here are four. It is hard to say which is the best. We honor the judgment of the Committee of Award in distributing the generous prize offered among the four. Each has its peculiar excellencies, some in one line of merit and some in another—and all possess superior worth, and discuss the great theme with thoroughness, with eloquence, and no mean power of illustration. The discussion in each is eminently Scriptural and of a practical character. The light of God's own Word is made to shine upon the subject, and Christian experience is happily appealed to. The subject discussed, so vitally connected with individual piety and usefulness, and with the interests of the church and a perishing world—the varied ability which characterizes the discussion—and the pressing need of such a result as can be reached only by the extensive adoption of the principle involved and urged in these treatises, ought to secure for them the prayerful reading of every minister, and every Christian throughout the land.

We are at a loss to know why the Tract Society have published (as they have in the neat volume before us) three of the four premium treatises, and not the whole. Our friend Dodd, however, ready to every good work of the kind, we are glad to see, has come promptly forward and supplied their lack of service.

15. A DICTIONARY OF PRACTICAL MEDICINES ; comprising General Pathology, the Nature and Treatment of Diseases, &c., by JAMES COPLAND, M.D., F.R.S. Edited, with additions, by CHARLES A. LEE, M.D. Part XXI. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1850.

The literary merit of this voluminous work is unquestionably of the highest order. As to its scientific and practical value we are not qualified to express an enlightened opinion. Competent judges, however, pronounce it to be decidedly the leading production of the age, both as it regards its philosophy and its vast accumulation of facts, as well as the systematic order in which they are arranged: so highly elaborate and finished, it is affirmed, are the different articles, that they form complete monographs on the various subjects of which they treat. The Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal says of it—"A work as yet unrivaled in the English language."

16. LATTER-DAY PAMPHLETS. Edited by THOMAS CARLYLE. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1850.

These are pamphlets of about forty pages each, issued monthly, in which various public matters, pertaining mainly to Great Britain, are discussed, if so sober a term can be applied to such outlandish jargon. The titles of the six before us are—*The Present Time—Model Prisons—Downing Street—The New Downing Street—Parliaments*. They are written in Carlyle's very worst strain and style; and although they contain some timely and noble truths, spoken fearlessly, and pointedly, and now and then with withering effect, they give utterance, at the same time, to many barbarous, monstrous sentiments, alike offensive to good taste, piety, and all that is wholesome and good in society.

Carlyle is crazy! No thoroughly sane mind could foam and rant at such a prodigious rate. We agree with the "London Punch," that he needs some one to take care of his reputation. The course he is now pursuing must damage, if it does not utterly destroy it. And what he can be aiming at by such a tirade of scorn, invective, and bedlamite storming, we are at a loss to conjecture.

We especially protest against the general title which he has given to these mad rhapsodies—"*Latter-Day*" pamphlets. This is a sacred Scriptural term, having a solemn, sacred application, and to pervert it to such a use is in very bad taste, to say the least.

17. *SOUTHEY'S COMMON-PLACE BOOK.* Edited by his Son-in-law, JOHN WOOD WARTER, B.D. 8vo. Third and Fourth Numbers. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

We have already expressed our opinion of the first two numbers of this work, and these complete it. It is a voluminous collection of all sorts of rare quotations, from an almost endless list of authors, and on every conceivable topic of thought and inquiry. It is a vast wilderness of detached thoughts and facts, in which one may wander about all his life without seeing all; a mammoth museum, in which the curiosities of literature, gathered from every quarter, are arranged without much order or system, yet containing, with much that is common-place, and some that is decidedly exceptional, a multitude of gems, and other rare and valuable things. It is interesting as an index to Southey's tastes, and habits, and the character and extent of his reading. It is valuable as embodying many of the choicest thoughts of old authors, on a great variety of subjects.

18. *THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF ROBERT SOUTHEY.* Edited by his Son, the Rev. CHARLES CUTHBERT SOUTHEY, M.A. To be completed in six parts. 8vo. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

This is an exceedingly captivating work, thus far. That part of it especially which Southey has drawn up himself in the form of "Letters to a Familiar Friend," embracing his ancestry, his early life and struggles, and the incipient stages of his authorship and fame, is inimitably beautiful. The narrative is free, unaffected, lively, and abounds with some exquisite delineations of character, and representations of truth. It cannot fail to prove an eminently popular work, and to extend the sphere of the gifted Boet's fame and influence.

19. *THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE REPUBLIC.* Translated from the French of ALPHONSE DE LAMARTINE. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

The design of this work is, as the celebrated author says, to "recapitulate briefly, for the use of those who have not the time to read every morning the innumerable swarm of public journals, the principal events since the foundation of the Republic; to analyze the ideas, the doctrines, the opinions, the illusions, the truths which dispute possession of the intelligence of the masses." We need not say that the work is performed with remarkable ability, and great candor and fairness. The historical sketch of the leading events which have occurred since the revolution of February, is by the hand of a master. The position and strength of the several parties existing under the Republic, are set forth with great clearness and impartiality. And all the great questions which relate to home affairs, foreign relations, finance, taxation, and suffrage, are discussed with no little tact and ability. It is calm, dispassionate, and hopeful in its tone.

It holds up Lamartine to view in a most favorable light; and more than ever makes us regret that the helm of government was wrested from his hands. France had never committed the errors which she has committed—never stained her honor and branded her name with infamy before the civilized world by her affair with Rome—had she followed the wise and conservative counsels of the gifted and noble-souled Lamartine.

He says that the Socialist party, from which we are wont to apprehend the chief danger to France, is "to be deplored, but not in the least to be dreaded." And here is the reason: "Among a population of thirty-six million souls, there are six millions of land-owners, twelve millions of house-owners, six millions of possessors of capital, of public stocks, of banks, of commercial establishments, of shipping, of public functions, of grades, of posts in the army or navy—in all, twenty-six millions of proprietors, not one of whom

would resign his fireside, his capital, his business, his rents, his pay, except with his life." "The sole danger to the Republic is in the party of the dynasty of 1830."

20. THE WORKS OF LEONARD WOODS, D.D. In five volumes. Vol. II. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1850.

We have already expressed a strongly favorable opinion of the first volume of this work. The present volume is characterized by the same lucid and truly elegant simplicity of language, the same clearness and power of argument, the same reverence for the Scriptures as the rule of faith, the same masterly methods of investigation, we had occasion to commend in our notice of Vol. I. These works must, as we think, prove a very valuable addition to our stock of theological literature. If we mistake not, they are destined to live, and be read by students of theology and preachers of the gospel, as *standard* works on the subjects of which they treat.

The present volume, like its predecessor, appears in the form of Theological Lectures. The doctrine of Divine Providence is the theme of the first four of these lectures. We have read them with unqualified approbation. The next topic is *Moral Agency*, the examination of which extends through thirteen lectures. In the constitution of a moral agent Dr. W. places three elements, i. e., Conscience, Will, and Affections. From the latter, in the view of Dr. W., a moral being derives his character as good or bad. They are the motives *subjective*, which determine the acts of the will, or the voluntary operations of the mind. Dr. W. takes his stand strongly on the side of Moral Necessity, and wholly repudiates the doctrine of "a *power of contrary choice*" without contrary inducement. He belongs to the school of Edwards, maintaining the doctrines of Liberty, Natural Ability, and Moral Inability, in the senses held by Edwards. We have no space even to state his argument on these intricate questions, much less to review it. It is conducted with his usual thoroughness and candor.

Having considered man as a *moral agent*, Dr. W. next proceeds to view him as a *depraved* moral agent. Twelve lectures are occupied with this subject. The argument in proof that man is such an agent, as derived from the Scriptures and human conduct, is presented with great clearness and convincing power. The fact is demonstrated. The objections to this proposition are fully stated, and ably answered. Dr. W. candidly admits, that no philosophical theory which has been invented to account for man's depravity, is free from difficulties. His remarks on the theory of Dr. John Taylor, as also on the views of original sin held by Coleridge, are well worth reading. What is commonly known as the *orthodox* view of man as a fallen and ruined being, finds an able advocacy in these lectures. Depravity is "a well-known, dreadful fact—a fact, whether explained or unexplained, as certain as our existence." It concerns our present state and future destiny as *moral beings*. It is eminently "the part of Christian wisdom to receive those particular views of the subject which best agree with the current representations of Scripture, and with the lessons of experience and observation, to whatever speculative objections those views may be exposed."

The lectures on the *Atonement*, twelve in number, we have read, and some of them carefully studied, only to be impressed and delighted with their great excellence. The Dr. begins his inquiry at the *proper* place—the SCRIPTURES. His first question is, What does the Bible teach? His classification of passages, as well as their exegesis, we think to be admirably executed. The doctrine of substitution or vicarious sufferings; that of propitiation, or satisfaction of justice in the sense of answering its penal ends; both are clearly stated and ably vindicated. Dr. W. does not hold that Christ suffered the *literal* penalty of the law, but an equivalent for it. He agrees with those theologians who regard the atonement as *general*. His "Remarks on the controversy respecting the extent of the atonement, as conducted by the two

parties," are exceedingly valuable. He takes Symington and Jenkyn, as the representative types of these "parties;" and shows by an admirable comparison of their views, that they are much nearer alike, than their difference of phraseology would seem to imply. We cannot speak too highly of the Dr.'s manner of treating the atonement. To those, if any such there be, who have been captivated with the unscriptural mysticisms of Dr. Bushnell on the subject, or are inclined to view his system as no departure from sound faith, we respectfully recommend the reading of these Lectures. We have no desire to disguise the fact, that we belong to the admirers of Dr. Woods, as a theological writer. Few can be compared with him in this respect.

S. T. S.

[By REV. J. FEW SMITH, Prof. in Andover Theol. Seminary.]

21. **ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF RHETORIC**; adapted for use in Colleges and Academies, and also for Private Study. By HENRY N. DAY. 12mo. Hudson, Ohio, 1850.

The title of this work appropriately describes its character. It is a clear and systematic exhibition of the elements of the Art of Rhetoric. It is such a work as those acquainted with Professor Day's previous contributions to the study of Rhetoric and Elocution would expect from him: thorough, philosophic, exact, covering all the ground of its subject, yet not departing from the limits by which the subject is bounded; beginning with the fundamental principle, and from it logically developing the whole system.

Many of our popular systems of Rhetoric have been deficient either in the fundamental view which they have taken of the subject or in the order in which they have presented it. Some have given it a very limited restriction, while others giving it a wide comprehension have failed to exhibit the distinction between it and the kindred art of Logic, and Grammatical science. Others have collected many valuable remarks on language, and composition, and style, and elocution, and have thus presented rules of criticism, rather than the elements of the art of Rhetoric; while others, though more philosophical in their view, have yet overlooked an important part of the art which they profess to teach. A prominent defect has been the failure to seize upon the fundamental idea of Rhetoric, and then systematically, scientifically, to develop that idea, and show it pervading the whole of what is exhibited as the province of Rhetoric. Then, again, there has been a doubt whether Rhetoric should be treated as a science or as an art, as a philosophy or a practice. So that while we have many excellent works within the broad field of Rhetoric, we have scarcely one which gives a comprehensive view of the whole field; and so applies its principles as to show the way to success in rhetorical performances. We are accustomed to attach more value to Dr. Blair's Lectures, than seems of late to have been accorded them—and we yield to none in our estimate of those excellent works, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, by Dr. Campbell, and *The Elements of Rhetoric* by Archbishop Whately: and yet we think that by one who intelligently considers the subject the remarks above made will be found applicable even to them.

Professor Day has endeavored, and we think successfully, to avoid their errors, and supply their deficiencies. The prominent characteristics of his work are, the general exactness of his definitions, the clear limitation of his subject, the philosophic development of it, the large share of attention which he gives to Invention as a branch of Rhetoric, and his analysis of style. In these particulars, especially in the last, there will be found to consist what of originality the book possesses, and its chief value above kindred works.

He unhesitatingly treats of Rhetoric as an *art*; distinguishing an *art* from a *science*, by the circumstance that while a science "proposes truths and principles as subjects of knowledge," an art "carries them out in application to practice." Every art of course implies science—implies certain "truths and principles" on which it is based—and therefore has its foundation in

realities, and is capable of assuming a systematic form. Indeed only as such is it worthy of the name of an art. He who undertakes to give instruction in art must, therefore, have regard to the principles on which it is based, and by which it is controlled; and must exhibit these, not merely as a set of scientific principles, but as principles applied to practice. "An art always contemplates the exertion of some power or faculty; and proposes to point out the means and furnish the occasion, of developing and regulating that faculty in the best manner." It is the province of the Art of Rhetoric, for instance, not simply to teach men the principles of oratory, to show them what oratory is, but also to show them how to be orators—to aid them in becoming orators. And it is easy to perceive that these are two different objects; and that the accomplishment of one does not necessarily secure the other. A man may have a scientific acquaintance with music, and yet not be a good performer. He may be a good critic, who is but an indifferent writer or speaker. A man may skillfully practice an art who can tell but little, scientifically, of the principles on which it is based. Yet even unconsciously he is conforming to fixed principles, which his own intuition, or his observation have discerned, and without deliberately considering it, is guiding his practice by them. This will be found true of those who are sometimes called "natural orators;" that is, men who have had no training in the schools of rhetoric and elocution. They speak according to the laws of nature; and this is true art. And the great work of an art, as an instructor, is to teach men how to conform most truly to those fixed laws of mind, in man, which constitute his nature. The art, in other words, does not invent principles—but exhibits and applies them—and teaches how the individual may give them force in his own case. And here we find the proper ground to estimate the value of rhetorical studies, and to expose the absurd notion, that Rhetoric is but a mere artifice, the tool of the sophist, or of the vain aspirant after applause. It is not a mere artifice, but a noble art. It is concerned not simply about words, but about words as expressions of thought. It aims to develop the powers with which man is endowed—to teach him how to use his faculties most effectively, most wisely. It contemplates man as he is; a complex being, acted upon by a variety of influences, moved by many impulses, the prey of varied emotions, a being of intellect, of feeling, of will, dwelling with his fellows, the subject of sympathy; dwelling in a physical world, in the midst of sights and sounds which constantly affect him. It studies the working of his mind and heart; the effects of sound upon the soul, of physical things upon man's spiritual part. It considers the effect of certain classes of truths, and certain modes of presenting truth, upon the soul. It investigates the faculties of speech, and the laws of language. And from all these studies deriving its principles, it aims so to arrange and present these, as to show men the power that is in them, and to teach them how to use it. And so long as the utterance of noble thoughts aright, by the lip or the pen,—that is, so long as *fit* discourse, shall be esteemed a glory of our race, so long shall the art of Rhetoric, the art which teaches men how to discourse aright, be worthy of careful study, a part in the circle of discipline which is to give to man his most complete development.

In his introductory chapter Prof. Day affirms it to be "the object of the art of Rhetoric to develop and guide the *Faculty of Discourse*;" that is: "it proposes to explain the principles by which we discourse, or communicate thought and feeling to other minds, and to furnish the means of acquiring a skill and dexterity in the use of this power."—p. 1. Its limits and relations to other arts are then set forth; and then follows a concise but valuable and interesting chapter, exhibiting Rhetoric as a *developing and invigorating art*. This is followed by a view of Rhetoric in its relation to *Æsthetics*, or as "an æsthetic art." We regard the positions maintained in these chapters as highly important, and think that essential service is done by the clear exhibition of them. To distinguish between things often confounded, and to exhibit

clearly the true relation of things connected, is sometimes a difficult task. Thus we often find writers on Rhetoric confounding it with Grammar or Logic, or Taste and Criticism. Prof. D. has clearly distinguished it from all these, while showing its relation to them. We commend these chapters to the reader's attention.

After enumerating and distinguishing the different kinds of discourse, oratory being regarded as "the proper form of discourse, in its strictest and fullest import," and as constituting the immediate object of Rhetoric, the author proceeds to announce the two great divisions of the art of Rhetoric; viz.: *Invention* and *Style*. The first of these, *Invention*, is treated at great length; and this, as already intimated, constitutes one of the most striking and valuable features of the work. It is remarkable that in most of our treatises on Rhetoric, this has been almost entirely overlooked. And yet on reflection it must appear that it is a constituent and indispensable part of Rhetoric. Discourse is concerned not simply with language; but rather mainly with *thought which is expressed in language*. We cordially agree with Prof. D. in the remark, "that *Invention* must constitute the very life of an art of Rhetoric. It respects the soul and substance of discourse—the thought which is communicated. Quintilian justly says, '*invenire primum fuit estque præcipuum*.' It is in invention that the mind of the learner is most easily interested, most capable of sensible improvement. It is next to impossible to awaken a hearty interest in mere style, independent of the thought, as the futile attempts to teach the art of composition as a mere thing of verbal expression have proved. Composing, when thus taught, must necessarily be regarded as a drudgery, and be shunned instinctively with a strong aversion. It is otherwise when the thought is the main thing regarded. There is to every man a pure and elevated pleasure in inventing. There is a pleasure in expressing thoughts that have sprung into being from one's own creative intellect:—in embodying them in appropriate forms or language."—p. 33—34.

Invention has reference both to the supply, and the arrangement or disposition of the thought. "The ultimate end of all discourse partakes of a moral or ethical character; but the immediate objects through which this ethical end is reached may lie in the understanding, the feelings, or the will of the person addressed."—p. 42. This suggests the different objects of discourse, of which Prof. D. says: "The possible immediate objects of all proper discourse are but four in number—viz.: explanation, conviction, excitation, and persuasion."—Ib. And these four objects constitute the four parts under which the subject of *Invention* is fully treated. We are not sure that the forms of expression in its treatment are in every case the best that might be used; and we think that some important points are not made so prominent as they deserve to be made. We would, for instance, prefer to see the subject of *Unity* more distinctly and fully developed by itself—and think that the whole discussion is made rather more fragmentary than is desirable. Yet the essential elements are there, and are for the most part philosophically exhibited; that is, in their due relation to each other and to the whole. The discussion is masterly, instructive, valuable; full of suggestion to those who have allowed themselves to overlook this branch of rhetorical art; and highly interesting to those who have already learned to give it a proper degree of attention.

In treating of the second general division of his subject, Prof. D. presents us with a new analysis of *Style*, which commends itself to our attention. "The first generic distinction of the properties of *Style* is into the *absolute* and the *relative*." "The absolute properties of *Style* are founded on the nature and laws of language itself." "The relative properties are those which are determined by the state of the speaker's mind, or by that of the mind addressed."—p. 168.

Language is then defined to be "*the verbal body of thought*;" and this definition is appropriately defended by these remarks: "Language is not, as sometimes represented in loose expression, the mere *dress* of thought. It has

a vital connection with thought; and is far more truly and appropriately conceived of as the living organic body of thought, interpenetrated throughout with the vitality of the thought, as the natural body with the life of the spirit, having living connections between its parts, giving it unity, and making it a whole, than as a mere dress, having no relation to thought, and no organic dependence in its parts."—p. 170.

We are glad to see this view, so ably, although so concisely exhibited as it is in this work. In our opinion it is the true, and only view of Language, and the only proper basis for the study of Style. Style thus becomes something more than mere words. It is the expression of thought—and correctness, perfection of style, is something more than mere outward adornment, and overweening care for appearance. It is the perfect expression of thought. Then, too, such is the relation of the two, that style affects thought: that cultivation of perfection in the use of language, tends to cultivate the character of thinking. That is, the best style requires clearness, energy, and elegance in the thought.

The "absolute" properties of Style are now distributed into three classes, "as they respect more directly the nature of the material of language, or articulate sounds; the relation of that material to the content of language, or the relation of articulate sounds to thought; or the laws of thought itself. These several classes may be denominated the *oral*, the *suggestive*, and the *grammatical* properties of Style."—p. 173.

The oral properties are divided into *Euphony* and *Harmony*. And here Prof. D.'s elocutionary studies enable him to present some valuable suggestions and illustrations. The suggestive properties include the *imitative* and the *symbolical* properties of style. The grammatical properties respect the *forms of words*, their *connection*, or their *meaning*.—The relative properties are distributed into the *subjective* and the *objective* properties. The subjective properties, which are determined by the mental condition of the speaker, include *significance*, *continuousness*, and *naturalness*. The objective properties, "which are determined to discourse by a regard to the effect on the mind addressed," are *clearness*, *energy*, and *elegance*.

Appended to the work is a list of "Themes" for exercise in the several departments of which it treats. The whole work is divided into sections, the definitions and leading thoughts being printed in larger type than the explanatory remarks. This arrangement, while probably increasing its value as a text-book, makes it a less readable book. Indeed, it is a *text-book*—a book of "elements"—a book to be *studied* rather than *read*—a book for teachers as well as for learners. Such it was designed to be: and no one can study it without profit. And yet we think it might have been made somewhat more readable; and were we to find fault with it, it would be on this account,—that it does not deal enough in the practical application, but is rather philosophical and abstract throughout, excepting its illustrations: that it is made more fragmentary than was desirable, and so fails to take as firm hold; as a whole, on the mind, as it should take; and that sometimes some of the statements are not quite so concise and clear as we think they might be made. We should probably venture, on a few points, perhaps of minor importance, to differ from the author. We should prefer, in some cases, the more familiar mode of stating things, and a little greater expansion of some parts, or rather the fuller development of them; and we think that there might have been a little more of interest and vivacity given to the work.

We cannot fail to notice the excellence of Prof. Day's illustrations. He has succeeded in avoiding most of the stereotyped examples which have come down to us "from past generations;" and has given us some exquisite gems which have an intrinsic beauty, along with a relative value, as exemplifying his subject.

The object of this notice has not been to enter into a critical examination of Prof. Day's work, nor to make it the basis of an article on Rhetoric; but

simply by a glance at the leading topics of the book, and the order in which they appeared, to furnish some idea of the course which the author has pursued in the treatment of his subject, and the view which he takes of it. We desire to direct attention to the book as an important contribution to the study of Rhetoric, and the cause of sound education, and as such would commend it to the regard of those for whose use it has been prepared.

22. *THE HOME-ALTAR. An Appeal in behalf of Family Worship; with Prayers and Hymns for family use.* By CHARLES F. DEEMS. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1850.

This is a good book in its way—but valuable, mainly, we think, for its appeal in behalf of family worship. We do not ourselves place a very high value upon forms of prayer for family use—we would almost as soon think of introducing written forms into the closet—and if we must use them, there are enough of most excellent collections already before the public—to name only the “venerable prayer-book” of the Episcopal Church, and Mr. Barnes’ judicious and excellent work.

The source of this work is a little strange. Mr. Deems is a Methodist clergyman, and Editor of the *Southern Methodist Pulpit*! Would he have his brethren not only write their sermons, but use forms of prayer in their families? Spirit of liberty! where art thou fled?

23. *EDUCATION FOR THE MILLIONS; Physical, Intellectual, and Moral.* By S. W. GOLD, M.D. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1850.

The great subject of Education is treated of in a brief, popular, and judicious manner, in this little work. The author’s views are in the main correct, wise, and important; and every parent would do well to purchase and read the work.

24. *RAILWAY ECONOMY IN EUROPE AND AMERICA.* By Dr. LARDNER. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

This is a large 12mo volume, containing 442 closely-printed pages. It embodies an almost incredible amount of information on the subject of railways, most admirably arranged and presented for practical use. It discusses with great clearness and ability every conceivable question respecting the management, prospects, and relations, commercial, financial, and social, of railways—and furnishes an exposition of the practical results of all the important lines now in operation in the United Kingdom, on the Continent, and in our own country. Some idea of the extent and comprehensiveness of this work may be had from the fact that the Table of Contents covers twenty-one closely-printed pages. We should not have thought it possible that so much could be said on this subject—or that so much valuable information—such a thorough discussion of the whole railway system—such a world of facts and statistical matter, could be condensed into a single volume. Nor is it a wilderness of dry and uninteresting details. Any intelligent mind will be surprised, delighted, instructed, in poring over its pages. Dr. Lardner never did a better service than in preparing and giving this volume to the public. If our space permitted we should like to give some curious facts and results from it; but our readers will not believe us unless they read and judge for themselves.

25. *AMERICAN RAILWAY GUIDE, for the United States.* New York: C. Dinsmore. 1850.

We recommend this little book to all who mean to travel. It is full of reliable and needful information to such—a knowing and indispensable “guide.” It contains accurate tables of all the railway lines in the United States, giving

distances, fares, time of starting, etc.—also of steamboats and stages running in connection with railroads—together with a complete railway map.

26. *THE CONQUEST OF CANADA.* By ELIOT WARRBURTON. 2 vols. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

This appears to be a full, impartial, and well-authenticated history of Canada, from the period of its first settlement down to the time of the overthrow of the French dominion, and the establishment of England's supremacy, on the fall of Quebec in 1759. The author possesses no little literary merit and reputation: he has made himself master of his subject: his style is easy, free, graceful, and vigorous, and the entire execution is superior. It is unquestionably altogether the best history of Canada, under the French, that has ever been published. We hope the author will now give us Canada under the English rule.

27. *PICTORIAL FIELD-BOOK OF THE REVOLUTION; or, Illustrations, by pen and pencil, of the history, scenery, biography, relics, and traditions of the War for Independence.* By BENSON J. LOSSING. With six hundred engravings. To be completed in about twenty numbers. Parts I., II., III. Large 8vo, 48 pp. each. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

The above title is descriptive of the character and distinguishing features of this truly magnificent work. The numerous engravings are mostly from sketches drawn by the author on a recent visit to the localities described; they are strikingly illustrative of the scenery, events, and important characters embraced in the text; and they are executed in the highest style of the art. This is a most attractive and valuable feature of the work. It is history sketched by a gifted pencil.

It is also a *veritable history* of the War for Independence—not, indeed, in the form of a continuous and rigid narrative of the facts and events in the order of their occurrence—but a history of the Revolution gleaned chiefly from its *battle-fields*, in the order in which they were visited by the Author, beginning with that of Saratoga, interspersed with the personal adventures and sketches of a lively and poetic tourist. The scenery, the leading actors, and the relics and traditions, connected with these memorable localities, are grouped together with great artistic skill, and serve not only to rivet the attention, but shed additional light on the text of history itself. The plan of the work is not more unique and happily conceived, than it is tastefully and beautifully executed.

The *pen* sketches are not inferior to the delineations of the pencil, and blending together their mutually illustrative graces, they constitute a page of rare attractiveness and excellence. The narrative is free and easy; the style is pure and natural; the descriptions of scenery and the sketches of character are sober yet graphic; the author's feelings are all aglow with his theme; there is nothing to offend good taste or pure sentiment: while the entire mechanical execution of the work reflects the highest praise on the enterprise and taste of the Publishers. Altogether it is one of the most attractive works in the department of history that has ever fallen under our notice. If it maintains throughout, as we doubt not it will, this high artistic and literary character, it must become immensely popular.

28. *THE ILLUSTRATED DOMESTIC BIBLE.* By the Rev. INGRAM COBBIN. New York: Samuel Hueston.

This is a truly elegant illustrative and comprehensive edition of the Holy Scriptures. The work was published in London last year, and received the highest commendations from the best sources. Mr. Hueston proposes to publish it here from a duplicate set of stereotype plates, purchased from the London publisher, in twenty-five numbers, at twenty-five cents each. The speci-

men number before us is altogether superior to the London copy. The character and cheapness of the work must introduce it into extensive use.

Among the distinguishing features of the work we notice particularly the number and character of the pictorial illustrations—the extensive marginal references—the arrangement of the poetical books in metrical form—questions at the head of each chapter for family examination—and dates affixed to the chapters for each morning and evening's reading, comprising the whole Bible in a year. The Notes are brief, exegetical, critical, and practical—"containing the essence of the best commentators, with much original matter by the Editor;" and so far as we have examined, they seem to be sound, wise, and good. We know of no edition of the Bible so eminently adapted for general family use as this, and we confidently and heartily commend it as worthy of extensive patronage.

29. **INTRODUCTORY LESSONS ON CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES.** By ARCHBISHOP WHATELY. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1850.

This is a small work which has passed through many editions at home. It is specially adapted to children and youth, and is an admirable manual, on the important subject of which it treats, to introduce into Sabbath-schools, and our primary seminaries of learning, and, indeed, into all our common schools. Though published anonymously in England, it is understood to be from the practiced and very able pen of Whately.

30. **THE SHOULDER-KNOT; or, Sketches of the Three-Fold Life of Man.** A Story of the Seventeenth Century. By B. F. TERRY. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

The author of this pleasing volume, to whom worthily belong the titles of Rev. and D.D., is the able and accomplished Editor of "The Ladies' Repository," of Cincinnati—a periodical which, in point of literary merit and beauty of appearance, is not only an honor to the "Queen of the West," but is, in our judgment, decidedly superior to any other published in this country, adapted to the sphere of woman, and claiming her patronage. We rejoice in so good an opportunity to say this much; and also because the substance of this volume originally graced the pages of that Repository of chaste thought and truly accomplished and healthful literature, and was read by us in consecutive numbers with avidity and good impression.

The story is admirably conceived, and is developed with no little dramatic interest and effect. There is not a word, nor a sentiment in the whole, to which the most fastidious can object. It breathes no sickly sentimentalism, but a pure and high-toned moral and religious life; and it aims to vindicate true virtue and the Scripture doctrine of Divine retribution. Though founded on history—events in the life of the celebrated Louis the Thirteenth, and his brilliant and virtuous Queen, Anne of Austria—it is essentially a romance. If works of fiction must be read—and read they will be while fancy and genius live in man—we welcome those of the class before us. Our only objection to the work is the author's blending historic truth with the creations of his own exuberant fancy. The tendency of this we believe to be decidedly injurious. It helps to fritter away the boundary between historic truth and fiction. Walter Scott did incalculable mischief in this way. His brilliant creations have discolored, if not falsified, many pages of English history in the minds of untold numbers of his readers.

31. **HARPER'S NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE.** New York, June, 1850. Large 8vo, 144 pp. Terms, \$3 a year.

A new candidate for the public favor. Its appearance also is exceedingly attractive; while its ample pages are crowded with the choicest specimens of

the lighter sort of English literature; and it is offered at an astonishingly low price.

It differs materially in its scope and character from that sterling work which our friend BIDWELL has for several years so ably conducted—"THE ECLECTIC MAGAZINE"—and is adapted and designed for quite another class of readers. *That* gives us the cream of the foreign Quarterlies and Monthlies—John Bull's very best roast-beef, elegantly served, with just enough condiments to make it relish, and pastry to constitute a rich, complete, and healthful repast—"a feast of reason and a flow of soul," without poetic exaggeration. We have eaten constantly of this viand since it was first offered to the American public, and with a growing appetite for and relish of it, and a profounder appreciation of English mind—and we think we have thrived on the fare, and would heartily commend it to all dyspeptic and feeble souls, who are trying to live on the mere froth and scum of literature.

This "New Monthly," we must say, smacks a little of French cookery; or, rather, it is mainly made up of the staple of the better class of modern novels: the tales of Dickens, Bulwer, Croly, Lever, and Warren, are to figure conspicuously in it; though it purposes to glean from the whole range of English and American literature. It will cater to the tastes of the more refined, virtuous, and intellectual part of the novel-reading and light literature-loving community, and will unquestionably attain to a wide circulation, and exert no little influence on the intellectual and moral character and training of American mind. The Publishers possess every possible facility to make it just what they wish to make it; they will give it the very highest literary character which such a work can possess; and send it as on the wings of the wind to every city, town, and hamlet almost throughout the land. It will make sad havoc, we predict, among the lighter "Monthlies," and sweep by the board a large class of novel-books which are purchased extensively now for their cheapness, and in this we shall rejoice. It has a wide and open field; it meets, it cannot be denied, however much it may be regretted, a wide-spread and deep-seated demand. We could wish it were a little more elevated in its aims—more select in its range of topics—had less of the spice and more of the nourishing principle of literature in its pages—had more to do with reason and less with passion; still, it has many admirable qualities, and we wish it an honorable, vigorous, and useful life. There is no little responsibility connected with the creation and conduct of such a work, and we trust it will be felt in the right quarter, and will operate to make this periodical an ornament and a blessing.

33. THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES; according to the text of Augustus Hahn; with NOTES AND A LEXICON; for the use of Schools, Colleges, and Theological Seminaries. By JOHN J. OWEN, D.D., Professor of the Latin and Greek Languages and Literature in the Free Academy in New York City, accompanied by a finely engraved Map. New York: Leavitt & Co. 1850.

In introducing this work to the public, we cannot do better than to quote some passages from its well-written preface, in order to convey an idea of its design.

"The edition of the Acts of the Apostles is an exact reprint of Dr. Robinson's edition of Hahn's *Novum Testamentum Sacre*, published by Messrs. Leavitt & Co. in 1842, which is perhaps as accurate an edition as can now be found. The type is of that plain and beautiful kind called the Porsonian, which, at the special instance of the Editor, was imported by Mr. J. F. Trow, to be used in this and kindred works. The boldness and clearness of this letter, together with the pains taken to avoid a crowded page, it is hoped will prove highly satisfactory to such students as may use the book in class exercise.

"The Notes are intended to be confined mostly to grammatical exegesis, yet it will be seen that the elucidation of other points of obscurity has not been overlooked. As the same laws of construction, which govern other compositions, are to be applied to the interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures, conjectural solutions of difficulties have been discarded, and every thing examined and explained according to the most approved system of modern hermeneutics.

"The Lexicon is abridged from Dr. Robinson's Lexicon of the New Testament, which was kindly placed at the disposal of the Editor by its author, as a proof of his interest in a work undertaken mainly at his suggestion.

"The great object of the Editor, in preparing this volume, was to secure, if possible, the introduction of a portion of the Greek Testament, into the prescribed and regular course of classical study in our Academies and Colleges."

We have only to add that the design, thus clearly expressed, is satisfactorily and admirably carried out. The work is another instance of that sound, accurate, and modest scholarship for which Prof. Owen is justly distinguished. The Notes are full, occupying nearly half of the volume, and will be of essential service to students of theology, and to all who would study the New Testament critically. Indeed, we regard the work as no less than a valuable critical commentary on one of the most important portions of the New Testament.

H. F. T.

SHORT NOTES.

We have space only to announce a few of the Essays, Sermons, and Foreign Quarterlies, which lie upon our table.

The recent numbers of the "*Eclectic Review*," and "*British Quarterly*," London, and "*North British Review*," Edinburgh, contain some articles of unusual interest. The May No. of the North British has an able and highly satisfactory article on Calvin, speaking in high praise of Henry's Life of the Reformer, and taking the same condemnatory view of Dyer's recent work which we expressed in our last No., and a thorough review of which we shall give in our next.—We are glad to see Dr. Price again at the helm of the *Eclectic*.—The *Chinese Repository*, Canton, edited by our countryman, S. W. Williams, LL.D., is always welcome; we wonder its merits are not better known in our literary and commercial circles.—An *Essay on the Opium Trade*, by Dr. Allen, of Lowell, Ms., ably sketching its history, extent, and effects on India and China.—*A Plea for Children and the Christian Sabbath*; two Discourses, by Dr. Cheever, full of wise suggestions and important timely truths.—*The Baptismal Controversy*, by Rev. R. Montgomery, England. We are sorry to find the able author of the "Gospel in Advance of the Age," advocating baptismal regeneration, and, so far at least as doctrine is involved, siding with the Bishop of Exeter party in the great controversy now agitating the English Church. We had hoped better things of him.—*False Grounds of Security against Crime*, by Rev. C. H. A. Bulkley, Mount Morris, N. Y. The doctrine of this sermon is Scriptural—it is ably reasoned and enforced, and leaves a strong impression on the mind.—*The Choral Advocate*, New York, a new Monthly, devoted to sacred music, edited by D. E. Jones; corresponding Editors, Lowell Mason, and G. J. Webb. The "*Advocate*" piously aims to improve our church music, and by means which commend the work to all who desire this part of Divine worship performed to "edification," as well as "scientifically." Its views, we think, are sound, wise, and important. We wish every pastor would examine its claims. It is free to pastors who will take an interest in the matter.—We announce as in press a work from the gifted pen of Dr. Spencer, entitled "*A Pastor's Sketches*," and we know it to be a work of rare interest, and graphic power of thought and description. His many admirers will welcome it.

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ARTICLE I.

THE HEBREW THEOCRACY.

By Rev. E. C. WINNA, New York.

Jehovah was the civil head of the Hebrew State. The law-making power and the original sovereignty of the state resided in him. This fact distinguishes the polity of the Hebrew Commonwealth from all other governments ever known among men. It is on this account, that Josephus, and others after him, have called it a THEOCRACY. Theocracy signifies a divine government. The term is a just description of the Mosaic Constitution in several important respects. Yet there is danger of being misled by it, and thence of falling into error respecting the true nature and powers of the Hebrew government. There was undoubtedly a strong infusion of the theocratic element into this Constitution. Nevertheless, it was but an element of the government; and not the whole of the government. In other words, the Hebrew government was not a pure Theocracy. It was a Theocracy; but a Theocracy in a restricted sense. Every student of the Hebrew history knows, that the Hebrew people, like other nations, had their civil rulers, men who exercised authority over other men, and were acknowledged and obeyed as lawful magistrates.

What, then, was the proper province of the Theocracy? what its leading objects? In our apprehension, these objects, without excluding others, are chiefly two. One was to teach mankind the true science of civil government. And how well does it correspond with the goodness of God in other respects, that he should make a special revelation on this subject! We hold it to have been an important part of the legislation of the Most High, as the lawgiver, judge, and ruler of Israel, to show how civil au-

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thority should be created, and how it should be administered so as best to promote the welfare and happiness of a nation ; and also how the relations between rulers and ruled should be adjusted and regulated. But another, and, we are persuaded, the leading object of the theocratic feature of the Hebrew government, was the overthrow and extirpation of idolatry. The design was, to make idolatry a crime against the State, so that it might be punishable by the civil law without a violation of civil liberty. There can be no doubt, that a fundamental purpose of the Mosaic polity was the abolition of idolatrous worship, and the substitution in its place and maintenance of true religion in the world. And the only agency adequate to the production of this result, so far as human wisdom can see, was this very institution of the Jewish Theocracy. We propose, in the present article, to examine the theocratic element of the Hebrew polity in this relation.

In Ex. 19 : 4-6, we find this remarkable and important record. God there addresses the Israelites thus : " Ye have seen what I did unto the Egyptians, and how I bare you on eagles' wings, and brought you unto myself. Now, therefore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people : for all the earth is mine : and ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation "

The nature of this covenant is still more clearly disclosed, in a further account of it, contained in Deut. 29 : 10-18. " Ye stand this day all of you before Jehovah your God ; your captains of your tribes, your elders, and your officers, with all the men of Israel, * * * that thou shouldest enter into covenant with Jehovah thy God, and into his oath that he maketh with thee this day : that he may establish thee to-day for a people unto himself, and that he may be unto thee a God, as he hath said unto thee, and as he hath sworn unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob. Neither with you only do I make this covenant and this oath ; but with him that standeth here with us this day before Jehovah our God, and also with him that is not here with us this day : (for ye know how we have dwelt in the land of Egypt ; and how we came through the nations that ye passed by ; and ye have seen their abominations, and their idols, wood and stone, silver and gold, which were among them :) lest there should be among you man, or woman, or family, or tribe, whose heart turneth away this day from Jehovah our God, to go and serve the gods of these nations ; lest there should be among you a root that beareth gall and wormwood."

Here we have what Lowman calls the original contract of the Hebrew government. Two principles constitute the very life and substance of it—viz. the maintenance of the worship of one God

in opposition to the prevailing polytheism of the times, and, as conducive to that main end, the separation of the Israelites from other nations, so as to prevent the formation of dangerous and corrupting alliances.

Without stopping to inquire critically into the meaning of each several expression here employed by Moses, the general sense of the transaction is plainly to this purport:—If the Hebrews would voluntarily receive Jehovah for their King, and honor and worship him as the one true God, in opposition to all idolatry, then, though God, as sovereign of the world, rules over all the nations of the earth, he would govern the Hebrew nation by laws of his own framing, and would bless it with a more particular and immediate protection.

This view is confirmed by the testimony of St. Paul, if Bishop Warburton has correctly interpreted a passage in his Letter to the Galatians. Speaking of the law of Moses, the apostle says, "It was added because of transgressions." It was added. To what was it added? To the patriarchal religion of the unity, says the learned prelate. To what end? Because of transgressions; that is, according to the same authority, the transgressions of polytheism and idolatry; into which the rest of mankind were already absorbed, and the Jews themselves were hastening apace.

To this agrees the opinion of Maimonides, the most learned and judicious of the Hebrew doctors. He assigns this general reason for many of their laws, that they were made to keep men from idolatry, and from such false opinions as are akin to idolatry,—incantations, divinations, soothsaying, and the like.

Idolatry had now reached its most gigantic height, and spread its broad and deadly shadow over the earth. To preserve the doctrine of the unity, in the midst of a polytheistic world, was the fundamental design of the Mosaic polity. To this all other purposes, however important in themselves, or useful in their general action, were both subordinate and subservient. If this were a design worthy the wisdom and goodness of God, none of the means adapted to promote it, *can* be beneath his contrivance, or in the least degree derogate from the dignity and perfection of his nature.

This single observation sweeps away at once the foundation of most of the silly ridicule with which infidels have amused themselves, in their disquisitions on these venerable institutes. Statutes, which, at first sight, and considered apart from their true relations and intentions, seem frivolous, and unworthy the wisdom and majesty of God, assume quite a different air, and appear in a light altogether new, when viewed as necessary provisions against the danger of idolatry.

Let us illustrate this position with a few examples. In the

19th chapter of Leviticus, we find this law : " Ye shall not round the corners of your heads, neither shalt thou mar the corners of thy beard." This prohibition has called forth many a sneer from men, who, without any remarkable claim to such a distinction, arrogate to themselves the exclusive title of *free-thinkers*. But to those who really think with freedom and candor, it will appear a direction not only proper, but important, when it is known, that it was aimed against a magical custom, which, as Herodotus, and other ancient authors, inform us, prevailed among certain sects of idolatrous priests. These ministers of a false religion, made this mode of cutting the hair and beard essential to the acceptable worship of their gods, and efficacious in procuring the several blessings prayed for by the worshippers.

In the 23d chapter of Exodus, the following statute occurs : " Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother's milk." While this law inculcated, incidentally, a lesson of humanity, it was directed chiefly against an ancient practice of idolatry, which the Israelites had probably seen in Egypt. Cudworth proves from an old Karaite manuscript, that it was a custom of the ancient heathens, when they had gathered in all their fruits, to take a kid and boil it in the dam's milk, and then, in a magical way, to go about and besprinkle with it all their trees, fields, gardens, and orchards, thinking thereby to make them more abundantly fruitful. The learned Spencer, in his great work, "*De Legibus Hebræum*," has shown, that the same idolatrous custom prevailed among the ancient Zabii.

Not to detain the reader with similar remarks on the law against wearing garments made of a mixture of linen and woolen, and against men wearing the apparel of women, and women that of men, with other regulations, apparently equally trifling, yet whose wisdom and necessity, under the circumstances, may be fully established from the writings of Herodotus, Macrobius, Maimonides, and others ; let us bestow a moment's attention on that part of the Jewish polity, which concerns clean and unclean meats, and which has ever been most open to the ridicule of unbelievers. The law upon this point descends to so low and minute a detail, that men, ignorant of its true nature and end, have, on its apparent unfitness to engage the concern of God, hastily concluded against its divine original. But if they would but take the trouble to reflect, that the purpose of separating one people from the contagion of universal idolatry, was a design not unworthy the Governor of the Universe, they would see the brightest marks of divine wisdom, in an institution, which took away from that people the very grounds of all commerce, whether of trade or friendship with foreign nations. Doubtless the design of this institution, as of most others in the Mosaic system, was

manifold ; and, among other ends to be answered by it, a not unimportant one, was to furnish the chosen tribes a code of wholesome dietetics. That considerations of this nature entered into the legislator's mind, was the unanimous opinion of the ancient Jews ; and Maimonides labors, with especial zeal, to prove its correctness. There can be no question, at any rate, that we are thus to account for the prohibition of swine's flesh,—a kind of food wonderfully fitted to favor the spread of cutaneous diseases, and to aggravate that most shocking malady, the leprosy, which was endemic in the East, and which so terribly prevailed among the ancient inhabitants of Palestine. It is equally undoubted, that purposes of a moral and typical nature entered into the general design of the law. But these and such like considerations are far from exhausting the full scope and intention of it. Its prominent design was to raise an impassable wall of separation between the Israelites and their idolatrous neighbors, and thereby to prevent the dangerous infection of their example in religion and manners. This opinion does not rest on mere conjecture ; nor even on the basis of legitimate inference from admitted premises. The leading intention of the law is plainly set forth in the 11th chapter of Leviticus : " Ye shall not walk in the manners of the nations which I cast out before you ; ye shall THEREFORE"—that is, to the intent that ye may not thus walk—" put difference between clean beasts and unclean, and between unclean fowls and clean : and ye shall be holy unto me."

The wisdom of this provision, considering the end in view, is most admirable. " Intimate friendships," observes a sagacious writer, " are in most cases formed at table ; and with the man with whom I can neither eat nor drink, let our intercourse in business, be what it may, I shall seldom become as familiar, as with him whose guest I am, and he mine. If we have, besides, from education, an abhorrence of the food which each other eats, this forms a new obstacle to closer intimacy. Nothing more effectual could possibly be devised to keep one people distinct from another. It causes the difference between them to be ever present to the mind, touching, as it does, on so many points of every day contact. It is, therefore, far more efficient in its results, as a rule of distinction than any difference in doctrine, worship, or morals, than men could entertain. It is a mutual repulsion, continually operating ; and its effect may be estimated, from the fact, that no nation in which a distinction of meats was rigidly enforced as part of a religious system, has ever changed its religion."

It is peculiar to the legislative policy of Moses to aim at the accomplishment of several ends by the same law ; and sometimes

the incidental design was even the most important. This is unquestionably the case with respect to the statute which fixes the method whereby a slave, who refused his liberty after six years service, bound himself to perpetual servitude. In testimony thereof, he was to have his ear bored through in the presence of the magistrate, according to certain prescribed formalities. Now, this particular ceremony, which answered the ostensible end of the law as well as any other would have done, was itself chiefly levelled against idolatry. Moses wished to bring the custom of boring the ears into disgrace; and how could that object be more effectually accomplished, than by making it the mark and memento of perpetual bondage? It would thus become an indelible stigma, which no freeman would willingly carry about with him.

But why should Moses be anxious about a practice, as we should esteem it, so harmless and unmeaning? Because superstition was deeply concerned in it. The Israelites, Midianites, Ishmaelites, and other Eastern nations, were extravagantly fond of golden ornaments, and especially golden ear-rings. But they were not worn merely as *ornaments*. In the Chaldee language, they were called by a word which signifies "holy things." They were often consecrated to some deity, and were then worn as amulets to keep off disease, and also to prevent the sounds of enchantment from entering the ear and proving hurtful. For such purposes as these, they were constantly worn by parents themselves, and hung in the ears of their children.

We find a very remarkable law in Leviticus 17: 1-7. It forbids, even on pain of death, the killing of any animal for food, during the abode of the Israelites in the wilderness, unless it was at the same time brought to the altar, and offered to the Lord. This certainly appears, at first blush, not only harsh and rigorous, but even unjust and tyrannical. But it was aimed against idolatry, which was treason in the Hebrew State, and therefore justly punishable with death. The statute is thus translated by Michaelis:—"Whoever, among the Israelites, killeth an ox, sheep, or goat, either within or without the camp, and bringeth it not before the Convention-tent, to him it shall be accounted blood-guiltiness; he hath shed blood, and shall be rooted out from among his people; and this, in order that the children of Israel may bring to the door of the Convention-tent, their offerings, which they have hitherto made in the field, and give them unto the priest, to be slain as feast-offerings in honor of Jehovah; that his priest may sprinkle the blood on the altar of Jehovah, and burn the fat as an offering-perfume in honor of him; and that no man may any more make offerings to Satyrs, running after them with idolatrous lust." "The reason and design of this law," observes the same writer, "we have no need to con-

jecture ; for Moses himself expressly mentions it. Considering the propensity to idolatry, which the people brought with them from Egypt, it was necessary to take care lest, when any one killed such animals as were usual for sacrifices, he should be guilty of superstitiously offering them to an idol. This precaution was the more reasonable, because, in ancient times, it was so very common to make an offering of the flesh it was intended to eat. And hence arose a suspicion, not very unreasonable, that whoever killed animals, usually devoted to the altar, offered them of course ; and, therefore, Moses enjoined them not to kill such animals otherwise than in public, and to offer them all to the true God ; that so it might be out of their power to make them offerings to idols, by slaughtering them privately, and under the pretence of using them for food." This law was expressly repealed on the entrance of the nation into the promised land, when the enforcement of it would have become a hardship and a tyranny.

It is perfectly evident from the history of the Israelites, that their entire isolation from other nations was the only means, save a miraculous control of their understanding and will, of abolishing idolatry among them. The stupid superstition of polytheism was then the common sentiment and the common practice of the world ; and the Jews often appear, as Michaelis has said, to have had their heads turned, and to have been driven, as if by a sort of phrenzy, to the belief and worship of many gods. Yet this circumstance, strange as it now appears, when duly considered, forms no just ground even of wonder, much less of any supercilious self-complacency on our part. Opinions are extremely infectious, as we ourselves have but too many proofs in the thousand isms and extravaganzas of the times. Let us not flatter ourselves that, had we lived then, we should have been superior to the power of the most absurd and besotted follies. Even Solomon, a learned man and a philosopher, and once the favorite of heaven, incredible as it appears, actually built idol temples, and sacrificed to strange gods.

The idolatry of the ancient Israelites had, moreover, this material circumstance of mitigation. They never, at the very height of their polytheistic madness, formally renounced the worship of Jehovah. The follies of idolatry are endless ; and among them, the belief in gentilitical and local gods,—“ the one ambulatory, the other stationed ” as Warburton quaintly expresses it,—was a leading principle : this led to an inter-community of worship, so that the adoption and worship of a new deity, was by no means looked upon as a necessary renunciation of those worshipped before. Thus it is recorded of the mixed rabble of idolaters, with whom the king of Assyria, after the conquest and re-

moval of the ten tribes, had peopled Samaria, that "they feared Jehovah, and served their own gods," as not dreaming that the two things were inconsistent with each other. So also Sophocles makes Antigone say to her father, that a stranger should both venerate and abhor those things that are venerated and abhorred in the city where he resides; and Celsus gives us a reason for so much complaisance, that the several parts of the world were from the beginning parcelled out to several powers, each of whom had his own peculiar allotment and residence. It was the same idea that led Plato to adopt and advocate the maxim, that nothing ought ever to be changed in the religion we find established.

In accordance with this principle, the Israelites combined the worship of idols with the worship of the true God; who, in amazing condescension to their prejudices, assumed the title of a tutelary local god, and chose Judea for his peculiar regency. Thus when the people "made a calf in Horeb," it was evidently designed only as a representative of the God who had wrought deliverance for them; for Aaron proclaimed a feast to Jehovah—not to Isis, or Osiris. So Jeroboam, when he set up the golden calves at Dan and Bethel, does not give the slightest intimation of a formal intention to renounce the service of Jehovah; and Jehu, one of his successors, while he still persisted in the sin of Jeroboam, the son of Nebat, that is, in the worship of the calves, actually boasts of being a zealot for Jehovah. Instances of a like nature are thickly scattered throughout the whole of the Old Testament Scriptures; and they prove conclusively, that the defection of Israel "did not consist in rejecting Jehovah as a false god, or in renouncing the law of Moses as a false religion; but in joining foreign worship and idolatrous ceremonies to the ritual of the true God. To this they were stimulated, as by various other motives, so especially by the luxurious and immoral rites of paganism."

These observations naturally lead us to the inquiry, whether the suppression and prevention of idolatry, was a design worthy to engage the care of the Divine Mind; in other words, whether idolatry was a matter of mere harmless speculation, or a fountain of dangerous immoralities, and a bitter and prolific source of evils to the human race, whenever and wherever it has prevailed?

The religious sentiment has ever been paramount, either for good or for evil, in its action both upon societies and individuals. "Wherewith shall I come before Jehovah, and bow myself before the most high God; shall I come before him with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil; shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin

of my soul"?—is the piercing and anxious cry, which our universal nature has sent up to heaven, in all ages of the world. Let the thirty thousand gods of the Greek and Roman mythologies, the costly temples reared for their worship, and the countless hecatombs that smoked upon their altars; let the monstrous follies of the Egyptian theology; let the long and painful pilgrimages of whole armies of devotees to the shrine of their idolatry, and their innumerable and cruel self-tortures, inflicted in the vain hope of thereby securing the divine favor; above all, let the rivers of human blood, shed to glut the rapacity of some sanguinary deity, which have stained the soil of every nation under heaven—attest the truth of this observation.

"Religion," says Coleridge, "true or false, is, and ever has been the centre of gravity in a realm, to which all other things must and will accommodate themselves." The sense which mankind have ever entertained of the power of the religious sentiment in modifying and moulding human character, plainly appears in the pains taken by the ancient lawgivers to impress upon those for whom they legislated, an idea of their inspiration by some deity. Minos, lawgiver of the Cretans, often retired to a cave, where he boasted of having familiar conversations with Jupiter. Mneves and Amasis, renowned legislators of Egypt, attributed their laws to Mercury. Lycurgus claimed the sanction of Apollo for his reformation of the Spartan government. Pythagoras and Zaleucus, who made laws for the Crotoniates and the Locrians, ascribed their institutions to Minerva. Zathraustes, lawgiver of the Arimaspians, gave out that he had his ordinances from a goddess adored by that people. Zoroaster and Zamolxis boasted to the Bactrians and the Getæ their intimate communications with the goddess Vesta. And Numa amused the Romans with his conversations with the nymph Egeria.

These facts invincibly demonstrate a universal persuasion of the controlling energy of the religious principle over men's minds and practices. It cannot, indeed, be otherwise than that the ideas which men entertain of the God they worship, should constitute a capital element in the formation of their moral character. "Like gods, like worshippers." It is vain to expect, that the virtue of the devotee will exceed the virtue of the divinity. The worshippers of an insatiate Baal, a bloody Mars, a thievish Mercury, an incestuous Jupiter, and a voluptuous Venus, could hardly help being sanguinary, dishonest, and licentious.

"Gods partial, changeful, passionate, unjust,
Whose attributes were rage, revenge, and lust,"

could never become the authors of the opposite virtues in those by whom they were adored. Whatever sanctions they might annex

to their laws, their example would always prove more powerful than their terrors.

Plato excluded poets from his republic, dismissing even Homer with a garland on his head, and with ointment poured upon him. His object in this otherwise unaccountable rigor was, that they might not corrupt the right notions of God with their fables. And if we consider the absurdity, as well as the immorality, of their fictions, we shall hardly be disposed to blame him. They distinguished the gods in their places and ways of living, in the same manner as they would different sorts of animals. Some they placed under the earth; some in the sea; some in woods and rivers; and the most ancient of them all they bound in hell. Some are set to trades; one is a smith; another is a weaver; one is a warrior, and fights with men; others are harpers; and others still, delight in archery and the chase. The father of the gods himself is fast bound by the fates, so that he cannot, contrary to their decrees, save his own offspring. Not seldom does he resort to policy and craft, nay to the basest disguises and hypocrisies, to accomplish his purposes. Fear, madness, fraud, and the vilest passions, were invested with divinity; and whole cities offered sacrifices to them. Unbounded lusts and disgraceful amours were ascribed by the poets to almost all the gods. There was scarcely a member of the Olympian senate who would now be admitted into decent society among mortals! No wonder that Plato shut out from his commonwealth a class of writers, whose extravagant and teeming fancy he regarded as the source of these monstrosities.

It was a common and a most pernicious principle of the reigning polytheism, that the supreme God, after he had made the world, retreating, as it were, wholly into himself, had committed the government of it to subordinate deities. Thus the temporal blessings of health, long life, fruitful seasons, plenty, safety, victory over enemies, and such like advantages, were to be expected and sought from these demons, or idols. And these were to be obtained, as well as the opposite evils averted, not by the practice of virtue, goodness, beneficence and holiness, but by the use of some magical ceremonies, gestures, and words, or else by certain senseless and barbarous rites of worship.

That this was a fundamental doctrine of idolatry, we have the most undoubted proofs, both from sacred and profane writers. King Ahaz, in 2d Chronicles, says, "Because the gods of the Syrians give them victory, therefore to them will I sacrifice." Thus, also, the Jews are represented by the prophet Hosea, in his time, as saying, "I will go after my lovers (the false gods) that give me my bread and my water, my wool and my flax, my wine and my oil." And to a reproof from Jeremiah for their idolatry,

they replied in substance, that as long as they worshipped the queen of heaven all had gone well with them ; and her, therefore, they would worship, and to her sacrifice, in spite of his admonitions. To the same purport is the declaration of Plato. In his work *De Amina Mundi*, speaking of the punishment of wicked men, he says expressly, "All these things hath Nemesis decreed to be executed in the second period by the ministry of vindictive terrestrial demons, who are overseers of human affairs ; to which demons the Supreme God hath committed the government of this world."

Thus men came to think that they were not to expect the blessings of life from the favor of the one true God, by imitating his purity and goodness ; but from a Jupiter, stained with crimes that would doom a mortal to the gibbet or the penitentiary ; from a Mercury, a thief the patron of thieves ; from a Bacchus, the god of drunkenness ; from a Mars, the instigator of war and bloodshed ; or from a Venus, the patroness of all manner of voluptuousness and debauchery. Hence they became, almost necessarily, as corrupt in practice as they were grovelling in their opinions. The principles of moral goodness were well nigh extinguished in the human heart, and the practice of the moral virtues had almost disappeared from the earth. And intemperance, ferocity, lust, fraud, and violence, might have brought a second deluge upon the race, had not the truth of God stood pledged against the repetition of so dire a calamity.

But the ancient mythologists represented their deities under a still more malign and repulsive light. The learned Meiners, in his "*History of Opinions concerning the True God*," says, that the more ancient Greeks imagined their gods to be *envious* of human felicity ; so that when any extraordinary success attended them, they were filled with terror lest the gods should bring upon them some dreadful evil. Herodotus attributes to Solon, in his interview with Cræsus, the formal declaration, "the gods envy the happiness of men." This he repeats and confirms in the instances of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, and Xerxes, king of Persia. Amasis, the Egyptian monarch, grounds the withdrawal of his friendship from the former on the notoriously *envious* nature of the Divine Being. The sage Artabanus warns the latter, that even the blessings which the gods bestow are derived from an *envious* nature. And the illustrious Fabius remonstrated with the Roman people against an election to the consulship, in his old age, saying, among other reasons, that some divinity might think his past successes too great for mortal, and turn the tide of fortune against him. Agreeably to this doctrine, we find even the reflecting Tacitus expressing the opinion, that the gods inter-

fere in human affairs but to punish,—“non esse curæ deis securitatem nostram, esse ultionem.”

As a necessary consequence, almost the entire of the religion of the ancient pagan world consisted in rites of deprecation. Fear was the leading feature of their religious impressions. Hence arose that most horrid of all religious ceremonies,—the rite of human sacrifice. Of this savage custom, De Pauw, in his “*Philosophical Researches*,” asserts and proves that there is no nation mentioned in history whom we cannot reproach with having made the blood of its citizens stream forth in pious ceremonies, to appease the divinity when he was angry, or to move him when he appeared indolent.

“Conformably with this character of their gods,” says the learned Archbishop Magee, “we find the worship of many of the heathen nations to consist in suffering and mortification, in cutting their flesh with knives, and scorching their limbs with fire. The cruel austerities of the Gymnosophists, both of Africa and India; the dreadful sufferings of the initiated votaries of Mithia and Eleusis; the frantic and savage rites of Bellona, and the horrid self-mutilations of the worshippers of Cybele, but too clearly evince the dreadful views entertained by the ancient heathens of the nature of their gods.”

Such was the idolatry of Gentile antiquity, and such continues to be the religion of idolaters, even to our own times. The same dreadful rite of human sacrifice has been found to exist, at the present day, in Africa, in the South Sea Islands, in Aboriginal America, and in modern India. The annual sacrifice of the Mexicans required many ten thousands of victims; and in Peru two hundred children were yearly devoted for the health of the Inca.

Undoubtedly, then, it became the wisdom, the justice, and the goodness of the one true God to check these spreading and direful evils; to bring men back from their polytheistic follies to the belief and worship of himself; and to let them know that he had not parted with the administration of Providence, nor given over the disposal of temporal blessings to any subordinate beings whatsoever; so that health, plenty, and all kinds of prosperity were to be sought from him alone, and expected as the sole gift of his sovereign bounty. And here we may take notice, by the way, of an observation of Spencer, that it was for very wise reasons that temporal blessings and evils were made so much use of in the Mosaic Constitution. They were the common and prevailing enticements to idolatry. But by being taken into the Hebrew Constitution as rewards to obedience and punishments of disobedience, they became motives to true religion, instead of encouragements to polytheism. In

fact, without the least irreverence it may be said that a sort of necessity was laid upon the true God to proceed in this manner. How could he effectually check the propensity to idolatry; how could he show that he had not delegated to demons the government of the world; how could he vindicate his own incommunicable sovereignty and omnipotence, but by doing in reality what the false gods pretended to do? Upon the same principle it was, we think, that prophecy, in the more restricted sense of the term, was so much employed throughout most of the time during which the Hebrew Commonwealth existed as an independent government. The ability to foretell future events was claimed by almost all the ministers of the ancient idolatrous worship; and the people put confidence in their pretensions, and consulted them upon all occasions. To meet and overcome the power of superstition in that direction, it was indispensable that the true God should show that the past, the present, and the future were all one to him, and that predictions, uttered under his inspiration, would infallibly be fulfilled.

But the pestilent virus of idolatry was too wide-spread, and too deeply-seated, to be eradicated by such agencies as these. The question arises, then, what just and rational means were adequate to the suppression of it? Opinions are not to be bound up by legal enactments; and to enforce mere theological dogmas by the arm of the civil law, would be a gross breach of one of the first principles of civil liberty. It would be strange, indeed, if a code, to which the world is indebted for most of the true principles of constitutional freedom, violated that freedom in a fundamental article of it. And in truth, however certain prejudiced writers may have represented the matter, the Constitution of Moses is chargeable with no such inconsistency.

How, then, was Moses able to suppress idolatry without infringing the principle here announced? By the introduction of the theocratic element into his inspired legislation. "One God only shalt thou serve," was the first great principle of the Hebrew polity: To the end that this fundamental truth of religion might become a vital element of Hebrew thought, faith, and manners, the one true God became also the covenanted king, the civil head of the Hebrew State. Viewed as to a main design of it, then, the theocracy was a divine institution, employed the more effectually to suppress idolatry, without a violation of that precious principle of civil liberty, that mere opinions, whether theological, ethical, or political, were not to be cramped and restrained by the pains and penalties of the civil law.

"The records of the Hebrew Polity," observes Coleridge, with a just discrimination, "are rendered far less instructive as lessons of political wisdom by the disposition to regard the Jehovah in

that universal and spiritual acception, in which we use the word as Christians; for relatively to the Jewish polity, the Jehovah was their covenanted king."

God condescended to assume the title and relation to the Hebrew people of chief civil ruler. The manner in which the compact, giving reality to this relationship, was formed, deserves particular notice. It is detailed in the 19th chap. of Exodus. Moses, acting under a divine commission, proposed to the nation the question, whether they would receive Jehovah for their king, and submit to his laws? The suffrage of the people appears to have been entirely free in this matter. By their own voluntary consent, Moses made God their king. Thus idolatry, and every thing leading to idolatry, or growing out of it, became a crime against the state,—became, in fact, "*crimen læsæ majestatis*," high treason, or rebellion. As such, it was justly punishable with death,—all governments agreeing in this, that treason is the highest of civil crimes. The punishment of idolatry by law had, then, plainly, this capital quality of justice, that it was punishing the act of those who had chosen the government under which they lived, when freely proposed to them. Their own unbiassed suffrages had made it a civil offence. Hence idolatry is called by the Hebrew writers, "*the transgression of the covenant*." It was a breach of the fundamental compact between the Hebrew people and their chosen king.

It is, moreover, a material consideration, and one which throws light on the subject of the Theocracy, that Moses nowhere deduces God's right to give laws to the Israelitish nation from his being the one only God, but from his having, by miraculous interpositions and works of power, laid the foundation of their state.

In confirmation of this position, the reader's attention is invited to a remarkable passage in the 6th chap. of Deut. :—"When thy son asketh thee, whence come all the statutes and laws which Jehovah thy God giveth thee? thou shalt say to him, we were in Egypt slaves to the king; but Jehovah, with a strong hand, brought us out of Egypt, and did before our eyes great miracles; whereby he punished the Egyptians, and Pharaoh, and his house; and he brought us out to give us the land which he had by an oath promised to our fathers: Therefore has he commanded us to keep all these laws." Here the right of legislating for the Hebrew nation is, in express terms, grounded on the favors God had bestowed upon it, and not upon his absolute sovereignty, as creator and universal king.

To the same effect is the following from Ex. 20 :—"I am Jehovah thy God, which have brought thee out of Egyptian bondage; thou shalt have no other gods before me." It would have been quite consonant with sound theology to say: "I, Jehovah,

am God above ; thou shalt have no gods but me." This fundamental article of religion is taught, with emphatic distinctness, in many parts of the Mosaic writings. But the opinions of the Israelites were not to be fettered by legal enactments ; and yet idolatry must be prohibited on pain of civil punishment. God, therefore, as Michaelis has observed, addressed a people strangely, prone to polytheism, to this effect :—" Lest ye should absurdly suppose that there are many gods who can hear your prayers and recompense your offerings. know that I alone have delivered you from Egyptian tyranny ; have made you a people ; and am the author and founder of your state : THEREFORE let no gods but me be worshipped among you."

Considering the monstrous doctrines, tendencies, pollutions, and cruelties of idolatry ; considering the true nature and ground of God's claim to be the lawgiver and king of the Hebrew people ; and considering that the government was a voluntary compact between the sovereign and the subjects, —taking, we say, all these circumstances into the account, and giving them their just weight, —to have imposed the penalty of death upon the worship of false gods can hardly appear, even to the jaundiced eye of prejudice and irreligion, in the light of inquisitorial tyranny.

It is an interesting inquiry connected with the general subject of the Hebrew Theocracy, in what manner, and through what agencies, this element in the government made itself practically felt ? The general answer to this question is : " It was by means of the Oracle of Jehovah." With a view of shedding, if possible, some light on this obscure but interesting point, we propose to inquire briefly into the nature and functions of the Hebrew oracle, to institute a comparison between it and the oracles of pagan antiquity, and to vindicate the wisdom and benevolence of such an institution against the sneers and sophistries of infidelity, by showing its admirable adaptation to the infant state of the world and the church.

The Oracle played a conspicuous and most important part in the establishment and administration of the Jewish Theocracy. That incomparable summary of the Mosaic code, and of all moral duty—the Decalogue—was uttered amid terrific thunderings and lightnings from the mysterious symbol of the divinity, in an articulate voice, which reached every ear, and penetrated every heart, and awed every understanding of the mighty multitude that crowded around the base of Mount Sinai. So also all the rest of the political, civil, moral, and religious laws of the Hebrews were dictated by the Oracle, though they were afterward, as observed by Dr. Spring in his " Discourses on the Obligations of the World to the Bible," passed upon and adopted by the legal assemblies of the nation. The Oracle, in the form of the cloudy pillar, regulated

the motions of the Israelitish armies: "For when the cloud was taken up from the tabernacle, the children of Israel journeyed; and when the cloud rested, there the children of Israel pitched their tents; at the command of Jehovah they journeyed, at the command of Jehovah they pitched." How far the Oracle directed the military affairs of the Hebrews, plainly appears in the history of the Canaanitish wars, and particularly in the story of the siege and capture of Jericho. In the earlier periods of the Commonwealth, the Oracle was constantly appealed to on questions of civil and ecclesiastical law, in settling principles of state policy, and generally in affairs of moment, appertaining to the public administration. In the time of Moses," observes Michaelis, "the Oracle was unquestionably very conspicuous. God himself gave laws to the Israelites; decided difficult points of justice; was constantly visible in the pillar of cloud and fire; and inflicted punishments, not according to the secret procedure of providence, but in the most manifest manner."

The person charged with consulting the Oracle, was the high priest. An objector may here ask: "Did not this open the door to corruption? Might not an ambitious pontiff abuse such a trust to unrighteous ends?" This difficulty may be best met by explaining to whom the consultation of the Oracle was permitted; the occasions on which it might be consulted; and the probable manner of the consultation.

The Oracle could not be interrogated by any mere private individual. This was permitted only to the chief magistrate, or other high functionary of the government. The occasions on which the advice of the Oracle could be asked, must be of a public nature. The matter of consultation must relate to a question of public policy, of public morals, or of religious faith. Neither could the consultation take place in a clandestine way. The person proposing the question to the high priest remained with him during the ceremony. Josephus affirms that any person who chose might be present on such occasions. This would be an effectual guard against collusion, and an ample guarantee for the fairness of the transaction. The office of the high priest, in this particular, was that of a mediator, or middle man. He was herein simply the channel of communication between the Hebrew State and its divine head. It is remarkable, that there is not an instance on record in the Jewish annals of a high priest who abused this trust to unworthy objects.

The opinion of the Jews, in which learned Christian authors concur, as to the manner of taking the sense of the Oracle, is this: The high priest, clothed in his pontifical garments, and having on the breastplate of judgment, in which were the mysterious Urim and Thummim, symbolical of the clearness and

fullness of the oracular responses, presented himself before the veil of the tabernacle, over against the mercy seat,—the immediate residence of the divine presence. The magistrate, who came to consult the Oracle, stood directly behind him, and propounded the question, which was repeated by the priest. The answer was returned in an audible voice, in terms explicit, direct, and unambiguous. This explains the reason why the holy of holies, where the mercy seat stood, is so often called the Oracle. It was because from thence God returned answers to those who came to ask counsel of him on behalf of the public conscience, or the public administration.

That the responses were returned in an articulate voice, seems probable from several expressions of holy writ. When the ten commandments were given on Sinai, it is said that "God spake all these words." In regard to the subsequent laws, it is declared that "Jehovah spake unto Moses, saying." When Moses went into the tabernacle to learn the divine will, it is recorded of him that "he heard the voice of one speaking to him from off the mercy seat." Similar forms of expression are used in reference to the like occasions in after ages, from all which the conclusion seems warranted, that the responses of the Hebrew Oracle were rendered in an audible voice, and without secrecy, craft, or ambiguity of any kind.

In comparing the Hebrew Oracle with the Oracles of paganism, our remarks will embrace the period of their respective institution; the times, occasions, and conditions of consulting them; the machinery of consultation; and the nature of the responses uttered by each.

Infidel writers have represented the Hebrew Oracle as a mere imitation of those of pagan institution; a graft from one system of imposture into another but little better. Morgan says, that "while the Jews were in Egypt, they had been dazzled by the infallible declarations of Jupiter Ammon." Sir Isaac Newton, however, places the birth of Ammon more than 400 years after the exodus of Israel out of Egypt. These are the words of this illustrious chronologist: "The year before Christ 1002, Sesac reigned in Egypt. He erected temples and oracles to his father in Thebes, Ammonia, and Ethiopia; and thereby caused his father to be worshipped as a god in those countries. This was the original of the worship of Jupiter Ammon, and the first mention of oracles I meet with in profane history. The Greeks, in their oracles, imitated the Egyptians; for the oracle of Dodona, which was the oldest in Greece, was set up by an Egyptian woman after the example of the oracle at Thebes." Thus it appears, according to this high chronological authority, that, instead of the Jewish Oracle being an imitation of the pagan

oracles, the reverse was the fact. The latter drew their original from the former.

The Hebrew Oracle could be consulted at all times, when the occasions of the State required; the Grecian, only on particular days of a particular month in the year. It is obvious to remark what an advantage this gave to the priests of those lying divinities to anticipate the questions to be proposed, and to frame skilful and deceptive replies.

The Hebrew Oracle could be consulted only by some high public functionary, and when questions of moment relating to the government of the Republic demanded resolution. The Grecian oracles refused not their utterance to any persons, nor upon any occasion, provided only that the fee was sufficiently ample to cause them to break silence.

This leads us to remark upon another distinction between the two institutions. No money was ever received for consulting the Jewish Oracle. The offer of it would have been an insult to him, whose voice was heard in its responses. The Grecian oracles were sources of vast revenues to the priests. The wealth of the Delphian Oracle exceeded that of the most opulent states and princes. Its treasury blazed with uncounted jewels, and groaned beneath the masses of gold and silver that filled its capacious vaults.

Another point of difference appears in the machinery of consultation, and the character of the responses. Nothing can be more simple than the method of consulting the Divine Oracle; nothing less ambiguous than its answers. But what endless mystery, and mummerly, and cumbrous rites of divination, accompanied the responses of the heathen oracles! These were always so contrived as to be susceptible of a double interpretation. In proof of this, the reader's attention is directed to the response of the Delphian Oracle to Croesus, the powerful monarch of the Lydian empire, respecting the issue of his war with Cyrus. Its purport was, that he should overturn a great empire, and that the Persians would not conquer him till they had a mule for their prince. History has recorded the result. The wily priests had well considered their answer. They knew nothing of the issue. How could they? But they must clutch the treasures of Lydia's richest sovereign. To this end, they must flatter his pride. And they must maintain the credit of their Oracle, whichever way fortune might decide the contest. With demoniac cunning did they frame the response to answer all these ends. When the unhappy Lydian, lured to his ruin by their lying flatteries, dared to reproach them with their deception, with insulting scorn they replied:—"Ungrateful fool! you *have* overturned a great empire, even that over which you reigned, and your throne and

sceptre have been wrested from you by the mule of our oracle, even Cyrus, who, his father being a Persian and his mother a Median, fills the measure of its import." Behold the system! Behold the commentary! Each worthy of the other, and both of that infernal craft and policy in which they had their origin. One hardly knows against whom to feel the greater indignation; whether against the contrivers of such a system of delusion, or the bold blasphemer who dares to liken it to that Oracle of eternal truth, whose immaculate responses were fitly symbolized by a legend, which signifies, "LIGHTS AND PERFECTIONS."

Infidels have indulged in a superabundance of malignant and silly ridicule over this Divine Oracle; but with their usual want of inquiry and reflection. We admit that it is an extraordinary institution. We admit that it is altogether without a parallel in the history of the world. But this is no argument against either the fact or the wisdom of it. No other civil society has ever been formed for precisely the same objects, nor existed under exactly the same circumstances. No other civil polity ever proposed, as its main end, and the overthrow of idolatry, the preservation of true religion in the world, and the education of mankind for a more spiritual and universal dispensation of grace. Add to this, that the human race was then, as it were, in its infancy and nonage. It had but few abstract ideas. It was, for the most part, confined in its mental operations to sensible objects. In such a state of things, philosophy itself would teach us to look for just such an institution as the Hebrew Oracle. And when we find it making its appearance in the Jewish church, enlightened reason is prepared to exclaim in the language of revelation, "Oh the depths of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God."

The Oracle was *the* institution of all others, precisely adapted to the mental condition, habits, and needs of the Hebrew people. It operated as a salutary check to the ignorance and rashness of both rulers and people. By powerfully impressing the imagination through the senses, it supplied the place of a strong realizing conception of an infinite and omnipresent spirit which was wanting in that minority and pupillage of the nation. It served to detach their affections and their trust from the pompous and alluring idolatries of their heathen neighbours. This sensible manifestation of the Deity,—the cloud of glory shooting up to mid-heaven in a column of massy splendour, or resting in luminous folds over the mercy-seat in the Holy of Holies,—is so far from being incredible, that while Scripture affirms its truth, reason and philosophy declare its expediency. The Divine Oracle,—with its attendant visible glories,—the ark, the mercy-seat, the cherubim, the luminous cloud, the breastplate of judgment, with its mystical stones of Urim and Thummim, and the audible responses of the

Deity,—formed a school, designed, with admirable wisdom and condescension, for tutoring the infant intellect and heart of the world, and training them up to a full spiritual maturity and strength.

“To pour contempt, therefore, on these extraordinary appearances, as absurd and romantic fables, would be as unphilosophical and as ungrateful, as it would be for a child, when arrived at manhood, to censure and despise those condescending methods, by which parental wisdom and love had moulded and carried forward his childhood to manly vigor and understanding.” Let us not be guilty of the folly, the injustice, we may say, of measuring the intellectual and religious wants of a comparatively rude and infant state of society, by those of our own more cultivated, more enlightened, more spiritual, more manly and Christian age of the world. And while we admire the beauties of the dawn, and adore the wisdom and benevolence of those early pencillings of spiritual light, let us rejoice and be grateful, that the full-orbed sun has arisen upon us in all his splendor.

Having, in the former part of this article, unfolded the properties, tendencies, and results of the ancient systems of idolatry, it will be proper to conclude with a comparison between them and the religious and moral doctrines of the Hebrew code.

There is one God, says the Jewish lawgiver, and there is none besides him. He is the sole object of religious trust and worship. Himself the Supreme Being and the necessary source of all other beings, there is no other that can be compared with him. A spirit, pure, immense, infinite,—no material form can be a fit symbol of his nature. He framed the universe by his power; he governs it by his wisdom; he regulates it by his providence. Nothing escapes his omniscient glance; nothing can resist his almighty power. The good and the evil of life are alike dispensed by his righteous hand.

A public worship of this God is instituted. Ministers to preside over it are appointed. Sacrifices and offerings, and a splendid ceremonial, are established. But all this pomp is nothing in his eyes, unless prompted and animated by the sentiments of the heart. The worship which he demands before all, and above all, is the acknowledgment of our absolute dependence, and of his supreme dominion; gratitude for his benefits; trust in his mercy; reverence for his authority; love toward his excellence; and submission to his laws.

What purity and beauty in the moral doctrines of this code! Equity, probity, fidelity, industry, compassion, charity, beneficence;—in a word, everything that makes men respectable in their own eyes, everything that can endear them to their fellows,

everything that can secure the repose and happiness of society—are placed among the number of human duties.

Where else, in all antiquity, are to be found ideas of God and his worship so just and sublime ; religious institutions so pure and spiritual ; ethical doctrines so conformable to the sentiments of nature and the light of reason. Recall the picture, before presented, of the religious and moral condition of the ancient world. What false and grotesque notions of the divine nature ! What extravagant, impure, and cruel rites ! What objects of adoration ! From the heavenly orbs to the meanest plant, from the man distinguished for his talents or his crimes to the meanest reptile,—everything has its worshippers. Here, chastity is sacrificed in the temples. There, human blood flows upon the altars, and the dearest victims expire amid flames kindled by superstition. Again, nature is outraged by beastly amours, and humanity brutalized by vices that cannot be named without offence. Everywhere the people are plunged into a frightful ignorance ; and the philosophers themselves grope in doubt and uncertainty.

Wherefore this difference ? But one cause, adequate to the result, can be assigned. All the pagan nations had for their guide only the feeble and tremulous light of human reason. Among the Hebrews, a higher, even the pure and eternal reason, had pierced the darkness, scattered its shades, fixed its uncertainties, and poured a divine illumination into the mind of prophet, priest, lawgiver, judge, and king. Thus was the intellect of the nation enlightened, and its heart purified. Thus were its manners humanized ; its morals elevated ; its institutions liberalized. Thus was the nation itself educated for its great mission of guidance and of blessing to all the nations of the earth, in all the periods of their history.

ARTICLE II.

THE POSITION OF THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR.

By REV. ALBERT BARNES, PHILADELPHIA.

WE shall arrange the thoughts we wish to submit on the subject of this article under three heads : the Position of the Christian Scholar in this age : the Means by which that position has been reached : and the Advantages which it gives him as he enters on life.

The first point is the POSITION WHICH HE OCCUPIES IN THIS AGE.

He has two things that characterize him : his scholarship and his religion. The one is that which is furnished by a liberal education ; the other, that which is produced by Christianity applied to his heart. The one would make him different from a youth educated in ancient Athens or in modern Turkey, Persia, or China ; the other makes him different from what he would have been if trained to worship in the Parthenon or Pantheon ; if he were a Mussulman or a Parsee, a Brahmin, or a Buddhist. His religion and his scholarship are not of *equal* worth, though they each possess a value which cannot be corrupted, and combined they give him a position in the world, which is peculiar.

Religion and learning have always had an interesting relation to each other, and are always destined to have. As they contribute to promote each other or come in conflict ; as they sustain, oppose, or modify each other ; as one has the ascendancy, and the other is held to be subordinate ; or as they move on in harmony each in its appropriate sphere, they serve to give character to particular periods of the world, and mark the progress which has been made in human affairs. It requires but little knowledge of history to understand that now one is in the ascendancy, and now the other ; that now they seem to come in conflict, and now they move along harmoniously ; that now the conclusions of science are proscribed because they are in collision with some article of the "Creed," and that now the teachings of religion are modified or rejected because they are supposed to come in conflict with some of the revelations of science.

The facts here adverted to are most likely to occur in those cases where the religion has written records, as most religions have. In all those cases the records are permanent, and are believed to contain unchangeable truth. But those records have commonly been made in comparatively rude ages of the world, and among a people having little pretension to science. They incidentally or necessarily make many statements bearing on the provinces of learning ; they contain affirmations on the subjects of moral and mental philosophy ; and in all these respects they encounter the risk of the opposition which the disclosures of science in more advanced periods of the world may make. There are few of the sacred books in the various systems of professed revelations in the world, which have not *volunteered* numerous statements on points which have subsequently become identified with the sciences. The fact of the permanency of these records, and the necessity subsequently felt of reconciling them with the facts which science has disclosed, has given rise to many of the methods of inter-

pretation which have prevailed, and which characterized whole systems of theology. If those records are not absolutely incompatible with the disclosures of science, a system of interpretation will be adopted that will aim to retain their authority. It is only when the point of absolute contradiction is reached, that the effort will be abandoned; but, until this is perceived, the attempt at reconciliation will be pursued through all the forms of allegorical and mystical interpretation; of accommodation and double sense; of rationalism and transcendentalism. When the disclosures become irreconcilable, the system of religion falls, and the scientific world passes off into the form of total unbelief, or embraces some new claim of revelation.

The Hellenistic religion cannot be said to have rested for its authority on written records; but it became enshrined and embodied in the Greek poems, particularly in those of Hesiod and Homer. How far these poems were allowed to influence the popular belief on the subject of religion, cannot now be ascertained; but at an early period the rigid philosophy of the Greeks recognized the impossibility of ascribing to the Deity manifestations so grossly human, so immediate, and so barbarous, as those represented as divine in the wild conflicts of Hesiod's *Theogony*, and in the domestic occupations, and trivial pursuits of the Homeric deities.¹ "Hence arose the quarrel of Plato, and prior to him, of Pindar, with Homer"; hence the cause which induced Anaxagoras, to whom the invention of the allegoric mode of interpretation is ascribed, to apply the Homeric delineations to virtue and justice; hence it was that the Stoics understood the *Theogony* of Hesiod, as relating to the action of the elements, which, according to their notions, constituted in their highest union, the divine nature." Ultimately, the whole was seen to be fable, as depending on neither historic nor scientific grounds, and as irreconcilable with truth by any principles of allegoric interpretation; and the cultivated mind of Athens and Corinth, as that of the world at large has now done, passed into a state of unbelief in regard to all the forms of what Mr. Gibbon calls "the beautiful mythology of Greece."

The Hebrew people had little science. What they had was mostly embodied in their sacred books, as the science of India is now in the *Shasters*, and the political wisdom of China in the works of Confucius. Jewish scholars made no progress in astronomy, geology, anatomy, mental philosophy, geography, or history, which even *seemed* to conflict with the statements of their prophets. And yet the men among them who claimed to be inspired of God, were constantly uttering sentiments which,

¹ Strauss' *Life of Jesus*, p. 3.

as the result has shown, could not but appear in future times to come in conflict with the disclosures of science.

It was only when revealed religion encountered the doctrines, which in a later age came in from the East, or when it overstepped the limits of the stunted territory of Palestine, and came in contact with the Western mind, that any discrepancy between the religion of the Bible and science, seemed to occur, which required an effort to reconcile them. Then arose the whole system of allegorical interpretation, in an attempt to harmonize the statements in the Bible with the prevailing belief in the philosophic world. On the one hand there were these writings, held to be a revelation from God, composed in a comparatively uncultivated age, and in a land not distinguished for science; and on the other, there were the views in philosophy, sanctioned then by the great teachers of the world; and there must be in future times, the new disclosures which true science would make. The statements in the system of revealed religion were recorded statements, and must be held to be true, if this religion was to retain its authority; the maxims of philosophy, and the discoveries of science, were also regarded as settled and certain; and it was not unnatural that they should seem to come in collision. It was difficult to pursue the inquiries of philosophy, without allowing the mind to be influenced by the question, how these would bear on the doctrines of religion; and it was as difficult to hold to the articles of the faith, without permitting them to influence the mind in the conclusions to which it would come in scientific investigations. There was not, as yet, confidence that the doctrines which would be reached by the fair interpretation of the sacred writings, would be found to be in accordance with the conclusions of science; nor did those views as yet prevail, which would lead men to pursue the investigations of science with a firm conviction that its disclosures would *not* be found to be at variance with those of revealed religion. Hence arose the whole system of *allegoric* interpretation;—a system which, while it allowed the friends of religion to retain their belief in the inspiration of the sacred writings, allowed them also to embrace any dogmas of philosophy, or any truths of science, which might be developed, and even to maintain that those very doctrines were found, covered with a veil, in the sacred volume itself. Origen, who, though he adopted the principle from Philo the Jew, may be regarded as among Christians, the father of this system of interpretation, attributes a threefold meaning to the Scriptures, corresponding with his distribution of the human being into three parts:—the literal sense answering to the

body ; the moral to the soul ; and the mystical to the spirit. The rule with him, was to retain all these meanings, though differing in worth ; in some particular passages, however, he was of opinion that the literal sense either gave no meaning at all, or else a perverted meaning, in order the more directly to impel the reader to the discovery of the mystical signification. In many cases, also, the application of this principle, permitted the entire *denial* of the literal truth of a passage in the sacred writings, as being in conflict with some truth established by philosophy, and thus it became necessary to search for, and to hold, only the mystical truth. Hence, one of the maxims of Origen was, that "a spiritual truth often exists embodied in a corporeal falsehood."¹ Hence, also, it often happened that the literal truth of the narrative was denied, and a method was devised, by which it was supposed, that the inspiration of the Scriptures might be maintained, and the independent investigations of philosophy might be pursued. It was thus, that, after the age of the apostles, Christianity attempted to *accommodate* itself to philosophy ; thus, that it sought to avoid an absolute rejection by the cultivated mind of the world, and to show that it was not inconsistent with the independent progress which mind would make in science. The apostles, more honest men, had pursued a different course. They made an effort to accommodate the one to the other. They assumed that the revelation which they came to make, was true, and that all the science which actually opposed this was false. They never doubted this, while there was much "science falsely so called," that was in direct conflict with their message, all true science would be found to be in accordance with it. They, therefore, gave themselves no trouble in attempting to reconcile the one with the other, but proclaimed their message in their own way, leaving the world to take care of science as it might choose.

In the middle ages, till the time of Galileo, things assumed another form. Then religion, as it was held, had the ascendancy. All science was subordinate to it. All the professorships in the universities were in the hands of the friends of the church ; all the learning was possessed by the clergy ; all the investigations of science were pursued by the friends of Christianity ; and no one wished, or dared, to reach a conclusion which would not be sustained and sanctioned by the articles of the creed. If there was any bold spirit that ventured out in a new line of discovery, and whose conclusions seemed likely to infringe on some article in the church, his religion checked

¹ Com. in Joann., Tom. x. § 4. σωζομένου πολλῶν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς πνευματικῶ ἐν τῷ σωματικῷ, ὡς ἂν εἰποὶ τις ψευδῆ.

him, or he was soon checked by the voice of an authority which no one presumed to disobey. The imprisonment of Galileo was just the exponent of this state of things, on the part of the church; the solemn retraction by Galileo of the opinion which he had expressed, and the denial of the truth of what he had seen through the telescope *because* it seemed to impinge on the articles of faith in the church, was just the exponent of the feelings which had reigned throughout the dark ages. There was as yet no independent pursuit of the investigations of science on the one hand, or of the interpretation of the Bible on the other; no confidence that they would be found, when thus formed, to harmonize with each other.

The Reformation placed things on a different ground. It *maintained* confidence unimpaired in the Bible; it *restored* the apostolic confidence that the investigations of science would not be found to be in conflict with the doctrines taught by its fair interpretation. It broke the shackles which had bound the human intellect; made men once more independent in their scientific investigations; imbued their minds with true confidence in religion, and, at the same time, gave utterance to the opinion that the most free investigations of science would never come in conflict with the truths derived from the fair interpretation of the Bible. While it gave to scientific investigation all the prudence which would be demanded by the principle of the inductive philosophy, it, at the same time, held to the belief of the divine origin and authority of the Bible with a tenacity which was unequalled in any former age, and which increased in strength just in proportion as the mind felt itself emancipated from the thralldom of the dark ages.

The deists and naturalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, assumed another position still on the subject. They had become imbued with the principles of the inductive philosophy, and maintained the right of independent investigation in science in the most absolute manner. At the same time, they looked with contempt on the whole system of allegoric interpretation; and they believed firmly that the principles of sound philosophy, would lead to direct conflict with the teachings of the Bible. They became infidels, therefore, because they supposed that the teachings of the Bible and of science were not capable of reconciliation. Toland and Bolingbroke pronounced the Bible to be a collection of unauthentic and fabulous books. According to Morgan, the law of Moses is a miserable system of superstition, blindness, and slavery. According to Chubb, the Jewish religion cannot be true, because it debases the moral character of the Deity, by attributing to him arbitrary con-

duct, partiality for a particular people, and, above all, by the command to exterminate the Canaanitish nations.

In more modern times, there has been scarcely a discovery in science that has not been arrayed against Christianity, and that has not furnished, on the one hand, a ground of temporary alarm to the friends of revealed religion, and on the other, a ground of momentary triumph to its foes. It would lead us too far from our purpose to state, in detail, the objections to Christianity which have been derived from those sciences, or to consider the question whether those objections have, or have not been satisfactorily solved. The remarks made will suffice to show the difficulties which may be expected to be encountered in the nature of the case, between a religion where there are permanent written records, and the disclosures which will be made by science. On the part of the friends of the Revelation, there may be expected to be apprehension and alarm; on the part of its enemies, the note of triumph. With the one there will be a tendency to depart from the proper rules of interpretation to accommodate the revealed doctrine to the scientific discovery; with the other there may be anticipated much that is unreasonable, in not being willing to admit proper explanations, and in not conceding what is fairly to be inferred from the fact that the Revelation was not *designed* to give instruction in the sciences. It may be anticipated that it will be long before the true method of reconciling these things will be understood; it will be long before the friend of religion will engage in the pursuits of learning and science with a perfectly independent judgment; it will be long before the friend of science will pursue his inquiries with no expectation and no desire that his conclusions shall conflict with the teachings of revelation.

Whether that point is now reached, it is not very material to inquire; but it may be affirmed that it is now morally certain that that is the ultimate tendency of the course of events. This leads us to state more specifically what *is*, as we understand it, the exact position of the Christian scholar in this age. Without entering into any inquiry as to the comparative claims of Christian scholars and others, and without starting the question whether, other things being equal, piety is favorable or unfavorable to scientific pursuits, a few remarks may be made on the subject, which will define the present position of the Christian scholar.

(a.) The first is, that it has come to be generally admitted in the scientific world, that the results of investigation in the one will not be found to be inconsistent with the other; or that there is no incompatibility between the profoundest reverence

for the Bible, and the highest pursuits of science and learning. It is neither assumed nor feared, that the one will impinge on the other. It is neither supposed that in order to high attainments in science, it is necessary that a man should be an infidel, nor that he would be embarrassed in such pursuits by his being a Christian. It is neither necessary for a scientific man to begin his inquiries by being an infidel, nor, in pursuing them to the utmost, to fear that he will become one. The man of science pursues his investigations as fearlessly as if there were no book claiming to be a revelation from God; the Christian interpreter applies his rules of exegesis as independently as if none of the disclosures of modern astronomy, anatomy, chemistry, geology, had been made. If it should be doubted whether this point has been exactly reached; if it should be maintained that there are *some* who approach the Bible timidly, fearing that a fair interpretation of its pages will be found to conflict with the disclosures of science, and who seek to find recondite and allegorical meanings as a refuge from disaster and defeat; and if, on the other hand, there are those who do pursue the investigations of science with the expectation and the hope that they will reach results in conflict with the teachings of the Bible,—still it is true that these are exceptions to the prevailing feeling. As a proof that the point which we are now stating has been practically and substantially reached, we need only refer to the literary and scientific institutions in this land. The two things that are to be noticed are, that those are Christian institutions, and that they are, at the same time, seats of science. There are no avowedly infidel colleges in these United States. There are none, it is believed, in which the forms of Christian worship are not maintained. There are none in which the Bible is not read, or studied, as being of Divine authority. There are few which have not been founded expressly under Christian patronage, and which are not sustained mostly by the liberality of Christians. Of those colleges, also, a large portion have been endowed with the express design of preparing men for the Christian ministry. And yet, in no place in our country—in none in the world—are the sciences more encouraged, or pursued more independently, than in our colleges. It is a part of the plan; it is of the very essence of the design of founding them, that the highest facilities shall be furnished to conduct young men along the departments of history, and geography, and criticism, and chemistry, and astronomy, and geology; and those institutions feel themselves most honored, and suppose that the design of their being founded is best carried out, when their pupils go forth, prepared to take an elevated rank in any of

these departments, or when any one of their alumni makes a new discovery in science. These facts show that a change has come over the public mind, so far that it is a conceded and well-understood point, that there is *supposed* to be no inconsistency between the highest attainments in religion, and the highest attainments in science.

(b.) The next thing to be said as indicating this position is, that in the apprehension of the Christian scholar himself, the two pursuits are not *incompatible* with each other. And this is much. In an honest endeavor now to be a Christian of most eminent faith and devotedness, he does not assume, as was once inevitably felt, that it is necessary to avoid the pursuits of science; in his efforts to become eminent in any of the departments of learning, he does not assume, as has often been felt, that it is necessary to lay aside his Bible, or to forsake the place of prayer. In order to be either in the highest degree, it is not needful that the mind should be embarrassed by any apprehended conflict of the one with the other; nor in order to eminence in the one, is it necessary that he should withdraw his devotion from the other. A man who is disposed to make the most of his talents in the cause of science, will not feel that it is necessary, in his own apprehension, to proscribe religion as the first grand pursuit of life; nor will one, who aims to make the highest possible attainments in piety, deem it necessary for him to eschew the walks of science, in order that he may maintain his faith unimpaired. We are not now insisting on the fact, which might be urged, that a man who wished to make the most of his powers in the cause of science would be most likely to be successful, if he imbued his mind with the principles of religion in the highest degree; we are adverting to another point, that, in his own mind, there will be no necessary embarrassment—no apprehended conflict—between the one and the other. He may enter his laboratory with no fear that the devotions of the closet will be disturbed by any discoveries which he will make there; he may go to his closet with a mind undisturbed by the revelations of the blow-pipe, or the telescope.

As to the reality of the fact above stated, we suppose there will be no doubt. If there were, it would be easy to confirm it by referring to any number of illustrious names in the various departments of science, not less distinguished by the steadiness of their faith in the gospel, and by their lives of consistent piety, than by their learning. Even in geology, the science in which, just now, there would be supposed to be most that is in conflict with the Bible, and in which there is most difficulty in adjusting its disclosures with the account in the

sacred records, it is a remarkable fact, that, alike in our own country and abroad, the men most eminent in that science, are men who see no discrepancy between it and the records in the Bible. Need we do more than allude to the names of Buckland, and John Pye Smith, and Silliman, and Hitchcock ?

But what we wished particularly to say as illustrating the present position of the Christian scholar, was, that it has not always been so. In the early times of Christianity, it must often have been a subject of anxious inquiry, whether the truth of the sacred records would stand the test when the religion came in contact with the doctrines of philosophy. In the dark ages, when here and there one—for there were such, like Roger Bacon,—pursued his researches into nature, apprehension must have often been excited lest these pursuits should impinge on some article of faith, and the researches of science were pursued in secret places, and with a trembling hand. It is easy to imagine what apprehension Galileo in a later age, felt when his comparatively rude telescope disclosed to his astonished vision the satellites of Jupiter, and when his mind adverted to the probable bearing of this on what were regarded as the established articles of the Christian faith. Nor need we conceal the fact that probably *all* the sciences have in their turn produced alarm in the bosoms of the friends of religion, and that many a votary of science has approached his favorite pursuit with a fearful apprehension that the next step of discovery might overthrow the cherished articles of his faith. This source of apprehension is now at an end. On the one hand, the sciences may be pursued to their utmost extent with no dread of the Inquisition, or, what is more alarming to a truly pious mind, with no fear that an article of faith will be weakened or shown to be false ; and on the other, the votary of science, if inclined to skepticism, is constrained to abandon the last hope that nature has anything to disclose that will disprove the written revelation which God has made, or that will confirm him in his unbelief. The Christian scholar may push his way up to the highest seats of learning, and be under a necessity at no point of his progress to lay aside his simple habits of devotion, to abandon any of the articles of his Christian faith, or to omit his daily devout reading of the Bible.

(c.) Another thing to be noticed in regard to the position of the Christian scholar in this age is, that from some cause his religion is accompanying the march of science around the world. Whether it precedes or follows it ; whether it prepares the way, and prompts to scientific discoveries, or whether it follows in its *wake*, and avails itself of the preparations which science makes in the minds of men to receive the Chris-

tian revelation, may be a point on which some difference of opinion might be entertained, and is not material to the subject before us. The matter of fact to which we are adverting is, that the two accompany each other; that the eye in looking over the world sees the one where it sees the other; and that the same lines of boundary will determine the position and the extent of both. Any one may be satisfied of this by procuring a map of the world, and marking out on it the portions of the globe most distinguished for science and literature, and, if he had never before adverted to it, he would be surprised to find how accurately those lines would determine the places where the Christian religion prevails. And if, in the still dark portions of the world, he should find here and there a spot gleaming in the midst of the darkness, like Iceland in the northern seas, or on any of the borders of the fixed boundaries he should spread his pencils of light partially in the surrounding darkness, he would be no less surprised to find that his geographical limits are in all cases determined by the combined influence of Christianity and science. He would find neither of them occupying independent positions, or making independent aggressions on the regions of night, but would see them moving hand in hand in the world. If he saw indications of one, he would see that the other was not far in the rear. Together they determine the limits of light on the globe.

This also, is not only true *in fact*, but the belief that this *is* so, is fast gaining ground in the world. The heathen nations have learned, or are learning, to associate the one with the other. The impression is fast becoming fixed in the faith of the world, that the two are in fact blended, and are to be blended; that where the one prevails, the other will prevail also; and that if men will have the one they must welcome to their bosoms also the other. The great fact cannot be concealed, that where Christianity prevails, there also civil liberty prevails; that there the highest point has been reached in navigation, in manufactures, in legal and medical knowledge, in the arts, in the spirit of enterprise and adventure. Whether these things may be *valued* or not, the fact is seen and admitted. The American savage that looks upon Christian institutions with feigned or real indifference, sees it; the Turk, the inhabitant of China, the Arab, that at long intervals visits our shores, sees it, and they respectively bear the report to their own land. There is no impression that is more certain to become established among the nations, than that, for some cause, Christianity, refinement, the arts, the sciences, and the influence of the press, have a mysterious but certain connection. Every year tends to confirm this impression. Every mission-

ary that we send out confirms it. Every ship that visits a barbarous coast; every press that we establish among the heathen; every book that we print and circulate there, tends to confirm it.

(*d.*) And there is one other thought which may be adverted to as of value in illustrating this point. It is, that somehow Christianity has shown a remarkable affinity for the best form of *mind* that the world has developed; namely, the Teutonic; and especially the Anglo-Saxon mind. It was very early in the history of the nations that poured in from the North, and that overrun the Roman empire, that they were brought under the power of Christian truth; it was early in the records of the Anglo-Saxon that they exchanged their superstitions for the faith of the gospel. In most respects that mind, in its various branches, is the best mind of the world. It has more vigor, energy, power. It is better adapted to the sciences, to political toil, to the useful arts. It has more of that enterprize which explores the seas and lands that make up the globe, and covers them with ships and with dwellings. It has more expansive power; it secures a firmer grasp on improvements; it strikes out more new inventions; it has more creative resources in overcoming difficulties. It is more imbued with the love of liberty, and is less liable to be controlled by the sceptre of the tyrant, or to be debased by superstition. It is already the ruling mind of the world, and is pushing its conquests farther and farther every year. There is scarcely any portion of the globe now that does not feel the power, in some departments of action, of the Anglo-Saxon mind; and when its conquests are made, they are permanent. It is not so much the conquest of arms as it is the conquest of intellect; not the triumph of the sword so much as the triumph of the mariner's needle, of the telescope, of the quadrant, of the blow-pipe, of steam, and of the press. Now, it is undoubtedly a fact, that Christianity, from some cause, has attached itself by bonds never to be dissolved, to this order of mind. The developments of that mind have been closely connected with the Christian religion. Rough at first—fierce, warlike, barbarous; it has been subdued, refined, civilized, by its connection with Christianity, without losing aught of its energy and power. In connection with that mind, Christianity occupies the principal seats of learning in the world; in connection with that it is now seen at nearly all the missionary stations on the earth, and alike by arts and literature, and religion is coming in contact with all the heathen mind of the world.

What we have said under this head is, that the Christian scholar, after having often had most indefinite views of the posi-

tion which he should occupy ; after having been often opposed and ridiculed for the position which he sought to occupy and to which he thought himself entitled ; and after having done more than any other man to mould society itself, and to shape its affairs so that he *might* occupy the position which he does, has at last come to an understanding with the world on the subject. Scientific and literary men are to pursue their investigations in their own way, and he is to pursue his investigations in his way—as free as they are, and they as free as he is. He is not to hinder or denounce them ; nor are they to hinder or denounce him. He is on the same level with them in his honest pursuits ; and they are on a level with him in theirs. He is free to go into any of their departments, and bring out all that he can find that they have elaborated or discovered, to defend his religion ; and they are free in their departments to make an honest application of all that they discover to the religion which he requires them to believe. He is to have no fear as to any ultimate conflict between science and religion ; and they are to raise no shout of anticipated triumph as if, in their department, they can overturn the Christian system. His religion has stood thus far, and still stands ; and that which has outlived the objections drawn from the revelations of the telescope, the microscope, the blow-pipe, and the mariner's-needle ; which has lived on and flourished most in the periods and lands where nature has been subjected to the severest torture to reveal her secrets ; which has survived while science has penetrated the earth, and brought forth the records of ages and times hundreds of thousands of years before man himself lived, it may be presumed has nothing to fear from any future disclosures.

We proceed to notice some of the MEANS by which this position has been reached. This inquiry has more than a speculative interest and importance. It has been already shown that the position which the Christian scholar now occupies is not that which has always been assigned to him ; and it may be of use, in regard to the future, to be able to understand by what arrangements it has happened that so important a change has been produced. It may do something, if we trace this history, to lead us to recognize the providence of God in past times, and perhaps to lead us to see that it has been, not the result of chance or of fate that this has occurred, but that there are evidences that it was the *design* of God that the best forms of literature, and the developments of science on the earth, should be identified with the Christian religion.

Enough for our purpose has been said of the ancients. They had done their work when Christianity appeared. They had shown

how far the human mind can go, under the best auspices, to find out a religion suited to the race. They had prepared the world for the most speedy propagation of the new system of religion. They had furnished models of literature to be useful in all times. The Greek had furnished a language better fitted than any other then existing, and indeed the only one then existing, to express the nicest shades of thought ; to give utterance to new spiritual conceptions ; to record the mysteries which had never yet been unfolded to man ; to be a vehicle for the profound and clear reasoning of Paul on most abstruse subjects, the delicate practical thoughts of Peter, and the unequalled symbolical representations of John, in the most wonderful book ever composed—the Apocalypse ; and the Romans had trodden down the nations, and made one great empire, and furnished facilities for carrying the new message from land to land—and then these wonderful nations, having accomplished their work, speedily made way for new combinations of power to spring up in the world.

We propose, therefore, to say no more of them. But there have been three remarkable events, or series of events, bearing on the subject before us, mainly affecting three distinct classes of mind. We propose to illustrate what may be spoken of as a single fact in regard to them. It is that other nations have been apparently on the very verge of the inventions in the arts, and of the discoveries in the sciences, which now distinguish the Christian nations ; and that, in a manner which no one can explain who does not believe in a superintending Providence favorable to Christianity, the progress of these inventions and discoveries has been then arrested, so that ultimately they have passed into Christian hands. A little farther progress among those nations—an advance in discovery which there was nothing in our notion of things to arrest, and whose arrest we know not that any one has attempted to explain by natural causes, would have placed all these discoveries and inventions in other hands, and given to other nations the eminence which Christians now have, and which they are destined ever to maintain. Had this occurred, the relation of Christianity to literature and science would have been vitally different from what it is now. Had this occurred, it would have been difficult to propagate the Christian religion at all, or to have removed idolatry and superstition from their seats by any power except miracles. We shall explain the fact by the supposition that it was the divine purpose to identify the Christian religion with the best type of mind in the world, and to send it forth in connection with the *prestige* derived from the undoubted ascendancy of Christian nations in everything fitted to elevate the race.

(1.) We begin, in the illustration, with *heathen* mind. In this illustration we might take the *whole* of the heathen mind.

But it will better answer our purpose to take one portion of that mind, which will be regarded as a fair illustration of the whole, and which can be best compared, in this respect, with the progress made in Christian nations. We shall therefore take China. We wish to show you, in order to illustrate our main thought, that, in respect to the matter before us, a great heathen people—the greatest ever gathered under one sceptre—has been just on the verge of the most useful, and the most splendid discoveries in the arts, in literature, and in science which have distinguished Christian nations, and that *when* thus on that verge, the progress of discovery has been suddenly arrested, and that the discovery has been made over to Christian nations, and is now identified with the Christian religion.

(a.) China is, in every respect, admirably adapted to the purpose of our illustration. It is the oldest nation in the world—a nation where there has been the best opportunity to develop talent; to pursue a course of steady improvement, to strike out new inventions in the Arts; to carry forward those plans that required ages to perfect them: for Assyria, and Babylon, and Macedon, and Egypt, and Media, and Rome, once its cotemporaries, were, as it were, cut off in their infancy, and had comparatively little time to mature their plans. It is the most numerous people in the world now united under one government; and more numerous than any one nation has ever been: more numerous than Assyria was in the days of Ninus or Sardanapalus; more numerous than Babylon was when Nebuchadnezzar walked in his pride in his splendid capitol; more numerous than the kingdom of Darius or Xerxes was when they wanted *only* the little country of Greece to make their empire universal; more numerous than the empire of Alexander was when he had *annexed* all the kingdoms of Xerxes and Darius to his own little Macedon; and more numerous than the Roman people when, coming in from the west, an unknown power in the days of Xerxes or Alexander, it swallowed up all. It has a government admirably adapted to foster genius, and to execute great and generous plans. Secure, calm, sagacious, absolute; free from internal shocks, and the danger of revolution; it can execute any of its purposes, and accomplish any of its designs. It has a climate and a soil equal to any in the world; and there is not an element of civilization that might not find its best home in China. In its own way, it has the most complete system of education in the world, and there is not a nation on earth, not even our own, where learning and talent, as there understood, will be so

likely to be rewarded with situations of trust and power. The ambitious youth from the most remote and humble province, may make his way to the capitol; may stand in the presence of the emperor; may become prime minister; and in all the steps of the advancement, he may *calculate* on what he can never do in a republic swayed by popular feeling, or under a monarchy when no arbitrary will of the sovereign determines the award—on the exact position which he may yet occupy. He can measure his steps from point to point, until he is sure, if he has talent and learning to deserve it, to stand at the very head of power. And there *is* talent in that land—talent of all orders and degrees; talent which all do not do well to despise. They who have read the State papers of Lin, in his controversy with British ambassadors, can see, and cannot fail to see, that though the *power* was in British cannon, the *argument* was with China; and that though the fortresses of the empire were dismantled, and her ports thrown open, the arguments of the Imperial commissioner were not demolished, and that the glory of Britain is in her arms, and not her logic.

(b.) Yet with these advantages, which should have placed China at the head of the world in literature and science, what has been the fact; what is now the fact, in regard to her position in this respect? We answer: The main and striking fact in regard to her is, that all inventions and sciences there proceed to a certain point, and are then, from some unknown cause, arrested, and remain *fixed* and *petrified*—often in the rudest form; that China has been on the eve of all the discoveries in science, and all the inventions in the arts, which now characterize the most advanced nations, but has been, as it were, spell-bound. She has struck out the incipient thought, but has made no use of it; she has hit on the principle, but it has remained unapplied. The elements of all that make other nations great are there, but they are not combined or applied; and for centuries the nation has made no progress. The great mind that ruled the intellect of China five hundred years before the coming of the Saviour, is the mind that rules there now—the mind of Confucius. There is no other mind in China. The national intellect is that of the great philosopher prolonged and perpetuated. There is not one of the things which they have invented or discovered which they have carried out to its practical uses, or which has been made to contribute, as it might have done, to the national advancement. We may concede that they discovered the uses of the mariner's needle; or, at least, it was long known among them, before it guided Columbus across the ocean; but what Chinese did it ever guide out of sight of land? What adventu-

rous mariner of the Celestial empire did it ever conduct forth to discover a new world? They had the art of printing, and we may concede that they had it long before the German inventor discovered it in the Western world. But, having struck out the invention, in the rudest form, there it was arrested, and there it has remained. They cut their words on blocks; they have no separate types; no metal types; no presses, but those of the rudest construction; and, although they cannot be ignorant of the power of this art, and of its application in other lands,—yet the Chinese inventor was spell-bound, and the first rude effort among them was as complete as the art is now. They turned their attention early to painting; and with as much skill at first as now. With the most slender knowledge of perspective—scarcely going in this beyond the paintings in the temples at Thebes, they have made no progress towards imitating the productions of Rubens or Raphael. They anticipated us in the invention of gunpowder; but in what is called the art of war, they have made no progress, and seem incapable of applying the destructive element except in the rudest form. And in astronomy, and chemistry, and anatomy; in the art of ship-building, in the implements of agriculture; in their dress, in their music, in all these they seemed to have *paused* when the first rude conception struck the mind; and among all their millions, multitudinous as the sands of the desert, there has arisen no Bacon, or Newton, or Davy, or Watt, or Liebig, or Arkwright, or Whitney, or Franklin, to move them onward in the path of discovery.

This is the fact to which we adverted. They are spell-bound. Their inventions were hardened and “set” at a certain point. They seem to approach all that is great and glorious in science, and there they pause—as, for some reason, heathen mind has always done.

(c.) We are prepared now to appreciate, in some measure, the effect of this fact in its bearing on the point before us, in giving to Christian nations and Christian scholars, the ascendancy which they now have. Suppose, then, that these discoveries begun in China, had been carried forward as they have been in Christian lands. Suppose that the press were doing there what it is doing here; and that the mariner’s compass were doing there all that it is doing here; and that there were spread over that vast empire the facilities of intercommunication, which now characterize our own land; and suppose that all this were connected with the forms of religion which prevail there—employed to increase the homage rendered to Confucius; or in the hands of Buddhist priests; or under the control of the Rationalists there, and that the three

hundred millions of that people were sustained in their opinions by the perverted application of science, how almost hopeless would be the attempt to dislodge those forms of religion ! What prospect could there be of making an impression on such a mass of cultivated mind, in favor of another system of religion ? With what force would they appeal to things around them as proof that their religion had placed them at the head of the nations of the earth, and that they wanted no better system than that which had come down from the remotest ages, and which had shed the blessings of science and civilization all over their vast territory ! But all these things have been arrested in their incipency, and there they were petrified, and there they have remained ever since. China, though semi-civilized, is neither a scientific nor a literary nation ; and that vast people, with all their pride, are yet to receive their sciences, and their valuable literature, and their most needed arts, from Christian nations. Does not this look as if God *meant* that the progress of discovery under heathenism should be arrested, and that the best forms of science, of art, and of civilization, should be developed in connection with the Christian religion ? If this is not so, will any philosopher explain how this *has* come to pass ?

(2.) We turn to another class of mind illustrating the same truth—a class of mind better adapted to scientific and literary pursuits than that of China, and where the effect of uniting that mind with the highest forms of science and literature would have been still more disastrous. We allude to the Saracenic or Arabic mind. The thought which we wish here to set forth is, summarily, that in this case also, the progress in science, in literature, and in art, was mysteriously arrested by an influence that no man can explain who did not believe at the same time in a Providence, and in the truth of the Christian religion, and arrested *in order* that the best forms of science, of civilization and of art, should be developed in connection with Christianity. The Arabian was on the verge of the most splendid discoveries which have marked our own age, and of making his own country the seat of science in all coming times, and, if this had not been arrested, on the lands of the religion of Islam, the sun of science would have risen soon to the meridian, and have stood there in full-orbed glory, to go down no more.

A few well-known circumstances in the history of that remarkable people, illustrating the prospect that at one time the empire of the world, and the empire of science, would pass into their hands, will show what we mean.

(a.) They had there, at one time, the prospect of subduing

the world to their arms, and of extending their religion over Europe as they had already done over a large part of Asia, and Africa. Schlegel, in his *Philosophy of History*, calls the Saracenic invasion, "that mighty Arabian conflagration, whose flames were scattered over the terrified globe by the sons of the desert." No one can doubt that the Saracens, zealously devoted to their own religion, aimed to make it universal; and no one can doubt that this *would* have occurred, if, in the eternal councils, it had not been determined that it should not be. Let us look a moment and see how near this was to being accomplished. Let one place himself in imagination on some eminence, and take in the limits of that vast Saracenic empire, in the eighth century of the Christian era. Let him look to the East. Syria, Mesopotamia Persia, Arabia, are all under the sway of the Saracens—and the conquering crescent is over them all. Bozra, Damascus, Heliopolis, Jerusalem, Aleppo, and Antioch, have all fallen. Let him look over the South—over Egypt, Lybia, Africa, Numidia, and Mauritania. The Roman sceptre has long since departed. The empire of the Vandals has disappeared. Cairo, Memphis, and Carthage, have fallen, and where once Augustine and Cyprian expounded the oracles of God, Mohammedan doctors enforce the doctrines of the Koran; and where once, in the times of Cyprian there were thirty thousand Christian churches, stand unnumbered multitudes of Mohammedan mosques. Let him look to the West. Once the Romans reigned there; and there the Goths set up their dominions. But Roderic, the last of the Goths, has fallen. The Christian fugitives are driven into the fastnesses of the northern mountains. The splendid Alhambra rises in Spain, and all over that beautiful and fertile land are scattered the plans, the mosques, and the minarets of Saracen victors. Let him look to the North. It was still, indeed, unsubdued. But the plans of the Caliphs extended there also. "The whole southern part of the Roman empire," say they, "is subdued; the North, too, must fall. By two routes our armies must pursue their victorious course. From Spain, France must be assailed; and then the Belgians, and Britain, and Germany. From the East, Constantinople must be taken, and Thrace, and Macedonia, and Greece, and Hungary; and then from all quarters must we concentrate on Italy." The plan was that the armies of the East and the West should meet, and then, turning to the South that Rome should be overwhelmed. And there was every human probability of the success of the plan. "A victorious line of march," says Gibbon, "had been prolonged above a thousand miles, from the rock of Gibraltar to the bank of the Loire; the repetition of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to

the confines of Pband, and the Highlands of Scotland. The Rhine is not more impassable than the Nile or the Euphrates, and the Arabian fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelations of Mahomet."¹

But there was another aspect in reference to this more fearful than the mere prospect of the subjugation of Europe to the Arabian arms. There was at that time, at least an *equal* prospect that the whole empire of science would remain in the hands of the Saracens, and that all its developments would be in connection with the literature of the Koran, and that the position of the Mohammedan scholar would be that which the Christian scholar now holds. The Saracens are by nature an intellectual race, and are now, in the judgment of the leading Missionary Boards, in this respect the first people of Western Asia. Differing somewhat indeed from the Chinese in this respect, in the points already adverted to, and being a race of people far better qualified to push the discoveries of science than they are, they had nevertheless struck on some of the most splendid discoveries that the world has seen, and we even yet wonder *why* it was that they paused, and left the application of those discoveries to Christians. They gave us the numerical figures, which we use in our mathematical calculations. They gave us algebra; what prevented its application among them in all the wide results of fluxions? Why was not some Newton born and raised in Arabia? They taught the first elements of chemistry; why did not Black, or Priestly, or Davy appear, to carry out those principles? To the Arabians we owe the manufacture of paper from cotton and linen. What prevented their making the use of it which Christian nations now do? The names of the stars on our celestial globes are Arabic names; why did no Kepler, or Brahe, or Newton, or Herschell, rise there to tell us the laws of their motions, their magnitudes, and their distances? They had the knowledge of gunpowder? why was it never applied as it has been in European warfare? They had a beautiful, a copious, a finished language—a language perfectly fitted for all purposes of science, philosophy and poetry, while not one of the barbarous provincial languages which succeeded the Latin, was at all fit for any such purpose. They were skilled in architecture, for how few edifices more splendid than the Alhambra has the world even now to boast of?

To this, is to be added the undoubted fact, that they were then at the head of the literary world. The second of the Abassides

¹ Dec. and Fall, III, 467, Seq. Harpers' Edition.

founded Bagdad, and soon made it at once the most splendid, and the most literary city of the East. The ambassadors of the Caliphs at Constantinople collected the volumes of Grecian learning, which were translated by the most skillful interpreters. Almanzor invited learned men of all nations to his court; collected from them the names of celebrated authors and works in the Greek, Syriac, and Persian languages; caused journeys to be undertaken, and immense numbers of them to be secured. The impulse was felt throughout the Saracen empire. In the words of Sismondi, "In all parts, in every town, schools, academies, and colleges were established, from which many learned men proceeded." "Bagdad was the centre, but Bassora and Cufa almost equalled her in reputation, learned men, and poets. Balkh, Ispahan, and Samarcand, were equally the homes of science. In Alexandria, Cairo, Fez, and Morocco, were schools and colleges, magnificent buildings, and extensive libraries, which preserved to Europe a number of precious volumes which had been lost in other places."

But it was Spain more particularly that was the seat of Arabic learning. In the words of Sismondi, "It was there that it shone with superior brightness, and made its most rapid progress. Cordova, Grenada, Seville, and the other cities of the Peninsula, rivalled one another in the magnificence of their schools, their colleges, their academies, their libraries. In various cities of Spain, seventy libraries were opened for the instruction of the public, at a period when all the rest of Europe, without books, without learning, and without cultivation, was plunged in most disgraceful ignorance. The number of Arabic authors which Spain produced was so prodigious, that many Arabian bibliographers wrote learned treatises on the authors born in particular towns—as Seville, Valencia, or Cordova; or on those who devoted themselves to a particular branch of study—as philosophy, medicine, and more especially poetry." "The period of this literary cultivation," says our own countryman, Prescott, "reached far into the fourteenth century, and may be said to have equalled in duration that of any other literature, ancient or modern."¹

At that period, the tendency, the probability was, that all the great discoveries in science and the arts would be struck out by the followers of Mohammed, and that they would at the same time place themselves at the head of the nations in science, in arts, in political power, and in arms. Yet this career was checked; and from these impending dangers by their

¹ For many of the details in this notice of Arabic literature, we are indebted to an article by Rev. Edward Beecher, D.D., *Bib. Repos.*, Jan. 1848.

arms, and from the prospect of this ascendancy in science, the world was delivered. In the East, the progress of conquest was arrested by the Greek Fire; in the West, by the valor of Charles Martel. The plans of the Caliphs were frustrated; the tide of conquest was rolled back; the anticipated junction of the armies of the East and the West never occurred; and the dominion in political power and in science, passed into other hands. Yet we can hardly help pausing to reflect what a different destiny would have awaited mankind if the plans of the Mussulman had succeeded, and the discoveries which he had commenced in science had been pushed a little further. Science would have established itself again in its native Egypt; would have spread over Arabia, would have traveled eastward to Persia, to Hindoostan, to China. On the plains of Chaldea, the astronomer would have again built his tower, and looked out on the heavens with the telescope in his hand, and there would have marked the distances and the periods of the stars to which the Babylonean had given names. The magnetic needle would have directed the ships of Islam to the Western world, and the Crescent would have been reared where Columbus planted the cross: our rivers, lakes, and bays might have been navigated, and our lands cultivated, by Mussulmen; and the Tigris, the Euphrates, and the Ganges have been the first to open their bosoms to bear vessels navigated by steam. Empire would have traced its way to its native seat in the plains of Chaldea; and the Prophet of Mecca would have swayed the sceptre, perhaps over the whole world. What Gibbon, in a quotation already made, said might have been anticipated, would have occurred, when "the interpretation of the Koran might have been taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might have demonstrated to a circumcised people, the sanctity and truth of the revelations of Mahomet." And what then would have been the effect in any attempt to propagate Christianity among the followers of the Prophet? How could Christians then hope to compete with the religion of the Koran; how hope to introduce a better system? Suppose the present hundred and twenty millions of believers in the Koran had been in possession of our science, our literature, our arts; suppose that they were in the possession of all the results of science in agriculture, chemistry, navigation, intercommunication by land and sea, and in domestic life; suppose in literature they had placed themselves where Christian nations now are; how next to hopeless would be the attempt to introduce among them a purer and a better faith. With their beautiful, philosophical language; with their high order of talent; with their zeal and devotion to any cause which they embrace;

with their union in the faith ; with their belief that their religion might be propagated, and consequently that all other religions may be resisted, by the sword, what a formidable front would the Mussulmen people present to any effort to spread among them the principles of our faith, and how distant, if not hopeless, would have been the conversion of the world to the Saviour !

God rules among the nations. He checks them at his pleasure, alike in the career of conquest, in science, and in the arts. He designed that these sciences should receive their form and consummation on Christian soils, and the splendid career of the Arabian was arrested, and the empire of science was transferred to Europe and America.

(3.) We notice a third fact in reference to the course of events which has given to the Christian scholar his present position. It is that Christianity and science at present are connected with the best type of mind in the world—the form best adapted to carry forth their combined influence over the nations. We mean, in general, that great class of mind known as the Teutonic mind, and especially the Anglo-Saxon mind. We have already adverted to this point, and it would be interesting to trace the course of events in this respect on a wider scale than has been done, and to see how, one after another, the true religion has somehow detached itself from certain forms of mind, leaving only a debased and miserable superstition ; and how, as already in part noticed, the incipient sciences have done the same thing, until they are now found influencing a single portion of the mind of the world, and receiving their best developments there. That mind, in its various branches, the most remarkable that the world has seen, is spreading its influence over all the nations. It is now the most philosophic, profound, learned, sagacious, and enterprising of all minds. It early showed, when it became known to Europe, a singular affinity, if we may be allowed the expression, with Christianity ; and the purest forms of Christianity have been manifested in connection with it. But all that is necessary to be said on this point farther may be comprised in two very brief statements. One is, that if on a map of the world, one should undertake to mark by bright colors the portions of the globe most distinguished for literature and science, he would be surprised to find with what accuracy he was designating the places where that order of mind is to be found, and at the same time surprised to find how nearly he marked out the limits where the Protestant faith prevails. The other is, that it is *that* form of mind that is now actively employed

in producing all the great changes in the world. But on these points, we have no space to enlarge.

We proceed to notice the Advantages which the facts above illustrated give to one entering on life in this age of the world. There are three thoughts which we will suggest.

The first is, that mind is *worth* more now than it has been at any former period of the world. It can be turned to better account; it is coming more and more to be appreciated. In a Christian community, in the circumstances which we have been illustrating, it is worth far more than it is in Turkey, in Persia, in China, in Arabia, in Africa; far more than it was in ancient Egypt, Assyria, Greece, or Rome; far more than it was in the days of Thomas Aquinas, Abelard, and Duns Scotus. Of what value, comparatively, was mind when the pyramids were built? Of what value was it in the dark ages of Europe? We pity a monk in his cell in the dark ages; and yet admire his industry, and his efforts to make something of himself. Many such a man, amidst the general indolence and corruption of those institutions, had true piety, and desired to serve God. He had industry, too, for his condition prompted him to find out something to do, just as now the dreadful loneliness and wretchedness of solitary imprisonment prompt the convict to plead for something to do. But what could the monk do? How could he employ his mind? If he busied himself with retorts and crucibles, he was in danger of impinging on some settled article of faith, and exposing himself to the terrors of excommunication, or to the rack. There were things that he could do, and did do, and the world should be thankful that he was not idle, while at the same time we feel that *mind* then was of little value. He could count his beads; he could visit the tomb of a saint—employments useless to the *world*. But he could also, with slow and patient toil, transcribe the sacred Scriptures,—ruling his parchment with great exactness; dividing his words with particular care; re-writing the whole if a word had been written wrong; illuminating certain parts of the manuscript, and giving brilliancy to certain letters. That was employment; it was pious and useful employment, and we should not despise what he did. But go into the rooms of the Bible Society. In a single hour, the press, attended by two or three boys, will throw off far more than the patient monk could transcribe by the labors of his whole life, and mind has been rescued in this way from humble drudgery for higher and more important ends. So every invention in a machine does it. The boy that by the application of a string in a steam engine, discovered the principle of the “eccentric,” and gave himself time to play, instead of working the valve by

his hand, released thousands of boys, not for play but for other employments. The invention of Whitney, relieved millions from the laborious and slow process of picking the seeds out of cotton, that they might be engaged for other purposes. The invention of Arkwright, relieved millions of females from the wheel and the distaff, that they might have time for the cultivation of the mind, and the pursuits of benevolence. The steam-mill for sawing marble, will do the work as well as immortal man; and it releases mind from a mere mechanical employment, for its higher and nobler functions. The machine which makes a nail, a button, a shoe-peg, an adze, or a hammer, is doing the work which *mind* must otherwise have much more slowly done, and gives, by all the facility by which it is done, an augmented value to the soul.

There never was a period of the world, when mind was *worth* as much as it is now. In consequence, there never was a period of so much responsibility, or when there was so little excuse for indolence and supineness. The reason for monasteries, and nunneries, and for indolence in all forms, has passed away. Shame on the educated mind that can find nothing to do! Shame on the spirit which would found monasteries and nunneries in this age and in this land!

(2.) The second thing to which we advert is, that mind now has higher *advantages* in accomplishing the purposes of benevolence, than at any former period of the world.

The facts to which we have called attention, give to Christian scholars an inestimable advantage in endeavoring to diffuse their religion around the world. For the heathen are beginning to see the superiority of Christian nations; beginning to feel, that somehow the Christian religion is connected, more than others, with all that tends to purify, elevate, and adorn society. The *prestige* is with us. The presumption is spreading farther and farther, that the same form of religion is desirable also for other people; that it would accomplish among them what it has done for us; and that the religion has all the evidence which these facts furnish—that it is from God. A Brahmin, forbidden by his religion to destroy life, was directed by a missionary to look through a microscope, and see the multitudes of living things in the water that he drank, and on the leaf, and to reflect how many lives were sacrificed every time he drank, and at every tread of his foot. Indignantly he seized the instrument and dashed it to the earth, for it had overturned the authority of all his sacred books, and all his religion. “May God curse all infidels and their works,” said the deputy of the Cadi in Mosul; “what comes from their hands is of Satan; it has pleased the Al-

mighty to let them be more powerful and ingenious than the true believers in this world, that their punishment, and the reward of the faithful may be greater in the next."¹ The fact of the superiority of Christians he could not deny, but his way of accounting for it is not that which will long prevail in the world.

The truth is, that wherever among barbarous tribes, or nations halfcivilized, the Christian scholar chooses now to go, the *presumption* goes before him that in all that contributes to the progress of society and the welfare of the race, he is superior to those to whom he goes. Every vessel that goes from a Christian to a heathen port; every steamship that plows the ocean, is an important agent in showing the superiority of the Christian religion to all other religions, and facilitating the reception of the message of salvation which the Christian missionary bears to distant shores. There is science making use of the magnetic needle; looking with unerring accuracy at the stars; triumphing over winds and waves; and directing civilized men to a distant land. There, too, may be science conveying a printing-press to some barbarous clime; bearing the telescope, the quadrant, the safety-lamp, the cotton-gin to some distant country; and there, too, conveyed by the triumphs of science across the deep, is the herald of salvation borne onward to tell the nations of a common Saviour, and a common heaven. Wherever, therefore, one goes from a Christian land to any other part of the world, he goes preceded by the presumption that he occupies a higher grade in civilization, in refinement, and in art, than those to which he goes, and is in possession of that which may be of immense advantage to every part of the world. This remark is of special importance as applicable to the Christian missionary. In the highest sense, and in every sense, he goes out as an *instructor*—prepared to carry out in all respects the injunction of his Saviour, "Go, therefore, and *teach* all nations."

Our last thought is, that the world is growing *better* than it was. It is better than it was in the times when Greece and Rome flourished; than it was in the times of the Christian fathers; than it was when Councils were held at Carthage, at Nice, at Clermont; than it was in the days of chivalry; than it was in the times of Elizabeth or James; than it was in the days of the Pilgrims; than it was a quarter of a century ago. There are those who do not believe this; and there is a class of orators and writers—usually old men, who are always endeavoring to prove that things are growing worse. This kind of argument and gloomy foreboding we always expect to find among those who are too indolent to keep up with the march

¹ Layard's Ruins of Ninevah, I. 130.

of the world ; among those who are covetous of a waning spiritual power ; among those who, by neglecting to improve themselves, have lost their influence, and who see others gaining the ascendancy ; and often among those who have advanced far in the journey of life. The belief that the world is growing worse, is frequently among the first indications of approaching age, and it is one of the sadnesses of that condition of life, that they who are becoming old see around them only evidences of deterioration and decay, and that their minds are embittered by contrasting those evidences of decay with the brighter things which the world possessed when they were young. We would have every man adopt it as a settled truth to be adhered to all along his journey of life ; in all times of change, and disappointment, and sorrow ; when the sun shines, and when clouds come over the sky ; when in the hey-day of youth, in the soberness of middle life, and when the shades begin to lengthen ; when he goes forth from college halls on the voyage of life, and when near its close he looks back over the career which he has run ; in the church, or in the state ; in reference to our own country, and in reference to all lands, that the world is growing better—that our own country is making advances—that the church is increasing in numbers, in purity, and in knowledge—and that there is a sure and steady progress toward the universal triumph of Christianity, and of civil and religious liberty.

ARTICLE III.

THE LIFE OF JOHN CALVIN.¹

By REV. J. W. McLANE, WILLIAMSBURG, N. Y.

RARE qualifications are demanded in a good biographer. To repeat what others have said—to mould anew materials already gathered up, and give them a peculiar tinge—to praise or censure, as the fit may take us, is easy enough. But for one to go back centuries in the track of time, and identify himself with the spirit of some bygone age—to get fully into the currents of thought, feeling and action then existing, and to search, and sift, and gather up nothing but the realities of truth,—to give every occurrence its place, every act its mo-

¹ THE LIFE OF JOHN CALVIN, compiled from authentic sources, and particularly from his correspondence. BY THOMAS H. DYER. New York. HARPERS. 1850.

tive, and every end its influence—to bring the past fully into the present—to place us in the society of some great and good man—to set him before us in all the peculiarities of his character, to show him to us in public when impulses from without are acting upon him; to enable us to go with him into the retired scenes of life where restraint is withdrawn—to enter his house, to sit down at his table, to listen to his conversation, to lean upon his bosom, and feel the throbbings even of his heart—in one word, to reproduce the veritable man, this is no easy thing. It requires peculiar qualifications. There must be a patience that tires not—an industry that toils on through all the tangled threads of incident—a discernment that sees clearly the boundaries of truth—a candor that will give a man the benefit of a doubt, of a charitable peradventure—such a discipline of the intellect and the heart, as will allow the truth to come forth without diminution or perversion. Most of all, there must be some kindred feeling—some sympathy of soul with the great principles of piety, which ruled in the actions of the man whose character is to be portrayed. Without this feeling we believe it impossible for any one to do justice to the conduct of exalted worth. If Festus had written the life of Paul, he would have pictured him to us as a mad enthusiast—as a wild roving fanatic. A Cavalier would have given a wretched delineation of the wisdom and elevation of soul in Hampden. A cringing courtier of Charles could never have written anything but a miserable caricature of the patriotism and the piety of a Covenanter. The reason is obvious. There was no sympathy in the mind of the one with the great principles which regulated the conduct of the other. In such a *diathesis* a man sees nothing but darkness in a pillar even of fire.

We are sorry to find a sad illustration of these remarks in the work of Mr. Dyer. So far as we can gather from these pages, he possesses none of those high qualifications requisite in a good biographer. Not one element has he, which fits him for the work he has undertaken—the delineations of Calvin's character—a man who lived in one of the most eventful periods of this world's history, and who was himself a chief actor in its great and troubled scenes—a man too, whose name is identified with the movements of a revolution, surpassed in importance only by that effected through the labors of the apostles; and who did more than almost any other uninspired man for the intellectual, social, and moral elevation of our race. The writer is not equal to the task. The subject is too great for his grasp. An old author humorously compares a certain geologist of his day to a gnat mounted upon the back of an

elephant, and laying down its theories, and making its assertions, respecting the whole internal structure of the vast animal, from the appearance of the skin, which came within the compass of its tiny vision. The moral of this incident has not been regarded in the case before us. Mr. Dyer sees nothing beyond the surface. He is unable to comprehend the greatness of Calvin's principles, and, therefore, unqualified to set forth his character in its true light. He has ventured entirely too far—has pushed out into waters whose depth he cannot fathom. It would have been well if he had followed the prudent advice of Poor Richard,

"Vessels large may venture more,
But little boats should keep near shore."

The work is wanting in almost every element of interest. In a *literary* aspect, it has no claim upon public attention. It presents no evidence of a vigorous, discriminating mind—no traces of the enthusiasm of true genius—no kindlings of soul as he goes up with the Reformer to those great moral elevations where he planted himself, and battled it, even unto death, for the victory. The surface of the book is unbroken by any hill or mountain height. All is one uniform *dead level*. As a *biography* of Calvin, the book is worthless. The pervading spirit of it is antagonism to the Reformer, and to the system of truth which bears his name. On almost every page we find evidence enough that the writer feels no love for the man, and none for his creed—that he has no sympathy with those great principles which governed Calvin's actions, and which produced in him those solemn and burning convictions that broke forth from his indignant soul, and made guilt cower, and monarchs tremble. As a high churchman, and an Arminian of the Tomline school, he can have but little fellow-feeling with one whose sentiments are so entirely opposite to his. The man of forms and ceremonies—he, who is content to stand in the outer court, and concerns not himself with those truths which are suited to the manly state of Christian life, is not the man to follow Calvin into the inner temple, and describe the workings of his mind in contact with the deep things of God's Word. He cannot relish a theology which makes so much of God, and so little of man. Yea, more. The man, who in this age puts in a plea for "cards, dancing, plays, and masquerades" as "innocent amusements," and as showing the "cheerful side of religion,"—he, who can speak of "special providence," of "the new birth," of "justification by faith," and of "the jargon of the elect," as the writer does in this volume, gives but little evidence of any personal acquaintance with the workings of true

religion, and is, therefore, wholly unqualified to write the life of such a man as Calvin. His mind gravitates too strongly toward the earth ever to ascend with Calvin in the elevations of his piety, in his sublime conceptions of God's infinite majesty, —or be willing to go down with him into the depths of man's littleness and entire dependence as a sinner. No; the advocate of "man's egoism" can never sympathize with Calvin's views of God's absolute supremacy.

We press this point. Calvin's *inner life* must be understood in order to comprehend the outward action. The fundamental principles of the man must be seen and appreciated ere his conduct as a Reformer can ever be described aright. He saw the Word of God stricken from its place, and tradition, the authority of man, exalted above it. And the question with him was, which is to rule the world, the truth or a lie? God or the devil? His decision was soon made, though it cost him a hard struggle, as he tells us, to break loose from the chains of Popery. He gave the Bible its place. He made it the supreme arbiter in every question of doctrine and of duty. To this light he brought every being and every act. He knew no distinction; he could make no difference. The high and the low, the rich and the poor, the monarch and his menial, must all bend to the same authority—must be meted by the same measure. He took his stand at once and forever by the Scriptures, and it mattered not with him who or what was arrayed against them; the depths of his soul were stirred by the dishonor thus thrown upon God's Word, and the same indignant feelings burst forth from his heart, and the same living thunderbolts flashed from his giant intellect.

Along with this enthronement of God's Word in the affections of the man, and, as one of its legitimate results, there was a deep working sympathy in his mind with the existence of Christian freedom. The peculiar state of things then existing in Europe helped to cultivate this feeling. Calvin came upon the threshold of active life when that continent was waking up from the slumber of a thousand years, and when the fires of persecution were blazing all around him. He saw the sufferings of God's people. The cup of bitterness was put to his own lips. He had to flee from his home—to dwell in secret places—to live for some time the life of a persecuted wanderer. Destined to hold up the hands of the saints, and to prepare a home for them, when persecuted in other lands, he was early made acquainted with this grief. Marked out, as he was, in the purposes of God as the instrument by which he would break the rod of the oppressor, and bring order out of confusion, and awaken in a million of hearts the desire of

freedom, Calvin was made to learn, at the very first, *the secret place of power*. The fires of persecution drove him for refuge to God, and thus prepared him for his great work. Oh ! how little do the enemies of God's truth think of this inevitable result of their opposition. The fire of the soul cannot be thus extinguished. The hay, wood, and stubble of persecution gathered around it, and designed to smother it, only increase the blaze and spread the conflagration. But this is not all. The strength of a righteous man, when persecuted, is always greater than at any other time. The blasts of the storm cause him to draw his principles closer around him, and thus brace him up. The calm would leave him on the surface, with his ordinary strength, quiet and unobserved in his work of love, but the whirlwinds of persecution are sure to lift him up, to bring him into wider notice, and with an increase of might. For every attack drives him nearer to God, and thus clothes him with mightier energies, and brings him out into the field of conflict with more of his heavenly armor on, filled with the spirit, and guarded by horses and chariots of fire, and, like Milton's angels, *vital* in every part.

Such was the result in Calvin's case. His trials filled him with strength. Starting with his one great postulate, the sufficiency and supreme authority of the Scriptures, and realizing, as the consequence, a free and unfettered mental independence, the Reformer's aim was to gain for the world the standard of faith, of worship, and of conduct, recorded in the Bible. He could recognize no other law—he could subject the minds of men to no other authority. In the freedom of the gospel, therefore, he took his position, and directed every eye to the Bible as the standard of faith—as the Magna Charta of religious liberty—as the living testimony against all the pretensions of spiritual despotism. Fearless and stern, he hurled the thunder of a righteous indignation against the work of persecution. With a heart bleeding for the woes of the distressed, and for the dishonor done to truth, he declared to the monarch of France, who had lighted these fires, “He is not a king, but a robber, who does not seek to promote the glory of God ; and most miserably is he deceived, who hopes to establish the prosperity of an empire, which is not governed by his Word.”

With these sentiments and feelings Calvin came to Geneva. He had been preceded by Farel, by whom the ancient polity, and the religion which supported it, were demolished, and the spirit of free inquiry excited among the people. A great work was to be done. The old forms had been thrown away; the reform spirit was aroused, and needed a master's hand to guide it. A new system of education, of civil jurisprudence, and of ecclesiastical government was to be established, and a strong

moral atmosphere created to sustain these institutions. Calvin undertook the task. He began with the Bible. Upon this foundation he built the entire superstructure. His aim was to enthrone the written Word in the hearts of the people. He saw the young republic starting into existence, and, as "an eagle, musing her mighty youth," and he would have her "kindle her dazzled eyes at the full midday beam, and unscale her long abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance." It was thus that he sought to make Geneva the abode of freedom—the Thermopylæ of the Reformation—the light of the world—a blessing to itself, and a blessing to others. He, therefore, who would rightly understand the conduct of Calvin, must view him *as moved in all his plans and purposes by one deep absorbing desire, the glory of God in the entire regency of his Word over thought, feeling, and action in man.*

Into this light, however, Mr. Dyer seems to have been unwilling to come. While he does not indulge in those wholesale attacks upon the character of the Reformer, which others have made, and is not guilty of the same barefaced offences against historic truth, he is yet very far from doing justice to the man. The whole aspect of the work is adverse to Calvin, and, in many instances, the statements are groundless, and the inferences drawn from them unjust and cruel. Indeed the book abounds with misrepresentations and insinuations respecting Calvin, that have not the slightest foundation in fact. He looks at everything from a wrong position, and through a perverting medium. He sees nothing, consequently, truly noble and praiseworthy in the man. There is always some drawback—some deduction to be made from everything bearing in his favor. If his humility is deep, still it has in it "a good deal of pride." If he was diligent and laborious above most men, still he was "ambitious." If he battled it nobly for the truth, he was yet "more concerned for his own reputation." If he reasoned logically from the Scriptures, there was this against him, that "he drew his conclusions with too great logical exactness." Thus, from the beginning to the end of the book, there is something said to lessen every virtue—to mar every excellence—to cast a shade upon every bright spot in the character of the man.

But we must come down to particulars. We owe it to ourselves, to the reader, and especially to the cause of truth, to expose some of the many misrepresentations of this book. If the result bears hard upon the fairness of Mr. Dyer, we cannot help it. To rescue a man from the rebuke he thus brings upon himself, is to arrest the progress of penal justice, and sin against the truth. Charity is an angel indeed when she rejoices in the truth, but a harlot when she countenances what is wrong.

Our author thus speaks of the courage of Calvin. "He was more inclined to propagate his doctrines by stealth, and at a safe distance, than to risk his life in maintaining them: Thus, though he was continually exhorting others to behave like martyrs, he was always disposed to fly at the first appearance of danger." p. 32. This we regard as entirely aside from the truth. He did not indeed possess the *natural* courage of Luther, or of Knox, but he had, through grace, what was far better. His whole history shows that he was raised above the fear of man. No danger dismayed him—no enemy arrested his progress. Strong in the power which truth imparts, and in his confidence in God, he moved fearlessly on amid a thousand difficulties. Opposed by the principalities and powers of the earth, he felt that he had the truth on his side, and, therefore, he quailed not. True, he had to flee from Paris, and so had Paul to escape secretly from Damascus. But did Calvin display no moral courage in Geneva, where he was opposed and menaced by the enemies of religion; from which he was actually banished; and where his life, after his return, was a living martyrdom for the truth? True courage—the highest, noblest exhibition of it—is seen in the man who, in the face of a frowning world, plants himself by the truth, and determines to stand there, let what will betide him. This Calvin did; meekly, firmly, unflinchingly did; and this is a

"Courage, to which the lion stoops his crest,
Yet grafted on qualities as soft
As a rocked infant's meekness."

"Calvin's mind," our author thinks, "was essentially logical." He is even prepared to admit, with a "perhaps," that "never has there existed so ardent a theologian with so little tincture of superstition or enthusiasm." p. 93. But afterwards, when he comes to account for his views of God's purposes, he says, "Hume has somewhere traced the doctrine of absolute decrees to a spirit of enthusiasm; and in its founder, (Calvin,) and many of his followers, this was, probably, its true origin." Recollecting, however, as it would seem, what he had said about Calvin's freedom from all enthusiasm, he attributes his adoption of this doctrine to "another disposition of mind," which in certain cases, he thinks, favors its reception, namely, "the love of systematizing, and of logical deduction." And then, as if still dissatisfied with his guessings, he adds yet another cause, "the gloomy view of religion which characterizes him as a theologian." p. 219. The author's powers of analysis, and of logical deduction, will not be doubted after this! He is sorely pressed here—flies from one perhaps and

hypothesis to another, never once imagining, as it would seem, that this "ardent theologian" found this doctrine in the Bible, and finally settles down upon Calvin's "gloomy views of religion," as the explanation of it all. The religion which leads a man to live godly in Christ Jesus, and to keep himself unspotted from the world, must, we suppose, always be exposed to the charge of "gloominess." Certain it is, at least, that it can never present that "cheerful aspect" which, in the view of some, "cards, dancing, plays, and masquerades" give to a profession of godliness. The life of *the Christian* is a race, the terminus of which is glory, and the condition of reaching it, thoughtful, earnest, agonizing effort. No one ever felt this more than Calvin. In his mind, life had a serious aspect, a momentous issue; and thought, and feeling, and action, were all enlisted for the prize. If this be gloom, let it be so.

The domestic life of the Reformer is set forth in these pages in a most forbidding light. "Calvin in love, is, indeed, a peculiar phase of his history. He had now arrived at the sufficiently mature age of thirty; and as his imagination had never been very susceptible, so, in the business of choosing a help-mate, he was guided wholly by motives of prudence and convenience. In fact, he left the matter entirely to his friends, just as one would buy a horse, or any other thing; giving them instructions as to the sort of article he wanted. His wretched health led him to seek for a nurse rather than a wife." p. 91. Calvin was a wise man. In him, reason regulated feeling, and gave a direction to action. He did not, therefore, belong to that passionate class of lovers, as he himself asserts, who, when once captivated with the external form, embrace also with eagerness the moral defects it may cover. He had his eye upon the intellect and the heart. The person "that alone could win his soul was one in whom grace and virtue, contentedness and suavity, were united with simplicity." He was seeking for some lasting bond of union—some similarity of mind—some sympathy of soul, growing out of kindred sentiments and training. And most richly was he rewarded for this exercise of wisdom. In his beloved Idelette he, found a most fitting companion—one, of whom, perhaps, it can as justly be said as of any of Eve's daughters, that

"Grace was in all her steps; heaven in her eye;
In ev'ry gesture dignity and love."

We pity, therefore, the man who can speak of such action, crowned as it was with so rich a blessing, as a cold, mercenary, selfish piece of business—action like that of "buying a horse!"

But the climax of misrepresentation, in reference to Calvin's domestic character, is yet to be stated. His happy union with Idelette lasted only nine years. Mr. Dyer thus speaks of the Reformer as affected by the death of his wife. "As convenience, rather than affection, had prompted his marriage, so the death of his partner does not seem to have caused him any excessive grief. The letters, indeed, in which he announces the event to his friends, contain the usual phrases of decent regret; but his bereavement did not for a moment divert him from the ordinary routine of his occupations." p. 204. This is cruel, and is as unjust as it is cruel. Calvin often spoke of his wife, while living, in the language of strong and deep affection, and of himself, when separated for a season from her, as "alone, comfortless, and without his stay." He saw the approaches of the disease, which terminated her earthly existence, and spoke of them with trembling anxiety. And when the hour came, and the silver chord was loosed, his great mind was bowed down to the very earth. "I do what I can," says he to Farel, "not to sink altogether under the weight of this misfortune. My friends leave nothing undone to lighten, in some measure, the sorrow of my soul." Years after this event, when comforting one who had been called to pass through the same deep waters, he says, "I well know, from my own feelings, how acute and burning the wound must be which the death of your excellent wife has inflicted." Does not all this evince the existence of deep feeling? True, Calvin continued, notwithstanding his burden of sorrow, to discharge his *official duties*. But was this any proof of *apathy* on his part? any evidence of a superficial grief? Can we reason in this way, and assert of any Christian minister, who is not so entirely overwhelmed by affliction as to be incapacitated for his duties, that he is wanting in tender sensibility—that his temperament is cold, unfeeling? Never. We should tremble to do so. Viret, in his letter to Calvin at that time, ascribes this conduct in him to the influence of the Holy Comforter, and speaks of it as "no common virtue"—as "no ordinary proof of the mercy of God to him." So we view it. Calvin knew where to go for consolation. He looked at once to Him, who giveth songs in the night, and was sustained. The harp of his spirit had, indeed, been torn and shattered by the storm, and, in that condition, would, by most men, have been laid aside for a time as useless; but Calvin, with a bleeding heart, at once drew near to Him who framed that harp, and who knows how to bind it up, and to make it produce its sweetest music—joy in tribulation.

But however cold and phlegmatic Calvin was in domestic

life, according to Mr. Dyer he was warm enough in the field of conflict. Here, however, the pendulum swings as far in the opposite direction, and we have Calvin presented as "passionate and vindictive, pursuing with bitterness and acrimony what most men would have overlooked with contempt." p. 126. We do not say that Calvin, in all the trying and exciting circumstances in which he was placed, never once lost command of his feelings; though Beza, who knew him so well, states that the Spirit of God enabled him so to govern himself, "that no expression, unworthy of a good man, ever fell from his lips." But what Mr. Dyer calls passion, anger, and the like, in most cases, men of candor would have denominated zeal for the truth. Calvin was indeed full of this. He had a most vehement desire for the honor of God's Word. He could not bear to see it perverted or trampled upon. In the hour of conflict, in his battles with error, this feeling kindled into an intense glow. But it was not passion—it was not anger—no; it was the kindling of his soul for the honor of God's Word—aye, it was the celestial gale of his spirit, which filled the sails of virtue and enabled him to multiply the storms of conscience against the dishonor done to truth. As to Calvin's "malice," or "vindictiveness," we may well reply in the language of that burning rebuke, given to this charge by a master in Israel,¹ and say, that "to speak of this is to utter what is false—is to contradict all that we know of his life and being."

We follow Mr. Dyer into the still darker shades which he would induce upon the character of this great man. In repeated instances he accuses him of duplicity, of saying one thing and intending another, and more than intimates his want of truth, and of an unbending conscience. Every one familiar with the history of the Reformer, knows what a protracted struggle there was in his mind about returning to Geneva after his banishment from that city. Our author thinks that "this reluctance was in some measure real," but "cannot help suspecting that he made the most of the conjuncture," that he "coquetted and raised difficulties." p. 109. This is all *suspicion*, and is as destitute of any real foundation in truth, as it is beneath the dignity of an honest historian to utter it. Again: Calvin, as is well known, denied that he had any hand in the apprehension of Servetus in Vienna. This, our author admits, "may be *literally* true," but thinks that there was some "subterfuge" in the statement, and, in order to justify himself in harboring such dark suspicion, asserts that "Calvin's conscience was rather pliant in the matter of reservations, as may be seen in a letter of his to the Duchess of Ferrara; in which

¹ Dr. Paul Henry, of Berlin.

he tells her that she is not obliged to keep an oath administered to her when called on to take part in the French government." And then in a note he adds, "These *reservations* became characteristic of the Puritans." p. 301. Grosser misrepresentations it would be difficult to find anywhere. This stale slander respecting the Puritans has been refuted a thousand times, and buried, we had supposed, in oblivion. Mr. Dyer, however, will have the credit of once more raking it up from the ashes of the sepulchre, and of sending "the baseless fabric of a vision" abroad over the earth.

But our concern, at present, with this singular statement respects Calvin. In proof of his sweeping charge, the author refers to his letter to the Duchess of Ferrara, but there is not a word there about any *mental reservation*. The facts are simply these: The Duchess had warmly espoused the Protestant cause—had afforded protection and encouragement to the persecuted saints. After the death of her husband she was called to take part in the government of France. The oath of office stipulated, among other things, *fidelity to the Catholic religion*. This oath she foolishly took. Calvin, for whom she entertained the highest respect, felt, that in doing this she had acted wrong, and wrote to her as follows: "Since you have sinned in this and offended God, you are not bound to keep this oath. You know that Herod is not praised for having observed the oath he rashly took; but is known rather to have fallen into a two-fold condemnation." This, then, is the head and front of Calvin's offending. He tells a person who had taken an oath to do a wicked thing, that she is not bound to keep that oath. Does this show a *pliant* conscience? a trifling with truth and righteousness? The Duchess saw her error—followed Calvin's advice, and retired from the government. How baseless then is the charge in question! Dr. Henry, in his admirable life of Calvin, says that "he was pre-eminently a conscientious man;" that "the genuine love of truth formed the foundation of his character, and exercised the most remarkable influence over his life"—that it was "the highest point in the development of the man, and the profoundest in his nature." And Beza too testifies that "he was as determined an enemy of hypocrisy and deceit, especially in matters concerning religion, as he was a warm friend of sincerity, simplicity, and childlike purity of soul." Such testimony is refreshing, and places the work of perversion and detraction in its true light.

Throughout his work Mr. Dyer represents Calvin, as "cruel and despotic,"—as "exercising spiritual tyranny,"—as "usurping power,"—and as "aiming to establish in Geneva a theocracy of which he himself was to be the oracle, the

prophet, and the dictator." He, therefore, asserts "that Gruet was the victim of Calvin's ascendancy, and of his desire of making the power of his consistory absolute." p. 185. This charge is taken entirely from the falsehood of the convicted libertine, whose condemnation for high treason must have taken place, if Calvin had not been in Geneva. While, therefore, we abhor *the torture*, to which the wretched man was subjected, we feel still more indignant at *the greater torture* inflicted upon the truth, in the attempt made to fix the odium of that cruelty upon Calvin. It has not the shadow even of truth to sustain it. "Nothing," as Henry says, "can be more ridiculous than the clamor raised at the mention of Gruet's torture, as if Calvin was the author of its infliction. Not the slightest evidence exists in history that such was the case."

In the same reckless spirit of crimination, our author would implicate the Reformer in the assassination of the Duke of Guise, and this too with the fact before him that Calvin had, in a previous instance, entirely opposed such violence. The only ground he has for this horrible insinuation is the circumstance that Calvin, "who had always besought God to have mercy on him," prayed, when the persecuting Duke was shedding the blood of the saints, "that the Lord would lay his hand upon him, and deliver the church from his ravages, if it was not his will to convert him." But did that implicate him in the guilt of the assassin? Paul prayed the Lord to reward Alexander the coppersmith according to his works. What if some one had taken it upon himself to mete out that measure to the guilty man, would Paul have been the abettor of the violence? David prayed that God would even cut off his enemies. And suppose some one had plunged the dagger into them, would David's prayer have implicated him in the murder? Is Mr. Dyer not casuist enough to know that asking God to do an act, is not the same thing as instigating a man to do it? This glaring injustice does not stop here. The writer goes on, and even raises the question, whether Calvin may not have had some agency in kindling up the first fires of death in Protestant England—in bringing the unhappy Joan of Kent to the stake. The insinuation is that he instigated Cranmer to the work of persecution, and this upon no other evidence than a construction put upon his letter to the Archbishop, which stultifies itself. Such charges and surmises show the spirit of the author—demonstrate the utter worthlessness of the book as a record of facts. Biography is an important element of history—is one of the sources from which its details are gathered up, and its lessons of wisdom made out. Deep and lasting injury is done, therefore, to the cause of truth, whenever that element becomes a perversion of facts.

These charges of cruel and unrelenting persecution are, however, only preliminary to that brought against the Reformer in the matter of Servetus. Here the writer puts forth all his strength. He accuses Calvin of holding "sentiments pre-eminent for their atrocity" even in that distant age, and of "abandoning principles previously advocated by him." The injustice done to Calvin in this matter cannot be lightly passed over. The cause of truth demands that it should be fully exposed. All the alleviating circumstances connected with the affair, are studiously withheld. The charity, extended to others, is denied to Calvin. Charges are put forth against him, as if he *alone* was responsible for the burning of Servetus—as if the destinies of that wretched man were entirely in his hands—as if it was equally in his power to save or to destroy. Calvin is thus pushed out into the forefront of the picture as the cruel, unfeeling persecutor, while the other great and good men of that age are tender-hearted—are for mild and tolerant measures, but are overborne and thwarted, and their tender mercies extinguished, by the stern and unrelenting autocrat of Geneva. Never was there more signal injustice done; never has the testimony of history been more sadly misrepresented, or the spirit of truth more deeply wounded.

The want of candor, and of manly bearing here among the enemies of Calvin, is most remarkable. All join in the hue-and-cry. No sect or party, however guilty, however implicated in the work of persecution, has failed to cast odium upon his conduct in this matter. Even Romanists have lifted their voice against him. Romanists! the history of whose Church is written in the blood, and published in the tears and groans of a thousand years,—a Church, whose infamy it is to have originated the Inquisition and the auto-da-fe, and whose whole existence is connected with scenes of cruelty and torture; which make "the cheek of darkness pale;" a Church too, which had actually tried and condemned this very Servetus to the flames, and from which he escaped only by escaping from prison. Romanists crying out against the punishment of a heretic! "The Gracchi declaiming against sedition"! The whited sepulchres of Jerusalem finding fault with uncleanness! It is too much for our nerves! and we turn away from the horrid inconsistency. In common with all the friends of toleration and freedom of opinion, we mourn over the sad influence which Rome's maxims had upon the first action of the Reformation in all countries. But it must be remembered that it was no easy thing to come out of *such* darkness all at once—no easy thing to free the mind immediately from all its hurtful, perverting impressions. The wonder is, that the leaders in that work

were what they were. Reform is gradual. The light comes in by degrees. Persecution was the strange work of Protestantism—was the exception to her rule of freedom—the last lingering shade of that darkness from which she was fleeing forever.

The state of things in Geneva, at the time Servetus made his appearance there, was peculiar. The cause of the Reformation there, and the Republic itself were in peril. A party, that had long been restive under the wholesome restraints of virtue, were gaining influence, and intending to change the whole constitution of the church—a design which might easily be made auxiliary to the still darker and more determined purpose of Servetus—its entire dissolution. Let it be borne in mind here that in those days the cause of the Reformation was the cause of civil freedom also. They advanced together. The spiritual worked out the temporal deliverance, and sustained it. The church was united with the state. Whatever touched the one, was sure to affect the other also. If the former sunk, so must the latter. If the evangelical faith ceased to prevail, the Republic must fall. The state, therefore, could never be indifferent to the existence of anything which tended to result in its own ruin. The truth was its guardian—the mighty ægis of its protection. This was seen by Calvin, and by all the friends of the Reformation. It was seen by the magistrates of Geneva, who were thoroughly convinced that the prevalence there of sentiments which destroy all moral obligation, and sap the very foundations of society and of government, would be the overthrow of the church, and the consequent downfall of the Republic. And hence they acted as they did.

The crime for which Servetus was arrested and tried was no ordinary one. It was not that he differed in opinion from Calvin—not that he rejected his theological views—nor even that he impugned the common faith of the Protestant churches. No; this was not his offence. His shafts were aimed at the vitals of religion—at the foundation of all moral obligation—at the very existence even of God. His crime was the utterance of the most revolting blasphemy. It was for this that he was tried in Geneva, and justly, as we believe. For blasphemy is an offence against the community, and ought to be punished. So Calvin felt—and so the whole Christian world in his day believed. The cry of persecution here is entirely out of place. That is an attempt to force the conscience—to make a man believe contrary to his convictions of truth. This the law cannot—ought not to do. But the punishment of blasphemy is a very different thing. A man may think as he pleases; but he has no right to utter sentiments which corrupt the minds of

men. He has no right to exhibit an obscene picture, or to utter obscene and blasphemous language. The legal maxim, applied to property, is equally applicable here: *Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas*. Let each one so use his freedom, enjoy his faith, as not to injure the rights of others. Blasphemy transgresses this rule. It is, therefore, an offence against the interests of the community, and ought to be punished. In saying this, we do but give utterance to the common sentiment in all Christian countries. In England it is punished as an offence at common law. They proceed on the principle that Christianity is a part of the common law, and that whatever, therefore, strikes at the foundations of this, tends to subvert all rule and all authority. The same great principle is maintained in this country. 'Again and again have our courts acted upon it; and men have been tried for this offence, convicted, and sentenced to fine and imprisonment.' In causing Servetus, then, to be arrested and tried for blasphemy, Calvin did what good men have ever since done—what our highest civil tribunals have ruled to be correct. He felt that blasphemy is an offence—is a flagrant crime against the peace and order of society, yea, against the very existence even of civil government, and he acted accordingly. So far we contend he did what was right—what every good citizen ought to do.

The death of Servetus formed no part of Calvin's design in the prosecution. This, it is true, was the punishment of those who *obstinately persisted* in their blasphemies. But it was by no means the inevitable result of a conviction of that offence. A confession of guilt—a promise of amendment, affected the whole issue of the case. Calvin's object, therefore, was to prevent the mischief of Servetus, by effecting, through this process, his reformation. He had tried other and milder measures. He had often admonished him—had done all that persuasion could do to turn him from his wickedness; but all was in vain. He still persisted in his course. He might, as Calvin asserts, have saved his life by *mere moderation*. Instead of this, he gave utterance, during his trial, to the most awful blasphemies—blasphemies so shocking as to astonish every one, and render his conviction inevitable.

The Court adjudged him guilty, and sentenced him to be

¹ In this State a man named Ruggles, was, in 1810, tried for blasphemy, convicted, and sentenced to three months' imprisonment, and to pay a fine of five hundred dollars. In this case, the prisoner's counsel objected to his being tried for this offence, on the ground that Christianity is not here a part of the common law. Chancellor Kent overruled the objection, and affirmed the existence here of the same great principle which obtains in the English courts. Again, in 1834, Abner Kneeland was tried in Boston for this offence, convicted and sentenced to sixty days' imprisonment in the common jail.

burned to death. Here was the error in the case—the error indeed of the times, and followed universally in the jurisprudence of that age. *This sentence, however, was not in accordance with Calvin's feelings.* He wished to save the life of the man by inducing him to retract his blasphemies. When he failed in this, he exerted all his influence to have the *mode* of punishment changed. He felt indeed that, under all the circumstances of the case, the man ought to suffer death. He looked upon his crime as *treason* against the State, and, as such, deserving of death, but not in the terrific form of the sentence. To this he was entirely opposed. But he could effect no change. The judges were inexorable. The only thing, then, that can be said against the Reformer touching this whole transaction is, that *he favored a degree of punishment in such cases now deemed too severe.* But with what an ill grace does even this charge come from a man, the penal code of whose country is so excessively sanguinary, and which actually sentences the criminal, in the case of treason, to be drawn on a hurdle to the place of execution, to be hanged by the neck, to be cut down alive, disembowelled and quartered! Aye, with what painful inconsistency does it come from a man, whose church, in the person of her Primate, compelled young Edward to commit to the flames a poor, weak, ignorant *woman*, and not for the thousandth part of the guilt of Servetus,—a man whose church through her bishops was in that very age hunting down, imprisoning, torturing, and burning men to death for reading and circulating the Bible in English! We blush for the *equity* of the man; who, while he would put Calvin in the pillory of this world's scorn for what he never did, does at the same time pass most charitably over that in the leaders of his own church, which few men on earth could ever have had the heart to do.

The work of misrepresentation and injustice is crowned by Mr. Dyer in accounting for this and other acts of Calvin's life. "Pride"—a concern for his "literary reputation, or his authority as a teacher," he thinks had much to do in the movements of the man. "He loved Castellio," he says, "till their views began to clash, and then he pursued him with the most unrelenting malignity. Though acquainted with the views of Socinus, and the other Italian anti-trinitarians, he tolerated those heretics so long as they flattered him; but when he discovered that this flattery was a mere cloak and pretence, his indignation knew no bounds. Nay, he even endured and corresponded with Servetus, the arch-heretic of them all, till he found himself ridiculed and abused by the Spaniard, and then he formed the resolution of putting him to death; a design

which he cherished for seven years, and which he effected the moment it was in his power to do so : and that in spite of the mild and tolerant principles which his understanding, when calm and unruffled, had led him deliberately to lay down." p. 438. We know not how to speak of this terrible paragraph. It mocks all that has gone before it—sets truth at defiance—and marches straight forward in the work of defamation. It resembles one of those Gothic irruptions into the sanctuary of departed genius and piety, so graphically described by Moore, which defaced what it could not understand, polluted what it had not the soul to reverence, and took revenge for its own darkness in the wanton profanation of all that is held sacred in the hearts of others. Public sentiment in *heathen* Rome put forth its *Nil de mortuis nisi bonum* to protect the memory of the dead. The *last lingerings* of veneration in the Jew built the tombs of the prophets, and garnished the sepulchres of the righteous. But in our day this feeling is at a still lower ebb, and men are found, whose business and delight it is to pull down and to destroy.

Calvin was a great man—great in the grasp of his intellect, and in the goodness of his heart. He was the master-spirit of his age—was one of those great men, who appear in our world at intervals of centuries, and who stand out on the canvass of its history so far in advance of all others. He no doubt had his faults. It would be strange indeed, if in all the trying circumstances in which he was called to act, he had never spoken a hasty word, or for a single moment lost command of his feelings. We look for no such miracle in fallen man. But to the eye that is single the whole disk of Calvin's character is full of light—so full, that the spots, whatever they may be, like those in the sun, are not seen except through some *discolored* medium, and by the aid of some *magnifier*. And little, therefore, do we envy the feelings of the man, who, in his eager desire to detect and expose the blemish, shuts out from his mind the full orb of brightness. Calvin's character, we repeat it, is full of light—light that will shine on and bless our world in despite of all attempts to dim or extinguish it. The name of the man will live, and be revered, as long as the truth, he so nobly defended, shall continue to exist.

ARTICLE III.

LUCIAN DE MORTE PEREGRINI.

By H. B. PERRY, A.M., Prof. Greek Language and Literature, Brown University, R. I.

ONE of the most interesting heathen writers who have left us valuable evidence concerning the life, belief and worship of the early Christians, is the infidel and scoffing Lucian. This distinguished author, the Aristophanes of his age, was a native of Syria. The precise time at which he lived it is impossible now to determine. According to Suidas, the only ancient historian who speaks of him, he was a contemporary of Trajan. Many however believe that he lived at a much later period, some indeed in the times of the Antonines and Commodus.

If it be that Lucian wrote the *Philopatris*, Suidas is undoubtedly correct in saying that he lived not only as early as the time of Trajan, but even before. Mention is made, in that keen satire and burlesque upon the Christians, of events which some place under Nero, and some even under Claudius. There is in it a direct allusion to the preaching of John the Baptist, to Paul, and even to Christ; and these allusions are of such a life-like character that one cannot rid himself of the impression that the author, whoever he may be, had been a witness of the scenes and events which he takes such trouble to ridicule. The times depicted in it are those of the apostles, or their immediate followers. The customs, manners, and events, everything indeed that concerns that noble band of Christian believers, most significantly indicates the first century of the Christian era.

The account of the life and death of the mountebank, *Peregrinus*, belongs undoubtedly to Lucian. That, to us, bears the impress of times as early as those of Trajan. The author strangely confounds the Christians with the Jews, which at that time was as common as it was natural. Even Tacitus makes not the proper distinction. But that a writer of Lucian's industry and acuteness, at a much later period, should not have properly discriminated between them, is improbable. If it be objected that the *Philopatris* displays much more minute and accurate information concerning the Christians, it might be considered to have been composed at a later period when by proper inquiry and examination the author had come to make a proper distinction. Indeed, no supposition could be more natural than that, when the author had in earnest undertaken the task of writing a burlesque upon the Christians, he should gather together that information concerning them, in which at some previous period, he was deficient.

The manner also in which Lucian in the *De Morte Peregrini* speaks of the crucifixion is singular. He makes allusion to the crucified Redeemer as a person well known in his time. It is not spoken of as an event that took place so long before that there should be the least doubt of its real and actual occurrence. No shadow of antiquity hangs over it that would cause us to believe a suspicion was entertained that the story was fabulous. No use of *πάλαι*, *πρότερον*, or any other particles that would indicate that a century had elapsed since the Saviour hung upon the cross—that it was so effaced by antiquity that the circumstance of time must be mentioned to bring it vividly before the mind of the reader. The Saviour is spoken of as *Him crucified*, well enough known to all.

But the Saviour is also particularly spoken of as a Sophist, an imposter. The divine doctrine which he came into the world to preach is called *the Wonderful Wisdom or Sophistry*, τὴν θαυμαστὴν σοφίαν. This would indicate the age during which Pliny dispatched his memorable letter to Trajan. It accords well with what both Pliny and Tacitus say of that *prava et immodica superstitio*, and would argue a time when the Christian faith was as yet confined to a few. Not only this but it is spoken of as a new religion, *καινὴν ταύτην τελεστέην*, just introduced into this life. All this significantly indicates the first century of the Christian era. Indeed all he says of their opinions, beliefs, customs, manners, and devotions points unmistakeably to the same period. There is much therefore in what he says of the Christians to lead us to the conclusion that Lucian lived, as Suidas says, in the times of Trajan, if not before.

His travels in search of knowledge, after the custom of his times, were extensive. He visited most of the cities of the East and the West. While in Asia Minor his principal place of residence was Ephesus. Much must he have mingled with those Christians to whom Paul gives that sound instruction contained in his Epistles.

While in the West he resided at Athens. Here he had ample opportunity of doing that homage to the immortal remains of Greece divine, so often rendered in later days by her fervent and devoted disciples. How deeply he drank at the Pierian spring, may be gathered from every page of his writings. The language that Homer could not exhaust, nor Demosthenes fathom, was studied in all its beauty, force, and purity. Aristophanes, the wonderful, the wit, the buffoon, the profound philosopher, was doubtless his morning study, and his midnight retreat. How deeply he penetrated the exhaustless fund of wit and humor, jest and seriousness, buffoonery and philosophy, to be found in this author's writings, may be gathered

from the sparkling thought and pure Attic that characterize his own.

An universal skeptic, scoffer, and infidel, he believed not in the soul's immortality, and had no hope beyond the grave. Spert on this subject, his irony, raillery, and satire knew no bounds. Keenly alive to the religious follies of mankind, he handled the tales and legends of the heathen poets, concerning the attributes and exploits of the gods, with unsparing severity. Nothing ridiculous or absurd in religion escaped his raillery and sarcasm.

That he should have attacked the Christians, and their religion, is not strange. One so given to scoffing, could meet with no system not ridiculous in his eyes. Relying, like every infidel, on his own unaided powers, and a firm believer in the supremacy of the human reason, he could not comprehend that faith which believed that Christ was the Son of God, and the sufficient sacrifice for our sins. Especially, the personal character of the despised and prayerful Christians would be the objects of his keenest satire. But, conducted as it was with all the intensity of his railing and sarcastic spirit, even then it was futile. In the three pieces which have come down to us, and in which he makes allusion to the Christians, there is but little to excite a smile, save the wonderful simplicity of those who held the faith. The designing could, with ease, impose upon them. But we see them, at once, separating from such when their crimes had become known. It is because Lucian looked with a scoffing and contemptuous spirit equally on things human and divine, that he found in his intercourse and enquiries among them the least subject for ridicule. We have not been left in the dark on this point. Pliny is a witness to their honesty, sobriety, and godliness. But the account of Lucian, such as it is, has the highest and most absorbing interest.

The *De Morte Peregrini*, or the account of the life, death, and character of the mountebank Peregrinus, or Proteus, as he was sometimes called, is one of the most graphic and interesting narratives which this remarkable writer has left us.

Peregrinus was a Parian by birth, and lived in the time of the Emperor Trajan, about a hundred years after Christ. Christianity had then become quite widely spread abroad, though it had not, as yet, gained that power and authority which made it felt and courted during the reign of Julian. It was, as yet, counted a *depraved* and *immoderate superstition*, and, if we are to trust Tacitus and Pliny, was so reckoned by the civil power, though it had been unable to gather the least proof that it was so. It was in Bithynia, where they had be-

come quite numerous, that Pliny, its governor, was called upon, as we learn from his memorable letter to Trajan, to institute an inquiry into their conduct and character. Though he united in calling them the victims of a depraved superstition (*prava superstitio*;) still, he confessed that this was the sum of their crime or error,¹ "that they were accustomed to come together on a stated day, before light, and bind themselves by an oath, not for any crime, but that they would not commit theft, robbery, nor adultery, that they would not be faithless nor false to a trust: when these things were done, it was their custom to depart, and come together again to take their food, promiscuously, but not with crime."

Lucian also is a witness to their sobriety, prayerfulness, and godliness, directly, in plain declaration to that effect, and indirectly, when he records the imposition of which Peregrinus was guilty. For had not their lives and conduct been such as to meet the approbation of the heathen from whom they had separated themselves, there had been no object in the imposition, the impostor could have gained nothing. The simple fact then that Peregrinus sought admission among their number is evidence that even in its earliest infancy, the Christian religion had professors who lived lives of godliness which commanded the admiration of those among whom they dwelt.

We have said that the impostor was a Parian by birth. Paria was a small country in Asia Minor on the shores of the Pontus. The greater portion of his life, according to Aulus Gellius who has given an account of him, was spent in Palestine. His early life was but a mingled scene of dissipation and debauchery, unrelieved by the least shadow of a virtue. Before he had arrived at man's estate he strangled his aged father, that he might the sooner come to the possession of his property. In this attempt he was foiled, for the crime came to light and aroused the indignation of the citizens, by whom he was driven out of Paria. Wandering about he came, among other places, to Palestine. It was here that he fell in with the Christians upon whose honesty and simplicity he imposed that he might gain a sustenance and gratify his love of fame. He became distinguished among them, obtained money and assistance from them in his many distresses, but was finally found out and abandoned. He returned to his native country where he hoped his crimes had been forgotten, and made an attempt to get pos-

¹ Hanc fuisse summam vel culpæ suæ, vel erroris, quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire: carmenque Christo quasi Deo, dicere secum invicem; seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depositum appellati abnegarent: quibus peractis morem sibi discedendi fuisse, rursusque coeundi ad capiendum cibum, promiscuum tamen et innoxium.—Plin. Lib. X. 97.

session of his property; but was again expelled, and thence he wandered to Italy. Here he distinguished himself by railing against every person and everything with his slanderous tongue. He spared not even the king in his venomous attacks. His vices and crimes knew no bounds, and he was finally cast out with Mousonius, Dio, and Epictetus. He now wandered into Greece and Egypt and other countries, at each place distinguished alike for his boastful, swaggering and vain-glorious spirit. He finally came into Elis at the time the Greeks were celebrating the Olympic Games. His braggart sayings at this place as recorded would prove him the veriest madman. He at this time professed to be a Stoic. In order to prove his sincerity he erected a funeral pile, and, in the presence of the assembled multitude, threw himself upon it, and perished amid the rejoicing of the Cynics. His name was ever afterward held in reverence by them.

Such was the fate of the infidel Peregrinus, and such the fate of a multitude who lived at that time, and of which he might be considered a fit representative. The corrupt system of Paganism was proved unsatisfying to the immortal soul and was breaking up. No wonder their faith was shattered. In any case the passage from one religious system to another is perilous. But in this case it was doubly so. A system that had held heathenism in bondage for a thousand years—that was rendered indissoluble by its union with the state, and by the dependence upon it of every ramification of society—that could boast of temples innumerable in number and gorgeous in splendor, in honor of whose patron gods, kings, and princes delighted to make offerings—that had a system of oracles which coming home to every one perpetuated its power—that had mysteries that bound faster the initiated, and kept in awe the profane—that could number its countless superstitious devotees who would fall upon their faces and cry “Great is Diana of the Ephesians;”—this system, with all its splendor and mysterious ceremonies, had been weighed in the balance and found wanting. No wonder that the faith of its miserable devotees was shattered. When cut aloof from a system which had proved corrupt and false, they plunged into the open sea of human speculation, only to be carried over into the abyss of infidelity. When called upon to transfer that faith which they had given to Paganism to the saving faith as it is in Jesus, they hesitated. The right of unrestricted speculation and inquiry—the sacred right of private judgment and reliance upon human reason, which only leads to a rationalism that ends in infidelity, could not be renounced for that believing, undoubting,

unenquiring faith which Paul inculcates as the foundation of Christ's holy church, and which he, at his second coming, would find abiding with his people.

The times which we have lived to see present a case precisely similar. We protest against the rottenness and corruption of Rome—we protest against the infallibility of her decision, whether by Pope or by Council—we would transfer our faith in priests and cardinals to the simpler record of the Scriptures as an unerring rule of faith. But in breaking off from Rome did we not place that faith in jeopardy? Did we not cross the miry gulf of human speculation at the peril of bearing away with us the filth of rationalism? Let French infidelity, declaring that there is no God, and voting death an eternal sleep—let German rationalism, which believes nothing but what will quadrate with human reason—let the infidel, scoffing and fiendish spirit of this free-thinking age, which will countenance the speculations of Swedenborg, the revelations of Davis, and *alphabetical* communications with the spirit-world, be the answer.

Having sketched the life and character of the impostor Peregrinus, let us gather up the information concerning the Christians which Lucian has left us in his account of the impostor. After giving an account of the exile and wanderings of Peregrinus, the author follows him to Palestine, and introduces him to the Christians.

“At this time, also,” continues Lucian, “he (Peregrinus) came in possession of the wonderful wisdom (*σοφία*) of the Christians. And to what purpose? Why, in a short time he proved them but children, himself becoming their prophet and sacrificer, their leader in the synagogue and everything else. Some, also, of their books he brought forth and divulged; he also composed many, and they reckoned him as a god, and followed him as a lawgiver, and declared him their chief. They were, at that time, and still are doing reverence to Him, the great man, who was crucified in Palestine, because he brought that new doctrine (*τελότης*, end or object,) into life.

“And for this, also, was Proteus (alias Peregrinus) apprehended and cast into prison. This imprisonment he reckoned no small subject of boasting, in conformity with the usual tenor of his life, with his love of exciting wonder, and his vain glory, of which he was enamored. But when he had been bound, the Christians, thinking the event a common misfortune, moved all things in their attempt to snatch him away. When this was found impossible, they rendered him every service in their power, not in an indifferent manner, but with zeal; and from early morning were to be seen old women, widows, and

orphans, wandering about the prison. And some of his friends, in the fulfilment of what they considered their duty, slept with him in the prison, having corrupted the guards. Moreover, various dishes were carried in, their divine narratives were read, and this best Peregrinus (for he was, as yet, so called) was accounted a new Socrates by them.

"There also came Christians from the cities of Asia, sent at common expense, in order to assist and carry on the synagogue with them, and give consolation to the man. It is wonderful what alertness is displayed when any such calamity happens. For, upon the shortest notice, they lavish out everything in profusion. At this time, also, no small contributions of money were made for Peregrinus, because he was in bonds. The miserable devotees persuade themselves that they are immortal, and shall live forever. For this reason, they also despise death, and many willingly give themselves up. Moreover, their lawgiver, the first, enjoined them all to be brethren, that, having once confessed, they should deny the Grecian gods, and worship that sophist of theirs who was crucified, and live according to his laws. They therefore despise all others alike, whoever they may be, and consider everything in common among themselves, each freely receiving without making any pledge. If, therefore, there came among them any mountebank, or deceiver, he, in a short time, became rich, making drafts upon private men, who were considered as brothers.

"But Peregrinus was spared by the then governor of Syria, a man who delighted in philosophy, who, perceiving his folly, and that he desired to die, that he might leave glory for himself, dismissed him, not thinking him worthy of punishment.

"He then went forth to wander about the second time, calling upon the Christians to pay his fare, and, by means of whom, he lived in abundance. In this manner he lived some time. But afterward, having broken some law which held among them, (I think he was caught eating something forbidden by them,) in trouble because they no longer received and admitted him, he made another attempt to get possession of his paternal estate."

This account has the appearance of honesty and general truthfulness; but there are particulars in which the author is manifestly in error, arising, sometimes, from inaccuracy of information, sometimes from prejudice. In the first place, he has fallen into the usual error of heathen writers on the subject, of confounding the Jews and Christians. The Jews had "priests," "scribes," "prophets," "sacrificers," and "leaders of synagogues," but not the Christians. Each believer was a high-priest unto Christ, and, consequently,

there was no need of an established order to minister as did the Jewish priesthood in the temple—the law had, in a measure, been superseded by the gospel, and, consequently, there was no need of scribes to read and expound it: the New Testament was the fulfillment of prophecy, and, consequently, commissions had been withdrawn from those charged with opening the future to our gaze: the sacrifice had been made, and Christianity needed not a sacrificer; in fine, the whole system of the Jewish rites and ceremonies commanded by the law had given place to the purer worship of the Spirit.

So also the “books” (τῶν βιβλίων) of which Lucian speaks, some of which Peregrinus is said to have divulged and many to have written, were probably the Jewish books. There is no evidence that the records of the New Testament were kept secret, while the Old were preserved with remarkable care and vigilance. Indeed, the writings of Christians were published to the world, and circulated with zeal and enthusiasm.

Such errors as these do not at all invalidate the fidelity and truthfulness of the general account. We may allow that the general statement of Peregrinus’ intimacy with the Christians is true, while believing that the particulars are not so. It would be very natural for the author, in his account, to attempt to give the reasons of the intimacy. Ignorant of the precise difference between the Jews and Christians, and having heard of such public teachers among them as priests, scribes, prophets, etc., it would be natural for him to ascribe that intimacy to his association with such orders of the Jewish priesthood.¹

¹ This confusion was not unusual. Indeed, the proper difference was seldom made. Suetonius confounds them. He says, in his life of Claudius, *cap. 25*, *Judeos, impulsore Christo, assidue tumultuantes Roma expulit*. “Rome drove out the Jews, who, at the instigation of Christ, were creating trouble.” So, also, Arian confounds them, when, speaking of the peculiarities of the Jews, he says, 2, 9: “When we see any one adapting himself to more than one character, we are accustomed to say, He is not a Jew, but a deceiver. But when he shall have received the mark (σῆμα) of baptism and calling, then, in reality, he is called a Jew. In regard to the word *baptized*, (βεβαμμένον,) he is most assuredly in error. The Jews were never baptized. So, also, the word *ἡσχημένον* sounds very much like its use in the New Testament, where the *disciples* are spoken of as *called* or *chosen*. Tacitus himself seems to have been ignorant of the true distinction between the Jews and Christians. Hence perhaps it is that he comes to charge the crimes of the former upon the latter.—*Vid. Ann.*

According to Suidas, the followers of Christ were first known by the name of Christians in the time of Claudius, when Peter was preaching in Antioch. They were before called Nazarines and Galileans. His words are: “In the time of Claudius, king of the Romans, Peter, the apostle, preaching the gospel in Antioch, they who were before called Nazarenes and Galileans, took the name of Christians.” The fact, then, that Lucian fell into an error so common at this time, does not at all invalidate his testimony, as far as honesty and general truthfulness is concerned.

Having thus ascertained what reliability is to be attached to the account as it has come down to us, we proceed to inquire, what truths are established by it, touching the lives, character, belief, and mode of worship of the early Christians.

First the question arises, *From what class in society did they come?* And here, whoever expects to find the high and mighty bowing in humility to the Saviour, in the infancy of the Christian faith, will soon be convinced of his error. Lucian's testimony bears out to the letter the declaration of the Apostle, "Not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called." Lucian is also express in the declaration that those who sympathized most deeply with the misfortunes of the impostor, whom they believed to be a Christian, and who were seen continually about the prison, in which he was confined, were old women (γραιδία), widows (χήρας), and orphans (παῖδι ὀρφανά). His remarks also concerning their contributions of money to alleviate the distress of Peregrinus is sufficient evidence, that the goods of this world had not fallen to their lot. The same testimony is borne by the author of the Philopatris, whoever he was, and we cannot but think it to have been Lucian. The whole account, contained in that keen satire and burlesque, goes to show the low estate of all who professed the name of Christ. Indeed the author wanders out of his way to give a satirical description of such as composed the Christian assembly to which he was admitted. He represents them as lame, and halt, and blind, subject to all the ills which flesh is heir to. Some were but apologies of men, deficient in a due complement of eyes and nose and limbs, unsightly and filthy in the extreme. Some were without shoes, others without garments, or if they had them, they were torn and tattered. Indeed it would be difficult to bring together words to express greater poverty or a lower estate.¹ Nor indeed is the picture of Lucian overdrawn. The same evidence is afforded by both Pliny and Tacitus, the last of whom, in the Annals, represents them as so poor and weak, that Nero could with impunity charge upon them the conflagration of Rome, of which all knew them to be innocent, and inflict tortures upon them for the same. Surely "God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things that are

1 Ἀνδρωπίσχος δὲ τις, τοῦνομα Χαρίκλεος, σέσημμένον γερόντιον, βέγγχον τῇ ῥνι, ὑπέβητε μύχιον, ἐχρέματτο ἐπισδυσμένον ὁ δὲ πτύλος κυανώτερος θανάτου. * * * Ἄλλος δὲ τοῦνομα Χλευόκαρμος, τριβώνιον ἔχων πολύσαδρον, ἀνυπόδρος τε, καὶ ἄσχετος, μετέειπε, τοῖς ὁδοῦσιν ἐπιπροσώτων, ὡς ἐπεδείξατό μοι τις κακοίμων, ἐξ, ὁρέων παραγενόμενος, καχαρμένος τὴν κόμην.
—Philopatris 20, et seq.

mighty, and base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are : that no flesh should glory in his presence."

Nothing perhaps, in this narrative, is more remarkable than the simple and unsuspecting character of such as held the Faith. The designing could with ease impose upon them. There is abundant evidence of this in the whole story of this imposition. That a man of this impostor's boastful swaggering character should succeed in playing upon their credulity, is testimony sufficient that they suspected none save on the most indubitable evidence. They threw open their arms immediately on his profession, not hesitating to receive him into their closest communion and brotherhood. They sympathized with him in his misfortunes, and made his troubles their own. They even placed their private purses at his disposal, and raised large contributions to alleviate his distress. The common purse, too, was placed within his reach, from which, Judas-like, he was accustomed to purloin. In all this they entertained not the slightest suspicion of his imposition, or doubt of his sincerity and Christian character. They even paid his expenses by the way (ἐφόδια) during his second wandering, nor did they finally cast him off till they had the most indubitable evidence of his breaking their laws. Surely, if as some say, an unsuspecting character be proof of virtue and honesty, the early Christians upon whom Peregrinus imposed, can justly lay claim to them. That this was not an isolated case of imposition, we gather from the narrative, "that if *any* mountebank or deceiver came among them, skilled in turning to advantage every opportunity, he soon became rich." Many doubtless were the cases, aside from the recorded ones of Judas, Ananias, and this Peregrinus who thus practiced upon them.

The firmness displayed by those despised, but honest and simple believers, is particularly to be noticed. Amidst the scoffs and sneers, the pains and tortures they endured, they remained steadfast in the faith. All heathen authors agree in recording the most horrid barbarities which were practiced upon them. Suetonius, *Vita Claud.* 16, says:—"Severe punishments were inflicted upon the Christians, a class of men distinguished for a new and wicked kind of superstition. *Afflicti suppliciiis Christiani, genus hominum superstitionis novae ac maleficæ.*" In the *Annals*, Tacitus gives the following account of the tortures inflicted upon them by Nero:—"Et pereuntibus addita ludibria, ut ferarum tergis connecti, laniatu canum interirent, aut crucibus adfixi, aut flammandi, atque, ubi defecisset dies, in usum nocturni luminii urentur,"

a description which almost baffles translation, as the tortures are unknown to any human language, save that of the Roman Empire, in the days of Claudius Caligula and Nero. The last mode mentioned must have taxed human ingenuity to the uttermost. Juvenal makes allusion to it in the first Satire:—

“Tac la lucebia in illa,
Qua stantes ardent, qui, fixo guttere, fumant,
Et latum media sulcum diducis arena.”

It consisted in clothing the culprit in a garment of pitch, rosin, or the like, and placing him at the corner of the street with pointed spears at his throat. A lighted torch was then applied to the combustible garment, and a human being in flames made a substitute for lamps to light the streets of Rome by night.

But all these barbarous cruelties did not make them swerve from their purpose: they persisted in denying the heathen gods, and in worshipping their divine Master. Such is the declaration of Lucian.¹ That of Pliny is of the same import, “That none who are in truth Christians (qui sunt revera Christiani) could be compelled to call upon heathen gods, to worship the image of Trajan, which had been set up, and blaspheme Christ.” Indeed, so firm and unyielding were they in the profession of the faith, even in the face of every torture which the ingenuity of man could invent, that the impostor Peregrinus, to prove his sincerity, must submit in all humility to barbarities which would not have been inflicted on him had he denied the Saviour, and refused to associate with his disciples. Doubtless there were many more among the primitive Christians whose horrid sufferings have not been recorded, who were bound and cast into prison, and, even like Stephen, died the death of martyrs at the stake, counting all things gain, so that they might win the Lord Jesus, and gain the mansions of everlasting rest.

Having thus disposed of the testimony afforded by this narrative of the lives and character of the primitive Christians, we come to the question, *In what did they believe, as shown by this account?* And here, so full and unequivocal is the author, we might answer almost in the words of the Apostolic Creed: “They believed in Jesus Christ, our Lord, who suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried: They believed in the Holy Ghost; The Holy Catholic Church; The communion of saints; The forgiveness of sins; The resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting.” In the consid-

¹ His words are emphatic:—Ἐπειδὴν ἅπαξ παραβάντες, θεοὺς μὲν τοὺς ἑλληνικοὺς ἀπαρνήσονται, τὸν δὲ ἀνυπολόπιστον ἐκείνον σφόδρῃ αὐτῶν προσηυνῶσι, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἐκείνου νόμους βιώσι.—De Morte Peregrini. 13.

eration of the subject embraced in this paper, we have not proposed to adduce the Scriptures in evidence on any point. The question is, What say heathen writers of a contemporary period of the creed and practice of the primitive followers of Christ. In the consideration of this branch of the subject, we shall follow the order of the creed as quoted above.

1. "They believed in Jesus Christ, our Lord," that is, they believed in his Divinity, and acknowledged his supremacy. Lucian, we believe, is the only person of heathen antiquity who gives so minute an account of the various events of our Saviour's life; but many make various allusions to him as a distinguished personage, well known in their time, whose followers were already become numerous, and bid fair, as Pliny says, to cheat the heathen temples of their offerings and sacrifices.¹ They all united in speaking of him, as do many, doubtless as wise philosophers of various schools of modern times, as a Sophist, (σοφιστήν,) and his teaching as sophistry (σοφίαν). They would class him with the greatest benefactors of the world, and condescend to rank him with such men as Socrates, Bacon, and Swedenborg. They would unite in according to him acuteness and comprehensiveness of mind, magnanimity of soul, and sweetness of temper; they would even call him *The Great* (τὸν μέγαν ἔχσινον), but still a mere man (ἄνθρωπον). They would not hesitate to accord wisdom to his teaching, and even call it *The wonderful*, (τὴν θαυμαστήν,) but still it was but the speculation and teaching of man, it was *sophistry*, and would take rank with the Republic or Laws of Plato.

But while they all agree in expressing this private opinion of the authority of Christ, and the nature of his doctrine, there are no discrepancies in their various declarations, that the primitive Christians held the contrary. In this narrative, Lucian says: *They still worship Him who was crucified in Palestine*, implying that it was a distinguishing characteristic of such as called themselves Christians, to worship the Saviour, not once or twice, but all time, past, present, and future. His words are τὴν σέβουσι, signifying, *to worship, to do reverence as to a god*, and is so used throughout classic Greek as well as the Greek of the New Testament. Again he says, *They were commanded to reverence Him crucified and live according to his laws*. Here the word is προσκυνῶσι, signifying throughout the New Testament, *to do reverence as to a god*.

The Philopatris, by whomsoever written, speaks not only of

¹ Certè satis constat, prope jam desolata templa coepisse celebrari, et sacra solemnia diu intermissa repeti: passimque vaenire victimas, quarum adhuc rarissimus emptor inveniebatur.—C. Plin. Tr. Imp. S.

their belief in the Divinity of Christ, but also of the Trinity, consisting of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. So entirely does their creed as given by it, agree with the Nicene creed that the date of the piece has been placed, without sufficient authority, subsequent to the convocation at Nicæa.¹

The record of Pliny of a contemporary period, concerning the creed of the Christians in Bithynia, affords the same evidence. He says, they were accustomed to sing praise to Christ as to a God, *carmenque Christo quasi Deo*. Full as plain and clear is his evidence of the same import, when he says, "that they who are in truth Christians, cannot be induced to *blaspheme Christ*." They would forbear assembling together and taking their food in common, indeed, they would not insist on observing many rites which they thought highly proper, but, as we can gather nothing more, when forbidden by the civil power, but still they never could be induced to cease the worship of the Saviour and *blaspheme Christ*. We feel authorized from such declarations of Greek and Latin writers of a classic period, to conclude that the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ was clearly held by the early Christians. The special care which they take, to express themselves on this point, is remarkable. They all unite in giving their private opinions that he was a Sophist, an impostor (which as unbelievers they doubtless held), but while doing so they are careful to record the contrary as held by the Christians. They themselves believed him but man, though a man of no ordinary character, but they expressly declare that his followers believed him Divine, and worshiped him as such.

2. They believed "He was crucified, dead, and buried." Lucian, we believe, is the only heathen writer of antiquity who makes allusion to the crucifixion of our Lord. He speaks of it twice, first in the eleventh section, and again in the thirteenth. He does not mention it as a report simply, which he had heard from others, but as an event well enough known in his time to need no corroboration.

3. They "believed in the Holy Catholic Church and the communion of Saints." It is not difficult, so explicit is our author, to ascertain what relation the early Christians sus-

¹ The words of the Philopatris are :

Ἰψιμέδοντα θεῶν, μέγαν, ἁμβροσιον οὐρανίωνα,

τὸν πατρός, πνεῦμα ἐκ πατρός ἐκπορευόμενον,

Ἐν ἑκ τριῶν, καὶ ἕξ ἐνός τρία

Ταῦτα νόμιζε Ζήνα, τὸνδ' ἡγοῦ θεον.—Vid. Philopatris 12.

The doctrine is about as comprehensible to Criton as it is to us. Says he : "I don't understand what you mean by three in one and one in three, ἑν τρία τρία ἑν, you probably mean the tetractys of Pythagoras."

tained towards themselves and their Divine Master. This is summed up in the injunction of Christ, ὡς ἀδελφοὶ πάντες εἰεν ἀλλήλων, that they should all be brethren. The reason of this injunction is given in the following sentence, because "they all denied the Grecian gods, worshiped him that was crucified, and lived according to his laws." It was therefore to be a holy *Catholic* Church, a Christian brotherhood of all such as loved their Lord and Master, of whatever land or clime.

Of this Catholic Church, Christ was the supreme and only Head. It was he who brought it into existence,¹ and therefore was its fountain source. His life and death and sufferings became, to his followers, a new mystery, a new object of religious communication. The religious word τελεσθῆν defines its boundaries. The new church was to be founded on Christ as its head, on his death and sufferings as its base, of which it was never to lose sight. He was as surely to be the source from which all ceremonies should spring, and the object to which they should be directed, as in the old and worn-out mythology, Bacchus and his exploits were to be the source and object of the bacchanalian orgies and revels.

Christ was also to be the very soul and spirit, the life and animating principle of this new church. His followers were not only to worship him, but live according to his laws. What these laws were our author does not inform us. They are to be found in the New Testament. They are the laws of charity, kindness, and love. The primitive Christian church then was to be a *Catholic* church, embracing in essential unity, all who professed the name of Christ, and lived according to his laws, of which he was the supreme head, the fountain-source, the life and animating principle. If any evidence were wanting to prove that this injunction was obediently observed—that the early church was in reality a Christian brotherhood, it might be found in that part of this narrative which records the sympathy, shown by the Christians, with one who professed, though hypocritically, the same faith as themselves. "No sooner was Peregrinus cast into prison by the civil power, for heresy," runs the narrative, "than the Christians, thinking the event a com-

¹ Lucian says, they worshiped him because he brought this new religion into this life, ὅτι καινὴν αὐτοῦ τελεσθῆν εἰσέγαγεν ἐς τὸν βίον. The word, τελεσθῆν, is particularly to be noticed. It may mean, *end* or *object* of life, as living for the future and not the present. But more probably it has the same signification here, it has in classic Greek, that of *religion* or *church*. Such is its signification in Eurip. Bacch. 234, where the old Teiresias speaks of the religion of Bacchus.

Τελετὰς προσείνων εὐθὺς νεάνισιν.

It is sometimes translated by the Latin *sacra*, sometimes more properly by *ceremonie originem* as in Iph. in Tauris 960. This is probably its signification in this place, a *new religion* which must have new rites and ceremonies.

mon misfortune, adopted every expedient to release him from duress. Finding this impossible they rendered him every assistance in their power, not indifferently, but with zeal. From early morning were to be seen old women, widows, and orphans, wandering about the prison. Some of his friends in obedience to what they considered their duty, shared the imprisonment with him, having corrupted the guards. They also carried him various dishes, and performed divine service in the prison, that they might administer to him the joys and consolations of their religion. Not only this, but Christians were sent from other cities at a common expense, to give, among other things, consolation to the unfortunate man. Money was also contributed in large sums, because he was in bonds. So also when he had been released, he traveled at their expense, and by the same means lived in abundance.

Such is the manner in which they treated one individual of their number, and which is but an example of the manner in which they treated all. All things were common (*καὶ κοινὰ ἡγοῦνται*), each receiving necessary sums from the common purse, without giving any pledge. They had, as did Christ and his disciples, a common purse or box, *γλωσσόκομον*, as John calls it, into which were cast the contributions, *εἰσβαλλόμενα* made by such as became Christians. This was carried by one of their number, and from it all necessary expenses were made. The same custom is alluded to in the Acts of the Apostles, in the account of Ananias and Saphira. The money which they received from the sale of their land, and which should have been thrown, without reserve, into the common treasury, was kept back, in part, when they came over to the Christians.

It was the universal confidence which they cultivated among one another, that afforded an opportunity for the designing to extract money from them, and enrich themselves. This appears to have been the case with Peregrinus, who, Judas-like, had obtained possession of the purse, and like him, purloined from it.

The Christian Brotherhood, if we credit Pliny, extended not only to their hours of worship, but as far as it was possible, to all the business of the day. They ever take their meals in common. "Their custom was," says he,¹ "to come together before light for worship, which being done, they separated to meet again at their meals, promiscuously, but without any crime." That this was only done *con amore*, and not from an idea of its essentiality, we learn from the declaration of the same author, that they desisted from assembling together in this manner, when commanded by the edicts of Pliny, not-

¹ Letter to Trajan.

withstanding they could not be compelled to worship the image of Trajan and blaspheme Christ, when commanded by the same authority. This was the difference, the worship of Christ was essential, while the daily assembling together, though eminently proper at that time, and in their peculiar situation, and by them considered a privilege, was a custom from which they desisted, as non-essential, when commanded so to do.

This church, or common brotherhood, which they were enjoined to preserve, was perfectly distinct and separate from the world. This is shown by the general account of Lucian and Pliny, by whom the Christians are always mentioned as meeting by themselves, as well as by their direct declaration, that they despised and cut themselves off from all others. This charge of exclusiveness was frequently made upon them. *Καταφρονούσι οὖν πάντων ἐξίσης*, are the words of Lucian. Tacitus speaks of the same exclusiveness in still stronger terms in the Annals. According to him, the heaviest charge made against them, was their hatred of all mankind.¹ The expressions are harsh, as the Christians, by their separation from the world would seem to hate and despise mankind.

That it was obedience to the injunction, that they should be brethren, which, in a great degree caused the rapid spread of the Christian religion, we think, cannot well be denied. It was thereby better able to show its superiority over the fabrications and philosophy of men, by pointing to the purity and holiness of its disciples. The authority of Christ was compared with that of man.

That prosperity shall only follow obedience to this injunction, is not only proved by the unexampled progress of the Christian church, during the first century of its existence, but also by its history in after times. Nothing perhaps has done more to stay the progress of Christianity in the earth, than the impediments which the exercise of temporal favor by the church and its union with the state, have thrown in its way. The history of their union at Rome and at Westminster, is evidence that the church must come wholly out of the world and be separate from it, if it receive the blessings of Him who enjoined it.

4. "They believed in the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting." The evidence of this rests on the express declaration of the author, "that these miserable devotees have persuaded themselves that they are immortal and shall live for ever," *τὸ μὲν ὅλον διάνασται, ἔσονται, καὶ βιώσονται τὸν αἰῶνα χρόνον*. This belief of the early Christians is particularly mentioned by Lucian, because it was contrary to the general sentiment of the age.

¹ Odio humani generis convicti sunt. Tac. Ann.

² "Life and immortality" were emphatically brought to light in the gospel.

It was this confidence of the Christians of a glorious immortality which animated them with a contempt for this mortal life. Death too they despised (φρονέουσι τοῦ θανάτου) like the Getai of whom Herodotus speaks, believing that death was but life.

It remains that we examine this heathen testimony in regard to the *customs and mode of worship of the early Christians*. And in this part of our subject we necessarily anticipated ourselves in the inquiry concerning their creed; since belief and practice are so intimately connected that it is difficult to separate them. We have seen, that they lived in community as much as in their power, cutting themselves off from the rest of the world. They labored together, talked together, ate together, even to the breaking up of the family relations, counting those who professed the same faith, as their father and mother, their sister and brother. Above all they worshiped together, assembling, as Pliny says, before light, and at an hour most fit for calm meditation, series reflection, and undivided devotion.

It is needless to inquire in what places this devotion was rendered. Their poverty rendered them unable to secure the comfort, the convenience, the gorgeousness and splendor of places of worship, where Christ is said to meet his disciples in modern days. Had the wealth of later times been theirs, it would doubtless have been spent in spreading the gospel in the earth. They would have had little ambition to eclipse the splendor of ancient Pagan temples. They would have preferred the dark, comfortless garret where Lucian found them,¹ the caverns whither they had fled before the persecuting power of Rome,² or even the prison in which one of their number was confined.³ Symbolism and ecclesiology doubtless date later than primitive Christianity.

In regard to their worship, we have a declaration in the following words, λόγοι ἱεροὶ αὐτῶν ἐλέγοντο, a declaration sufficiently explicit to exclude every idea, that they believed at all in the efficacy of bowing, kneeling, genuflexions, and the like, or that outward actions constituted the smallest part of their worship, but still so general as to compel us to look elsewhere to determine in what the λόγοι ἱεροὶ consisted.

Moses does not reveal the doctrine; the Psalmist and the Prophets make but the faintest allusions to it. There had indeed sprung up among the Jews, a sect who thought that there was no future state of existence. The Greeks, believed in it but as a matter of poetic faith, now and then breaking the gloom which surrounded them. As with Homer, Achilles says, "Though they do forget the dead in Hades. Yet even there will I remember thee, my friend." Sometimes the aspirations of Cicero and Plato bore them beyond this mortal life, but into what absurdities they were led, the Tusculan Questions of the one and the Phædon of the other are humiliating witnesses.

¹ Vid. Philopatri.

² Vid. Letter to Trajan.

³ Vid. De Morte Peregrinus.

Pliny says they were accustomed on a fixed day to come together before light, and to sing praise to Christ as to a God, and to bind themselves to commit no wrong. According to him then, their worship consisted in singing praise to Christ, and in encouraging one another to lives of godliness and virtue. There is one peculiarity to be noticed in their praise. It was by responses, *dicere secum invicem*, indicating that the later custom of singing continuous hymns by a choir alone, or by the congregation, had not been introduced. They doubtless copied after the Hebrew mode of praise, which was by alternate responses.

The account in the Philopatris is still more explicit, though it is difficult to ascertain the truth, so much has the writer of it given himself up to ridicule. From all that we can gather concerning it, and from the expression itself, we should judge the *λόγοι ἑσπεί* to have consisted in praise to Christ, conversation and mutual exhortation, and in reading of the Scriptures. The literal translation of the text would point more particularly to the last. They might have been the Hebrew Scriptures, but more probably the New Testament writings, which must have been in their possession.

The exclusiveness with which they shut themselves out from the world, during these exercises, is worthy of note. It afforded the author of the Philopatris, an opportunity for considerable pleasantries. He finds them, as he entered the Christian assembly, of which he gives a description, pale and sallow from long confinement, engaged in unearthly pursuits, dwelling in the air, (*ἀποβατούντες*). As though they had been absent for years, they deign to ask a few questions concerning things in the world. Upon his answering, he asks in turn of things in the air. Then follows a conversation, during which he learns they had spent ten days without food, and as many nights in watching.

ARTICLE V.

RELATIONS OF THE CHURCH TO THE YOUNG.

By REV. J. F. TUTTLE, Rockaway, N. J.

THE importance of a correct religious education cannot be over estimated. Such an education enters vitally into those influences which shape the destiny of individuals, and thereby, to a great extent, the destiny of the church. Time has wrought no little change in the modes and measures by which good

men have sought the conversion of souls. We have somewhere seen the statement, that during the great revival which occurred in the College of New Jersey during the presidency of the late Dr. Green, nearly all of those who were converted were under conviction for some months. There are but few now who would advocate or encourage such a protracted season of conviction. While careful to guard against any extravagance in the doctrines and measures used in revivals of religion, most ministers are more earnest in insisting on immediate submission to God, as the imperative duty of every sinner.

In connection with this change, we think we perceive the greater prevalence of the opinion which regards early conversions as both practicable and desirable. Our fathers diligently instructed their children in the doctrines of the Bible, and literally obeyed the injunction of Moses to the children of Israel (Deut. 6 : 6-9) ; and yet so far as appears from the history of those days, and from the venerable men of that period who still survive, that instruction had reference mainly to future years, when with mature powers their children might decide the great concern intelligently. If we have not misapprehended the fact, the conversion of children in early life was not their expectation, nor the burden of their prayer ; and when such a case did occur they were surprised, as if an event had taken place not in accordance with the usual analogies of grace. They broke up the fallow-ground and cast in the seed, praying for the early and latter rain, without any well-defined expectation of an immediate harvest.

President Edwards, in his "Thoughts on the Revival of Religion in New England," incidentally mentions that "there is a strange alteration almost all over New England amongst young people : by a powerful, invisible influence on their minds they have been brought to forsake those things in a general way, as it were at once, that they were extremely fond of, and greatly addicted to, and that they seemed to place the happiness of their lives in, and that nothing before could induce them to forsake."¹ And in exhibiting the various remarkable facts which attended that great revival, he particularly notices that a fast-day was observed by gathering all "the people of the congregation in their particular religious societies ; companies of men by themselves, and companies of women by themselves ; young men by themselves, and young women by themselves ; and companies of children in all parts of the town by themselves, as many as were capable of social religious exercises ; the boys by themselves, and the girls by themselves."² This fact very

¹ Edwards' Works, vol. iii., p. 296.

² Ibid, p. 419.

In his "Narrative of Surprising Conversions" he speaks of the regeneration

plainly shows the opinion which prevailed previous to the revival of 1740, and that the effect of that revival on children was one of the most notable which could be mentioned. And it is no uncommon thing to meet with aged persons who, in comparing the present with the past, say in substance, "How much greater efforts are now made to secure the conversion of children than when we were young!" One of this class told the writer that when she was a child she did not dream of the possibility of an early conversion! She must wait till she became a woman. There were exceptions, but this was the general rule.

Robert Raikes originated a great change of opinion on this point. Children have been brought more directly under the means of grace through an institution organized expressly for their benefit. In a sense, the Sabbath-school is the place where the child hears the gospel preached, not to adults, but to him personally and appropriately. The results have been remarkable, so much so that in many churches the greater number of conversions takes place among the members of Sabbath-schools and Bible-classes. These have not been restricted to those scholars who were somewhat advanced in age, but among those so young, that in former days their conversion would have been considered chimerical. The pastor of a large church in Ohio has kept for several years a table of statistics embracing the principal facts pertaining to his Sabbath-schools and Bible-classes. In these tables are bills of punctuality, also showing how many have recited the Shorter Catechism perfectly, and the lessons assigned in addition. Here is a deduction which bears directly on the point. "I have one or two scraps," says this pastor, "which I have published on Bible-classes. The amount of them is, that by keeping a bill of punctuality a series of years, conversions were almost in exact ratio of punctuality. Almost every one who attended eighty or one hundred lessons became a hopeful convert. In five years one hundred and seventy-five members of my Bible-classes united with the church."

These facts awaken in us a desire to examine the relations of the church to the young, in order to excite a more profound interest in a subject which is vital to the interests of piety. Our opinions modify our actions. If we are looking for God's chosen ones among the adults of congregations, we shall suffer our anxieties to fix themselves entirely on Eliab and Shammah, and to say "surely the Lord's anointed is before him," whilst

of "those that were very young" as "a very extraordinary dispensation." And of one convert about four years old, he says, "and because this last will be *most* difficultly believed, I shall hereafter give a particular account of it."—p. 239.

we altogether neglect the stripling David, who, uncared for, is in the fields keeping the sheep. The little ones still clinging to our knees, and watching every word and action, will be suffered to grow callous with the lapse of years, almost unrebuked, feeling that they cannot become Christians for some years to come.

And at the outset we raise the inquiry, Whether regeneration cannot and does not take place in some cases at so early a period that the subjects of it have no recollection of the time? We are aware of the metaphysical objections which may be urged against the position implied in the question, and of the difficulties which surround the subject, and for this reason we desire to avoid dogmatic assertion, and positive assumption. And lest we be misunderstood it will be necessary to lay down two scriptural positions which are regarded as vital.

1. Every descendant of Adam has a corrupt nature which will lead him to commit sin with perfect certainty as soon as moral existence begins. This corrupt nature will remain unchanged until the new birth. The Saviour's declaration to Nicodemus settles this matter beyond a reasonable doubt. 'Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν, λέγω σοι' εἰ μὴ τις γεννηθῇ ἄνωθεν, οὐ δύναται εἶδεν τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ (John 3 : 3.) The word *τις* embraces the whole human family, infants as well as adults. "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except every one of the human family be begotten from above, he cannot see the kingdom of God." The same form of expression is repeated in the fifth verse. This position is plainly sustained also by various expressions in the Psalms, (see Psalms 14: 1-3; 53: 1-3; also Ps. 51: 5.)

2. The only efficient agent to produce a radical change in this corrupt nature is the Holy Spirit. The passage just quoted distinctly implies this. The word "*ἄνωθεν*," from above, points us to the efficient power in the new birth as plainly as in these words, "which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." (John 1 : 13.) The same truth is set forth in the Epistles of Paul.

Let us then recur to the question, whether regeneration does not take place in some cases at so early a period that the subjects of it have no recollection of the time? One fact must be admitted, a large part of the human family die in infancy, before they know good or evil, or exercise the powers of moral agency. What shall we say of this numerous portion of the human family? Shall we adopt the theory which consigns them to annihilation? Or shall we regard infants as innocent in nature, with no elemental propensities to evil, and of course at death transplanted without change to a more genial clime? Such a theory finds no countenance in the Scriptures, and all

the developments of human nature, and all the facts which transpire in actual life in this world, are against it. Or shall we adopt the belief, once somewhat prevalent, that such infants as stand in covenant relations to God through a pious parentage or baptism, are saved, while all not standing in such relations are consigned to endless punishment? We speak the feelings, not only of private Christians, but of learned theologians, when we say, no one without a shudder can read even the hypothetical inference of Dr. Emmons, "If children die before they become moral agents, it is most rational to conclude that they are annihilated." The length of time previous to moral accountability Dr. Emmons does not undertake to fix, but says, "during that space, whether longer or shorter, they are not moral agents, nor consequently accountable creatures in the sight of God or man. It is rational to conclude therefore, that God will not treat them as accountable creatures, nor reward or punish them. Of course we must conclude they will be annihilated."¹

The mere fact that the period of moral agency has not been attained, cannot lead to such a conclusion, nor yet to a belief that some infants will be lost who have never been favored with a season of probation. It has grown, we think, into a sentiment, prevalent among Christians of every name, that those dying in infancy will be saved. The annihilation view has been abandoned, and we hope that also which consigns any infants to hell. Be this as it may, all theologians who have rejected the idea that infants are annihilated, believe that *some* infants will be saved. The number, whether a part or all, does not affect our argument. If any are saved who have not reached the period of moral accountability, that is sufficient for our argument.—*On what ground are these saved?* The Scriptures explicitly declare that every child of Adam has a corrupt nature, and universal experience proves that in every case where opportunity for moral action has been given, that action has been sinful. So universal and without exception is this law of sinful development, that let the circumstances be what they may, we know that man's nature, unregenerated, will put on a sinful character by voluntary transgression. We may transplant the bramble to the choicest spot in Eden, and cultivate it never so carefully, yet it will be a bramble still; or we may nurse a lion's whelp with the same milk and care that we bestow upon a child, and yet it will grow up with a lion's nature. We have altogether mistaken the drift of the Scriptures; if they teach that any cultivation, or any outward circumstances whatever, can change the doctrine implied in these ques-

tions, "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one." "How can he be clean that is born of a woman?" Job 14 : 4, and 25 : 4.

The question then recurs: Are those infants who are saved regenerated, or are they saved being unregenerate? If we answer the last question in the affirmative, then we contradict Christ's own words, (John 3: 3): "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except every one of the human family be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God." If we answer the first question in the affirmative, then we are compelled to admit that there is such a thing as regeneration by the Holy Spirit, of some who had not attained to moral accountability. In adopting the opinion, that the songs of love which the redeemed sing in heaven are made fuller and more joyful, by the voices of those little ones who have been snatched away from us by death before they had attained the knowledge of good and evil, we also adopt the belief of their spiritual regeneration. The question is not *how* the Holy Spirit regenerates such, but *does* he perform this necessary and gracious act? We are all ready to accord an affirmative answer to this question, when it pertains to those dying in infancy.

And if this be true, who can allege a good reason why the same efficient Agent may not sometimes work the same change in corrupt nature, in some infants who are spared to grow up to years of maturity? The thing plainly is not impossible, nor yet does it appear unreasonable, since it is not inconsistent with the known capacities of human nature under the power of such an agent as the Holy Spirit.

But are there any well-authenticated facts to sustain this theory? The case of Samuel is one in point. His mother had asked him of the Lord, and vowed, as she prayed, to "give him unto the Lord all the days of his life" (1 Sam. 1: 11). Her prayer was answered, and she purposed, as soon as he was wanted, to "bring him that he might appear before the Lord, and there abide forever." "And when she had weaned him, she took him up with her, with three bullocks, and one ephah of flour, and a bottle of wine, and brought him unto the house of the Lord in Shiloh, and the *child was young*," (vs. 22, 24.) She tells her own story to Eli, and the Holy Spirit adds: "For this child I prayed; and the Lord hath given me my petition which I asked of him: therefore, also, have I lent him to the Lord; as long as he liveth he shall be lent unto the Lord. *'And he worshiped the Lord there.'*" (vs. 27, 28.) Here we have certainly a young worshiper in a child just weaned. A partaker in human depravity, and by nature an heir of the same wicked propensities with other children, yet at this very

early period we find him a worshiper of Jehovah. *He must have been regenerated previous to this time.* And in tracing his history we find the facts in the case confirming this view. He immediately enters on the work to which he had been devoted, for it is said, "And *the child* did minister unto the Lord before Eli the priest," (2: 11.) "But Samuel ministered before the Lord, *being a child*," (2: 18.) "And the child Samuel grew before the Lord," (2: 21.) "And Samuel grew, and the Lord was with him, and let none of his words fall to the ground," (3: 19.) It seems certain that he had become a new creature before he left his mother's arms. As soon as he reaches the sacred place, he worships as if it were no strange exercise, and forthwith ministers before the Lord. From his mother's breast he was doing holy work. He was not left to the dominion of evil habits till the meridian of life, like Saul of Tarsus, and then converted. The Holy Spirit changed his heart so early, that his piety resembles an acorn planted in soil made genial by culture. In due time it sends forth a tender but vigorous shoot. The dews distil upon it; the rains water it; the sun warms it; and the owner cares for it. Year by year it increases, according to an inherent principle of growth. From first to last it is a comely object; as an acorn unvegetated, as a vigorous shoot, as a spreading tree; and even when a century has aided it to lift its brawny old limbs heavenward, it is comely still. From the acorn to the old oak there was a natural growth, and the change constantly apparent was not the miraculous change of a useless tree into an oak, but of an oak in germ to a young tree, and from that to a great oak standing among its fellows like their monarch. In Samuel's history we cannot specify the time when he did not love God—when the "carnal" was supplanted by the "spiritual"—but his love for God mingled with the lisps of infancy, and reached back into the dim twilight of early childhood.

When the word of the Lord came to Jeremiah, it declared that he had been sanctified even before his birth, that is, set apart for a particular work (Jer. 1: 5;) and Isaiah expressly declares that the Lord had formed him from the womb to be his servant. The angel revealed it to Zacharias that John the Baptist should not only be great in the sight of the Lord, but that he should "be filled with the Holy Ghost, even from his mother's womb." (Luke 1: 15.) We have the time when Paul was converted, and when Peter and Andrew became fishers of men, but there is no intimation that the son of Zacharias and Elizabeth was not converted in early childhood. The

promise of the Holy Ghost was on him whilst yet a babe in the arms of his devout mother.

Although the fact is not explicitly stated, yet there is a pleasing savor of early piety in the lives of Joseph, Moses, and David. That these distinguished saints became the friends of God while young, we learn from their histories; and when we look at the even excellence and the natural growth which characterized their piety, we are quite certain that the implantation of divine grace, as in the case of Samuel, was in infancy. Their experience is different from that of Paul and of Peter. We do not find these men, like Peter, falling under the power of some previous wicked habit, for a moment getting the mastery; nor yet do we ever hear them crying out like Paul, who, from being a persecutor, was suddenly changed into a friend, "O, wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

The biographer of Dr. Doddridge informs us that this eminent Christian "was brought up in the early knowledge of religion by his pious parents," "and his mother taught him the history of the Old and New Testaments before he could read, by the assistance of some Dutch tiles in the chimney of the room where they commonly sat: and her wise and pious reflections on the stories there represented were the means of making some good impressions on his heart which never wore out." The time of Doddridge's regeneration is not pointed out, but there is something in the conduct of that child, not able to read, yet drinking in with such avidity the truth, which bears a striking likeness to the "child Samuel."

Dr. Plumer has sketched an admirable character in his "Western Patriarch." In every relation of life he was a conspicuous Christian, whose path was like that of the shining light, which shineth more and more unto the perfect day. From his early childhood to a good old age, he gave abundant reasons for the hope that was in him. During the latter part of his life, "he often said, If I am indeed a child of God, I became such when very young. If I now indeed love the Lord, *my memory does not go back to the time when I loved him not.*" Dr. Plumer, in view of this narrative, remarks: "Early piety is still possible. Jeremiah and John the Baptist were savingly renewed from their birth. In more modern times, many persons of undoubted piety have traced their saving impressions to very early childhood. We ought to pray and labor for the conversion of our children while they are yet young."

¹ New York Observer, March 16th, 1850.

Two instances similar to this have fallen under our own notice. One is the case of a minister whose name is familiar in our churches, and whose labors have been abundant and successful. And now that old age is drawing on, this servant of God is sharing peculiar manifestations of the grace of Christ. The other is the case of a lady, whose piety cannot be reasonably doubted. In the family and in society she has exhibited the ruling disposition of her heart to be to glorify God. Neither of these Christians is able to date the period of their conversion. From earliest childhood, so far as memory reaches, their hearts were impressed with a sense of obligation and inspired with the love of God.

The observation of others has no doubt fallen on many similar facts which have never been committed to paper: but these are sufficient to establish the principle, that regeneration is possible by the Spirit's power at so early a period that the memory of the subject of that change goes not back to the time when he did not love God. And in closing this branch of the subject we may appropriately quote the words of Dr. Emmons, not only as expressive of truth, but to guard against misapprehension. "As soon as the youngest sinner is born of God, he is a new creature, and is a child of God. Though he cannot exercise repentance toward God, nor faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, yet he may exercise true benevolence, which is true holiness; and God may pardon and save him through the atonement of Christ on the condition of benevolence, as well as on the condition of repentance or faith or any other exercise of holiness. There is reason to think that many persons were saved before the gospel day, who had no distinct knowledge of Christ or faith in him. Their hearts were indeed changed. * * * And just so he may pardon little children whom he renews and causes to exercise holy affections, though they are ignorant of him and of Christ, for whose sake he forgives and admits them to heaven. It is sufficient for God to know that he pardons and saves them on the ground of Christ's atonement; and when they arrive in heaven, they will love and trust in Christ as their only Saviour."¹

We now approach another question of the greatest practical moment, respecting the conversion of children who have reached the period of moral agency. The impossibility of determining that period definitely is admitted. We do not say then *when* moral agency begins, nor is it necessary; but one thing is matter of common experience and observation, viz: that a child learns to distinguish between right and wrong at a very early age, and therefore is responsible. His knowledge is that of a

¹ Emmons' Works, Vol. IV. p. 511.

child, weak and imperfect, and yet his nature has such adaptations that God's truth fits it as the bone fits its kindred bone.

The question is this. Admitting that the period of moral agency has arrived, *when* shall we begin in earnest to seek the conversion of children? Do we overstep the proper bounds of discretion in asserting that the practice of many parents, whose piety is not to be doubted, does not accord with what is manifestly wisdom on this point? They do not seem to regard the conversion of children to God in very early life as possible and hopeful in such a sense as to make it an object of prayer, and of direct persevering effort. We fear there is no little practical unbelief and parental neglect in this thing throughout the church. Christian parents are wont to feel great anxiety for such of their children as have reached the age of twelve, fifteen, or twenty years, unconverted, and they pray for, and hope for, some "mighty rushing wind" to prostrate them in penitence and submission before God, while the plastic and easily affected hearts of their younger children are often strangely neglected, or if cared for at all, the prayers and efforts bestowed upon them, practically point to a hoped-for conversion at some future period.

Let us then examine this conduct by the tests of Scripture, by the maxims of a sound expediency, and actual facts.

And at the outset let us reiterate the cardinal doctrine already stated, that the regeneration of any heart is the work of the Holy Spirit. To present properly the obligation which rests on the instructors of children, is not to question in the slightest degree the office work of the Spirit. There is no question as to the propriety of religious education. Nature and the Bible conjointly assert this truth. Our fear pertains to the practice of the church. In this age of cheap religious books, of Sabbath-schools, and other means of religious instruction, there is danger of departing from God's own methods, ordained and of perpetual force in the church, and looking, as we conceive, to the early conversion of children. The plan of Robert Raikes has already placed many precious jewels in the crown of Jesus Christ; but this plan, good in its place, must not supersede the plan of God. The preaching of the gospel, and Sabbath-school instruction, are vastly important instrumentalities in their proper place, but neither was designed to supersede or conflict with the home institution. Jehovah is perfect, and knew the wants of mankind just as well when he instructed Moses as he knows them now. He did not command him to organize public schools in which the young Israelites should learn the dealings of God with their fathers. Such a course might have left the nation to degenerate into a horde of barba-

rians. Jehovah well understood the system by which the recollections of the Exodus were to be kept fresh. Accordingly, every head of a household was constituted an oracle to answer the inquiries of the thoughtful and impress lessons of truth upon all.

Here then we have the truths to be imparted, and the means of imparting them. "Hear, O Israel: The Lord thy God is one Lord. And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might. And these words which I command thee this day shall be in thine heart; and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shall *talk of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up.* And thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thine hand, and they shall be as frontlets between thine eyes. And thou shalt write them upon the posts of thy house, and upon thy gates." (Dent. 6: 4-9).—It was a family school in which the parent is the divinely appointed teacher, who did not dare to consign his own duties to some hireling, or even to some benevolent friend. How cold and lifeless any school compared with the animating instructions of the home, the atmosphere of which is perfumed with religious doctrine, and the very language of which is the conveyance of that truth to the youthful scholar! We cannot too much admire the wisdom of this arrangement, nor too closely imitate it in the religious education of children.

Now in this arrangement we have a teacher who is ever at his post. The parent was appointed that teacher, so that the very fondlings of infancy, and the more elevated and refined endearments of youth might be imbued and energized with a grateful sense of the obligation which we owe to our Heavenly Father. Would that this sacred custom were revived, that religion might be taught at home, and the best lessons of truth learned at the fireside; that the gentle courtesies, and sweet attachments of home might engrave the words of God and the gospel of his Son on the heart of every child and member of the household! How often is it the case, that the parent is more ready to talk on spiritual themes to a stranger than to his own child! how often is it that whole families grow up and leave home without any systematic means being used for their salvation! The Sabbath-school, the pulpit, the casual visit of a pastor, or the inquiry room, instead of being the auxiliaries, become the supplanters of home instruction.

A son now in the ministry wrote this to his parents: "I verily believe that had my religious training been confined to the gleanings of the Sabbath-school, instead of the steady en-

forcement of the Mosaic arrangement at home by my parents, I might now be pursuing a far different course, and living for a far different end. Many, very many times, as early in childhood as I can recollect, has the Spirit of God convicted me of sin as my father at home has taught me out of the Scriptures, and I cannot easily forget that the same high-priest of the home church once tore from me the hypocrite's hope. And that dear place had another to carry on the work, gentler but not weaker, and memory recalls a mother pressing her face close to mine as she often knelt with me before the mercy seat. I will not cast reproach on any institution which has been productive of good to myself and to others, but with profound gratitude will say, *home* was the place of my spiritual nativity, and my parents were God's instruments in leading me to Christ."

This accords strictly with two injunctions addressed by Jehovah to the different parties interested in this truth. "Train up a child in the way he should go and when he is old he will not depart from it," (Prov. 22 : 6 ;) which thought is given in the most significant language by the apostle Paul, "And, ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath : but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord," (Ephes. 6 : 4.) The other injunction is addressed to the scholar, and bears equally on the argument, "Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth," (Eccles. 12 : 1.)

We think it very plain from these considerations, that God forbids Christian parents to suffer the hopeful days of childhood to pass away without the most importunate prayer, and the most assiduous effort for the conversion of their children. He would have them carry out the heavenly plan of Hannah, invoking the divine blessing on the proper means, that the very beginnings of moral life may be so moulded that the children shall grow before the Lord.

In advocating this truth, we do not breathe a word of disparagement against adult conversions. To do this, would be to disparage the conversion of Paul, Augustine, and John Newton. Adult conversions do occur even late in life, and after a long course of sin, and they are sometimes accompanied with such agonies of conviction as well nigh to unsettle reason, and destroy life. Our object is not to cast reproach on such conversions, but to ascertain, if we can, the "mind of the Spirit" as recorded in the Scriptures. And according to this we believe that parents are not held guiltless in sending their sons and daughters from home, matured in rebellion against God, unless to the full extent of their ability they have striven to carry out the divine economy, with its potent means or-

ganized and set in motion for the religious education of their children at home. While the Bible gives instances not a few, in which the most abandoned sinners have been regenerated, it inculcates, with the sanctions of frightful threatenings and blessed promises, the truth that it is the urgent business of the church to train up the little ones for God. It enjoins it upon the pious to seek an early implantation and growth of religion in their children, rather than wait for sin to lay such beds of flinty rock over their hearts that an earthquake shall be necessary to tear them asunder. And as to the general result, we believe, that in all but extraordinary cases, a character fashioned according to the principle for which we plead, will be as different from that of one matured in sin and then converted, as a fruitful prairie is from the rugged and fissured breast of the Alleghanies.

All maxims of a sound expediency point to the same conclusion. An orchardist has a nursery of young trees which he knows will produce worthless fruit unless a change is made by the process of grafting. He can let those trees stand for years, and then cut away its natural branches and insert scions of a good kind. In this way it is true that an old tree which has been evil may produce good fruit. But what a waste it is, when all that time might have been used in growing trees which, in Thompson's phrase, should be "big with bending fruit." It is a sound expediency which leads the husbandman to engraft or inoculate his trees whilst they are in the nursery.

It is unnecessary to multiply illustrations drawn from the common events of life, all of which go to show the expediency of seeking the earliest conversion of children possible, and at the same time to show that not unfrequently the conduct of Christian parents and teachers is such, that were it adopted in the common concerns of life, it would be regarded as the frenzy of madmen and the folly of fools.

Let us gather a few facts from history, having a direct bearing on this position. The steady and joyous glow of Dr. Dwight's piety may be traced back to his mother's faithfulness, for "she taught him from the very dawn of reason to fear God and keep his commandments." She aimed, at a very early period, to enlighten his conscience, to make him afraid of sin, and to teach him to hope for pardon only through the righteousness of Christ. "The impressions then made upon his mind in infancy were never effaced."¹ The mother of the younger Edwards is declared to have been "a rare example of early piety, having exhibited in a remarkable manner the life and power of religion when only five years old. And what is far more, the fond hopes that were thus excited, she fully

¹ Dwight's Works, vol. i. p. 4.

confirmed by the uniform and increasing excellence of her character as she grew up to youth and maturer years. Such indeed was the devotedness of her piety, and so warm and animated her religious feelings in every period of her life, that they might have been regarded as enthusiastio, had they not been ever controlled by her true delicacy and sound discretion. By one who knew her well, she is described, before her marriage, as having "a strange sweetness of mind, and a singular purity in her affections; as most just and conscientious in all her conduct; as of a wonderful sweetness and calmness and universal benevolence." And in after life, as a Christian and a Christian mother, she is represented as being "as near a perfect model as is often seen on earth."

We shall select but one incident more to give emphasis to the general truth. The point of the illustration will be seen in the reply of the veteran in the face of death. At the age of ninety, Polycarp was arrested during the persecution which raged under Marcus Aurelius. He was urged to save his life by denying Christ, by calling "the emperor our Lord, and sacrificing." He refused. The proconsul urged him farther, "Swear, curse Christ, and I release thee." The old man replied, "*Six and eighty years have I served him*, and he has done me nothing but good; and how could I curse him, my Lord and Saviour!" The veteran believer, the disciple of the apostle John, a Christian at the age of four, was worthy to make such a reply, and before the fire, which was to consume him, was kindled, to utter such words as these: "I praise thee that thou hast judged me worthy of this day and of this hour, to take part in the number of witnesses, in the cup of thy Christ."

These considerations lead us to conclude that it is scriptural, reasonable, and obligatory on all who have in charge the religious education of the young, to seek by every lawful and hopeful means, their early conversion to God, and to seek this end as matter of reasonable expectation. This is the surest hope of the church. Pious parents, with a proper sense of their own insufficiency, and the necessity of Divine aid, should be-

¹ Works of younger Edward, vol. i. p. 11.

President Edwards in his sketch of Phebe Bartlet, a convert of "four years old," informs us that "her parents were not wont, in the counsels they gave to their children, particularly to direct themselves to her, by reason of her being so young, and, as they supposed, not capable of understanding." The history of this child's overpowering convictions, her importunate prayer for mercy, her clear conversion, her own personal joys, and her anxieties for others, together with the remarkable consistency of her conduct as she grew up, form one of the most affecting and remarkable passages in religious experience. In reading it, we involuntarily repeat the words, "out of the mouths of babes and sucklings thou hast perfected praise." Edwards' Works, vol. iii., pp. 265-9.

² Neander's History of the Christian Religion and Church. Vol. i., p. 110.

gin in very early life to impress truth on the minds of their children, and strive for their conversion. They must be made to breathe an atmosphere of holiness, and drink at the fountain of eternal life, before they are tainted with this world, and enticed away by it. They must not be suffered to leave the home altar without giving evidence that they are growing before the Lord, like the anointed little one who aided Eli in the ministrations of the sanctuary.

How important, in the light of these thoughts and facts, is the family arrangement in training the young for heaven. It stands at the fountain head of moral life, and gives direction and impression to future years. With multitudes of holy and eminent men, the family has been the birth-place into God's spiritual kingdom. Who, then, can sufficiently prize a piety at home, which is cheerful, uniform, and healthful? Perhaps if all children were favored with these appointed means of grace, according to the Divine will, the efficient power of the Holy Spirit would be exercised over the greater portion of them. Fewer parents certainly would be left to mourn over adult children unconverted.

We disclaim any intention in these remarks to find fault with the revivals which, at various times, have been enjoyed by the American church. For those seasons of special power and grace we have reason for devout gratitude to God. Their blessed influence is plainly visible in the ministry of this day, not a few of whom were converted in those extraordinary times. The same influence is no less visible in the laity, multitudes of whom were gathered into the church by the same instrumentality. We would cherish the memory of these by-gone seasons of powerful effusion of the Spirit of God, and pray for similar Divine manifestations at the present time, fearing, as we do, that if such refreshings do not again come from the presence of the Lord, the majority of the present adults, now impenitent, will be driven away in their wickedness. But we much desire to see a new era introduced, when children shall receive the most prayerful and assiduous culture with reference to their early conversion. We wish to see all who sustain the responsible relations of Christian parents, going forth and weeping, bearing precious seed, confidently expecting to come again with rejoicing, bringing their sheaves with them. We are sure that such training would produce a delightful change in the external manifestations of piety, and result in a greater symmetry of Christian character. The church, then, in its increase, would not, as now, so much resemble some hardy but dwarfed plant in Greenland, enjoying a very short summer, to be succeeded by a long, dreary winter, as the orange tree of the tropics, on which hang blossoms and ripe fruit continually.

ARTICLE VI.

NAMES FOR SOUL.

By Prof. TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., Union College, Schenectady

SCHOLARS have ever been struck with the grandeur of the Homeric oath—

Ἰστω Ζεὺς καὶ, οὐρανός 'Η ἔδνος' εἰ.

Bear witness Jove and Heaven,
And thou all-seeing sun.

Sometimes the terms are varied, although the trinal form is generally preserved. As in the *Odyssey*, v. 184—

Know earth, and Heaven above us spreading wide,
And Hell's dark wave that flows beneath.

The first example strongly calls to mind the passage (*Deut.* 32 : 1.)

Give ear, O ye Heavens, while I speak ;
And listen, thou Earth, to the words of my mouth.

But how immeasurably, both in natural and moral sublimity, is the classic oath transcended by the solemn Hebrew adjuration—"As *Jehovah liveth, and as thy soul liveth*"? In the one, the appeal is made to the strongest and most enduring objects in the natural world; in the other, there is associated with the Divine name, not the sun, nor the earth, nor the heavens, but the human soul, as partaking more than all merely physical creations of the Divine permanence and eternity. The full form is employed on occasions of intense earnestness and solemnity, as in *1 Samuel* 25 : 26, where Abigail adjures David not to shed blood, or avenge himself with his own hand. "*As the Lord liveth and as thy soul liveth*," is the impassioned obtestation; and then, in what admirable harmony with this association of ideas, is the language that follows: "For the Lord will certainly make my lord a sure house; and the *soul* of my lord shall be *bound in the bundle of life* with the Lord thy God." The elliptical form—*as the Lord liveth*—which is of very frequent occurrence, may be regarded as ever implying the other clause; and sometimes we find the second member by itself, yet clearly carrying with it the adjuring power of the more complete form; as in Hannah's appeal to Eli, *1 Sam.* 1 : 26.

In one or the other of these modes, this form of adjuration is quite common in the Old Testament; and yet how often may it have been read without even a glimpse of the mighty truth

that lies beneath,—a truth not obtruding itself upon the blind Sadducean eye, and yet plain enough to one who truly regards the Holy Scripture, and every part of it, as indeed “given by the inspiration of God.” “He that seeketh findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened.” Whosoever studies the Bible with half the zeal with which others seek for earthly wealth, will indeed find it to be a mine of inexhaustible treasure, a field thickly sown with pearls of greatest price, a

Broad land of wealth unknown,
Where hidden glory lies.

“*As the Lord liveth and as thy soul liveth.*” Why this remarkable conjunction of terms? Is it accidental? Is it merely rhetorical? Or is it intimated, and more than intimated, in this wonderful association of the human spirit with “the Father of spirits,” that as the one lives so shall the other live also, and that a similar ground of assurance is to be regarded as contained in either aspect of this frequent and most sublime adjuration?

There would seem to be also some allusion to the etymology of the name Jehovah, as given Exodus 3. The verbs for *life* and *being*, חיה and חי, are closely allied in form—differing, in fact, only in degree of aspiration—and, in respect to spiritual and intellectual existence, may be regarded as almost, if not quite, synonymous in meaning. *Life*, the source of life, that which has *life in itself*, would seem to be the import of God’s incommunicable name. This he challenges to himself as his “memorial unto all generations” (Exod. 3: 15). It is in this higher sense, and not merely by way of contrast with the dead Baals and Dagon of surrounding heathenism, that he is so often styled, *The Living God*—as in Jeremiah 10: 10. “*Jehovah Elohim, He is Elohim Haggim, The Living God,—He is Melek Olam, the king of eternity.*” May we not suppose, too, that there is some reference to this name and this oath in Paul’s remarkable declaration, Acts 17: 28, “*ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ ἐσμεν*,” “*In Him we LIVE and ARE,*” when there is a like union of the verbs of *being* and *life*, and the same allusion to the Divine spirit as the source and upholder of all spirituality?

“*As the Lord liveth and as thy soul liveth.*” The Old Testament, (as we have elsewhere previously attempted to show in the pages of this Review,) has little to say, didactically, about a future state. It has no philosophy of the soul,—in other words, no psychology, no physical or metaphysical theory of life, either the present or any other—and yet it has something higher and better than all this—something far more clear,

more consoling, more assuring. Sadducean as it may seem to certain minds, there is more hope for another life to be derived, even from the Pentateuch, than from the Phædon, or the Tusculan Disputations, or the stoical rhapsodies of an Antonine. There is a firmer foundation for faith in its earnest expressions of the divine care for the "*chosen people*," than in all the metaphysical arguments of ancient or modern schools. Although nothing is told us directly of immortality, yet this old book may be said to give an assurance of it, stronger than ever came from discussions respecting non-extension and indivisibility, and indestructibility, or from any proud discourse of pre-existence and architypal ideas. It carries this assurance, simply because, to the spiritually-minded reader, it everywhere connects humanity with God, so identifies the truest and best life of the human spirit (whether here or in any other state of being) with his service and adoration, so makes all true blessedness to consist in the Divine "*favor and loving kindness*," those gracious words of life,—so resolves the great problem of the *summum bonum*, the anxious inquiry, Who will show us the sovereign good? into that sublime conception, "*the light of His countenance*," and, finally, so places all hope in the clear and comforting ideas of *grace* and promise, instead of philosophical argument, or natural law, or the fancied results of any self-rewarding human virtue. We see this especially in that one word which God so kindly employs to express his chosen relation to humanity, as distinguished from that which he bears to the natural creation. It is the word *covenant*, so full of life and immortality,—so gracious on the part of Deity, so honorable to man. There is a strange repugnance manifested to it by some aspects of modern theology, and yet there is certainly no term more purely scriptural.

Although not employed in the particular account in Genesis, yet the reality is certainly there. God placed the material and merely animal universe under natural law; with man he entered into the higher relation adapted to a rational being—the relation of moral law, of promise, of condition, of mutual assent of will. In other words, "He made with him a covenant of life." Whence, then, this disposition, even in some who would be thought evangelical, (it is *natural* enough in the ordinary politician or philosophizing infidel,) to seek in nature, and in *natural right*, as it is called, what has been so graciously placed on the higher ground of the oath,—the oath which God swore unto the father, even the "father of the faithful," and the father of the race. Here, too, would seem to be this same idea in the common form of the Hebrew adjuration, as suggestive of a stronger bond (*berith religio*) than exists between the

Deity and the merely physical word; although the term *covenant* is sometimes used figuratively even of the latter; as in Jerem. 33: 20, when it is applied to the invariable succession of day and night. In such references to nature it is clearly metaphorical, when employed to express the relation of God to man, and especially to his church, or *redeemed* man, it is ever in the highest sense real. The Lord does indeed make a covenant with humanity, and this is the great pledge and proof of our immortality. He would not enter into stipulations with the being of a day, or one who had no higher existence intended for him than the ever-flowing and ever-changing nature by which he is surrounded. This is the substance of Christ's argument with the Sadducees.

"*As the Lord liveth, and as thy soul liveth.*" The one is the pledge of the other. Materialism in respect to man is atheism in respect to the universe. The views entertained in the one case will ever run parallel with those entertained in the other. There is a doctrine which regards all the phenomena of spirituality in us as but the results of the material organization of our finite microcosm. Such a view cannot long be held without transferring, in the end, the same conception to all the phenomena of the great world around us. This is atheism. Or if the notion of something to which we give the name of God, comes in at all, it can only be, legitimately, as the last product (if there ever is any such last and perfect product) of nature and matter working up through seminary gas, fluid, solid, vegetable, animal, &c., to the human vitality, and thus, finally, to *Deity* itself. But as this term includes, by logical necessity, the idea of highest and most perfect, it, of course, is never reached, and never can be reached, in this eternally moving and eternally unfinished progression. Again: There is a doctrine which might seem, at first view, the very reverse of the preceding. It would regard all the phenomena of materiality, and, in fact, its very *εὐρηξία*, or reality, as but the outward evolution of spirit. In the cant of a certain mystic school, soul is the *interior* of which body is the necessary *exterior* or *ultimate*. This, carried out to the universe, is Pantheism, or that revived modern Gnosticism which now charms so many minds by its false show of spirituality. As the human body, in this scheme, is the exterior, the ultimate, the outgrowth and *correspondence* of the soul, so the visible universe, accordingly, is the *necessary* correspondence, emanation, or outgrowth of God. In other words, it is his body regarded as a necessary manifestation of the *outworking* spirit. The world is, therefore, not his voluntary work, or creative act, as the Bible plainly teaches, but comes from him by natural law or development, just as the

plant grows out of the seed and the soil. In the one case, *all is matter*; in the other *all is soul*. A mighty difference it would seem. The latter claims to be infinitely removed from the gross materialism, of which it asserts itself to be the only true antagonist. It affects a wondrous spirituality. And yet, in fact, both views come in the end to just the same thing. Both alike deny the true idea of God by confounding him with the universe. Both are equally false, equally pernicious, equally opposed to that idea of man which has the sanction of the two highest and concurring authorities, the Scriptures, and the common sense or sentiment of the race, as expressed in all human speech,—the idea of man as composed of two distinct parts, differing in essence, in energy, in individuality—two distinct parts mysteriously bound together, yet coming from two distinct sources, and neither of which can be regarded, in any way, as a result, or accident, or outgrowth, or ingrowth, or attribute of the other.

To reverse our proposition, then, we may say, that no one can believe in a God thus distinct from the universe, and have vividly in his mind an idea of him in his moral relations as creator, lawgiver, and judge, without also having (morally, at least, however ill-defined it may be to the intellect,) a corresponding idea of the human soul as something distinct from the body, both in essence and power—as something not proceeding from the body—not even as connected with it by virtue of any necessary dependence—but as joined to it because God himself has seen fit to establish and maintain that bond as the best mode of conducting the soul through a state of moral probation, arising from its connection with nature, to a final approach to, and union with, the Divine spirituality.

Connected with this view of the Divine nature, as something separate from the universe, *above* the universe, ruling *over* the universe, as well as *through* and *in* the universe, is the idea of the human soul as something distinct from the human body, (being neither its cause nor its effect,) ruling *over* as well as *in* the body, (unless when it becomes its voluntary slave,) and, finally, surviving the body after the period of dissolution.

This, then, is the fundamental proposition—*The soul an entity distinct from the body*—in some sense older than the body—derived from another department of being—capable of existing by itself, although obtaining through the body its first knowledge of the material world—not growing out of the body, as a *nature* or *quies*, but coming into the body *ab-extra*—*quickening* the body and afterwards going *out* of it, and *away* from it into some Hades or unseen world—this, we maintain, is the idea of soul which has been in the human mind from the be-

ginning,—its distinct entity as a fact, rather than any metaphysical or psychological view of the spiritual nature. The rudest tribes have held fast to such a notion of departure and separate existence, and that, too, in the face of all sensible phenomena attending the period of dissolution; whilst philosophy has never improved upon it, or really advanced one step beyond that first view which is common to all mankind. This is the idea which has shown itself in all languages—in all direct names for soul, and in all allied phraseology. This it is which has caused life everywhere to be characterized as a *bond*, or union, and death as an *ἀνάγκη*, a *loosening*, *release*, separation or *departure* of something which this phraseology regards as still existing in the world of entities. Hence it is not spoken of as a ceasing, a going out, in the sense of return to new existence, but as a journey, a change, or transition (חֲלִיפָה *discessus*, μεταβάσις, μεταστροφή,)—a breaking forth of the soul from something which confines it, as in Euripides *Alcestis*,

ψυχὰς γαίῃ τε καὶ μεταστῆναι βίῳ—

and in a great many passages in Homer, where the phenomenon of dissolution is spoken of. The notion of annihilation, return to nothing, or ceasing to be, is certainly alien to the early tongues;¹ and hence there are neither nouns nor verbs, primitive or derivative, corresponding to them. Such, we may say, is the view which has been held *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*, whenever it has been left to its own spontaneous development, undimmed by any refinements of philosophy, and unperverted by the unspiritualizing tendency of any scientific naturalism.

This is the more remarkable, because the universality of the *idea* is in such striking contrast with the difficulty of the *conception*. It is ever in seeming contradiction to the *sense*. It is very hard for us to *conceive* of a disembodied spirit, but the *idea*, notion, or intellectual apprehension, as distinguished from the sensual *conception*, is not anything difficult or away from the common mind. This may be fairly inferred from its universality. The most illiterate entertain it, as well as the learned. The child accepts it with a readiness that often seems to have anticipated the teacher. Every savage tribe recognise the distinction, although nature and sense would seem to say, that when the body is laid in the grave, there is an end of all animate existence. Thus we infer that the very effort which the soul has to make in *conceiving* of itself, only shows the more the reality and strength of that intellectual cognition which lies back of it. This effort at *conception*, and the conception

¹ The use of the Greek *τελευτάω*, instead of being an exception to our view, confirms it. The way in which it is used elliptically of the present life, almost always suggests the idea of change or transition to another state.

itself, would never have existed without the previous and more interior existence of the idea.

With respect to such separate entity, and separate source of being, there may be a great variety of differing and even opposing views. Soul may be regarded as coming from previous soul, and that from other soul, and so on up to the most remote or primitive fountain. It may be supposed to have passed through every kind of metempsychosis. It may be viewed as derived from a world of spiritual essences, where it had some kind of generic existence previous to its individualizing residence in an earthly body. It may be maintained that it comes, in each human personality, directly from the "*Father of spirits*." It may be supposed to be derived by a chain of traduction from successive spiritual progenitors; thus accompanying the body, not as a growth from it, but as an independent entity running parallel with the stream of physical transmission. Or it may be regarded, in every instance, as a new creation of spiritual substance co-operating by a pre-established harmony with each successive physical birth. Yet still, amid all this difference of view respecting its origin and transmission, there yet remains the great and universal article to which we have endeavored to call attention, as everywhere contained in the human thought, and engraved in human speech—the belief in it as an entity distinct from the material organization, and the consequent position, that, come from whence it may, it is in some sense, in the order of nature at least, if not of flowing time, from a prior order of existence, or, in other words, older than the body.

It is this notion of the soul as a separate entity, which appears, as we will endeavor to show, in the earliest names given to the immaterial principle, and in the derived expressions which are to be found, perhaps, in every language that has ever been made the subject of philological investigation.

Our first argument is derived from the very *fact* of its having, in the earliest languages, and in all languages, a *separate* name. As far as we can take for our guide the unvarying laws of the human mind, (and on some subjects we can have no higher test of reality,) original terms ever denote a distinct notion and belief of some corresponding entity,—and that too, from whatever source, whether spiritual or material, those terms may have been derived. Men do not invent or use words, as original and distinguishing names, without a belief in the reality of that to which they are applied. So far, then, as we may regard the universal notions of the human mind as having been given to its constitution by its very Creator, as an image of his own thought, and thus as implying a reality, or a real idea, in distinction from a mere conception, so far may we view these distinct names for spirit

(thus representing distinct notions) as indicating realities no less than those applied to the body or material nature. If so, then, the mere *fact* that in all tongues there are names for soul as distinct as those for body, is in itself evidence that mankind have believed as much in the independent entity of what is denoted by the one class of names, as in the reality of that which is denoted by the other. נַפְשׁ נִיחַ *animus, geist, soul, ghost*, have been supposed to stand for real and distinct existences, just as much as גִּוּמָא, גוּמָא, *corpus, leib, body, flesh, or matter*.

If it be said that these names may have been given to it as something subordinate to, and *growing out of*, the body, and that, therefore, they no more indicate a distinct entity, *per se*, than the terms *strength*, beauty, or health, regarded as denoting *results* of bodily organization, the answer is at once at hand. The very manner in which these words are used contradicts any such supposition. In no language is a mere result ever placed in direct antithesis to that of which it is the result. In no dialect under heaven do we ever find strength, or health, or beauty used in contrast with the body of which they are regarded as attributes, any more than we find knowledge, or thought, or feeling ever employed as the antithesis of soul. But we may say, with equal confidence, that the words for soul are ever placed in the most opposing parallelism with those for matter, or bodily organization; and so strong is the mind's a priori conviction of the unerring guidance of language in this respect, that we have not the least doubt of finding the same distinction, expressed by similar distinct and independent terms in every human tongue that yet remains to be analyzed. In all the speech of all men, and in all ages, *soul* and *body*, *flesh* and *spirit*, *mind* and *matter*, with the qualities and actions, or adjectives and verbs, corresponding to each respectively, have ever formed the most direct and clear antithesis,—have ever implied a separation and independence of entity more distinct even than is expressed by any other terms whatever.

Now, it matters not whether among the earlier or later, the ruder or more civilized races, there has ever been attending these expressions any philosophical or scientific views of the nature of spirit on the one hand, or of matter on the other. It matters not how gross or defective may have been men's ideas in respect to either substance. There need be, moreover, no difficulty in the admission, that in expressing these distinctions there has ever been a tendency to material metaphors, or symbols, which, when scientifically considered, might seem to confound the very difference of entity they would appear to aim at setting forth. It is the *fact*, the *distinction* itself, to which we call attention,—the clear, strong, antithetical dis-

tion which is ever most plainly intended, and to the expression of which mankind seem ever forced, as by a law of their mental constitution carrying on its processes in some way above the very thoughts and conceptions themselves. It is the clear distinction running not only through the primary, but also the whole range of derivative terms,—a distinction without which language would have a vital defect extending very far into all its branches, and unfitting it for its most important as well as its more ordinary uses,—a distinction without which they could be neither religion, nor morality, nor philosophy, nor poetry; for all these are ultimately grounded on this dualistic idea of *spirit* as some way ruling over matter, whether in the human microcosm, or in the vitality of the universe.

Such, then, would be the outline of an argument under this first head. We appeal to the bare *fact* of the universal employment of such separate and antithetical terms, as evidence of a settled law of language. We appeal next to this law of language, as proof of a higher law of mind, from whose workings it has proceeded. We appeal to this law of mind, as denoting the mind of Him who not only "planted the eye and the ear," but who "taught man knowledge" (Ps. 94 : 10), and "revealed unto him his thought" (Amos 4 : 13). And to this, in the last place, we appeal, as evidence that the distinction, thus traced from its lowest manifestation to its highest source, is the satisfactory proof of one of the most real of all realities.

Our next argument is, that this distinction is implied, not only in the *fact*, but in the very significance or etymological analysis of the names employed. It might, at first view, be supposed, that the most direct mode to effect this would be by some term denoting at once immateriality; but then such term would be a mere negation. It would be merely calling soul, *not-matter* or *not-body*. It might just as well be demanded, on behalf of the higher substance, that matter or body be named from a subordinate term which should be a mere negation of spirit, and be called, accordingly, *not-spirit*, or the *unspiritual* substance. Something positive was wanted as denoting a positive entity; and this is obtained in the class of names made use of. They all denote active powers, and yet are the best symbols that can be obtained of immateriality. The soul, in other words, has shown its conviction of its own immaterial nature, by taking, as its representative, the least material of all substances that in any way manifest themselves to the sense.

Here, however, comes up a most plausible objection. In all tongues, as far as known, there ever lies at the bottom of these names for soul a material or sensual conception. Spirit, breath,

wind, air, æther, and sometimes fire, may be found as the basis of them all. The universality of this, it may be contended, is proof that immateriality was a notion unknown to the primitive mind at the birth of language.—The objection seems to have much force, although we have known it but seldom urged. It is, however, capable not only of an answer, but of being transformed into one of the strongest confirmations of the view it is supposed to subvert. To make this clear, we need only call attention to some of the primary laws of the human mind, or, rather, of the mind's *action* as modified by its union with the material organization. The very necessity of spoken language would seem to arise out of this union. It would seem to follow, at once, from any notion we could have of pure spirit, that its communication with other pure spirit must be either immediate, that is, without any intervening media, sign, or symbol, or, if it employed signs at all, that it would be by making use of the lower or more obvious spiritual phenomena, as types of the more interior and remote. In other words, thought, feeling, knowledge, would make themselves known at once by their very presence to, and mingling with, other feeling, thought, emotion, and intelligence, or by their power of exciting certain cognitions of the soul which might stand as their spiritual representatives. But in the present human condition, this otherwise essentially free spirit inhabits a natural organization. It is enclosed in matter. It looks through the darkened windows of its house of flesh. It knows what is passing without only by the shadows reflected on the rear wall of its cavernous abode. Even in reading itself, or studying its own thoughts, it is compelled to make use of sensual representations, or reflex diagrams upon the sensorium. Much more, then, is it under the necessity of transmitting intelligence of its own internal feelings and conceptions by like shadowy signals sent forth from the apertures or loopholes of its own retreat; and these must be of a nature adapted to similar inlets to other souls in similar confinement.

It is, indeed, a very old opinion, that our present union with matter is very far from being our state of perfection; and hence, as Socrates says, some of the wise men of the olden time have handed down the saying, that the present body is actually the soul's sepulchre, in which it is buried, by way of condemnation, perhaps, for the sins of a former existence. Of course, we need not hold to this. Neither would we venture to condemn the mere fact of the spirit's connection with matter, when we remember that, according to the Scriptures, such will be its last and perfect state when both are purified and transformed,—when the one becomes a sinless or uncarnalized

soul, the other a "spiritual," or rather spiritualized body¹—that is, a body in perfect subjection to the spirit, instead of the latter being, as it now is, a carnal spirit, or a "carnal mind," in other words, a spirit not only *united to*, but immersed and enslaved in matter. All this we may maintain, and yet hold, with all reverence for God and nature, that our *present* union with a material organization is an imperfect and defective state, although designed for high and glorious ends in the spiritual history of the redeemed.

But whatever view we may take of it in regard to its final cause, such is the present state of humanity. Thoughts, emotions, ideas, in going from soul to soul, *must* pass through the flesh; and to fit them for this passage, and even that they may be able to make the passage at all, they must first be arrayed in the robes of the flesh. Hence not only words for soul itself, but all abstract terms, all spiritual terms, all words significant of mental entities, properties, or acts, do ever present in their primary sense, and, from the very nature of things, must present, some material substance, or agent, or some sensation, or some sensible action, or phenomenon, as the *inner word*, if we may so style it, which does itself *re-present* the abstract or spiritual notion. As we have elsewhere remarked, there are, and must be, two stages in this process. The outward word or utterance stands primarily for some material essence, or sensible action, and this material substance, or sensible action, is itself the inner language of the soul to express the spiritual conception. In this manner does the representative, thus sent forth, reach at last the ear or eye for which it was designed, and through which, by like repeated stages, though in a reverse order, it is finally conveyed to another spiritual inhabitant enclosed in a like cavern of the flesh.

Such, then, is the necessity our present organization. Spiritual ideas, and even the ideas of spirit, must array themselves in the robes of the flesh. They must put on the garb of materiality. But the more truly spiritual they are, or the more removed from every notion of matter, the more ethereal will be the dress assumed; or,

¹ The expressions *σῶμα πνευματικόν*, a *spiritual body*, and *σῶμα ψυχικόν*, an *animal body*, (1 Cor. 15: 44) if not contradictory and unmeaning, would seem, nevertheless, to transcend all human comprehension, as long as we regard the adjectives as in any sense denoting the *material* from, or out of which the body is constituted; and if we take it so in the one case, we must also in the other. If the one is a body made or formed of *πνεῦμα*, the other is a body formed of *ψυχή*. It becomes plain, however, if we regard the terms as denoting the *predominant influences* under which the present and the future man are respectively held. A body perfectly obedient to spiritual direction—the soul's servant instead of its master; is *σῶμα πνευματικόν*—just as a spirit, under the direction of the flesh, is *φρόνημα σαρκικόν*, or "a carnal mind."

rather, the less grossly material the vehicle in which this mysterious voyage from soul to soul, through the two intervening oceans of sense, is at last accomplished.

The spiritualizing pensiveness, then, is seen in the fact, that in all languages this inner word, thus itself represented by the outward name, is that substance which is conceived to be the farthest removed towards the ultimate verge of matter, if not, in fact, even beyond its utmost borders. Instead, then, of favoring materialism, these terms show how much the human mind has ever abhorred it, shrunk from it, gone to the greatest distance from it the law of its present connection would permit, or, in other words, to the very end of its chain. It manifests its tendency to the spiritual by selecting (since it was thus compelled to make use of them) material *representations* of the most ethereal, or seemingly least material kind. Language thus proves that soul, in all names for itself, has ever striven to get as far from the corporeal as it possibly could. Its רוח, נפש, פנח, רשמים, *anima, spiritus, soul, sawl, siel, ziel, Gele Drift (gust) ghost*, have all presented this notion, and this tendency, more or less, according to the accurate or inaccurate scientific conceptions of the ages when they were first employed. The substance supposed to stand next to immateriality has been the one selected as this inner word or symbol. This is proved, too, from the fact, that as progressive knowledge has revealed more and more of the materiality of these first conceptions, language has taken another step to a term supposed to be of a still more refined significance. The soul, which in the earliest ages is called *air* or *breath*, is afterward characterized by epithets derived from the fire, or the supposed heavenly æther. This first manifests itself in poetry (or in that early musing, mystical, semi-poetical theology to which we may give the general name of Orphic,) until in time the phraseology passes into general use, and becomes incorporated into the common dialect. The fire, or æther, is thus brought in as a higher or more refined order of substance, as something more removed from gross matter, or more nearly approaching that region of pure immateriality to which the imprisoned soul ever draws nearer and nearer in seeking the best name for herself, but which, in this way, she can never fully reach during her present connection with a material organization. This is the only method she can take without employing, in opposition to nature and all analogy, arbitrary and unrepresentative sounds, affording in themselves no clue to their application, and standing for ideas as the letters of the alphabet represent unknown quantities in algebra.

Sometimes, too, there may mingle with these symbols other

conceptions beside that of immateriality,—such as the mysterious *invisibility* of the wind, the upward tendency of the flame, the fancied universality and eternity of the substance styled æther; which having its seat above the atmosphere, was supposed to pervade all space, and was regarded by those who verged toward a pantheistic view of the universe, as the sensorium of the divinity, or *animus mundi*. Hence it is styled “most holy, most solemn, or sacred”—

Ἀΐδρα σπνροτατον βιοδρεμων παντων,¹
 “Source and nourisher of life to all things.”

We may take a step farther than this, and regard these names not only as denoting the *least material* substances, and, in this way, the best representatives of spirit, but as actually expressive of what was supposed itself to be an immaterial entity, and which might therefore be rationally regarded as actually constituting, instead of being merely representative of, the immaterial principle in man.

There has always been a tendency in the human mind to hold to the real existence of supposed substances, which, although not regarded in themselves as spirit, might still be viewed, in some way, as *immaterial* active entities, incapable of being resolved into any mere results or affections of matter, although related to it. There is also an analogous intermediate conception of this kind, belonging to what may be called the spiritual side of being. Thus truth may be regarded as a real entity related to mind, yet not spiritual, or of the same essence with mind; and so also those powers to which we have alluded as having a place in the belief of mankind, may be viewed as real entities related to matter, and yet not matter,—that is *immaterial*. Even in modern science, this seemingly intermediate region has not yet been fully closed up. It is still occupied by that unknown class of agencies which, as exhibited under different modifications, we style light, electricity, or magnetism. The field may have been slowly narrowing, but ever, as substances or agencies, supposed, through defective science, to belong to this class, have been found actually to possess materiality, has the mind been only driven farther and farther back to discover a similar *principium*, or to look for the realization of its thought (a thought it cannot surrender) in something else,—in some remote ground or limit, still farther removed from the obviously material. Even when light and magnetism shall have been clearly proved to belong to the order of material substances, (if they ever shall be thus proved,) the innate belief will still seek its object in what are called the

¹Aristophanes Clouds, 570.

attractive powers. It will still remain in gravitation and cohesion; and when these, too, are resolved into invisible and imponderable fluids, there will even then be presented the idea of a power still farther back—the idea of something which would seem to be neither spirit, nor matter, nor any *known* property or affection of either, and yet a real and powerful entity. Now, without being required to admit any actual existence of such mid-region of entities, we may advert to the belief in it, and the constant tendency of the mind to seek for it, as having an important bearing on our present argument. Air once occupied a place in the human thought similar to that which is now possessed by the subtle, imponderable agents of the modern chemist. It may, accordingly, have been so universally taken as the best name for soul, not simply because it was supposed to be the *least* material of all substances then known, but because it was actually regarded as an immaterial agent, in which dwelt the *immaterial* life or energy of the spirit. Everything combined to render it remarkable and mysterious. It was invisible, yet most powerful. It was unseen by the eye, yet possessed a strange and incomprehensible voice for the ear. “The wind blew where it listed; men heard the voice thereof, but could not tell whence it came, nor whither it departed.” It was *felt*, yet could not be grasped nor held; produced its effects, and exerted its powerful energies in space, and yet in that space there seemed, to the senses, nought but vacancy—nothing which could be seen, or fixed, or weighed, or measured.

In this way, too, came the same terms to be applied to the great *unseen* Soul that ruled the universe. Those who urge the objection we are considering, drawn from the supposed materiality of the symbols and names employed, should remember that God too, in the Bible, is styled רוח, *spirit*, (*wind, air*), and not only this, but also אלה רוּחַ Elohe Ruhoth, “The God of the spirits to all that is flesh.” Those, then, who would divest the Old Testament of all spirituality in respect to man, because its terms for soul signify only air or breath, (an argument we have seen advanced,) must, to be consistent, regard the Jews as believing that the wind was the God who made the worlds,—that it was the wind, or a wind which entered into covenant with their fathers, which spake to them from the fires of Sinai, and represents itself to Moses, in the burning bush, as the I AM THAT I AM, the sole, eternal, self-existent fountain of all being. Such a view would fully justify the assertion of the Roman Satirist, that the Jews believed

“Nil præter nubes, acia, atque cœlum inane;”

In nought but clouds, and air, and empty heavens.

Should it, however, be admitted, for the sake of argument, that the primitive mind did use these terms as significant of something material, and that, too, not as symbolical, but as denoting the very substance of the living principle itself, still, even the extreme and wholly unauthorized view will not establish that gross theory it is brought to support. We may distinguish between the idea of the *incorporeal* and that of the *immaterial*. The clear duality of soul and body (the important point which, we contend, has been always recognized, however incorrect the philosophy attending it,) may be as firmly maintained by the one as by the other. Admitting that, in their gross conceptions, the soul may have been regarded as, in itself, something material, still it *might* be viewed, and *was* viewed, as distinct from the bodily organization. It was still *soul* as opposed to body, נִיח as opposed to בָּשָׂר, פְּנֵימָה as opposed to סָוּמָה, or *spirit* as opposed to *flesh*.

To make this clear, we may observe, that there are two kinds of materialism. The one may be the offspring of gross irrationality, and yet truly conservative of the idea on which we have so much insisted, (the idea of the fundamental distinction between the soul and the present human body as separate entities) together with all the moral and religious notions closely connected with such acknowledged difference. The other form of materialism may be refined, philosophical, and scientific. It may even seem to assume a highly spiritual aspect; and yet be radically destructive of any conception of the soul as a distinct reality, and of all those views of present moral accountability, and future survivorship, which flow so naturally from it.

Again: The soul, as a soul, may be regarded as actually composed or constituted of some material substance. Such a doctrine, it is true, may be very irrational and unscientific, and yet sincerely and consistently held in connection with the other ideas of the spirit's distinct entity, independence, and survivorship. This material substance may be supposed to be more or less æthereal,—as fire, or ether, or the grosser air,—and yet a substance, a system by itself—separate from the body in energy, in identity, and capable of existing apart from it in time and locality. It may be viewed as joined to it for a season, and yet as having received its *genesis* from a sphere higher than that of its earthly residence. It may be regarded as *coming into* the body from this higher world of materiality, instead of being a natural outgrowth, and again, as *going away* from the body, as surviving the body; and as living, in this sense, a *disembodied* thought not an *immaterial* life,—*ἀσώματος*, *incorporeum*, though not *ἀψύχον*. There may be metaphysical objections to this, but in other respects, the view may

be perfectly consistent and conservative of the highest moral truths relating to our being and our accountability.

Of the other form of materialism it is the peculiar characteristic that it makes the soul to be, not matter, but something lower—even a *result* of matter. It is an *effect* merely—an effect of organization—a harmony of material strings. Man is not composed of two parts. He is not soul and body, but body only. What is called the spirit has not even the dignity and rank of matter. It is a *nonentity*. It is the hum of an Æolian wind-harp, having no essence, or *esse*, aside from the motions of the syntagma of strings by which it is produced. It is not the self-subsisting harmonizing principle, but the transient harmony which is only what the chords and their tension may permit it to be. It is not the vivifying power, it is not the *cause* of vitality and intelligence, but a certain *effect*, called life and thought, resulting from a certain site, figure, and motion of the particles and fluids of which the body is composed.

Between these two systems of materialism, there may be, as far as pretension is concerned, an immense difference. The one, in regard to its philosophy at least, may be more gross; the other more refined. The one may betray ignorance of the very first elements of certain departments of knowledge; the other may boast loudly of its science. And yet, were the writer compelled to choose between them, he would say without hesitation—Let me believe that the soul, *as a soul*, is fire, is æther, is air, is fluid, is blood, is earth, or lead, or iron even, if there can still be maintained, consistently or inconsistently, its destined entity, its separate and higher originality, its personality, its spiritual sovereignty, its survivorship. We would cling to this, however gross it might seem as a science or a philosophy, rather than hold to any form of transcendental pantheism, or pananthropism, which denies and confounds the *duality*, either by resolving spirit into matter, or by sublimating body into the sphere of soul, or by making either of these distinct two the *effect*, or out-working, or evolution, or ultimate, of the other. There is an aspect of this philosophy which indignantly spurns the name of materialism; it would even seem to ape the highest spirituality; it talks boastingly of faith, and declaims against sensualism,—and yet, after all, makes out man to be but a microscopic lens, refracting and transmitting the panorama of nature, and has even for its highest thought of God nothing more than the idea of the wind-harp, or organ, through which is ever pouring the eternal anthem of the universe.

From such a false hyper-spiritualism we turn to the Bible for

refuge and relief. We thank God that his blessed book avoids all appearance of philosophical argument,—that it merely adopts the ordinary distinctive language which has had its origin in our most obvious psychological necessities,—that it simply places *soul* and *body*, *flesh* and *spirit*, in contrast, without indulging in any speculations as to their essence or their nature,—that whilst it has nought to say of substance or accident, it traces one part of humanity to the earth, the other to the eternal *Breath* or Spirit, or *Ruah* in the heavens,—that it so distinctly, yet kindly, speaks of the one as frail, earthly, and incapable of sustaining its own infirmities, (Prov. 18: 14,) and of the other as not only the sustainer of the flesh, but as itself sustained by God's power, enlightened by the light of his countenance, having an interest in his righteousness, and capable of sharing in his salvation.

And so, too, in respect to God and the universe. Be it that the Bible comes down to the very verge of anthropomorphism, and anthropoperthism, in setting forth what this age, above all others, so much wants, a vivid view of the Divine personality and personal providence. It is enough for us (and we ought gladly to accept it in lieu of all philosophy,) that he is therein represented as the eternal *Ruah*, or spirit who distinctly presents himself to us as *separate* from the universe he has created—as *above* the universe,—ruling *over* the universe (ὁ ὢν ὑπερ τοῦ κόσμου as well as ἐν τοῦ κόσμου)—making all natural agencies subordinate to moral personal ends, and thus originating, sustaining, wielding, dispensing with, or utterly violating nature, according as may be required for the manifestation of that high sovereignty, those holy attributes of justice and providence, which, even in connection with anthropomorphic views, are so much higher and more valuable than any merely philosophical or scientific theism that discards them, or keeps them in the background of its systems of man and of the universe. Better believe *ex animo* in what is called the grossness of the Old Testament anthropomorphism,—that God talked face to face with Abraham in the field of Mamre,—that “he came down to *see* the sons of men, and the tower they were building” on the plain of Shinar,—that he held converse with Elijah on the summit of Carmel,—that he spake with Moses in the burning mount, and placed him in the cleft of the rock as he passed by, and manifested to his human vision his *ahorim*, or the finite and temporal aspect of infinite and eternal Deity,—far better to give our hearty credence to these clear representations of the Divine personality and providence, than to confound and enfeeble the mind with the misty pantheistic impersonality of those rhapsodizing schools that

destroy all distinction of God, and nature, and soul, and the world, and yet claim to be the most *spiritual* as well as the most profound.

This conception of *air*, wind, or breath, may be regarded as primary in almost all terms for soul. The most important tongues ever present this peculiarity of human speech, and it may safely be regarded as universal. We need only advert to a few of the ancient and modern languages. It is enough barely to mention the Greek *πνεῦμα* and the Hebrew *רוח*. The older and more general word *ψυχή* although the primary sense is obsolete, presents the same conception of *air* or *wind*; and hence the sense of coolness. The Latin *animus* is clearly the same with the Greek *ἀνemos*. Spirit is from *spiro*, and this from the very sound and motion of respiration. The German *secle*, and the English soul (Saxon *sawl*) do not, at first view, so distinctly present the common conception; but the double vowel in the one, and the compensating diphthong in the other, show that they are both from an old root that has lost a guttural, and which may be supposed to contain the radical idea. This must be *segel*, the *sail* of a ship, evidently carrying us back to an older meaning, to *blow*, or *breathe*, like the Latin *flō flare*, from whence come *flame* and *afflatus*. This is the same with our *sail*, to which family would also seem to belong the word *soul*, thus presenting the same significance with the Latin and Greek terms, and by a similar metaphorical derivation. With *geist*, *ghost*, compare the Saxon *gast*, *gas*, *gust*. The latter term seems peculiarly connected with ghost, as generally now applied to a spirit departed from the body. It suggests the flitting, gliding motion, which the legendary imagination has ever given to the disembodied apparition, especially to its departure, when

it scents the morning air,
And hies to its confine.

Thus the ghost of Anchises—

Jamque vale : torquet medios nox hūmida cursus,
Et me sævus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis,
Dixerat, et tenues fugit, ceu fumus, in auras.—*Æneid*, v. 793.

tenuesque recessit in auras
Par levibus ventis.—*Id.* ii. 791.

We would, however, at present, dwell more especially on the Hebrew words, and the language respecting soul and body which is most commonly employed in the Old Testament. And first, let us turn to that remarkable account given Gen. 2 : 7, and in which, we think, is to be found the origin of this dis-

tion that runs through all language, as well as of the peculiar phraseology which has ever been employed to present it. We have ascribed this distinction of terms to the laws of the human mind. In perfect consistency with this, however, we may also trace it to this ancient account, and the fact it sets forth, as a collateral as well as ultimate cause. "And Jehovah Elohim," it says, "formed man of earth from earth," האדם מן-הארצה—or, as Paul expresses it, "*from the earth earthy*," "and then," proceeds the narrative, "he breathed into his nostrils the breath of lives, (the term, it will be remembered by the Hebrew scholar, is plural,) and (thus) the man (this previous man of earth) became a living soul," or "a soul of life,"—a soul now living in, and the cause of life to, a living body. The phrase נפש חיה (*nephesh haggah*) is also used of the animal creatures, and, therefore, the emphasis here must be on the *manner*, rather than on the *fact*, or the mere concluding assertion. There is meant to be set forth the pre-eminently divine *manner* in which the human organization became spiritualized. And thus man became a *nephesh haggah*—a *living soul*.

We cannot help regarding the names referred to, and the distinction implied by them in all languages, as but the echo of this most ancient account of the human origin. God's voice, uttered in his earliest revelation, sounds in perfect harmony with the law of the human mind as thus revealed in human speech—*soul and body—flesh and spirit*,—earth from earth and the Divine *ama*, or breath of God, which comes down from the highest heaven. We hear this same echo, too, repeated from other parts of the Sacred Volume. Even in the solemn sentence, "*Return to your dust*," there is implied the presence of this higher and heavenly principle—that, which makes man more than earth—that at whose departure the mortal residue returns to the bosom of the earthly parent, and which will again constitute its reviving power when the same divine voice shall sound through the realms of Sheol or Hades, saying "Come again' *Benè-Adam*. Come back again, ye sons of earth, and from the earth." There is, too, an evident reference to this narrative of the human origin, Ecclesiastes 12 : 7, where the dust is said to return to earth as it was, and the *ruah* or spirit unto God who gave it. Even in the Grecian poetry may be traced the ancient strain distinctly uttering the same thought, and presenting, in the same language, the same distinction of essence and origin.

¹ Thus rendered in the prayer-book version of the 90th Psalm. The word שׁוּבוֹ may certainly have the one sense as well as the other. Why may not both be implied?

πνεῦμα μὲν πρὸς αἰθέρα,
το δῶμα δ' εἰς γῆν—

The soul to the ætherial heavens,
The body to its earth.—*Eurip. Sup.* 535.

Some might charge even this statement in Genesis with materializing conceptions; and they might be right, or at least have a plausible argument, if no account were to be taken of the law of language on which we have dwelt. Even here, the soul, it may be said, is merely air; it is *neshamah*, breath. It is said to be breathed into man, and he breathes in return and lives; and hence he is said to become a living or breathing soul—a spirit, a ghost. But here again, we say, let there be marked the evident contrast and opposition intended. Here again our idea of the materiality or immateriality of either, or of both substances, becomes of less importance than the recognition of the duality. We are called again to observe the distinction between the two principles of humanity, their action and their origin. Whether involving immateriality or not, it is a distinction, on the very face of the account, as wide as heaven and earth. Let us look at it again in its most striking particulars. God had formed the human *body* of the earth or earthly elements. There it lay before him, as yet inert and inanimate. It was like the dry bones in the valley of vision, before the Prophet had said, Come, O wind, and breathe upon them. As a bodily organization it was perfect; no material or physiological part defective;—the lungs in perfect order,—the air, too, surrounding them on all sides and penetrating every part. Still there was no real breath, for the breath was not yet present. There was no life, no motion, no emotion, no intelligence. “And God breathed,” says this ancient narrative. “The Spirit of God,” says Elihu (Job 30: 4), in evident allusion to this very language, “hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life.” Now, the sacred writers must have had some meaning in such passages,—some meaning which they deemed of great importance, and which was far above any mere play upon words, or trifling with language. What, then, was signified by this mysterious breath of the Almighty? Could it have been intended to denote the mere play of the surrounding atmosphere? In the use of this remarkable language, was there nothing more in view than the inhaled and exhaled air,—a substance in itself, as much belonging to the earth as the grosser elements, particles, and fluids of which the body was directly formed? Shall those who would thus interpret, ever dare to impute their own anthropopathism to Moses and the Old Scriptures? Let us pro-

ceed again with our inspection of the record. "*And God breathed*" into this man of earth, (τὸν πρῶτον ἀνθρώπον ἐκ τῆς (1 Cor. 15 : 47) γῆς, ΧΟΙΚΟΝ). Call it emanation or what you will; yet here we contend is there distinct mention of an unearthly principle—something which may be truly said to have been originally divine, although becoming strictly human—(and here we avoid all those imputations of a pantheistic tendency with which such a view may be charged when incautiously held)—becoming strictly human by its separation from its celestial source, and its individualizing union with him who was to be the appointed father and representative of our race. Here was born the humanity. Here was that which was higher than the body—something which came from the spiritual principle of the universe—something which did not grow *out of*, but came *down* to and *into* the human bodily organization, after it had been formed, in all its physical perfection, from the earth, and which, therefore, we may feel assured will not perish when the earth returns to earth again.

The terms for soul in the Hebrew are certainly among the oldest, however much it may be contended for the equal or superior antiquity of some other Oriental tongues. At all events, it claims our attention as the language of the earliest divine revelation. In the Hebrew, as every Biblical scholar knows, there are three principal terms for soul, —רוּחַ (*Ruah*), נֶפֶשׁ (*Nephesh*) and נִשְׁמָה (*Neshamah*); in all of which there is this same radical conception, more or less modified, however, by related ideas. *Ruah* is the wind, the air, generally; *Nephesh* and *Neshamah* more properly *breath*, or air inhaled. The first is generally used of the soul in its higher aspects of affection and intelligence, and in its connection with the universal *Ruah*. *Nephesh* is not much employed to denote the intellect. It is frequently used of the affections, the disposition, or the general character; as in Exod. 23 : 9, "*For ye know the soul (Nephesh, the feelings,) of the stranger.*" Sometimes it is taken for the whole personality, as in those passages in which the Psalmist apostrophizes his spirit, or calls upon himself. It is not unfrequently applied to the appetites and propensities, as in the phrase בָּאֵל נֶפֶשׁ (*baal nephesh*), Prov. 32 : 2; Isa. 55 : 2, &c.; but more usually like the Greek ψυχή is it employed as the most general name for soul, or for all of humanity that is incorporeal, or *not flesh*. *Neshamah* is most commonly significant of mere *animation*, although it sometimes has the higher sense of disposition and intelligence. In one passage, Prov. 20 : 27, it rises even to the highest significance of *nephesh* or *ruah*. The

*spirit of man (nishmath adam), is the lamp of the Lord, exploring all the secret chambers of thought.*¹

There are some few cases in which *ruah* is taken in its primary sense, as denoting the lowest aspect of animation, or, rather, the mere breath itself. It is thus employed to set forth the exceeding frailty of humanity, as a vapor, a passing wind, an exhalation. Thus, in Job, 7 : 7, "O remember that my life is but breath," or, "a breath." So also, Ps. 78 : 39, "A breath that departeth and returneth no more." This, however, is capable of a higher reference, and may denote, not so much the mere idea of frailty, as the irrevocable nature of the change produced by dissolution. Thus *ruah* may be taken, even here, for the surviving spiritual part, *going out*, but not lost—"A soul that goeth forth and cometh not back again." A more common mode to express frailty is derived from the other department of our nature, which for this purpose, and when man is viewed under this aspect, is used for the whole personality, just as we have seen that in the loftier invocations he is characterized by the spiritual part alone. To set forth the transitoriness of the present condition, he is called *flesh*. As in the same passage of the 78th Psalm, "He remembered that he was *flesh*, and that when the spirit departed, it returned not back again." So also in the famous passage Genesis 6 : 3, "MY spirit shall not always strive with man, (or rule over his earthly nature), seeing that he is *flesh*."

All materializing inferences from such passages are completely nullified by the fact, that *ruah* is applied to God as well as to man,—or rather to God primarily, and as the ground of its being applied to man. In the first chapter of Genesis, we have the *Ruah Elohim* that *moved*, or more strictly, according to the Hebrew, *hovered* over the chaotic darkness; or as Milton paraphrases, it with evident allusion to the Evangelical account of the descent of the spirit,

Dove-like sat brooding o'er the vast abyss.

Then, it is the generator and quickener of all things that have life, from the highest to the lowest organic forms. Thus also, Ps. 104 : 30. "Thou sendest forth *THY spirit*; they are created, and thou renewest the face of the earth." Again, Job 26 : 13 : "By *HIS spirit* he hath garnished the heavens," or, "From his spirit is the beauty or splendor of the heavens."

¹ The Hebrew phrase here, חררי בטן, would literally mean, the interior parts of the belly. It is evidently, however, a figurative expression of the same kind with those employed, Ps. 51 : 8, for the more hidden department of the soul, or the deepest thought. So also the "reins," and the "inward parts," (קרב) *ima pectoris penetralia*.

Ruah is also employed of the Divine spirit that filled the ancient seers. In other words, it was the source and cause of that prophetic and interpreting afflatus which opened their eyes to the divine vision, and their ears to the divine message. As in Ezek. 2: 1, "And He said,—Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak unto thee; And the *spirit entered into me* when he spake, so that I heard him that spake unto me." Hence, such a one was called אִשׁ אֱלֹהִים (*ish elohim*), a *man of God* (θεῖος ἀνὴρ), and sometimes, as in Hosea 9: 7, *ish haruah*, a *man of the spirit*, or a *spiritual man*. See also Gen. 41: 38, where, as far back as the days of Joseph and Pharaoh, it was said of one peculiarly gifted with a discerning and interpreting knowledge, "*The spirit of God, or the Ruah Elohim, is in him.*" In the same, or a similar manner, was it said of a man who had any extraordinary skill of invention or art, whether useful or *curious*, as in Exodus 31: 3; 35: 31.

It is thus used to denote the Divine energy in three distinct ways—as the life-giving and life-sustaining power of the *natural* creation—as the supernatural quickener of the human sense to see, and of the human intelligence to know, what it could not otherwise have seen or known—and thirdly, as the moral power which is, in a still higher manner than sense and intelligence, the true life of the human soul. Examples of this third application are too familiar for citation. In its widest significance, however, and in that which comprehends all the rest, is it applied to God, in the remarkable passage to which we have already referred; where he is styled *El Elohe-ruhoth*—*God—The God of the spirits to all that is flesh*. This, too, is, doubtless, the origin of the appellation used in the Epistle to the Hebrews, πατὴρ τῶν πνευμάτων, The Father of spirits—where it is placed in direct contrast with earthly parents, τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν πατέρας, "the fathers of our flesh," or, "our fathers of the flesh."

Ruah is employed, not only for the human spirit as residing in an earthly body during the present life, but also as disembodied, or regarded as dwelling in the ghostly world. It is thus clearly used in the sublime vision of Eliphaz, (Job iv.) a passage, by the way, which is enough to refute all that has been ever brought forward to prove the Sadducean creed to have been that of the ancient Israel. This passage, as well as the account of the bringing up of Samuel by the sorceress of Endor, (whatever we may think of the actual fact in the latter transaction,) shows conclusively that the then prevailing opinion or tradition among the Jews and early Arabians, in respect to a ghost-world, was the same as now prevails, and as ever has prevailed among mankind from the beginning. The very supersti-

tion which gave rise to the belief in the possessors of the *Oboth*, or those dealers in familiar spirits who pretended to bring up the ghosts from Sheol, or the Jewish Hades,¹ could have had no meaning, or cause, or any other supposition than that there was among the Jews as strong a notion as now exists among us, of a ghost-world, or realm of departed souls, and of the possibility of their sometimes coming back to revisit the earth. That this should occur, even in dreams, is sufficient for our argument; as showing the popular creed, and that these terms, on which we are dwelling, were supposed to indicate, not the mere breath of respiration, beginning and ending with the bodily organization, but some living power or entity that survived the bodily dissolution. In other words, *soul* then meant the same that soul does now. It suggested to the common mind the same ideas. It was connected with the same fearful thought of another world, or ghostly abode, undefined in locality, yet still near to us in a sense that might well awaken, and did awaken, an interest of the most solemn and even fearful nature. It gave rise to visions and imaginations the same as now haunt the world. An age or race of confirmed materialists would never be apt to dream of ghosts, or even to *fancy* scenes such as that recorded in the fourth chapter of Job.

But to return to this most serious narration. "A spirit," says Eliphaz, "a *ruah* flitted before my face." It was a *wind*, say some of the unspiritualizing commentators. The simplest study of the context, however, will enable the common reader to determine for himself the true value of such an interpretation. "A spirit, a ghost passed before my face. The hair of my flesh rose up. It stood. I could not discern the *form* thereof, and yet an *image* was before mine eyes. There was *silence*, and yet I heard a *voice* saying, *Shall a mortal be more just than God? Shall a man be more pure than his Maker?*

How strange, we cannot avoid remarking, this announcement from the spiritual world, and yet how different from what would be expected by mere human curiosity. Especially may this be said in an age like the present, so characterized by its singular mixture, or rather jumble, of skepticism and credulity, of pantheism and gnosticism, of Sadduceeism and demonology, of naturalism and idealism,—in short, of a secularizing sensualism, assuming the garb of faith, and even boasting of its spirituality. But the declaration made by this ancient spirit is in solemn keeping with the whole description. There is no attempted disclosure of those secrets of the unseen world

¹ The reader is referred to the 23d No. of the Bibliotheca Sacra, where the writer has dwelt on the kindred topic of the Jewish belief in a future state, and presented views he would otherwise have introduced here.

which human curiosity would vainly seek to penetrate. There is presented no physical or spiritual theory of another life, no clairvoyant system of psychology. There is nothing announced of "new light about to break forth," or of any throwing down of barriers between the separated worlds, or of any new revelation of the mystery of being. The introduction of the supernatural and the spiritual is not for its own sake, but only to give force to the *moral* truth, and vividness to the moral impression.

And in this idea, is to be found the striking difference between a true and a spurious revelation. Where Christ has barely raised a corner of the veil, and given us a few brief sentences respecting the physical nature of the other existence, Swedenborg and other gnostical dreamers have given us volumes. Where prophets and apostles have hardly dared to look, the latter have rushed boldly in, and explored the whole spiritual topography. Paul "knew a man in Christ who had been caught up to the third heavens," yet Paul barely ventures to speak of "the house not made with hands," and deems it enough to announce the psychological fact, that in some way, through God's great power, "this corruptible will put on incorruption, and this mortal immortality." Even "he who came down from heaven," and "descended into Hades, and rose again from the dead"—even he has thought it sufficient to inform us, that "in his Father's house there are many mansions," and that in the unseen world "there is a great gulf" between the lost and the saved. And so in this revelation given to Eliphaz; all is subservient to strictly *moral* ends. A light just gleams upon us from the spirit-world, but it is not so much to show us things within the veil, as to cast its irradiation upon our moral state, and to present more distinctly our moral relations to the invisible and the eternal. It is the solemn announcement of that great moral truth which is most darkened by our probationary residence in the flesh, and which it most concerns us to know,—the great truth of God's eternal righteousness, notwithstanding the clouds and darkness which, in the seemingly chaotic aspects of our present state, may appear to veil the splendors of that high attribute—the great truth, that all here is but subservient to another condition of being when everything that is wrong shall be rectified, and everything that is morally dark shall be made light. And I heard a voice saying, "*Shall a mortal be more just than God? Shall a man be more pure than his Maker?*"

Such, throughout, is what may be called *the awful reserve* of the Bible as compared with the impudent and blasphemous assumptions of pseudo revelations. It offers to us the disclo-

sure of no physical, or physiological, or physico-psychological secrets. Even if this were good for us, and the truth itself were not ineffable in respect to our present state and faculties, still it may be supposed to be kept back, because we have first to learn a higher moral lesson connected with the future world; and until this is deeply and savingly impressed upon the soul, all other knowledge in respect to it would only be a hindrance rather than an advantage. This is the announcement which pervades the Scriptures, and which is so expressively summed up in the prophet's solemn charge: "Say ye,

"Wo to the wicked,
It shall be ill with him;
Joy to the righteous,
It shall be well with him."

Without this, all other disclosures would but blind the mind and harden the heart. Without this, although the ghosts should rap ever so loudly at the partition wall which divides them from the world of the flesh—though

"The sheeted dead
Should squeak and gibber in our streets,"

and the spirits of the departed congregate in museums and public places for the gratification of our profane curiosity, we should still "cleave unto the dust," and become the more animal and earthly, the louder our boasts of such faith and such *spirituality*.

This same term *ruah*, is often applied to invisible celestial or angelic beings. "*Who maketh his angels spirits,*" (*ruhoth*). This is the apostle's rendering. The neologist contends that it should be translated,—Who maketh the winds his messengers. He sneers, too, at the scholarship that would think of any other version. It is he himself, however, who is governed by his prejudices. It is he who makes unmeaning modern metaphors, and a modern *usus loquendi*, the foundation of his criticism; and we are so accustomed to the naturalizing tendency of the day, that it seems extremely plausible. Metaphors, with us, have become, in great measure, mere elegances of speech, and we think it must have been always so. We forget that in the earliest utterance of mankind there could have been nothing unmeaning. No metaphor was ever used except as implying behind it a deeper reality than could be presented in the mere direct forms of speech. If, then, we are to judge the Hebrew by the ancient ideas, and not by the modern naturalism, the apostle was right in his hermeneutics—"He maketh spirits his angels (or messengers), his servants the flaming fire." Neither does the latter part of the passage

come in conflict with this idea. In Isaiah 6: 1, it may be seen that "*the flaming fire*" is but another term for a still higher order of spirits, named from the symbolized conception of a higher or less material element. By the flaming fire we may understand the burning seraphim, (as the word etymologically denotes) who touched the prophet's lips with the glowing fire of inspiration.

Extravagant as this may seem to some, we know that it is in accordance with what may be called the Hebrew theory of nature. Whether that theory be true or not, the writers of the Old Testament did believe in the supernatural agency of invisible beings controlling the phenomena of the visible world. Sometimes in the Bible the veil is slightly lifted, and there is disclosed to view the spiritual agent standing behind the machinery of natural means. Had such an expression occurred as *ha ruak haddeber*, *the spirit of the pestilence*, it would doubtless have been rendered by some interpreters, *the wind of the pestilence*, or a *pestilential wind*. But the account to which we now refer (2 Sam. 24: 15) is all plain prose. There is no poetry, no metaphor about it. "So the Lord sent a pestilence upon Israel; and the angel stretched out his hand upon Jerusalem to destroy it. And the angel of the Lord was by the threshing floor of Arannah the Jebusite; and when David saw the *Malak ham-mash-hilh* (or *destroying angel*) that smote the people, he spake and said." Now whether this Jewish philosophy of nature be true or false, one thing we would boldly affirm, namely, that no amount of science, present or future, will ever be able to disprove it, or show its inconsistency with any chain of natural causation, long enough for the construction of any scientific system of natural philosophy, and yet allowing a limit back of which there is ample room for the supernatural. We however simply allude to the passage as giving the true exegesis of the one from the 104th Psalm, and thus as illustrating the scriptural use of *ruah*. There is not the least intimation here that this recorded pestilence is peculiar in the agency by which it was brought about. It presents the same doctrine that we find in the account which the evangelist, with so much truth and simplicity, gives us of the *healing angel* (המלאך המרפא) who descended at times into the waters of Bethesda, and which, although having no real difficulty, except in our irrational unbelief, is yet such a σκάνδαλον or stumbling block to the rationalizing interpreters.

However little exact science they may have possessed, the ancient Hebrews believed as firmly as we do in the succession of natural causes, and some general machinery of natural laws. Such a belief is in fact a primordial faith, or one of the

innate principles of the human soul. Science does not create the idea of such a system of law, but only unfolds its links. The Jews held, as consistently as the most scientific among ourselves, to the גלגל תולדת (*galgal toledoth*), to use the Rabbinical expression, or *wheel of generation*, or *course (currus) of nature* (εξουθενει της γενεας James 3: 6); but along with this, they also distinctly held that there were spirits (*ruhoth*) in the wheels. As in that wondrous vision of Ezekiel, "Now as I looked upon the wheels they were very high,—so high that they were dreadful to behold. And they were full of eyes all round about. And their appearance, and their work was, as it were, *wheel within wheel*. As went the *living creatures*, so went the wheels; and when the *living creatures* rose, the wheels also were lifted up over against (or in correspondence with) them. For there was a *living spirit* (a *spirit of life*, *mahha-hagah*) in the wheels. Wheresoever the *spirit* was to go, there they went, and where the living creatures stood, there they stood. For there was a *living spirit* in the wheels."

Allied to this use of *ruah* is its application to another class of superhuman beings, who are represented as having a similar agency in respect to the chain of moral causes,—that is, who change the course of *historical* events by exerting an influence on the minds and motives of men, or who are the Divine ministers sent forth for the judicial blinding and hardening of the reprobate and rebellious. As in the remarkable account, 1 Kings 22: 19, "And the Prophet Micaiah said, I saw the Lord sitting upon his throne, and the hosts of Heaven standing by him. And the Lord said, who shall persuade Ahab that he may go up and fall at Ramoth Gilead? And there came forth a spirit (*ruah*) and said, I will persuade him. And the Lord said, thou shalt persuade him and prevail also. Go forth and do so.

The other word (*nephesh*), is also used in the Old Testament just as we now, and with our present creed, employ our term soul. The common reader so understands it. The rational critic says it is because he all along imposes on himself by unconsciously carrying the modern meaning with him. Rather may we say—inverting the argument—he carries the common meaning into the old words, because the ancient and modern phraseology are so precisely alike as to suggest no suspicion of any difference in their significance. "And the Lord hearkened unto the voice of Elijah, and the *soul* came back again," 1 Kings, 17: 22. "The *soul* came again," says the Scripture, "and he lived." How strikingly similar to the language in Genesis, when "God breathed into the man, and

he became a living soul." How well, too, does it correspond to those universal expressions to which we have before alluded, and by which, in so many languages, death is characterized as a *departure*, a going forth of something that is loosened from the body. The neologist, however, would make the whole process a mere temporary reunion of a little breath with the surrounding atmosphere, and again, a temporary abstraction from it. Such, he would say, was all that the Jewish writer meant. But does this—we ask it in the name of all intelligent and candid criticism—does this come up to the sublime simplicity and affecting truthfulness of the language? There is no earnestness, no meaning, no *soul* in such a translation. Let the Bible be true or false in its claims to inspiration, yet one thing may certainly be said respecting it,—it is ever serious, ever in earnest. It never trifles with us; it never says unmeaning things. Had, too, the other view been really intended, there would have been no difficulty in expressing it in other Hebrew terms, carrying no ambiguous suggestion of any higher sense.

In exact correspondence with this are other scriptural expressions which represent death as a yielding or giving up of something that goes away at the bodily dissolution. Thus in Psalm 21: 1, "*Into thy hands do I yield up my spirit (ruhi) for thou hast redeemed (or purchased) me, O Lord God of truth.*" Here is clearly the idea of *restoration*, or the paying back of a *deposit*,—and the connection between it and the language in Gen. 2: 7, is too plain to be mistaken. Blind must they be who, in such expressions, see only nature, or a debt due to nature, as the naturalist would say, and nothing of covenant, nothing of grace, or of the redemption of the soul.

In Ecclesiastes 2: 5, there is not only a direct contrast between the soul and the material part of man, but also a clearly implied distinction both of essence and origin, together with a rebuke of such as would venture to for many mere psychological theory of their mysterious relation. "As thou knowest neither the *way of the spirit*, nor even how the *bone* (that is, the *body*) grows in the womb, so thou knowest not the work of God which he worketh in the world." Till thou canst solve the mystery of the finite microcosm, presume not to explain the surpassing mystery which is involved in the life of the universe, or in its moral government.

It is not, then, the *nature* of soul and body, but the clear distinction between them, as matter of fact, which forms the main psychological truth of the Scripture, both old and new. Without any philosophical parade of terms, without any affectation of spiritualism on the one hand or any materializing cant on the other, it simply, yet strongly speaks of man as composed of

two parts, soul and body, flesh and spirit, *ruah* and *basar*. We give only a passage or two in which the contrast between the spiritual and material part is too plain to be mistaken. "*Surely*," says Elihu, (Job 33 : 8), "*there is a spirit in man*." The most frigid neologist would shrink from destroying all the force and interest and even meaning of the passage, by rendering it *breath*. "*Surely there is a spirit in man*,"—there is something unearthly, something allied to the Divine Spirit. Observe, too, the reasoning implied in the subsequent clause—"Surely there is a spirit in man, *for it is the inspiration, or inbreathing of the Almighty which giveth him understanding*."

Sometimes they are brought in immediate connection and succession, as though to present the two component parts of humanity in the most distinct contrast. As in the 63d Psalm, "O Lord thou art my God ; at the dawn will I seek thee. My *soul* thirsts for thee ; my very *flesh* cries out, how long, as in a dry and desert land, wherein no water is." So again Ps. 84 : 2, "My *soul* longs for the courts of my God ; even my *flesh* cries out (*el El hagi*) to the God of life." Compare also Ps. 73 : 26, Prov. 18 : 14. Gen. 6 : 3. Isa 57 : 16, &c.

It is thus that the Scriptures present distinctly the earthly and the heaven-derived portions of our nature. They deal not in barren notions of non-extension and indivisibility ; they indulge in no Platonic flights respecting sense, and reason, and innate intelligence. They have but little to say, especially the older Scriptures, of the nature or manner of fact even, of the future existence. In distinction from all this, and above all this, the Old Testament idea of the soul's dignity, and eternity, and infinite value, is to be sought and found in those sublimely spiritual declarations which represent God himself, or the eternal *Ruah*, as its light, its life, its strength, its rock, its refuge, its salvation, its everlasting portion, its eternal home, or "dwelling-place in all generations." This language is the pledge of the spirit's immortality ; because, as we said in the beginning, it so connects humanity with God, or the human with the Divine Spirit, as to make the eternity and infinity of the one the immovable ground of the blessedness or well-being of the other, so far as it believes, and, in believing, truly lives the spiritual life in distinction from the mere earthly and animal existence. "*As the Lord liveth and as thy soul liveth*—"*Ὅτι ἐγὼ ζῶ, καὶ ψυχή σου ζήσεται*"—"Because I live ye shall live also." "*For with Thee is the fountain of life, and in thy light do we see light*."

ARTICLE VII.

THE HARMONY OF SCIENCE AND REVELATION.

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THERE is no lawless atom nor irresponsible agent in the universe. Throughout the vast system of which God is the centre, there is a proper subordination of the visible to the invisible, of the finite to the infinite, of the temporal to the eternal. "The end of all philosophy," in the study of the Word and works of God, "is the intuition of unity." All knowledge is related to one eternal scheme, of which the ultimate end is the consummation of Messiah's mediatorial reign. The proper position of the Christian student, as the moral centre, is the cross of Christ. From this point he may observe the whole circumference of truth, and admire the relations of the several parts, as in their orbits of glory they move forward in their appointed missions, revealing the unity of Nature and Religion, the harmony of Reason and Faith, and the coincidence of Science and Revelation, mutually self-supporting and illustrative. They are parts of one system, as binary or quadruple stars revolving around one another and mingling their light together; and so perfectly united, that if one were removed, the withdrawal of its light and influence from the common sphere would diminish the lustre and tarnish the glory of the others. A beautiful simplicity and harmony pervades the sciences of earth and heaven.

The ancient Greek philosophers, seeking for all known facts a comprehensive system, assigned to particular branches of science and art their appropriate tutelary spirits, or guardian divinities, whom they called Muses, and represented as the daughters of Jupiter and Mnemosyne. Mnemosyne was the daughter of Cœlus and Terra, and signifies memory, and was called the mother of the Muses, because we are indebted to this mental endowment for the progress of science. The Muses were nine in number, and were often painted with their hands joined, dancing in a ring, while in the centre sits Apollo, their commander and prince, holding a harp. And we are assured by Pliny that these figures were not delineated by art, but by the spontaneous handiwork of nature. The pencil of nature, it is said, described them in that manner upon the agate which Pyrrhus wore in a ring, dancing in a chorus, to indicate the indissoluble connection between the liberal arts and

sciences. Calliope, one of their subordinate divinities, the goddess of epic poetry and eloquence, is represented as holding a roll of parchment in one hand and a trumpet in the other, proclaiming with trumpet-voice the record of her parchment roll,—that the sciences, earth-born but heaven-descended, are co-existent, harmonious, and eternal.

Truth being universal and eternal, must be self-consistent throughout the volumes of Nature and Revelation. The universe were unworthy to be the creation of God, if unbroken harmony prevailed not through its whole extent. Weak, indeed, must be that faith which fears that reason can derive from the *works* of God a contradiction to the true meaning of his *Word*. Any interpretation of the Scriptures which is in conflict with the facts of science, is necessarily false; and any application of known truth to unknown quantities and relations, which restrains the free action of the mind in the investigation of the works or the Word of God in reference to matter or mind, is unjust and oppressive.

Too often has there been war between the teachers of Science and of Revelation—an unnatural divorce between philosophy and religion—placing many of the world's great minds and profound thinkers in opposition to the claims of revealed truth, and leaving the church, in her paucity of means, comparatively impotent for the accomplishment of her mission.

If the voices of Nature and Revelation were properly interpreted, the most perfect harmony would be perceived throughout all their manifold lessons; science would blush to scoff at religion, and religion would cease to frown on science; and the whole system of related truths as parts of the visible universe would dwell together in unity, the memorials and the monuments of the INFORMING WORD. The sciences are not to be regarded as rival aspirants for place and power, but as affiliated truths inseparably connected and set as a single gem in the diadem of Him who is ALL IN ALL.

All harmony, says Coleridge, is founded on a relation to rest. Take a metallic plate and strew sand upon it. Sound a harmonic chord over the sand, and the grains will whirl about in circles and other geometrical figures, all dependent as it were on some point of sand relatively at rest. Sound a discord, and every grain will whirl about without any order at all, in no figures, and with no points of rest. That plate is the human heart, and the grains of sand are the facts and principles of universal science. The point of rest is God himself. The chord harmonic is the voice of truth, and the result is the harmony of earth and heaven.

Ideal truth is absolute, co-existent, and necessarily harmo-

nious. The *apparent* discrepancy of relative truths resulting from the imperfection of language, or the disturbing force of unknown truths, or the shadows and false lights cast by reflecting surfaces, or from the influence of a false position, or from the mystery incident to all subjects of a transcendent character, is not inconsistent with the most perfect harmony of the ideal and absolute.

Gravitation is not inherent in matter, but is an expression of a law of the Eternal Mind. Colors are but reflections, and belong by illusion to the objects of which they are predicated. Were we endowed with senses of a higher order, or a more perfect character, it might appear, perhaps, that the language which we regard as strictly philosophical, is but that of *appearance*, with reference to a language still more nearly perfect. And yet the popular language of *appearance*, though inconsistent with *absolute* truth, is scientifically correct. It is the language of Davy and Henry in the laboratory, and of Nichol and Leverier, and Mitchell at the observatory, and will be the language of the world to the end of time.

As the philosopher, in the instruction of a juvenile class, by the structure of language and terms and images and indirect allusions, would indicate that he knew more than he was attempting to communicate, so the Divine Mind, in presenting to man the history and law of the moral-universe, often alludes to principles of collateral sciences, but always with the utmost precision, and with reference to the most perfect classification; proving that the words of the Scriptures, before misunderstood, are in pre-established harmony with absolute truth—the universal science which preceded that of time.

Nature and Revelation are the records of the same mind—segments of the same circle—reflections of the realities of Heaven, thrown upon different parts of the canvass on earth, and read from different stand-points—parts of the great book of universal history—branches of one all-comprehending philosophy, perfectly harmonious and consistent, and reflecting upon each other a bright and beautiful light.

The whole history of science demonstrates the convergence of truths discovered with truths revealed. Like the prismatic colors, they mingle and blend together, forming one luminous whole. Like rivers from different sources, rushing through the mountain gorges, and flowing along the valleys, they tend to the same ocean, and lose their waters in its blue depths. Each in its place is perfect, and *neither* can, without violence, assume the office or exercise the functions of the other.

The idea should not be entertained for a moment, that the

facts of science are, or could be, in conflict with the statements of Revelation. Nature and Revelation are *facts*. Truth is eternal. Any hypothesis which omits facts, or involves falsities, may be refuted by the application of the principles of inductive philosophy, without recourse to the *à priori* scholastic philosophy, invidiously arraying the ministers and priests of the temple against the disciples and prophets of nature.

It is not to be supposed that any facts or principles are new to the Infinite Intelligence. Those things which are new to us, are as old as creation, and consequently we find that the statements of the great Architect concerning his works, stand the test of experience. The alarm and anxiety manifested by many religious teachers, lest the revelations of Science should overthrow the doctrines of the Bible, under an imposing appearance of zeal for the truth, betray a sad want of confidence in its inspiration and power, as well as a lamentable ignorance of the laws of mind, and of the peculiar province of Reason and Faith.

Often, within the era of modern inductive philosophy, has some new science appeared, with bold pretensions, seeming to the timid religionist as a destructive comet rushing with its fiery train across the horizon, but soon it passed out of sight and was lost in the darkness; but still dependent on the great law of the system, the same erratic star, after a while, has come circling back to do homage to Revelation. Thus it has been with Astronomy, Physiology, Geology, and Philosophy, as well as the modern science of spiritual sympathy and power, yet in a transition state, which, when stripped of its empiricism and extravagance, and matured and made to take its place in the sisterhood of sciences, is destined to illumine the dark page of mental science, and to throw a flood of light and glory on the relations of man to God, and of time to eternity.

A brief induction of particular facts will illustrate the general principle just unfolded.

Revelation asserts that the earth has been the theatre of an astonishing series of miracles, demonstrating the supremacy of Jehovah, and his superiority to any of the laws of his ordination. Skepticism asserts that all things continue as they were; that a miracle is impossible, if not absurd; and that all around, above, and beneath, is governed by the laws of Nature. But true science has demonstrated that skepticism is blind, that its arrogance is folly, and its wisdom insanity.

The earth has been more than once subjected to the action of fire and water. There was a long interval between the creation and the final organization of waste and darkness, most expressly described by the phrase, "without *form* and *void*," with no

basin for the sea, disruptive elevations, volcanic action heaving up mountain ranges and burying continents, alternations of sea and land, and an atmosphere obscured by dense carbonic vapor. That was an era of stupendous miracles. And shall we suppose that the Creator has retired from his throne, or gone to sleep like Brahma, leaving the world to work out its own destiny by chance?

Law is but the expression of the will of God. We see the law of gravity superseded by that of chemical action, and that again by the law of life. And if there be a still higher law, into which all these may be resolved, the most stupendous scheme of miracles of which angels ever conceived would be neither absurd nor contradictory. It would be merely the unraveling of the mystery of nature, and showing, in the sublimity and simplicity of truth, that God *worketh all in all*.

By the simple exercise of that more comprehensive law, all the creations and forms of subordinate laws would disappear, and the energies of the elements, long locked in the earth's embrace, would be developed; rocks would melt, and mountains disappear; and in the *miracle* of the dissolving the heavens and the earth would be seen the consummation of Time's era and the fulfilment of the last prediction of inspired seers.

Revelation asserts the extreme antiquity of our globe, placing its creation in the *beginning*—a period before the ages which the inspired historian could not or did not choose to number one of the units of a series of its history,—revealing a plan of the Deity, grand in its outlines and beautiful in its execution,—reaching far back into past eternity, and looking forward, perhaps, indefinitely into the future, precisely in accordance with the deductions of geological science; the fact being incontrovertible that the earth had undergone repeated changes, and been the theatre of other forms of life, under widely different circumstances, long anterior to its present formation and the creation of man.

Revelation teaches that the earth in its present form is of recent origin—a fact which the pride of modern philosophers and the vanity of ancient Oriental dynasties have endeavored to controvert, claiming for the progress of society an indefinite series of ages, but which the researches of modern antiquarians have clearly established.

Revelation asserts that the creation of the earth as a residence for man was a gradual work, in regular order, at stated intervals, man being the last and crowning work of the Creator's hand; and science demonstrates that the earth was in existence prior to the creation of man and the existing

orders of animals, and vegetables were created at least three epochs before the present order of existence, and, in a condition of things incompatible with human life, attained an enormous size, either on account of a more intense terrestrial magnetism, or the greater inclination of the ecliptic, or some powerful cause which philosophy has not been able to conjecture.

It is the enunciation of Revelation, and the deduction of Science, that the earth has been the subject of many changes, with regular steps of progress in consecutive order, in the development of a mighty plan, involving various conditions of the earth's surface, incompatible with the existence of the present order of beings, and referring to the beginning of the present state of things, and to the existence of the *beginning* and the *end* of preceding states, and pointing to the beginning of the whole series, and conducting us back to the first act of creative power.

Revelation places the creation of light before that of the sun—an order of events which no uninspired man, in the days of Moses, would have ventured to assume. Whereas, modern science has demonstrated that light is an element, independent of the sun, diffused, perhaps, throughout the universe, which is acted upon and rendered palpable by the sun when above the horizon, and that the Hebrew word *אור* includes both light and heat, and that these exist in all bodies in a latent state.

Revelation, in the true spirit of modern science, speaks of the stars as innumerable—sown like dust through space—while, according to the ancient system of astronomy, not more than 500 could be seen in both hemispheres, and without the aid of the telescope, scarcely 2,000 can be seen during the clearest night. And while the ancient philosophers regarded them as intelligent and subordinate divinities, exerting an influence upon the course of human events, the Scriptures, with scientific accuracy, represent them as inert matter, brilliant, disposed and guided by the creating hand, and moving with the order of an army advancing to battle.

Revelation recognises the existence of moral and physical laws, controlling the worlds of matter and of mind, and affirms that obedience to one does not avert the consequences of a violation of the other—a fact which modern science has just discovered—a fact of which the polytheistic world is profoundly ignorant, and which, when fully understood, will dissipate the twilight of superstition, and melt the frosts of skepticism, by limiting to their appropriate spheres the principles of the ideal philosophy pervading the republic of mind, and the laws of the Baconian philosophy, which control the universe of matter.

Revelation asserts the unity of the human race—a doctrine peculiarly obnoxious to a large portion of the skeptical world—but recent laborious investigations, historical, physiological, and ethnographical, have shown a similarity of customs and traditions, an identity of constitution and character, and an affiliation of languages throughout the globe, indicative of a common origin, and have settled the question for ever as to the unity of the human race.

Revelation asserts that the Cross of Christ is the sun of the moral system,—the source of spiritual light and life,—and the philosophy of history has abundantly demonstrated that civilization is the attendant result of Christianity. What we are in the scale of civilization, Christianity has made us; and what we are to become, depends on the personal application we may make of the philosophy of Heaven. It is a beautiful idea of some author, “that the return of the sun to the southern tropic does not more certainly occasion winter to the northern zone, and lock up the energies of vegetation, than the withholding of the Bible from the people, or their neglect of it, would paralyze the energies of the soul, seal the fountains of genius, nip the fair flowers of fancy, produce an intellectual and moral darkness which can be felt, and put an effectual stop to all useful inventions and moral improvement.” Moral deterioration is the necessary consequential result of sin under a moral government.

The beautiful fable of Grecian mythology, representing the banishment of Epimetheus, after having incurred the evils of Pandora's box, and been changed into a monkey, to the island Pitheculia—the name applied by the later poets to Homer's description of the place of torment allotted to the earth-born Typhoeus—and the confinement of Prometheus upon the rugged rock Caucasus, where, for 30,000 years, the vulture was to prey upon his vitals, still unconsumed, because he had stolen fire from the chariot of the sun, with which to animate his man of clay, most strikingly corroborates the truths of Revelation and philosophy concerning the fall of man, and the decline of civilization. Ovid's beautiful description of the first man founded partly on Hesiod's golden age, and partly on traditions of the patriarchal religion, that we were at first good and happy, and lost our felicity when we lost our innocence, is surely more favorable to virtue, consonant to reason, and honorable to our nature, than the theory that man was the result of one of nature's gradual formations—at first an oyster, an owl, a serpent, or a monkey, a few of whose descendants having acquired, by some strange accident, the faculty of speech, have attained to literature, civilization, and religion.

It is not necessary to extend this process of generalization. It might be continued indefinitely, until the facts of science were exhausted, plucking all the while fresh laurels with which to adorn the brow of Christianity.

Moral and political science, with the theory of government, is but the application in social life of its principles; and the splendid systems of science constructed by Butler, Edwards, Chalmers, and Wayland, are but *echoes*, with various degrees of distinctness, of the voice of God proclaimed in his Word and works. The Bible is *the Book*, and contains the science of Heaven. In the picture language of another, "A plank from the wreck of Paradise, thrown on the shores of time by the hand of Providence, it contains in the germ all truth that pertains to man and to God, to time and eternity, and with it all human science must be allied, and by its spirit pervaded, that seeks for perpetual vigor and immortal youth."

The experimental and physical sciences are necessarily imperfect, being only approximations toward the ideal and absolute. The triangle cannot be *made*, but *is*. The circle is that which is, which always was, and which ever will be, and yet the circle is not, never has been, and never can be made; consequently all the physical sciences are subject to constant revision and change. They cannot be made absolutely perfect.

But the Bible contains no errors. Like its Author, it is true, pure, perfect, consistent and eternal. Imagination, passion, prejudice, tradition, philosophy, and erroneous science, sacrificing the spirit for the letter, may pervert and distort it, occasioning shadows, reflections, inconsistencies, contradictions, and absurdities; but these belong not objectively to its inspired record, but subjectively to the mind contemplating it.

If the Bible, fairly interpreted, should be found to contain a single error, it would forfeit its claims to divinity. If, for instance, it had taught the theory of the early fathers concerning the earth's motion, or had called stars crystal, as Philolaus; or had said that the two hemispheres are enlightened by two suns, as Empedocles; or that the fixed stars, by the quickness of their diurnal motion round the earth, kindled the sun with their fires, as Leucoippus; or that the heavens and the earth were formed by the motion of air and the ascension of fire, as Diodorus Siculus and the Egyptian sages; or that the moon was fifty thousand leagues higher than the sun, and that the earth is flat, seven stories high, each with its own degree of beauty, its animals and its seas, one of honey, another of sugar, another of butter, and another of wine, and thus the whole mass is carried on the heads of elephants, who, by shaking themselves, cause earthquakes, as the Hindoo Shaster; or had

adopted any of the ancient theories of astronomy, astrology, necromancy, or philosophy; or the more modern cosmogony of Buffon, or the theory of Voltaire, concerning fossil remains of a primitive world, as the fanciful vagaries of the author of "*Vestiges of Creation*," or the revelations of modern clairvoyance,—it would have been inconsistent with the facts of demonstrative science, and would be forced to retire from its proud pre-eminence as the only key to unlock the vast temple of Truth and unfold the mysteries of Universal Science.

While it is true that the Bible is the sun of the spiritual system, illuminating the whole field of science, it is also true that the influence is reciprocal; salutary changes in Biblical interpretation having been wrought by the development and progress of physical science, as the invention and improvement of the telescope reveals new worlds in the firmament and new glories in the sun.

It was formerly supposed by learned and pious men that the world was a boundless plain, and that the sun was a light rekindled in the east and extinguished in the west in everlasting succession. The present theory of the solar system, so grand that it makes the dullest student eloquent with inspiration, and so accurate as to enable the astronomer to describe and weigh the unseen wanderer on the very circumference of the circle, was once denounced on the authority of the Bible. Had the Pope and the College of Cardinals been able to establish their position, they would have done what the infidel world has tried in vain to accomplish. See that assembly of Cardinals in solemn conclave, clothed with infallibility, endeavoring by resolutions to fix the laws of nature, to control the revolutions of suns and stars, and then with marvellous self-complacency, having laid the foundations of the earth, and spread out the heaven as a curtain, imprisoning the sage who first disclosed the unexplored regions of space. Hear them, as they enunciate the sublime truths to which the earth and heavens, with sun, and moon, and stars, must be subjected:—

"Solem esse in centro mundi et immobilem motu locali propositio absurda et falsa in philosophia et formaliter heretica; quia est expresse contraria sacrae scripturae. Terram non esse centrum mundi nec immobilem sed moveri, motu etiam, diurno, est etiam propositio absurda, et falsa in philosophia, et theologia considerata ad minus erronea in fide."

Galileo was told that his doctrine was contrary to the Scriptures, and though mounted upon the highest walls of the universe, vindicating by his genius and his telescope the system of Copernicus, he was cast into prison at Rome at the age of 80 years, having 10 years before been induced to make a recan-

tation, and saying on bended knees, "I hate, curse, and detest the theory of the earth's motion."

The true theory of the solar system had been proclaimed in the church at an earlier period, derived, doubtless, from the fragments of ancient science studied by the Fathers, but was rejected by the doctors of the church. Augustine said, that the doctrine that there are antipodes is against theology. Lactantius asked, Is any one so simple as to believe that there are men with their feet over their heads, trees with their fruit hanging upward, rain and snow falling upward? To answer you, they pretend that the earth is a globe. One knows not what to make of such men, who, once in an error, engulf themselves in their folly, and maintain absurdity by absurdity.

Pope Gregory, writing to Boniface, the Legate, said, concerning Virgilius,—If it be proved that he maintains that there are other men under the earth, assemble a council, condemn him, drive him from the church, and depose him from the ministry. Even Turretine, whose theology is yet the textbook in some theological seminaries, has laid down five formal propositions to disprove the diurnal revolutions of the earth, the third of which is, that the earth is said in the Bible to be immovably fixed, and the fourth, that the birds would not be able to return to their nests, for during an hour's absence the earth would have moved 450 miles. Luther, even, rejected the Copernican system of astronomy. He says: "There are three motions of heavenly bodies. The first is *primi mobiles et raptus*. The whole firmament moves quickly and nimbly around, and revolves in 24 hours in a course of thousands of miles, which is perhaps ordered by an angel. It is wonderful that such a great edifice can turn in so short a time. If the sun and stars were made of iron, silver, gold, or steel, they would soon melt in such a rapid course. The second movement is that of the planets. These have their own especial and peculiar motions. The third is a wavering motion, which is called trepidation, which has lately been discovered, and is very uncertain. I think highly of astronomy and mathematics, for they deal in demonstration and certain proofs.

"A new sort of astronomy has been proposed, which would prove that the earth revolves, and not the firmament, the sun, and the moon, as when one rides in a carriage or a boat he thinks that he is still, and that the trees and the shore are moving. *So it goes*. Any one who would be thought wise must be contented with nothing that another does; what he himself does is better than all. The fools would overthrow the whole science of astronomy. But the Holy Scriptures show that Joshua commanded the sun and moon, not the earth, to

stand still." Luther, if now on earth, might adorn a theological chair, or write admirable comments on the texts of Kirwan, but with his astronomical faith he could hardly compete with Nichol and Mitchell in lecturing on the wonders of modern science.

The existence of the Satellites, after their discovery, was denied by the clergy, and the belief of it was denounced as heretical. Even scientific men were so ignorant of the laws of mind, and the principles of the inductive philosophy, as to attempt by *à priori* reasoning to invalidate the testimony of ocular demonstration. Francisco Lizzi, an astronomer of reputation, said, that as there are seven days in the week, seven metals, seven primary colors, and seven windows in the human head, two eyes, two ears, two nostrils, one mouth, so there can be only seven planets; two favorable, Jupiter and Venus, two unpropitious, Mars and Saturn, two luminous, the sun and moon, and one Mercury, indifferent.

To so great an extent has mind been under the influence of superstition and false philosophy, that the fundamental principles of the Bible have been overlooked, condemned, and denounced as heretical and impious by the doctors and champions of orthodoxy. During the progress of the Reformation, the great doctrine of justification by faith was stigmatized as a doctrine of the Devil, by faithful churchmen, who, in derision of the leaders of reform, called their dogs Luther and Calvin.

It is only 114 years since the penal statute against witches was repealed in England and Scotland; and it is remarkable that the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland enumerated the repeal among the national sins, over which they prayed, lamented, and wept. Interpreting the Bible in the light of tradition and prejudice, they honestly supposed that it regarded witchcraft as a capital offence; whereas the old Hebrew statute refers to a different class of offences, and the original word translated *witch* does not even suggest the idea which modern usage has attached to it.

The proclamation of the Pope's bull against witches in 1684, converted all Europe into a Pandemonium, one-half the people being bewitching or bewitched. In Geneva, five hundred were put to death within three months. In Lorraine nine hundred in fifteen years. In the diocese of Como one hundred in a single year. In Germany ten thousand during the continuance of the Pope's bull. In England three thousand during the session of the Long Parliament. Even Sir Matthew Hale, so pure and comparatively free from prejudice and superstition, was involved in the prevailing fanaticism, and heartily gave his voice

for the condemnation of the victims of their own deluded imaginations.

It is said that a learned Brahman crushed the microscope which showed him living animals in his favorite pomegranate. The spirit of the Brahman still lives even in Christendom, and is disposed to crush by force every new truth not within its own range of vision.

We are yet in the twilight of Christianity. It was midnight at the period of the Saviour's advent, and though the sun now shines clearly, it has not yet attained the meridian. Although the plain practical principles of the Bible are clearly understood, it is yet a deep mine, into whose amazing depths no shaft has yet penetrated. Are we to suppose that no more light is to be thrown upon the Bible? that perpetual shades are to rest upon the Oracles of God, to defy curiosity, mock research, and disappoint hope? Or, rather, may we not anticipate that the light of the last days will cause their splendors to flash out and blaze resplendent as the light of a thousand fires?

The rays of light diffused and reflected from the earth and from the sky, fall upon that most delicate organ, the eye, without pain, presenting a beautiful and luminous appearance, yet when condensed by the lens and concentrated, they burn the hardest substances, or impress the image of the beholder upon the polished plate, and when refracted by the prism, exhibit all the beautiful colors of the rainbow. There are qualities in nature not discovered without observation, experiment, and reflection. In Revelation, too, there may be facts revealed and brought out by the Divine Mind, which cannot be perceived without careful analysis and steady vision. That many things in the Bible are obscure, or apparently inconsistent, is no evidence that they are not sufficiently clear to the disciples within the porch. If Nature withholds her mysteries until put to the torture by the fire and the crucible; if the laboratory of the chemist, with its retorts, and crucibles, and gases, and skylights, and blue lights, speak an unintelligible language to the tyro in science, is it to be expected that the symbols used by the Divine Mind as vehicles of the philosophy of heaven should give up their secrets at a glance? Doubtless there are in Revelation, as well as in Nature, many obscure facts and latent principles, yet to be evolved and brought into the great web of universal harmony.

The assumed facts of science are often contingent or illusory, while the popular interpretations of the Bible are frequently the mere reflections of the mental states of the reader. When, therefore, they are arrayed against each other, there is presented

a false issue between the claims of Science and Religion. Besides, the principle is eminently unphilosophical. To confront the physical phenomena with the declaration of the moral law, is as absurd as to attempt to propel a locomotive by the law of love. It is the province of true philosophy to examine the assumptions of science, and if sustained by evidence, to show the mutual harmony and dependence of the acknowledged truths of Nature and Revelation.

True philosophy embraces both science and religion, and seeks to realize the unity of man with nature through the senses, with man through the affections, and with God through faith in Christ. The archetype of all outward perfection is in the mind.

Christianity is a germ, the life of the interior sphere, which, developing itself according to divinely appointed laws, produces in the outer and palpable spheres of thought and action an approximation towards the ideal and perfect. The external forms may change and perish, but the internal life is immortal. Faith recognises in Christianity a correspondence to man's nature; his faculties, susceptibilities, passions, necessities, hopes, fears, and aspirations, being prefigured to the reception of its transcendent truths.—Christianity is the great lighthouse of the skies. The sciences are its radiating surfaces, reappearing, by reflected light, its essential laws. Christianity is the flower which unfolds at the top of the human pyramid, shedding a charm upon the lowest leaves of the living series. The sciences are humble flowers in an inferior position, living in its shadow, and realizing their well-being in the protection enjoyed. Christianity is the supreme limit of human attainment, the luminous and sublime point by which humanity maintains its contact and vital union with Deity. The sciences are links in the series connecting the several parts of the system. Christianity is the sun of the moral system, shedding its cheering rays upon the world, and waking into melody the songs of the whole creation. The sciences are planetary orbs, reflecting its light by night, and contributing in proper measure to the world's illumination, and deriving their power and glory from their connection with and dependence upon the central sun.

The orbit of Saturn includes that of the earth, and the attraction of the sun transcends them both. So the Christian faith is the perfection of human intelligence, and affirming the principles of "moral architecture on the several grounds of prudence, morality, and religion, the second signifying the first, and the third containing and supplying both the former," approves, sanctions, and requires every measure, science, and reform, which tends to promote

man's welfare here, or to enhance his happiness in another life.

Christianity is a fixed fact, around which the moral world revolves, itself only unchanged, the all-embracing medium in which everything moves, increases, and lessens, being only transiently modified in the outward manifestations. It is a plant not set by human hands, of spontaneous growth in the great order of creative wisdom. It is a stream flowing from the throne of God, refreshing, purifying, healthful, and adapted to every age and condition of humanity, and every stage of intellectual progress, proceeding from an exhaustless fountain, extending to every part of the globe, mingling with and purifying the waters of every stream and fountain which has been discovered in the progress of science. Its truths, profound, yet simple, sublime, yet practical, beyond and above an angel's comprehension, yet adapted to a child's capacity, are the only themes presenting sufficient scope for the mighty energies and lofty flights of the unfettered spirit.

You gaze upon the cloud, as it reflects a glorious golden sunset; you admire the bow in the heavens, as it reflects its beautiful colors; you stand awe-stricken, and adore, as you look upon Niagara pouring forth its broad liquid sheet of molten silver, and hear its mighty thunderings, like the voice of God, and feel the earth trembling under your feet, as if approaching the mount that burned; but here is an object purer, brighter, more sublime—the bright reflection of the Eternal Mind, and perfect guide of man to heaven.

We have endeavored to present the sciences in this brief paper, as a system—one grand organized body of knowledge, answering in unity, as well as diversity, to the universe of God. In this system we have placed the Cross of Christ as the centre,—the throne on which sits the Prince of Peace,—while the spirit of literature and science ministers before the altar, as did Apollo, the prince of the Muses, in the ring which Nature painted and which Pyrrus wore.

Believing there can be no true mental culture over which the Cross does not preside, and no true science in which its grand truths do not predominate, producing a spirit of reverent inquiry and high moral enterprise, we have endeavored to illustrate the harmony and unity of that universal science which is embodied in Nature and Revelation, and which confers upon its possessor mental harmony, purity, and power.

Nothing tends so directly to divert the intellect and freeze the fountains of emotion, as exclusive devotion to one idea or pursuit. Even the plant which springs up at our feet re-

quires a varied and complex influence—the rain, and breezes, and sunshine—to give it health, vigor, and maturity. The law of mental action is progress, and its motive is hope.

The sciences, not the masters but the ministers of religion, are only beginning to assume a definite form and a proper relation in the system of truth. They are in a forming and transitive state, and it is incumbent upon every careful thinker, and earnest worker, to contribute to their perfection and proper relative position. Especially is it the duty of the Christian ministry to vindicate the claims of the Bible, and to resist the aggressions of “science falsely so called.”

The liberally educated man is desirous to hold familiar intercourse with the whole circle of the sciences. He is willing to call no man master. He cherishes a higher ambition than to make his mind the polished brilliant satellite of another's sun. It is his privilege to leave no field of science unexplored. As an amateur of the Muse, he would with Milton sing—

“Of ethereal light quintessence,
Pure springing from the deep.”

As a philosopher, he would, with the genius of Stagira, speculate upon the quintessential purity of a heavenly body immutable; or, with the rigid Baconian, in the spirit of the inductive philosophy, observe closely and analyze the phenomena of matter and of mind, and deduce the general principles which control their operations. And with the astronomer, he would take his position upon the observatory, and hold converse with the stars.

A mind fully educated and subjected to rigid discipline, should be able to grasp the unseen, or to be filled with a single idea, as the human eye, combining the principles of the telescope and the microscope, now embracing a hemisphere, and now seeing only an animalcule. Such a mind possesses the peculiar force of genius and talent combined. The former soars on eagle pinions to worlds unseen and spiritual; the latter, like Atlas, stands under and supports the phenomenal world; the former creates, the latter executes. The characteristics of the former are activity, celerity, daring, imagination, and invention; of the latter, conception, comparison, and strength. Origination is the province of the former; enterprise and exertion, the glory of the latter. United, and mutually supporting each other, they make earth's great minds; and animated and directed by the evangelical principles of Christianity, they form heaven's aristocracy, the true nobility of human nature.

"It is," says the illustrious Arago, "the men of study and thought who in the long run govern the world; and the spirit of union among men of science is a certain presage of the union of nations and the good of the world."

The education of the people of any country is the true measure of their rank, power, and grandeur. Had Rome not cultivated letters and philosophy, her renown in arms would have perished beneath the ruins of the power that achieved it. The imperishable glories of Greece were achieved, not by the sword, but by the pen, the pencil, and the chisel. When the last pyramid shall have perished, and the channel of the Nile alone shall indicate the domain of the Pharaohs, the astronomical and scientific attainments of the priests of Egypt will illustrate and perpetuate the glory of her name. But we need not multiply illustrations on this interesting subject. The theme is inexhaustible, and the scene which it presents to our imagination is grand and overwhelming.

The triumphs and glories of educated mind are not seen in the present state. They are garnered up in the great temple of truth, to be wrought into thrones and crowns for the kings and priests of the Most High. Without presuming to unveil the future, we may confidently affirm, that if faithful in the fulfilment of our mission on earth, we shall be permitted, in the exercise of a living faith, having borne the last testimony to the harmony of Science and Revelation, to look up to heaven, and exclaim with rapturous anticipation—

"What means you blaze on high!
 The empyrean sky,
 Like the rich vail of some proud fane is rending.
 I see a star-paved land,
 Where all the angels stand,
 Even to the highest height in burning rows ascending.
 Some with their wings outspread,
 And bowed the stately head,
 As on some errand of God's, departing,
 Like flames from evening's conflagration starting.
 The herald's of Omnipotence are they,
 And nearer earth they come to waft my spirit home."

ARTICLE VIII.

SECULAR AND CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION.

By REV. SAMUEL W. FISHER, Cincinnati, Ohio.

To one who looks out upon the world as it is, and back upon it as it has been, the scene presented is the most involved and contradictory imaginable. Instead of flattering the pride of man, or inferring for him a glorious destiny, it is full of pictures the most humiliating, of facts the most mournful. Amidst the rise and fall of nations, the spread and decay of art and science, he seeks for some clue to thread the labyrinth, and discover the divine purpose around which these opposite results may harmonize. The Deluge is there, engulfing a quarter of the life of the race; the ocean rolls over all the earliest civilization of the world. Then follow the Dispersion, the creation of new forms of speech, the formation and development of many and various nations, their ascent to power and civilization, and their mysterious return to the oblivion from which they sprung. Those form a problem, the solution of which he seeks in vain. To effect what great purpose have Asia, Europe, and Africa been the seats, now of barbarism, then of civilization, interchanging from century to century? For what purpose these forms of government, ranging from absolute monarchy down to simple democracy; forms of religion descending from the pure theism of Noah to the reptile worship of Egypt, and then ascending to Christianity? Forms of government, too, in religion, from the pontifex maximus of Rome through hierarchies and synods to the anti-formism of George Fox? Here are vast moral forces at work for long ages, in ways innumerable, resulting in developments the most diverse and varied; experiments conducted on a scale of surprising grandeur, both in respect to the long periods occupied, the numbers engaged in working them out, and the magnitude of the interests concerned. What, then, is the final purpose of all this life so industriously at work for six thousand years? The question is not, what results does a single one of these forces effect, but what is the *grand resultant* into which all those trials are to be resolved? What lesson is the universe to be taught? What preparation is here made for a nobler civilization than the world has ever seen?

There are those who regard all these as fortuitous occurrences. As the seed borne by the wind now falls in the cleft

of the rock, and now in the rich valley, germinating in the one case a tree stunted and deformed, in the other a noble specimen of vegetable life, so has the race of man colonized, formed governments, built cities, warred, conquered, decayed. The laws which control the movements of nations are isolated, individual. History has no central chain along which all its facts crystallize; the parts are connected together, if at all, by loose contact, as stones in a vessel, not as the corn in the ear, with the germ in the earth from whence it came. To this unscientific and atheistic hypothesis we make no specific reply. Its defenders cannot consistently hold to the providential government of One infinitely wise; and denying that, conviction is to reach them by other means than discussions of this character.

Others, reflecting more deeply on these subjects, have adopted a very different theory,—a theory of progress, according to which the world, by these successive stages of discipline, has been advancing from infancy to manhood, and is destined to reach, at length, the full stature of a perfect society. The past contributes to the present; thought, knowledge, never dies; nations may decay, may cease to exist, but that which is of value to man, gained by their experience, survives; it passes over to their successors; it becomes an element of improvement; it grows itself in power, and then is delivered over to succeeding generations. The life of the race is thus a stream, widening and deepening as it flows, gathering upon its bosom all manner of rich craft, and laving the shores of Time with fertility and blessing. Man is on the whole rising; the world is gaining in knowledge—in religion—in all the elements of a complete civilization. If his life is not cut short too soon, if the conflagration can only be deferred to some far distant future, we may anticipate his elevation to a more than paradisiacal perfection. This is a most beautiful theory. It is full of hope, sanguine of good, replete with glorious visions. Over that grand future which it declares is coming on, imagination, restrained no longer by the stern facts of the past, is free to spread her wings; and poetry here can create a world of beauty, in the full assurance that it will yet become a substantial reality.

This theory we accept so far as to adopt two of its leading ideas; we reject it so far as it pretends to give the philosophy of these changes in history, the purpose of God in their permission, and the precise mode in which the elevation of man is to be accomplished. Unquestionably the *end* contemplated by this theory,—a far higher and nobler style of civilization than any yet attained,—is in perfect harmony with the annuncia-

tions of prophecy—with those brilliant pictures of times yet to come, drawn by inspired pencils, and distancing in their grandeur the sublimest conceptions of mere worldly philosophy or poetry. Nor is it to be denied that the past is made to contribute to the progress and perfection of the present, as it will to that of the future. But with this admitted, it is equally certain that the elevation of men is not to be secured chiefly by the increase of knowledge flowing from the various experiments of history, and so creating a new and pure atmosphere around society. Neither in the past, nor in any of the laws that connect us with it, is there power sufficient to warrant the supposition that, through the gradual advance of century after century, the race, becoming generally and thoroughly enlightened, would, in time, work itself clear of all its social evils, and attain an elevation of perpetual purity and peace. Whatever homœopathy may accomplish in medicine, we are sure that in respect to human progress, it is of little avail—that it needs mightier forces than these minute contributions saved from the wreck of nations, to preserve others from a similar fate, and lift them to a nobler destiny. Surely it is not alone for these slight advantages that mighty kingdoms have flourished and decayed; that the world presents to us such magnificent experiments ending in failures so disastrous. If the life of the race may be likened to a river, it is a river now deep, then shallow; now broad, then narrow; now dashing in cataracts, then creeping sluggishly; now swelling over its banks, then almost losing itself in wide-spreading saharas.

In this discussion it will aid us to have present a definite idea of that highest style of civilization toward which the world is advancing. This involves five things.

1. Bread. Food and raiment in abundance, with only an amount of physical labor consistent with advancement in other respects, is a radical idea of all true civilization. A state in which multitudes are compelled to live at the lowest point of physical endurance, where the brawniest arms and the most skilful hands alone earn a fair livelihood, while the weak and the less ingenious stand ever on the threshold of starvation,—such a state, no matter what other advantage it may possess, or how many may roll in luxury, or what agonies it may send forth on the broad ocean, is yet deficient in the first elements of a true civilization. *That* is elevation above the savage, *this* is depression in one point below him.

2. Freedom. The liberty of self-government and self-advancement, with only such restraints as are indispensable to the secure enjoyment of that which we attain, and which, therefore, really quicken men to action by the stimulus of a

sure reward, belong to the condition we are now contemplating. A civilization in strata—a sort of geological civilization, with all the soil and the verdure, and the fruits and the beauty above, and all the sand and stones below, is far removed from our ideal of a perfect state. Despotism can never consist with this condition, unless the despot be himself the noblest being in the universe. Without the ability to rise through all gradations of society; without an open pathway to the highest positions from the very lowest, in a world like ours there never can be realized the purest form of rational life.

3. Knowledge. Into this civilization there enter science and art, the study of all that is beautiful and excellent in nature, the production of forms of beauty and grandeur, of those innumerable instruments by which the taste is gratified, labor diminished, the comforts of life increased, and distant regions approximated. These advantages of knowledge, no longer confined to a limited circle, are diffused through the whole of society, dignifying the lowly and enriching the poor.

4. Social peace and harmony. War, which a philosopher of note affirms is the natural state of man, is wholly foreign to this noble condition of society. With the exclusion of all social institutions that exalt one at the expense of another, the leading external causes of strife are banished. With equal privileges, the motives to discord are greatly reduced. That civilization is confessedly most imperfect, in which the most attractive music is the clash of swords and the roar of artillery; where the camp and the court-room, the arsenal and the jail, stand in the front rank of society. That state has risen to a most noble position, in which the prevalence of peaceful arts, humane dispositions, and enlarged views have banished the drum and the war-horse, and turned the court-room into a stage for the quiet arbitration of difficulties.

5. Pure religious faith. This quality of civilization, although not visible, is yet the secret spring of all its goodness. Without elevated affections, healthfully developed toward God, and spreading themselves benevolently among men, society can never attain completeness. The education of the heart in all excellence; the communication of those principles of faith by which a soul is anchored, so that no storm of passion, no currents of selfishness can bear it off into licentious indulgence; the indwelling of divine influences, of God himself as a sovereign and father in the heart, ever saying to its native turbulence, "peace, be still;"—these constitute an element of popular prosperity, often overlooked, but nevertheless the most essential power in the whole social system. These five things,—bread, freedom, knowledge, social harmony, and a pure faith,—

are the leading elements of that complete destiny to which the race is advancing.

Now, when it is affirmed that man hitherto has lived as the infant, the child, the youth; that this being the case, the past experiments and attainments of the world are furnishing the secret power by which he will be enabled to ascend to his true position, and attain his perfect manhood, and rise to the highest civilization, we think too much plastic power is attributed to the past, and that the theory fails to assign a sufficient reason for the remarkable changes to which the race has been subject. It is indeed surprising how comparatively trifling, so far as we can see, are the contributions of the first half of the life of man to his growth at this day. The history of the first three thousand years is written somewhere, and will doubtless yet be read by us; but for man, while here on the earth, there remains only a few hieroglyphics to indicate the scenes, the institutions, the changes, the attainments of ages in time and innumerable millions of people. So far is it from being true, as a universal statement, that no good thought or art has perished,—that all useful knowledge remains when the nation decays, and passes over to some other heritor,—that the very opposite assertion is most probably correct. Certainly the advocates of this opinion can never prove it, while there are strong probabilities, rising even to certainties, that there have been periods in the world when the most profound national ignorance succeeded the most brilliant attainments; that it seems to have been a part of the divine plan that many nations should work out for themselves their own elevation or degradation, with little assistance from the past or their cotemporaries; and that there are now hidden from our eyes histories, and achievements, and sciences belonging to the past, that, once unfolded, would thrill through the heart of universal man. Authentic history, if we except the Sacred Scriptures, hardly reaches back twenty-five centuries. Yet how immensely valuable, how intensely interesting, in all probability, would be the records of the preceding period! What remains to the world of ante-diluvian civilization? What record declares the form and results of that post-diluvian empire in central Asia, to which so many otherwise unaccountable facts seem to point? What knowledge of Egypt? We have her Zodiacal circle, her solemn and gloomy temples, her pyramids standing sentinel over buried empires, her mummies and hieroglyphics. But in what manner, in what state of society, were those pyramids reared? Who understands the mysteries of Isis—mysteries which, like those of Eleusis, sent forth a mighty influence upon both prince and people? It is even yet in dispute what elements of knowl-

edge and religion Egypt gave to Greece, or whether that queen of the nations is indebted for a single pearl in her coronal to this ancient monarch of the Nile. What knowledge of Assyria and Babylon? A torn leaf of a splendid romance; a few admirable sculptures, exhumed by the patient enthusiasm of Layard; a few brief sketches in the sacred volume; two or three half fabulous chapters of profane history, are all that remain of those once the most magnificent and powerful kingdoms on the globe, confessedly far advanced in civilization, and inferior to no other nations of their time in art and science. There is in the quarry at Baalbec, a stone 70 feet in length, 14 high, and 14 broad, hewn ready for removal. By what means they transported such immense masses, antiquity informs us not. Etruria, Phœnicia, and her fair daughter Carthage, what have they given to the world in comparison with their age, their grandeur, and their attainments, as an element of power to assist in working out its final elevation? Their temples and palaces—the productions of their poets, orators, philosophers, and statesmen—their mechanic arts and practical sciences, have all gone down into oblivion. What art can now dye the Tyrian purple? Nay, who can discover that modern secret—the mode in which the artist of the middle ages stained in such exquisite tints the windows of cathedrals and abbeys in Europe? Who can restore the 400,000 volumes destroyed by the soldiers of Omar in the capture of Alexandria? Where are the lost books of Solomon, of Livy, of innumerable authors, the naturalists, historians, philosophers, theologians of their day? Where are now the treasures of Arabian literature—of that Augustan age when, at Bagdad and Cordova, learning flourished green and rich in fruits most precious, at the very time its stock laid withered to the root in Rome and Athens? The Almansars and Abd-Alrashmans of the East and the West have left us successors; while their splendid libraries, scattered to the winds or hidden within the palaces of ignorant Pachas, are lost to the world.

As we approach our own times, it is easy to trace the influence of two nations upon the literature of our day. Grecian taste and Roman law reveal themselves clearly enough in modern society. Yet on this subject we venture two assertions. The first, that the chief element of the more advanced civilization of this day is Christianity; the second, that whatever advantage we have derived from the nations just mentioned, there is to be set off against it their influence in corrupting Christianity, and so enfeebling the very power which was working out the regeneration of the world. It is not from them influences are to proceed greatly influential in human elevation. Their

chief power is past—its results are known, and known to be insignificant compared with the wants of man. Not solely for these ends were they raised to such a height of dominion and refinement.

Must we then look upon the life of the world hitherto as an ocean, now washing away one side of a continent, then casting up its sands on another, gaining here what it loses there, tossed with winds, driven in secret currents, ebbing and flowing, yet much the same after 6,000 years as at the close of one? Is there no real advance; no influence from the past tending to the exaltation of the future; no forces potent enough to elevate the world to that state for which all this creation groans; no higher ends to be accomplished than such as are now visible? In the heavens each satellite has its proper motion round its primary, and each planet a motion round the sun; while we have reason to believe that this whole system has still another motion, an orbit immense and grand, around another centre. Thus, while in their courses there are relatively backward movements, yet absolutely there is a steady progress. There is a secret force lodged somewhere, not now fully known to us, in obedience to whose attraction they are all passing round the vast circle that encompasses the central power. It is thus with our world. These nations, rising and falling, returning upon themselves, and inverting the order of ascent at the very time when all things promise fairest for progress, are parts of the life of the race, satellites and planets, in the vast system of Providential government. Neither their advancement nor their retrogression is without connection with the steady progress of the whole round the grand centre.

The great problem in this world—excluding the world of spirits and eternity—is by what means to impart the noblest civilization to fallen minds—to minds *naturally* prone to barbarism. Were it not so; were there no strong tendencies downward adverse to his elevation; were, indeed, the chief forces strongly set toward whatever is pure, and noble, and excellent, then, unquestionably, the solution of the problem would be the easiest in the world. Left to himself, he would soon throw off his weights, and soar into his native heavens. There might be obstacles in his way; but we are well assured that they must yield to the constant effort of such powers steadily directed against them. Long ago, had this been the case, the world would have reached its meridian of glory and blessedness. It is the fact that man's nature is earthly, that constitutes the difficulty of a full solution of this question.

The answer to it is purely theological, yet is it none the less vitally associated with literature, science, and art—all that is

beautiful in form or noble in thought. The power to reach man, to give him the grandest civilization, is from *without*,—from God. The *Word* that inspiration has written, and the *Spirit* that divine wisdom bestows, are the powers which are to effect this result. Here it is well to speak more fully. There are those abroad, in common with us, seeking for the solution of the same great problem, who dignify their schemes of reform as the developments of true Christianity, and the realization, in the fullest degree, of the Christian dispensation. Regarding Christianity as mainly a scheme for the bettering of man's condition here, they necessarily lose sight of some of its most essential truths. Appending to their scheme of social organization that portion of it which is more or less common to all systems of morals, and which they might just as well have taken from Socrates or Cicero, they baptize the whole compound Christianity. They girdle that glorious system, and then take the deadened, leafless trunk, as the living tree that is to be for the healing of the nations. In opposition to all such theories, we regard in this experiment Christianity as a whole—a complete system—adapted to the largest wants of man. We include all its doctrines, its depravity, its cross and atonement—its divine sovereignty and the efficacious working of the Holy Ghost—its precepts and sanctions, promises and revelations of the future world. It is the entire system which is yet to be made available in securing the perfect civilization of the world.

In addition to this, we regard Christianity as aiming primarily at our preparation for heaven; secondly, only at our elevation on earth. Her chief ends are future. Its foliage and its blossoms are for time; its fruit for eternity. Thus its vivifying power is drawn from the other world. Its grand agent is invisible. It is the descent of divine wisdom and strength into man, to recover him from that pestilent fall which has over-spread this life and that to come with darkness. Its power as a civilizer of the race is derived almost wholly from its connection with the forces of eternity. To elevate us for this life is a secondary object, a means to a far nobler and more enduring end. The kingdom of Christ is not properly of this world. But its spread and establishment here will create the finest condition possible for humanity on earth, at the same time that it is preparing spirits for a brighter sphere. It is by the union of the two that power is gained for temporal purposes. He who views the Christian scheme as having respect chiefly to time, strips it of the force essential to its success in time. Its success for this world will be measured in the longest period by its success for the other. It can only effect fully the

civilization of the race here, by preparing it most perfectly for a life most sublime and most holy beyond the grave. It is this linking of time to eternity, this bringing the forces of *that* to work upon the heart and mind of man in *this*, by which the grandest results are to be secured.

Such is the theory, but at first it is only a theory—a purely theological dogma, proved by no experience, demonstrated by no facts. As mind is the subject of its operations—the most subtle, variable, independent agent in the universe—so it never can be inferred absolutely before actual trial, that this is the solution of the problem, or, if for convincing reasons of another nature *we* attain this conviction, yet the immense multitudes who are to be affected by it, can never be so grandly impressed with the perfection of this scheme, and the wisdom of its Author, as by the demonstration of an actual experiment. To the completeness of this impression, it must be illustrated both positively and negatively. It must be shown by the failure of all other forces that *this alone* can secure the perfect civilization of the world. The experiments must be so varied, and so protracted, as to include a fair trial of all the chief kinds of influence that can be brought to bear upon the human mind. They must *all* be tried, or the illustration is not complete; the one omitted may be that which is able to effect the elevation of man. They must have a fair, and therefore a *protracted*, trial, because these causes act slowly, spreading themselves down the slope of centuries, and gathering about them the spirit and power of antiquity.

It might seem, at first, an easy matter to determine this problem: it might seem as if a century or two at most would be all sufficient for this purpose. But that complex being, man, is not thus easily compassed. The mind and heart are, of all things, the most capacious recipients of influence; they are moved and moulded by an infinite variety of objects. The causes which move them are not only varied, but often slow in their operation. It is possible to quicken physical causes; it is possible that certain forces concerned in the stratification of the globe, and the settlement of its chaotic masses, did as much work then in a year as in other circumstances they could do in a thousand. But it is not possible thus to hasten the operation of moral causes. Mind itself matures slowly; feeling unfolds gradually. The man is to grow up not simply as one, but in generations and nations, that similar influences may mould him in the cradle, in the social circle, in the world without; that the power of each class of motives may receive all the strength which time, which antiquity, which system, and other leading influences interlocking with it, and increasing

its plastic energy, can bestow. Even in material science there are some questions which centuries alone can solve. There are disturbing forces in the sky, whose results the astronomer observes, but their nature and origin he is unable to determine till after the recorded observations of many centuries afford the data for his calculations. There is a star whose revolution round its centre is supposed to be 160,000 years. If, then, in the world of matter there are cycles so immense, and problems solvable only after the passage of slow moving ages, how much more reasonable is it, that in order to the settlement of this stupendous moral question, age should follow age, century succeed century, decades of centuries rise and set ere the grand experiment shall be fully tried, and the result announced to the far off and eagerly attentive world.

Let us here note some of the elements of this experiment, and then select two or three as illustrations of the whole. In determining the only means by which man can be exalted to the highest civilization, there must come into trial, the influence of life long continued, and life brief and uncertain; of differences of language; of social institutions; of forms of government and national distinctions; of climate and physical position; of the country and the city; of war and peace; of luxury and poverty; of commerce, agriculture and manufactures; of law in all its forms; of art and science; of the press, the pulpit and the school; of religion, both in doctrine and government; of theism and Christianity in connection on one side with the simple and complex rites, with corruptions and talmuds, rabbinical sayings and priestly additions; on the other with monarchy, the hierarchy, republicanism and democracy. These constitute a part of that great assemblage of influences by which it has been tried to elevate man to the highest earthly felicity. It is obvious that these experiments are necessarily more or less intermingled and combined, rendering the process of solution slower and more difficult. For the influences at work must be combined in all the different modes of which they are susceptible, in order to furnish a triumphant conclusion. It may be that sufficiency of food and healthful labor are all that is essential; or that these must be combined with some one form of religion; or these with art and science; or these with some peculiar government; or all these with an age of centuries to perfect their operation. Where the elements are so numerous, the combinations on which the final result is to depend may be greatly increased. The Socialist tells you, "Grant me, 1st, land; 2d, a certain organization of social life, and I will build you up a perfect state, a pattern community; I will set up my beehive, remove the drones, set the queen adrift, elaborate the

richest honey, expel the worms, bar out the chill blasts of winter, and exalt my little industrial community to the loftiest point of civilization." Now, that which this man affirms of his plan, millions have affirmed of theirs. "Let me select, let me combine, let me watch and guard against adverse influences, and I will rear a grander Utopia than Plato, or More, or Swedenborg, or Fourier, ever imagined. Well, this process of selection and combination, on the largest and most protracted scale, has been going on for 6,000 years, and is still in progress. Let us look at some of these experiments.

First in time, if not of importance, is the Methusaleth period—the age of physical and mental vigor, maintained through long centuries. The experiments of those 1,600 years must have been numerous and deeply interesting. What an opportunity to determine the capacity of individual improvement in science and morals! Think of an investigation conducted by a ripe intellect in any direction for six, seven, or eight centuries; think of the steady advance of a single mind through almost the entire period of the existence of the Roman Empire. What decisive results it could attain during so immense a progress! The mere decay wrought by time within that period, would give the most magnificent cities to ruin. The adding of a stone each day would rear a palace of enormous dimensions, or a tower rivaling that of Babel. What progress in art could not the skill of ages effect! What architecture! What statuary! What painting! What music could not the artists, whose experience extended through 800 years, have achieved! In general science, how profound, how large, how admirable the results would be! *Now*, the strongest intellect has only become well educated for its work, and fairly commenced its investigations, when disease enfeebles its power of application, or death totally terminates its relations to this world. How often the chariot is arrested midway in its burning progress to the goal, and the ardent spirit, animated by the anticipation of victory, suddenly tumbled from his seat! What vast projects, spreading far into the future, and destined, could they be accomplished, to open new worlds of thought, are left for ever unfinished by the rude interference of time! Could Copernicus have lived to follow out the magnificent system of the universe he had barely time to trace and commit to the immortality of the press;—could Bacon have not only theorized but demonstrated, not only composed a new method of science, but prosecuted that method, with the matchless vigor of his intellect, in a body yet undecayed, for half a dozen centuries!—could Burke have advanced in political philosophy, and Edwards in theology, for many ages, what rich and wonderful products

would they have given to the world ! Time corrects errors, changes points of view, gives opportunity for experiment, for the comparison of opinions, for the abatement of prejudice, the protracted culture of the power of discovering truth. But now men barely get seated at their work before the pale messenger beckons them away. The broken clue another may tie, but that other may not rise for long ages. The openings of grand thoughts, the vision of new mysteries, without a question, are often closed for ever by the advent of death. No other being in the whole history of the race may arise, who shall occupy the same stand-point, and behold truth in the same combination. But that past period gave full scope for the experiment of time. Whatever man *could* do, they enjoyed the opportunity of doing. To what heights of civilization they rose ; what magnificent cities they built ; what smiling arcades greeted the morning sun ; what provisions for luxury, what experiments in government and religion, they made, we do not fully know. But one thing we do know ;—the experiment of *Time* was a failure. The mere possession of age—of long ages of existence, in which human nature might correct the evil, and work out the good in all imaginable forms of beauty and utility—in which all the influences that meet us here might have room to show their power in elevating this race to its high destiny,—all this was not sufficient. Whatever progress it secured in some directions, it failed in laying the broad foundation on which alone true civilization could be permanently reared. It not only failed, it *signally* failed ; it was a failure worthy of the frightful catastrophe which buried the unsightly fabric of antediluvian toil from the sight of future generations, lest its presence should aid improperly in vitiating all other experiments. The records of that mighty age, when men of gigantic form, who could look back over many centuries, thought, planned, and wrought, are yet to be unrolled. When the eye shall rest upon them, who will be able to doubt either the magnificence of the experiment in human legislation, or the utter powerlessness of earthly forces, separate or combined, in the case of such a temporary immortality, to work out the grandest destiny of man ? The singings of that angry flood roar unceasingly, in the ears of heaven and earth, angels and men, and on through the yet unborn future proclaim the sad conclusion of the first great act of Time.

Let us enter now upon another period—that which furnishes the broadest field for the recorded experiments of history ; that in which life declines nominally to three quarters of a century, but actually in the great majority of cases falls much lower. The conditions of the experiment are now wholly changed.

The alteration in the age of man introduces a revolutionary element into all the previous combinations, and necessitates a repetition of them. From the Flood onward, the experiments in reference to civilization fill up each age of history. But of these it will be necessary for our purpose to select only two or three as illustrations of the failure of the whole. We will select first an example of popular freedom combined with popular intelligence and polytheistic worship.

In the south-eastern peninsula of Europe dwelt a people, free even to the extreme of democracy, intelligent to a degree rarely equalled. Girt in by the waters, a nation, circumscribed within the circuit of a few leagues, rose to an eminence in history to which the world has ever since looked back with admiration, and from which, as a queen, she sent forth her commands for centuries to the worshipers that kneeled around her throne. Worthy was she of that queenly crown. Never before had another such risen on the earth; and few since have appeared who dare pretend equality with her. The stars that illuminated her firmament still shine serenely. She gave to the world such forms of beauty as ever since have ravished the senses of mankind. She sang; the nations listened enchanted. She speculated; and men learnt to reason. She wrote; her narrations thrilled the soul; the scenes of history, instinct with life, moved before the eye a present reality. She spake; the tones of her eloquence swayed the heart; the earth gave audience; her whispers penetrated far continents and distant ages. She acted; it was nature revealing nature to the soul, passion sublimely impassioned, virtue avenged, vice punished, law triumphant. She wrought; the Parthenon arose. She fought; Marathon, Salamis, Plataea became the watchword of freedom in all time. What nation is ignorant of her history? What academy, college, university worthy of the name, studies not her works? What land of modern civilization seeks not to realize her beautiful forms?

This wonderful perfection was national, universal. It was not an exotic, reared in a royal conservatory to adorn a monarch's court. There, statesmen, orators, poets, philosophers, warriors, sprang spontaneously from the people. The roots of their greatness derived vitality from the masses among whom they grew. If they had genius, it was but a fuller development of the genius of the multitude. If they possessed intelligence, it was an intelligence not greatly in advance of the mass for whom they wrought. They were the loftier oaks of a noble forest. Their native genius, combining with a most perfect system of popular education, gave birth to a remarkable diffusion of general intelligence. Rarely in the world's

history can we find a nation more thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of learning. Without a press, they yet studied, questioned, listened to the most cultivated minds, judged, passed laws, criticized works of arts. They seemed to live mainly for the curious, the beautiful, the new. Their national enthusiasm inspired devotion to art, to science, to letters. An entablature, a statue by Phidias, an oration by Demosthenes, a play by Euripides, moved the heart of the nation. Their everlasting "*τι χαίρον*," and "*τι χαίροντες*," about which both the Apostle Paul, and their own chief orator, declared they mainly busied themselves; their perfect freedom, their self-government, their daily exercise in all those great questions which have always tested the powers of the human intellect; the direct intercourse between them and their great men, combined to lead them in this path of self-instruction, and diffuse abroad a vast amount of general intelligence. "Let us,"—says one of the most brilliant critics and historians of the age,—“let us for a moment transport ourselves in thought to that glorious city. Let us imagine that we are entering its gates, in the time of its power and glory. A crowd is assembled round a portico. All are gazing with delight at the entablature, for Phidias is putting up the prize. We turn into another street; a rhapsodist is reciting there; men, women, and children are thronging around him; the tears are running down their cheeks; their eyes are fixed; their very breath is still; for he is telling how Priam fell at the feet of Achilles, and kissed those hands—the terrible—the murderous—which had slain so many of his sons. We enter the public place; there is a ring of youths, all leaning forward, with sparkling eyes, and gestures of expectation. Socrates is pitted against the famous atheist from Ionia, and has just brought him to a contradiction in terms. But we are interrupted. The herald is crying, “Room for the Prytanis.” The general assembly is to meet. The people are swarming in on every side. Proclamation is made—“Who wishes to speak?” There is a shout and a clapping of hands; Pericles is mounting the stand. Then for a play of Sophocles; and away to sup with Aspasia.”

Under such a discipline, Greece must have enjoyed influences, the most effective of their kind, for ennobling the character, exalting her to the highest point of civilization. Whatever the most unlimited freedom of thought, speech, and action could effect; whatever art and popular intelligence could do; whatever dignity the responsibility of public treasures, a personal interest in the minutest affairs of state, the opportunity of daily witnessing the finest displays of genius, could impart to the character,—all this she possessed in the highest degree.

Whatever purity and elevation the soul could derive from the most artistic and beautiful forms of polytheistic worship, the grand and lovely images of gods and goddesses, the splendor of their public celebrations, the awful communion of their mysteries, this was within her reach. If art, if taste, if sentiment, if general intelligence, combined with a genius for action the most enthusiastic, and a field for its display the most unbounded, in connection with the finest style of polytheism, could secure the noblest state of man, then would this people have attained that state, and left the world the legacy of a model civilization. Yet who of her most enthusiastic admirers; who of those that have examined her history with sufficient attention to discern the foul currents of passion that beneath all this exterior of beauty were ever in motion; the pride, the sensuality, the levity, the ingratitude, the malevolence, the ambition, the indifference to the noblest feelings of religion; who, understanding her whole character and history, is willing to accept her as an illustration of the highest style of civilization—of that destiny to which he hopes the race is yet to be exalted? Who, on the other hand, knowing her well, will not pronounce this experiment one of the most decisive, though splendid, *failures* in the whole series of experiments! Possessing a part of the elements of true civilization in great richness, she yet lacked the noblest, most effective of them all. Her civilization was *natural, instinctive*. It was neither created by the highest form of religion, nor pervaded by the pure spirit of divine love, nor irradiated by supernatural intelligence, nor guided to the most useful ends by the precepts of a noble humanity. The mighty stream of evil passion flowed on unchecked, unpurified; and though it meandered through meadows enameled with flowers of every hue, amidst parks of most majestic trees, and by temples and palaces of noble architecture, yet it was the same foul and destroying current still. No prophet had sprinkled salt upon its bitterness; no intellectual cultivation had sufficed to cleanse away its putridity. In due time the beauty that adorned its banks faded; its marble glories crumbled; its majestic oaks lost their foliage, and death and solitude reigned with an unbroken sovereignty. Greece! what is she now but a sad and splendid illustration of the imbecility of these outward and earthly influences to secure man's noblest elevation. For this she rose; for this she attracted by her meteor brilliancy the notice of all time; for this she set for ever in a night of gloom and death. Her genius, still breathing around us, and destined to live wherever the feet of civilized man shall tread, now looks sadly down, and declares the necessity of other and higher forces than mere

freedom and intelligence, to create and preserve the purest, richest, and happiest earthly state.

Turn now to her colossal neighbor. Rome, from her protracted existence, her wide-spread dominion, and the changes which the world underwent during her ascent to power and subsequent decline, furnishes a variety of negative illustrations of our subject. *First*, She illustrates the inability of mere law, however wise and just, however established in constitutions and vigorously executed, to elevate a nation to the highest point of civilization. If Greece was distinguished for art and general science and popular freedom, Rome was, for ages, equally distinguished for constitutional law. Her Senate was a far more august tribunal than that of the Areopagi. Her forum gave birth to those statutes of justice which have been wrought into the code of the civilized world. Around her sons she threw a shield of brass, and the talismanic words, "I am a *Roman* citizen," forced prætor and consul to respect the rights of the State, though maintained by the meanest of the populace. Even the conquered nations, though sometimes wasted with reactions, were yet in the main treated with the justice that befitted the sovereignty of Rome. We cannot account for the steady maintenance of her power, and the firm incorporation of so many diverse nations into one empire, except on the supposition that she carried her principles of civil equity abroad, and sought to ally the subject people by lifting them to a comparative equality of privilege. Such at least was the *theory*. It was law—known law—ruling, rather than a king or an emperor. The death of Remus, for his contempt of law and right, was a fit type of the spirit of that stern dominion. Its history illustrated the power of law in the exaltation of a people. Yet this experiment failed. Excellent in theory, there was a secret force of evil that vitiated its practice. The masses were ever unhappy, restless—a dark sea, tossing its unquiet waves and dashing things most precious to destruction.

Then the emperor—the Cæsar rose. Another experiment is tried. Vast power is centralized in a single hand. The mightiest empire the sun ever shown upon, knew but one master. He spake; they trembled or rejoiced. He commanded; swift winged couriers bore the edict to the Highlands of Scotland, the pillars of Hercules, the mountains of Armenia. Yet this, too, was a failure. Stagnation followed action; the free-man, turned into the slave, lived to riot or suffer. Man rose not so high under the Emperor as under the Consul.

Again the experiment is changed. In the preceding cases, the combination is with Polytheism. But now a purer religion began to spread itself abroad—to force even emperors and

pagans to recognise its divinity. The Immanuel had died ; and Christianity, sealed by his resurrection, had begun her world-wide mission of mercy. This mighty State allies the ministers of this pure faith to itself ; they, in turn, corrupted by prosperity, and grown into an hierarchy, soon blend the rites of paganism with the simple worship of the religion of the cross. Then began the experiment of Church and State on the one hand ; of Christianity wedded to heathenism on the other, as forces powerful to work out the elevation of men. They were both gigantic failures. The pure spirit of religion shrunk from the profanation ; with the form of paganism came its power ; the baptism of its temples neither overturned its altars nor demolished its idols. The name was changed, but, save in pomp and splendor, the old worship differed little from the new. The State itself declined in power as the priest grew, until the experiment reached its full demonstration, when the tiara towered above the crown, the mitre overshadowed the helmet, and princes with devout humility held the stirrups for the apostate successor of Peter. Behold here the result of spiritual authority, centralized in a fallible mortal, spreading over a wide field, and operating with a more fearful energy than did that of the empire ! Man debased to the most degrading superstitions, yet hearing the sacred name of Christ ; mind active only in rearing cathedrals, in foolish disputations, in feudal combats ; ignorance settling thicker and darker upon the face of the earth ; discussion on all the high themes of religion restrained by a law inconceivably horrible ; while even physical science must ask on bended knee a priestly benediction, ere it dare publish to the world its brilliant discoveries. Then were all souls captive, in dungeons dark, and strong, and terrible. At such an hour, the clarion of the Monk of Wittemberg rang through Europe ; it reverberated in the dome of St. Peters ; its echoes lingered in the Alps, and were repeated in the Highlands of the North.

Another experiment began. Christianity was divorced from paganism, but yet it was cumbered on the one hand with artificial forms of worship, and on the other by State alliances. Since then, these and various other combinations have been tried. The church has been allied in turn to monarchy and democracy. It has been arrayed in all manner of ritualism, and made to play a part subordinate to earthly interests. These experiments have all been failures. Not that *Christianity* has in any true sense failed. Wherever it has been permitted to come in contact with men, it has wrought with vast energy. It has upheaved continents of superstition, abuse, and ignorance. It has done all for man that was most vital to his elevation.

But in all these cases the experiment of the power of Christianity, has been partially vitiated by that which men have associated with it. They have mingled, without a just appreciation of their relations, the human with the divine; used physical energy to assist moral influence; built towers of stone to strengthen the pillars of heaven. Truth has often been like a thread of gold in a cloth woven for the most part of perishable materials. When at length the garment lost its strength and brilliancy, men blamed the thread of gold, and not the miserable elements around it. Yet did that thread remain unfaded, unimpaired, as bright and strong as when first woven. Oh! had the world possessed the wisdom to have used this material alone, this work would have stood for ever.

Did our limits permit us to gather up the results of experiments in human elevation thus far, it would be easy to show that no mere earthly force has been sufficient to secure, for even a brief period, that style of civilization which we now anticipate. It would be seen that no form of government and no merely social organizations have power to effect this end. It would be demonstrated that no form of government, combined with greater or less degrees of popular intelligence, could secure the result. It would be manifest that none of these, combined with any form of false religion, or any corruption of true religion, or even with *Christianity* itself, when the alliance subjects the latter to the former, can succeed. It would be seen, that even the art of printing, the boasted liberty of the press, and the diffusion of intelligence in itself, has no power to exalt or civilize the race. A vast variety of forms, alone and in combination, have thus been tried. There is in every experiment something wrong; some unguarded point; some secret evil, which works the failure of arrangements seemingly most wise. No matter what the constitution of society may have been, the historian can always see something which, if it had or had not been associated with all the other elements, might have saved the State. There is always something wanting to the perfect working or the perfect results of the best plan. All reflecting minds tacitly or openly admit the failure of the combination as it was. Now, if they could only find some other organization which had succeeded—some one that, surviving the ruin of the rest, grew brighter and stronger with the passage of time, elevating man to the highest heaven of terrestrial blessing—then might we exclaim with the ecstatic mathematician, "Eureka, Eureka!" then we might believe that if Egypt, or Greece, or Rome had only possessed this or that earthly element, they would have given an abiding illustration of just the combination of forms necessary to lift the race

to its just position. But in the absence of such positive examples, amidst the overwhelming testimony of so many dead and dying nations, amidst the wailing of millions in their debasement and sorrow, we are forced to the conclusion that all efforts to effect the largest civilization of man by earthly influences have been, in the main, failures. Some things they have effected; but they have not effected the elevation of the race, or any large portion of it, to that position for which it is qualified by its original endowments.

Thus far, it is true, these experiments have been chiefly negative and secular. Christianity or pure Deism has run along through these earthly forces; and wherever their operation has been most free, the results have far transcended those of any combination of other powers. Whatever is most bright, whatever the *heart* loves to dwell upon with most delight, has been associated with the truth of God. It has been well remarked by F. Schlegel, that "The majesty of antiquity is felt to be indissolubly linked with images of decline and ruin, for both arise from the same source—the dominion of instinct, and the spontaneous development of nature." The civilization of the past has been chiefly the development of nature, and that the lower nature of man. The instruments for effecting it have been drawn from reason and instinct. The forces have been almost wholly secular and earthly, or if other powers have been brought in, if religion has been introduced, it has been rather as an assistant than as a sovereign. The nature of man has been permitted to work its way and reveal its richest fruit. But that nature, being itself in ruins, without a total transformation, can never rise to a perfect civilization. Aided by all the powers of reason, yet destitute of strength from above, it can only attain an imperfect condition—a perilous elevation in one or two directions—an elevation unsustained and unguarded by the higher powers of the soul, and from which it is certain to be precipitated by the evil that is unsubdued in the heart. Here is the grand difficulty with all past experiments in civilization. The instinctive love of the beautiful and the orderly, combined with the most vigorous powers of the reason, may, from art, and law, and science—may thus construct the body of a civilized society most symmetrical and majestic; but in vain do they strive to create a soul that in purity and love shall animate that body, and guide its limbs, and use its senses for noble purposes. All these trials show conclusively, that man, left to the workings of his own nature and reason, can never deliver himself from the evil that hitherto hath undermined his noblest structures. But the experiment of religion—of pure Christianity—the positive experiment, has yet to be fully tried.

Hitherto it has wrought insubordination to inferior powers. Now it is to assume the first place. Men are to be intent not so much on that which is outward as on that which is inward, vital, saving ; not so much on mere forms of government as on *self-government*; not so much on the dress of life, as upon its spirit, its ultimate character. Christianity is to create governments, and not governments to create Christianity. The order pursued in secular civilization is to be reversed. For without such a reversal, the positive example cannot be fully exhibited. Its operation will oblige men to give *it* the first place in their thoughts, and listen reverently to its teachings, and yield implicit obedience to its laws. It is impossible Christianity should have a fair trial, unless it is permitted to assume the relative position which the other elevating influences of the past have occupied. As men have listened to the voice of learning and eloquence, so must they listen to these sublime teachings ; as they have bowed to earthly rulers, so must they submit to God ; as they have sought by mere organizations to cover the defects of their nature, so must they seek from their heavenly Father the cure of their distempered spirits. Such will be that positive experiment by which the Divine Wisdom revealed in the system of the gospel, and the Divine Spirit giving it life and power, will first reform the impure nature of man, and thus enable him to develop all his powers in their appropriate work. It will reach out and remove the cause of national mortality. It will make science and art consistent with purity and law. It will spread abroad a civilization of the million rather than the few, and make princes common, by elevating all men to princely character.

What further examples of self-ruin, of blind effort ending in disaster, of man struggling to raise himself from the morass, and sinking deeper, we are yet to witness before the trial of this great experiment, does not yet appear. One thing is most manifest—whatever particular or general experiments are yet to be made, will be far more intimately connected with the *world as a whole*, than heretofore. In time past, nations rose and decayed, with only occasional connections with other nations. Their isolation gave a peculiar impress to their character, and enabled them to illustrate more perfectly the operation of local influences in molding states. But the tendency of this day is to universality. The earth, long possessed by conflicting nations—nations so separated by rivers, mountains, oceans, and their own intense selfish patriotism, as to forbid the entrance of universal knowledge—is now passing under the reign of influences that in time will level the dividing walls, and net-work its entire surface with the means of rapid and

constant intercommunication. Rome had a vast empire, traversed by solid roads in various directions. But Rome was only a single nation, confined to the land, or creeping fearfully along the shore in her clumsy triremes. How absurd her ideas of nations no farther distant than Britain! What school-boy has not laughed at the description given by Tacitus of the ocean that washes those northern isles, and the ridiculous philosophy by which he accounts for the viscosity of its waters? Now the ocean is as truly the home of millions as the land. Compare an ancient war galley with an American frigate. What want of adaptation and power in the one; what life, force, majesty, in the other! That was bounded by the Mediterranean; this presses the everlasting ice chains of the poles. The earth has no nook so secluded, no retreat so hidden, as to escape the Humboldts and Lyells of this age. Steam—the chief agent as yet in the approximation of the distant—has but begun its reign. Half a century has not elapsed since it was successfully applied to locomotion. Five miles an hour satisfied Fulton; twenty miles an hour on railroads, a few years ago, was declared to be highly dangerous; while more recently still, a celebrated lecturer on natural science demonstrated, before an intelligent audience, the impossibility of ocean-steam-navigation. With what rapidity has experiment outrun theory and overturned hypothesis! Thirty miles an hour is ordinary speed; the steam-ship circumnavigates the globe. Locomotion is reduced to a very simple problem: so much water and so much coal, and then let the tempest rave; against wind and tide the staunch boat presses gallantly onward. The expansion in this mode of travel within ten years is prodigious. What, then, shall another half century witness, when perchance other and even more efficient agencies may be harnessed to this work?

The almost accidental discovery, that a stream of electricity passing over a soft iron converts it into a temporary magnet, is the fundamental idea of a new instrument for the transmission of intelligence, whose results are just beginning to unfold themselves. That thought should travel around the globe, record its progress, reveal its character, distancing time itself in its flight, is a fancy of yesterday, a fact of to-day. The distinguished conductor of the Cincinnati Observatory—a gentleman whose fertile genius, power of application, capacity for the most subtil analysis, admirable mechanical ingenuity and exhaustless invention combined, with a profound knowledge of his science, have introduced a new era in the history of Astronomy; who has made of the lightning a printer, and compelled him to stereotype the positions of the stars with an accuracy and •

rapidity that multiplies a hundred-fold the ability of the astronomer to advance in the solution of that amazing problem, the motions of the stellar world—this gentleman has actually measured the progress of the electric fluid. By positive and negative experiments, he has determined the speed to be about a mile in $\frac{1}{300000}$ of a second;¹ so that a word, a thought, committed to this Mercury, would travel round the globe, were the wire circuit complete, in a single second! The idea of such an encircling of the world is abroad. We may yet live to see the Emperor of China, the Czar of all the Russias, the Queen of England, and the President of the United States, engaged in a friendly conversation on the same evening.

Commerce, keeping pace with these increased facilities, is spreading itself everywhere. The knowledge of the world as it is is penetrating all nations. Even the Celestial Empire—hitherto the centre of the world, while all beyond was a rim of barbarism—even this empire, heretofore of all others most impenetrable to foreign ideas, has recently witnessed the publication of an historical Geography, written by one of her most eminent scholars and civilians, graphically and truly describing the earth itself, and the nations that dwell upon it. Meanwhile, the two great maritime nations are putting forth their joint energies in the same direction, and seeking to annihilate the obstacles that have kept men asunder. The treaty between Great Britain and the United States, by which the neutrality of any pathways of commerce hereafter to be constructed across the Isthmus that divides the two Americas is secured, is a sign of the approaching brotherhood of nations. With such elements at work; with such means of exploration, of commerce, of the transmission of intelligence, of the more perfect acquaintance, and more frequent intermingling of nations, it is obvious that the era of a new series of experiments, or of some one grand experiment, has arrived. Never before have the chains of sympathy stretched from continent to continent as they do now; never before has mere physical power so felt its weakness in the presence of the moral sentiment of far-off millions. What force has of late years wrought most effectually at Constantinople? The press of London and Paris. How long will it be before the Emperor of China will find the Times a necessary appendage to his breakfast, and Pekin shall have its reading rooms, vying in extent with those of New York and Boston? It is out of the question, in these circumstances, for the old pro-

¹ We do not mean to engage in the controversy respecting the nature of this motion, or the manner in which it is propagated. Whether it is a current, or an atmospheric fluid, or what it may be, we leave to others to determine. The simple result of these observations in respect to time, is all we design to state.

cesses of thought and action to continue and repeat themselves. It is impossible for any one nation to isolate itself from these silent and omnipresent influences. The *world* is usurping the *nation*; the invisible force of intelligence and moral sentiment is slowly but surely undermining the ramparts of sectional bigotry and ignorance. The steamship that penetrates the waters of the great Eastern Archipelago, is the sure sign of an approaching revolution in manners, knowledge, morals, modes of thought, and even mechanic arts, among the innumerable multitudes of that unknown world. The Chinese are digging for gold in California; but they are *Chinese* no longer. There is in our own country a similar process going forward. In the intermixture and friendly collision of millions born in different lands, the *national* is gradually lost. National churches cannot long exist without a radical assimilation to the new order of things around them; while national modes of thought, customs, and language, soon give place to something very different—a combination of Americanism with the sturdier qualities of national character—the old framework penetrated by a new spirit, and manifesting a new life. This process is to go forward all over the world. Nothing can long retard it. The result will be something new—something perhaps grand—something far more remarkable in the way of experiment toward the full civilization of man, than history has yet recorded.

What effect this intermingling of nations, this casting down of the separating walls, this mutual action and reaction, is to have in settling the question respecting the only true means of human elevation, we cannot foresee. That no such world-wide brotherhood, no such rapid intercourse is sufficient to satisfy the conditions of the noblest civilization, we are well assured. There are other considerations that seem to indicate that this new aspect of the world is to be associated with the full trial of the positive and grandest experiment of civilization. It is to be supposed, indeed that the closing up of the experiment of the earthly forces will be gradual. It is not according to the analogy of the divine government in time past, that these vast processes should suddenly cease. The winding up will probably be slow; coterminously with the opening of the final illustration, trains of powers reaching back through centuries will spend themselves; subordinate and even some of the grandest forces to which humanity has clung with despairing tenacity as the chief anchor of hope, amidst the heavings of this troubled sea, will reveal their weakness. Side by side with these vanishing powers, the Christian experiment will push itself forth, growing like a tree which, long roofed over and pent in by walls, at length enjoying the sun, the rain, and the

breeze, rapidly spreads its life far up into the sky. There are two circumstances, among others, which specially indicate the rapid approach of the time for the full illustration of Christian civilization. *First.* The tendency to religious freedom is increasing on every side. Freedom is one of the leading conditions of the great experiment. This mighty scheme cannot be tried, or the fullness of its power be manifest, while men and states are ever rearing their perishable buttresses around it, stretching out their arm and their sword to shield it from peril, and enforce its authority. Truth asks no such defence; David cannot fight in Saul's armor; neither will Christianity ally to itself such elements of corruption with which to divide the glory of victory. Its triumphs are in the soul, where no external power can reach, where human authority and brute force are powerless. It goes forth alone in its own spiritual might, to do battle with the forces of depravity. It will stand alone upon the morass in which corruption is sinking the race; alone it will despoil their foe, lift them on their feet, and make the earth solid beneath them. Too long its victories have been retarded and its glories eclipsed by the secularizing policy of states, and the unbelief of its own supporters in its intrinsic power. Misunderstanding the nature of man, the plans of God, and the vitality of the gospel, they have coupled the eagle and the owl, as if the lazy bird of night could assist the monarch in his soaring to the sun. On this most important point the world is getting wisdom. Ever since the opening of the fifth act of time, when the curtain was lifted up from this vast country, as the broad stage for the noblest scenes of time, causes have been in operation which have at length wrought out the freedom of truth here, and are slowly sending their influence over the entire world.

In yonder isle of the deep—our fatherland—where power and wealth, genius and learning have reared their throne, behold! the earth trembles beneath their lofty cathedrals, while their time-honored union of church and state bleeds freely from the vigorous thrusts of a true hearted chivalry. From the hills and glens of Scotland, the noble army of confessors send forth around the earth the voice of liberty achieved, of truth casting off her unnatural ally and rushing on to combat in the strength of God alone. In that land which infidelity, wedded to papacy, has filled with monsters,—the land of the Huguenot,—in those forests and fields where of yore the trumpets of Luther and Zwingli spake the first sounds of deliverance to the spiritual bondmen,—even there also, where the tiara still gleams luridly in the light of yon blazing mountain, are hearts by millions panting for this rich boon—freedom of thought, of utterance,

of worship; hands innumerable ready to grasp the sword to achieve it; and purposes deep, settled, immovable, yet to effect it. Even the Crescent grows pale before the gray dawn of this coming day, which is to scatter the darkness of Moslem bigotry, and herald the triumphs of a nobler civilization than even Athens, or Bagdad, or Constantinople ever saw. This onward progress toward religious liberty is no dream; no midnight vision; no paroxysm of a crippled giant, to pass away in a deeper bondage and a more hopeless night. Backwards and forwards, now eddying this way, now rushing that; seething and foaming against opposing rocks; pausing at times as if about to settle away in the earth and be lost for ever, still the stream rises and swells, and will rise and swell, till at length Christian truth shall spread over every land, in the glorious freedom, the uncontaminated purity and living force of the wisdom of God. This condition of the great experiment is gradually forming itself in one and another land; especially in those lands whose power over the world is most quickening, and whose sons seem destined to revolutionize the forms of social life, the governments, the commerce, and the religion of half the globe. Such is the first clear sign of the trial of the chief experiment.

The second condition of its operation and sign of its coming is similar in its character. It is the preparation of a great multitude of hearts for actively engaging in this experiment. The spirit and the truth work in human hearts, through human minds and tongues. These noble instruments will be found polished and prepared in great numbers, increasing as the great work of Christian civilization is fully open to their efforts. The silent preparation of large masses of men for some such labor, is obvious to any careful observer of the church of Christ. At this hour, and increasing all over the earth, are armies of souls who despair of human elevation by human inventions; who feel not only that their higher life for the better world must be inspired from above, but that the noblest form of this *earthly* life must be cast into the same mold, and bear the same impress. Confidence in human governments, in forms, in rites, in merely external influences, as complete means of civilization, is dying—in a multitude of souls is already dead. They are looking away to a higher power; they are going forth in the simple panoply of truth, to revolutionize nations, upheave their hoary superstitions, abolish their hereditary and interlocked abuses, set up a new form of civilization, and make Christianity the lever with which a world is to be moved from its place of evil, and elevated to a position of light and love, of purity and peace. It is not usual for

Infinite Wisdom thus to prepare his instruments when their work is yet far distant. These convictions, these efforts, this faith in a better scheme of civilization, are his own product. They are the marshaling of an army for near conflict; the mighty preparation for the noblest victory. Hitherto the good have been overborne; defeat has depressed the spirits of those who sought for man's elevation. But now a new era will open—an era of faith and victory. The king will himself ascend the throne, direct the forces, infuse energy into his subjects, baffle his enemies, and at last spread over the earth the light, and joy, and peace of man's golden age.

Such are the indications of the near approach of the positive experiment. The old must die. The mighty whom the earth has worshiped, must fall. One after another, the schemes and appliances for human civilization must spend themselves. Yet not in vain have they lived and wrought. Those forests that stretch across our western world must die. Those grand old trees, amid whose majestic tops the winds have moaned the requiem of centuries; that exuberant life which age after age has renewed itself, and spread the shade of its foliage over the swarthy Indian and his wild prey, even they must fall. But though they fall, yet not without a purpose of good have they so long existed. That life above has created the mold of a nobler life than its own: that deposit of ages past, hurled downward by autumn winds and rotted by winter rains, is the soil, deep, rich, exhaustless, which, uncovered to the sun, is yet to nourish countless myriads. The genius of a nobler civilization cries to us: "Girdle those wide-spreading giants; heed not the tossing of their brawny arms against the wintry sky; heed not the grandeur and the loveliness, the pride and majesty, the wealth of life and grace of motion, with which they rise between you and the burning sun of summer! Below their shade, brutes, reptiles, beasts of prey nestle on the very soil that would minister wealth to starving myriads. Down then with the majesty of rank! let in the sun! let in the plow! bring forth the cradle and hoe!" Behold! a new scene opens. The wild winds sing their requiem no more; the war-whoop startles us no more; the catamount and the deer have hied them to other lands. But around us smiles a noble civilization. The tasteful farm-house, the clustering village, fields waving with grain, meet the eye; the lowing of cattle, the hum of commerce, the snort of the steam-horse, the merry voices of children, fall upon the ear. The school-house, the academy, the college, rise before us in all the beauty of art; while conspicuous among them, the crown of earth's richest possession, the truest source of abiding prosperity, the church of the Redeemer, sits queenly.

Thus will it be when this protracted drama shall approach its close. Those wondrous forms and institutions of the past, through which man has in vain sought to liken himself to God, must crumble. Egypt, with her solemn temples and rock built pyramids; Greece, with her beauteous diadem of illustrious minds, her bright and joyous Acropolis; Jerusalem, with her awful tabernacle, her priestly train, her splendid ritual; Rome, with all the magnificence of her forum, her vast Coliseum, her monumental arches, her noble Basilicas, and her stern, unflinching justice; Rome spiritual, with all that art which she has made religion, her Vatican palaces and libraries and paintings, the robes of her harlotry, with that world-renowned trophy of *his* skill, Great Angelo!—these, and a hundred others less grand and mighty, must all pass away. Upon your decaying majesty, your marble mausoleums, your crumbling castles, your works of mightiest genius, we gaze with wonder, spell-bound with that fascination which so long made you the mistresses of the world. Yet when we look beneath, look at the populace, at the publicans and sinners, at the foul reptiles that found a covert under your shade, the unclean birds that revelled in your dim, religious light, and amid your grand leafy aisles, we waken from that dream of joy, and welcome your conquerors, and light the torch that shall send the flame crackling and roaring through all your pride. Another world is opened as ye fall; another civilization begins its course as ye decay, as far above yours as yours was above that of the savage in his wild home.

As one after another these earthly schemes reveal their powerlessness, the system of Redemption by Christ will attract to itself the hearts of the world. Entering the mind and forming it first for the life to come, it will in its progress fashion the noblest sons of earth, develop their finest attributes in harmony, link religion to genius, and cause genius to bring forth finer products than history has ever recorded. From that state of elevated humanity, idleness, enervating luxury, perishing poverty, blood-thirsty war, bloated drunkenness, licentiousness with its lustful eye and insatiate appetite, court-room wrangles, ignorance with its idiot merriment and its unskillful hands, passion in its rudderless vessel, with its unsheathed dagger,—all these and whatsoever else doth wound and corrupt society, shall be banished. Then shall that divine wisdom, instinct with divine power working in the heart, and out in the life, give health, vigor, and beauty to man; harmonize conflicting interests; purify all social intercourse; guide all energies to noble ends; and elevate the intellect into a clear atmosphere, where the glorious forms of science

shall appear in harmony and light. Then knowledge shall daily grow in accuracy and extent, unfolding the mysterious forms of nature, and their application to now unknown ends of practical utility. Then mechanism, associated with the finest powers of genius and invention, shall push aside the common mode of labor, alleviate the condition of toil, and lift poverty to competence. The sweat of man's brow will not stream so copiously; the earth will bring forth her weeds less luxuriantly; and the face of nature will be as the garden of the Lord. Then *Art* shall have its resurrection, its true inspiration. No longer substituted for religion, and worshiped as God, it shall come forth to minister to spiritual religion, and assist in guiding man back to the Infinite. It shall rear our temples and dwellings in forms that will awe and tranquilize and gladden the heart, speaking to it as doth nature in the roar of the ocean or the wailing of the forest. Then grace and motion, then all sounds of harmony and melody, all forms of beauty, shall harmonize with the works of wisdom and power around us; and the outer life of man possess a loveliness, a bright and joyous character, indicative of the purity, the peace, the science and the faith of his spirit. Such, in faint outline, will be that better state to which the race is advancing, and to which it will attain when the experiment of Christianity shall be fully tried.

At length, even this positive experiment shall have wrought its results. Then will come the final gathering up, and comparison of both the negative and positive trials. What a scene will that be, when the life, the deeds, the whole panorama of antediluvian existence shall be displayed. A manuscript history, begun by Adam, continued by Methuselah, and completed by Noah, would set the world on fire with eager desire to behold and read. But this scene, transcending all such imperfect testimonies, will place that ancient life in all its minutest operations before our eyes and those of the universe. Thus, too, will Assyria, Babylon, and Egypt all be raised to life, and seem to move before us. Each experiment, however small or great, will take its just position in that vast exhibition, like the separate features of a luminous painting; while in contrast with them all, shines forth this last and grandest scene of Christian civilization; a race fallen, in ruins, whom no plenteousness of food, no freedom of government, no influence of art, no teachings of science, no sanctions of law could refine, elevated to the highest point of earthly aggrandizement, by the inworking force of that truth, THE LAMB OF GOD SLAIN FOR THE SINS OF MEN, AND THE SPIRIT OF GOD BESTOWED FOR THE PURIFICATION OF POLLUTED SINNERS.

ARTICLE IX.

LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES OF BOOKS.

BY THE EDITOR.

1. A PASTOR'S SKETCHES : or, Conversations with Anxious Inquirers respecting the way of Salvation. By IOHABOD S. SPENCER, D. D., Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y. New York : M. W. Dodd. 1850. 12mo., pp. 414.

No man has so responsible and yet so difficult a part to act in life, as the Christian Pastor. He must have an eye for every interest, a heart for every sorrow, a hand for every service. He is called to deal with all classes of minds,—with men under every conceivable circumstance in life,—with human nature in her thousand phases of mental, social, and moral development. Not only must he preach the gospel “in season, out of season, warning every man;” but he must “watch for souls;” he must go forth and mingle with his flock, seeking out the inquiring, visiting the sick and the poor, comforting the afflicted, and ministering to the dying. He often witnesses scenes the most solemn and affecting; is called to speak in counsel or instruction, where life and death seem to hang on his lips; and he gets, if at all observing, a deeper insight into human being and life, than other men, and treasures up facts and experiences not only thrillingly interesting, but highly instructive, to the world.

It is not surprising that the young and inexperienced pastor so often feels extreme *embarrassment* in his work. His work is always a difficult, and often a delicate one. He has no *experience* to guide him, and it is like “drawing a bow at a venture.” His knowledge of man is mainly a *book* knowledge, and it avails him but little in dealing with the real living beings with whom he has to do. He knows not how to approach them with the truth. He cannot adapt himself and his instructions to the peculiarities of each case. He is ignorant of a thousand devices, a thousand exercises and phases of the human heart. He cannot meet the practical and endless objections of unbelief. He is not skillful in the use of the weapons of his warfare. He has not learned to confide in the simple truth, as the two-edged sword of the Spirit. He is embarrassed by a sense of his insufficiency when he enters the chamber of sickness, or the house of mourning, or stands over the dying, or goes to the “inquiry meeting.” Cases of such difficulty often arise, that he is totally in the dark as to what course to pursue—what counsel to give—what expedient to adopt. He wants light himself; and where shall he seek it? Books of ordinary instruction do not meet the case. *What shall he do?* Many a pastor has wept and prayed over this question, and sought the experience of older brethren to teach him.

We doubt not that the ministry oftener fails of its great end from a lack of a correct and thorough knowledge of human nature, and how to adapt wisely the gospel to individual cases, occurring a little out of

the track of ordinary experience, than from any other cause. There is a great amount of piety and intellect and learning, in the ministry of our day; but we do think that there is a great lack of that *practical knowledge of mankind*; that shrewdness of observation, and penetration of character, and common sense view of things as they really exist; that facility of adaptation to circumstances, and seizing upon passing events to subordinate them to the one ruling purpose of life, which so eminently characterizes the men of this age in all other professions and pursuits.

We welcome, therefore, as we know thousands of ministers and private Christians will, the book before us. It is not a book of fancy, but a record of the observation and experience of one of rare qualifications and opportunities, during a long, laborious, and successful ministry, in the most difficult cases and services connected with the Christian Ministry. It is not a book of abstract truth, or of truth in its more ordinary application—but a book of real **EXPERIENCES**—the experiences, in most cases, of anxious inquirers after salvation, in every stage of inquiry, and under all the variety of spiritual exercises;—of truth in its special applications in the sick-room, with souls under conviction, to skeptics and scoffers, to hypocrites and self-deceived persons, to doubting and despairing souls, to sinners dying hopeless, and saints triumphant. In a word, it is a plain, reliable record of what an honest, fearless, wise and faithful minister endured, and saw, and said, and did, in the most difficult and trying circumstances in which the man, whose business it is to deal with souls, is ever placed. It is the teaching of **EXPERIENCE**, where experience is most of all needed; and it will prove a light in the path of many an anxious pastor.

We cannot dismiss this book without saying a word of its Author, and giving a few specimens of its intensely interesting and powerful "Sketches."

Dr. Spencer has been for twenty-two years engaged in the active duties of the ministry. As a preacher, notwithstanding some little infelicities of manner, we think he has no superior among living men, uniting as he does the imaginative with the philosophical, the doctrinal with the practical, the graces of style with the power of comprehensive and impressive thought, to a degree that is seldom attained. As a pastor, we know him to be most laborious and faithful, searching out such cases as he has here so graphically sketched, and ministering to them as the circumstances may require.

The Dr.'s peculiarities and excellencies are strongly marked. They are seen in the pages of this unstudied and unpretending volume. He reasons at times with the strength of a clear and great mind. When he pleases, he can touch the secret springs of the heart, and make the tears to gush forth. At times he displays an imagination and a genius of the highest order. With a word, he often dashes to the ground a self-righteous hope, or sweeps away the sinner's last "refuge of lies." "Rooted and grounded in the truth," he is bold as a lion—clear, decided, authoritative in his enunciation of it. His own convictions of the truth are deep and powerful, and he makes his hearers feel that it is the **WORD OF GOD** that he preaches to them, and that they are not at liberty to refuse it, or half-believe it—that they *must* believe it, and

obey it, or be *damned*. He has evidently made man the study of his life. He seems to penetrate one's character at a glance; to know the human heart in its most subtil deceptions, and in all its sinuosities, and how to meet it on its own ground, and either carry it by storm, or undermine its strong bulwarks by the power of his argumentative skill. A scholar of rare attainments, fitted to shine in any station, on any occasion, he yet gives himself wholly to the work of the ministry among his people, and aims continually, and labors by every means in his power, to bring perishing sinners to Christ.

We feel in duty bound to say this much of the Author, for the benefit especially of those who do not know him—and he will pardon us for saying it—that this class of our readers may appreciate these “Sketches.” They embody the wisdom, the experience, the example, of one having the entire confidence of those who know him best; of one eminently fitted to guide his younger brethren in those perplexities and difficulties which all who are called to exercise the ministry, experience.

These “Sketches” are 40 in number—some of them very short, and others of considerable length. They are taken from real life, being “the experiences of some whom the author has known in the course of his ministry.” They were selected “from the materials in his possession, on the principle of avoiding useless repetitions, * * * and of meeting some of the strange difficulties which sometimes trouble inquirers after salvation.” Each case, therefore, is the representative of a *distinct class* of cases; each case meets a special difficulty, and not only shows us how it was met by the Author, but furnishes us with a striking illustration of truth, or a useful fact. The sketches are drawn from various classes in life—from scenes often of harrowing interest; they portray every shade of character—and possess various degrees and kinds of merit and interest. Some of them are given without any drapery—the bare fact and the moral are left to speak, and tell their short but affecting story: while others are comparatively full and perfect sketches of history, character, and conversations, drawn with artistic skill, yet with perfect fidelity to the truth, and are overpowering in their interest, and most pointed and impressive in their instruction. Some of them, (“The Welch Woman and her Tenant,” and “The Harvest Past, or Dying Universalist,” for instance,) are *tracts* equal in interest and value to anything that we have ever read. They ought to be adopted by the Tract Society, and sent forth by millions on a mission of mercy and of warning.

Take a specimen of the Author's reasoning powers. It occurs in his sketch of “The Young Irishman,” which is by far the longest of the series, and contains, we hesitate not to say, the most condensed, and ably reasoned and satisfactory argument in our language, drawn from Natural Theology, to prove the existence of spirit, and of God the Infinite Spirit. This man was a highly educated and accomplished lawyer, but an avowed infidel, and fast sinking into the grave when our author was called to see him. He questioned the being of a God, the existence of spirit, everything but matter. The infidel, who would take nothing on “*trust*,” but must have “*knowledge*” for everything, raised, during the discussion, the following question:

“Do you mean to affirm, then, that human knowledge in respect to spirit is as clear and certain as in respect to material things?”

"Certainly, sir : I mean to affirm just that ; and I maintain, that the idea of the imperfection of our knowledge about spirit is all a mere impression and mere prejudice. The mind has taken an untenable position, and has espoused a falsehood, when men declare, 'we know little about spirit,—we can understand what matter is, but spirit is beyond our comprehension.'"

"And in the outset, I admit, that our knowledge about matter comes in such a *mode*, that that knowledge has a vividness, and often an impressiveness, which belongs to no knowledge gained in any other way. We have a sensible organism, which brings us into contact with matter. Our nerves are affected by it. And through that machinery, sensitive as it is inexplicable, we have impressions as well as knowledge, and have an instant certainty, which requires no slow and cool processes of reflection, or examination of evidences. We see the sun ; and that is enough : the moment we have the sight, we have the knowledge. We hear the thunder ; and that is enough : the moment we hear, that moment we have the knowledge. We need not any other examination.

"Now this sensitive machinery, and the instant rapidity and suddenness with which it acts, give to the knowledge which we gain in this way, a vividness, an impressiveness and force. But is not that all ? Have we any greater certainty about things seen, and things heard, and things handled, than we have about things reasoned and demonstrated ? How is this ? Can we trust the mechanism of our nerves, any better than we can trust the multiplication table, or the mathematical processes of astronomy and the counting-house ? any easier than we can trust the deep philosophy of law ? Indeed, is it not *more* probable, that some derangement should come in, among the mechanism of the senses, and make us see wrong, or hear wrong, or taste wrong, than that the sure processes of mathematical calculation should deceive us ? In our knowledge derived through the senses, we can employ only our own processes ; nobody else can use our nerves of sight, or hearing, or taste. But in our knowledge derived through mathematics, and in some other modes, we employ the same processes which others have employed before us, and are employing all around us ; and we can therefore fortify our own conclusions by theirs, and substantiate our certainty in knowledge, (if need be,) by a comparison of calculations. *Their* processes, by which they obtained their knowledge, their certainty, we can make *our* processes ; but we cannot use another man's eyes or ears, or the nervous mechanism by which they act. All we can do, is to take the testimony of the men who do use them ; and then our knowledge rests only on testimony, not on the senses. And because we are confined to our own machinery of sense, and cannot employ another man's machine ; we have *not*, herein, one of the advantages for certainty, which attend knowledge in mathematics, and all other matters of reasoning. We can employ for our assurance, another man's reasoning powers, but his eyes are his own, and we cannot use them. We can add the *testimony* of one man to that of another man, and then add another, and make them all auxiliary to our own, for heightening our assurance and certainty in knowledge ; but we can do nothing of this in the knowledge derived from the senses—we cannot borrow another man's nerves. And it follows from all this surely, that, instead of there being *more* ground of certainty in knowledge derived directly through the senses, there is *less* certainty than in knowledge that comes in some other modes."

"But I have not done with the charge. There is another item in this count. There is another false assumption in the notion which I am combating. Your notion is, that we can have a certainty of knowledge about matter, such as we cannot have about spirit ; because our senses furnish evidence of matter, but not of spirit. This is a mere assumption, and a falsehood. Have you no *sensible evidences* of spirit ? When you move your tongue, and utter your arguments, are not the motion and the arguments any evidences of an unseen mind ? They are *sensible evidences* of something to me ; for I see the motion, and I hear

the arguments. And will you tell me, that the *matter* of the tongue, the mere material of it, moves of its own accord, and weaves the arguments by its own power? If not, then, the motion I see, and the arguments I hear, are sensible evidences of the existence of an unseen spirit, which prompts the motion and weaves the arguments. Though my senses do not *directly* reach the spirit itself, yet they do reach the effects of that spirit (the motion of the tongue and the audible arguments,) which come from the unseen mind. And thus my very senses do furnish me with an evidence of the existence of that mind, as clear and certain as if my eyes could behold it. They do behold the effects of it—the traces of it—the signals of it, as clearly as they behold anything. The signals, the traces, the effects, cannot come from any other quarter. They must come from mind. A reasonable argument must be a production of reason. And just as certainly as I hear it coming from human lips, just so certainly I have the evidences of two of my senses, that a mind exists somewhere, a spirit which has moved the lips, and contrived the argument. It is, therefore, an *assumption* and a falsehood, when one says he has no sensible evidences of spirit, and hence cannot know much about it.”—Pp. 14–23.

Again :

“You surprise me by saying that power lies in will.”

“Just in will, sir,” said I; “nowhere else. This presides over the whole field of causes and effects. It belongs to the very nature of the human mind, to attribute *any change* which we behold, to *something*. That something we denominate the cause. It may not be itself the cause, only instrumentally, unless it is the will; and when it is *not* the will, then we must trace our way back through the instruments, till we reach the real seat of power; and we shall always find that to be the will. My motions, my speech, my walking, are changes, and no sane man supposes them to be uncaused. Everybody supposes them, knows them, to proceed from some cause adequate to the production of the changes. This is common sense; and on this principle every language on earth is formed. The principle is interwoven with the structure of the Greek, the Latin, the French, the Chinese, with every tongue. No man’s mind rejects this principle. If anybody thinks changes to be uncaused, he is a madman or a fool. Common sense always knows, that changes are the *effects* of some *cause*, which holds power over them. That cause, in respect to my motions, is my spirit. My motions are an *effect*. My spirit is the cause. The cause of all the changes in the universe is God. All these changes are effects coming from something, and that something (whatever it be,) is God. He is the great first cause of all things. But he has delegated to me a little power, (for a time,) over a few particles of matter, which I call my body; and by the exercise of that power, I can move. My agency is only a subordinate agency, limited, and not lasting. It may last till I die, but no longer; and then I must account for my stewardship. It extends only to my own flesh. I cannot make a stone or a clod of earth move, by my willing it, as I can move my material frame. And, dependent creature that I am, I cannot move my material frame, except by the mysterious power of my spirit, which *wills* it,—a power not my own, in the sense of independency, but only in the sense of subordination. But in this subordinate sense, I am the cause of my own actions, and accountable for them, —sometimes to men, and always to God.

“Now, just on this ground of common sense, my motions are all evidences of the existence of my spirit, which has power over them; and the great motions of the universe are all evidences of an unseen Spirit, which has power over them. That unseen Spirit is God. These changes of the universe are visible. Our senses take note of them; and, therefore, our senses, though they cannot directly reach the Divine Being, *can* reach, and reach *everywhere*, those changes which are his effects, and demonstrations of his existence and mighty power.—This argument is rock. There is no getting away from it. These changes of the universe are effects, by the common consent of all mankind. Being so,

they must have a cause: they demonstrate the existence of a cause. And whatever that cause, be it is God. Our senses come in contact with the effects;—and now, who shall maintain, that we have not as good evidences about God, as if our eyes could behold him? It may be less sudden, less startling, and hence less impressive evidence; but is it not as good? May I not be as certain as if I saw him? Do not I know, that a cause of visible changes is operating, just as well as I know the effects which I behold? If there is any uncertainty about my knowledge of God in this way of knowing, let any man attempt to tell where it lies. He cannot tell.—The changes? my eyes see them. I, therefore, know them by evidences of sense. They are effects. I know this by my common sense, and the common sense of every man around me. And the cause of these effects, you must either allow to be the Deity, or you must maintain, that dumb matter, mere dirt and rock, has reason, and will, and power of motion, of its own. And coming in contact with these effects constantly, as I do, I certainly am unable to perceive, why I do not positively know there is a God, as well as I know there is a sun that moves, or a drop of rain that falls. My knowledge may not be impressive and startling; but is it not real—certain—founded on good and legitimate evidences?

“And now, what is power? or, where does it lie? or, what yields it? Where is its seat? its home? Where does power originate? There is something which men call power—something which is capable of effecting some change; and the question you put to me is, what is it? or, where is the seat of it? And the answer is, *power lies in the spirit—not in matter, but in spirit.* The power by which all changes in matter are effected, resides immediately in spirit, in mind. The power by which I move a muscle does not belong to the muscle itself. The muscle is only an instrument which obeys that act of my spirit, which I call *my will*. My will is that mysterious thing with which my Maker has invested me, and by which I can move. The will is the power. We cannot move a single atom of matter in the universe without it. It has a direct power over our bodies in health, and till we die; and an indirect power over a little other matter. Acting indirectly, our will can bring our bodies, or some portion of our material frame, into contact with other matter; and thus we can effect some changes in that other. The stones we lift, the mountains we level, the ships we build, are all lifted, and leveled, and built, by the power of our will. Power resides nowhere but in spirit. You speak of the mechanical powers, and I am not going to find fault with your language. But let not the imperfection of language mislead your understanding,—as it certainly does, if you suppose these mechanical powers have an item of power of their own. They have none. The power exists only in your own will. You use them. You bring your hands, or feet, or some other portion of your body into contact with some other matter, the lever, the screw, the pulley; and thus you *willingly* employ these contrivances to do what you could not do without them. But the lever, the screw, the wedge, the pulley, have not an item of power in themselves. Nobody ever saw them doing anything alone. It is will, it is spirit, which employs them. The will first formed the contrivances themselves; and could not form them so as to invest them with power to work alone. And the will, in every instance of their operation since they are formed, must come along with its continued power, or they will do nothing,—*can* do nothing. They have no power, because they have no will. You have, then, this great, universal lesson, *Power resides only in mind; all power exists in spirit, and in spirit only.*

“God’s will is his power. He employs his power directly or indirectly, as he pleases. He can use instruments, or do without them. He has no need of them, as you have. The direct power of your own spirit is limited—it is limited, as I said, to the few particles of matter which make up your mortal body; and if you would move or change anything beyond that, you must contrive some mode to bring your material body into contact or some connection with it. But God, the unseen, eternal Spirit, is able to bring the power of his will to bear

directly upon all things,—as directly as the power of your will bears upon the body it moves. He has only to will it, and any conceivable change will instantly take place. The power all lies in the Infinite Spirit. God is Spirit. His will is the effect. Nothing intervenes between his volition and the change which follows it, to give any power to the volition itself. The mere volition is all his power.—Awful God! Tremendous Deity! On his simple volition hangs this mighty universe of being! Earth, heaven, hell depend upon it! If he should will it, there would not be an angel in heaven, or a devil in hell! existence would cease! this universe would become a blank! and nothing would be, except ‘that high and lofty One, who inhabiteth eternity!’—Oh! who would not have this God for his friend! Oh! who would endure to have him his enemy? Enemy? sooner, come annihilation! Let me perish—let my spirit die—let all these thinking faculties, my soul, go out in eternal night, sooner than have this awful God against me! It need not be. That God who ‘spake and it was done,’ who ‘commanded and it stood fast,’ who said, ‘let there be light and there was light,’—this God is love. I hear a voice coming from resurrection lips, ‘all power in heaven and earth is given unto me; go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature, and, lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world. He that believeth shall be saved—though he were dead, yet he shall live again.’ Blessed words! blessed Saviour! Open your heart, sir, to this message. Take this offer. Poor sinner as you are—weak mortal—being of a day, and soon to lie in the dust; cast your immortal soul upon the power of this Christ, to save you from eternal death, and give you life evermore!”—Pp. 26–32.

The third sketch gives a beautiful illustration of the *simplicity of faith*; and the Author’s remarks suggested by it, are just and striking. He was sent for, in great haste, to visit a dying woman. He found her happy in mind, and already at the gates of the celestial city.

“Mrs. M., you seem to be very sick?”

“Yes,” said she, “I am dying.”

“Are you ready to die?”

She lifted her eyes upon me, with a solemn and fixed gaze, and speaking with great difficulty, she replied:

“Sir, God knows—I have taken him—at his word—and—I am not afraid—to die.”

“I wanted to tell you—that I can—trust—in God—while—I am dying.—You have—often told me—he would not—forsake me.—And now—I find—it true.—I am—at peace.—I die willingly—and happy.”

“Many of the published Dissertations, on the nature and philosophy of the atonement, may be deep, but they are dark. We cannot afford to travel along such weary distances, and through such twilight paths, in order to get at the fact—at what it is, that we are to believe, and trust in. The Bible puts it directly before us—‘slain for us—the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God.’ We are asked to receive it, just on God’s testimony: not by the aids of philosophy, but on the declaration of the fact. We ‘make God a liar,’ if we do not ‘believe the testimony which he hath given us of his Son.’ We must take it on God’s declaration. That is faith. The speculations may be useful to silence skepticism; but they never soften hearts. They may make us scholars; but they never make us children, or lead us home. The atonement satisfies God. He says so. That is enough. Leave it there. Men may try; but they will try in vain, when they attempt to convert the weapons for defending against infidelity, into bread to feed God’s hungry children. We must ‘take God at his word.’ The philosophy of religion, is just faith: nothing more.”—Pp. 73, 75.

The most deeply affecting sketch in the volume, is that of "The Welch Woman and her Tenant." He was asked to go to a distant street to visit a sick woman, an entire stranger. He found her in the last stages of consumption, and in extreme poverty. She was young—had been married but a year—and had an intemperate husband. She had seen better days, and was now the tenant of a poor but pious Welch woman. "I have seldom seen a more perfectly beautiful woman. Her frame was delicate, her complexion clear and white, her countenance indicative of a more than ordinary degree of intelligence and amiability; and as she lifted her languid eyes upon me, I could not but feel, in an instant, that I was in the presence of an uncommon woman." He found her extremely ignorant, however, of religion. She had never prayed—never thought of religion—never read the Bible—was never inside of a church. "And it is too late now for me to do anything about it. I am too far gone." The kind pastor, in a most feeling and admirable manner, sought to enlighten her dark mind. We give only the last scene:

"But—will he save—such—a wicked—undone creature—as I am?"

"Yes; he will. He says he will. He came from heaven to do it; 'to seek and to save that which was lost.' He invites you to come to him. I read it to you in his word; 'come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.'"

"May I go?" says she, (her countenance indicating the most intense thought; and her eyes, suffused with tears of gladness and doubt, fixing upon me, as if she would read her doom from my lips.)

"Yes, you may go to Christ. Come in welcome. Come now. Come just such a sinner as you are. Christ loves to save such sinners."

She raised herself upon her couch, and leaning upon her elbow, with her dark locks falling over the snowy whiteness of her neck, her brow knit, her lips compressed, her fine eyes fixed upon me, and her bosom heaving with emotion,—she paused for a moment,—said she:

"I do want—to come to Christ."

"He wants you to come," said I.

"Will he—take—me?" said she.

"Yes, he will; he says he will," said I.

"I am wicked—and do not—deserve it," said she.

"He knows that; and died to save you," said I.

"Oh, I think—I would come, if God,—if the Holy Spirit—would help—me. But—my heart—is afraid. I thought,—just now; if I only knew—the way, I would do it. But now, when—you have told me; I cannot believe it. I cannot—trust Christ. I never—knew before; what—a distant heart I have!"

"The Holy Spirit does help you. At this moment in your heart, he urges you to come, to trust Christ. The Bible tells you to come. 'The spirit and the bride say, come.' God lengthens the hours of your life, that you may come; while he says to you, 'Behold now is the accepted time, now is the day of salvation.'"

I paused for a little time; and as I watched her countenance, she appeared to be absorbed in the most intense thought. Her brow was slightly knit—her lips quivered—her fine eyes roamed from side to side, and often upward; and then, closed for a moment. And seeming utterly forgetful of my presence she slowly pronounced the words, with a pause almost at every syllable;—"lost sinner—anger—God—Christ—blood—love—pardon—heaven—help—Bible—now—come." And then, turning her eyes upon me, she said:

"I do want—to come—to Christ—and rest on him. If my God—will accept—such—a vile sinner—I give myself—to him—forever!—oh!—he will—accept me—by Christ—who died!—Lord—save me—I lie on thee—to save me."

She sunk back upon her bed, with her eyes lifted to heaven, and her hands raised in the attitude of prayer; while her countenance indicated amazement. I knelt her bed, uttered a short prayer, and left her, to return at sunset.

As I returned, the old Welch woman met me at the door, her eyes bathed in tears, and her hands lifted to the heavens. I supposed she was going to tell me that the sick woman was dead; but, with uplifted hands, she exclaimed, "Blessed be God! blessed be God! The poor thing is happy now; she is so happy! Thank God! she is so happy! She looks like an angel now! She has seen Christ, her Lord; and she will be an angel soon! Now I can let her die! I can't stop weeping! She has been a dear creature to me! But it makes my heart weep for joy now, when I see what God has done for her, and how happy she is." She conducted me to her sick friend's room. As I entered, the dying woman lifted her eyes upon me, with a smile:

"The Lord—has made me happy!—I am—very happy. I was afraid—my wicked heart—never would—love God. But, he has—led me to it. Christ—is very dear—to me. I can—lean on him now. I—can die—in peace."

I conversed with her for some minutes, the "old lady" standing at my elbow, in tears. She was calm and full of peace. She said, "All you told me—was true; my heart finds it true. How good—is Jesus, to save such sinners! I was afraid to fall upon him; but I know now—that believing is all. My heart—is different. I do love God. Jesus Christ is very dear—to me."

She appeared to be fast sinking. I prayed with her, and left her. The next day she died. I visited her before her death. She was at peace. She could say but little; but some of her expressions were remarkable. She desired to be bolstered up in her bed, that she might "be able to speak once more." She seemed to rally her strength; and speaking with the utmost difficulty, the death-gurgle in her throat, and the tears coursing down her pale, and still beautiful cheek, she said:

"I wonder—at God. Never was there such love. He is all goodness. I want—to praise—him. My soul—loves him. I delight—to be his.—He—has forgiven me—a poor sinner—and now—his love exhausts me.—The Holy Spirit—helped me—or my heart—would have held—to its own—goodness—in its unbelief. God has—heard me. He has come—to me,—and now—I live—on prayer. Pardon me—sir,—I forgot—to thank you—I was—so carried off—in thinking—of my God. He will—reward you—for coming—to see me. I am going—to him—soon—I hope. Dying will be sweet—to me—for Christ—is with me."

I said a few words to her, prayed with her, and left her. As I took her hand, at that last farewell, she cast upon me a beseeching look, full of tenderness and delight, saying to me: "May I hope—you—will always—go to see—dying sinners?" It was impossible for me to answer audibly; she answered for me: "I know you will; farewell."

She continued to enjoy entire composure of mind till the last moment. Almost her last words to the "old lady" were, "My delight is—that God—is king—over all, and saves sinners—by Jesus Christ."

I called at the house after she was dead, and proposed to the "old lady" that I would procure a sexton, and be at the expense of her funeral; lifting both her hands towards the heavens, she exclaimed—"No, sir! Indeed; No, sir! You wrong my heart to think of it! God sent you here at my call; and the poor thing has died in peace. My old heart would turn against me, if I should allow you to bury her! the midnight thought would torment me! She has been a dear creature to me, and died such a sweet death. I shall make her shroud with my own hands; I shall take her ring-money to buy her coffin; I shall pay for her grave; and then, as I believe her dear spirit has become a ministering angel, I shall hope she will come to me in the nights, and carry my prayer back to her Lord."—Pp. 134—140.

"The Harvest Past; or, The Dying Universalist," is a soul-harrow-

ing sketch: What a commentary on the doctrine which some men try to believe, and some are wicked enough to preach! But harrowing as it is to the feelings, it contains a warning which ought not to be kept back—which ought to be wrung in the ears of those who are weak enough to be deluded, or wicked enough to delude others to ruin, by this specious error. There is in the son's feelings and conduct towards the father who had misled him, a foreshadowing of the experience of a darker world:

I was hastily summoned to the bedside of a sick man, by the urgent request of his mother. He was yet a young man, I suppose about twenty-six years of age, was married, and the father of one little child. I had never spoken to him.

As I entered the sick man's room, and as she called my name, and told him that I had come to see him, he cast a sudden look at me, appeared startled, and turned away his face toward the wall, without uttering a word, as if he regarded me with horror. I approached him familiarly and kindly, offered him my hand, which he seemed reluctant to take, and feeling his feverish pulse, aimed to soothe him, as much as I could.

"Has your pain returned?"

Still holding his hands aloft, and without looking at me, he exclaimed, in a tone of horror, "oh! oh! oh!"

"Are you in great pain?" I asked.

Another groan was his only answer.

"I am sorry to find you so ill," said I.

He uttered another groan—a dreadful shriek!

His wife, sobbing aloud, left the room.

I then said to him, "God is merciful. He is the hearer of prayer; and if you are"—

"Oh!" was the dreadful sound from his quivering lips which interrupted me; it was a shriek which rang through the house, and every one of the family hurried into the room where he was. Among others was his little brother, who was the only one he seemed to notice. He glanced, once or twice, at him, and thinking he was about to speak to him, I remained silent. As he sat thus erect in his bed, with his hands stretched aloft to the utmost of his power, his eyes fixed on vacancy before him, and his lips uttering only his dreadful monosyllable, as a scream apparently of horror, he was the most pitiful object my eyes ever beheld.

"Shall I pray with you?" said I.

"It will do no good to pray for me, sir."

I waited for him to say more, but as he did not appear to be inclined to do so, I replied:—

"God is the hearer of prayer: he has encouraged us to pray to him; he has not said that it will do no good to pray."

"My day has gone by!" said he. "It is too late for me!—it is too late!"

"No, sir; it is *not* too late. If you want God's mercy, you may have it. God himself says so: 'Whosoever *will*, let him take the water of life freely.' You ought to think of the death of Christ for sinners,—of the mercy of God."

"*Mercy! mercy!*" he vociferated; that is what makes my situation so dreadful! I have despised mercy! I have scoffed at God! I have refused Christ! If God was only *just*, I could bear it. But now the thought of his abused mercy is worst of all! There is *no mercy* for me any longer! For years I have refused Christ! My day has gone by! I am lost! I amlost!"

"You think wrong," said I, "God has not limited his invitations. Christ says, 'Come unto me *all* ye that labor and are heavy laden.'"

"My day has gone by!" said he.

"No; it has *not*," I replied, in a voice as firm as his own; "behold *now* is the accepted time—*now* is the day of salvation."

"That is not for *me*!" said he; "I have had my time and lost it! I have spent all my life for nothing! I have been a fool all my days, and now I am dying! I have sought for nothing but this world! I have refused to attend to God, and now he has taken hold of me, and I cannot escape!" (The family, much affected, retired from the room.)

"You have time still to seek him, to repent and flee to Christ. You have time *now—to-day*. The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth from all sin. Pray to God. You may be saved."

"You think so," said he; but I know *better*—I *know* better! It is too late! I am dying, sir!"

"Christ accepted the dying thief," said I. "God is so rich in mercy, that he pardons sinners at the eleventh hour."

"The eleventh hour is *past*!" said he. "This is the *twelfth* hour! God's time of vengeance has come! I have had my time, and lost it! It is all gone! I have loved the world only, and now I must leave it! Oh! fool! fool! What is the world to me? Oh! how could I live so? I have been a fool all my days!"—Pp. 382—391.

The reproaches he heaped upon his father were terrible coming from the lips of a dying son:

"*Don't talk to me, father*," said he, in a tone of authority, or rather of hatred and anger. "You have been my worst enemy! You have ruined me! You led me to disobey God, and neglect the Bible! You led me into sin when I was only a little boy! You took me off to fish and hunt, Sundays, and stroll round the fields, when mother wanted me to go to church. You told me there was no hell, that all men would be saved. And *don't come here now to try to deceive me any longer!* You have done your work! You have been my ruin!—Oh! if I had minded mother, and not *you*, I should not have come to such an end!—Don't cry, mother, don't cry so,—(he heard her sobbing.) You are a good woman: you have nothing to be afraid of. God will take care of you. Don't cry so. Oh! I would give a *thousand worlds*, if I owned them, to have your religion—or any part of it—or anything like it! But I am lost! I am lost!—You told me, father, there was no hell, and I tried to believe it. I joined you in wickedness, when I knew better. I have laughed at hell; and now hell laughs at me! God will punish sinners! He has taken hold of me, and I cannot get out of his hands!"

His father attempted to say something to him, but the son would not allow him to finish a single sentence. The moment he began to speak, the son exclaimed:

"*Quit, father! Don't talk to me!* Your lies cannot deceive me any longer! You have ruined my soul!"

* * * * *

"Father! I am *no more crazy than you are!* You need not deceive yourself with that notion! But you are *not* deceived. You know better! You try to deceive yourself, just as you try to believe there is no hell. You pretend that all men will be saved; but you don't believe it. You led me to talk in the same way, and laugh at the warnings in the Bible against sinners. When I was a little boy, you began to lead me into sin! Don't come here to torment me with your falsehoods now, when I am dying!"—Pp. 392—394.

His interview with his brother is one of the most solemn and affecting scenes that the eye of man ever saw, or the pen of man ever sketched.

"At this moment, his little brother, about twelve years of age, whom he had asked for, entered the room. Calling him by name, and looking tenderly upon him, vastly different from the look he had just bent upon upon his father, he said :

"Come here, my brother. I am going to die very soon; and I want to tell you something. I want you should remember it after I am dead. You are young now, and I want you to begin to live in the right way. I have been a very wicked man. Don't do as I have done. Read the Bible. Never swear, or take God's name in vain. Always go to church, Sundays. Always mind what mother says to you. Father will lead you into a very bad way, if you are not very careful. He led me into sin, when I was a little boy, like you. He has led me to ruin, because I was fool enough to yield to him. If I had done as mother wanted me to, I might have died in peace. She is a good woman.—Don't cry, mother, do not cry so:" (sobbing aloud she left the room :) —"If father ever says there is no hell for the wicked, don't believe him. There is an awful hell! Remember that I told you so when I was dying! If father ever says that all men will be saved, never believe a word of it. The wicked will be turned into hell! Dear boy! It is a pity that he should be led to ruin. Never believe what the Universalists say. Believe your mother; and don't let father lead you into sin. Be a good boy. If I could live, I would tell you more another time. But I must die!"

"It was one of the most affecting scenes. His mother, who had returned again to the room, his wife and myself, subdued to tears, sat for some time in silence. But the sick man never shed a tear. I had hoped, when he spoke so tenderly to his mother, and when he began to talk so affectingly to his little brother, that his own sensibilities would have been excited in a tender manner, and be a means of overcoming the stern and dreadful stubbornness of his resolute despair. But there was none of this. His voice never faltered. His eye never moistened. His burning brow never quivered."—Pp. 394—395.

And thus he died. What interest and emphasis do the solemnities of that scene give to the lines of the poet :

"When the harvest is past, and the summer is gone,
And sermons and prayers shall be o'er;
When the beams cease to break, of the sweet Sabbath morn,
And Jesus invites thee no more;
When the rich gales of mercy no longer shall blow,
The gospel no message declare;—
Sinner, how canst thou bear the deep wallings of wo!
How suffer the night of despair?

When the holy have gone to the regions of peace,
To dwell in the mansions above;
When their harmony wakes, in the fullness of bliss,
Their song to the Saviour they love;—
Say, O sinner, that livest at rest and secure,
Who fearest no trouble to come,
Can thy spirit the swellings of sorrow endure;
Or bear the impenitent's doom!
Or bear the impenitent's doom!"—p. 400.

We leave this book with reluctance. It has all the interest of Warren's Sketches, entitled, "*Diary of a Physician*," and it is an interest of a much higher order. It is a book, too, of pointed and solemn instruction, on the gravest of all themes. Nothing like it exists. It is invaluable to the young minister, to the private Christian, to all classes

of inquirers after salvation, and to all who would give safe and wise counsel to them. "Twenty years ago he would have valued a book like this above all price." So says the Author; and so will every reader say, who can call to mind the trials and experiences of a twenty years' ministry. We hope the success of this volume will be such as to encourage the Author to develop his rich stores of treasures, knowledge, and experience on other subjects on which he is able to show the light of a great mind, and of an original, independent, and thorough investigation.

We ought to say, that the book is brought out in an exceedingly attractive and beautiful style.

2. THE WORKS OF LEONARD WOODS, D. D. In five volumes. Vols. III., IV., V. Andover: JOHN D. FLAGG. New York: M. W. Wood, 1850.

These three volumes complete the series of Dr. Woods' Theological Lectures, and contain, besides, the most valuable of his controversial writings, and his contributions to periodical literature, and occasional sermons. We have already given an analysis of the first two volumes. The subjects discussed in the third volume, are Regeneration—Holiness—Repentance—Faith—Prayer—Justification—The Perseverances of the Saints—The Resurrection—The Endless Punishment of the Wicked—Baptism—The Lord's Supper—The Sabbath—Church Government—and Personal Religion necessary to Ministers. These several subjects are all of them discussed in a very lucid and able manner, and some of them with great thoroughness and power of argument.—Vol. IV. contains his celebrated Letters to Unitarians, in reply to Dr. Ware—his Letters to Dr. Taylor, of New Haven, being strictures on his peculiar theological views—and his masterly examination of the doctrine of Christian Perfection, in reply to Mr. Mahan, first published in the *Biblical Repository* in 1841. Vol. V. contains Letters to Young Ministers—Essays on the Philosophy of the Mind—Remarks on Cause of Effect in connection with Fatalism and Free Agency, and his reply to "Inquirer," first published in *Bib. Repository*—and 26 Sermons preached on occasions of special interest and importance, *e. g.* the sermon preached at the ordination of the first missionaries sent out by the American Church, Messrs. Newell, Judson, Nott, Hall, and Rice.

As we expect a thorough review of this work in our next number, from the able pen of Dr. Edward Beecher, it is unnecessary to add much to what we have already said of its excellences, (see *Bib. Rep.* for January and July, 1850.) The work, as a whole, will undoubtedly take high rank, and win its way to extensive favor. The style of it is eminently simple and clear; and the spirit of it candid, courteous, and Christian-like throughout. Every page bears the marks of a vigorous and discriminating mind, of patient research, and of a thorough and independent investigation. The Author is no friend to rash speculation; nor is he disposed to take anything on human authority. He is wise in keeping within the limits of revealed truth, in the matter of doctrine; wise in giving such liberty to the reasoning powers within those limits; and wiser than all in the profound reverence he everywhere shows for the teachings of the Scriptures. In the statement of doctrine, in the definition of terms, and in the manner of meeting and replying to

objections, Dr. Woods, we think, is eminently felicitous : we know not his equal in these respects.

We are gratified to learn that the sale of the work far exceeds expectation. We are confident that, notwithstanding the rage for speculation, in certain quarters, and the unhappy influence of German rationalistic views upon a certain class of minds amongst us, there is a growing regard in the great mass of evangelical minds in this country, not only for the good old doctrines of New England theology, of the Edwardean stamp, but also for the plain, common sense, old-fashioned, scriptural way of stating and defending them. And in this we rejoice. We by no means wish to see the German experiment of philosophizing and rationalizing in matters of religious belief, tried in this country. There is a constant tendency that way, beyond a doubt. Such systems of theology, and such modes of reasoning, as Dr. Wood's, will do much to counteract it, and help to retain in the American church the simplicity and purity of the Gospel.

3. DR. JOHNSON : HIS RELIGIOUS LIFE AND HIS DEATH. New York : Harper & Brothers, 1850.

ONE, in these days, can judge but little of the character or nature of a book, from its title. All sorts of devices are resorted to in order to catch the public eye and secure purchasers : all sorts of crude thinking and worthless trash are put forth under captivating or imposing names. A lucky title and a fine style will do more for a book than its intrinsic merits. We have an instance of this in the book before us. Thousands will buy it for its title : DR. JOHNSON : HIS RELIGIOUS LIFE AND HIS DEATH ! Who can resist the attractions of such a *name* and *subject* ? But ninety-nine out of a hundred who buy it will be disappointed. The book had as appropriately borne almost any other title. Dr. Johnson is the *text* to be sure, and something is occasionally said about his religious belief and experience : but the main body of the sermon is about something else, and all sorts of applications, to all sorts of subjects, are made before the preacher concludes. A more appropriate title for the book would be—*The Church and her Virtues vs. Dissenters and their Persecutions*. What moved the Author to this work, for which he has not a single qualification, we are at a loss to divine. We grant that "no apology can be due to the public for another book on Dr. Johnson ;" but to inflict *such* a book upon the public is almost enough to blast the good Dr.'s reputation, and make the grave "Old Samuel Johnson" figure in a burlesque.

The book throughout wears the aspect of undisguised and bitter hostility towards the English Dissenters ; its spirit and style are those of a conceited, arrogant, self-complacent high churchman. To work on the prejudices of the reader, the author repeats all the stale slanders that he is master of, and indulges in the most sweeping and condemnatory remarks. For Papists, he has great charity ; and, in his judgment a "Deist may be a very good man ;" but towards all Dissenters he shows a pious horror. The drift of much that he says is to fasten upon them the stigma of intolerance and persecution. "While we mourn over the excesses of a Chreighton, or a Claverhouse, we cannot but acknowledge their temper and spirit of persecution to be verily

incarnated in the Presbyterian body." "They (the Presbyterian ministers of Scotland) make intolerance an article of their religious creed and action; they sanctify their tongues and right arms with it; they will not admit the exercise of toleration."—p. 240. "What are we to think of those who fled from Episcopal authority to New England, there to exercise the most dreadful kinds of persecution?" There are many such amiable specimens of the Author's spirit and fair dealing.

What are we to think of the candor and intelligence of the man who can coolly perpetrate so foul a slander on the memory of John Calvin, and on the character of his Dissenting brethren?" "John Calvin caused *Servetus* to be roasted; and was the principal means of bringing Gentilis to the block." "Few men are *intellectual* and *conscientious* in their dissent." He is at great pains also to show that Dr. Johnson held all Dissenters in abhorrence. He represents him as saying, and ever acting up to it: "I will not give a sanction, by my presence, to a Presbyterian assembly." "Never," says the author, with characteristic candor and truthfulness,—“never was the Church of England so esteemed as at the present time.” His bump of self-complacency must be large. Pity he did not select a text worthy of his theme, and not vent his spleen and savage ferocity against poor Dissenters over so venerated a name. It is a shame to consecrate such gross assaults upon the piety and intelligence and history of a large part of the Christian world, by the ashes of the dead. This part of the book, (and it forms the major part of it,) is not only worthless; it is intolerable.

Dr. Johnson's religious character was, in many respects, highly interesting and striking. His mother was the means of impressing religious truth deeply upon his mind in early life. While at Oxford, the reading of Law's *Serious Call to a Holy Life*, revived those first impressions and made them permanent. He was eminently conscientious and devout in his whole religious character. He lived a life of prayer. He was unbending in his integrity. He would not suffer profane swearing in his presence, nor allow the utterance of immoral sentiments to go unrebuked. He was somewhat superstitious and bigoted, but this arose in part from the depth and strength of his religious sentiments and feelings. He had all his life an intense fear of death; but that fear was wholly connected with the state after death, whose awful realities seemed ever vividly present to his mind. His religious character sympathized with his intellectual; it was rugged, massive and somewhat austere and gloomy; but then it was honest, sincere, reverent, the outgrowth of strong convictions and deep pious feeling. He met death at last with great calmness, humbly hoping for mercy through Jesus Christ. Notwithstanding some occasional expressions to the contrary, we are inclined to the opinion, that Dr. Johnson took a true view of the Gospel, and bowed his great mind in true penitence before God, and received Christ as his salvation in the spirit of a little child.

4. THE BIBLE AND CIVIL GOVERNMENT, in a course of Lectures, by J. M. Mathews, D. D. New York: Carter & Brothers, 1850.

We regard these lectures by Dr. Mathews as a most valuable contribution to the means of Biblical learning. They are five in number, and embrace the following topics: 1. Introductory Lecture, showing how

fitly it corresponds with the goodness of God, that He should give to the world a distinct revelation on the subject of Civil Government ; 2. Civil Government as ordained in the Commonwealth of the Hebrews ; 3. Influence of Emigration on National Character ; 4. General and Sound Education indispensable to Civil Freedom ; 5. Agriculture as an Auxiliary to Civil Freedom. The general subject of the whole discussion, as announced by the Author himself in his first lecture, is The Connection between the Holy Scriptures and the Science of Civil Government ; a subject full of interest to all classes of readers, but far less generally understood than it deserves to be. Dr. Mathews writes upon it with thorough scholarship and learning. His principles are solid and just, and his inferences philosophically drawn. In these days of sciolism and semi-infidelity, when we are flooded with a spring-tide of transcendental essays and *soi-disant* scientific lectures, and when a suicidal hand is attacking the Old Testament as the stronghold of war, slavery, and despotism, it is refreshing to hear a bold and manly voice, and to see a strong and vigorous arm raised in defence of that Venerable Record as the fountain, not only of all that is true and precious in religion, but of all that is wise, just, noble, dignified, compassionate, liberal, free, and comprehensive in government. Dr. Mathews has produced a book, which ought to be in the library of every divine, every statesman, every lawyer, every scholar, every friend of free and popular government, and, we will add, of every Sabbath-school and every Common-school in the land.

5. LIFE AND LETTERS OF THOMAS CAMPBELL. Edited by WILLIAM BEATTIE, M. D. In two volumes. Pp. 556, 521. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1850.

THESE are elegant volumes, both in a mechanical and a literary sense. It is refreshing to the soul to meet with such charming writing amid the wilderness of trash that one encounters in the world of modern literature. They leave a deep and very pleasing impression on the mind, of the gifts and general character of the renowned author of "Pleasures of Hope," and "Gertrude of Wyoming."

Of Campbell as a poet, it becomes not us to speak ; nor need we ; for he is favorably known the world over, and will be admired and honored as a poet, while true poetry retains a place in the affections of mankind. These volumes present him mainly in other relations and aspects ; they beautifully portray his life, his real every-day character ; and sketch his manifold experiences, the habits of his mind, his private friendships and opinions, joys and sorrows, and finally his death. They set him forth in the relations of a son and brother, a husband and father, a bosom friend and companion, a citizen of the world, and an actor in its stirring scenes. We see him struggling with poverty in early life, and indeed through all his days ; making his way from obscurity, and against many trials, by the power of his genius, to fame and greatness ; battling manfully with adversity, and private griefs, and embarrassments ; sharing his scanty income with his aged mother and invalid sisters as long as they lived ; delighting ever in the charms of domestic life amid the rural beauties of his favorite Sydenham ; retaining the warmth of his affections, and the strength and freshness of his early

attachments to the last hour of a long life; enduring the rude blasts of many a fierce storm, burying friend after friend of his cherished love, and finally, retiring from the world, with only the society of a favorite niece, meeting death among "strangers in a strange land," seeking consolation in, and cheered by the hopes of that glorious Gospel which he had been early taught to revere, but which he had evidently neglected, if not disbelieved, during many years of his life. It is an affecting, a deeply interesting and profitable sketch of a gifted and admirable man.

The staple of these volumes is Campbell's own *Correspondence*, tastefully and with admirable judgment arranged and woven into the narrative of his life. It is Campbell, therefore, telling his own story throughout, and in his own way, which is remarkably free, pleasing, graphic, and captivating. This mass of correspondence, judged of in a literary and social point of view, surpasses in interest and excellence anything of the kind we remember to have read elsewhere. Warm with the life of pure, ardent, confiding friendship; sparkling with the gems of a rare fancy and genius; rich with classic learning, and abounding with personal, historical and descriptive sketches of a high order of merit; redolent with genuine wit and soul and eloquence, both of thought and expression; and unfolding the delicate and somewhat intricate web of his own life and destiny,—it carries the reader along to the last page of it with a keen and growing relish. Dr. Beattie has certainly performed this delicate task for his lamented friend, with rare taste and judgment; not seeking to conceal his faults, nor to exaggerate his virtues and gifts.

Did space permit, we should be delighted to give some of the many passages we had marked for citation. There is a good deal of philosophy and solemn thinking in these volumes, as well as poetry and lighter matter. Take a specimen, where Campbell gives his judgment of the value of posthumous fame.

"When I think of the existence which shall commence, when the stone is laid above my head—when I think of the momentous realities of that time, and of the awfulness of the account I shall have to give of myself—how can literary fame appear to me but as—nothing! Who will think of it then? If, at death, we enter on a new state of eternity, of what interest beyond this present life can a man's literary fame be to him? Of none—when he thinks most solemnly about it."

The closing scene, as his biographer has presented it, is deeply affecting. Had he believed in and sought consolation from the Gospel during his life, as he did in death, he had been a much happier man, and his influence on the world had been of a much higher and more salutary character. We give a single extract from Dr. Beattie's particular description of the death-scene:

"By his desire," says Dr. B., "I again read the prayers for the sick, followed by various texts of Scripture, to which he listened with deep attention; suppressing as much as he could the sound of his own breathing, which had become almost laborious. At the conclusion, he said: 'It is very soothing.' At another time, I read to him passages from the Epistles and Gospels; directing his attention, as well as I could, to the comforting assurance they contained of the life and immortality brought to light by the Saviour. When this was

done, I asked him, 'Do you believe all this?' 'Oh, yes!' he replied, with emphasis—'I do.' His manner all this time was deeply solemn and affecting. When I began to read the prayers, he raised his hand to his head—took off his night-cap—then clasping his hands across his chest, he seemed to realize all the feeling of his own triumphant lines:

'This spirit shall return to Him
Who gave its heavenly spark;
Yet think not, Sun, it shall be dim
When thou thyself art dark!—
No! it shall live again, and shine
In bliss unknown to beams of thine,
By Him recall'd to breath,
Who captive led captivity,
Who robb'd the Grave of Victory,
And took the sting from Death.'

"Later in the day he spoke with less difficulty—he said something to every one near him. To his niece, who was leaning over him in great anxiety, and anticipating every little want, he said, 'Come, let us sing praises to Christ!'—then pointing to the bedside, he added—'Sit here.'—'Shall I pray for you?' she said.—'Oh, yes,' he replied; 'let us pray for one another.' * * * At two o'clock he opened his eyes, and then, as if the light of this world were too oppressive, closed them. He is now dying. The twilight dews of life are lying heavy on his temples."

6. **ELEMENTARY SKETCHES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.** By the late Rev. Sidney Smith, M. A. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1850.

These sketches are the substance of Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution in the years 1804–5–6. A part of them are mere fragments; the rest are perfect, though they treat mainly of the elemental principles of the science. The subject is treated in a *popular* form, being prepared "for a mixed audience of ladies and gentlemen," and hence is divested of that dryness and abstruseness which characterize the most of the treatises upon the science of mind.

Mr. Smith treats of Moral Philosophy not in the restricted ethical sense in which we are accustomed to define it, but in the broad sense in which it is taught in the Scotch Universities, as comprehending all the intellectual, active, and moral faculties of man, embracing, therefore, both mental and moral science. The subjects treated of in these sketches with greater or less fullness, are—The History of Moral Philosophy—Conception—Memory—Imagination—Reason and Judgment—Wit and Humor—Taste—The Beautiful—The Sublime—The Faculties of Animals as compared with those of Men—The Conduct of the Understanding—The Active Powers of the Mind—The Evil Affections—The Benevolent Affections—The Passions—The Desires—Surprise, Novelty, and Variety—Habit. The style of the book is beautiful; its illustrations are happy and often very striking; it is full of genuine wit, fancy and eloquence. It is introduced by an admirable letter from Lord Jeffrey to Mrs. Smith, written a few days before his death, in which he nobly retracts a hasty judgment which he expressed against these lectures years ago, and urges their publication. This Prince of Critics says among other things, in this letter: "The book seems to me to be full of good sense, acuteness, and right feeling—very clearly and pleasingly written—and with such an admirable mixture of logical intrepidity, with the absence of all dogmatism, as is rarely met with in the conduct of such discussions. Some of the conclusions may be questionable; but I do think them generally just, and never propounded with anything like arrogance, or in any tone of assumption, and the whole subject is treated with quite as much, either of subtlety or profundity, as was compatible with a *popular* exposition of it."

7. PHILOSOPHY OF THE PLAN OF SALVATION. By an American Citizen.

With an Introduction, by Calvin E. Stowe, D.D. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Co. Cincinnati: G. L. Weed.

Few theological works of modern times have excited more attention, or been more extensively read than this. As a short, original, understandable, and vigorous treatise on the subject, written by one who was not hampered by a false philosophy, and who had no favorite theological scheme or school of his own to sustain, it has scarcely its equal. It is written with great power. Its philosophy is that of the Bible. Its teaching is in the main, we think, correct, and highly important. We are glad to know that it is so extensively appreciated. The present is the *eighth* edition: it was first published in 1841. We have before fully expressed our views of it. No intelligent man can neglect to read it, without injustice to himself.

8. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LEIGH HUNT: with Reminiscences of Friends and Contemporaries. In two volumes. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1850.

CONSIDERABLE interest has been awakened in regard to this work, in advance of its publication, not only on account of the known characteristics of Hunt's mind and genius, but also because of his relations to many of the distinguished literary men of the past generation. Our own impression is, that it falls considerably short of meeting the expectation which had been raised in certain quarters in reference to it. It has an interest, certainly, but not of the highest kind. It is immeasurably inferior, in many respects, to the volumes on Campbell. Leigh Hunt is certainly a man of genius, and of great versatility of power and gifts, and possesses many charming traits of style, thinking, and character. But his weaknesses, according to his own showing, are many and excessive; he has no elevation of moral sentiment, or sympathy with moral and religious truth. His vanity is nauseating; his personal antipathies are inveterate; his blunders have been serious and numerous. He tells the story of his life without any reserve, and with great apparent candor and fidelity; and discusses the merits and faults of his "friends and contemporaries" with great freedom. His life has been anything but a happy, serene, and prosperous one; and the insight he gives us into the lives of many distinguished literary men of his times, presents a sad and humiliating illustration of human nature.

The religious views of Mr. Hunt, he has taken no pains to conceal, and they are of the loosest and most erroneous cast. Of the Scriptures he appears to be perfectly ignorant. And we should infer from his crude sayings, that he had never spent an hour in his life in the sober exercise of his reasoning and reflective powers on the subject of Christianity; and yet, as Carlyle would say, he has a gospel to preach; a Jesus to reveal to mankind; an ideal faith to avow, to which the world must be converted or be damned. And he sums up, on this point, after the fashion of Carlyle, and our own Parker and Emerson, in the following language:

"It seems clear to me, from all which is occurring in Europe at this moment, from the signs in the papal church, in our own church, in the universal talk and minds of men, whether for it or against it, that the knell of the letter of Christianity has struck, and that it is time for us to inaugurate and enthrone the spirit. * * * Such, and such only, are the texts (texts that speak only of *love*) upon which sermons will be preached, to the exclusion of whatsoever is infernal (which he calls the doctrine of future punishment,) and unintelligible. No hell. No unfatherliness. No monstrous exactions of assent to the incredible. No impious Athanasian creed. No creed of any kind, but such as proves its divineness by the wish of all good hearts to believe it if they might, and by the encouragement that would be given them to believe it, in the acclamations of the earth. The world has out-grown the terrors of its childhood; and no spurious mistake of a saturnine spleen for a masculine ne-

cessity will induce a return to them. Mankind have become too intelligent; too brave; too impatient of being cheated, and threatened, and put off; too hungry and thirsty for a better state of things in the beautiful planet in which they live, and the beauty of which has been an unceasing exhortation and preface to the result. By that divine doctrine will all men gradually come to know in how many quarters the Divine Spirit has appeared among them, and what sufficing lessons for their guidance they have possessed in almost every creed, when the true portions of it shall hail one another from nation to nation, and the mixture of error through which it worked has become unnecessary. For God is not honored by supposing him a niggard of his bounty. Jesus himself was not divine because he was Jesus, but because he had a divine and loving heart; and wherever such greatness has appeared, there has divineness appeared also, as surely as the same sunshine of heaven is on the mountain-tops of east and west."

For the benefit of Americans we give a specimen of a different character, which is not only characteristic of the Author's extreme vanity, but expressive also of his amiable feelings towards us, and his appreciation of our national character:

"How many poems of mine, or editions of poems, or prose writings, have appeared in America, I cannot say; but I believe the booksellers there have republished everything which I have written; and I confess I cannot but be sensible of the shabby honor thus done me, and heartily glad of every genial hand into which my productions may be carried in consequence; but I should like to know what an American publisher would say if some English traveler were to help himself to the fruits of his labor out of the till, and make off with it on board ship. Being a cousin-germane of the Americans, I am very popular in their country, and receive from them every compliment imaginable, except a farthing's payment. How came my mother to be born in such a country? * * * I hold in due favor their Bryants, their Emersons, their Lowells, and their ambassadors. But I wish I could get rid of the impression which I have before mentioned, to wit: that one great shop-counter extends all down their coast from Massachusetts to Mexico. Why do they not get a royal court or two among them, and thus learn that there is something else in the world besides huffing and money-getting? To be slaveholding in the south, payment-shirking in the north, and arrogant everywhere, is not to 'go ahead' of the nations, but to fall back into the times of colonial Dutchmen."

9. *FIVE YEARS OF A HUNTER'S LIFE IN THE FAR INTERIOR OF SOUTH AFRICA.* By R. GORDING CUMMING, Esq. With illustrations. Two volumes. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

THESE volumes have no lack as to the exciting and the marvelous. They are the adventures of a "fierce and blood-thirsty Nimrod," in hunting the lion, elephant, rhinoceros, giraffe, hippopotamus, and the like, in the wilds of South Africa. The man must have a strange taste who could exchange the Highlands of Scotland, and the charms of civilized society, for the perils and hardships of an African forest, and the society of the wild men and wilder beasts of prey that prowl in their native haunts, and who could seem to find the highest of earthly happiness in the indulgence of the most daring and destructive propensities. The adventures are exciting, novel, and wild to the highest degree. The volumes have a value, too, as giving much information relating to the natural history of the southern portion of that little known continent.

10. *DARIUS THE GREAT.* By JACOB ABBOTT. With illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

ANOTHER volume of Abbott's historical series, pleasingly written, beautifully illustrated, and in a style of real elegance, corresponding with the previous numbers. We have often commended these Histories, and do again, as eminently adapted to instruct the younger class of minds in this important branch of learning. The style is pleasing; the subjects are well chosen; and a great deal of historical information is condensed into a small compass.

11. **THEOPNEUSTY, OR THE PLENARY INSPIRATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.** By S. R. L. GAUSSEN. Translated by Edward Norris Kirk. Fourth American, from the second French edition. New York: John S. Taylor. 1850.

THE theory of inspiration advocated in this work by Prof. Gausсен, is already so well known that it is unnecessary to speak particularly of its peculiarities and excellences. It takes high ground on the whole subject of inspiration, and maintains it with an array and force of argument which we have not yet seen destroyed. There are orthodox ministers and writers, not a few, who think its views are *extreme*; but it is better infinitely to err on the rigid side, than to adopt the latitudinarian views which are so prevalent in the old world, and which we fear are making headway in our own country. But, for ourselves, we do not think its views are extreme; we believe they are true and scriptural, and the only consistent and safe views which can be held on this important subject.

We are glad to see a new edition of this valuable work. It has been carefully revised and enlarged by the author. It treats of a fundamental subject. It discusses it with great ability and force. The subject and discussion are eminently timely, and worthy the profound attention of all who reverence and receive the Scriptures as the inspired testimony of God. Great laxity of views on the subject prevails with many; we are in no little danger from this source. We cannot be too watchful and vigilant here. And we know, on the whole, of no work so well adapted to meet and expose the prevalent false philosophy and rationalistic views on the subject, as the book before us.

12. **THE LIFE OF LUTHER**; with special reference to its Earlier Periods and the Opening Scenes of the Reformation. By BARNAS SEARS, D. D. 12mo. Pp. 528. American Sunday-School Union.

LUTHER has fallen into much better hands than Calvin in the preparation of a new biography. Dr. Sears was the man to give a standard work in English, on the great Reformer of Germany. He possessed himself of all the materials needed to furnish a full and faithful life of him, and he has used them with discrimination, skill, and judgment. Those the most competent to judge, pronounce this by far the best life of Luther accessible to the English student. It is written in a popular and pleasing style, and the Society have put it into a beautiful and substantial form.

13. **A BIBLE TRINITY.** By THEOPHILUS. 12mo. Pp. 332. Hartford: Edwin Hunt. 1850.

WE are sorry that the venerable Author should have wasted so much time and money on so crude and worthless a book. It is altogether beyond our criticism. The Author has sought to present the doctrine of the Trinity as he thinks he finds it in the Bible, regardless of all theories and creeds. And he may have given "a Bible Trinity" view of the great subject, but he has failed totally to give the "Bible Trinity" doctrine as held by orthodox men. The volume is inscribed to "all who love divine truth more than the dogmas of the schools; who receive the Holy Scriptures as a sufficient rule of faith and practice, and bow to the authority of no other creed; and who, thinking for themselves, allow all others to enjoy that sacred birthright, unmolested by bigotry, superstition, antiquated error, or arrogant power." Hence, the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds are "superannuated fictions," "monstrosities;" and such orthodox views of the Trinity as were given in the Bib. Repository, by Dr. Edward Beecher, Oct. 1849, are denominated "speculations the most daring, presumptuous, audacious, and benighted." The views of the author, we think, will find little favor in any quarter; they are not likely to originate another "Bushnell controversy," or school of theologians. We felicitate the author in the matter of the only wise thing we see in the book—its fictitious fraternity.

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